


AWM4
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/42/19 Part 6

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 1st
Australian Division

August 1916



AWM4-1/42/19PART6

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Appendix No. 10.

A P P E N D I X N o 1 0 .

Handing over Notes of 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde when relieved by
5th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

A U G U S T 1 9 1 6

Right Bde. Sector Aust. Divisional Front.

LOCATION.

General.

The line is established as shewn on MAP BOISELLE and sun prints supplied by G.S.O.3. 1st. Aust. Divn. all handed to you herewith. The 44th. Inf. Bde, is on the Right and the 3rd. Aus. Inf. Bde on the left

WORKS

Comm. Trenches.

Every effort has been made to keep certain lines in repair. These lines are WALKER AVENUE, COPSE AVENUE, SYDNEY ROAD, LONG DRIVE, PIONEER TRENCH, MUNSTER ALLEY and these trenches are good except the last named which is always heavily bombarded.

Garrisoned Trenches.

DOT TRENCH is good along its length but not as good as it can be made, it has till this day (21st) escaped enemy artillery attention. From the portion on the left of the BAPAUME Road a view is obtained of COURCELETTE and the SUNKEN Road which runs due N & S. O.G.1 & 2 do not exist as trench lines they are two successive lines along which there are remains of trenches which accomodate the posts.

Enemy Works

Between MUNSTER ALLEY and BAPAUME ROAD little can be said of them as they are hard to recognise but the aeroplane photos show them as well made trenches. They are apparently situated just over the crest. The enemy is continually working behind this line as evident from the working parties that come along the road.

Policy.

An attack launched by us against the enemy opposite the right sector did not succeed great loss being occasioned from M.G. fire from positions apparently in rear of objective and also from right flank, so saps were started forward along the whole of our front at intervals of about 80^x with the object of making a new line and linking it up with the offshoot from MUNSTER ALLEY. Saps are now from 5^x to 20^x forward.

The trench shown from R.35.D.06 to 46 has been investigated for 2/3 its length and found to be in bad condition and unoccupied the ground beyond it has also been patrolled to foot of valley without gaining touch with enemy.

Enemy Attitude.

At first very active but last two days both his infantry and artillery has slackened off. He patrols well, in groups of five, and his M.G.'s are generally active.

O.G.1 & O.G.2 with the communication near them are targets on which he plays with artillery continually and this makes it hard and continuous work to keep them in order.

Inferences.

From the reports of the last few days it would appear that he thins his line X.6.A.22 to R.35.D.35 during the day and this morning (21st) he shelled it himself either his artillery was rattled or he thought he had lost it. He relieved on the night 19/20 as men with packs on were seen leaving in the morning of the 20th.

(Sgd) T. F. ULRICH Major.
 Bde. Major. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Copy to 5th. Bde. - 1st. Aust. Divn. - File - War Diary.

2311

APPENDIX 11. to War Diary 1st Aus Div Gen Staff
August 1916

Report on Operations of 1st. Australian Division

August 15th. to August 23rd. 1916.

Report on Operations of 1st. Australian Division

August 15th. to August 23rd. 1916.
-----RELIEF OF 4th. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

1. The relief of the 4th. Australian Division by the 1st. Australian Division commenced on the night 15th. August and was completed on the morning of the 17th.

OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT.

2. On the 16th. August proposals for the operations of the Division during the period it was in the line were received from 1st. A. & N. Z. A. C. These involved two operations. Operation (A) The advancing of the line to the north by the capture of the German positions on the line east and west through MOUQUET FARM. Operation (B) To advance the line on the east by the capture of the German trenches from R.35.D.4.6 to MUNSTER ALLEY.

DISPOSITIONS ON TAKING OVER.

3. The command of the Divisional front passed from the G.O.C., 4th. Australian Division to me at 5 p.m on the 16th. August. The 2nd. Infantry Brigade were in the line on the right and the 1st. Brigade on the left, each with two Battalions in the line and two in Brigade reserve. The 1st. Australian Divisional Artillery covered the right sector and the Lahore Divisional Artillery covered the left sector. The 3rd. Infantry Brigade was in Divisional reserve.

The exact position of the front line north of POZIERES at the time of taking over was in doubt for some time, but finally proved to be as follows:-

From the junction of TORR trench and O.G.2 to X.5.B.2. $\frac{1}{2}$.
Along O.G.2 to R.34.B.1.2.- 28.C.8 $\frac{1}{2}$.0.- 7.1.- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$.0.-
R.34.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.9 $\frac{1}{2}$.- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.- 33.B.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 $\frac{1}{2}$.- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.- 3.2.- 2.2. with
a gap to 33.A.8.1.

The total length of the line held was 3400 yards.

8-5/3
PREPARATIONS.

4. Orders were issued for Operations (A) and (B) to be carried out by the 1st. and 2nd. Infantry Brigades, respectively, at 9 p.m on the 18th. August. (vide Appendix I attached)

PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION "A".

5. During the 16th. and on the night 16/17th. the G.O.C 1st. Infantry Brigade prepared to push forward bombing parties to seize ground forward as far as possible and at 7 p.m our barrage was lifted to enable this to be done. One result of this was to give the enemy infantry immunity from our shell fire, who appear to have been preparing for a more or less general attack on our north-western front along the line R.28.C.- QUARRY) SKY LINE Trench. A deliberate bombardment of our front line and support trenches commenced at 4-30 p.m and continued till 7-30 p.m. At this hour the hostile bombardment intensified and small parties of the enemy were seen pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole. At 8 p.m enemy rifle and machine gun fire opened and at 8-45 p.m the hostile infantry attack was launched. This attack was met and broken by steady rifle and machine gun fire and by a counter attack by the bombing parties who had been got ready to push forward. Several enemy infantry attacks were launched during the night but were all broken up, by rifle and machine gun fire and only one came within bombing distance. The attacks in most cases were carried out on a narrow front and were disconnected. The last attempt to advance was made at 2-30 a.m. The effect of this action by the enemy was to prevent our bombing parties pushing forward very far. The enemy's artillery also succeeded in obliterating portion of our front line trenches.

Very little work could be done during the daytime of the 17th. and on the night of the 17/18th. August instead of digging new assembly trenches in advance of our line the infantry had to be employed on those which the enemy had blown in on the previous night.

Owing to the extent of the front line it was found

8-3/4

necessary to put an additional Battalion in the line in order to have sufficient men of the Brigade available for the operation against the enemy's position.

Prior to the attack the Brigade were disposed as follows:- 1st. Battalion on the right, the 3rd. Battalion in the centre and the 4th. Battalion on the left, 2nd. Battalion was in Brigade reserve; six guns of the machine gun company were posted in rear of the front line for direct enfilade fire and the remainder were disposed for indirect fire.

During the 18th. the Brigade was subjected to a bombardment by our own artillery on which the Brigade Commander reports as follows:-

"Our own howitzers shelled our own trenches during the day. At 1-20 p.m they appeared to shell R.34.A.2.7 with 6" shells. At 1-30 p.m R.28.C.1.8 was reported as shelled by 9.2". At 4 p.m the 3rd. Battalion was shelled very heavily by our own guns which then eased off and commenced again at 7 p.m in great intensity till the barrage time 8 p.m to 9 p.m began. This barrage was on our own front line from R.28.C.9.0 to 7.1 to 2.0. In three places our front line was breached for twenty yards, and some casualties occurred. At 10-20 this shelling lifted on the right".

PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION "B".

- 6. During the nights 16/17th., and 17/18th. August a considerable amount of digging was done by the right Brigade. From MUNSTER ALLEY running northwards a fresh trench was dug beyond the tramline, its total length was about 440 yards North of this an error was made in laying out the trench and instead of digging a line parallel to the enemy's, the portion dug presented a semi-oval shape with a parabola towards the enemy's line. The southern portion of this line was concealed from the enemy's line by a low crest which ran between them. Throughout the day the 2nd. Infantry Brigade continued working on its new trench line and its work up to this time was very little interfered with by hostile artillery. All preliminary arrangements for the attack were completed and the troops

8-315

were in the assembly trenches a quarter of an hour before zero hour.

ACTION OF 2nd. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

7. The distribution was:- 8th. Battalion on the right, two companies in line with two in support. The 7th. Battalion in centre with two companies in line and two in support, the 6th. Battalion on the left and 5th. Battalion in Brigade reserve. The attack on the enemy's trenches was made by the 8th. and 7th. Battalions and the 6th. Battalion was directed to join up our line to the north with the left flank of the 7th. Battalion.

As the situation of the assembly trench on the left of the 7th. Battalion was unfavourable for launching the assault, arrangements were made for the company to form up on the left flank of the right company prior to the attack. At about 8-40 p.m this company commenced to creep forward to its alignment and came under heavy H.E and shrapnel fire. The O.C. Company and one other officer, C.S.M., and two Sergeants were buried within a few minutes and two other officers took charge and brought the men forward, but communication between the two companies was not established. On the extreme left this company made its way into the German Strong point at the road junction at Sq.R.35.D.4.5. and commenced to push forward by bombing systematically. The trench running north from this point appears to have been very little damaged by our shell fire and the enemy made a strong counter attack down it which drove out our party who fell back and joined up with the 6th. Battalion on its left.

The right company of the Battalion, occupied the portion of the assembly trench nearest the enemy. Portion of it appears to have reached the enemy's trench but suffered severely from oblique machine gun fire and bombs thrown from the trench and was forced to withdraw after having lost the whole of the officers who were taking part in the assault.

The 8th. Battalion on the right were formed up with two companies in front line in lines of half companies; one company

8-316
in support and one in reserve. Immediately the right moved forward over the crest it met with a heavy machine gun fire from the centre and left and was forced to withdraw. The support company was pushed in and a second attempt was made which reached the enemy's trenches but was unable to remain there. Meanwhile the C.O., 7th. Battalion was uncertain as to whether his men were in the enemy position or not, as he had received a message which indicated they were, but as the 8th. Battalion were making their second attempt he reinforced his right company, which had fallen back and become somewhat intermingled with the left of 8th. Battalion, and sent them forward to assist the 8th. Battalion. This effort however, failed.

There does not appear to be any doubt that hostile machine guns were distributed in strong points which had not suffered from our artillery fire.

It was very difficult to obtain definite information as to the situation on this flank but as soon as it was clear that we were not in possession of the objective, orders were issued to form strong bombing parties to push forward towards the German strong point at the road junction. The Brigade Commander represented that he had only 23 bombers all told on account of numerous casualties, and this enterprise was abandoned.

Contributing factors in the failure of this attack were (a) the wrong direction of the northern portion of the jumping off trench, (b) the heavy losses of the assaulting companies, (c) the previous artillery fire had not succeeded in effectively demolishing the enemy trenches and does not appear to have had any effect in breaking up the strong points and machine gun positions, (d) the very heavy casualties amongst officers of the assaulting companies. All the officers of the 8th. Battalion who participated became casualties at an early stage.

ACTION OF 1st. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

8. The attack was made by a series of strong bombing patrols which pushed forward along the various communication trenches and other lines of advance.

A strong patrol was pushed out to 9.3 and found the enemy

8.317

holding the high trench at 9.5 to 3.6 with machine guns. An enemy flanking party pushed out and engaged our patrol which established itself at point 9.3 and subsequently connected to 8.1 by a sap. In the centre of this Battalion another patrol went out and also on the left. It is stated that the patrol on the left could not advance more than 100 yards from our own firing line as our own barrage had not lifted beyond this. The 4th. Battalion advanced to points 0.1 and 9.1 and found the trenches wired and occupied by the enemy with bombers and machine guns.

R.33.B.5.6 was occupied and a strong point made which was defended by machine guns and a detachment of bombers. The enemy attacked this point several times and only ceased at 9-0 a.m on the 19th.

On the left the line advanced and dug itself in between point 5. to the Quarry.

The Brigade was relieved by the 3rd. Infantry Brigade on the night 19/20th. August., with the exception of the 1st. Battalion which remained in the line and was attached to the 3rd. Infantry Brigade.

PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK BY 3rd. BRIGADE.

9. Throughout the 19th. the front line was consolidated and the communication trenches were repaired. On the 20th. preparations were made for the renewal of the attack on MOUQUET FARM front by the 3rd. Infantry Brigade, in accordance with Divisional Order No. 51, copy of which is attached. (vide Appendix II)

The objective was the enemy position R.28.C.9.5 - 6.6. - 3.6 - 0.3 - 0.1 - R.27.D.9.1 - R.33.B.5.7 - 5.5.

The Brigade was disposed as follows:- 10th. Battalion on the right holding the line from R.34.A.9.8 to R.34.A.3.9 the 11th. Battalion continued the line to R.34.A.2.6½, 12th. Battalion went from this point to R.33.B.6.3½ and the left was held by the 9th. Battalion from this point to 8.1.

The attack was ordered for the 21st. August. Zero hour was fixed at 6 p.m.

8-3/8
During the day a number of hostile aeroplanes crossed our lines and dropped bombs on several places in the Divisional area.

ATTACK BY 3rd. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

10. The dispositions for the attack were: 10th. Battalion on the right; portion of the 11th. Battalion in the centre and the 12th. Battalion on the left, the 9th. Battalion was to hold the extreme left of our line and cooperate by fire. The companies of 11th. Battalion which were to take part in the attack were organised as bombing parties which were to bomb up the two German trenches on their front and to connect the attacks of the 10th. and 12th. Battalions.

All battalions were to be in position by 5-30 p.m. The 11th. Battalion had been engaged in carrying duties; these were all relieved by 12 noon but throughout the whole day the enemy kept a barrage fire on the communication trenches. This led to great congestion and delay.

The G.O.C., 3rd. Infantry Brigade on hearing of the intensity of the enemy artillery fire considered it possible that the 11th. Battalion might not be able to make its way up in time to take part in the attack. At 3-30 p.m. therefore he ordered the 9th. Battalion to send two platoons with bombing parties to the support of the 11th. Battalion or to take the place of the parties of 11th. Battalion which had been told off to the attack, if the latter were not in position. This party arrived at 5-55 p.m, but found the 11th. Battalion in the trenches, and the O.C. Party appears to have been told that he was not required. It appears however that the officers commanding the companies of the 11th. Battalion had been put hors de combat and reorganisation was necessary, hence a delay of over an hour occurred before the 11th. Battalion participated in the action.

At about 5 p.m the enemy artillery fire which had been fairly continuous throughout the day increased in intensity and the front line was heavily bombarded from this time forward. The 10th. Battalion on the right suffered 120 casualties in

8-319

their trenches before the zero hour. At 6 p.m our barrage opened and the attack was launched with the exception of the 11th. Battalion in the centre, as already mentioned. The 10th. Battalion in spite of its losses prior to the advance attacked and carried their objective with however the loss of all their officers except one who also fell shortly after reaching the trench. It was found that point 9.5 was strongly held and that the enemy had other machine guns to the north of this point. Communications were cut with the rear and the situation was obscure to the Battalion commander whose sole reserve consisted of 1 company of the 9th. Battalion and 2 guns from the Machine Gun Company which were sent by the Brigadier. They were however not sent forward but retained to hold the now vacant trenches of the 10th. Battalion in case of a counter-attack. In spite of the loss of their officers the surviving N.C.O's and men of the 10th. Battalion hung on to their position until after 10 p.m, when pressed on both flanks especially on the right, they eventually gave way and fell back to the line R.28.C.8.2 to 4.1 to 2.1½. having suffered some 300 casualties out of a total strength of 650., actually taking part in the attack.

Meanwhile the 12th. Battalion had followed close up under the artillery barrage and seized its objective. The left pushed on in pursuit of the enemy and entered MOUQUET FARM and bombed the dugouts securing a few prisoners, but eventually fell back into line with the right. The right company extended to its right filled the gap left by the non-arrival of 11th. Battalion and bombed the strong post in R.27.D.9.1 killing over twenty of the enemy taking three prisoners and a machine gun. During this time the 11th. Battalion had made ground and joined up with the 12th. Battalion on the left and the 10th. Battalion on the right closing the gap.

ACTION ON 22nd.

11. At 1-50 a.m on the 22nd. the line ran R.28.C.8½.0 - 2.½ - 4.1 - 2.1½ - C.0.1 - 27.D.9.1 - to about 40 yards to the S.E corner of MOUQUET FARM to 33.D.5.2 - 5.5 - northern end of Quarry to point 8.1 and 100 yards to the south west

8-320

Throughout the day the front line and communications were heavily shelled and the shelling increased in intensity from 5 p.m. At about 3 p.m the 11th. Battalion sent a bombing party to bomb from 22.D.9.1 to D.7.5 but this met with very strong opposition and eventually made a block about 20 yards north of point 9.1. The 9th. Battalion sent a bombing party towards point 33.B.2.7 at the same time; they found the trench 5.5 - 2.7 unoccupied and then entered MOUQUET FARM. A bombing post was formed at R.33.B.4.5 and a block formed ahead of it.

On the night 22/23rd. August the 3rd. Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 6th. Infantry Brigade.

I handed over command to the G.O.C., 2nd. Australian Division at 9 a.m on 23rd. August.

GENERAL.

12. The assistance rendered by the Lahore Artillery and our own Divisional Artillery was of a high order. The night barrages were very effective.

The Medical arrangements worked well and the wounded were cleared expeditiously.

The Engineers worked in close cooperation with the Infantry
The Pioneers were employed chiefly on communication trenches which required continual attention.

I attach Appendix I		Divisional Orders for the actions on August 18th.
"	II	Divisional Orders for the attack on August 21st.
"	III	Strength and Casualties.
Map	I	Situation on taking over on August 17th.
"	II	Situation on August 19th.
"	III	Situation on morning 23rd. August.

8-321
S E C R E T.

Copy No.....

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No.47.DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
18th AUGUST, 1916.

1. Information as regards our own Forces. - On the 18th August the 4th Army is attacking the German Intermediate Line south of MARTINPUICH at 2.45 p.m. The 15th Division on our right is cooperating with this attack by discharging smoke. The 48th Division on our left is attacking the enemy positions in Square X.2. at 4 p.m.
2. Action by the Division. -
 - (a) 1st Aust. Inf. Bde will seize and occupy the line of trench running from R.34.A.9.7 - R.28.C.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.1 $\frac{1}{2}$ - R.34.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.8 $\frac{1}{2}$ - R.33.B.5.5. - QUARRY - R.33.A.8.1 and will construct a strong defensive flank in R.34.B connecting with the post at R.34.B.2.4.
Strong points will be established at -
 - (i) R.28.C.8.1.
 - (ii) At sunken road in R.28.C.
 - (iii) R.33.B.5.5.
 - (B) 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde will attack the enemy from the left of the 15th Division at X.6.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$ to R.35.D.4.6. and will join this point to the present line at about R.35.C.4.8.
Strong points will be established -
 - (i) Near the tramway X.6.A.
 - (ii) R.35.D.4.7.
3. Artillery. - The operations will be immediately preceded by a bombardment with heavy guns.
Programme of bombardment and time table of Artillery barrages will be issued separately.
Barrages will begin 50 yards forward of our "starting line" and will lift 50 yards at a time. In the case of Operation "B" barrages will begin 50 yards in advance of a line joining R. 28.C.6.8. and our new T-heads south of the tramway line. No troops will be in advance of this line at the time of the attack. Assaulting troops will follow barrages closely.
4. Engineers. - Engineers will be detailed by C.R.E. for work on the strong points. They will be sent forward under the orders of the Infantry Brigade Commanders.
5. Reserve. The 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde will be the Divisional Reserve. Two Battalions will move to the area between a line X.14.D.2.9 - X.15.c.3.4. - X.15 Central and TARA HILL, inclusive, during the day of 18th instant.
6. Aircraft. - Contact aeroplanes will fly over the line at 7.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. on 19th instant when flares will be lit.
7. Time. - Zero hour will be 8 p.m. Watches will be synchronised with the Div. Signal Company at 12 noon and 5 p.m.
8. Consolidation. - Routes for communication trenches to the new line will be selected by Infantry Brigadiers in conjunction with C.R.E. beforehand. O.C. 1st Aust. Pioneer Bn will detail parties to construct these trenches.
Patrols and posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out in advance of the Line when established.
When captured ground is entered by enemy trenches, strong blocks will be constructed. For this work special parties will be told off beforehand and provided with the necessary stores. Bombers will be specially told off for the protection of all such blocks.

P. T.O.

8-322/11

2.

Bombing parties will be detailed to push along the enemy trenches leading forward from the captured line.

9. A C K N O W L E D G E.

W. Blamey
Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff,
1st Australian Division.

Copy No.	To whom	Time	Method.
1 - 5	D.H.Q.	6 a.m.	Orderly.
6 - 11	Div. Art.	"	D. R.
12	Div. Engineers.	"	"
13	Div. Sig. Co.	"	"
14	1st Aust. Inf. Bde.	"	"
15	2nd " " "	"	"
16	3rd " " "	"	"
17	Div. Train	"	"
18	A. D. M. S.	"	"
19	D. A. D. O. S.	"	"
20	Pioneer Bn.	"	"
21	Mob. Vet. Section.	"	"
22	A. D. V. S.	"	"
23	1st ANZAC "G"	"	"
24	1st ANZAC "Q"	"	"
25	A. P. M.	"	"
26	2nd Aust. Div.	"	"
27	4th Aust. Div.	"	"
28	15th Division.	"	"
29	48th Division.	"	"
30	Salvage Coy	"	"
31	Corps Park.	"	"
32	Reserve Army.	"	"
33	Camp Comdt D.H.Q.	"	"
34- 39	Lahore Artillery	"	"
40- 45	Anzac Heavy Artillery	"	"
46	7th Squadron R.F.C.	"	"

S E C R E T.C O P Y.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 48.Headquarters.
18th. August 1916.

In continuation of Divisional Order No. 47.

1. Zero hour for the operations on night 18th. inst. will be 9.p.m.
2. The 1st. Inf. Brigade holds the line R.34.B.6.0.-2.4.-A.9.9 $\frac{1}{2}$.-
R.28.C.6.0 $\frac{1}{2}$.-R.24.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.9 $\frac{1}{2}$.-1 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.-R.33.B.4.2.-R.33.A.8.1.
3. It will advance this line at zero tonight to the line
R.28.C.8 $\frac{1}{2}$.3-5 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 $\frac{1}{2}$.-2.2.-0.1.-R.27.D.9.1.-R.33.B.5.7.-R.33.B.5.5.-
and will consolidate this line under cover of the artillery barrage.
Strong points will be established at 28.c.8 $\frac{1}{2}$.3., 28.c.2.2., 28.C.0.1.,
27.D.9.1., and 33.B.5.7.

A strong defensive flank will be constructed from R.34.A.9.9 $\frac{1}{2}$
to about R.28.D.1.3.

This is substituted for the action described in para 2 (a)
Divn.Order No.47. of today's date.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

T.A.BLAMEY. Lieut.Colonel.
General Staff.
1st. Australian Division.

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Appendix II
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Appendix No. 11

SECRET

Copy No.....

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 51.

Headquarters.
20th. August 1916.

1. Action of 3rd. Inf. Brigade.

The 3rd. Inf. Brigade will attack the enemy position R.28.C.9.5.- 6.6.- 3.6.- 0.3.- 0.1.- R.27.D.9.1.- R.33.B.5.7.- 5.5. at 6 p.m. on 21st. inst.

2. Artillery Action.

(a) An artillery barrage will be formed at zero hour along the line R.28.C.9.5. along German forward trench to G.2.2.- R.27.D.9.1.- R.33.B.5.7.- R.33.A.7.3.

At zero plus two minutes the barrage will lift to the line of the objective.

At zero plus five minutes the barrage will lift to a line in advance of the objective.

(b) The objective will be submitted to a series of special bombardments on 20th. and 21st. inst.

(c) Medium Trench mortars will deal with the hostile strong points at R.34.A.0.8 $\frac{1}{2}$., R.27.D.9.1., R.28.C.0.1., under cover of the special bombardments.

3. The Infantry Advance.

Under cover of the artillery barrage the infantry will press close up to the hostile position and rush it as soon as the barrage lifts. Arrangements will be made to support the advance by Machine Gun fire on the left flank.

4. Consolidation.

Strong points will be constructed at:-

- (i) R.28.C.9.5.
- (ii) R.28.C.3.6.
- (iii) R.28.C.0.3.
- (iv) R.28.C.0.1.
- (v) R.27.D.9.1.
- (vi) R.33.B.5.7.

Parties to construct the strong points will be detailed by G.R.E. and will move forward when directed by G.O.C., 3rd. Inf. Bde.

Patrols and Posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out into shell holes in advance of the line when established.

Where there are enemy trenches leading from the captured position, strong blocks will be constructed as far forward as possible.

For this work special parties will be detailed beforehand and will be provided with the necessary stores. Bombers will be detailed for the protection of these blocks.

Special measures will be taken to protect the right flank. Arrangements will be made to join up point R.28.C.9.5. by a trench with the present right at about R.28.C.8.2.

Routes for communication trenches to the new line will be selected by G.O.C., 3rd. Inf. Bde. in conjunction with G.R.E. beforehand.

G.R.E. will arrange with 1st. Pioneer Bn. for parties to construct these.

(D.O.No.51.)

-2-

5. Aircraft.

Contact aeroplanes will fly over the line at 7-30 p.m. on 20th. inst. and 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 22nd. inst. Flares will be lit on each occasion.

6. Watches will be synchronised with Divn. Signal Company's time at 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. O.C., Divn. Signal Coy. will check time with 1st. ANZAC Signal Company fifteen minutes before these hours.

7. Carrying Parties.

G.O.C., 2nd. Inf. Brigade will place a party of 200 all ranks at the disposal of G.O.C., 3rd. Inf. Brigade at 3 p.m. on 21st. inst for carrying duties.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

J. A. Blamey
Lieut-Colonel. General Staff.
1st. Australian Division.

Copy No.	To Whom	Time	Method.
1 - 5	D. H. Q.	8 - 15 p.m.	Orderly
6 - 11	Div. Art	"	D. R.
12	Div. Engrs	"	"
13	Div Sig Co	"	"
14	1st. Inf. Bde	"	"
15	2nd. Inf. Bde	"	"
16	3rd. Inf. Bde.	"	"
17	Div. Train	"	"
18	A.D.M.S?	"	"
19	D.A.D. S.	"	"
20	Pioneer Bn	"	"
21	Mob. Vet. Sec	"	"
22	A.D.V.S.	"	"
23	1st. ANZAC "G"	"	"
24	1st. ANZAC "Q"	"	"
25	A.P.E.	"	"
26	2nd. Aust. Divn.	"	"
27	4th. Aust. Divn.	"	"
28	15th. Division	"	"
28	48th. Division	"	"
30	Salvage Coy	"	"
31	Corps Park	"	"
32	Reserve Army	"	"
33	C?Comd. D.H.Q.	"	Orderly
34 - 39	Lahore Arty.	"	B.R.
40 - 45	Anzac Heavy Art	"	"
46	7th. Squad. R.F.C.	"	"

STRENGTH & CASUALTIES.

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
U n i t.	Strength as at noon 15th. Aug. 16.			Casualties from 15th. August to 23rd. August 1916.						
	O f f i c e r s	O . R a n k s	T o t a l s.	Officers			Other Ranks.			
			K i l l e d	W o u n d e d	M i s s i n g	K i l l e d	W o u n d e d	M i s s i n g	T o t a l s	
Divn. Hd. Qrs	30	242	272	-						
Divn. Artillery	120	3122	3242	2	3	-	13	79	-	97
Dvsn. Engineers	27	874	901	1	2	-	-	32	-	35
Pioneer Bn.	29	815	844	-	1	-	21	80	4	106
1st. Inf. Bde. Hd. Qrs.	6	36	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1st. Battalion	19	525	544	-	3	-	21	70	5	99
2nd. Battalion	26	647	673	-	-	-	12	29	1	42
3rd. Battalion	26	642	668	1	8	-	29	124	5	167
4th. Battalion	28	697	725	1	8	-	55	228	9	301
1st. M. G. Coy	8	149	157	1	-	-	4	5	-	10
1st. L. T. M. Bty.	3	48	51	-	-	-	-	6	-	6
2nd. Inf. Bde. Hd. Qrs.	10	93	103	-	-	-	-	-	-	
5th. Battalion	35	796	831	2	6	-	38	201	1	248
6th. Battalion	37	973	1010	-	3	-	48	158	4	213
7th. Battalion	36	757	793	1	9	3	33	143	34	223
8th. Battalion	39	749	788	1	13	-	24	141	32	211
2nd. M. G. Coy.	10	165	175	-	-	-	1	5	-	6
2nd. L. T. M. Bty.	4	46	50	-	-	-	2	10	2	14
3rd. Inf. Bde. Hd. Qrs.	5	29	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	
9th. Battalion	29	794	823	3	2	-	24	110	24	163
10th. Battalion	30	850	880	3	6	1	48	165	112	335
11th. Battalion	29	647	676	-	3	-	14	44	18	79
12th. Battalion	34	815	849	-	5	1	42	148	48	242
3rd. M. G. Coy.	11	196	207	-	-	-	-	8	-	8
3rd. L. T. M. Bty.	4	65	69	-	-	-	-	13	-	13
Divn. Train	26	486	512	1	-	-	4	12	-	17
1st. Field Amb.	10	225	235	-	-	-	3	5	-	8
2nd. Field Amb.	14	355	369	-	-	-	1	6	-	7
3rd. Field Amb.	11	242	253	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sanitary Sect.	1	25	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Salvage Coy.	1	29	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mobile Vet. Sectn.	1	27	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Totals	699	16161	16860	17	70	5	437	1822	299	2650.

Total Casualties : 92 Officers, 2,558 Other Ranks

NOTES: (a) Of the total infantry strength 25 to 30 per cent were employed on carrying and other duties other than fighting.

(b) Maximum number of officers who took part in the action - 20 per battalion.

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No. 111

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