

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/1/22

Title: 1st Infantry Brigade

May 1917



AWM4-23/1/22

May 1917

WAR DIARY

1st Australian Inf Bde

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Near FAVREUIL	May 1		<p>Ref map 57c</p> <p>1st + 2nd Battalions hold the Bengny 4 hrs line - 1st Bn from 18c 64 to H 12 b 45, 2nd Bn from latter point to H 4 b 02</p> <p>The remaining battalions are in the Vaulx-Morches line, 3rd under the tactical control of 5th A.I. Bde from C 28 C 93 to C 21 C 29 + 4th under the GOC 6th Brigade from ^{here to} C 13 d 19</p> <p>1st provides escort to heavy batteries at C 26 b</p> <p>2nd " " " " " " at C 19 a</p> <p>3rd " " " " Q Group 7. a at C 16 d + C 17 c</p> <p>4th " " " " P " 7 a at C 3 c</p> <p>Weather fine + warm</p>	
	2		<p>Situation the same except at 2000, 3rd Bn concentrates at Vaulx to be available with 7th A.I. Bde as Divisional Reserve</p> <p>The 4th Battalion takes over the whole of the Vaulx-Morches line to 18c 64 Both battalions come under control of GOC 7th A.I. Bde</p> <p>1st + 2nd Bns supply each working parties of 11 Officers 600 men for work in C 10 digging a communication trench in connection with projected attack on the Stendenburg line by 2nd Aust Division on the morning of 3rd inst.</p> <p>Officers of the Brigade reconnoitred ground to our front</p> <p>Weather fine + warm Good visibility. Little activity</p>	5/17/17 J.H. [Signature]

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or of
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

1st Aust. Inf. Bde

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
			Ref. Maps 57.C.	
	3	0745	Orders received from 7th Bde for 3rd batt ⁿ to move forward & be in readiness to reinforce them. Whole of batt ⁿ immediately moved into position along NOREUIL-LONGATTE road in C.9.D.	
		0900	2nd Batt ⁿ moves from BEUGNY-VITRES line, comes under orders of 7th Bde & moves to C.19.B.	
		0910	3rd Batt ⁿ under orders through this brigade from 2nd Aust. Div. moved forward to old front line in RAILWAY embankment at C.4.B.	
		0940	1st Batt ⁿ under orders through this brigade from 2nd Aust. Div. moved to pos ⁿ in C.19.B. previously held by 2nd Batt ⁿ . in C.19.B. & came under orders of 7th Bde. Occupied this pos ⁿ at 1030.	
			In order to be in readiness & closer support to 7th Bde, under orders from latter, slight changes were made during the day in the above positions and at 1600 dispositions were as follows:-	
		1600	Bde. H. Q. (Lt. Col. J. G. Mackay D. SO. temp. commanding) 1st Batt ⁿ (Maj. P. L. Woodford temp. commanding)	H. 12. C. 75 C. 20. C.

Draws attached as appendix 5/17/17
Distributions as 5/17/17
4th May

May 1917

WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Ref. Maps 57.C. 51 B $\frac{1}{40000}$ Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	3	1600	<p>2nd Battr. [3 Coys in SUNKEN ROAD in C. 9. D. 1 Coy " " " " C. 16. B.</p> <p>3rd Battr. [3 Coys in SUNKEN ROAD in C. 10. A 3 Platoons RAILWAY embankment C. 5. D 1 Platoon in road in C. 5. B</p> <p>4th Battr. (May. Saxon) (up comd) In inside & outside lines N & N.E of VAULX.</p> <p>1st M.G. Coy In BEUGNY-YTRES & VAULX-MORCHIES lines</p> <p>1st ALTMB from BEAULENCOURT to road in H. 12. D " " H. 12. D to C. 19. D.</p>	
		2030	and 1st, 2nd & 3rd Battr. moved into line.	
		2200	<p>Bde. HQ (C.O., B.M., I.O., B.O., and S.O.) moved to Bde fighting H.Q. at C. 5. A. 42. near H. Q. remaining at above position. (H. 12 C. 7. 5)</p> <p>4th Battr. relieved in VAULX lines by 13th L.H. & Cyclists, under orders of G.O.C. 5th Bde moved to railway embankment at C. 5. A. 5.0 relieving two battns of 5th Bde.</p> <p>[On following night a/Staff Capt. (Capt. N. M. Butcher) moved to 6th Bde H.Q. at C. 9. D. 9. 5. - supervising dumps & dispatch of SAA, bombs & supplies forward.</p>	<p>2nd Div. G/275</p> <p>W</p>

May 1917

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices																					
LINE (BULLECOURT)	4 th to 9 th (inclusive)		<p>Ref. Maps 57.C. & 51 B 1:40000</p> <p>For operations of Brigade during this period under 2nd Aust. Div.</p> <p>From inst. allotment of leave to brigade was tripled.</p> <p>On this date, units of brigade moved to & occupied following positions:-</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Bde H Q</td> <td>to</td> <td>Camp at SUCRERIE N. 24. ^{Central} 24.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1st Batty</td> <td>to</td> <td>N. 24. □ 45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2nd "</td> <td>to</td> <td>N. 11. Central</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3rd "</td> <td>to</td> <td>N. 11. Central</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4th "</td> <td>to</td> <td>BANCOURT H. 36 Central</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M.G. Coy</td> <td>to</td> <td>RIENCOURT N. 6.C.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>L.T.M. Batty</td> <td>to</td> <td>BEAULENCOURT N. 17. □</td> </tr> </table> <p>2100</p> <p>Divisional Order No. S/5528 received - that 1st Aust Div would relieve 11th Imperial Division between 12th & 15th instant, & that 1st A I Bde would take over right sector of this divisional front.</p> <p>10th</p> <p>All units resting. Troops all being bathed & refitted with complete change of under-clothing.</p> <p>1430.</p> <p>Army Corps commander makes informal inspection of units in their camps.</p>	Bde H Q	to	Camp at SUCRERIE N. 24. ^{Central} 24.5	1 st Batty	to	N. 24. □ 45	2 nd "	to	N. 11. Central	3 rd "	to	N. 11. Central	4 th "	to	BANCOURT H. 36 Central	M.G. Coy	to	RIENCOURT N. 6.C.	L.T.M. Batty	to	BEAULENCOURT N. 17. □	
Bde H Q	to	Camp at SUCRERIE N. 24. ^{Central} 24.5																							
1 st Batty	to	N. 24. □ 45																							
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3 rd "	to	N. 11. Central																							
4 th "	to	BANCOURT H. 36 Central																							
M.G. Coy	to	RIENCOURT N. 6.C.																							
L.T.M. Batty	to	BEAULENCOURT N. 17. □																							

Atty

May 1917

WAR DIARY

or of 1st Aust. Inf. Bde

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices															
			Ref. Map 57.C. 1/40000																
	11 th		All units resting.																
		1030	G/457 received from Division stating that relief laid down in S/5528 of D.H.Q. will not take place.																
		1130	G/460 from D.H.Q. that 1 st Bde will move to BAZENTIN on 13 th inst.																
		2000	First batch of 2 officers and 100 O.R.'s leave brigade for days at 5 th Army Summer Rest Camp at VALERY-SUR-SOMME.																
	12 th		No change from previous day																
	13 th	0430	Brigade proceeded by march route to BAZENTIN. To save marching during the heat of the day an early start was made & all units were in position by 0830. as follows:-	Brigade Order No 30															
			<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Bde. H.Q., M.G. Coy., LTMBty.</td> <td>in huts at</td> <td>S. 14. B Central</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1st Batta</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>S. 8. D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2nd Batta</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>S. 8. D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3rd Batta</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>S. 8. B</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4th Batta</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>S. 8. B.</td> </tr> </table>	Bde. H.Q., M.G. Coy., LTMBty.	in huts at	S. 14. B Central	1 st Batta	" " "	S. 8. D	2 nd Batta	" " "	S. 8. D	3 rd Batta	" " "	S. 8. B	4 th Batta	" " "	S. 8. B.	Appendix 57/17/3
Bde. H.Q., M.G. Coy., LTMBty.	in huts at	S. 14. B Central																	
1 st Batta	" " "	S. 8. D																	
2 nd Batta	" " "	S. 8. D																	
3 rd Batta	" " "	S. 8. B																	
4 th Batta	" " "	S. 8. B.																	
			Troops rested for remainder of day.	J. H. M.															

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAZENTIN	14 th		<p>Ref. Map 57.C + ALBERT $\frac{1}{40000}$</p> <p>Reports on recent operations forwarded.</p> <p>Units doing a little settling up drill. Parties from each battalion constructing two rifle ranges up to 200 yds at S. 14. B + two miniature ranges at S. 14. A + S 8 D respectively.</p> <p>M.G. Coy also constructing range in S. 14. B.</p>	
	15 th		<p>Training commenced as per attached syllabus in addition musketry practice on the four ranges.</p> <p>200 reinforcements arrive for Brigade.</p>	<p>Appendix 5/17/4</p>
	16 th		<p>Training continued.</p> <p>Men being bathed at FRICOURT baths.</p> <p>Bygone Headquarters unscathed</p>	
	17 th		<p>During night 16/17 it rained heavily + still raining morning of 17th.</p> <p>Outdoor training replaced by lectures in huts. GOC sent to Div HQ to meet GOC Troops in France</p>	
	18 th		<p>Training continued - Weather improved.</p>	

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WAR DIARY
of 1st Aust. Inf. Bde

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAZENTIN	19		Ref. Map ALBERT 40,000	
			Syllabus of Training for week ending 26 th May prepared & sent to units. 1 st Division Order No. received with reference to move to BAIZIEUX Area.	App. 5/17/5
	20		Church parades held by all units. Otherwise no parades. Forward billeting parties leave for BAIZIEUX Area.	
	21		Brigade Group (1 st Field Coy A.E.; 2 nd Aust Field Ambulance; 1 st Pioneer Batty) - attached moves to BAIZIEUX Area in accordance with attached Movement Order & units of Brigade established as follows:- Bde. H.Q. } 1 st Batty } at LAVIÉVILLE 1 st M.G. Coy } 2 nd Batty } 3 rd Batty } at BUIRE 4 th Batty } 1 st A.L.T.M.B. }	App. 5/17/6
	22 nd		Above completed by 1130. G. S. Memo No 25 of 1 st Aust Div. re. Training Received.	
			Training continued - syllabus for day attached. Difficulty experienced in finding suitable ground for training on account of most of the area being under cultivation	J. May

May 1917

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAIZIEUX Area	23 rd		<p>Ref. Map ALBERT 40000</p> <p>Foden Lorry available for Brigade. Blankets & clothes being cleaned & men bathed.</p> <p>Syllabus of Training on principle of "G.S. Memo No 25" prepared for period 24th May - 1st June inclusive.</p>	
	24 th		<p>Syllabus Attached</p> <p>Special class for Junior N.C.O.s commenced under Division.</p> <p>Training in accordance with above syllabus commenced - Musketry, Close-order drill & a small amount of field training in morning and Recreational training in afternoon. Lectures at night.</p> <p>2 N.C.O.s pr. Coy being trained in construction of bombing blocks under supervision of 1st Field Coy & latter Coy receiving instruction in M.G. work from 1st M.G. Coy.</p> <p>Weather excellent & condition & appearance of troops improving greatly.</p>	App 5/17/7
	25 th		<p>Training continued.</p>	
	26 th			
	27 th		<p>Morning-Church Parade for whole of brigade at 17.00.</p> <p>Afternoon - Recreation & Rest.</p> <p>Syllabus of Training for 1st June</p>	<p>App 1/17/7</p>

May 1917

WAR DIARY
or of 15th Aust. Inf. Bde.

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BRAIZIEUX Area	28 th 29 30 31		<p>All battns. carrying out competitions to select their best all-round company to represent them in the Brigade Competition, their final selection to be made by 2nd June.</p> <p>Weather still fine & arrangements made for swimming in the River ANCRE south of BUIRE.</p> <p>Strength returns attached as appendix 5/17/8</p>	<p><i>[Signature]</i></p>

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B.M.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.Brigade Headquarters,
1st. May, 1917.SECRET.

1st. Aust. Battalion,
2nd. Aust. Battalion,
3rd. Aust. Battalion,
4th. Aust. Battalion,
1st. Aust. M.G. Coy.,
1st. Aust. L.T.M. Coy.



In connection with the forthcoming operation, dumps and Battle dumps have been established by the 2nd. Aust. Division as follows:-

A Echelon of 2nd. and 4th. B.A.C. at B.30.D.3.5. (Lieut. HELLAR in charge).

Divisional dump at H.11.D.4.7.

Right Brigade Battle dumps at C.10.C.7.7. and C.5. Central.

Left Brigade Battle dumps at C.10.D.1.9., C.5.A.0.5. and U.22.C.9.1.

[Signature]
Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

*War diary**Appendix 5/17/11*1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 11.Brigade Headquarters,
2nd. May, 1917.


1. The 2nd. Australian Division will attack on morning of May 3rd. Zero hour will be communicated later.

2. The 4th. Aust. Battalion will take over the MORCHIES - VAULX line from 3rd. Aust. Battalion which will concentrate and be available as part of the reserve in the hands of the G.O.C. 7th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

Relief to be completed by 2000 on 2nd. inst. C.O. 3rd. Aust. Battalion will report to G.O.C. 7th. Aust. Infantry Brigade for further instructions.

3. 1st. Aust. Battalion will detail two platoons to report to A.P.M. 2nd. Aust. Division at NOREUIL before 1800 on 2nd. inst., to assist in guard and escort duties. This cancels instructions previously given in 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade Order No. 28.

A C K N O W L E D G E .



Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copies to:-

1st. Aust. Battalion,
2nd. Aust. Battalion,
3rd. Aust. Battalion,
4th. Aust. Battalion,
1st. Aust. M.G. Coy.,
1st. Aust. L.T.M. Bty.,
2nd. Aust. Division,
5th. Aust. Inf. Brigade,
6th. Aust. Inf. Brigade,
7th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

ISSUED AT 1050.

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"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message _____

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions. _____			Sent _____		Service. _____	Date _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____			(Signature of "Franking Officer.") _____

TO { **DL** }

Sender's Number. * Bur 1	Day of Month 4	In reply to Number	AAA
------------------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------	------------

Push your flanks towards the West at least so far as to gain and maintain communication trench running North from U22 D60 and to establish communication with British troops not attacking BULLECVURT from the SOUTH
~~and Report of the~~
~~Commanding British~~
~~Captain of British~~
~~troops~~

From **Quail**

Place _____

Time _____

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z) *[Signature]*

Censor. _____ Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name. _____

* This line should be erased if not required.

(4198) Wt. W14042—M44. 300000 Pads. 12/15. Sir J. C. & S.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Service.	Date
			At			From	
			To			By	
			By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO ~~1st Bde~~ ~~2nd Bde~~ ~~3rd Bde~~
 1st Am B Coy
 1st Am B Coy

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* Bm 2	4 April		

1. 3rd Battalion will remain in its present position, defend it, and extend to the left of O C 2 Position from U 23 C 90 to U 22 d 53
2. 7th Battalion will remain in its present position. Headquarters and 3 companies in O S 1 from U 29 a 87 to U 28 b 59 + will extend to the left in conjunction with the 3rd Batt. One company in C 4 d
3. 4th Batt will on relief by a battalion of the 3rd Brigade relieve units of the 6th Brigade on embankment from C 5 a 52 to U 27 d 7.3
4. 2nd Battalion on relief by a unit of 3rd Brigade will be distributed on roads and cuttings in

From	C 4 a c + D
Place	5 1st Am B Coy will relieve 6th Am B Coy at once
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Service.	Date
			At			From	
			To			By	
			By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* Bm 2 (ctd)			

6. 1st a t m Battery will relieve 6th a t m Battery
 7. On completion of relief of 6th Brigade the Brigade sector from U 23 C 90 to U 22 d 53 will come under the orders of Brigadier 1st a 1 Bde
 8. Necessary reconnaissance will be made by Battalions who will also announce any details not mentioned in this order
 9. Brigade Headquarters at C 5 a 24
- Acknowledge

From	1st a 1 Bde
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

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Appendix No. 5/17/1

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.

No. of Message _____

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Service _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO

14 + 3rd Bns

* PM 6	Day of Month 4 April	In reply to Number May	AAA
--------	----------------------	------------------------	-----

The 1st Battalion in O 51, the 3rd Battalion in O 52 will by means of bombing attacks extend along these trenches to the West + form a fire trench facing W from U 23 D 30 to U 29 B 27 and in addition suitable blocks should be made in trenches and underground made to connect with 7th British Division in O 51 + O 52. A special block is required at U 28 B 19 in ~~the trench~~ communication trench and it is reported that British are in O 52 at cross roads U 27 C 95 20 and Stokes mortars Lewis guns + snipers placed

From _____	Place _____	Time _____
------------	-------------	------------

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.

No. of Message _____

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____	This message is on a/c of: _____	Recd. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Service _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO

* PM 6 (ch)	Day of Month _____	In reply to Number _____	AAA
-------------	--------------------	--------------------------	-----

on the flanks of Bombers will be exploited to the full on the flanks of bombers and Relays of fresh bombers to be organized + the attack kept going and if required artillery assistance may be arranged also sweeping fire for Vickers guns and Requirements in artillery + any additional Vickers guns + other mortars to be made known as soon as possible

From 1st at Bde	Place _____	Time 1645
-----------------	-------------	-----------

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Appendix No. 5/17/11

14

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

C.2121
 (in pads of 100).
 No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.						
Sent			Service.			Date.....
At.....m.			From.....			By.....
To.....			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")			By.....
By.....						

TO { 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Regts. New 2nd Div.

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

* BM 69
 1. The 9th British Div is to make an attack on RULLECOURT.
 2. As a preparatory measure 1st Unit of Bde is ordered to carry out a bombing attack on 6-5-17 (today) on the trench Oh 2 as far west as U 22 D 6.3 and Oh 1 as far west as U 28 B 1095. The time of attack will be notified later.
 3. During 6th the 4th Regt will relieve 1st Regt on Oh 1 and 2nd Regt will relieve 3rd Regt on Oh 2. After which 1st Regt will occupy Ry embankment + 3rd Regt will take over trenches now occupied by 2nd Regt. Work will be completed as soon as possible. Details to be arranged by HQ concerned. Completion of relief to be reported to Bde HQ.
 4. The 1st A.S. Bde comes under the orders of Bde Commander 1st A.S. Bde

From	Place	Time
------	-------	------

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C.2121
 (in pads of 100).
 No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.						
Sent			Service.			Date.....
At.....m.			From.....			By.....
To.....			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")			By.....
By.....						

TO { 2

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

* BM 69
 1. As far as U 28 B 1095, three mortars of 1st A.S. Bde and 2 Regt of 1st A.S. Coy will be at the disposal of HQ 4th Regt during the attack and for consolidating the positions gained. Strong points will be formed at U 28 B 1095.
 2. The 2nd A.S. Bde will carry out a similar attack along Oh 2 as far as U 22 D 6.3. It will have at its disposal 3 mortars from 1st A.S. Bde and the machine guns of 1st A.S. Coy in addition to those already in the line.
 3. The artillery will bombard trench Oh 1 + Oh 2 west of points now occupied by the Bde. Barrage lifts from successive sections of trench will be followed by bombing attack. The latter will be carried out by relays of bombers who will advance under support of machine guns and Lewis guns in addition to

From	Place	Time
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Appendix No. 5/1/11

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C.2121
(in pads of 100).
No. of Message.....

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date.....
			At.....m.		From.....	
			To.....		By.....	
			By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
TO		3				

* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
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attack while the advance of the bombers is continued.

8. Two guns of 6" HLMs will be at the disposal of 2nd Bn and 4th Bn also for depending present line of trenches of adequate supplies of bombs & other bombs and other materials will be arranged for by Bde Bombing Officer.

10. After relief 1st and 3rd Bn will be available for carrying duties.

11. 4 guns of 22" Army Coy will provide covering fire during the operation.

12. On taking objective in Obj 3 in order not to over crowd the left flank of 4th Bn may take over if necessary trenches far east as U 22 D 9.0 otherwise 4th Bn will hold as at present. This will be taken by 4th Bn to

From	Place	Time
	of their left flank.	

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C.2121
(in pads of 100).
No. of Message.....

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date.....
			At.....m.		From.....	
			To.....		By.....	
			By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
TO		4				

* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
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13. Strong ports will be made at U 22 D 6.3 in Obj 2 and at U 22 B 10.95 in Obj 1. There should be designed to give fire in all directions and to sweep approaches with Mgs. All enemy trenches leading from strong ports should be filled in & thickened with mine at about 70 yards from the strong port.

J. H. ...
Bde Major 1st ...

From	Place	Time
	1520	

Appendix No. 5117/1

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form G. 212L

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date	
			At	m.	Service.	From	
			To		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	
			By				

TO { 1st 2nd 3rd 4th + 9th Bns 2nd Ambr Div

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* BM 71.	6 th		

With reference to BM 69 of this date the following instructions are issued:

1. Password for British units is BYLAND that for Australian Division is THROW THROUGH.
2. Zero hour for our operation is 2200 tonight that for British units 0345 tomorrow.
3. The Gordon Highlanders are attacking on our left. 100 ammonal bombs will be fired together into BULLECOURT at British zero.
4. With reference to para. 5 of BM 69 the 9th Bn will make good the trench to U28A8.8 and gain touch with the Gordon Highlanders there. The action of the 2nd Bn is as detailed in para 6 of BM 69. They will establish a block at U22.D6.3.
5. Watcher will be synchronised at 1730 and 2000

From	by Bde signal section
Place	Red flares will be shown on flank when
Time	

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form G. 212L

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date	
			At	m.	Service.	From	
			To		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	
			By				

TO {

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
*			

called for by contact aeroplanes.

7. At 2100 COs 2nd 4th + 9th Bns will if they are prepared for our zero hour to be at 2200 send the word SYDNEY. If unprepared the word HALT will be sent. Our zero hour cannot be altered if advice is received late.
8. The CO 1st Bn will be prepared to vacate that portion of the embankment west of C4 C8.2 if relieved by a British unit.

J. H. Underhill
Bde Captain 1st Bde

From	
Place	1845
Time	

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Appendix No. 5/17/1 17

No. of Message

Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
	Sent	Service.	Date.....
	At.....m.		From.....
	To.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....

TO { 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Bns. 1st M.G. Coy. 1st A.L.M.B.Ty.
 2nd Aust Div. 8th Bde 6th A.S. Bde. 3rd A.S. Bde.
 5th British Bde.

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number.

* BM 81. 7th April. — AAA

- 1 The 1st A.S. Bde will be relieved by 2nd A.S. Bde during the night of 7th April and relief completed before 0400 on 8th.
- 2 On relief units will move to the following locations:
 - 1st Bn to left sector MORCHIES-VAULX line with H.Q. at C19D0.S.
 - 3rd Bn to right sector MORCHIES-VAULX line with H.Q. at C26C8.S.
 - 2nd Bn and 1st M.G. Coy (less 2 sections) to NOREUIL LONGATTE Road relieving 21st and 22nd Bns.
 - 4th Bn to sunken road. C10C+D and to pass to command of G.O.C. 3rd Bde on completion of relief.
 - 2 sections 1st M.G. Coy to MORCHIES-VAULX line.
- 3 1st + 3rd Bns will provide the artillery escorts now being found by units of 6th A.S. Bde.
- 4 French mortars will be handed over in situation an equal number being transferred.

From In day light parties forward of MORCHIES-VAULX

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

No. of Message

Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
	Sent	Service.	Date.....
	At.....m.		From.....
	To.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....

TO {

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number.

* BM 81. 7th April. — AAA

- 1 line will consist of not more than 4 men.
- 2 Before and during relief the utmost vigilance will be taken to guard against counter attacks when all ranks are to understand clearly that the responsibility of holding present important line rests with 1st Bde until relief has actually taken place.
- 3 Bde H.Q. to C9D9.2 (H.Q. 6th A.S. Bde) on completion of relief.

Acknowledge.

- * 4th Bn and 1st A.L.M. Bty to NOREUIL-LONGATTE road relieving 23rd + 24th Bns.

From 1st A.S. Bde

Place 1230

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Handwritten signature
Bde Major

Appendix No. 517/1 18

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 29.

Brigade Headquarters,
9th. May, 1917.

REFERENCE MAP, 570 1:40,000.

1. The 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade will proceed by march route in accordance with attached move table.

2. East of the BEUGNATRE-FREMICOURT Line Units will move in artillery formation. In the area further West if marching on roads 100 yards between companies and 200 yards between Battalions will be maintained.

3. 3rd. and 1st. Aust. Battalions will be relieved by Units of the 8th. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Commanding Officers 3rd. and 1st. Aust. Battalions will detail 1 Officer and 4 guides each for the relieving Battalions and will hand over sketches shewing the exact location of each post and the wire in the defensive line concerned.

The skeleton garrison will be responsible for the defence and sanitation of each post and will stand to each morning as if in the line.

4. The following artillery escorts now found by the 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade will be relieved by the 8th. Australian Infantry Brigade during night 9/10th. May.

(a) Escort of two platoons for "Q" Group Div. Artillery at NOREUIL.

(b) Escort of one platoon for "P" Group Div. Artillery at LONGATTE.

(c) Escort of two platoons for Heavy Artillery in VAULX, one platoon at C.26.B., and one platoon at C.19.A.

On being relieved escorts will rejoin their Units.

O's. C. Units will arrange for guides from escorts to report at 3rd. Battalion Headquarters VAULX to guide reliefs.

5. (i) Nos. 1 of all Vickers and Lewis Guns will remain with the relieving teams for 24 hours after relief, and will then rejoin their Units.

(ii) One Officer or N.C.O. per Infantry Company will also remain with the O.C. relieving Company for 24 hours after relief, and will then rejoin their Units.

6. Brigade Headquarters will move with 4th. Australian Battalion and open at N.24.B.1.4.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

H. Hardie
Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Extra copies to:-

- No. 13. 2nd. Aust. Division,
- 14. 8th. Aust. Infantry Brigade,
- 15. No. 2 Coy., A.A.S.C.
- 16. 15th. Aust. Infantry Brigade.

ISSUED AT 1100.

MOVE TABLE TO ACCOMPANY 1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 29 DATED 9/5/17.

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<u>Unit.</u>	<u>From.</u>	<u>To.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
1st. Aust. Battalion.	MORCHIES-VAULX Line.	N.24.Central.	At once leaving skeleton garrison, moving West of VAULX and BANCOURT thence via BAPAUME-LE TRANSLOY Road.
2nd. Aust. Battalion.	VAULX	N.11.Central.	Via FREMICOURT. To leave VAULX when Unit of 15th. Aust. Infantry Brigade passes through.
3rd. Aust. Battalion.	MORCHIES-VAULX Line	N.11.Central.	Via FREMICOURT, at once leaving skeleton garrison.
4th. Aust. Battalion.	NOREUIL	BANCOURT.	Via FREMICOURT moving East of VAULX, to leave NOREUIL when Unit of 15th. Aust. Inf. Bde. arrives.
1st. Aust. L.T.M. Bty.	VAULX	BEAULENCOURT	At once.
1st. Aust. M.G. Coy.	NOREUIL and MORCHIES-VAULX Line.	RIENCOURT	2 sections on arrival of 15th. Aust. Infantry Bde. remainder on relief by 8th. Aust. M.G. Coy.

Appendix No. 5/17/17

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Annex 5717/2
 Brigade Headquarters,
 13th. May, 1917.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS WHILE ATTACHED TO THE 2ND. AUST. DIVISIONIN THE VICINITY OF BULLECOURT FROM THE 29TH. APRIL TO 9TH. MAY, 1917.REFERENCE MAPS, 57c 1:40,000.0.31 - D.24. 1:20,000.29TH. APRIL, 1917.

1. The Brigade moved from the vicinity of BEAULENCOURT to the vicinity of FAVREUIL and VAULX and came under the orders of G.O.C. 2nd. Aust. Division.

Battalions of this Brigade were disposed as follows:-

1st. and 2nd. Battalions held BEUGNY-YTRES (Corps) Line.

The 1st. Battalion relieved the 17th. Battalion and held from I.8.C.6.4. to H.12.B.4.5. The 2nd. Battalion held from the latter point to H.4.B.0.2.

The 3rd. and 4th. Battalions held the MORCHIES-VAULX Line. The former, being under the tactical control of the 7th. Aust. Inf. Bde. held from C.28.C.9.3. to C.21.C.2.9. relieving the 18th. Battalion; and the 4th. Battalion under the G.O.C. 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde. held from the latter point to C.13.D.1.9.

1st. Aust. M.G. Coy., had 8 M.G.'s. in MORCHIES-VAULX Line and 8 in BEUGNY-YTRES Line.

1st. Aust. L.T.M. Bty. at BEAULENCOURT.

Brigade Headquarters at H.12. Central near FAVREUIL.

The following escorts were provided for artillery:-

1st. Battalion 1 Platoon escort to Heavy Batteries at C.26.B.

2nd. Battalion 1 Platoon escort to Heavy Batteries at C.19.A.

3rd. Battalion 2 Platoons escort to "Q" Group Field Artillery at C.16.D. and C.17.C.

4th. Battalion 1 Platoon escort to "P" Group Field Artillery at C.3.C.

30TH. APRIL, AND 1ST. MAY, 1917.

2. No change, except 3rd. Battalion came under orders of 5th. Aust. Inf. Bde. on night 30th. April/1st. May.

2ND. MAY, 1917.

3. The 4th. Battalion took over the portion of the MORCHIES-VAULX Line held by the 3rd. Battalion in addition to its own sector, the latter concentrating at VAULX to be available as Divisional Reserve. Both 3rd. and 4th. Battalions ^{were now} ~~then came~~ under the control of G.O.C. 7th. Aust. Infantry Brigade. Relief was complete at 2000. At 2300 Headquarters 3rd. Battalion was at VAULX; "A" "B" and "C" (less two platoons) companies at VAULX; "D" Company in C.21.C. and C.27.B.

4. On the night of 2/3rd. inst., a working party of 11 Officers and 600 O.R. was supplied by 1st. and 2nd. Battalions to

assist.

assist in digging the communication trench in C.10. and C.4. in connection with the projected attack on the HINDENBURG Line by the 2nd. Aust. Division on the morning of the 3rd. instant.

The 1st. Battalion also placed two platoons at disposal of A.P.M., 2nd. Aust. Division at NOREUIL for escort duties.

3RD. MAY, 1917.

See Map No 1 5. At 0300 "A" Company, 3rd. Battalion, moved to C.16.A.4.2.

6. At 0745 orders were received for remainder of 3rd. Battalion to be in readiness to reinforce the 7th. Brigade. The Battalion immediately moved into positions along NOREUIL- LONGATTE Road in C.9.D.

7. At 0800 the 1st. and 2nd. Battalions moved from the BEUGNY-YTRES Line to C.19.B. and came under orders of 7th. Brigade.

8. At 1000 3rd. Battalion was ordered to move to Railway Embankment and take up a position from point C.5.A.5.2. to C.4.B.4.9. relieving 28th. Battalion which was to move forward. 2nd. Battalion replaced 3rd. Battalion.

9. At 1040 3rd. Battalion was ordered to move into communication trench which cancelled orders to move into Railway Embankment. At 1230 Battalion was in squares C.4. and 10. Fighting strength was 17 officers 543 other ranks- 2 officers 77 other ranks on artillery escort were not available.

The 4th. Battalion late at night was relieved in the MORCHIES-VAULX Line by "C" Squadron, 13th. Light Horse and half Company of Cyclists, and moved up to NOREUIL. This relief was completed ^{early} in the morning of 4th. instant.

1st. L.T.M.Bty. moved from BEAULENCOURT to NOREUIL during the day.

10. At 2000 3rd. Battalion received orders from 6th. Brigade to relieve ^{elements of} 4 Battalions in O.G.2. from road (not inclusive) at U.23.C.8.0. to U.23.C.0.3. and to move at once. At 2100 they were ordered to stand fast. At 2200 they were ordered to carry on with relief which was completed at 0400 on 4th.

11. At 2100 the 1st. Battalion, less 2 platoons, came under orders of 6th. Aust. Infantry Brigade and took over line in O.G.1.

from

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from road inclusive at U.29.A.9.7. to U.23.C.2.0. relieving details of 17th, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th. Battalions. "D", "BC" and "A" Companies were in front line and "B" Company was in support at C.5.A. and was used for carrying purposes. Relief was complete by 0330 on 4th. instant. Enemy were on both flanks and trenches had been badly knocked about by shell fire. Strength of 1st. Battalion at this time was 19 officers 400 other ranks.

12. At 2200 instructions were received for Brigade Staff to go forward to Headquarters 6th. Brigade, Railway Embankment C.5.A.4.3., preparatory to taking over. Operations carried out by Battalions of this Brigade were at this time under orders of the G.O's.C. 5th. and 6th. Aust. Infantry Brigades.

13. At 2330 2nd. Battalion had moved to C.3. Central disposed to meet a reported counter attack from BULLECOURT.

4TH. MAY, 1917.

14. At 0400 the enemy made a bomb attack against our right post at U.29.A.9.7. (using a flame projector) without success. He retired after 5 minutes leaving 5 dead.

15. At 0430 enemy attacked on right and left of O.G. 2. for half an hour. We killed 30 and took 1 prisoner. At 0515 there was considerable sniping. Every opportunity at this time was taken of improving trenches.

16. By daybreak 2nd. Battalion had relieved 18th. Battalion and elements of 5th. Aust. Infantry Brigade Units and was holding road through U.29.C. and A. and communication trench therein facing East. Under orders of 5th. Brigade at 1540 companies entered O.G.1. and O.G.2. assisted by our artillery. Considerable opposition was met with at U.23.D.0.1.; a block was established in communication trench leading North from U.23.D.0.1. at a point 80 yards North of O.G.2. and posts at U.23.D.25.00. and U.29.B.25.70. were gained.

Trench Mortars were of great value in this operation.

Communication trench here ⁽³⁰⁻³⁷⁾ was strongly held by the enemy.

17. 4th. Battalion were ordered to relieve 19th. Battalion at Railway Embankment C.5.D. It was found necessary, however, to keep.

to keep in the communication trench South of the Embankment.

At 1400 the 4th. Battalion followed 2nd. Battalion in small parties. At 1700 two Companies moved into O.G.1. and two into O.G.2. and consolidated positions relieving part of the 2nd. Battalion.

18. AT 1200 I TOOK OVER COMMAND OF THE LEFT SECTOR from G.O.C. 6th. Brigade at the time HAVING THE 3RD. BATTALION in O.G.2. from U.23.C.8.0. to U.23.C.0.3. AND THE 1ST. BATTALION in O.G.1. from U.29.A.9.7. to U.23.C.2.0. 4th. Battalion did not report back from 5th. Brigade area till 5th. inst., when they moved into Railway Embankment and came under control of this Brigade. Similarly the 2nd. Battalion moved on the 5th. inst., to C.4.C. and D. and came under my orders. The 1st. M.G.Coy., relieved the 6th. M.G.Coy., and the 1st. Aust. L.T.M.Bty., the 6th. Aust. L.T.M.Bty. The latter reliefs were, however, not completed until much later than the Infantry relief and the Trench Mortar relief not until the 1st. Aust. L.T.M.Bty., (under the command of the 5th. Brigade) were relieved in the right sector.

19. At 1400 our bombing parties of 1st. and 3rd. Battalions worked West along O.G.1. and O.G.2. and after strenuous opposition succeeded in clearing the trenches and establishing blocks at U.22.D.6.0. and U.22.D.6.3. and forming a flank along communication trench between these points.

The 1st. Battalion reached ^{U 22 d 5 0} ~~U.22.D.5.9.~~ and established a block there. 25 enemy were killed and 12 prisoners taken. A further 4 prisoners were taken in communication trenches and 2 enemy were killed.

20. At 1500 1st. L.T.M.Bty., took over 5th. Brigade line and worked with 2nd. Battalion with 3 guns in O.G.1. - none in O.G.2.

21. From 1630 onwards our positions were very heavily shelled and at 2100 when barrage lifted the enemy tried to rush O.G.2. from U.23.D.4.1. He was driven off with heavy casualties.

22. At 1800 a counter attack was made from the East of REINCOURT but did not develop against our line. Reports

continued.

(5)

continued to be received up to 1940 of enemy concentration in U.24.C.

23. Machine Guns. 6 guns of 1st. M.G. Company were emplaced in Railway Embankment and 5 guns were kept in reserve at C.4.D.2.3.; 4 guns were placed in the trenches after dark, one German gun was also available in the trenches. One gun was damaged by shell fire during the relief.

24. At 2100 the enemy attacked the left flank of the 1st. Battalion and the front of 3rd. Battalion after artillery preparation and under cover of barrage. A post in O.G.2. at U.22.D.6.3. was driven in. A block was made by 1st. Battalion in communication trench at U.22.D.6.2. A strong post was established at U.22.D.8.4. to cover approaches.

The attacks were driven off but we had considerable losses during the artillery bombardment.

25. At 2215 the enemy barraged right company 3rd. Battalion and attacked but a prompt barrage was put down and no further trouble was experienced. The enemy shelled our line during the remainder of the night.

5TH. MAY, 1917.

26. At 0230 2ND. BATTALION was relieved by a 3rd. Bde. Unit and CAME UNDER COMMAND OF 1ST. AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE. 2nd. Battalion moved to C.4.C. and C.10.A.

At 0400 4TH. BATTALION were relieved by 11th. Battalion and CAME UNDER ORDERS OF 1ST. INFANTRY BRIGADE and moved back and lined Railway Embankment relieving 24th. Battalion from C.5.A.5.2. to U.28.C.7.3. Heavy shelling was here experienced.

Both Battalions provided large carrying parties continuously during the 5th. inst.

27. At 0300 on the 5th. the 3rd. Battalion front now strengthened by the two Platoons previously forming the artillery escort extended from U.23.C.9.0. to U.22.D.8.4. and the 1st. Battalion's left was at U.22.D.5.0. 1st. Battalion held the communication trench as far as U.22.D.6.2. but the 3rd. Battalion
post.

post at U.22.D.6.3. was not yet reestablished. Repeated attacks were made during the night of 4/5th by parties bombing along O.G.1. and O.G.2 from the West. 3rd. Battalion were forced back several times, but made good the ground. They were however finally held at U.22.D.8.4. where a strong point was established. The left of the ^{1st} 3rd. Battalion still remained at U.22.D.5.0. and a block was established in the communication trench at U.22.D.6.2. Communication between O.G.1. and O.G.2. was also established by another communication trench running North from U.22.D.9.0.

28. At 1030 enemy bombed along O.G.1. but was checked twice by rifle grenades and retired leaving a few dead.

29. The front line was very heavily shelled at intervals. At 1100 Major P.S.S. WOODFORDE, Commanding 1st. Aust. Battalion was fatally wounded and Capt. A.K. MCKENZIE was sent for from Transport Lines to take command. At 1300 the reserve company of 1st. Battalion moved up from C.5. to join this Battalion. At the same time the enemy again attempted to bomb down O.G.1. but fell back after fighting for 10 minutes.

30. At 1600 the enemy, about 35 strong, attempted to bomb down O.G.1. from the direction of BULLECOURT but was repulsed after three attempts on his part. The action lasted about 45 minutes. Enemy casualties estimated 10. Our casualties 1. Stokes Mortar fire was of great assistance being directed on point U.22.A.6.7. where the enemy assembled for each attack.

At this time artillery escorts were relieved by 5th. and 8th. Battalions and the men were brought up to their Battalions acting as ammunition carriers en route.

31. A strong post was established after dark at U.22.D.8.3. and a shallow trench was dug connecting it to the post at U.22.D.6.2. At 2207 the Brigade on the right sent up S.O.S. signals and a heavy barrage was put down but nothing eventuated.

32. The 22nd. M.G. Coy. from their positions South of
the railway

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the railway embankment carried out indirect fire each night from the 6 cross roads in U.23. to about U.22.A.

6TH. MAY, 1917.

33. At 0500 an ^{enemy} attack was made on the left of O.G.1. but was driven off. During the attack the enemy used a bomb, shaped like a stick bomb, but filled with inflammable material.

At 0530 3rd. Battalion and Brigade on our right were attacked after half hour's preliminary barrage. On the right the enemy got near the trench occupied by the 3rd. Battalion but all who reached that point were killed. Rifle fire, rifle grenades, machine guns and Stokes Mortars were used by us during this attack.

34. The 11th. Battalion who were on our right were driven out of their trench and parties retired up communication trench in U.29.A. and C. Capt. A.K. McKENZIE, Commanding 1st. Battalion, immediately organised a counter attack with his right company, signallers, batmen, and some of the 11th. Battalion and drove the Germans out of the trench in U.29.B. and continued to bomb them out of O.G.1. to the East of that point. Two officers and 25 other enemy dead were counted in the trench. In the meantime parties of the 11th. Battalion had been seen from Brigade Headquarters coming up communication trench and 4th. Battalion were ordered to reinforce the front lines, two companies to O.G.2. and two companies to O.G.1. At the same time 2nd. Battalion was ordered forward to the Railway Embankment vacated by 4th. Battalion. One company of the 4th. Battalion at once dribbled men over the top of the embankment and went forward. Two more guns of 1st., A.M.G. Coy. were emplaced in Railway Embankment.

35. Information was received of the success of the counter attack made by the 1st. Battalion when only one and a half companies of the 4th. Battalion had gone forward. The remainder of the 4th. Battalion were then ordered to stand

stand

stand fast and 2nd. Battalion (the leading parties of which had reached the Railway Embankment) was ordered back to its original position in C.4.C. and C.10.A. One company of the 4th. Battalion occupied the trench of the 11th. Battalion for a short period so as to ensure connection on the right of ~~this~~^{1st} Brigade, until the situation became quieter, when they were withdrawn.

36. KR 26 from the 11th. Battalion stating that their left in O.G.1. and O.G.2. had been broken and driven back in the communication trench running into U.29.A. and B. was received soon after 0700, but by this time the trench was in our possession.

37. A further attack took place on the left flank of the 1st. Battalion at 0800 when a party of about 20 Germans attempted a bombing raid along O.G.1. The enemy were driven back without trouble.

38. At 1350 we blew up a dump of bombs in O.G.1. about 100 yards from our left flank by means of rifle grenades.

39. 1st. A.L.T.M.Bty. was relieved by 3rd. L.T.M.Bty. in right sector and then relieved 6th. and 7th. L.T.M.Btys. in 1st. Brigade front. Three guns were put in O.G.1. and three in O.G.2.

40. During the afternoon of the 6th. instant 3rd. Battalion was relieved by the 2nd. Battalion and the 1st. by the 4th., 1st. Battalion then occupying the support line along the Railway Embankment and 3rd. Battalion going to C.4.C. and D. Relief was accomplished without incident and with remarkably few casualties by 2000. In order to carry out further offensive operations 9th. Battalion was put at my disposal by G.O.C., Division.

41. During the evening the 9th. Battalion moved forward and was disposed as follows :-

Battalion, less 1 company, in O.G.1. on left of 4th. Battalion; the remaining company was put at the disposal of

O.C., 2nd.

*Second Period
See map no 2*

(9)

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O.C. 2nd. Battalion in O.G.2. who placed them on the left of the line.

42. A medium Trench Mortar with 30 rounds of ammunition was placed in the line in O.G. 1. during the night.

43. During the night indirect machine gun fire was carried out by 22nd. M.G.Coy., on communication trench in U.22.C.0.4., on road U.22.C.4.5. North East to 4 cross roads beyond factory, and on road U.22.D.4.8. to U.22.B.8.5.

44. Carrying parties for S.A.A., Bombs, etc., rations and water were organised continuously from support troops during the 6th. and 7th. inst.

7TH. MAY, 1917.

45. At 0100 Devon Regiment took over part of Railway Embankment as far East as U.28.D.0.2. preparatory to the attack ~~from~~ BULLECOURT by the Brigade on our left.

46. At 0200 the left flank post in O.G.1. was driven back some 40 yards. As a combined attack was pending no attempt was made at this stage to recover the ground lost.

47. At 0345 the 20th. Brigade attacked BULLECOURT from the South East and in conjunction with this attack we bombed along trenches O.G.2. as far West as U.22.D.6.3. and O.G.1. as far West as U.28.A.8.8. One medium Trench Mortar, 6 Stokes mortars and 3 machine guns were available to assist in this attack. The attack in O.G.1. was carried out by the 9th. Battalion. In O.G.2. the 2nd. held from U.23.C.9.0. to U.23.C.0.4. with one company 9th. Battalion on left. Little opposition was met with in this trench. Strong posts along sunken road ~~and~~ ⁱⁿ U.22.D. were made and 3 Vickers M.G's. and one Stokes Mortar emplaced.

48. The attack was carried out by relays of bombers advancing under support of rifle grenades and Lewis guns in addition to artillery, mortars, and Vickers guns. As each short length of trench was occupied by a party of bombers steps were taken against counter attacks whilst the next relay of bombers went through them. One V.M. Gun worked with Battalion in O.G.2. and two.

and two V.M.Guns with 9th. Battalion in O.G.1.

49. Strong points were made at U.22.D.6.3. and U.28.A.8.8. at which latter point we connected up with the Gordon Highlanders in O.G.1., at 0515. Report of C.O. 9th. Battalion gives in detail the account of this attack. 30 Germans were killed in O.G.1. in this attack and some prisoners including an Officer were taken. Our casualties amounted to 71. O.G.1. was found at this point to be badly knocked about and difficult to consolidate. A communication trench running North from U.22.D.9.0. was still in good condition. The strong point at U.22.D.8.4. gave an exceptionally good field of fire and a Vickers M.G. as well as a telephone was established there. Our left flank post and the right one of the Gordons were exchanged so that our flanks would actually overlap.

50. At 0900 enemy were reported massing for a counter attack at U.22.B.8.5. but the attack did not eventuate.

51. At this time V.M.Guns were in O.G.2. at U.23.C.8.0. U.23.C.7 $\frac{1}{2}$.1. (we also had a German gun here), U.23.C.2.3 $\frac{1}{2}$., U.23.C.1.4., U.22.D.7.3.; in O.G.1. at U.22.D.4.0., U.28.B.2.9.; 7 guns on Railway Embankment between C.5.A.5.2 $\frac{1}{2}$. and D.28.C.5.3.; one gun in reserve at C.4.D.2.3.

52. During the day owing to the state of weariness of the men assistance of carrying parties of 8 Officers 340 O.R. had to be obtained.

53. During the night the Brigade was relieved in the line by the 2nd. Brigade. The 1st. Battalion was relieved by 6th. Battalion during the night of 7/8th., relief being completed at 0200 on 8th. The 2nd. Battalion was relieved by the 8th. Battalion. The Battalions moved back into reserve - 4th. Battalion at NOREUIL-LONGATTE Road, 2nd. at VAULX, while the 3rd. and 1st. Battalions occupied the right and left sector of the MORCHIES-VAULX Line respectively.

8TH. MAY, 1917.

54. 1st. M.G.Coy., moved 2 sections to MORCHIES-VAULX Line.

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Line. 1st. L.T.M.Bty., moved to VAULX being relieved at 0330 by 2nd. L.T.M.Bty.

55. No incident of importance occurred during the 8th. inst., except that on night of 8/9th. the Brigade had to send forward a wiring party of 2 Officers and 100 O.R.

9TH. MAY, 1917.

56. On the evening of the 9th. the Brigade, with the exception of the machine gun company, was relieved, and moved into the BEAULENCOURT area. The relief of the M.C.Coy., was not completed by the 8th. Brigade until the evening of the 10th.

57. Very heavy ^{General} artillery barrages were at times put down by the enemy both on the front line trenches and on the Railway Embankment. The artillery fire came both from the front and from the right flank evidently from the vicinity of QUEANT. This latter fire enfiladed both the front line trenches and the Railway Embankment and was particularly damaging in its effect.

58. During the operations the wisdom of organising relays of bombing parties and allotting to each a definite task was clearly proved, as each job was done quickly and well before the relay got tired.

59. The efficiency of rifle grenades was clearly demonstrated. They were found particularly effective in dealing with enemy counter attacks and bombing raids, keeping the enemy outside bombing distance. More cup attachments for their use should be issued.

60. The following further points are worth attention!-

1. More than one communication trench is necessary the instant operations become stationary.

2. Parties of pioneers should be used every night to deepen, widen, and clean up communication trenches which are constantly being smashed in during the day.

3. Trenches O.G.1. and O.G.2. were latterly so flattened out by hostile artillery fire that it was necessary for each relieving Battalion to dig out afresh these trenches upon taking them over.

4. Unwillingness of technical Units to undertake construction of strong points in front line again very much in evidence. This causes much delay and gives little real relief and assistance to Infantry. It is also in marked contrast to the dogged holding on of the Infantry and this should be realised.

ample.

5. Ample and safe Brigade Headquarters are required.
6. Additional trenches necessary between O.G.I. and Railway Embankment.
7. Telephonic communication was practically impossible. As soon as operations tend to become stationary buried cable should be used at least as far forward as Battalion Headquarters. Situation of these cables should not disclose locality of these Headquarters.
8. Power buzzers and Amplifiers were exceptionally valuable and but for them no communication except by runner was possible forward of Brigade Headquarters.
9. Owing to the nature of fighting, viz, bombing attacks from flanks, huge stores of bombs, rifle grenades and Stokes bombs had constantly to be sent forward. To reduce man carrying pack horses and limbers should be used wherever possible. Dumps should be dug into banks where possible.
10. M.G.'s. can be kept dismounted, but ready for instant use, in many positions thus reducing possibility of them being destroyed by shell fire.
11. More instruction could with advantage be given in the use of German bombs.
12. Many petrol tins are required for supply of water. This question will become more acute as the summer advances and, together with that of wells, requires much forethought.
61. During the period under review the casualties were as follows:-

Unit.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.	Total.
	Off.	O.R.	Totals	Off.	O.R.	Tot.		
Bde. H.Q.	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2
1st. Bn.	5	84	49	8	232	240	29	318
2nd. Bn.	1	24	25	9	154	163	8	196
3rd. Bn.	1	56	57	3	245	248	8	313
4th. Bn.	3	47	50	4	203	207	-	257
1st.M.G.Coy	-	-	-	1	16	17	-	17
1st.L.T.M.B.	-	2	2	1	3	4	-	6
<u>Total.</u>	10	175	185	26	853	879	45	1,109

To these must be added the casualties sustained by 9th. Battalion whilst attached to this Brigade, which amounted to 1 officer 159 other ranks.

The casualties sustained by the 1st. Brigade includes 167 N.C.O's.

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62. The following table shews prisoners and materiel captured and materiel lost and damaged by shell fire :-

<u>Unit.</u>	<u>Prisoners Taken.</u>	<u>Materiel.</u>	
		<u>Lost and Damaged.</u>	<u>Gained.</u>
1st Bn.	18	3 L.G's by shell fire	Nil.
2nd Bn.	70	-	1 automatic rifle.
3rd Bn.	8	1 L.G. lost.	-
4th Bn.	10	-	-
1st M.G.Coy.	-	1 M.G. by shell fire.	-
1st L.T.M.Bty.	-	-	-
9th Bn.	11		3 "Pineapple" T.M's. 3 Flame projectors

Large supplies of ammunition, bombs, and flares were also captured.

Lieut.-Colonel,

At the time Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

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Appendix No. 5/17/2

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"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C.2121
(in pads of 100).
No. of Message _____

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent		Service.
			At.....m.			From.....
			To.....			By.....
			By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO { 1st Inst Inf Div

Sender's Number	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
-----------------	---------------	---------------------	-----

I herewith enclose report on recent operations

2/15

From	1st Inst Div
Place	0100 B. St.
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

750,000. W 2186-M509. H. W. & V., Ltd. 6/16.

Omaha 1st Div

Report of 1st Aust. Inf. Bn. Operations
during period 28th April to 7th May 1917

Reference Map.
1:20000 Edition 2.

Bn Headquarters
10 May 1917

I have to report that the Bn under the
command of Major P. S. S. WOODFORD on 29th April
moved from N 24 D 26 into Corps line near VAAUX
relieving 17th Bn in 1.7 central remained there
till on 3rd May at 11.30 it moved to VRAUCOURT
at C 19 B central.

At 2100 it moved into front line, less two
platoons left on escort duty, having received
orders to report to 6th A.I. Bde, the latter ordering
it to take over line then held by details of 17th
22nd 23rd & 24th Bns.

The trench taken over was part of O.G. 1
from road (inclusive) at U 29 A 8586 to U 28 B 05
95. Dispositions from right to left, D, C, A Coys
in front line, B Coy being in support & used
for carrying supplies in Railway Embankment
running through C 4, & C 5. Relief was complete
by 0330 on 4th May. The 3rd Bn occupied
front line O.G. 2. The enemy were on both our
flanks. The line was in very bad order being
badly knocked about by shell fire. The garrison
at this time was approximately 19 off 400 or 1
on 4th May at 0400 the enemy made
a bombing attack on our right post at

U29 A8570 using a FLADIERWERFER without success, attack lasting five minutes when he retired leaving 5 dead.

At 1300 the 2nd Bn in conjunction with 3rd Bn sent party 10ff (Lt. RICHARDS) + 1600 to bomb along O.E. 1 WEST from U22 D90. Party bombed to U28 B59 re-established a block gained touch with 3rd Bn, captured 12 prisoners & killed 25 enemy, our losses 3 killed & 3 wounded. This party further bombed along trench at U22 D90 & took 4 more prisoners & killed 2 others. Very good work & excellent leadership was shown by Lt. RICHARDS during these operations.

At 1400 the 2nd Bn bombed down O.E. 1 to the right & re-established a post 300 yards ~~long~~ from our right post thus making our right flank more secure. The 3rd Bn took over this part of trench from 2nd Bn shortly afterwards. From 16.30 onwards the enemy shelled our position very heavily.

At 2100 enemy launched strong counter attack on our left & our 3rd Bn who were driven out of position of O.E. 2 leaving our left flank rather exposed & a block was therefore made in the communication trench at our extreme left post. Shortly afterwards 3rd Bn sent a party to gain touch which was again established. The enemy

appeared ³ to suffer heavily during this attack.

on 5th May at 0700 A Coy on left bank had suffered heavy casualties were relieved by D Coy, A Coy taking over D Coy's position of line.

at 10.30 enemy about 40 strong attempted bombing attack along O.E.1. our post on left checked their advance with rifle grenades after two attempts he retired to Sunkur Road in U28A, leaving a few dead.

At 1130 Major PSS WOODFURDE was fatally wounded, Captain A R MACKENZIE was sent for stock over command of BN.

At 1300 the enemy about 40 strong again attempted to bomb down O.E.1 but after ten minutes fighting was driven off.

At 1600 enemy made another attempt this time with far more determination although heavily bombed with rifle grenades he succeeded three times in getting within hand bombing distance. The attack lasted 45 minutes, the enemy being then driven off finally. Great assistance was rendered at this time to the defence by Stokes Mortar fire brought to bear on a point at U28A 67 where the enemy reassembled for each attack.

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At 1800 B Coy (45 strong) were ordered to reinforce the left (D) Coy, the two Coys acting together.

At dark the post at U2280595 was connected up with post at U223001 by a small trench about 4'6" deep.

On 6th May at 0500 enemy again attacked on left attempting to burn down from O.B. 2 across along O.B. 1 & succeeded in throwing several bombs into the post. The enemy used a new bomb on this occasion. It was shaped like a stick bomb but apparently was filled with inflammable material. The enemy's attempt failed.

At 0600 ^{the enemy} put down a heavy barrage at 0630 the Bn on our right was driven back practically to our right at U29A97 our right Coy held on but the position was a critical one. Orders were immediately issued by the C.O. to the Signalling Officer to organise all details at HQ (near which the event took place) consisting of signallers & others to attack & drive out the enemy. These assisted by the right Coy also some men of Bn on right pushed the enemy back after half an hour's fighting, conspicuous bravery being shown

by the ⁵men after about an hour's fighting chiefly bombs & rifle grenades being used the enemy were completely driven from the trench & the trench was then held. The line on our right then pushed forward again & took over this trench. Many enemy could be seen at this time on our left & although they did not actually leave the trenches it was very apparent they were ready to do so had we weakened our left flank or had the attack on our right succeeded. 2 German officers & 25 dead were actually counted in our trenches & 2 wounded prisoners were taken.

On night of 6th / 7th the line was relieved by 4th Bn relief being complete by 2300. Bn on relief moved to RAILWAY EMBANKMENT.

On night of 7th / 8th Bn was relieved by 6th Bn relief being complete by 0200. On 8th Bn on relief moved to position occupied by 8th Bn North of VAULT.

On 9th May Bn moved to SUGAR FACTORY at N 24 D 26 being relieved by unit of 8th A.I. Bde.

During the whole time in the line our field artillery was of the greatest assistance, the shooting being most

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accurate & well placed.

The STOKES Motors as already mentioned proved most useful.

The fighting was at close quarters & consequently grenades played a most important part rifle grenades proving an absolute necessity - undoubtedly it was greatly owing to the range of these that the enemy were prevented from approaching our flank posts in sufficiently large numbers to crush them. Supplies of all kinds were at all times forthcoming from BDE & the carrying parties did fine work.

The casualties suffered while the BN was in forward area were ~~as follows~~

5 off killed 8 off wounded
44 or killed 232 or wounded
29 or missing

3 Lewis Guns were put out of action

The enemy shelling during the period was exceptionally heavy, destructive & constant & I cannot speak too highly of the spirit in which all ranks bore it nor of the cool & brave manner in which they coped with the enemy attacks, using all weapons with judgment & skill. The officers both CO's, Coy's, junior Officers & NCO's

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led their men with conspicuous ability & set a splendid example. It is difficult to estimate the enemy casualties - prisoners taken numbered 18 but the large number of enemy dead to be seen shows that he suffered very heavily in his repeated counterattacks!


As already mentioned the BN was commanded during the operations first by Major P. S. S. WOODFORD & then by Captain A. K. MACKENZIE, both of whom acquitted themselves ably. I resumed command of the BN on 7th May.

Br Stair / Sgt 1st Lt
 Cassidy 1st Amd 2nd BN

P.C.

Rough Sketch showing position held by 1st Aust Div / Bn

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Appendix No. 517/2

Date

Place

Unit

Summary of Events and Information

Remarks and
References

* will be prepared in manuscript
and the day month respectively. The pages
summaries are contained in F. S. No. 1, Part II.
Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence

(Form heading not required)

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

or

WAR DIARY

Army Form C 3112

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REPORT ON OPERATIONAGAINST PORTION OF HINDENBURG LINE BY 2ND. AUST. BATTALION.REFERENCE MAPS ECOUST-ST. MEIN 1/10000 and 57c 1/20000, N.W.

1. At 0345 on May, 3rd. the 2nd. Australian Division, with certain attached troops, attacked the HINDENBURG LINE in Squares U.28., U.29. and U.30. with the object of breaking through, seizing REINCOURT and establishing a line North and East of that village. The operation was not wholly successful and this necessitated throwing into the fight the 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade which was in reserve.

2. PRELIMINARY MOVES. The 2nd. Australian Battalion at Zero hour was holding the Corps Line of Resistance north of BEUGNATRE from H.6.C. to H.4.Central, and at 0830 was ordered to move from there to C.19.B., where it would come under the control of the G.O.C. 7th. Australian Infantry Brigade. Successive positions were taken up during the day under orders from the 7th. 6th., and again 7th. Brigade Commanders, and at 2330 the Battalion was in a defensive position about C.3.Central, disposed to meet a reported counter-attack from BULLECOURT. At that hour orders were received from 5th. Australian Infantry Brigade to relieve the 18th. Battalion and elements of other 5th. Brigade Units, and to be prepared to carry out bombing attack on the German line by daybreak. The time was subsequently postponed.

3. DISTRIBUTION. The relief was carried out, and at daybreak on the 4th. instant the Battalion was holding the road through U.29.C. & A. along which a trench had been dug for nearly the whole length.

Each company held approximately 250 yards facing EAST. C Coy. was on the right, then A. D, and B, Coys. in that order. Battalion Headquarters at C.5.B.3.7.

By the same time the 3rd. Battalion had relieved elements of the 6th. Australian Infantry Brigade in O.G.2. from U.23.C.8.0. to U.23.C.0.4. and the 1st. Battalion had taken over O.G.1. from U.29.A.9.7. to U.23.C.0.0. Outside these limits the O.G. Lines were held by the enemy. A line of posts in C.6.C. & A. and U.30.C. was held by the 27th. Battalion.

No other positions were held by us North of the Railway line through C.4.5. & 6.

4. ORDERS. At 1120 the 5th. Australian Infantry Brigade Operation Memo No. 5 was received. In accordance therewith the Company Commanders, who had been kept informed of what was likely to be required so that preliminary arrangements might be made and bombing parties organised, were assembled at Battalion Headquarters. The Brigade Operation Memo was read to them, action of T.M. and M.G.'s. explained and verbal orders issued, supported by notes, vide Appendix B. At 1330 the G.O.C. 5th. Australian Infantry Brigade, in telephone conversation instructed me to move into O.G.1. and O.G.2. until serious opposition was met with when blocks would be established, the Artillery informed, and the original programme gone on with.

5. ACTION. In accordance with these instructions Coys entered O.G.1. and O.G.2. simultaneously at about 1415. Strong opposition was met with at U.23.D.1.1. where at C.T. entered O.G.2. After half an hour's fighting this was overcome and a block established in C.T. 80 yds. north of O.G.2. the company then moved on to within 70 yards of C.T. at 3.0

D. Company bombed its way along O.G.1. to a corresponding position about 70 yards short of 3.7. The C.T. joining these two points was strongly held and Coys were instructed to establish blocks until Artillery could be turned on. At 1450 Brigade was informed of the position and Artillery support was asked for. It was decided that zero hour should be 1530 as the Artillery could not open before then, and that the Artillery barrage should commence on the C.T. from 3.0. to 3.7.

At 1540 the Artillery barrage opened and the Infantry again moved forward. From here onwards normal bombing tactics were adopted; throwing bombers being relieved as they became tired.

The men were fighting with great dash and were doing great execution without suffering many casualties.

At 1615 B Coy was making such slow progress that C Coy went forward before B Coy had reached its objective, and coming in fresh with great dash carried on.

This completed Phase 2.

At 1700 A Coy moved through D Coy, whom they had been supporting for some time, and took the fight on their shoulders. Both these Coys then carried on until at 1900 when they were within 40 yards of their final objective, where they established posts.

The Coy in O.G.1. subsequently advanced to C.T. running from 1.6. to 3.7. where they consolidated.

During the whole progress of the fight 4th. Battalion had been working up road through 29.A. and C. and then along O.G.1. and O.G.2. At 1715 one platoon had relieved the men holding C.T. at U.23.D.1.1. and at 1900 remainder of 4th. Battalion had taken over the trenches allotted them.

This completed phase 3.

The incessant bombing fighting tired men quickly and the 4th. Battalion men gradually replaced 2nd. Battalion men in the fighting end of the trench, the relieved men of the 2nd. Battalion moving back to 4th. Battalion sector. This gradual exchange was not completed by midnight when relieving Units of 3rd. Brigade began to arrive. The positions gained i.e. O.G.1. to U.30.A.1.6. and 20.65. and O.G.2. to U.30.A.1.9. were maintained until the relieving Units of ~~3rd. Brigade~~ took over at about 0200 on the 5th. inst.

6. ACTION OF ENEMY. Reports were constantly received of the movement of enemy reinforcements down the East and West of REINCOURT. They assembled in the sunken roads running N.W. and S.E. south of REINCOURT and from these delivered their counter attacks.

His Artillery very quickly got on to the captured trenches and Road through U.29.A. and C. and kept them under continuous and very heavy shell fire.

Later in the day an extremely heavy barrage was placed at intervals in the vicinity of C.5.A. and D.

7. ARTILLERY SUPPORT. The rolling Artillery barrage from West to East was not a success. The fire was not well directed and for a ~~xx~~ great part of the distance could not be observed. It was not sufficiently concentrated in front of our men and individual guns were slow in moving eastwards with the result that casualties were caused. At 1630 our own 18 pounder shells caused casualties in O.G.1. and 29.B.3.7.

The Artillery was extremely useful in meeting and dispersing counter-attacks developing from the direction of REINCOURT.

REINCOURT and its vicinity could be observed from Brigade Headquarters, and it was from there that the Artillery were directed and dispersed the massing enemy.

8. TRENCH MORTARS. 1st. A.L.T.M.Bty., moved along O.G.1. and O.G.2. in rear of our advancing bombers and rendered most valuable assistance. ALL ranks spoke most highly of the work done by the Mortars.

9. COMMUNICATIONS. A telephone wire was run up the sunken road in 29.A. and B. thence eastwards along O.G.1. and O.G.2. As progress was made Coys tapped in and by this means almost continuous communication was maintained until 1900 when the lines were so badly cut that further repair was impossible and communication by runner was the only available means.

Communication to Brigade was maintained by buried cable until cut, then by overland routes, and with the exception of about three hours was continuous throughout the operation.

10. SUPPLIES. Supplies of bombs and S.A.A. were taken forward by Brigade carrying parties and the situation was never acute.

Demands were constantly received from the front line for rifle grenades and these could not always be met. There was no shortage of S.A.A.

It is estimated that 20,000 bombs were expended by the two Battalions between 1400 and 2400.

11. MISCELLANEOUS. The Mills bomb both hand and rifle again proved its efficiency. A very large number of Germans were killed in the trenches and in most cases their bodies were badly shattered by this most powerful weapon. I am absolutely convinced of the superiority of our bomb over the German article.

It was difficult to move in O.G.I. without treading on dead Germans.

It is recommended that for future operations a larger proportion of rifle to hand bombs should be supplied than we have hitherto considered necessary. This would involve an increased issue of cup attachments.

A number of splendid individual acts of bravery were performed and I intend to recommend a number for immediate award.

(Signed) S.L.MILLIGAN Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 2nd. Australian Battalion.

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1st Aust. Inf. Bde.
-----No
12/5FURTHER REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS
FROM THE 3rd to 8th MAY.

1. On being relieved by the 12th Australian Battalion at 0230 on the 5th inst., the 2nd Australian Battalion moved into reserve position on sunken road and trench in C.4.C. and C.10.A.
2. Carrying parties were required and were at once organized under officers and sent forward with bombs and ammunition for the Battalions in the forward line. This work was continued throughout the day. A number of casualties were suffered.
3. During the night of 5th-6th the enemy continued his artillery activity, and the Bn., less the carrying parties was kept ready for instant action. Each man was completed with 170 rounds S.A.A. and 2 Mills' bombs.
4. At 0700 on the 6th news was received that the enemy had countered and pierced the 3rd A.I. Bde., line. The Bn., moved forward, via C.T., through C.4. and C.5., and the head of the column reached Brigade H.Q. at 0730, when it was found that the attack had been met and defeated by the 1st and 4th Bns. The Bn., then returned to its shelters. The line of advance and return was under continual enemy shell-fire, and several casualties were caused during the movement.
5. At 1500 C.Os. 2nd and 4th Battalions were summoned to Brigade H.Q., and there received orders to relieve the 3rd in O.G.2., and the 1st Battalion in O.G.1. respectively, and to prepare plans to extend the front westward by means of bombing attacks, -- One company 9th Bn., attached to 2nd Bn., and three companies 9th Bn., to be attached to 4th Bn., for the operation.
The 7th Imperial Division were to attack BULLECOURT at the same time.
6. The relief of the 3rd Battalion was complete at 2000; but owing to delay caused by C. Co., 9th Bn., having to move up from VAULX, the command was not taken over until 2250.
7. ORDERS. - Company commanders were assembled at Bn., H.Q., and given their orders for the attack. C. Co., 9th Bn., was ordered to move at 0345 and occupy O.G.2., from U23.C.O.4. to U22.D.6.4., and the southern side of the sunken road parallel to O.G.2., as far as U22.D.6.3., and to establish posts, to be connected later, at U22.D.8.4., 83., 84., 85., each post to be composed of one platoon.

(continued)

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DISTRIBUTION.- The line ^{C.}425.90., to 423.0.0.4., was held by A., D., B., and C., companies, 2nd Bn., in that order *from right to left.*

Bn., H.Q. in O.G.2., at 423.0.61.,
C. Co., 11th Bn., were assembled in C. Co., 2nd Bn., lines until zero hour.

9. ACTION.- At 0345, zero hour, the operation was carried out with very little opposition, and at 0456 you were informed that the objective had been gained.

At 0600 it was found that touch had been established between the 9th Bn., in O.G.1 and the 7th Imp. Division. During the day the newly-gained posts were strengthened by emplacing three V. M.Gs., and a Stokes' mortar in their vicinity. A Telephone was run out and communication trench improved.

10. The enemy shelled the line all day, causing casualties, but no infantry assault was attempted.

11. The Bn., was relieved by the 8th Bn., during the night; and on relief at 0115 on the 8th inst., moved to the NOREUIL-LONGATTE road and thence to VAULX.

Rain commenced about sunset on the 7th and made the going very difficult. The men were physically worn out, but kept in excellent spirits.

I have nothing to add to the recommendations made in my earlier report.



Lieut.-Colonel,

Commanding SECOND AUSTRALIAN BN.

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(COPY).

Appendix No. 5/17/2

Headquarters,
1st. Aust. Infantry Brigade..

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 28/4/17 to 9/5/17.

Reference sheet 57 C and sketches attached.

(1) On 29/4/17 I was informed that my Battalion was required to hold the right sector of VAULX defences and that it was unlikely that my Battalion would be required for active operations, but to be prepared and keep in touch with operations.

PRELIMINARY MOVES.

(2) 28/4/17 at camp REINCOURT-les BABAUME.
29/4/17 29/4/17 marched to VAULX and took over RIGHT sector of MORCHIES- VAULX line from 18th. Aust. Battalion. This line consists of a line of posts as shown on appendix "A". Relief completed 1200 and Battalion distributed as shown on appendix "BA" and Battalion under orders of G.O.C., 7th. Brigade. Posts were manned by nucleus garrison of 1 N.C.O. and 4 men, and remainder of Battalion held intact.

30/4/17. 30/4/17 Two platoons "C" Company moved to NOREUIL as escort to "Q" group Artillery; otherwise distribution unchanged from 29th.
3rd. Battalion came under orders G.O.C., 5th. Brigade, night 30/1st. May.

1/5/17 1/5/17 No action.

2/5/17 2/5/17 1st. Brigade Operation Memo No. 11 for 4th. Battalion to relieve 3rd. Battalion by 2000 on 3rd. Battalion to come under orders 7th. A.I. Brigade received. Relief completed 2000.
7th. A.I. Brigade order re operations received at 2000. 7th. Brigade ordered one company to posts 5, 6 and 8 at NOREUIL at 2100.

- (At 2300 Battalion distributed as follows :-
- (Battalion Headquarters at VAULX.
- ("A" Company... .. " "
- ("B" Company... .. " "
- ("C" Company (less two platoons) " "
- (Two platoons "C" Company "Q" Group Artillery escort at NOREUIL.
- ("D" Company... .. NOREUIL DEFENCES.

3/5/17 At 0300 order received for one company to move to road at C.16.A.4.2.- "A" Company moved and reported in position 0500.
At 0700 remainder of Battalion ordered forward.
At 1000 dispositions marked GREEN on appendix "A"
At 1000 G.O.C., 7th. Brigade ordered me to move to RAILWAY BANK C.5. A.5.2. to C.4.B.4.9. and fill up as 28th. Battalion moved forward. At 1020 urgent message received to move one company to RAILWAY at once.
A verbal telephone order received about 1040 to move into communication trench and establish Headquarters at C.4.C.4.0.- this cancelled all orders to move to RAILWAY BANK.
At 1230 my dispositions were as marked BROWN on Appendix "A".

Proportion of officers, N.C.O's. and Specialists were sent back to details camp, leaving fighting strength :-

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
Headquarters... ..	3	30
"A" Company	4	154
"B" Company... ..	4	160

(2.)

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	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O&R.</u>
"C" Company (less 2 platoons) ...	2	68
"D" Company	4	131
Excluding M.O., Bn. Total ...	<u>17</u>	<u>543</u>

2 platoons "C" Company escort for "C" Group F. Artillery not available for use with Battalion	<u>2</u>	<u>77</u>
--	----------	-----------

At 1730 message received warning that 3rd. Battalion would go into line on night 3rd/4th. and Adjutant to report to 7th. Brigade for orders. Adjutant was told to inform C.O. to report to G.O.C., 6th. Brigade for orders.

G.O.C., 6th. Aust. Inf. Brigade informed me verbally about 2000 that 3rd. Battalion would relieve 4 Battalions of ~~figures~~ 6th. Brigade in O.G. 2. from ROAD (not inclusive) at U.23.C.85.05. to U.23.C.00.35. and that 3rd. Battalion were now under command of 6th. Brigade. I was ordered to move at earliest possible moment.

At 2100 I was ordered to stand fast.

At about 2200 I was ordered to carry on with relief.

At 0400 on the 4th. relief was completed.

Throughout day (3rd.) considerable enemy shell fire encountered; from 1000 to 2000 carrying parties supplied for moving stores to RAILWAY BANK and front line.

Estimated casualties to 2300- 3rd - 2 officers and 60 O.R.

- (3). DISTRIBUTION and strength of Battalion at 0800, 4th. May, 1917. In O.G.2 from RIGHT to LEFT and shewn on Appendix A1 marked in BLUE.

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
"A" Company	3	144
2 platoons "C" Company	1	65
Battalion Headquarters	3	30
"B" Company	4	137
"D" Company	<u>4</u>	<u>110</u>
Total.	<u>15</u>	<u>486</u>

ACTION & (4).
ENEMY ACTION.

4/5/17.

At 0430 enemy attacked on extreme RIGHT and LEFT of my Battalion trench. He advanced up old communication trenches to within 30- 40 yards and commenced throwing stick bombs. The fight lasted half an hour. We inflicted a number of casualties, estimated at 30 enemy killed. We took one prisoner.

0515 considerable sniping on both sides. Trenches improved and prepared for defence. At 2 p.m. "D" Company bombed along O.G. 2 from U.23.C.00.35. and established a post at U.23.D.6.3. and joined up with 1st. Aust. Battalion at U.22.D.6.2., strong resistance by enemy bombers and machine gun fire encountered. Many enemy killed.

At 2200 enemy attacked along whole of my front moving up old communication trenches. Enemy approaching RIGHT company ("B") within bombing range and were driven off after 30 minutes sharp fighting.

At same time our new post at U.22.D.6.3. was heavily attacked and after 30 minutes fight ran out of bombs and were forced to retire to original line. It was found that enemy could advance under cover to within bombing range, so a post was established at U.22.D.85.40. to cover approaches.

Enemy attack on centre of line did not get within 30 yards of our parapet.

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Enemy shelled our trench heavily at 2130 to 2215; one shell cut H.P. Buzzer earth wires and our only communication to Brigade was by "Runner". H.P. Buzzer re-established at 2220.

Midnight 4/5th. Situation normal.

5/5/17.

Considerable artillery activity and long range sniping. Trenches improved. No Infantry action.

2 Platoons "C" Company arrived on relief from artillery escort at 0300.

"C" Company moved to LEFT of line at 0700 dispositions were from RIGHT to LEFT - "A", "D", "B" and "C" companies, marked BROWN on Appendix "A1".

Atc2215 Hostile artillery placed heavy barrage on our line and enemy bombers attacked RIGHT "A" Company, our artillery opened 30 seconds after S.O.S. was put up. Our barrage apparently broke up enemy attack as no serious Infantry action followed.

Our own artillery dropped a number of shells in our trenches. Enemy shelled our line throughout remainder of night.

6/5/17.

Enemy shelled O.G.2. from 0100 increasing to a heavy barrage at 0430, especially on trench from U.23.C.6.1. EASTWARD.

At 0515 enemy attacked Battalion on RIGHT (11th. Bn.) by bombing up old communication trenches and dispersed the garrisons. Enemy also attacked my RIGHT company but did not get closer than 30 yards. S.O.S. Signal put up about 0515. Battalion on RIGHT fell back but on being reinforced by 1st. Battalion counter-attacked and regained their original positions.

All our VICKERS and LEWIS guns, and RIFLE GRENADES of RIGHT Company and RIGHT STOKES MORTAR brought fire to bear and many casualties inflicted on enemy.

0500 Enemy observed in SUNKEN ROAD and HEDGE from U.23.C.7.6. to U.23.D.7.8. They were dispersed by our artillery and machine gun fire.

Situation normal 0800.

REINFORCEMENTS.

(5)

One Company and two Platoons of the 4th. Battalion arrived at 0630 under Major LLOYD on 6/5/17 and took up position on RIGHT of "A" Company and connected up with 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

(6)

Except for post at U.23.D.6.3. no portion of line held was lost nor did enemy obtain a footing in our trenches.

SUBSEQUENT MOVES.

(7)

6th. May, 1917. 2nd. Battalion relieved 3rd. Battalion. Relief completed at 2000. 3rd. Battalion moved back to trenches in ROAD at C.4.C.4.0.

Carrying parties supplied to carry to front line and further parties on 7/5/17.

7/5/17.

On 9th. Battalion moving into our position 3rd. Battalion moved back and occupied RIGHT sector of VAULX Defences marked PURPLE on Appendix "A" as 29/4/17.

8/5/17.

Remained in occupation of VAULX Defences.

9/5/17.

Relieved by 29th. Aust. Battalion at 1900, moved to camp at REINCOURT.

CO-OPERATION OF ARTILLERY & INFANTRY.

(8)

On 4th. our S.O.S. Signals were not answered.

A forward observing Officer was stationed at my Battalion Headquarters. This officer was of great assistance. Communication was only possible by H.P. Buzzer to artillery.

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Our S.O.S. barrage was very effective and excepting case mentioned above rapidly opened when called for.

HEAVIES, 4.5 inch Howitzers and 18 pounders at different times dropped short in and behind our trench; on one occasion our Field Artillery placed a barrage on my line. Many 18 pounder shell cases and pieces of our heavy shells picked up in our trench.

A number of casualties were traced to our own shells. One of our shells burst in our trench and killed 4 men.

MISCELLANEOUS (9)

BOMBS and RIFLE GRENADES expenditure very heavy and supply difficult to maintain. Majority of carrying parties arrived with 50% of material started out with, due to casualties etc.

Wounded very difficult to send back. Garrison could not be spared and no ambulance bearers were available in advance of RAILWAY BANK. There were many wounded in the trench when we took over.

Carrying parties were utilised for this work.

(Signed) D.T. MOORE, Lieut.-Colonel,

Commanding 3rd. Battalion A.I.F.

In the field.
12th. May, 1917.

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Appendix No. 5/17/2

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4th Bn.
12th May. 1917

Herewith reports on
Operations of 4th Bn between
April 28th & May 5th 1917.

Chas Lane Taylor
4th Bn.

12/5

Narrative of Operations of 4th Bde from
28th April 1917 - May 9th.

On the 28th ~~April~~ ^{May} 1917 the 1st Australian Division was resting after the operations round HERMES & LAGNICOURT. The 1st Aust Inf Bde was resting round BARRAME, the 4th Bde being billeted in BARRAME itself. On April 29th the 4th Bde under orders from the 1st Inf Bde marched to VAUX & took over a line of posts from the 21st Bde. On April 30th the 4th Bde came under the orders of the 7th Aust Inf Bde 2nd Aust Division & acting under their orders took up a line of defensive posts known as the VAUX-MORCHIES line. ~~over our~~

On May 2nd the 4th Bde received orders from the 7th Bde to take over a further line of defensive posts from the 3rd Bde 1st Bde so as to release the 3rd Bde who were to concentrate at 5 A.M. on the 3rd May & support

The 5th Inf. Bde 2nd Ausb. Division in their attack if necessary.

On the 3rd May the fighting strength of the 4th Bde was 21 Officers & 6560 other ranks. on this day the 2nd Division attacked the HINDENBURG LINE at 3.45 a.m. with the 6th & 5th Inf. Bdes.

The 5th Inf. Bde were unsuccessful in their operations and in consequence at 12.30 a.m. on the morning of May 4th the 4th Bde received orders from the 2nd Division to move at once to MOREUIL and report to the G.O.C. 5th Inf. Bde. owing to the suddenness of this order no iron rations, sandbags, tools, ~~ammunition~~ or bombs were able to be taken.

In Company with my Adjutant I reported to 5th Bde H.Q. at 1.30 a.m. having issued orders to my Company Commanders to march independently to ~~the~~ MOREUIL, keep their Coy's under cover & report to me at 5th Bde H.Q.

I received orders from the

5th Inf Bde to occupy the position held by the 19th Bde along the railway embankments at C 5 D 6.5 & be prepared in conjunction with the 2nd Bde to ^{U 29 A 8.7} bomb our way into O G 1 & O C 2 where the 5th Inf Bde had been driven out. This was to be carried out as soon after daylight as possible. Bombs & sand bags were to be picked up at 5th Inf Bde Dump at C 5 A 77.

Due to the congestion of disorganised troops along the embankments there was no room for my Bde to get into position & I was ordered to keep them in the communication trench leading from MOREUIL to the Railway Embankments at C 5 A 3.3.

I was in this position with my Bde at 4.15 A.M. & held a conference with my Coy Commander. At 5.30 a.m. I visited Colonel Milligan 2nd Bde to confer concerning our proposed attack & learnt from him that it had been postponed.

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and that we would receive
 a written order from the 5th Inf
 Bde later in the day.
 At 2 p.m. the 4th Bⁿ, having
 received orders from the 5th Bde,
 followed the 2nd Bⁿ along a
 communication trench running
 under the embankments from
 C5A7.7 to U23C85.03. This
 move was carried out in small
 parties as we came under
 direct H.G. fire from the
 direction of BULLE COURT also
 heavy enemy shell fire but no
 casualties received as yet.
 At 5 p.m. the 4th Bⁿ moved into
 OB 1 & OB 2 behind the 2nd Bⁿ,
 2 Coy's in each trench, &
 consolidated the position gained.
 At 7 p.m. the enemy put on
 very lively barrage on U29A, B, & C
 till 9 p.m. when it lifted suddenly
 & the enemy tried to rush
 our position in OB 2 at U23D4.1.
 They were driven off by bombs,
 rifle & H.G. fire suffering
 heavy casualties.
 The casualties in my Bⁿ
 for the whole of the afternoon
 operations amounted to 47

Chiefly due to the enemy's heavy shell fire.

At 4 A.M. on the morning of the 5th May my Bⁿ was relieved by the 11th Bⁿ without incidents.

The 4th Bⁿ now moved back to the railway embankment at C 5 A 1.4 where we took over from the 24th Bⁿ. The enemy shelled this position very heavily throughout the day & night inflicting over 80 casualties a large proportion being killed.

The cover at this embankment was wholly inadequate as a dump & carrying parties for the front line had to be formed there.

At 4 A.M. the 4th Bⁿ came under the orders of the 1st Inf Bde under Lt Col Mackay D.S.O.

On the morning of the 6th May at 7 a.m. I received orders to support the 1st & 3rd Bⁿs in O B 1 & O B 2 on the 11th & 12th Bⁿs

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had been driven out of three positions. This I did with 2 Coys going straight over the top of the embankment as the sap in U 29 was too crowded & slow to use. My Coys arrived in the front line within 10 minutes with hardly a casualty; but found that the 1st Bn had counter attacked & driven the enemy out at once; so my two Coys were recalled to the embankment. The enemy again shelled the embankment very heavily throughout the day & inflicted heavy casualties on the Bn.

At 2 p.m. I received orders from the Brigadier to relieve the 1st Bn in O.C. this was carried out very successfully by dribbling in parties of

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two to three men at a time.
The Bⁿ did not suffer a
single casualty in this relief
which was good considering
the amount of shelling the
enemy was giving us.

I now received orders from
Brigade to support the
9th Bⁿ in a bombing attack
along O G 1 towards BULL COURT
to join up with the 2nd
Gordon Highlanders.

Three coys of the 9th Bⁿ under
Major Hehigan arrived in my
trench at O G 1 at 9 p.m.
A conference was held over
the method of bombing
down the trench. The coys
were organised into 3 parties
for each Coy Bombers 1st
followed by rifle grenadiers

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followed by M.C.'s. This method proved very satisfactory & by 3.30 a.m. on the 7th May the 9th Bu had bombed the Germans out of O.B.1 & joined up with the Gordons. About 20 Germans were killed & ten taken prisoner. Throughout the night & early morning of the 7th the enemy continued their heavy shelling. Orders were given to men to take as much cover as possible leaving one man in each post to keep a look out, this I found to be the only method for preventing very heavy casualties, as the trench had been blown in 3 different

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places & afforded hardly any cover to the men who literally had to scratch for their lives as the enemy's shells were in many cases falling right in the trench.

At 12.30 a.m. on the morning of the 9th the 4th Bn was relieved by the 5th Bn & returned to a sunken road behind

NOREUIL. This relief was bad owing to 3 other battalions being relieved at the same time & all having to use the SAP in U 29 which was in a very bad condition hardly giving any cover at all.

P.T.O.

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Our Casualties throughout
the operations were

47 killed & 203 wounded.

3 Officers killed & four wounded.

Of these nearly all were
due to shell fire.

Lessons learned.

- (1) Importance of Telephone
Communication however costly
it may be
- (2) Importance of digging proper
communication trench as soon
as objective is gained. Many
lines were lost owing to the
bad condition of the S.A.P. in
U 29. A Pioneer Battalion
digging on this sap & also
in O.C. 1 would have been of
the greatest value to the
men in the front line & in

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my opinion would have
saved many lives. The
importance of digging in
cannot be overestimated

C. B. Case, Major.
4th Bn.



1st Australian Machine Gun Company

On the 26-4-17 the Company made preparations to proceed to relieve the guns of 5th and 6th Aust. M.G. Coy in the BEUGNY-YTRES and VAULX MORCHIES lines at 1800 the following day the Company moved out by sections at 0800 and proceeded to BEUGNATRE where they were met by runners with orders to move straight into positions which they had occupied in rehearsal relief on the 27.4.17.

There were 8 M.G's in each of these lines and they remained there till midday on the 4-5-17.

In accordance with orders from G.O.C 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade, C.O. reconnoitered the VAULX line with a view to altering position. A sketch of proposed positions was sent to the 1st Aust. Inf. Bde.

On the morning of the 4-5-17 at about 1100 C.O. received orders to report to 6th Brigade H.Q. on arriving there it was found out that the 1st A.M.G. Coy would relieve the 6th A.M.G. Coy that night. This was easily arranged as the 1st A.M.G. Coy was ready to move at once and a rendezvous was arranged in Sunkel road 200 yards North of NOREUIL where Guide Op. 6th A.M.G. Coy met our men at 1500.

1 1/2 Sections were to proceed first and relieve gun in Railway bank at C.S.F. C.F.B. These left rendezvous first and on the way up one gun and one man were put out of action by

12
445 a shell. One of the reserve guns replaced this gun and these 6 guns were in position by 1730.

5th Guns took up position in reserve in trench at C4 D23. and Camp at C10ab8 was taken over to which all supplies were taken.

At dusk the remaining section proceeded to relieve 4 guns in front line. On the way up they were delayed by hostile barrage for some time but eventually relieved without any casualties by 23-15.

One German gun was taken over and used in case of emergency.

This gun was used on minor targets to save our GAH. and proved quite a success.

The 5th instant was spent in improving all positions and digging in banks etc. to provide shelter for men.

Men in front line were shelled by our artillery and enemy shelling was also severe 2 tripods which were mounted in railway cutting were hit by shells and position blown out. Care was taken not to have any more men exposed than necessary and also to reduce running with messages.

On the morning of the 6th 3rd Brigade were reported to be retiring from gun at C5 A34. H. G. which was situated at C5 A34. and Brigade was warned. 2 Reserve guns were brought up to Railway Embankment and got into position.

One good target was obtained and about 50 men being killed by our front line gun. remainder fired on small bodies and snipers etc.

On the evening of the 6th one gun was

3.

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was attached to 2nd Battalion in O.G. 2 for operation

2 Guns were attached to 9th Bⁿ in O.G. 1. These guns were to assist in Consolidation after Bombing operations were finished.

On the afternoon of the 7th. C.O. 2nd AMG Coy. arrived & arranged relief. Distribution was now as follows approx:-

- OG 2 { U. 23. C. 8.0.
- U. 23. C. 7 1/2 (also German Gun here)
- U. 23. C. 2 3/4
- U. 23. C. 1.4
- U. 22. D. 7.5.
- OG 1 { U. 22. D. 4.0.
- U. 28. B. 2.9.

7 Guns on railway between C 5. 17. 5 2 1/2 and D 28. C 5. 3.

One gun in Reserve at C 4. D. 2. 3. on the night of the 7th

8 Guns last mentioned were relieved and proceeded to occupy old position in VAUX line.

The remaining gun H.Q. were relieved later and took up position in Dinker road at C 10. D 6. 9. Relief complete by 0400 on the morning of the 8th.

Heavy bombardment that night. In the morning orders were received that 15 AMG Coy would relieve 8 guns. and 8 1st AMG Coy would relieve 8 in VAUX line. 8 guns in C 10. D were taken out at 1830. on the 9th but

AMG Coy had no orders to relieve the guns so they had to remain in.

The 8 guns relieved were taken back to REINCOURT at 1500 on the 10th. C.O. saw C.O. 8th AMG Coy who still had no orders to relieve the guns in VAUX line.

9

4 Saw 8th Bn and arranged relief at 200 that night.
 These guns moved ^{directly} to Reincourt and arrived there
 at 0100 on the 11.5.17.

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Total casualties 1 Officer and 15 O/s wounded.

The following points were noticed.

- (i) Necessity for all spare time and men being used to make & improve cover by digging in & in case of Railway Embankment building up wall to stop splinters from back.
- (ii) Reduce all movement to minimum.
- (iii) Guns kept dismounted & under cover till they were actually mounted to fire.
- (iv) Few men who have never worked a Maxim gun want instruction on German gun. We have plenty of instructors if we could obtain a German gun for instruction purposes.
- (v) Carrying gun gear with a rifle is very hard and revolvers would make a great difference.

Some Infantry Officers do not seem to realise that M/G Officers and Sergeants are specially trained in the tactical handling of M/G's and especially in asking for fire which should have been done by Lewis guns, also trying to make Gun Commanders mount their gun when there was no necessity, when the gun should have been dismounted and under ~~cover~~ cover.

J. R. Richardt

1st Lt. M. G. COY

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Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Class	Charge	This message is on a/c of:		Recd. at.....
		Sent		Service.		Date.....
		At.....m.				From.....
		To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By.....
		By.....				
TO { <u>1st Inf Brigade</u>						
Sender's Number.		Day of Month.		In reply to Number		AAA
* <u>T. M. BATTERY</u>		<u>10</u>		<u> </u>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>I attach herewith report on the recent operations</i></p>						
<p style="text-align: right;"><i>10/5/17</i></p>						
From		10/5/17		<u> </u>		CAPI
Place				<u>P.O. 1st Aust. L.T.M. BATTERY</u>		
Time						
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.				(Z)		
Censor.				Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.		
* This line should be erased if not required.						
750,000. W 2186-M509. H. W. & V., Ltd. 6/16.						

445 Report on Operations of this Unit whilst attached
to 2nd Aust. Division.
1st Brigade front. Bombing attacks to the left.

We took over the line from the 6th & 7th Bde's. They had three guns in the line & we at once pushed up three extra guns under instructions from Brigade. This gave us three guns in O.G. 1., & 3 guns in O.G. 2.

When taking over, the ammunition question was acute but the Brigade Bomb. Officer relieved me of all responsibility re the supply of ammunition & from that time the ammunition difficulty was overcome & we were able to hand over to the incoming unit well over 500 fully prepared rounds.

During the bombing attack to the left, where we were to ~~link~~^{bomb} up ^{to} a given objective & so link up with the troops on our left. We made full arrangements to follow up with two mortars in each line & fatigued parties to follow up with ammunition.

At the start of the operation a few rounds were fired by the mortars in O.G. 1. but as little opposition was encountered the guns in this line were not called upon for further work.

In O.G. 2. instructions were given to the L.T.M.B. Officer by the Battalion

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Commander that the guns were not to fire unless called upon as on especially good targets.

In the bombing attacks the guns were not called upon but during consolidation pineapple bombs became troublesome and after two bursts of grape from a Stokes Mortar on the suspected position no further trouble was experienced from these.

The operation ~~on~~ being successful & the Infantry having linked up with the troops who had come up on our left, the guns on both lines were placed in position to repel a possible counter attack, care being taken to have an extra supply of ammunition with the left guns which were placed ready for immediate action on the flanks.


In the event of a counter attack the guns in our support lines were prepared to put up a barrage at about 200 yds in front of our front line.

The front line guns would open up forming a barrage at the extreme range of 420 yards shortening as required.

The guns in the rear line were prepared to open upon receipt of instructions from the front line & runners were arranged to go to the rear through the communication trench or over the top if necessary.

One of the most satisfactory things in the work done was the entire absence of blunders & as C.O. of the Battery I have much

445 much to thank the Brigade Staff Captain,
~~for~~ as he not only personally dealt with
 the supply of the Stokes bombs, but also
 supervised the preparation of them.


 Capt.
 O.C. 1st Aust. L. T. M. BATTERY.

Movements since 28th ult.

- 3/5/17. Beaulincourt - Beaugnatoe
 Beaugnatre - Vauls. later in day.
 Vauls to Noeuit on receipt of instructions
 to relieve the 5th A.L.T.M.B.
- 4/5/17. Took over 5th Bde line. 5th A.L.T.M.B. being unknown
 to their Brigade. One 7th Bde. Muster
 relieved by us in 5th Bde. line.
- 6/5/17. Relieved from 5th Bde. line by 3rd A.L.T.M.B.
 and at same time we relieved 6th & 7th A.L.T.M.B.
 in 1st Bde. line
- 9/5/17. Relieved by 0330 by 2nd A.L.T.M.B.
- 9/5/17. Moved to Vauls.
- 9/5/17. Moved to Beaulincourt.

445 Report on Operations of this unit whilst attached to 2nd Aust. Division.

5th Brigade Front - Bombing attacks to the right. The W.C.O. got in touch with Officer of the bombing party and at his request fired on a communication trench just beyond the first objective. Then when the bombers were moving up the W.C.O. in charge went forward, selected prepared positions to sweep the trench ahead of the bombing. Ammunition fatigue parties were following up the guns.

When the bombers reached the final objective a slow but steady ~~fire~~ barrage was kept up while the position was consolidated. The two guns were then placed in position to repel a counter attack, suspected strong points being specially considered.

During the operation the enemy several times ran from the trench ~~both~~ both to avoid the mustard shells & to get round the barrage but hardly any escaped the rifle fire of the infantry in doing so.

It was found necessary for a capable man to keep in touch with the foremost bombers in this operation the senior W.C.O. did this work.

At one time the attack was held up by two Machine Guns & the Stokes gun was rushed up in a few minutes the bombers were able to carry on.

Much was due to the high efficiency & promptness of the W.C.O. in charge & the gun crews that the bombing was not considerably delayed.

..... Capt.
W. J. O'Connell
G.O. 1st Aust. L. T. M. BATTERY.

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1600 - Battalion was notified that 3 Coys. would carry out an attack on HINDENBURG Line from U.22.D.60.00. to U.28.A.75.70. Attack to take place at 2130. The remaining Company to be placed at disposal of C.O. 2nd Battalion to carry out an attack at the same time on HINDENBURG Line. "C" Company was placed at disposal of C.O. 2nd Bn. to carry out an attack from U.23.C.2.4. to U.22.D. 45.40.

Location of Battalion at 1600. Ref. Map 57c 1/40,000.

1 Company C.10.C.7.9. Sunken Road.
Bn.Hqrs, and 2 Coys. C.16.A.4.3. Sunken Road.
1 Company - H.6.D. Central.
Transport and 2 Cookers - H.6.D. Central.

2030.- Zero hour postponed until 0345.

2230 - Battalion in position. 3 Coys. (A,B,D,) in O.G.1 from U.29.A.8.5. to U.22.D. 60.00. One Coy. in O.G.2 to the right of U.23.C.2.4.

Operations in O.G.1.

2230. - Commenced reforming dumps near jumping off point. Wire, Stakes, Bombs, etc S.A.A. etc. The ground as much as possible examined. The delayed Zero hour permitted men a short rest and allowed for more complete arrangements to be made. Telephones were laid from Battalion Hqrs. to jumping off point ready for Companies to pick up as they moved out. Relays of runners were posted. It was decided after examination of communications to establish Regimental Aid Post in O.G.1. This was done. The Ambulance was notified of position of Aid Post. (The Ambulance however failed to clear from Aid Post - as a result a considerable number of fighting troops had to be used to clear the field).

2330.- Coy. Commanders, Light Trench Mortar, Medium Trench Mortar, and 2 Vickers Gun Officers received final instructions.

0130.- Artillery Time Table received and promulgated.

0200.- Left flank post of 4th Battalion driven out - fresh post established 40 yards back.

0345.- Artillery Barrage commenced.

0358.- Bombing attack launched.

0515.- Touch gained with 2nd Gordon Highlanders on our left. Consolidation and construction of Strong Posts commenced.

0600.- Took over line held by 4th Battalion from 12.D.85.00 to 29.A.40.85. in addition to newly captured ground.

0900.- Enemy reported massing for counter attack at U.22.B.8.5. Attack did not eventuate.

1900.- Exchanged flank posts with 2nd Gordon Highlanders in order to overlap.

Night of 7/8.- Bn. relieved by 5th Bn. Relief commenced at 0100, complete at 0230.

Settled in sunk roads in C.10.C. at 0530.

Operations in O.G.2. by "C" Coy. 9th Bn.

Object - to capture and consolidate from U.23.C.2.4. to U.22.D.45.40. (about 300 yds.), and erect posts at about

1. U.22.D.9.45.
2. U.22.D.9.3.
3. U.22.D.45.4.
4. U.22D.45.3.

0355.- Attack launched in 4 separate parties.

No. 1 Party from saphead - see sketch. to erect No. 1 Post.

No. 2 No. 2 "
No. 3 No. 3 "
No. 4 No. 4 "

0425.- Objective gained. Consolidation commenced.

Night of 7/8 May.- Coy. relieved by Coy. of 6th Bn.

Mildred McQueen

Major.,

Temp. Commanding 9th Battalion.

10-5-17.

STORY OF FIGHT IN O.G. 1.

Map references not quoted, but sketch shewing various points of interest is attached hereto.

The attack was launched at 3.58 a.m., the leap-frog method being employed, that is to say, a platoon captured a length of trench and immediately commenced consolidation. The following platoon passed through them immediately and captured a similar length, and so on until objective was reached.

Opposition was met almost immediately, the enemy using egg bombs, stick bombs, "Pineapple" mortars and machine guns. This opposition was dealt with by Mills bombs, rifle grenades, Lewis guns, and light and medium trench mortars. Under cover of these weapons our bomb parties pushed on until the point marked "2nd. Check" on sketch was reached. Here considerable was met, flame projectors being employed. At this stage it was discovered that the enemy had machine guns and snipers both in rear and front of the captured trench (see sketch). These were effectively dealt with by Lewis guns and rifle grenades.

Meanwhile a determined attack was made against the enemy opposition which was soon beaten down, one flame projector being exploded by a Mills bomb.

After capture of this point it was discovered that the enemy had employed three flame projectors and one "Pineapple" mortar from this point. These were captured. From here to the point marked "3rd. Check" little opposition was met and as it was thought that the enemy were retiring Lewis guns were placed in "NO MAN'S LAND" on either flank, which fired into the enemy trench and assisted to reduce their resistance.

At the point marked "3rd. Check" a fierce bomb fight raged for 2 or 3 minutes. From here on the resistance was not so great, the enemy bombing attacks becoming weaker. At point marked "3rd. Check" an enemy M.G. had been firing. The lock and a considerable quantity of belts and ammunition were there. The crew carrying the gun, were seen to be retiring down the trench in rear of a considerable party and covered by a small bombing party. Every effort was made to overtake this group of the enemy (about 40 strong) but owing to short bomb encounters, without success. The whole of this party with the machine gun were, however, so closely pressed that they fell into the hands of the Gordon Highlanders at almost the same moment as we gained touch with that regiment.

Two further "Pineapple" trench mortars were captured at the point marked "ETM" on sketch.

The 2 enemy machine guns that had been playing from "NO MAN'S LAND" were apparently successfully withdrawn as they gave no further trouble.

Almost at once after gaining touch with the "Gordons" the enemy commenced heavy shelling of both the newly and previously captured portion of the trench. This greatly retarded consolidation.

The spoil was considerable, consisting of beside the three T.M's. and 3 flame projectors, 250 to 300 rifles, large quantities of egg and stick bombs, flares, S.A.A., equipment, etc. Rations for about 200 men were found in the dugouts. The bread was fresh and of good quality. Other rations were plentiful and reasonably good.

Heavy casualties were undoubtedly inflicted on the enemy. In this sector alone, between 35 and 40 dead Germans were found including 2 Officers. A considerable portion of these casualties were caused by bomb wounds. Our own casualties were 1 Officer and 159 other ranks.

We took prisoners 1 Officer and 10 other ranks irrespective of the considerable numbers driven by us into the hands of the Gordon Highlanders.

State of the trenches. The enemy trenches were well provided with large deep dugouts. They are very wide and have been considerably battered about by shell fire. In rear of the trenches are large deep pits about 20 feet square. These pits are possibly tank traps. They have been very much battered about and most of them are no longer recognisable as pits.

(2)

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Enemy shell fire. The enemy shell fire throughout our tenure of the trenches was heavy, at times becoming intense. Generally speaking the fire was very accurate. Owing to the position of the trenches, besides frontal and flank fire we are defiladed from the direction of QUEANT and PRONVILLE. I am inclined to think it is this fire that is responsible for the idea that our own fire is falling short.

Total length of trench captured in O.G.I. was about 650 yards.

10-5-17.

(Signed) M. NILDER NELIGAN, Major,

Temp. Commanding 9th. Battalion A.I.F.

STORY OF THE FIGHT IN O.G. 2.

Map references not quoted, but sketch shewing various points of interest is attached hereto.

The attack was launched at 0400 in four parties, each party consisting of one platoon. Their respective objectives were as marked 1, 2, 3, 4 on attached sketch. Nos. 1 and 2 leading. After capture Nos. 3 and 4 passed through Nos. 1 and 2 and gained Nos. 3 and 4. At each of these points a strong point was erected.

Nos. 1 and 2 almost immediately met opposition from machine guns, snipers and bombers. This was soon overcome, and after two or three minutes severe bomb fighting ground was rushed and objective reached.

Word was then sent back to Nos. 3 and 4 parties who moved up through Nos. 1 and 2. Shortly after these parties had passed through Nos. 1 and 2 they met heavy opposition. A Light Trench Mortar was employed to assist in breaking this down and after about five minutes these parties were able to push on. Although heavy bombing was kept up by the enemy, objectives were gained and consolidation commenced.

Total German trench captured, about 250 yards.

Considerable casualties were inflicted on the enemy, about 20 dead were found in the trench.

Large number (about 150) rifles were captured with a quantity of equipment, bombs and S.A.A. and three flare pistols with large quantity of flares.

During the attack the enemy fired a number of "Pineapple" bombs at close range into our advancing troops. Shortly before 0500 these ceased to worry us.

The clothing and equipment of all enemy dead was quite new, as were also the bulk of the rifles.

The trenches were very wide and in places almost obliterated. Some deep dugouts were found.

Throughout the operation heavy and at times intense enemy shell fire was maintained rendering consolidation most difficult.

(Signed) M. NILDER NELIGAN Major.

Temp. Commanding 9th. Battalion, A. I. F.

10/5/17.

(COPY)

Appendix No. 5/17/2

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LESSONS.

1. Steel helmets should be covered. When wet they glisten and are easily seen when flares go up. I am confident that this is the cause of some of the heavy shelling during reliefs.
2. Insufficient ~~sup~~ attachments- if possible some permanent attachment should be employed which is independent of the bayonet.
3. More training in the use of German bombs required. These bombs can often be used- thus saving carrying parties for our own.
4. The formation of a regimental aid post in the front line trench proved very valuable- both from point of view of morale and in dealing with wounded who could not be got away for some time owing to barrages etc. The Field Ambulance, however, although informed where the aid post was situated, did not clear from this point. As a result there was for a time, a shortage of stretchers and a number of fighting troops had to be employed as stretcher-bearers. There seems to be some doubt as to whose business it is to clear from the regimental aid post.
5. Communication saps are not cleared of dead and wounded. Troops going into attack are naturally effected by this- besides the more important point that it blocks up the sap.
6. Some quick wire should be devised on the principle of the German concertina wire which is in small coils with corkscrews attached. The ~~HE~~ coils we employ are cumbersome and require much more time to deal with.
7. The lack of an artillery liaison officer was much felt.
8. The lack of permanent direct communication with Brigade was felt. A power buzzer would have been of much value.
9. Reserve rations and water should be kept in trenches such as O.G. 1 and 2 as rations parties from the rear are of necessity uncertain.
10. Very flares are far too difficult to get. S.O.S., except rockets, are also almost impossible to procure.
11. Absolutely no sandbags could be got in the earlier stages. This is a very serious matter in erecting strong points.
12. One communication trench is not enough. Numbers of lives were lost owing to so many reliefs going in at once down the one trench. Congestion was considerable and men were practically forced into the open.

(Signed) M. NILDER NELIGAN Major,

Temp. Commanding 9th. Battalion.

10/5/17.

Map No. 1

FIRST PERIOD

First phase

Position of units of 1st A.I. Bde when they took up positions under 5th & 6th Bullecourt

Second phase


Position of units of 1st A.I. Bde when they came under control of Brigadier 1st Bde (1st & 3rd Bns at 12:00 on 4/5/17, 2nd & 4th Bns at 02:30 on 5/5/17)

Third phase

Increased frontage gained by Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt

X Point to which 3rd Bn were driven back at 2:00 on 4/5/17

Block established by 1st Bn at 2:00 on 4/5/17



Emplacements

- Machine Gun
- Trench Mortar
- Unspecified
- Suspected Tank Gun
- A.A. Gun
- Observation Post

SCALE - 1:10,000

TRENCH RECEIVE

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Appendix No. 5/17/2

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ECOUST - ST MEIN
Edition 3

Map No 2
Second Period


1st Phase

Units on completion of relief
of front lines at midnight
on 6/7 May

2nd Phase

Frontage gained by 0515
on 7/5/17

Riencourt
Iez-Cagnicourt



25) 24-4-17.

SCALE - 1:10,000

TRENCHES
RECEIVED

Appendix 57/3

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 30

Brigade Headquarters,
12th. May, 1917.

REFERENCE MAP, 570, 1:40,000.

1. The 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade will proceed on 13th. inst., by march route to BAZENTIN-le-PETIT, (Squares S.8.B. and D.) via GUEDECOURT, FLERS and LONGUEVAL.

The 2nd. Field Ambulance will be attached for the move.

2. Units will pass the starting point, Cross Roads at N.18.A.O.O. as follows:-

1st. Battalion	0430
2nd. Battalion	0445
3rd. Battalion	0500
1st. M.G.Coy.,	0515
1st. L.T.M.Bty.,	0525
4th. Battalion	0530
Bdo. Headquarters	0545.

2nd. Field Ambulance at any time after 0550 but clearing BAPAUME-LE TRANSLOY Road before 1000.

3. Intervals of at least 200 yards will be maintained between Units, and transport of Units and other troops; and intervals of 100 yards between Companies.

Cookers will travel with troops; and Battalion transport under arrangements made by Staff Captain.

4. Billeting parties of one Officer 8 others from each Battalion and details from other Units will meet Capt. N.M.CUTHBERT at 0600 on 13th. inst., at road junction at S.8.D.8.O.

5. Rear parties of one Officer 8 others per Battalion and details from other Units will be left in present camps to hand over to Units of 48th. Imperial Division.

6. Special arrangements will be made for transport of men with sore feet and will be communicated to Units.

7. C.O. 4th. Aust. Battalion will detail one Officer 10 other ranks to march in rear of Brigade Headquarters to collect stragglers of all Units.

8. Brigade Headquarters will close at 0600 and re-open at BAZENTIN at same hour.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

H. Hardie

Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Extra copies to:-

No. 13 2nd. Aust. Field Ambulance,
14 No. 2 Coy., A.A.S.C.

ISSUED AT 1530.

H. Hardie
12/5

Appendix 5/17/4

445

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

SYLLABUS OF TRAINING FOR WEEK ENDING, 19TH, MAY, 1917.

<u>Date.</u>	<u>Morning.</u>	<u>Afternoon.</u>	<u>Night.</u>
16th.	Platoon training:- Artillery formations: thence into assualting waves.	Semi-open warfare:- Company in advanced guards and patrols.	Lecture, "Normal formation for attack" (S.S. 144).
17th.	Company training. Artillery formations to assualting waves - particular stress being given to position of Lewis Gunners.		Company night concentration march. Platoons of each Company to concentrate at a definite hour and a definite spot: thence carry out simple manoeuvre e.g. getting into attack formation.
18th.	Platoon attack from trench to trench; Position of Lewis Gunners and Representation of barrage.	Use of shell holes in attack and bombers defence:- Construction of L.G. positions and S.P's. and connecting up of the latter.	Lecture, "Attack on villages and woods" Spocial patrol men of Companies to be given night training in patrol work under Battalion Intelligence Officer.
19th.	Company attack on trenches - more than one objective; barrage.	Company attack on villages and specially prepared positions.	Lecture, "Map reading and making of rough sketches and reports containing necessary and sufficient information".

Training of N.C.O's. will be actively proceeded with.

J. H. Harris
Brigade Major 1st Aust. Infantry Brigade

Appendix No. 5/17/4

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

SYLLABUS OF TRAINING FOR WEEK ENDING, 26TH. MAY, 1917.

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Date.	Morning.	Afternoon.	Night.
21st.	Semi-open warfare. Company in advanced guards. Patrols - This exercise was not carried out on 16th. owing to inclement weather.	Working along trenches by bombing - using bombers, Rifle Grenadiers, riflemen and Lewis guns. Keeping fresh men at front.	Lecture to Platoon Officers - "Care and welfare of men in Platoon.
22nd.	Company attack on trenches - particular attention to messages and reports.	Company in action against a sunken road.	Lecture - Consolidation of trenches gained in bombing attack.
23rd.	Company attack on trenches - then bombing ahead and to flanks to extend position and consolidating measures against counter-attacks.	Dealing with enemy bombing counter-attacks from trenches. Formation of bombing blocks under R.E. supervision.	Discussion on day's work.
24th.	Rifle grenade and bombing practice for all ranks.	Consolidation of positions and rapid wiring under R.E. supervision.	Lecture - Artillery co-operation in the attack.
25th.	Semi-open warfare. Battalion in advanced guards.		Concentration of Battalion for night attack and taking up formation for the attack.
26th.	Battalion attack on trench systems.	Rifle grenade and bombing practice.	Discussion on day's work.

Company exercises will be set by Battalion Commanders.

H. J. Hardie

Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Appendix No. 5/17/5

445

SECRET.

Appendix 5/17/16

COPY NO. 30

83

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 31.

Brigade Headquarters,
19th. May, 1917.

REFERENCE MAP, ALBERT COMBINED SHEET.

1. The 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade will on 21st. May, 1917 march in accordance with attached march table from BAZENTIN to the BAIZIEUX area for rest and training.

2. 1st. Aust. Field Company, 1st. Aust. Pioneer Battalion and 2nd. Aust. Field Ambulance are attached for the move and with the Brigade constitute 1st. Brigade Group.

Advanced parties of 2nd. and 3rd. Aust. Infantry Brigades will also be attached on 21st. inst.

3. (a) The following intervals will be maintained on the march:-

- 200 yards between Battalions and Field Companies,
- 200 yards between transport of Units and other Units,
- 100 yards between Companies.

(b) Units of 1st. Brigade Group will give way to Artillery Units when met on the road.

4. (a) Advanced parties of 1st. Brigade Group will leave Brigade Headquarters BAZENTIN at 1000 on 20th. inst., and Officers in charge will report to Capt. J.D. ROGERS, M.C. 6th. Battalion, Brigade Billeting Officer, as follows:-

BUIRE at Town Major's Office at 1200
LAVIEVILLE at Town Major's Office at 1230.

O.C. advanced party of 6th. Field Company will proceed by route march to LAVIEVILLE leaving BAZENTIN at 0700 on 20th. inst.

Officer in charge 1st. Pioneer Battalion party will report to Town Major at DERNANCOURT and arrange billeting direct.

(b) Advanced and rear parties of 1st. Field Company and 1st. Pioneer Battalion will take over and hand over staging camps at BAZENTIN.

5. Commanding Officers 1st. and 2nd. Battalions will detail parties of 1 Officer and 10 other ranks to march in rear of 1st. Brigade Headquarters and Units of 3rd. Brigade Group respectively to collect stragglers.

6. Brigade Headquarters will close at 0600 and open at LAVIEVILLE at the same hour.

A C K N O W L E D G E.

J. L. Hardie

Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Extra copies to:-

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| No. 13. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. | No. 17. No. 2 Coy., A.A.S.C. |
| 14. 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. | 18. 2nd. Aust. Field Ambulance, |
| 15. 1st. Pioneer Battalion | 19. Town Major, BRISLE, |
| 16. 1st. Field Coy., A.E. | 20. Town Major, BUIRE, |
| 21. Town Major, DERNANCOURT. | |

ISSUED AT 1745.

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MOVEMENT TABLE TO ACCOMPANY 1ST& AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 31 of 19TH. MAY, 1917.

<u>Date.</u>	<u>Unit.</u>	<u>From.</u>	<u>To.</u>	<u>To pass Starting Point</u> <u>S.14.B.0.5.6</u>	<u>Route.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
21st.	1st. Battalion	BAZENTIN	LAVIEVILLE	0500	CONTALMAISON- AVELUY- BOUZINCOURT.	To halt for one hour near BOUZINCOURT.
	1st. A.M.G.Coy.	do.	do.	0520	do.	
	1st. A. Field Company.	do.	do.	0530	do.	
	1st. A.I.Bde. H. Q.	do.	do.	0540	do.	
	4th. Aust. Bn.	do.	BUIRE	0600	CONTALMAISON- FRICOURT- MEAULTE- VILLE-sur-ANCRE	Not to pass cross roads at E. 17.B.8.5. before 0915.
	3rd. Aust. Bn.	do.	do.	0620	do.	
	2nd. Aust. Bn.	do.	do.	0640	do.	
	1st. A.L.T.M.B	do.	do.			
	1st. Pioneer Bn.	do.	DERNANCOURT	0700	CONTALMAISON- FRICOURT-MEAULTE-	To halt for one hour East of E.17.B.8.5.
	Advanced parties	do.	2nd. Bde. Area	0720)	CONTALMAISON-	
	2nd. Bde. Group.	do.	3rd. Bde. Area	0725)	FRICOURT-MEAULTE- VILLE-sur-ANCRE.	
	Advanced parties	do.				
	3rd. Bde. Group.	do.				
	2nd. Field Amb.	do.	BUIRE Camp.	Not before 0730.	do.	

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
445

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.Brigade Headquarters,
19th. May, 1917.ADMINISTRATIVE MEMO. ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 31.

1. Motor lorries are not available to convey advanced billeting parties. Billeting parties will report as ordered but will now make their own arrangements as to times and travelling.

2. Mobile reserve S.A.A., Bombs, etc., will be dumped outside Area Commandant's Office S.13.B.5.2. at 1000 to-morrow. Receipts from Area Commandant will be obtained.

3. One motor lorry and 2 G.S. wagons per Battalion and one motor lorry and 1 G.S. wagon for Brigade Headquarters will be allotted for the move; the motor lorries if required will make two journoys. The G.S. wagons will report to Battalions on the afternoon of the 20th.; the motor lorries will report at 0830 on 21st. inst.



Capt.,

Staff Captain, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

445

Brigade Headquarters,
2nd. June, 1917.

SYLLABUS OF TRAINING FOR PERIOD 24TH. MAY, TO 1ST. JUNE, 1917.

<u>Date.</u>	<u>Morning.</u>	<u>Afternoon.</u>
24th.	(Bayonet fighting (Musketry.	Recreational Training.
25th.	(Bayonet fighting (Musketry.	" "
26th.	(Dealing with enemy bombing (counter-attacks from trenches. (Formation of bombing blocks (under R.E. supervision.	" "
28th.	(Bayonet fighting (Musketry.	" "
29th.	(Bayonet fighting (Musketry.	" "
30th.	Musketry.	" "
31st.	Marching and Musketry tests.	" "
1st.	Marching and Musketry tests.	" "

NOTE.

1. At the end of this period Brigade tests will be held in which the best all round Company of each Battalion will compete. The winning Company of these tests will represent the Brigade in the Divisional competition which will take place in another area and will extend over several days.

2. Training as laid down in G.S. Memo 25 of 20th. inst., regarding Lewis Gun, Bombing and rifle grenade practice will be carried out during above period at discretion of Commanding Officers, but the whole of the training as laid down must be completed by 1st. June.

Major,

Brigade Major, 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

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Appendix No. 5/17/8

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1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE.....5....1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day.		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day.	
			OFFICERS.			OTHER RANKS.				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	37	936							37	936
2nd. Bn.	33	878							33	878
3rd. Bn.	36	1014							36	1014
4th. Bn.	26	803							26	803
1 M.G.Coy.	9	186							8	186
TOTAL.	141	3817			1				140	3817

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. Brig.-General

RETURN NO. 1.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

DATE.....5....1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment.				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	2	21	23	17	5	26	31	1	
1st. Bn.	30	785	815	52	3		3		JOINED - 3% leave, 1% absent GONE - 1% leave, 2% on command, 5% F.Amb
2nd. Bn.	26	732	758	51					JOINED - 3% leave, 1% school GONE - 1% leave, 2% F.Amb, 1% on command
3rd. Bn.	29	880	909	47					GONE - 1% to F.Amb
4th. Bn.	20	672	692	49	1	3	4		JOINED - 1% leave
1 M.G.Coy.	7	179	186	47					JOINED - 1% leave, 1% from F.Amb for AMC duties
1 L.T.M.By.	4	40	44			20	20		GONE - 1% (attached) to Hospital
2 Sig.Sect.	1	25	26	8		27	27		
TOTAL.	119	3334	3453	271	9	76	85	1	

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

Lieut.-Col. Brig.-General

Sick evacuation for 1/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>N^o</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Scabies
	1	Dermatitis
	1	Rheumatism
	1	Chronic Synovitis
	1	Dental
2 nd Battalion	2	Dermatic Abrasion
3 rd Battalion	2	Piles
	2	P.U.O
	2	Sore Feet
1 st L.T.M. Bty	1	Scabies
	<u>14</u>	

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE...2...5...1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day.		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day.	
	Off.	O.R.	OFFICERS.			OTHER RANKS.			Off.	O.R.
			Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.		
1st. Bn.	37	936							37	936
2nd. Bn.	33	878						8	33	870
3rd. Bn.	36	1014							36	1014
4th. Bn.	26	803							26	803
1 M.G.Coy.	8	186						2	8	184
TOTAL.	140	3817						10	140	3807

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Lieut.-Col.
Brig.-General

RETURN NO. 1.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

DATE...2...5...1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment.				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	2	21	23	17	5	26	31	1	-
1st. Bn.	30	782	812	52	2		2		GONE - 3/4 CN BACKHOUSE from attached 3/4 to F Amb
2nd. Bn.	26	732	758	51					
3rd. Bn.	29	878	907	47					JOINED - 17% leave GONE - 3% to F Amb
4th. Bn.	20	675	695	49	1	3	4		JOINED - 37% detention, 17% leave GONE - 1% sick
1 M.G.Coy.	7	179	186	47					
1 L.T.M.By.	4	39	43			21	21		JOINED - 17% attached from leave GONE - 17% leave
2 Sig.Sect.	1	23	24	8		27	27		GONE - 1% on Command, 1% on leave
TOTAL.	119	3329	3448	271	8	77	85	1	

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

Lieut.-Col.
Brig.-General

Sick evacuation for 2/5/17.

Unit	No	Nature of Sickness
1st Battalion	* 1 Off	V.D.
	1 OR	V.D.
	1	Haemorrhoids
	1	Sprench fever
3rd Battalion	1	P.O.
	1	Tonsillitis
	1	Scalded feet
4th Battalion	1	Sore Throat & Adenitis
<u>10 Off 7 OR</u>		

* 2/Lt C N BACKHOUSE

Evacuations	Case	Sex
To end growth to 2nd	687	364 22

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 9...5...1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off	O.R.
1st. Bn.	31	702				1 W			31	701
2nd. Bn.	34	742	1 K. (Capt WESTBROOK)			4 K } 68 W }	12 } 8 x }		33	690
3rd. Bn.	36	729				4 K } 3 W }	2 }		36	724
4th. Bn.	23	646							23	646
1 H.G. Coy.	8	169	1 Lt DUTTON						7	169
TOTAL	132	2988	2			80	22		130	2930

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. Brig.-General
 * NOTE - Shown as sick in error. Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 9...5...1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	2	16	18	17	5	30	35	1	
1st. Bn.	24	557	581	51	1		1		GONE - Lt BUCHAN on leave 1% wounded 2/Lt CT WAUGA 2% 7 Amb 9% AWOL
2nd. Bn.	24	527	551	51					JOINED - Lt DM L FORREST 5% Schools L R R BARNARD, wounded, 1% 67 Army
3rd. Bn.	26	598	624	48					GONE - 1% leave 2% 7 Amb Capt WESTBROOK 7% and 4% Lt BRET and 68% Wounded
4th. Bn.	17	525	542	47	1	3	4		JOINED - 7% wounded GONE - 4% K 3% W L R RAGNEW 15% Army for instruction, 1% 65 Army 1% leave 1% Comm
1 H.G. Coy.	6	162	168	47					JOINED - 1% School 1% 1st T Bns 1% leave GONE - 3% to School 3% leave
1 L.T.F. By.	3	31	34			18	18		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	23	24	8		25	25		
TOTAL	103	2439	2542	269	7	76	83	1	GONE - Lt SA DUTT on wounded 7% 17, 1% leave

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

Sick Concussions for 9/15/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>N^o</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	* 1 off.	not stated
	1	Sprained ankle
	1	Influenza
2 nd Battalion	1	P.U.O.
	1	Sprained ankle
	<u>10 off</u>	<u>4 off.</u>

X ^{2/21} C. J. WAUGH.

445

RETURN NO. 3.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS						OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.			
1st. Bn.	31	701				3 K		21 sick 1 transfer	31	676			
2nd. Bn.	33	690							33	690			
3rd. Bn.	36	724			1	1 M 1 W 10 M	3	15 sick	35	700			
4th. Bn.	23	646				42			23	604			
1 H.G. Coy.	7	169		1		1 W			8	168			
TOTAL	130	2930		1	1	58	3	37	130	2838			

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 7.

DATE 10.5.1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	28	33	1	JOINED - Capt Chop W B TESSOP 10/5/17
1st. Bn.	25	558	583	51	2		2		JOINED - 2/LIAJ CRUISE 2/8/17 x Schools 2/8/17 From on Command 2/LISW CHAMPIONS lead
2nd. Bn.	24	526	550	51					GONE - Capt KIRKWOOD 4/8/17 on leave
3rd. Bn.	27	568	595	48					GONE - 1% to F. Amb.
4th. Bn.	17	480	497	47		1	1		JOINED - Capt AL HEMISH x School 3% from wounded 2% from on Command GONE - 1% K, 1% W, 10% M, 3% leave 20% 167 Amb.
1 H.G. Coy.	6	160	166	47					GONE - 3% to Hospital 42 O.R Casualties
1 L.T.M. By.	3	30	33			17	17		GONE - 1% W, 1% leave
2 Sig. Sect.	1	23	24	7		28	28		GONE - 1% leave, 1% (attached) leave
TOTAL	108	361	2469	268	7	74	81	1	JOINED 3% attached GONE 1 Horse to 1 st Av

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

445

Sick evacuation for 10/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
2 nd Battalion	1	P.U.O.
3 rd Battalion	20	Not available
4 th Battalion	3	Sore feet.
	<u>24</u>	

445

Appendix No. 5/17/8

"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message _____

Prefix _____	Code _____	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Reed. at _____ m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent		Service.	Date _____
			At _____ m.			From _____
			To _____			By _____
			By _____			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")

TO { *Brigade Major 1st A Bde*

Sender's Number. * <i>Aza 870</i>	Day of Month <i>11</i>	In reply to Number	AAA
--------------------------------------	---------------------------	--------------------	------------

Casualties and sick evacuations for week ended 10/5/17

Unit	Officers					OR					Total	
	K	DW	W	M	H	K	DW	W	M	H	Off	OR
<i>Bde Hq.</i>						2						2
<i>1st Bn</i>	2	3	8			44	3	231	26	20	13	324
			1*					4*			1*	4*
<i>2nd Bn</i>	1		8			31		196		11	9	238
								5*				5*
<i>3rd Bn</i>	1		3			56		244	10	32	4	342
								1*				1*
<i>4th Bn</i>	2	1	5			51		178	14	19	8	262
								3*				3*
<i>1st MG Com</i>			1					15		1	1	16
<i>1st T.M. Bn</i>			1*			2		2*		1	1*	4*
TOTAL	6	4	27	-	-	186	3	880	50	84	37	1203

From _____ ** At. Duty*

Place _____

Time _____

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. **(Z)**

Censor _____ Signature of Ad _____ or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

* This line should be erased if not required.

(4198) Wt. W14042-M44. 300000 Pads. 12/15. Sir J. C. & S.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 11.5.1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day		
	Off.	O.R.	OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS			Off	O.R.	
			Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.			
1st. Bn.	31	676		3	<i>Lt Graham Lt Parkinson Lt Bennett</i>		10 K 19 M	95	8 on command	34	734
2nd. Bn.	33	690		3				137		36	827
3rd. Bn.	35	700		1				32	2 on command	35	720
4th. Bn.	23	604							3 on command	23	601
1 H.G. Coy.	8	168		1				11		9	179
TOTAL	130	2838		8			39	275	13	137	3061

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

W. M. C.

Brig.-General

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 11.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	24	29	1	Gene - 4% from attached
1st. Bn.	28	624	652	51	2		2		JOINED L'FAGRAHAM & Seconded Lt J.N. BENNETT Lt W.H. PARKINSON & Reup. 17% to 1st Bn On 27% leave 19% on command, 9% reup etc Gene - 2% to 1st Bn, 2% on command, 10% killed, 19% in hospital
2nd. Bn.	27	663	690	51					JOINED L'R.F. CHRISTIANSON 7% & PH. HAYLEN 7% C.W. MENZIE & 137% & Reup
3rd. Bn.	28	592	620	48					JOINED Lt P.H. OWEN & 16% & Reup & 16% to Hoop 2% to leave Gene - 4% K, 6% wounded
4th. Bn.	19	534	553	47		1	1		JOINED - Capt R. TAYLOR RMO & Hospital, Lt ERWHART Lt W.P. CLEMENSEN & 10% to 2% to leave 16% to 2% to 39% to Reup, 7% to wounded Gene - Lt Col I.G. MACKAY D.S.O. and 2% to 2% to 1st Bn 7% to Hospital, 1% to on command
1 H.G. Coy.	6	170	176	47					JOINED Lt H.J. REX 7% to Reup etc, 1% to Hospital JOINED Lt Hoop, Lt L. BAYER 1% to School
1 L.T.M. By.	3	30	33			17	17		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	23	24	7		28	28		JOINED - 1% to attached Gene - 1% from attached
TOTAL	117	262	2769	268	7	70	77	1	

W. M. C.

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sick Evacuation for 11/5/19

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	2	P.U.O.
4 th Battalion	6	P.U.O.
	1	Scabies
1 st M.G. Coy	1	Not Known
	<u>10</u>	

W. W. W. W.
11/5.

5/17/8

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 12.5.1917

99

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS					OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.	
												Departure
1st. Bn.	34	734		1	2					33	734	
2nd. Bn.	36	827		1						37	827	
3rd. Bn.	35	720					3	12		35	711	
4th. Bn.	23	601		1	1		62	17		23	646	
1 H.G. Coy.	9	179								9	179	
TOTAL	137	3061		3	3		65	29		137	3091	

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DAILY STRENGTH.

DATE 12.5.1917

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	25	30	1	JOINED - 1% to Attached
1st. Bn.	26	606	632	51	2		2		JOINED - 2/Lt RG HUMPHREYS & On Com 7% School GODLE - 2% leave 2/Lt FH PACE & RW SAMSON 66 Aust DN 22% to Rest Camp 7/Lt TH ROBERTSON and 1% to 7 Amb.
2nd. Bn.	27	639	666	51					JOINED - 7/Lt SH TINDAL & school GONE - 10% to 25% to rest camp 1% to 7 Amb
3rd. Bn.	28	574	602	48					JOINED 7/Lt A LITTLEJOHN - School 7% School 39% Hosp 1% leave GONE 7/Lt CLSMITH ML + 23% to Rest Camp, 2% leave 4% to 7 Amb.
4th. Bn.	19	517	536	47	1		1		JOINED - 9% to 5th, 6% to School, 1% absentee 7/Lt CR Piper & School, L/R A. MACALPINE & leave GONE 7/Lt MR SHELLEY and 10% Hospital & DFT WOLFE to leave, 23% to rest camp
1 H.G. Coy.	6	169	175	47					GONE - 1% leave
1 L.T.M. By.	3	30	33	7		17	17		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	23	24	7		29	29		JOINED - 1% attached.
TOTAL	115	2574	2689	268	7	72	79	1	

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

Sick evacuations for 12/15/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	* 1 Off.	Shocks
	1	Dropsy.
2 nd Battalion	1	P.U.O.
3 rd Battalion	1	Ringworm
	2	P.U.O.
	1	French fever
4 th Battalion	⊕ 1 Off.	P.U.O.
	2	Old wounds
	1	Gonorrhoea
	1	Scabies
	1	Sore feet
	5	P.U.O.

2 Off 16 OK

* 2/Lt T A ROBERTSON

⊕ 2/Lt R M. SHELLEY

RETURN NO. 5.

DATE 13.5.1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS						OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.			
1st. Bn.	33	734							33	734			
2nd. Bn.	37	827				1		4	37	822			
3rd. Bn.	35	711				1	2	12	35	700			
4th. Bn.	23	646				1			23	645			
1 H.G. Coy.	9	179							9	179			
TOTAL	137	3097				3	2	16	137	3080			

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 7.

DATE 13.5.1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	5	21	26	1	JOINED - 19th leave GONE - 4th YPOA personnel
1st. Bn.	23	594	617	51	2		2		JOINED - 17th School GONE - 4th leave, 7th T.J. RICHARDS 4th 6 School 7th R.G. HUMPHRIES 7th School 1st HERRIS to School, 4th to 7th
2nd. Bn.	25	634	659	52					JOINED - 4th Amb. 5th leave, 4th Command 1st Ambulance 4th School GONE - 9th Amb. 1st HERRIS 1st Camp 4th Ambulance 1st School JOINED - 1st, 2nd Command 1st Camp
3rd. Bn.	25	559	584	48					GONE - 1st HERRIS 1st Camp 5 School, 1st leave, 7th troop, 1st School, 1st
4th. Bn.	16	511	527	47		3	3		JOINED 2nd troop, 2nd attached GONE - Capt. JUDGE - 2nd leave, 1st HERRIS and 1st HERRIS 2nd School 3rd troop 1st wounded & under fall
1 H.G. Coy.	5	166	171	47					GONE - Lt. L.G. SEWELL 1st leave 3rd troop JOINED - 2nd troop 1st attached from troop GONE - 2nd troop 1st Camp 2nd School
1 L.T.F. Coy.	3	28	31			18	18		JOINED - 10th leave GONE - 1st leave
2 Sig. Sect.	1	23	24	7		29	29		
TOTAL	103	2532	2635	269	7	71	78	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

445

Sick Examination for 13/7/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	2	P.U.O.
	1	Scabies
	1	Nephritis
2 nd Battalion	4	P.U.O.
	1	Abscess
	2	Septic Abscess
	1	Conjunctivitis
	1	Spained Ankle
3 rd Battalion	1	Humps
	1	Wine Trouble
	5	Breath fever
4 th Battalion	1	Gout
	2	P.U.O.
1 st M.G. Coy	2	P.U.O.
	1	Debility
	<hr/> 26	

M.P.M.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

445

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 14.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day.		OFFICERS.						OTHER RANKS.			Strength at noon this day.	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.			
1st. Bn.	33	734	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	734			
2nd. Bn.	37	822	-	-	-	-	+	15	37	807			
3rd. Bn.	35	700	-	-	-	-	-	8	35	692			
4th. Bn.	23	645	-	1*	-	-	-	-	24	645			
1 M.G.Coy.	9	179	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	179			
TOTAL.	137	3080	-	1	-	-	+	23	138	3057			

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

* Hon. Lt. C Molloy from R.Q.M.S.

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE. 14.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment.				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	5	21	26	1	
1st. Bn.	23	592	616	51	2	-	2		Joined 2 of a leave 1 1/2 hrs. leave Gone 2 of a to leave 1 1/2 school 1 1/2 absent
2nd. Bn.	24	637	661	52	-	-	-		Joined 2 of a leave 3 of a R.A. 2 of a wounded Gone Lt T.W. Horton + 1 of a to R.A. 1 of a on course 1 of a to school 1 of a wounded
3rd. Bn.	24	554	578	48	-	-	-		Joined Gone 1 D.G. Canley + 1 of a to leave 1 of a to school 3 of a to R.A.
4th. Bn.	18	573	531	47	-	3	3		Joined Hon. Lt. Molloy to 1 of a apppt. Lt. H.J. Estell + 1 of a R.A. 1 of a + school
1 M.G.Coy.	6	165	171	47	-	-	-		Gone 3 of a to R.A. 1 of a to leave
1 L.T.M.By.	3	28	31	-	-	17	17		Joined Lt. E. Heane + leave Gone 1 of a to leave
2 Sig.Sect.	1	23	24	7	-	29	29		Gone 1 of a to R.A.
TOTAL.	104	2530	2634	269	7	70	77	1	

Brig.-General, Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

445

Sicks evacuation for 14.5.17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
2 nd Bn.	1 officer 1 of ranks	F.T.S. V.D.
3 rd Bn	1 of ranks 1 of ranks 1 of ranks	French fever Scherreus Cellulitis
4 th Bn	1 of ranks 1 of ranks 1 of ranks	Mumps Debility Rectal Sinus
1 st L.T.M. Bty.	1 of ranks	Influenza

Total 1 officer 9 of ranks

2nd Bn Lieut J.W. Horton

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

445

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE..15.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day.		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day.	
	Off.	O.R.	OFFICERS.			OTHER RANKS.			Off.	O.R.
			Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.		
1st. Bn.	33	734	-	-	-	-	101	1	33	834
2nd. Bn.	37	807	-	1*	-	-	33	19	38	821
3rd. Bn.	35	692	-	2*	-	-	56	-	37	748
4th. Bn.	24	645	-	-	-	-	82	1	24	726
1 M.G.Coy.	9	179	-	-	-	-	2	4	9	177
TOTAL.	138	3057	-	3	-	-	274	25	141	3306

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. ^{x 2nd Bn Capt. HG Vernon a sick.} Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

*. 3rd Bn 2 Lt A. N. Buckley } 1st A.D.B.P. reinf
2 Lt A. E. Smith }

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE. 15.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment.				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	21	26	1	Gone 10/2 to B.A.
1st. Bn.	24	695	719	51	2	-	2	-	Joined Capt G. Boileau x 2nd F.A. 10/2 x school 10/2 x F.A. 13/2 x loop 88/2 reinf Gone 10/2 to Bde H.Q.
2nd. Bn.	25	673	698	52	-	-	-	-	Joined 33/2 x reinf 2/2 x base 2/2 x F.A. 2/2 x schools Capt H.G. Vernon x loop Gone 2/2 to F.A. 1/2 to leave
3rd. Bn.	25	613	638	47	-	-	-	-	Gone Lt Col. D.T. Moore D.S.O. + 2/2 to leave 1/2 to ret
4th. Bn.	17	594	611	47	-	3	3	-	Joined 2 Lts A. N. Buckley, A. E. Smith. 56/2 x reinf 2/2 x on command 1/2 x leave 2/2 x detachment.
1 M.G.Coy.	7	168	175	47	-	-	-	-	Joined 18/2 details 6/2 reinf 2/2 x school 1/2 x Bde H.Q. Gone Major C. D. Sasse D.S.O. to leave 1/2 to Bde H.Q.
1 L.T.M.By.	3	29	32	-	-	17	17	-	Joined Lt L. Bayes + 1/2 x school 1/2 x leave 2/2 x base Gone 1/2 to loop
2 Sig.Sect.	1	20	21	7	-	27	27	-	Joined 1/2 x loop Gone 1/2 to leave 2/2 to on command 2/2 x attached to 4th Bnd
TOTAL.	107	2808	2915	268	7	68	75	-	

Brig.-General.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

445

Sick evacuations for 15.5.17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
2nd Bn	172	Scabies
	172	Seborrhoeic dermatitis
4th Bn	172	Iritis
	272	Scabies
1st M.G. Coy.	172	Hospital
Bde HQ	172	P.U.O.
<u>Total.</u>	<u>772</u>	<u>Rankes.</u>

RETURN NO. 5.

DATE 16.5.1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS						OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.			
1st. Bn.	33	834	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	834			
2nd. Bn.	38	821	-	-	-	-	2	14	38	809			
3rd. Bn.	37	748	-	1*	-	-	5	-	38	753			
4th. Bn.	24	726	-	-	-	-	1	2	24	724			
1 H.G. Coy.	9	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	177			
TOTAL	141	3306	-	1	-	-	8	16	142	3296			

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. Brig.-General
L. C. L. Burrell x Superintendent
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 5.

DATE 16.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	22	27	1	Joined 17/2 x leave Gone 27/2 to leave 17/2 to school 37/2 to FA Joined 27/2 x wounds 17/2 x hosp Gone 37/2 to FA 17/2 to school Capt W. T. TROTT to leave Joined L. C. L. Burrell x superintendent 37/2 x hosp 27/2 x on command Gone 27/2 to leave 47/2 to FA Joined 27/2 as reimp 17/2 x leave Gone 17/2 to hosp Squad A S. ALLEN 47/2 to leave Gone 27/2 to leave Joined 17/2 x leave
1st. Bn.	24	690	714	51	2		2		
2nd. Bn.	24	672	696	52					
3rd. Bn.	26	614	640	47					
4th. Bn.	16	594	610	47	4	4			
1 H.G. Coy.	7	166	173	47					
1 L.T.F. Bty.	3	30	33		17	17			
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7	27	27			
TOTAL	106	2802	2908	268	7	70	77	1	

M. B. Burrell
 Brig.-General
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

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Sick evacuation for 16.5.17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1st Bn	3 of a	Scabies
2nd Bn	1 of a	Scabies
	1 of a	P. U. O.
	1 of a	Dental
4th Bn	1 of a	Pyelitis (albumen in urine)
3rd Bn	2 of a	Trench Fever
	1 of a	Bubonic Sore
	1 of a	Defective Eyesight
<u>Total</u>	<u>11 of ranks.</u>	

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Appendix No. 5/17/8

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 17.5...1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day.		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day.	
	Off.	O.R.	OFFICERS.			OTHER RANKS.			Off.	O.R.
			Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.		
1st. Bn.	33	834	-	-	-	-	-	Retained	33	822
2nd. Bn.	38	809	-	-	-	-	2	-	38	811
3rd. Bn.	38	753	-	-	-	-	3	10	38	746
4th. Bn.	24	725	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	725
1 M.G. Coy.	9	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	177
TOTAL.	142	3298								

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE. 17.5...1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment.				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	22	27	1	
1st. Bn.	24	686	710	50	2		2		Joined 10/2 x FA. Gone 10/2 to school 10/2 to leave 20/2 to FA 10/2 to Lt. M. B. T. 1 hour sick
2nd. Bn.	24	675	699	52					
3rd. Bn.	26	612	638	47					Joined 40/2 details Gone 10/2 to FA Joined 30/2 x heap Gone 20/2 to leave 20/2 to school 19/2
4th. Bn.	15	588	603	47		4	4		
1 M.G. Coy.	7	166	173	47					
1 L.T.M. By.	3	25	28			19	19		Joined 10/2 x heap. Gone 20/2 to leave 10/2 to FA.
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		27	27		
TOTAL.	105	2788	2893	267	7	72	79	1	

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade..

Sicks evacuation for 17.5.17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Bn.	2 ♀	P.U.O.
2 nd Bn	1 ♀	P.U.O.
3 rd Bn	1 ♀	Eyes.
4 th Bn	1 ♀	Old wounds.
	2 ♀	P.U.O.

Total. 7 ♀ ranks

5/17

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 18.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS						OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.			
	1st. Bn.	33	822	-	-	-	-	31	4	33	849		
2nd. Bn.	38	811	7*	-	-	-	-	-	31	811			
3rd. Bn.	38	746	-	-	-	-	1	-	38	747			
4th. Bn.	24	788	-	-	-	-	-	4	24	721			
1 H.G. Coy.	9	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	177			
TOTAL	142	3281	7	-	-	-	32	8	135	3302			

* 7 Officers wounded on 4th to 8th may not previously shown.

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 18.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	22	27	1	Joined 31/2 details to A. Rosnoll & leave Gone 4/2 to school L.H. Boardman to leave 1/2 to leave R.M.O. from school to attached. 1 horse to vet Joined 10/2 & F.A. 27/2 & leave Gone 2/2 to F.A. 27/2 to school 10/2 to leave Joined Capt A. McDermid & leave L.F.R. Shelley & school 10/2 & F.A. 10/2 & leave Gone 20/2 to leave Joined 10/2 & leave Gone 10/2 to leave 4/2 to school Gone 20/2 to leave Joined 30/2 & school Gone 10/2 to F.A.
1st. Bn.	23	712	735	49	3		3		
2nd. Bn.	24	672	696	52					
3rd. Bn.	28	612	640	47					
4th. Bn.	15	584	599	47	4		4		
1 H.G. Coy.	7	164	171	47					
1 L.T.F. By.	3	26	29			20	20		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		27	27		
TOTAL	106	2806	2912	266	8	73	81	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sicks evacuation for 18.5.17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
2 nd Bn	1 st Lt	P. O. O.
	1 st Lt	Traumatic Orchitis
1 st L.T.M.B	1 st Lt	Influenza
Total	<u>3rd ranks.</u>	

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RETURN NO. 3.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	33	849	-	3	-	-	3	-	36	852
2nd. Bn.	31	811	-	1	-	-	13	4	32	820
3rd. Bn.	38	747	-	-	-	-	12	8	38	751
4th. Bn.	24	721	-	8	-	-	18	4	32	735
1 H.G. Coy.	9	177	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	177
TOTAL	135	3305	-	12	-	-	46	16	147	3235

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. *for officers see attached list*
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade. Brig.-General

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.


RETURN NO. 3.

DATE, 19...5...1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	22	27	1	
1st. Bn.	24	715	739	49	2	-	2		<i>Joined 27/2 to leave 17/2 hosp</i> <i>27/2 hosp</i> <i>Gone 17/2 to leave 17/2 to F.A.</i>
2nd. Bn.	25	682	707	52					<i>Joined 13/2, reinf 17/2, school 17/2</i> <i>Gone 3/2 to leave 2/2 to F.A.</i>
3rd. Bn.	28	627	655	47					<i>Joined 18/2 hosp</i> <i>Gone 3/2 to leave</i>
4th. Bn.	23	577	620	47	4	4	4		<i>Joined 4/2 wounds 13/2 school</i> <i>27/2 reinf</i> <i>Gone 3/2 to F.A. 2/2 to leave 17/2</i> <i>Salvage Corps</i>
1 H.G. Coy.	7	161	168	47					<i>Gone 17/2 to leave 17/2 to school</i> <i>17/2 to F.A.</i>
1 L.T.M. By.	3	29	32		20	20	20		<i>Joined 27/2 hosp 17/2 leave</i>
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7	27	27	27		
TOTAL	116	2847	2963	266	7	73	80	11	

* Note for officers see attached list.
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade. Brig.-General



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CHANGES IN OFFICERS.DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

1st. Battalion.

2/Lieut. G.BITMEAD from Cadet Battalion
 G.LAMBERT, from Cadet Battalion,
 A.N.BACKHOUSE, from Cadet Battalion.

4th. Battalion.

2/Lieut. WILKINSON.	from Wounds.	18/5/17.
ESSEX	from reinforcements.	"
MALONE	" "	"
NEYLAND	" "	"
LAMBERT	From Cadet Battalion	"
MONTAGUE	" "	"
BANKIER	" "	"
ROBERTSON	" "	"

DAILY STRENGTH.

1st. Battalion.

2/Lieut. G.BITMEAD absorbed from attached to establishment.

2nd. Battalion.

2/Lieut. E.H.COMEEFORD from reinforcements. 18/5/17.

4th. Battalion.

2/Lieut. H.DeC. WILKINSON	from wounds	18/5/17.
ESSEX	from reinforcements	"
MALONE	" "	"
NEYLAND	" "	"
LAMBERT	from Cadet Battalion	"
MONTAGUE	" "	"
BANKIER	" "	"
ROBERTSON	" "	"

Sicks evacuation for 19/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1st Bn	10/a	P. U. O.
2nd Bn	20/a	Scabies
4th Bn	30/a 10/a	Trench Feet P. U. O.
1st M. G.	10/a	N. Y. D.

Total. 70/Ranks.

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1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Appendix No. 116

5/17/8

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 20.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	36	852	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	852
2nd. Bn.	32	820	-	-	-	-	1	1	32	820
3rd. Bn.	38	751	-	-	-	1	2	-	38	752
4th. Bn.	32	735	-	+	-	-	1	4	32	732
1 H.Q. Coy.	9	177	-	-	-	-	1	-	9	176
TOTAL	147	3335	-	-	-	1	5	5	147	3334

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 20.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	22	27	1	
1st. Bn.	23	711	734	49	2	-	2	-	Joined 17/2 x leave 17/2 x F.F. Gone 15 C.W.H.R. Somerset 17/2 + 27/2 to 5th Army school 4/2 to F.F.
2nd. Bn.	25	681	706	52	-	1	1	-	Joined 20/2 x F.F. 17/2 R.H. P.C. alt. Gone 10/2 to hospital 17/2 to F.F. 17/2 to school
3rd. Bn.	28	623	651	47	-	-	-	-	Joined 20/2 x leave Gone 20/2 to leave 30/2 to F.F.
4th. Bn.	22	583	605	47	-	4	4	-	Joined 3/2 x leave 17/2 x D.W. Sig. Gone 15 R.C. Piper + 15/2 to school 3/2 to F.F.
1 H.Q. Coy.	7	160	167	47	-	-	-	-	Joined 17/2 x leave Gone 20/2 to F.F.
1 L.S.M. Coy.	3	27	30	-	-	20	20	-	Gone 20/2 to F.F.
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7	-	27	27	-	
TOTAL	114	821	895	266	7	74	81	1	

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sicks evacuation for 20.5.17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Band	1 of 2 1 of 2 1 of 2 1 of 2	Sore Feet Septic Sores P.U.O. Trench Fever.
2 nd Band	1 of 2	Boils
4 th Band	3 of 2	P.U.O.
1 st M/G	1 of 2 1 of 2	Boils Trench Fever
1 st LTMB	2 of 2	Influenza
<u>Total</u>	<u>12 of 20 ranks</u>	

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Appendix No. 5/17/8 118

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 21.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick. <i>Positive</i>	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off	O.R.
1st. Bn.	36	852							36	852
2nd. Bn.	32	820					8		32	828
3rd. Bn.	38	752					85		38	837
4th. Bn.	32	732						2	32	730
1 H.G. Coy.	9	178							9	178
TOTAL	147	3334		1	1		93	2	147	3425

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 21.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	16	21	17	5	27	32	1	JOINED - 5% MP attached
1st. Bn.	23	702	725	49	2		2		JOINED - 5% School GONE - 2% Leave, 2% school, 10% 7 Amb.
2nd. Bn.	25	686	711	52	1	1	1		JOINED - 14% School, 4% Hospital, 4% 7 Amb 1% leave, Capt AEB GUDER, 2% seconded GONE - Capt T G MANN + 2% School, 3% 7 Amb 1% leave, 2% on Command
3rd. Bn.	27	705	732	47					JOINED - 25% Camp & details GONE - Capt G WOTT to School, 2% School 1% 7 Amb
4th. Bn.	21	586	607	47	4	4	4		JOINED 4% School, 1% leave, 1% 7 Amb 2% Hospital GONE - Lt R A MACALPINE + 2% to School 3% to Hospital GONE - 1% leave, 1% to Hospital
1 H.G. Coy.	7	158	165	47					
1 L.T.M. Coy.	3	27	30			20	20		
B Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		27	27		
TOTAL	112	2900	3012	266	7	79	86	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sick Evacuations for 21/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Bernia P.U.O.
	2	P.U.O.
	1	Abrasion of foot
	1	French fever
	1	Sprained ankle
	4	H.Y.D.
2 nd Battalion	1	Scabies
	2	P.U.O.
3 rd Battalion	1	French fever
4 th Battalion	2	P.U.O.
	1	Abrasion of foot
1 st M.G. Coy	1	French fever
	<u>18</u>	

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Appendix No. 5/17/8

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1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 22.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off	O.R.
1st. Bn.	36	852					19	11	36	860
2nd. Bn.	32	828					5		32	833
3rd. Bn.	38	837							38	837
4th. Bn.	32	730					13	5	32	738
1 H.G. Coy.	9	178		1	Watt			1 dep	10	177
TOTAL	147	3425		1			37	17	148	3445

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 22.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	5	28	33	1	JOINED - 19% x 7 Amb. 19% MPK attached
1st. Bn.	23	720	743	49	2		2		JOINED - 19% x Hoop. 19% leave GONE - 19% leave, 19% ambulance
2nd. Bn.	25	690	715	52	1	1			JOINED - 19% x 19% Amb. 10% x Hoop. GONE - 19% leave, 6% to Schools
3rd. Bn.	27	705	732	47					JOINED - 29% x Hoop GONE - 29% to leave
4th. Bn.	21	589	610	47		4	4		JOINED - 18% x details GONE - 12% to Schools, 2% Hoop, 19% leave
1 H.G. Coy.	8	160	168	47					JOINED 1/2 E WATT School, 19% School, 19% leave
1 L.T.F. By.	3	26	29			20	20		GONE - 19% leave
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		27	27		
TOTAL	113	2927	3040	266	7	80	87	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sick Evacuations for 21/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
4 th Battalion	1	P.V.O
	1	Venous
	<u>2</u>	

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1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 23.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off	O.R.
1st. Bn.	36	860						3 out	36	857
2nd. Bn.	32	833		2			1	2 Comd	34	832
3rd. Bn.	38	837						9 out	38	828
4th. Bn.	32	738		1			1	13 out	33	726
1 H.G. Coy.	10	177							10	177
TOTAL	148	3445		3			2	27	151	3420

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. Brig.-General
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.


DATE 23.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	5	28	33	1	
1st. Bn.	23	713	736	49	2		2		JOINED - 19 7/8 Amb 17 1/2 School, 1 1/2 Muster GONE - 10 7/8 to School
2nd. Bn.	27	687	714	52		1	1		JOINED 9 AM 1/4 Lt L.W. ROSEN and 1/2 CV McCulloch - 1st Appointment, 3 3/4 7 Amb GONE - 2 7/8 to Consummated rank, 1 1/2 School
3rd. Bn.	26	707	733	47					JOINED - 10 7/8 on Command GONE - Lt B.C. BERRY to School, 1 1/2 leave, 1 7/8 to School
4th. Bn.	22	587	609	47		4	4		JOINED - 1/2 R CRAWFORD 1st Appointment 1 1/2 7/8 GONE - 1 7/8 to Com Rank, 1 7/8 leave, 1 7/8 7 Amb
1 H.G. Coy.	9	160	169	47					JOINED - Lt S.H. DUTTON - Hosp.
1 L.T.M. By.	3	26	29			20	20		
3 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		29	29		JOINED - 2 1/2 leave (attached)
TOTAL	116	2917	3033	266	7	82	89	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.



Sick evacuations for 23/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
3 rd Battalion	1	Trench fever
4 th Battalion	1	P.U.O
	<u>2</u>	

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Appendix No. 5/17/8 124

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE:

RETURN NO. 3:

DATE: 24.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH:

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH:						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	36	857							36	857
2nd. Bn.	34	832						17 sick	34	815
3rd. Bn.	38	828		2				10 sick 2 Comd	40	816
4th. Bn.	33	726							33	726
1 H.C. Coy.	10	177					10		10	187
TOTAL	151	3420		2			10	29	153	3401

The above figures do not include Ede. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE: 24.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Ede. H.Q.	5	77	22	17	5	29	34	1	JOINED - 17/1 (A. Hasted) + leave.
1st. Bn.	23	709	732	49	2		2		JOINED - Lt V J. BUCHAN + 37/1 + leave, 27/1 on Command GONE - Lt B. W. CHAMPION on Command, 17/1 leave 17/1 School 7 7/7 Amb.
2nd. Bn.	27	684	711	52		1	1		GONE - 17/1 Command, 17/1 Detachment, 17/1 leave.
3rd. Bn.	28	700	728	47					JOINED - Lt CE. CLAYTON + Lt J. S. Hume from appointment, 47/1 + leave GONE - 27/1 Comm. Rank, 67/1 School, 37/1 Amb.
4th. Bn.	22	589	611	47		4	4		JOINED - 17/1 + Hosp, 37/1 leave GONE - 17/1 leave, 17/1 7 Amb.
1 H.C. Coy.	9	168	177	47					JOINED - 27/1 Hosp, 87/1 Penfa GONE - 17/1 leave, 17/1 7 Amb.
1 L.T.F. Bn.	4	28	32			20	20		JOINED - Lt WILKINSON + 27/1 + Hosp.
1 Sig. Bnt.	1	20	21	7		29	29		
TOTAL	119	2915	3034	266	7	83	90	1	

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

445

Sick Evacuation for 24/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Trench fever
	1	Gonorrhoea
	1	Noopia
	1	Varicos Veins
	2	P.U.O.
3 rd Battalion	1	Cataract
	1	Trench fever
	1	V.D.
4 th Battalion	1	Mumps
1 st M. G. Coy	1	P.U.O.
	<u>12</u>	

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 25.5.1917.

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS					OTHER RANKS			Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	St. Report	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off	O.R.		
1st. Bn.	36	857							36	857		
2nd. Bn.	34	815						28 Detention 4 Sick	34	804		
3rd. Bn.	40	816			4			1 Detention	36	815		
4th. Bn.	33	726							33	726		
1 H.G. Coy.	10	187							10	187		
TOTAL	153	3401			4			12	149	3389		

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q. Brig.-General
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 7.

DATE 25.5.1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	5	29	34	1	
1st. Bn.	23	712	735	49	2		2		JOINED - 3% x leave.
2nd. Bn.	27	677	704	52		1	1		JOINED - L/C H. THOMPSON + 1% x School 1% 7 Amb. 1% Absentee. GONE - L/SI SHEPHERD T. Bn. 1% 23 Amb. 1% Absent 7% 24 Detention 1% to School
3rd. Bn.	24	695	719	47					JOINED - 2% x Hospital GONE - CAPT SFB WHITE, L/1 W. ORMISTON, 1/2 R B BAYLEY to 12 T. Bn. 1/2 EPT CARTHY T. Bn. 4% 84 School, 1% leave, 1% Hosp, 1% Detention.
4th. Bn.	21	584	605	47		4	4		JOINED - 3% x Hosp GONE - 1/2 S BARRIER - 2% Hosp 1% leave, 5% Absent
1 H.G. Coy.	9	168	177	47					
1 L.P.M. Coy.	4	28	32			20	20		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		41	41		JOINED - 12% to attached.
TOTAL	114	2901	3015	266	7	95	102	1	

Brig.-General
 Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

B.M.

Sick Evacuation for 25/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
2 nd Battalion	1	P. U. O.
3 rd Battalion	1	Trench fever
4 th Battalion	* 1 off	Fibrous plaining
	1	Vision
	1	P. U. O.
	<hr/> 5 <hr/>	

* 2/Lt. S. BANKIER

445

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 26.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT.	Strength as per previous day		OFFICERS						OTHER RANKS		Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick.	Off.	O.R.		
1st. Bn.	36	857							36	857		
2nd. Bn.	34	804			1 on Comm.				33	804		
3rd. Bn.	36	815							36	815		
4th. Bn.	33	726		1				3	34	723		
1 H.G. Coy.	10	187							10	187		
TOTAL	149	3389		1	1			3	149	3386		

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 3.


DATE 26.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT	On Establishment				Attached.				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	17	22	17	4	29	33	1	<p>GENS - Capt N.M. Cuthbert to U.K. 24/7/17</p> <p>JOINED - Capt P.L. Howes Price DSO & 2 bars Staff</p> <p>1st Lt (Acting) Capt H.E. Rankin leave</p> <p>GENS - L.F. J. BRITON leave from Capt E. Wilson (attached) to 2nd 7th Amb. 17th Gen. 17th Ambulance</p> <p>2nd School 4th 7th Amb.</p> <p>JOINED - 17th 7th Amb.</p> <p>GENS - 4th 7th Amb. 4th 7th Amb. 17th Gen.</p> <p>JOINED - 17th 7th Amb. 4th 7th Amb.</p> <p>GENS - 2nd 15th 7th Amb.</p> <p>JOINED - 1st Lt 10th Ambulance DSO 2nd Bde HQ</p> <p>4th RSC TRIP to Ammunition Bank.</p> <p>GENS - 17th Gen. Rank 2nd 7th Amb. 1 leave 1 School</p> <p>2nd 7th Ambulance, 17th from attached</p> <p>JOINED Lt L.G. Sewell leave.</p> <p>JOINED - 17th leave, 17th Hospital</p>
1st. Bn.	24	705	729	49	1		1		
2nd. Bn.	27	669	696	52		1	1		
3rd. Bn.	24	698	722	47					
4th. Bn.	23	578	601	47		3	3		
1 H.G. Coy.	10	168	178	47					
1 L.T.F. Coy.	4	30	34			20	20		
8 Sig. Sect.	1	20	21	7		41	41		
TOTAL	118	2885	3003	266	5	94	99	1	

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General



Sick Evacuation for 26/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	3	P.U.O.
2 nd Battalion	1	Influenza - Anemia
	1	cut Foot
	1	Tonsillitis
	1	Myalgia
3 rd Battalion	1	Trench fever
	2	P.U.O.
4 th Battalion	1	Syphilis
	1	Old fracture of leg
	1	P.U.O.
	<hr/> 13. <hr/>	

445

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Appendix No. 5/17/8 130

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 27.5.1917.

UNIT	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
	Off.	O.R.	OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS			Off.	O.R.
			Cas	Arrvls.	Sick	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick		
1st. Bn.	36	857			2				34	857
2nd. Bn.	33	804		1 *				1 Sick	34	803
3rd. Bn.	36	815			1				35	815
4th. Bn.	34	723					1	1 absent	34	723
1st. M.G.C	10	187							10	187
TOTAL	149	3386		1	3		1	2	147	3385

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-General

* Taken off on error 26/5/17.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE 27.5.1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment				Attached				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	18	23	17	4	27	31		JOINED - 1 1/2 x leave.
1st. Bn.	22	721	743	49	1		1		GONE - 2 1/2 x and home from attached. JOINED - 5 1/2 x leave, 1 1/2 x Amb. 1 1/2 x A.P.P. 1 1/2 x A.P.P. 1 1/2 x A.P.P. GONE - 3 1/2 x detention, 1 1/2 x 7 Amb. L.F.A.C. GRHAM and L.F.C. KELLENBY to 6 th Div.
2nd. Bn.	27	667	694	52		1	1		JOINED - 4 1/2 x leave, 1 1/2 x D.H.Q. GONE - 1 1/2 x Amb, 4 1/2 x Absent, 1 1/2 x leave, 1 1/2 x in Comm.
3rd. Bn.	25	696	721	47					JOINED - L. Col. D.T. MOORE D.S.O. L. D. 6 th DIV. 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 x leave, 1 1/2 x 2 stop GONE - Capt. M. DEARMID to 6 th Div. 4 1/2 x 7 Amb.
4th. Bn.	24	580	604	47		2	2		JOINED - M. C. D. SASSI D.S.O. Capt. O.F.J. WOLFE 1 1/2 x leave, 3 1/2 x Rest, 1 1/2 x 2 nd San Sect 2 1/2 x A.M.C. details absorbed from attached GONE - Capt. O.F. TROTT to 5 th T. Bn. 2 1/2 x Absent 1 1/2 x absent, 1 1/2 x detention, 1 1/2 x to other
1 M.G. Coy.	10	171	181	47					JOINED - 4 1/2 x leave GONE - 1 1/2 x leave
1 L.T.M. By.	4	30	34			20	20		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	21	22	7		41	41		JOINED - 1 1/2 x Amb. 1 1/2 x
TOTAL	118	2904	3022	266	5	91	96		

Brig.-General

Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

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Sick Evacuation for 27/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	P.U.O
2 nd Battalion	1	P.U.O
3 rd Battalion	1	Tonsillitis
	1	Trench fever
	1	Bronchitis
	1	Chronic Nephritis
4 th Battalion	2	not stated.
	<hr/> 8. <hr/>	

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Appendix No. 5/17/8 132

445 RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 28.5.1917.

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas	Arrvls.	Sick	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	34	857	1*	5*	-	-	-	5	38	852
2nd. Bn.	34	803	-	1*	-	-	-	2	35	801
3rd. Bn.	35	815	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	815
4th. Bn.	34	723	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	723
1st. M.G.C	10	187	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	187
TOTAL	147	3385	1	6	-	-	-	7	152	3378

The above figures do not include Bde. H.Q.

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

* 1st Bn. 2Lt H.A. Clow
2Lt C.C. Judd
2Lt F.H. Williams
2Lt K.C. Moorlock
2Lt H.C. Chedokey

1st. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE. 28.5.1917.

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment				Attached				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	18	23	17	4	27	31	1	Joined 20/4 x rest camp 3/4 x school 2/Lt C.C. Judd, F.H. Williams K.C. 1/7 x school to 1st afft Gone 3/4 to 1st afft 4/4 to F.A. 1/4 to school 1/4 to UK 15/4 to rest camp 2/Lt F.L. Flannery to leave Joined 2/Lt B. Grey x rest camp 21/4 x rest camp 2/Lt E.G. Haxby commissioned 2/Lt R. Rannard + 6/4 x school 3/4 x F.A. Gone 1/Lt R.G. Morris + 16/4 to rest camp 2/4 to school 10/4 to leave 2/4 to F.A. 1/4 commissioned Joined 1/Lt H.D. Robb 1/Lt G.H. Leslie x school Capt W.J.E. Phillips A.R.M.C. 2/Lt C.L. Smith + 2/4 x rest camp 11/4 x school 1/4 x school 1/4 x F.A. 2/Lt C. Schumann Gone Capt H. North to 15/4 to rest camp. 1/4 to leave 1/4 to F.A. Joined 2/Lt R.C. Piper + 17/4 x school 2/Lt R.M. Shelley + 2/4 x school 23/4 x rest camp 1/4 x school Gone 2/Lt E.E. Neyland + 2/4 to school 4/4 to F.A. 2/Lt R. Crawford + 15/4 to rest camp. Joined 2/Lt A. ... Gone 1/Lt H. O'Keefe to leave 29/4 to O.T.C. Joined 2/4 x school 1/4 x rest Camp 1/4 x leave Gone 12/4 x attached for school
1st. Bn.	24	720	744	49	1	1	1		
2nd. Bn.	29	675	704	52	-	1	1		
3rd. Bn.	28	716	744	47	-	-	-		
4th. Bn.	24	602	626	47	2	2	2		
1 M.G. Coy.	9	171	180	47	-	-	-		
1 L.T.M. By.	4	34	38	-	-	20	20		
2 Sig. Sect.	1	21	22	7	-	29	29		
TOTAL	124	2957	3081	266	5	79	84		

Brig.-General Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sicks evacuation for 28.5.17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1st Bn	1/2	Hernia
	1/2	P.U.O.
	1/2	Influenza
	1/2	Anemia
2nd Bn	1/2	P.U.O.
3rd Bn	1/2	General Disease
	1/2	General Disease
4th Bn	1/2	Scabies
	1/2	Supposed Fracture Arm
<u>Total.</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9 ranks.</u>

$$\frac{10}{28/5}$$

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE. 29...5.1917..

445

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas	Arrvls.	Sick	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	38	852		1			35		39	887
2nd. Bn.	35	801					11	2	35	810
3rd. Bn.	35	815		1			20	3	36	832
4th. Bn.	34	723					22		34	745
1st. M.G.C.	10	187							10	187
TOTAL	152	3378		2			88	5	154	3461

The above figures do not include Bdo. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE. 29...5...1917..

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment				Attached				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Bde. H.Q.	5	18	23	17	4	27	31		JOINED - 1/2 attached Bde H.Q. GONE - 1/2 attached Bde H.Q.
1st. Bn.	25	749	774	49	1		1		JOINED - 7/2 5000 - Hosp. 35 7/2 Rump + Detail 3 7/2 GONE - 17/2 Bde H.Q. 7/2 School, 4 7/2 sick, 2 7/2 other
2nd. Bn.	28	685	713	52		1	1		JOINED - 11/2 Rump, 2 7/2 other, 2 7/2 school, 4 7/2 to GONE - 5 7/2 7 Amb, 7/2 L WARRTON + 4 7/2 to scho
3rd. Bn.	29	736	765	47					JOINED - 7/2 475 Co. and 20 7/2 Rump + Detail 17/2 School, 3 7/2 leave GONE - 1 7/2 leave, 3 7/2 7 Amb
4th. Bn.	24	627	651	47		2	2		JOINED - Capt C. K. JONES + 3 7/2 leave, 1 7/2 transfer 2 7/2 school + 2 7/2 detail + Rump GONE - Capt W. A. Mann + leave, 2 7/2 school, 1 7/2 other
1 M.G. Coy.	9	170	179	47					GONE - 1 7/2 to leave
1 L.T.M. By.	4	33	37			20	20		GONE - 1 7/2 to hospital
2 Sig. Sect.	1	24	25	7		29	29		JOINED - 3 7/2 + leave
TOTAL	125	3042	3167	266	5	79	84		

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sick Evacuation for 29/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Hernia
	2	P.U.O
2 nd Battalion	1	French fever
	1	Rash
	1	Otitis media
	2	P.U.O
3 rd Battalion	1	Fracture Metacarpus
	2	Scabies
4 th Battalion	1	Herpes
	1	Varicella
1 st A.L.F. Coy	1	Influenza.
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1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Appendix No. 5/17/8 136

RETURN NO. 3.

DATE...30.5.1917..

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas	Arrvls.	Sick	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	39	887		1			26	1	40	912
2nd. Bn.	35	810					20		35	830
3rd. Bn.	36	832					29		36	861
4th. Bn.	34	745		1			11		35	756
1st. M.G.C	10	187							10	187
TOTAL	154	3461		2			86	1	156	3546

The above figures do not include Bdo. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE...30.5.1917..

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment				Attached				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Ede. H.Q.	5	18	23	17	4	28	32		JOINED - 17% to attached & 4% from
1st. Bn.	25	767	792	49	1		1		JOINED - 11% Capt. H. Wells from Supply list 26% details GONE - 4% to P.Amb., 4% School, Capt. Morrison
2nd. Bn.	28	702	730	52		1	1		JOINED - 20% from Ramps, 17% School, 19% Bde HQ GONE - 1% leave, 2% School, 2% on command
3rd. Bn.	28	763	793	47					JOINED - 29% from Ramps for details, 1% leave GONE - 1% WER SHELLS, 1% leave, 1% on command
4th. Bn.	25	634	663	47		2	2		JOINED - 11% L. Holt & Ramps 12% details 2% School 1% leave 2% Amb. GONE - 2% School, 1% leave
1 M.G. Coy.	9	170	179	47					
1 L.T.M. By.	4	34	38			20	20		JOINED - 2% Hospital GONE - 1% 7 Amb.
2 Sig. Sect.	1	22	23	7		27	27		GONE - 2% command 2% from attached
TOTAL	125	3117	3242	266	5	78	83		

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

Sick evacuations for 30/5/17.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Hernia
	2	P.U.O
1 st L. T. Co. Bty	1	Appendicitis
	1	V.D.
	<u>5.</u>	

$$\frac{1}{30/5}$$

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

445 RETURN NO. 3.

DATE 31.5.1917

Appendix
5/17/8

DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.

UNIT	Strength as per previous day		DAILY FIGHTING STRENGTH.						Strength at noon this day	
			OFFICERS			OTHER RANKS				
	Off.	O.R.	Cas	Arrvls.	Sick	Cas.	Arrvls.	Sick	Off.	O.R.
1st. Bn.	40	912							40	912
2nd. Bn.	35	830						2	35	828
3rd. Bn.	36	861							36	861
4th. Bn.	35	756							35	756
1st. M.G.C.	10	187							10	187
TOTAL	156	3546						2	156	3544

The above figures do not include Edo. H.Q.

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

1ST. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RETURN NO. 1.

DATE 31.5.1917

DAILY STRENGTH.

UNIT.	On Establishment				Attached				REMARKS.
	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	Off.	O.R.	Tot.	Hrs.	
Ede. H.Q.	5	18	23	17	4	28	32		
1st. Bn.	25	762	787	49	1	1		TOINED - 3% x Amb, 2% School GONE - 7% to prison, 1% School, 1% to 7 Amb, 1% leave	
2nd. Bn.	28	701	729	52	1	1		TOINED - 3% School GONE - 3% to 7 Amb, 1% to School	
3rd. Bn.	28	759	787	47				GONE - 4% to 7 Amb, 2% to School	
4th. Bn.	25	634	659	47	2	2		TOINED - 1% School GONE - 1% to School, 1% leave, 3% to 7 Amb, 1% to 3d. H.Q. (Hutman)	
1 M.G. Coy.	9	170	179	47				TOINED - 1% to 2 Amb GONE - 1% to School	
1 L.T.M. By.	4	34	38		20	20			
2 Sig. Sect.		22	23	7	2	2			
TOTAL	125	3100	3225	266	5	78	83		

Brig.-General
Commanding 1st. Australian Infantry Brigade.

445

Sick evacuation for 31/5/17

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Nature of Sickness</u>
1 st Battalion	1	Haemorrhoids
2 nd Battalion	1	Synovitis
	1	Quinsey
	1	Rheumatism
3 rd Battalion	2	P.U.O.
	1	Scabies
	1	Kunecatrophy
4 th Battalion	1	Tumor Left Breast
	2	P.U.O.
	<hr/>	
	11	
	<hr/>	
		<u>No</u> 31/5