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AWM4-1/33/14PART2

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II ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 9th June 1917.

From the examination of prisoners the following information was obtained with regard to our Artillery and M.G. fire.

In the first place the lines of communication were kept so effectively under fire that both ration parties and reliefs were much hindered in their movements, and suffered some casualties.

In the second place, the enemy defences were so damaged by our artillery that the garrison remained permanently in their dugouts. Many prisoners stated that they dare not emerge because, if they escaped the artillery fire, they were caught by our M.G. fire.

A prisoner of the 68th F.A.R. stated the 12th Foot Artillery Regt. had arrived in COMINES during the last week.

A prisoner of the 10th Gren. Regt. (11th Div.) was captured about 0330 on the morning of the 9th. He stated the Regt. rest billets were in ROMBEKE. On the morning of the 7th they were taken from ROMBEKE to MOORSLEDE in motor lorries, and thence marched into line on 8th June.

Their companies have been brought up to strength by drafts and now number about 220 trench strength. No Light Machine Guns have been issued to his regiment.

22 M.G. Scharfschützen Abteilung.

Formation. In October 1916 as Army Troops.

Movements. They took part in the ARRAS Battle and returned to rest at DOUAI. Left DOUAI on the 1/2nd June and detrained at WERVICQ, and went into line in the sector occupied by 40th Div.

Establishment. 3 companies of 6 guns each and 2 spare.
Abteilung commanded by a Captain assisted by 3 Lieutenants.
Each Company is 80 men strong of whom 40 are Abkommandiert.

Dispositions. All guns in 2nd or 3rd lines.

Ammunition. No "K" ammunition. No orders to fire against Tanks.

Effect of Artillery Fire.
Our Artillery fire absolutely neutralized any action they might have taken, as it drove them to their dugouts and prevented them from firing a single shot before their capture.

Withdrawal of Artillery.
A number of Field Artillery batteries in the neighbourhood of the 104th I.R. were withdrawn two nights before our attack.

The following information was obtained from men of the 32nd Field Artillery Regt. (40th Div.) :-

Composition of the Regiment.
They stated the regiment now consisted of 3 Abteilungen (Sections) each of 3 batteries. Until recently there had only been Abteilungen, and the 3rd was probably composed of Light Field Howitzer batteries. All the batteries had only four guns.

Drafts.....

- 2 -

Drafts.

About 3 weeks ago each battery had a draft of 10 men. About half the men of this draft were 1918 Class, whilst the remainder were chiefly composed of returned wounded and combed-out men.

Ammunition.

The constant ammunition reserve kept in the battery positions for each gun was 1500 rounds, of which 500 were shrapnel. H.E. however, was mostly fired. No gas shells or armour piercing shells were ever used.

Orders.

They had direct orders not to fire at Tanks.

Light Signals.

The following signals were used:-

green rocket	=	barrage.
yellow	=	destructive fire on prearranged points.
red	=	increas range.

Battery Positions.

The guns were not built in but had only netting over them as aeroplane cover.

A prisoner of the 1st Guard Res. Regt. states they saw men of the 15th Bav. I.R. (2nd Bav. Div.) in WERVICQ on the 6th. This confirms the presence of the 2nd Bav. Div. in this area, as a report had already been received to the effect that the 4th Bav. Field Art. Regt. had been seen in the same place.

Another prisoner stated that he believed the 1st Guard Res. Div. would be relieved tonight (9/10th). This statement however was very uncertain.

AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

Photographs taken on 9th inst. show no new ^{German} line in front of the WARNETON line, a little new work on the GAPAARD cross-roads and very little work on the WARNETON line itself.

9th June 1917.

C. Cliffe Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

II ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 10th June 1917.

The following additional information has been obtained from prisoners:-

203rd NAHEKAMPFBATTERIE.

(i) Formation.

Formed on 25th January 1917 in COMINES from the 32nd and 68th Field Artillery Regiments.

(ii) Strength.

3 Officers and about 90 men.

(iii). Composition.


6 77 mm. guns.

(iv). Transport.

Borrowed horses from 32nd Field Artillery Regt. Ammn. Columns.

(v). Battery positions.

Guns detached separately: often a concrete dugout for the gun-team, and the gun arranged to fire in either of two directions behind dugout. Only aeroplane cover.



(vi). Communications.

Telephone communication with neighbouring guns. These were smashed 8 days before the attack. No communication between infantry or the rear.

(vii). Gun Crews.

1 N.C.O. and 3 men to each gun.

(viii). Orders.

The No. 1 responsible for direction of fire on Tanks. Their only orders were to fire exclusively on Tanks. No special point on Tank to be aimed at: the tender spot shown in sketches was only for infantry to fire at with armour piercing bullets.

(ix). Effect of our fire.

This rendered any action absolutely impossible, firstly, because the men were nearly all slightly wounded, secondly, their bad moral made them incapable of doing duty, and thirdly because the gun and rails were slightly damaged.

(x). Rations.

Up to the 4th June the 203rd Nahekampfbatterie got regular hot food rations from MESSINES. On the 5th, owing to heavy artillery and especially M.G. fire they drew 4 days cold rations which they cooked in their concrete dugout.

TELEPHONE DETACHMENT No. 40.

(i). Composition. 2 Platoons of 50 each (including two officers) each platoon (zug) had 6 signallers.

(ii) Duty Roster.

3 hours duty -
6 hours off.

Effect.....

Telephone Detachment No. 40 continued.(iii). Effects of our fire.

All communications out on 5th June. All attempts at repairs were impossible.

(iv). Gas Shells.

The fumes of these were prevented from entering dugouts by fires being lit in these.

(v). Losses.

Average losses during May reported by the 3 Regiments in the Division (104, 181, 154 I.Rs.) to the D.H.Q. were 2 killed and 5 wounded per regiment per day. This report was always sent through the telephone exchange in MESSINES (O 33 d 3.5).

Examination of prisoner of the 10th Company, III Battn.,
1st Guard Res. Regt., 1st Guard Res. Div. captured
8th June 1917.

(i). Method of capture.

Prisoner was a battalion runner and was sent to Company H.Q. with a message. He lost his way and came into our lines.

(ii). Order of Battle.

Prisoner could give no definite information except concerning his own regiment which had (N. to S.) the II and III Battalions in line with the I in Reserve.

(iii). Company Strength, Drafts and Classes.

The 10th Company was about 220 strong, 70 of whom were 'Abkommandiert'. The III Battn. received a draft of 75 after the ARRAS Battle, consisting of returned wounded and a few Landsturm recruits. The III Battn. is composed mainly of men of the 1914, 1915, and 1916 Classes about 5% reservists and 3% Landsturm Recruits.

(iv). Commanders of the III Battn.

9th Company	Lieut. PETERSEN.
10th "	" SCHUEERT.
11th "	" WOLKOWIAK.
12th "	" VOGELER.
M.G. 3	Ober-Lieut. TOPFER.

(v). Machine Guns.

The new light machine guns '08/15 have been issued to the III Battn. on the scale of 3 per company. (Prisoners statements as to the number of guns per company vary very much and require confirmation).

(vi). Moral.

Good.

PAPER BANDAGES.

A number of these have been captured. They appear chiefly to be used as practice bandages in regimental depots in Germany. A certain number of them are, however, always kept in reserve in battalion dressing stations, in case the supply of ordinary cotton bandages runs short.

25 Foot Art.....

25th Foot Artillery seen in TOURNAI 10 days ago.

TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED GERMAN ORDER.

"Group 'Mitte'"

4-6-17.

Extract from report by the artillery liaison officer.

The barrage yesterday was pronounced by the O.C. Fighting Troops to have been well placed. Last night a British raiding party in strength of 60 - 70 men made an attack on Sector A of the German First Line trenches. They were driven out. The Regimental Commander praises the good placing of the barrage but considers that the number of Field Batteries employed was too small.

Between the O.C. Fighting Troops and Regimental Commander there is a Light Signal Communication. By means of this signal method, large green rockets as a signal for danger of Tanks will be used. These must not be confused with the green flares.

Practice barrage fire checked by the artillery liaison officer has shown that it was well placed. Practice barrage will be repeated today. The Group asks for information (for the purpose of passing it on to the infantry) as to how far the danger of Tanks has now been ascertained and how many anti-Tank guns are at the moment ready for action.

(Sgd) FÖRSTER

EXTRACT FROM DIARY.

4. VI. Midday WERVICQ bombarded whereby a direct hit on an artillery ammunition dump caused it to explode. In a neighbouring stable there were 12 horses killed. In the evening we went in and secured a piece of the meat. We had cooked meat. It was splendid.

PRISONERS

Total number of prisoners passed through Corps Cage from commencement of operations to 6 p.m. 9th inst.

Officers 25.
Other ranks 1132.

TOTAL.....1157.

made up as follows:-

3rd Bav. Division.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
17th Bav. I.R.	12	326
18th do.	3	294
23rd do.	2	76
Total	17	756
4th Bav. Division.		
5th Bav. I.R.	-	2
9th do.	3	89
Total	3	91
2nd Division.		
4th Gren. Regt.	-	17
Total	-	17
24th Division.		
133rd I.R.	-	1
139th I.R.	-	10
Total	-	11
		40th Division.....

Prisoners (contd).

<u>40th Division.</u>	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>Other Ranks.</u>
104th I.R.	-	41
134th I.R.	-	3
181st I.R.	4	80
Total	4	124
<u>1st Guard Res. Div.</u>		
1st Guard Res. Regt.	-	35
2nd Guard Res. Regt.	-	5
Total	-	40
<u>11th Division.</u>		
10th Gren. Regt.	-	1 1
<u>7th Division.</u>		
393rd I.R.	-	1 1
<u>Miscellaneous.</u>		
385th Landwehr I.R. M.G. Coy.	-	8
388th do.	-	2
Sanitäts-K. 602	-	12
do. 4	-	2
do. 48	-	5
Funker-Klein-Abt. 62	-	3
Bav. Fernspr-Abt. 3	-	4
Fernspr-Abt. 40	-	2
M.G.-Abt. 22 (2nd Coy)	-	3
Minenwerfer 40	-	2
68th Field Art. Regt.	-	1
32nd do (II Bn.)	-	7
32nd do (VI Bn.)	-	2
32nd do (IX Bn.)	-	3
203 Nahkampf-Bn.	1	13
25th Pioneer Battn. (4th Coy)	-	22
Total	1	91
Total prisoners to 6 p.m. 9th inst.	25	1132

Besides the above unwounded prisoners the numbers which have been evacuated through casualty clearing stations are:-

Officers	5
Other ranks	498
Total	503

making a grand total of 30 officers and 1630 other ranks up to 6 p.m. 9th June.

Since yesterday 9 more prisoners of 23rd Bav. I.R. have been brought in. They were found in a dugout in which they had hidden for 4 days.

10th June 1917.

C. Clippel Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

II ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 11th June.

OPERATIONS.

Last night (10/11th) the line from FUZE COT: (U 10 d) through LA POTTERIE to UNDULATING TRENCH (U 4 c) was captured by our troops. Numbers of the enemy were killed and five were taken prisoners.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

They belonged to the following regiments:-

- 2 - 1st Guard Res. Inf. Regt. (1st Guard Res. Div.).
- 2 - 11th Bav. Inf. Regt. (16th Bav. Div.).
- 1 - 9th Bav. Inf. Regt. (4th Bav. Div.).

Identity discs from enemy killed during the night in clearing up the green line in O 34 and U 4 indicate the presence of the 64th Res. Inf. Regt. and 1st Guard Res. Inf. Regt., both of the 1st Guard Res. Div.

The 11th Bav. Inf. Regt. appears to be in the sector formerly occupied by the 9th Bav. I.R. The man of the latter regiment who was captured was acting as runner for the 11th Bav. I.R. as he knew the ground.

PRISONERS' STATEMENTS.

A lance-corporal stated that he had seen an Army Order for his Regiment to retire on the WARNETON line by 1.30 a.m. today, 11th.

UNITS SEEN.

The 82nd R.I.R. of the 22nd Res. Div. was said to have been seen in TOURCOING lately.

INFORMATION FROM CORPS ON OUR RIGHT.

A prisoner of the 14th Bav. I.R. captured night 10/11th in 36 C 17 a near FRELINGHIEN states that the 6th Res. Inf. Regt., 9th Res. Div. is on his right north of the LYS.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS OF 32ND FIELD ARTILLERY REGT.

(i). Losses. Prisoners of the 32nd Field Art. Regt. state casualties were fairly heavy during the preliminary bombardment, the 9th Battery for instance have about 5 killed and 15 wounded during the period. Of the guns, which were howitzers, only one was in action on the morning of the attack. (7th).

(ii). Effect of Gas. They were bombarded with gas shells, but they put their masks on and were never prevented from continuing firing.

(iii). Communications. The only communications between the battery (9th) and the forward Observation Post was by runner as the telephone lines were cut during the preliminary bombardment and never repaired.

(iv). Battery Position. Along road running north from O 34 a 10.75 to O 34 a 00.90. Only aeroplane cover. No concrete or deep dugouts for men or guns. Only shelters.

(v). Ammunition. Constant ammunition supply per gun reported in this battery (9th) to be only 200 rounds.

(vi). Targets. This battery only fired on trenches.

TRANSLATION.....

TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENT.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DETACHED MACHINE GUNS.

1. The chief object of detached machine guns is to keep enemy troops who have broken through the line and reached their objectives in the positions they have captured and then to annihilate them to the last man.

2. Every man in a detached M.G. position must know that the longer he holds up the enemy, the earlier will reserves come up to relieve him. Any man who is detailed for duty with a detached M.G. must realise that his superiors are conferring a distinction on him and showing great reliance in him. From this it naturally follows that a voluntary iron discipline must be kept amongst the team of such an M.G. post. The gun crews will be thanked and rewarded.

3. The enemy does not know the location of our detached posts, and everything must therefore be done to avoid the position being given away: e.g. quantities of smoke, frequent movement, tracks, are all to be avoided. When enemy planes approach, cover is immediately to be sought and men must not stand about to watch the aircraft out of curiosity.

4. The M.G. need not necessarily be fired only from its normal emplacement. It is often far better to make use of a hedge, a shell hole, or the remains of an old wall than to stick rather anxiously to the concrete emplacement. Every man must look for and know the alternate positions chosen. This is all the easier as the same gun crews will probably always be sent to the same gun.

5. Every man must know thoroughly the lie of the land in front of his position, so as to be able to give full support to any attack on the enemy's part during the night. The Gun Commander will instruct his crew in this from sketches.

6. Every Gun Commander must know the following:-

The position of neighbouring regiments.

The position of neighbouring guns and the direction of fire.

The line of his own wire.

The gaps in the enemy's wire.

Where the enemy's wire is strong and where weak.

Every man must do his utmost to strengthen the wire in front of our position as it concerns him personally.

7. Every man must know the following points around the M.G. post. Houses, important dugouts, e.g. Battalion and Regimental H.Q., the names of ruins, what troops lie quartered in them, what batteries he has to cover with his fire in case of necessity, what roads he must watch, how our own line runs, in order that he may recognise quickly from the Very lights what part of the line is being attacked or raided.

8. Every man must know of a cross-country approach to his post so that he is not bound to keep to roads and C.Ts. To guide him he should make note of land-marks, such as prominent groups of houses, ruins, light coloured fields etc.

9. The main position will always be the concrete emplacement. If the gun crew takes up an alternative position, 1500 cartridges, water and cleaning material should be taken to the new position. Alarm practices should be arranged daily by the N.C.O. in charge, including drills for changing positions.

10. Even under the heaviest fire a sentry must be out within calling or signalling distance. This sentry will only be called in by the N.C.O. in charge when the M.G. has started to fire.

11.....

11. Every N.C.O. in charge and man of the gun team must make quite certain that he sees the enemy before he starts firing. Ammunition is very valuable and can only be replaced with very great difficulty. Supply of ammunition is to come up with rations.

12. The following points must be carefully considered by each man:- From which direction can Tanks come? On which roads? Across which dry open fields? Where can one check or hold them up? How is one to fight them? (a) Is one to do it by putting up wire entanglements, filling broad trenches with water, or constructing steep banks? (b) Remember to shoot at them with SMK cartridges, which are packed in separate boxes with red stripes down the sides. Aim low down on the side or - if using a telescope sight - aim at the openings.

13. Shoot at aircraft flying below 1000 Metres with SMK ammunition; but do not fire alone: co-operate with flank guns.

14. On the gas alarm being given, put on gas masks, cover the M.Gs. with the canvas cover and watch the sentry carefully; then give the alarm by ringing bells and beating gongs; but do not first whistle and call out so as to give the alarm because in that case gas masks will not be put on quickly enough. Grease the gun well when the gas has blown over.

15. The following is to ^{be} found at every gun position:-
Iron rations of bread, water, (for drinking and for the M.G., the latter kept in buckets and other vessels).
Meat, methylated spirits, candles, matches, and at least 35 hand grenades, also a reserve of bandages.

16. Each man must know the following routes:-

1. To the nearest ammunition dump.
2. To the nearest ration dump.
3. To the Regimental and Battalion H.Q.; to the Regimental M.G. Officer, and to the Coy Commander on duty.
4. To the nearest Platoon (Zug) Commander.
5. To the nearest water point.
6. To the nearest Battalion Dressing Station.

17. Indents for equipment and material are to be sent through the Platoon or Coy Commander on duty. These Officers are also to authorise opening iron rations.

18. The N.C.O. in charge is responsible for the complete ^{number} and good condition of all the M.G. equipment in the post. He will check this daily.

19. The N.C.O. in charge has to hand over these orders personally to his relief. He must also make them acquainted with every observation, with a list of completed work, new work undertaken, reconnaissance reports and advice. A relief in which the out-going post goes away only saying "Good evening" is a bad proof of friendship.

20. If the enemy has pushed forward so far that no hope is left of holding out - then the last hand grenade must be used for the destruction of the M.G. Then the gun team must take their revolvers and do their best. It is the duty of every man to see that the M.G. does not fall into the hands of the enemy.

C. Cliffe Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

11th June 1917.

SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 12th June.

INFORMATION FROM AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

South of DOUVE. There is a continuous trench irregular in shape passing east of the most U 16 a, to where the MESSINES - LA BASSE VILLE road crosses the DOUVE. In front of this there appear to be posts at U 16 a 5.1 in UNTIMO LANE, U 16 a 8.3 ULTIMO RESERVE from U 16 a 75.50 to THATCHED COTTAGE; in C.T. at U 10 d 0.0, near FUSE COTTAGE, in parts of UNCERTAIN SUPPORT both south and north of POTTERIE FM. (the latter is a good trench over 100 yds. long), and there is a small post just south of the DOUVE at U 10 d 0.8.

DOUVE to HUNS WALK. Here the front line runs just east of UNDULATING TRENCH and along UNMANNY TRENCH to the road: two C.Ts. connect this trench with a support line 150 - 200 yds. in rear: there is a second support line which runs from LA HUTTE past WHITE SPOT COTTAGE. There appear to be many posts in front of this line and a long trench along the hedge from about U 4 b 5.3 to HUNS WALK U 4 b 35.75.

HUNS WALK to BLAUWEPPOORTBEEK. Here the front line is along OWL and ODD TRENCHES to the BLAUWEPPOORTBEEK: a good continuous trench with a support line behind OWL and posts in front along OWL and ODD supports, one evidently in an old trench at O 34 d 65.70 and one at O 34 b 7.2.

Enemy Lines. There appear to have been no attempts by the enemy either to dig a new line in front of the WARNETON line or to make this line continuous: no fresh work is visible on any part of this line. There is no photograph today showing the UMBO TRENCH area, but the enemy appears to have tried to keep UMBO AVENUE open and UMBO RESERVE might still be held: UMBO LANE and ALLEY are battered almost beyond recognition. The trenches in front of TROIS TILIEULS FM. are still strong and the enemy appears to occupy UNCLE SUPPORT to U 16 b 9.1, thence along the straight traversed trench to LE CHASSEUR CABARET. North of this UNCHAINED TRENCH is very much battered and untenable except perhaps for a few places about U 16 b 6.9 (This may even be one of our own posts). From the CHASSEUR CABARET the line probably goes along UNCHAINED AVENUE to the LA BASSE VILLE defences just west of the railway line, but no connection with the WARNETON line is visible. The WARNETON line is as shown on the latest map, but everywhere only the front trench is deep: there are two large emplacements at U 6 c 6.7 and O 36 c 15.50 which have been under construction a very long time. There is a gap in this line from the latter place to CINEMA road at O 36 a 2.1: a strong point in the triangle between the roads: then a further gap of 150 yds. to O 36 a 3.5: from there the trench is continuous but not very deep. The wire in front of this line is still a very formidable obstacle and only damaged in places: there is no wire in front of the support line, in which there appear to be dugouts which have not had much work done on them lately. In front of this line parts of UNCERTAIN LANE from U 10 b 55.50 to the DOUVE, and some bays of the trench just north of LA CROIX FM. and a straight trench at U 5 c 15.20 may be held by posts but neither UNDATED, UNDAUNTED, nor the switch from UNDATED to HIRONDELLE CABARET are deep; also little or no work has been done on them. There is a bay in UNDATED TRENCH at U 5 c 6.3 which has been cleared and might be in the hands of either side.

H. J. Trust
Lieut.

for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

12th June 1917.

Prisoners.....

Prisoner of the 12th Company, 9th Bav. I.R. (4th Bav. Div.) captured 10/11th inst. gives the following information:-

<u>Rest Billets.</u>	1st Battalion.	WAMBRECHIES.
	2nd "	BONDUES.
	3rd "	ROUSQ (N. of LILLE).
	Regtl. H.Q.	ST. ANDRE, LILLE.
	Divl. "	LILLE.

Formation. Composed chiefly of 1916 Class, also returned wounded and some 1918 Freiwillige.

Coy. Strength. 250. Rifle strength 180.

Losses. Before our attack, very light. The Company had held the front line several times without a single casualty.

Machine Guns. Each Company had two light M.Gs. ('08/15 Model). These were supplied about 2 weeks ago. The crews were trained at a course in ROUBAIX. Ammunition - 500 rounds K ammunition, 4000 rounds ord. If an attack is made by Tanks orders were to fire at their sides so to penetrate the petrol tank.

Trench Mortars. Light T.M. 4 to a Battalion - the crew consists 4 men.

Gas. Prisoner states that during the attack there were a number of casualties in his company from our artillery gas shells - some 40 - 50 men. The regiment has had no gas in the trenches since April 29 1916, when they were in the act of putting out gas against us, but owing to the light wind the gas wave turned into their own trenches and wiped out practically a whole battalion, as the Hun gas masks at that time were not proof against their own gas fumes. Since this accident steps have been taken to remedy this failing.

Prisoner of the 1st Company, 1st Guard Res. Regt., (1st Guard Res. Div.) captured on 10th inst. gives the following information:-

Movements of 1st Guard Res. Regt. during the battle.

8.30 p.m. 8th June. 1st Coy. (I Bn.) moved up to support 8th Coy. (II Bn.). 3 Coys. of II Bn. in front line. 2nd Coy. were moved at the same time to support III Bn. on the right of II Bn. To the South of them were 18 Bav. I.R. Great confusion.

Night 8/9th June. After bombardment only 15 men of 1st Coy. were left. Remainder either ran back or killed.

Evening 9th June. I and II Bns. merged into one owing to severe losses.

Composition.

Mostly active. Draft of 35 men from 613 I.R. 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Company Strength. Rifle Strength 90. Ration strength 110.

Machine Guns. The usual M.G. Coy. per battalion. Besides this each Coy. had one English Lewis and two '08/15 Model Light M.Gs. The English guns were captured at GAVRELLE.

Trench Mortars. Their T.M. Coy. used gas shells when T.Ms. were in use.

II ANZAC Intelligence.
12th June 1917.

TRANSLATION OF AN ORDER FOUND IN MESSINES H.Q.Regimental Order No. 9447 of 5th May 1917.INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDANT OF MESSINES.

1. In consequence of the importance of MESSINES as the southern corner post of the WYTSCHAETE Salient, I appoint a permanent responsible commander for the outer and inner defences. Captain THOMAS is detailed for this post.

2. The outer defences consist of :-

- (a) The whole trench system on the west (OYSTER RESERVE to ULCER RESERVE) - the trench round the south of MESSINES past the H.Q. (at U 3 a 15.15 to UNBEARABLE TRENCH) and the trench north of the town (OXONIAN RESERVE).
- (b) The inner defences of MESSINES are based on five concrete works which command the lines of the streets. More of these are planned, some being already in course of construction.

3. In the event of the outer defences being broken by the enemy the place itself is to be defended by sectors. The main defence is 5 concrete dugouts (see map) which are linked up by a close system of road metal obstacles. Each dugout is a strongpoint on its own, and as such is to be defended to the utmost, that is, until the place has been retaken. The concrete dugouts form together a mutually supporting system of strong points.

4. The Commandant of MESSINES has the following forces at his disposal which are to be considered as an emergency garrison. In order to distinguish them, these are to carry a white band on the left arm.

For the outer defence:-

- (a) One Zug (Platoon) of Regimental Pioneer Coy. of 181 I.R. for the defensive positions north of the road from VILLA BRENZLICH to WULVERGHEM.
- (b) One Zug of the Company of the Reserve Battalion which garrisons the west front of MESSINES (OYSTER RESERVE).
- (c) One Zug of the Regimental Pioneer Company of the 134 I.R. stationed in the dugouts of the KLOSTER (INSTITUTION ROYALE).
- (d) One Zug of the Regimental Pioneer Company of the 134 I.R. stationed in the western end. (UNBEARABLE TRENCH).

For the inner defence of the town:-

The remaining company of the Reserve Battalion (formerly Regimental Reserve Company) which is in MESSINES.

The battalions must arrange for the same companies to be detailed each time. Also the M.Gs. as per map and the emergency gun "SUEDFLINTE" which is in the S.W. edge of the town.

5. The duties of the Commandant of MESSINES include:-

- (a) Thorough instruction of all leaders and detachments (especially machine gunners) about their duties in case of enemy attack.
- (b) Practice drills in manning posts.
- (c) Provisioning the dugouts with sufficient rations.
- (d) Supervision of ammunition and ration depots.
- (e) Keeping ready special close range weapons and pioneer stores at each strongpoint.
- (f) Regulation of aid posts in conjunction with the M.O. on duty in the dressing station.
- (g) Control of Intelligence arrangements.

6.....

- 2 -

Translation of an Order found in MESSINES H.Q. (continued).

6. Captain THOMAS is authorised to make at once any necessary alteration to the disposition of the forces detailed for the defence of MESSINES and is to report on same by 10th May to Regimental H.Q. Lieut. SPANIER is detailed to assist.

7. Captain THOMAS will occupy the former battle headquarters of the Reserve Battalion Commander in the Institution Royale, and will relieve him every 5 days starting 16th May.


8. While Captain THOMAS is in rest quarters in COMINES the Commander of the Reserve Battalion will be the Commandant of MESSINES. When the defensive operations start, Captain THOMAS is to be continuously in MESSINES. The Commander of the Reserve Battalion will then be at my disposal and will probably be stationed at "BURGHOF" (O 36 S 5.5) or at "KRAUTHOF" (V 1 b 6.2).

(Sgd) NAUMANN.

- Shell-proof dug outs
- Splinter proof "
- Fire trench without parados

MESSINES

Scale 1:2500



SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 13th June.CONFIDENTIAL THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHESIDENTIFICATIONS.

A corporal and private of the 7th Coy. 98th Res. Inf. Regt., 207th Division were taken about 0 35 a 8.4 east of GAPAARD at 2 a.m.

EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS.

Method of Capture. The corporal was in charge of a group of 8 men who were disposed in shell holes in a series of double sentry posts. One platoon from his company was in this outpost line, the remainder being in the trenches of the WARNETON line some 700 yds. behind. He went out with the other prisoner to get in touch with the post on his right. This post he thought he had located by seeing German Very lights, which rise higher than ours, put up from it, but found on arrival that it was English.

MOVEMENTS OF DIVISION.

Relieved in PRONVILLE sector north east of BAPAUME between June 1st and 3rd apparently by 3rd Guard Division. Moved by rail CAMBRAI - FHALEMPIN. Marched to MERIGNIES (south of LILLE) where stayed 6 days. Then by road to TOURCOING where remained 2 days. Prisoner's battalion came through WERVICQ on night June 11/12th and relieved a Guard Battalion in the line about 2 a.m. The squad to which prisoners belonged was taken straight out to the outpost line.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Both the other regiments of the Division (the 209th and 213th Res. Regts.) ^{are} known to be up, but prisoners could only give a vague surmise as to their whereabouts. The 213th was thought to be on the north and 209th to the south.

WARNETON LINE.

Having come straight through this line on night 11/12th prisoners could give practically no information about it. Two belts of wire however were noticed and a Company Commander's concrete dugout. All three battalions of the regiment were thought to be in this line or in reserve not far in rear. Nothing was known as to width of sectors.

OTHER UNITS SEEN.

Men of all three regiments of the 3rd Bav. Div. were seen in TOURCOING. It was said that the 23rd Bav. I.R. had lost 1300 men in the fight. A fresh Bavarian Division, number unknown, was seen arriving the day they left (June 11th). Artillery of the 1st Guard Res. Div. spoken to said that a great number of damaged guns had recently passed through COMINES.

COMPANY STRENGTH.

About 170 including 20 to 30 specially employed.

COMMANDERS.

Div. General	-	Major-General SCHROETTER.
Brigade Commander		Frhr. v. LOTZOFF (? rank).
Regtl. Commander		Major BAUER.
2nd Battn. Commander		Capt. ORDEMANN.
7th Coy. Commander		2/Lieut. SCHLOSSER. (only Officer in Coy).

LIGHT MACHINE GUNS.

Due to arrive. N.C.Os. and teams left behind to fetch them.

GAS.

Our trench mortar gas shells killed 49 men of 2nd Battalion, 209th Res. Regt. about 20th May in the QUEANT sector.

INFORMATION.....

- 2 -

INFORMATION FROM AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN FROM SOUTH OF LA POTTERIE FARM TO FRELINGHIEN 13-6-17.

Front and support lines. No new trenches visible but a good deal of work seems to have been carried out repairing trenches and on emplacements and dugouts. Both front and support lines in good condition from the LYS to the craters at FACTORY FARM, and the C.Ts. are good especially UNA STREET, UMPIRE AVENUE, UMBO DRIVE and UMBO ROW.

In the reserve system CEDILLA RESERVE now stretches to the LYS at 36 C 5 a 2.1.

Rear Lines. A considerable amount of work appears to have been done N.E. of FRELINGHIEN on CERTAIN, CEYLON, and the new loop in front of CESSPOOL TRENCH: the intermediate line from CEMETERY AVENUE past the farms in C 12 a to near DURIEZ FM. is continuous and good, and CERTAIN TRENCH is very good and continuous to the road just south of PONT ROUGE.

North of the LYS some work on emplacements and dugouts U 28 d 85.50 and on trench from U 28 d 6.5 to U 28 d 4.6.

UNCOMMON TRENCH has also been improved. UNCLE TRENCH is bad throughout and the support trench would appear to be the trench held.

Miscellaneous. The PONT DE DEULEMONT and bridge just to south of it, and the bridge U 30 a 75.90 are still good and used by traffic in place of the PONT ROUGE bridges, which have been much damaged.

The roads near DEULEMONT still used considerably, especially the DEULEMONT - COMINES road.

C. Clifton Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

13th June 1917.



SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 14th June.

CONFIDENTIAL:- THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHES.
OPERATIONS.

Since yesterday posts have been established about

Knoll 20 U 28 b.

Loophole Farm.

U 22 b 5.8

U 16 d 9.0

U 16 b 8.0

U 16 b 8.6

U 16 b 8.9

U 10 d 0.4

Round LA POTTERIE FM.

Along UNCERTAIN TRENCH.

U 10 b 3.9 on the DOUVE.

U 5 c 0.5.

U 4 d 8.6

U 4 b 8.2

U 4 b 3.8

GAPPAARD.

The enemy appears still to have posts in AU CHASSEUR CABARET, FME DE LA CROIX, STEIGNAST FM. and LES QUATRE ROIS CABARET.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

Enemy shelled his old front line and areas to the west of it from the WARNAVE to the LYS fairly heavily during the night.

Between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m. 6 hostile aeroplanes flew over our lines and fired into our front trenches.

PART II.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

GENERAL SITUATION.

Confirmation of rearward movement of enemy's wireless ground stations was obtained last night, when those sections which were ordered back at 11 a.m. turned up to the east of the Canal and COMINES. Further examination of prisoners and of photographs taken yesterday indicates a slight attempt to improve the WARNETON Line, but it appears hasty and lacks continuity and thoroughness. Some attempt is being made to improve and connect up strong points on the TENBRIELEN Switch Line, and indications point to the preparation of this line for more serious defence. Other indications that the enemy does not intend to make a strong resistance on the WARNETON Line are:- (1) Its lack of new work; (2) Disposition of guns south-east of WARNETON to enfilade it; and (3) Special attempts hurriedly to make a trench behind the wire east of the YPRES-COMINES Canal by blasting a row of holes (photographs taken afternoon June 13th).

AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs taken on 13th inst. show that the enemy has commenced to dig a few short sections of trench about LA BUSSCHE FM (28 V 1 b).

PART III.....

PART III
CONTRE-ESPIONNAGE.

The undermentioned civilian workmen have been discharged for attempting to foment a strike, and should not again be taken into military employment:-

THIBAUT, Ferdinand, French, 18 years, Rue Gambetta, ARMENTIERES.
VALCKE, Gustave, Belgian, 16 years, Cle d'Hollande, NEUVE-EGLISE.

PART II.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS.

ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

A captured wireless operator states that it was the intention of the Germans to make a demonstration attack on the YPRES Salient so as to draw our troops away from the ARRAS sector, where they intended to make a further retirement, which by this means they hoped to accomplish unmolested. He also thinks there is a general idea to retire at some period or other to the line WERVICQ-KRUISECKE which he states to be a continuation of the SIEGFRIED Line.

WERVICQ-KRUISECKE Line. This line is not completed at this point but dugouts have been completed and ^{are} said to be invisible from above with head cover varying from 2 to 4 yds. in thickness. The trench itself is only mapped out to a depth of about 30 c.m. Trenches in rear are usually dug by trench machines (dredgers). The civil population has to work on concrete dugouts, but Russian prisoners are chiefly used for this purpose, as they show great aptitude for it.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONER AT A C.C.S.

A prisoner of the 11th Bav. Regt. who was captured on the evening of the 11th stated that he and his comrades had been told by their officers many times that they were to consider themselves as no longer belonging to the 16th Bav. Div.

The other two regiments of this division (21st Bav. R.I.R. and the 14th Bav. I.R.) were confirmed by prisoner, to be in the line north of ARMENTIERES. In the opinion of most men in prisoner's regt. they were removed from the other two regiments of the 16th Bav. Div. and put into a sector where the fighting was most severe as a punishment for having grumbled at being kept in the line for so long when at VIMY.

Prisoner was of the opinion that they had relieved the 5th Bav. R.I.R. and that the whole 4th Bav. Div. was out of the line, this division having had heavy losses. He had seen men of the 1st Guards Res. Regt. on his right but had no knowledge of the dispositions on his left.

14th June 1917.

C. Cliffe
Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

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SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 15th June 1917.

CONFIDENTIAL. THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHES.

PART I.
INFORMATION FROM OUR OWN FRONT.

OPERATIONS.

During the evening our front was advanced to the line shown approximately on the accompanying sketch maps.

58 unwounded prisoners were taken at various points and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

Prisoners were taken in U 17 a about AU CHASSEUR CABARET belonging to the 71st Res. Inf. Regt., 22nd Res. Div. (a new identification).

Other prisoners taken between FME DE LA CROIX U 11 b and STEIGNAST FM U 5 a gave normal identifications of 209th, 98th and 213th Res. Regts., 207th Division.

ENEMY'S ACTIVITY.

Hostile barrage was fairly heavy about 8.30 p.m. but there was very little counter-battery work. LE BIZET, PETIT PONT and PONT DE NIEPPE were among the areas shelled on the 14th. Our new front system was shelled intermittently. High velocity guns were again active.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS.

Order of Battle.

North to South stated to be :-

213th R.I.R.)
98th R.I.R.) 207th Division.
209th R.I.R.)

94th R.I.R.)
82nd R.I.R.) 22nd Res. Division.
71st R.I.R.)

21st Bav. R.I.R., 16th Bav. Division.

Method of holding line.

Prisoners only having been in the outpost line know practically nothing of their sectors. Each regiment of the 207th Division is stated to have 1 battalion in the WARNETON line. The 213th is said to have the other two battalions in close support near the Canal: the 98th, 1 battalion in support and 1 resting in LINSSELLES.

WARNETON Line.

There are said to be many concrete dugouts in front line which is in good condition. Work is proceeding on the support line.

Headquarters.

Headquarters of the battalion of the 98th in line is said to be at KIWI FM., O 36 c 5.5 called by the Germans BURGHOF.

Arrival of 22nd Res. Division.

Two battalions 71st R.I.R. came into line on morning of 14th from reserve south of COMINES crossing the LYS west of WARNETON. They relieved 5th Bav. I.R. and expected to be in for 3 days. The Division had previously been resting in the LENS area. It is a Prussian Division that has not seen much fighting this year.

INFORMATION.....

INFORMATION FROM AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN 15-6-17.

Our Lines. Small trenches visible at the following places in front of our main front trench: U 17 a 6.2, U 11 a 7.0, U 11 a 8.3, U 11 b 25.60, from U 11 b 5.8 to U 5 d 1.8 (just east of FME DE LA CROIX), U 5 a 9.6, U 5 a 9.8 (east of STEIGNAST FM.), O 35 c 9.1, O 35 c 9.5, O 35 c 8.7, O 35 c 9.6, O 35 a 9.0.

Trenches in U 22 d and 28 seem still in good condition.

Enemy Lines. Little new work is visible: UNCOMMON TRENCH is battered almost beyond recognition: no work on trenches just west of LA BASSE VILLE or on UNCUT TRENCH (U 18 c and 24 a) east of the LYS. The WARNETON line does not appear to have had much work done on it: south of the GAPAARD - WARNETON road the wire is poor, north of it there are still two strong belts of wire.

Trenches in Rear. Very little alteration to the small trenches in front of LA BUSSCHE FARM (V 1 d): north of this the trenches near BARBARAHOF (P 31 a) have apparently been made into a strong point. There is a suspicion of a new trench in V 15 b, 16 a, just north of PETIT HEL: only an irregular white line shows at present.

Miscellaneous. MAI CORNET and the buildings in P 31, P 32, P 33, V 1, V 2, and V 3 are still apparently occupied, and PONT MALHET Dump still in use.

The following roads appear to be much used:-
WARNETON-QUESNOY from just south of cross roads V 19 central, MAI CORNET-GARDE DIEU to farm P 31 d 8.5, PONT MALHET-COMINES (slightly damaged in places), PONT MALHET-DRIE LINDEN-KORENTJE PONT MALHET-HOPITAL FARM-new bridge P 33 b, road running N.W. from P 32 b 60.98, and road from MAI CORNET to bridge V 3 d 4.0. Many tracks are visible near LA BUSSCHE FARM and across fields in V 13, V 19: many tracks lead up to the WARNETON line in O 36 and U 6.

GERMAN STICK ROCKET GUN.



The gun, a sketch of which is attached, was captured during the recent operations near MESSINES. It is used for firing winged rockets. The apparatus is 2' 7½" total length and is of steel. The upper portion has a cylindrical portion A surrounding the stick B on to which the rockets are placed in the same manner as the "pineapples" used with the "Priester" T.M. The spike J is pressed into the ground plate K preventing the gun sinking too deeply. The firing mechanism is similar to that of a bolt action rifle. The gun is cocked by drawing back and rotating the bolt knob D and sleeve O, the safety device E engaging in one of the holes in the sleeve. E is kept in position by a spring H. The gun is fired by rotating the sleeve O by means of the lug F, at the same time depressing the safety catch E. This causes the striker C to detonate the cap L in the interior of the rocket. The rockets have a steel rod shank with three metal fins sweated on. The head is of zinc and is painted red or green (according to colour) with a longitudinal white stripe. The rockets are double green or double red stars and are done up in cardboard boxes containing five of one colour. They are marked "Kaliber 40 m.m."

15th June 1917.

C. Clifton Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

GERMAN STICK-ROCKET GUN CAPTURED AT MESSINES.

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Appendix No. 1


15.6.17.

55

52

Approx British Front Line

57



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SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 16th June.

CONFIDENTIAL :- THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHES.

GENERAL SITUATION.

From the LYS to the WARNAVE we have posts in enemy's old front and support lines, and down UNA AVENUE as far as U 28 b.6.0.

The front line is reported to have been found full of wire in place and had evidently been held by posts at the heads of C.Ts.

No enemy is reported South of the railway but he holds UNA AVENUE at about U 28 b.90.15. North of the WARNAVE our line runs as shown on sketch map issued with yesterday's summary.

IDENTIFICATION.

36 C 11 c a patrol entered FRELINGHIEN yesterday afternoon and brought back 3 unwounded prisoners of the 14th Bav. Res. Pioneer Coy. attached 16th Bav. Division (Normal).

INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS OF 14TH BAV. RES. PIONEER COY. CAPTURED IN FRELINGHIEN on 15th June.

Order of Battle.

Prisoners state 21st Bav. R.I.R. north of LYS, 14th Bav. I.R. south of the river. Two Companies of the latter regiment were thought to be in FRELINGHIEN. It was rumoured that the 14th Bav. I.R. would be relieved by the 5th Bav. I.R., 4th Bav. Div.

Employment of Pioneer Coy.

Prisoners' duties had been to keep in repair the pontoon bridge at C 5 c 60.15. According to one prisoner they had orders to remove all the bridges at FRELINGHIEN. The timbers and barrels were to be drawn to the French side of the river. He did not know if the bridges at WARNETON were ordered to be destroyed.

Movements.

The 14th Bav. Res. Pioneer Coy. had been for about 15 months on the VIMY ridge whence it came to the ARMENTIERES sector towards the end of May. Prisoner had been with the company since 16th April 1916.

Prisoner had been on guard duties for about 10 days first in LA FORGETTE (36 D 8 a) and later in QUESNOY (Chateau). He had been employed on bridge repair work at FRELINGHIEN since 4th June.

Disposition of Pioneer Units.

Prisoner could not give much information on this subject but knew for certain that the 14th and 15th Bav. Res. Pioneer Coys. were attached to 16th Bav. Division. 9th Bav. Pioneer Coy. (plus another company) were attached to 4th Bav. Division.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

The whole of the Corps front was heavily shelled from 6.30 p.m. to 10 p.m.; POINT DE NIEPPE throughout the night.

A hostile party 20 strong advanced against FARM DE LA CROIX (U 11 b) but was repulsed.

PART II follows:-...

PART II.
INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

AIRCRAFT.

Hostile aeroplanes were active yesterday morning but inactive in the afternoon. Three enemy machines were shot down, one of which fell in our lines near YPRES and four machines were driven down out of control. We dropped 34 20-lb. bombs on HOUTHEM Dump. Eight hostile aeroplanes flew over our front line on the southern portion of the Army front about 7.30 p.m. at a height of about 800 feet.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DOCUMENT.

Copy of Copy,
Group WYTSCHAETE.

12-5-17.

It has been ascertained from prisoners that the enemy knew of our plans for the night 9th/10th May and that, in consequence, he was standing to the whole night. To that fact the failure of the patrol enterprises of the 204th (? 24th) and 2nd Infantry Divisions and the bloody losses we sustained in carrying out these enterprises, may be principally attributed.

Our listening station (FRANKENWALD) reports that on the evening of the 9th May at 8.30 a Captain in the Artillery was speaking with his observer in the front line and told the latter that the "killing was to begin at 10.22". There is no doubt but that this conversation to which frequent reference has already been made, was heard by the enemy and that in this way he may have learnt of our intention.

The troops have been warned so frequently of the urgent necessity of avoiding all such telephone conversations in the front line, that any further warning should be unnecessary.

From this time-on, any guilty person will be proceeded against with the utmost rigour, and in circumstances such as the present instance, criminal prosecution will be considered. The divisions must ascertain who the guilty person was and must announce to the Group the results of the enquiry and the punishment inflicted. This refers especially to the 24th and 2nd Infantry Divisions.

(Sgd) v. LAFFERT, General.

* (Note: No such message appears to have been picked up by our Listening Sets).

16th June 1917.

C. Cliffe, Capt.
for Brig.-General G.S.
II ANZAC CORPS.

SECOND ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to 5 p.m. 17th June.

CONFIDENTIAL :- THIS SUMMARY IS NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE FRONT TRENCHES.

GENERAL SITUATION.

A post was established at U 22 d 60.65. There was much activity from hostile M.G. and snipers from the direction of the ARMENTIERES - WARNETON railway.

MACHINE GUNS.

Located at U 5 b 4.5. on avenue leading up to STEIGNAST FARM.

AIRCRAFT.

A number of enemy aeroplanes with red fuselage are reported flying low over our trenches between FLOEGSTEERT WOOD and FRELINGHIEN at 6-20 p.m. on 16th inst. One had black wings. A hostile Kite Balloon was brought down in flames between COMINES and QUESNOY at about 6 p.m.

FIRES.

At QUESNOY at 4-10 p.m.

At QUESNOY at 7-25 p.m. (two fires seen).

At WARNETON at 10 p.m. (C 5 d 2.9)

AT DURIEZ FARM at 4-25 p.m., there was a large explosion.

During the afternoon a stray shell set fire to the huts at 28.0. 36 d 69 (E. of GAPAARD).

ARTILLERY.

(a) Our field artillery fired on trench targets and kept up a harassing fire on enemy's roads and approaches. Heavy artillery carried out successful counter battery work with aeroplane and balloon observation.

(b) The enemy continues to shell posts between rivers LYS and DOUVE fairly heavily but there has been less shelling than usual North of the DOUVE.

FURTHER INFORMATION GIVEN BY PRISONERS OF 14th BAV. RES. PION. COY. taken on 15th inst. at FRELINGHIEN.

Garrison. The pioneers were exclusively engaged on bridge repair work and were quartered in dugouts in FRELINGHIEN. Early in the month there was a considerable garrison in the village and vicinity accommodated in reinforced cellars and dugouts. The garrison was said to have totaled one battalion but has lately been reduced to about two companies (one prisoner stated one platoon only).

Withdrawal. Prisoners had not heard of any intended withdrawal from the village although the bridges over the LYS had been ordered to be destroyed.

Bridges. That at C 5 C 5.9 was blown up and destroyed. That at C. 5 C 60.15. was dismantled and stored on the French side of the river. The steel road bridge at C 11 C 45 .p0 is impassable. The two bridges at C 11 c 45.95 were used for tramway and foot traffic. One had been destroyed by shell fire and the other demolished by explosive. Both are believed to be impassable.

The bridge at C 11 a 50.15 over which prisoners were brought back had been blown up but was found passable with difficulty.

The Ferry at about C 11 a 55.55 has had the cable cut and the raft is moored to the Eastern bank.

Headquarters.

Probably a battalion H.Q. in the chateau at C 11 b 15.40. There is an important centre with dugouts for M.G. and T.M. personnel at C 11 b 10.38 and 22.58 (confirmed by photographs.)

M.G. Position At C 11 a 60.25 is a sandbag emplacement. A M.G. is permanently mounted here.

PART II FOLLOWS

PART II.
INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

THE GENERAL SITUATION JUNE 17th.

While the enemy is on the general line FRELINGHIEN - WARNETON - ROLLERKE, he is holding at only lightly and has posts in shell holes in front. Prisoners state that the WARNETON line is held only in strong points and at places where there are concrete dugouts. The enemy has, however, been busily digging behind (East) of the YPRES - COMINES Canal and is also working very hard in completing and consolidating the TENBRIELEN Switch - Line (GODSHUIS - TENBRIELEN - ZAANDVOORDE) and commencing to dig a support line to it. It is to be expected that he will, if pressed from the WARNETON Line and Canal, move back to this line and will secure the flanks of this portion of his battle front by keeping a firm hold on the LVS and the high ground SOUTH of WERVICQ to protect LILLE on the one hand, and on the other very strong ZAANDVOORDE position on the other. That he has some such ultimate move in contemplation is evident from the haste which he is exhibiting in his work on these lines. Even with this apparent haste, the work he is doing as yet is quite sketchy judged from the photographs: the inference from this is that he is still disorganized and lacks the energy or driving power on a large scale which he has hitherto displayed under conditions of similar emergency.

IDENTIFICATIONS OF THE ENEMY'S UNITS.

11th Division. * A prisoner of 9th Coy., 38th Fus. Regt., was taken last night in 28 0 28 d 8.8. (North of DELORTE FARM). No definite information as to order of battle has yet been obtained.

9th Res. Division. 19th R.I.R. East of ARMENTIERES. 15th June.
 Man killed.

ENEMY'S AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY DURING WEEK ENDED 16th JUNE.

During the past week hostile fighting machines have been active each morning but inactive in the afternoon: artillery machines have been normal. Enemy aeroplanes have several times been reported low over our forward positions early in the morning. There has been little interference with our machines operating in forward areas, and enemy planes in general have been very seldom over our lines. Our machines have been very successful in aerial fighting and have engaged hostile infantry and transport with Machine Gun fire on several occasions: bombs have also been dropped in the COMINES - WERVICQ - HOUTHEM area. The number of hostile machines engaged by our anti-aircraft guns was 245. The percentage of hostile machines was 11% of the total observed. One enemy machine was destroyed by A. A. fire.

MACHINE GUNS AND BATTALION STRENGTH.

Prisoners of the 46th I.R. (119th Div.) state that the regiment has three machine gun companies, each armed with 9 guns; three of these were issued to each machine gun company on arrival on the Western front. In addition, the regiment received 45 light machine guns on the 13th June. This represents a complete issue of the new light machine gun, with some spares, and it may be assumed, therefore, that the battalion establishment of this regiment will in future be reduced to 650 general service men.

17th June 1917.

H. J. Trust
 for Brig.-General G.S.
 II ANZAC CORPS.