


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/42/19 Part 7

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 1st
Australian Division

August 1916



AWM4-1/42/19PART7

330

Cover for Documents.

Nature of Enclosures.

Reports on Operations from 16th to 23rd August 1916

Notes, or Letters written.

8-331

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.HEADQUARTERS,
1st AUSTRALIAN
DIVISION.Headquarters No. 124/23.
24th. August 1916. 24.8.16

1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
C.R.A., 1st. Aust. Divn.
C.R.E., 1st. Aust. Divn.
1st. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A. D. M. S.

Recd
30/8

Please furnish a report on the operations from
16th. inst. to 23rd. inst as soon as convenient.

G24/8.

McCaskey

Lieut-Colonel. General Staff.

1st. Australian Division.

1^{re} Aust. Div.

25th August 1916.

7 Hys. 1st A + 2. Any caps.

Summary of operations of 1st Australian Division
for period ~~between~~ 6 pm 18th August to 6 pm Friday 25th August 1916.

1. In accordance with Divisional orders W 47 and 48 ~~the order~~
issued at 6 am and 2.4 pm on 18th, the attack on the enemy ~~line~~
~~towards~~ the enemy position was launched as follows.
at 9 pm on 18th August as follows. The 1st Inf Bde. (on left)
attacked the line R34A97 - R28C6½1½ - R34A2½9 -
R33B55 - QUARRY - R33A81. and the 2^d Inf Bde. ^(on right) the line
from the left of the 15th Div. at X6A2½6½ to R35D46,
with orders to join this latter point to the present line at
about R35C48.
2. The Battalions were disposed as follows. 1st Inf Bde. had the
3^d Bn. on right and 4th Bn. on left, and 2^d Inf Bde. had
8th Bn. on right from MURSTEN ACRE to X5B78, 7th Bn.
from latter point to the BARADINE road at R35D1½3½
and the 6th Bn. ^{on left of the} latter point to the junction with 1st Inf Bde.
at R34B60.
3. The objectives were bombarded throughout the day and we were
subjected to intense fire just prior to the assault. But a
number of reports were received to the effect that our
artillery was firing into our own infantry both before
and after the attack. Every effort was made to verify these
reports but ^{from} our position in the Schiet mark ~~where~~ it is
possible that these reports were unfounded.
4. ~~The result of the attack~~ As result of the attack the 4th Bn.
reached their objective and made good the line R33A81
- QUARRY - R33B55 - AS. The 3^d Bn. were held up by
~~heavy MG~~ subjected to heavy shelling & MG fire and did
not succeed in reaching their objective. The 8th Bns made
~~repeated~~ attacks but were each time held up
by MG fire and rifle fire from the flanks ~~every time~~
~~points on the flanks~~. The 6th Bn. succeeded in
making good the line R35C48 to R35D2½4 and joined
with the left of the 7th Bn. at the latter point.

5. Owing to the use of our signals for communicating with contact patrol aeroplanes it was thought for a time that we had succeeded in occupying ~~the~~ the objective on the right. This was ~~subsequently~~ found not to be the case as patrols ~~and communication~~

6. Throughout the day of the 19th the ~~front~~ front line, were consolidated and repaired, having being practically demolished in a number of places by shell fire.

7. The 1st Bde. was relieved on the night of 19th by the 3rd Bde. (less 1st Bn) in the line on the night 19th/20th and GOC 3rd Bde. reporting that he had taken over command at 10.40 pm on 19th.

The estimated casualties for the period were 50 officers & 1376 OR.

Patrols were ~~ordered~~ ordered to investigate the line close on night 19th/20th ~~when~~ ~~the~~ were bombed and ~~the~~ fired on and it was definitely established that the trench was in possession of the enemy.

On 20th

Preparation were made and orders issued for a renewal of the attack on the MOUQUET FARM front, it having been decided at a conference at which the Army & Air Corps Commanders were present that the attack on the right flank was not to be resumed.

The objective was the line R28C95-66-36-03-01-R27D91-R33B57-55.

9. The 3rd Bde were disposed as follows. The 9th Bn. on the left, the 12th Bn from R33B63½ to R34A26½, the 11th Bn from the point to R34A39, the 10th Bn from the point to R34A98. The 1st Bn. were brought into the line to hold from the point to the junction with the 2nd Bde at R34C60.

10. The attack was ordered for 6 pm.

The 12th Bn. reached their objective and went beyond it to the line of the road from R33B59 to R27D91. The 11th Bn, who had become for the rear, were held up by heavy barrage fire on our communications and did not reach their starting point at the time of attack.

at 5.45 pm the enemy made a bombing attack preceded by a bombardment on the 9th Bn in the vicinity of the QUARRY. This was beaten off.

The 10th Bn. were subjected to very heavy shell fire from 5.30pm onwards and sustained many casualties before the attack was launched. Owing to the disorganisation thus caused and then heavy losses the 10th Bn did not succeed in making good its objective. Saps had been pushed forward by the 10th Bn. prior to the attack and these were joined up during the night 20/21st, making a new line about 50 yards in advance of their previous line.

The 11th Bn went forward during the night 20/21st and dug a line for the night of the 11th Bn. at R27D91 to join to the left of the 10th Bn. at R28C3.5.

11. The line held on the morning of 21st August was as follows. X6A14½ to R35D23½ to R35C48 to R34B1½3 to R28C82 to R28C3½ to R27D91 to R27D33B59 to R33B57 to R33A81.

A sap was dug from R33B69½ to join the ~~new~~ old line at about R33B57.

The 9th Bn. had previously dug a line in advance of the QUARRY to join points R33A81 to R33B55.

12. The 5th Inf Bde. relieved the 2nd Inf Bde in the line on the night 21/22nd Aug.

12. The Third Bde. were ordered to secure points in the vicinity of R27D73 and R33B48 during the 22nd August. This was accomplished by

~~This was accomplished by bombing parties~~
bombing parties, point R33B48 and a point about R27D82 being made good.

13. The 6th Inf Bde. relieved the 3rd Inf Bde on night 22/23 and the GOC 2nd Aust. Div. assumed command at 9am on 23rd August.

14. Throughout the operations the 7th Squadron RFE

The line held was consolidated during the 22nd August and the line detailed above was as ~~above~~ detailed above for 21st with the addition of points R27D82 and R33B48 was handed over to the 2nd Aust. Div. on morning of 23rd Aug.

~~The estimated total casualties for the period was~~
~~1000.~~

14. During the whole period covered by this report the enemy's artillery fire was active and accurate on our front line and communications, constant work being required to keep trenches passable for troops.
15. The AAA 7" Squadron RFA rendered valuable assistance both in locating our positions by means of contact patrols ~~across~~ and by successfully preventing ~~from~~ hostile aircraft from operating.
16. The Division proceeded by stages to the area on relief, Div. Hqs being established at ROBEMPRE.
~~The entrainment to the new area was announced on the~~
17. The estimated total casualties for the period was — Officers — OR.

Original
 Report by
 R. G. Casey
 JWC
 6.3.1959
 AWM FILE
 419/18/6

I Anzac Air reconnaissance

7th Squadron

19-8-16 2/Lt. Bowen and Lt. Pilkington Art. Observation. 5.10 - 8.10 pm.
Successful. Engaged hostile battery at R.15.c.9.7. with 65 Siege.
Hostile batteries seen at K7. KB. U86. F14, F46, F6, K3, R.16.d.4.4., U82. C.B.
C.B.H. informed. Southernmost pit of R.15.c.9.7. badly damaged. 3rd pit
pit from south knocked out. observation by observer.
2/Lt. Watkins and 2/Lt. Stephenson - Contact patrol. 8.45 - 9.40 am
Successful. Flares seen at X.2.b.3.7., R.33.c.2.7., R.33.c.4.8.,
R.33.b.3.2., R.33.b.5.3., R.33.b.6.5., R.34.a.2.8., R.28.c.5.0., R.28.c.8.0.
White sheets were waved at several points in the following lines of
trenches. R.35.c.6.5. - 86. - 95. - R.35.d.3.4.. R.35.d.6.3. - X.6.a.2.9.
White boards about one yard square with a "Y" painted on it in black
was placed on top of trenches at X.3.b.6.5. Observation difficult
owing to rain. Above information reported verbally to 1st Aus Div.
unable to write message while in air on account of heavy rain.
Observation by observer.
Contact Patrol. Special with Staff Officers. Capt. Sloan and Capt Car
2.35 - 3.25 pm. Successful. Men located in trench R.35.d.6.3. -
X.6.a.2.9.
2/Lt. Richardson and Cpl. Williams - Photography. 3.15 - 4.15 pm
Successful. 16 plates exposed. Area covered X6a., X5b., R35. R34.
by pilot.

Headquarters.
25th. August 1916.

Headquarters,

1st. A. & N. Z. Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS,
1st AUSTRALIAN
DIVISION.

No. 5. 871
Date 25-8-16

Following is a summary of operations of 1st. Australian Division for period 6 p.m. Friday 18th. August to 6 p.m. Friday 25th. August 1916.

1. On 18th. August the 1st. Infantry Brigade (on left) attacked the line R.34.A.9.7.- R.28.C.6 $\frac{1}{2}$.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.- R.34.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.9. - R.33.B.5.5.- QUARRY - R.33.A.8.1. and the 2nd. Infantry Brigade (on right) the line from left of the 15th. Division at X.6.A.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$. to R.35.D.4.6. with orders to join this latter point to the present line at about R.35.C.4.8.
2. Battalions were disposed as follows:- 1st. Infantry Brigade had the 3rd. Battalion on right and 4th. Battalion on left, remaining battalions in support, and 2nd. Infantry Brigade had 8th. Battalion on right from MUNSTER ALLEY to X.5.B.7.8., 7th. Battalion from latter point to BAPAUME Road at R.35.D.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 $\frac{1}{2}$. and the 6th. Battalion on left from the latter point to the junction with 1st. Infantry Brigade at R.34.B.6.0.
3. The objectives were bombarded throughout the day and were subjected to intense fire just prior to the assault. A number of reports were received to the effect that our artillery was firing into our own infantry both before and after the attack.
4. As result of the attack the 4th. Battalion reached its objective and made good the line R.33.A.8.1.- QUARRY - R.33.B.5.5.- 9.5. The 3rd. Battalion was subjected to heavy shelling and M.G. fire and did not succeed in reaching its objective. The 7th. and 8th. Battalions made repeated attacks but were each time held up by M.G. and rifle fire from flanks. The 6th. Battalion secured the line R.35.C.4.8. to R.35.D.2 $\frac{1}{2}$.4. and joined with the 7th. Battalion at the latter point.
5. Owing to the enemy using our signals for communicating with contact patrol aeroplanes it was thought for a time that we had succeeded in occupying the objective on the right.

for operations

8-333 Patrols, ordered to investigate this line on night 19/20th. were bombed and fired on, and it was established that this trench was in possession of the enemy.

6. Throughout the day of the 19th. the front line and communications were consolidated and repaired.

7. The 3rd. Infantry Brigade relieved the 1st. Infantry Brigade (less 1st. Battalion) in the line on the night 19/20th. and G.O.C. 3rd. Infantry Brigade reported that he had taken over command at 10-40 p.m. on 19th.

8. On 20th. preparations were made for a renewal of the attack on the MOUQUET FARM front.

The objective was the line R.23.C.9.5.-6.6.- 3.6.- 0.3.- 0.1.- R.27.D.9.1.- R.33.B.5.7.- 5.5.

9. The 3rd. Infantry Brigade were disposed as follows:-
9th. Battalion on the left, holding the line in the vicinity of the QUARRY, the 12th. Battalion from R.33.B.6.3½. to R.34.A.2.6½ the 11th. Battalion from this point to R.34.A.3.9., the 10th. Battalion from this point to R.34.A.9.8. The 1st. Battalion were brought into the line to hold from this point to the junction with the 2nd. Infantry Brigade at R.34.B.6.0.

10. The attack was ordered for 6 p.m.

At 5-45 p.m. the enemy made a bombing attack preceded by a bombardment on the 9th. Battalion in the vicinity of the QUARRY which was repulsed.

The 12th. Battalion reached their objective and went beyond it to the line of the road from R.33.B.5.9. to R.27.D.9.1. and extended the left to within 40 yards of MOUQUET FARM. The 11th. Battalion which had to come from the rear, was held up by heavy barrage fire on our communications and had not reached its starting point at the time ordered for the attack.

The 10th. Battalion were subjected to very heavy shell fire from 5-30 p.m. onwards and sustained many casualties before the attack was launched. Owing to the disorganisation and heavy losses thus caused, the 10th. Battalion did not succeed in making good its objective.

The 11th. Battalion went forward during the night 20/21st.

and dug a line from the right of the 12th. Battalion at R.27.D.9.1. to join to the left of the 10th. Battalion at R.28.C.3. $\frac{1}{2}$.

A sap was dug from R.33.B.6.9 $\frac{1}{2}$ to join the old line at about R.33.B.7.5.

11. The line held by the Division on the morning of 21st. August was as follows:- X.6.A.1.4 $\frac{1}{2}$ to R.35.D.2.3 $\frac{1}{2}$ to R.35.C.4.8 to R.34.B.1 $\frac{1}{2}$.3 to R.28.C.8.2. to R.28.C.3. $\frac{1}{2}$ to R.27.D.9.1 to R.33.B.5.9 to R.33.B.5.7 to S.5. to R.33.A.8.1.

12. The 5th. Infantry Brigade relieved the 2nd. Infantry Brigade in the line on the night 21/22nd. August.

The 3rd. Brigade were ordered to secure points R.27. D.7.3. and R.33.B.4.8. during the 22nd. August. The former was strongly held by the enemy and a block was established some distance south of it by us. The latter was found to be unoccupied and a patrol pushed past it and examined MOUQUET FARM.

The line held was consolidated during the 22nd. August.
13. The 6th. Infantry Brigade relieved the 3rd. Infantry Brigade on night 22/23rd. and the G.O.C. 2nd. Australian Division assumed command at 9 a.m. on 23rd. August.

14. During the whole period covered by this report the enemy's artillery fire was active and accurate on our front line and communications, constant work being required to keep trenches passable to troops.

15. The 7th. Squadron R.F.C. rendered valuable assistance both in locating our positions by means of contact patrols and by successfully preventing hostile aircraft from operating.

16. The Division proceeded by stages to 'S' area on relief, Divisional Headquarters being established at RUBEMPRE.

17. The total casualties for the period were 89 officers 2355 other ranks, killed, wounded and missing.

18. The number of prisoners taken was:- Unwounded 15, wounded 16.

Major-General.

Commanding 1st. Australian Division.

8-335

1st Australian Division

1st DH Q

Herewith my report on operations
commencing August 16th to 23rd.

A. H. Sunde

Colonel, A. A. M. C.
A. D. of M. S. 1st. Australian Division.



8-336
I beg to submit the following report upon the work of the A.A.M.C. under my command during the operations commencing August 16th 1916.

I took over the control of the Medical arrangements of the "T" area at 5 p.m. on August 16th 1916.

I entrusted the collection and evacuation of wounded to Lieut-Col Shaw of 1st Australian Field Ambulance, who in addition to his own Field Ambulance had the bearer divisions of the 2nd and 3rd attached and those of the 6th Australian Field Ambulance in reserve.

The 1st Australian Field Ambulance had already relieved the 12th Australian Field Ambulance this relief having been completed by 12 noon on August 16th, and the bearer divisions of the 4th and 13th had been relieved by the bearer divisions of 2nd and 3rd respectively.

As at the battle of Pozieres the Advanced Dressing Station was situated at Becourt Chateau, it having been found impossible to secure a more advanced position to which the Motor Ambulances could with safety be brought.

The collecting posts and Regimental Aid Posts were as indicated in Appendix "A".

All seriously wounded had to be carried on stretchers as far as Chalk Pit or Sunken Road. The carry was long but owing to willing and able work of the stretcher squads it was so successfully performed that at no time could it be said there was anything approaching congestion of wounded.

From the collecting posts wheeled stretchers were used as far as the wagon rendezvous where horse ambulances wagons conveyed the cases back to Becourt Chateau.

The tramway was used to bring back cases as far as the Advanced Dressing Station, but it was not found necessary on this occasion to convey cases all the way by tram to the tram base. Had a rush of casualties occurred the trams would have been more fully used and everything was in readiness for such an emergency.

The Motor Lorries of the Divisional Supply Col. were parked at the Tramway base and were brought up to Becourt Chateau two at a time for the conveyance of lightly wounded and walking cases.

As the casualties appeared at times light and Motor Ambulances plentiful Colonel Shaw wisely despatched many of the lightly wounded in Ambulance Wagons thus enabling them to reach their destination with more comfort and in a much shorter period.

The Main Dressing Stations were situated as before at Warloy and Vadencourt and came under the control of the A.D.M.S. "S" area.

Stretchers and dressings were at all times plentiful and reserve dumps of both were made at advanced collecting posts. Hot drinks and medical comforts were never short and were greatly appreciated.

The Field Ambulance bearers collected from the whole area proceeding as far as the front line and at times beyond it, and on one occasion brought in wounded from "no man's land" under the protection of the white flag, the enemy at the same time collecting some of their wounded under a similar protection.

I cannot speak too highly of the work of the bearers who laboured methodically backwards and forward under heavy fire and with only one thought, that of bringing in their wounded comrades.

The casualties though not heavy were sufficient to shew that their work was fraught with danger.

(2)

One Medical Officer, Captain Graham who did good work at Bailiff Wood was mortally wounded on August 19th and died a few days later in a Casualty Clearing Station.

The total casualties dealt with by our bearers are shown on a table attached which gives the evacuations for each day.

Our collecting posts were so situated that most of the wounded came into our hands. A few found their way into a British Field Ambulance by taking a turn to the right at Pozieres and so wending their way to Ovilliers a natural, but owing to the division of the area a wrong course.

In conclusion I would like to point out that the number of bearers attached to a Division is at times too small to cope with the large number of casualties which occur in modern warfare. For this reason the various bearer divisions had to be grouped together and controlled more or less by the Corps, with the result that when the Division went into rest the bearers were still left at the front nominally in reserve but actually more or less at work.

W. S. S. S.

Colonel

A.D.M.S.

1st Australian Division

Table of wounded evacuated from 1st Aust. Div.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
	2100-0600	2	48
17th	0600-1200	4	52
-	1200-2100	3	112
	2100-0600	2	99
18th	0600-1200	1	42
-	1200-2100	1	86
	2100-0600	10	256
19th	0600-1200	3	78
-	1200-2100	13	151
	2100-0600	1	71
20th	0600-1200	2	8
-	1200-2100	3	64
	2100-0600	1	56
21st	0600-1200	1	26
-	1200-2100	3	129
	2100-0600	4	175
22nd	0600-1200	3	82
-	1200-2100	3	79
	2100-0600	1	5
23rd	0600-1200	1	28
-	1200-2100	1	30
	2100-0600	1	5
24th	0600-1200	1	4
	1200-2100	1	2
Totals		60	1668

APPENDIX "A".1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.15.8.16.MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.SECRET.Map Ref. 57D. S.E. 1,20000.MAIN DRESSING
STATIONS.ADVANCED DRESSING
STATIONS.COLLECTING
POSTS.AID POSTS.School House
WARLOY.
18th Aust. F.
Ambulance.BECOURT CHATEAU
X 25 D.6.6.TRAM TERMINUS
E.4.D.5.7.

X.4.A.4.8.

X.5.A.0.6.

X.10.B.8.5.

X.11.A.2.2.

Main Dressing
Station.
WARLOY.
4th Aust. F.
Ambulance.NORTH CHIMNEY
W.28A.8.7.BAILIFF WOOD
X.16.A.1.2.Main Dressing
Station.
VADENCOURT
(for slightly
wounded)
2nd Aust. F.
Ambulance.CHALK PITS.
X.16.A.3.8.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY:

HEADQUARTERS,
1st AUSTRALIAN
DIVISION.

Appendix No. 12
DIV. ART. Headquarters.

25th AUGUST 1916.

Report on Operations from 16th to 23rd AUGUST 1916.

The 1st F.A. Brigade moved into the line on the 14th inst and the 2nd F.A. Brigade on the 15th inst, and both were under the control of the Lahore Artillery.

On the 16th inst the 3rd and 21st F.A. Brigades relieved the 4th and 22nd in the line, and the C.R.A. 1st Aust. Div. took over control of the whole of the 1st Aust. Div. Artillery. The Artillery in the line was divided into two groups, the 1st Aust. Div. Artillery forming the right group and the Lahore Artillery the ~~left~~ group.

The boundaries between the Artilleries was not the same as the boundary between the Infantry Brigades so the 1st Aust. Div. Art. was divided into sub groups, the Right consisting of the 2nd F.A. Bde and covering the front held by the Right Battalion of the Right Bde, the Centre consisting of the 3rd F.A. Bde plus two Batteries of the 21st F.A. Bde. and covering the front held by the Left Battalion of the Right Brigade, and the Left consisting of the 1st F.A. Bde. plus one Battery of the 21st F.A. Bde and covering part of the front held by the Right Battalion of the Left Brigade. Each Group had a liaison officer with the Battalion whose front it was covering; also there was a liaison officer with the Right Brigade who was in direct telephone communication with Div. Art. Hd. Qrs, and a liaison officer with the Left Brigade in direct telephone communication with the Left Artillery Group.

On the 18th inst two Brigades of the 2nd Aust. Div. Moved into the line and came under the control of the Lahore Artillery. A readjustment of boundaries was made and the 1st Aust. Div. Artillery became responsible for the front held by the Right Brigade. The sub groups were discontinued and the front was divided between the F.A. Brigades, the 2nd and 3rd covering the front held by the Right Battn, and the 21st and 1st the front held by the Left Battalion in that order from right to left. Each Brigade had a liaison officer with the Battalion whose front it was covering, and the same liaison officer remained with the Right Brigade.

From the time of taking over up to the attack at 9 pm on the 18th inst a light barrage fire was maintained by each Brigade. During the afternoon of the 17th inst reports were received on two occasions that the enemy had been seen massing near MARTINPUICH. Each time the 2nd F.A. Brigade increased its rate of fire and searched this neighbourhood, and though no actual results could be observed, no attack eventuated.

At 9 pm on the 18th inst the Artillery programme for the attack of the 2nd Aust. Inf. Brigade on the German front line commenced. The programme as laid down was carried out. At 10.15 pm the liaison officer with the 2nd Aust. Inf. Brigade reported that the 8th Battn. was being held up by bombs, and that there was no definite information about the remainder of the attacking force, and he stated that the G.O.C. 2nd Aust. Infantry Brigade wished the barrage fire to be continued. At 10.30 pm the 1st F.A. Brigade, whose barrage was off the front of the attack, was ordered to drop to its normal night rate. Although reports were being received from the liaison officer throughout the night no definite information could be obtained re the situation. At 12.45 am the rate of fire of the 2nd, 3rd and 21st F.A. Brigades was reduced to one round per gun per two minutes, and at 2.15 am it was further reduced to 100 rounds per brigade per hour. At 3.30 am all brigades reduced their rate to normal night barrage rate.

On the 19th inst no special tasks were carried out, but all brigades were firing occasional short bursts on their barrage lines. At 9.30 pm that night a report was received that the enemy were concentrating at X 6 a 3.8 so the 2nd F.A. Brigade turned a battery onto this point and no attack eventuated. At 2.25 am on the 20th the G.S.O.1. rang up and stated that our patrols were not in the German front line X 6 a 1 1/2. 7 1/2 to R 35 d 3 1/2. 4 1/2, but that it was strongly held by the Germans, ~~and no attack eventuated~~

8.340

(2)

strongly held by the Germans,

Appendix No. 12 343

and asked for a burst of fire into it. ~~The 2nd and 3rd F.A. Brigades~~ The 2nd and 3rd F.A. Brigades were turned on and fired for 10 minutes at the rate of 3 rounds per gun per minute, and then resumed their normal barrage. At 5.30 am the 2nd F.A. Brigade stated that a further report of enemy massing at X 6 a 3.8 had been received so a battery was turned on, and a report was received from the Infantry that this fire was very effective and the enemy had dispersed.

From 6 pm to 7 pm on the 21st a special barrage was put on by the 1st F.A. Brigade to assist in the attack by the 3rd Aust. Inf. Brigade on our left. At 11.30 pm on the 21st inst an aeroplane photograph was received showing a new German trench in R 35 a. The 1st F.A. Brigade was ordered to turn a battery onto this trench and it was kept under constant fire throughout the remainder of the ~~evening~~ night. Next day it was registered with aeroplane observation, as being in a dip it could not be seen from any of our positions, and it was kept under constant bursts of fire.

At 9.30 pm on the 22nd inst it was reported that the enemy was heavily shelling our front line in X 5 b so the 2nd and 3rd F.A. Brigades dropped their barrage onto the German front trench with rapid burst of fire for 10 minutes.

During the whole of the period a light barrage fire was maintained by all Brigades when no special tasks were being carried out. The night barrage was at the rate of 24 rounds (and for the last two nights 12 rounds) per battery per hour. During daylight the principle was occasional short bursts of fire on barrage lines or on any particular points where fire was required.

One Medium Trench Mortar Battery with two mortars took up a position on the right flank on the 18th inst and fired 8 rounds into the German front line before the attack. This battery was not again used during this period as the Infantry Brigadier, under whose control it was placed, stated that he had no tasks for it.

At 9 am on the 23rd inst the C.R.A. 1st Aust. Div. handed over to C.R.A. 2nd Aust. Div. All Brigades of the 1st Aust. Div. Art. were relieved and moved out of the line this day.

Casualties	Killed	Other Ranks.	10
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Wounded	Officers	2	Chaplain R.C. Oakley.
	Other Ranks.	50	Lieutenant H.E. Moody.

Expenditure of Ammunition.

18 pounder	40,000
4.5" Howitzer	3,000
	<u>43,000</u>

J. J. Hobbs
Brigadier General.

25th August 1916.

C.R.A. 1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

8/341

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Confidential

Recd 30/8.

Headquarters.

24th. August

HEADQUARTERS, 1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.	
No.	124/23.
Date	1916.24.8.16.

- ✓ 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- C.R.A., 1st. Aust. Divn.
- C.R.E., 1st. Aust. Divn.
- 1st. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- A. D. M. S.

Please furnish a report on the operations from
16th. inst. to 23rd. inst. as soon as convenient.

McCaskey Capt.

Lieut-Colonel. General Staff.

1st. Australian Division.



At Aus Div.
Herewith.

2.

Mr Smith Brigadier General 1st Aust Div

8342
1st Aus. Inf. Bde. Report on operations near
Mouquet Farm, August 15th to 19th, 1916.

Aug 15th. 2 Cos. 4th. Bn. relieve 50th. Bn. in firing line S. of FERME DU MOUQUET, the right at R33B84 the left at R33A81. very few trenches exist but shell holes are occupied and the Point 81 improved. Many of the 50th. Bn killed and wounded encumber such trenches as remain. The wounded are evacuated by the 1st. Bde. As touch is not obtained with 48th Division on the left our flank is extended 200 yds. further in that direction and refused in order to secure our communications.

Aug 16. During the night the remainder of the 13th Aus. Inf Bde. was relieved and the firing line from R34D79 to 34A38 occupied by the 3rd. Bn. The 1st Bn remained in Reserve N. of Sausage Valley and the 2d. Bn. undertook the service of man handling supplies for troops in the line, from CHACK PIT Damp. At 1430 the 14th Aus. Div. issued orders to 1st Bde to push forward saps to certain points in front of firing line. The 13th M.G. Co. had only 8 M.G.s in action and the 1st M.G. Coy. which completed relief at 0900 prepares positions for all M.G.s. with a view to working in firing line by night. The 1st. Bn. and 75 men of the 2nd Bn. are told off for entrenching work under the 1st. Fld. Co. Engineers. The 1st Pioneer Bn. commences work on the making of Communication trenches. The Artillery of 1st Aus Div. is responsible for barrages on the right of our position; 5th Lahore for centre and 11th Lahore and 18th Lahore for the left around MOUQUET FARM. Our artillery bombards enemy trenches in front of our position throughout the day. The fire does not appear to be concentrated on special trenches but to scatter all round the points designated which are R33B55 to 27, 55 to 48, 27D01 & 91, and just S. of R28C21. Our F.O. Offrs. were unable to communicate with their artillery except by pigeon or the slow system of runners. By previous arrangement our barrage was lifted to beyond the MOUQUET - COURCELETTE ROAD at 1900 to allow of the advance of our bombers and

8-343

Enemy Attack.

covering parties for the entrenching parties. This gave immunity from our shell fire to the enemy's infantry who were preparing as it transpired for a general attack on our N.W. front from R 28 C through the Quarry to 6th Avenue (SKY-LINE TRENCH) which was in the area covered by machine gun fire of the 48th Division though not continually occupied by them.

The enemy had commenced a persistent bombardment of our front line and support trenches from 1630 and at 1930 the bombardment intensified and small parties of the enemy with fixed bayonets were seen pushing forward from shell hole to shell hole.

At 2000 enemy rifle and MG fire opened, the bombardment being continued and at 2045 the infantry attacked. They were met by rifle and MG fire and our bombing platoons which were assembled ready to push forward repulsed them by a violent counterattack. In a few minutes the Germans were seen running back in different directions.

Simultaneously with the first Infantry attack H.E. shells were directed on the extreme right of our line and POZIERES was barraged on South & West.

Enemy's infantry attacks were renewed throughout the night but only one other came within bombing range. The right battalion was able to bring very effective enfilade fire to bear to its left from Lewis MGs on the enemy issuing from MOUQUET FARM Trenches.

The attacks were carried out on a narrow front against R 33 A 81 our left strong point. Repeated attempts to advance were made by the enemy throughout the night. An attack on the right was commenced in 6 waves. The last attempt of the enemy to mass for attack was at about 0230.

Owing to the enemy's shell fire our working parties were unable to reach the front trenches on the face that was attacked but the trenches facing E for 500 yds on our right were improved during the night. It was found that digging during daylight generally drew heavy enemy shell fire.

8344

3.

Appendix No. 12 347

17th August. At 10.30 an enemy aeroplane fell in flames in our lines after half an hour's duel with one of our aeroplanes.

During last night the 3rd Bn. on extreme right pushed forward 3 saps and captured a prisoner, 2 deserted enemy machine guns and a telephone in NO MANS LAND.

at 1500 large numbers of enemy were reported advancing towards our right from North of MARTINPUICH. Our artillery checked them.

Two men were sent to remain with night post of Bde. on our left which will not come forward and occupy 6th AVENUE in spite of our repeated requests. They claim to occupy shells holes near it at night.

During the night the whole firing line had to be remade, particularly NW and SE of the Northern salient in which parts it had been obliterated by enemy's shell fire. The 1st Pioneer Battalion continued to improve the communication trenches.

Enemy barrage fire continued on our front system of trenches throughout the night.

18th August. 3 Battalions disposed in firing line and

Support trenches as follows:

1st Bn. 750 yds. facing NE.

3d Bn. 500 " " N.

4th Bn. 1000 " " N.N.W. with 1 Co. 2d Bn. in support.

1st MG. Coy. 6 V.M.Gs in rear of front line for direct fire, remainder indirect fire.

1st L T M Batty. mortars disposed for defence; in reserve.

Bde. HQ to advanced report centre X 10 A 53.

Our own Howitzers shelling our own trenches during the day. At 1320 they appeared to shell R 34 A 27 with 6 in. shells at 1330 R 28 C 18 was reported as shelled by 9.2 in. at 2050, 3d Bn. reported shelled again by our guns. ^{Heavy} There are no artillery liaison officers in the Bde.

At 1600 our heavies shelled the 3rd Bn. particularly heavily then it eased off. at 1900 it again commenced and grew in density till the barrage timed for 2000 to 2100 began.

This barrage was on our front line R 28 C 90 to 71 to 20. In three places our front line was breached for 20 yards and some casualties occurred. At 2220 this shelling lifted on the right and in accordance with orders to seize the enemy's trench at

8.345

R 28 C 93 to 24 a strong patrol was pushed out to 93 and found the enemy holding the HIGH TRENCH at 95 to 36 with machine guns. The ground was very broken and the enemy pushed out a strong flanking party of about 30 men to the East of 93. Our patrol engaged the enemy and we occupied the point 93 subsequently connecting it to 81 by a s.s.

A centre patrol pushed out to R 28 E 54 but came back at daylight having been unable to establish itself securely. No enemy trench existed at this point which was under shell fire.

A left patrol of the 3rd Battalion to point 22 could not establish themselves there owing to our own barrage fire which continued on that point during the night and which was not more than 100 yds. from our firing line at this point.

Intermittent fire from our heavy artillery continued on the firing line on this front till early morning most of it just clearing our line.

The 4th. Bn on the left advanced to 01 and 91 and found the trenches wired and occupied by enemy bombers and M. Gs against which we could make no head-way until the arrival of M T Mortars which were being sent forward by the Division.

R. 33 B 56 was occupied and a strong point made there defended by 1 VMG

3 LMGs and a bombers detachment.

The enemy continued to counterattack this point till 0900 on 19th. inst. A trench was dug from point 55 past the Quarry to 82 on the left thus advancing the line 100 yds.

The 1st Bn. on the right advanced its line 150 yards at the valley road (34 B 24) and 120 yds. on the left. This new line was continually improved until the Bn. was relieved on 23rd. August.

The 1st Bn. reported our 18 pounder as well as Heavy Shells falling short throughout the night. Owing to the breaking of telephone lines close touch could not be maintained with our artillery. The Quarry might be suitable for a wireless installation now that communication to it is improved.

8.346
 Messages asking for our artillery to ~~not~~ appear ~~to~~
 have no result hence the advance of 3d Bn. was held up.
 Artillery order no 7 by G.O.C. R.A. 1st Anzac of 18.8.16
 was received too late to acquaint battalions
 with its contents giving details of our barrage fire.
 The Brigade thus occupied points assigned
 to it for the night of 18th. August except R 28 C 22.01
 and R 34 A 09 and the ground joining them to
 9B the point occupied on the N.E.
 The 1st Bn remained in the line till 23d. inst. and
 the remainder of the Brigade was relieved by
 the 3d Bde. on 19th. inst.

N. M. Smyth
 Br General

Comd 1st Aus Inf Bde.

25.8.16

8/24/17



Headquarters
2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.
27th Aug. 1916.

Enclosed is a report on operations by this Brigade from 15th to 22nd August on N.E. of POZIERES.

The reasons for the failure of the 7th and 8th Bns. are in my opinion.

(1) Inefficiency of artillery fire.

This was shown by the fact that the enemy trenches were barely touched by our fire and also by the fact that our infantry was met by a heavy fire immediately they advanced.

(2) Extraordinary casualties among the officers of the attaching force. The 7th lost 12 and the 8th lost 13. The men being without officers and being met with such a heavy fire were ~~not~~ unable to push the attack home with the determination necessary when such ~~difficult~~ difficulties as were met presented themselves.

Lieut-Colonel

Cmdg. 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2nd AUST. INF. BDE.
from 15th to 22nd August 1916.

- 8348
- 14th . On the 14th August the Brigade arrived and bivouaced at BRICK-FIELDS near ALBERT at 11.10 and came under the orders of the G.O.C. 4th Division. The 5th and 6th Bns. were moved immediately to TARA HILL as part of Divisional Reserve to 4th Aust. Division. Orders were received to relieve the 12th Bde. and the 5th and 6th moved into the line, the 5th taking from MUNSTER ALLEY to the BAPAUME ROAD (both exclusive) the 6th taking from BAPAUME ROAD (inclusive to R.35.C.48 the 7th went into support and the 8th Bn. into reserve. The M.G. Coy. and L.T.M. Bty., relieved these units of the 12th Bde. The relief was complete and command passed at 1000 from G.O.C. 12th Bde. to G.O.C. 2nd Bde.
- 15th. The enemy bombardment was continuous but varied in intensity this was considered the normal state of affairs and variations only were notified as they occurred. Work could not be carried on in the front lines OG1 and OG2 in daytime so all attention was given to connecting the saps out in front of these and lengthening and deepening them where the shelling permitted it; in rear certain communication trenches were selected and efforts made to keep these lines in repair. At night the sap Leads were worked with all available labour and the line known as LUXTONS TRENCH formed and saps started forward from this again. All working parties were heavily shelled from time to time. Lewis guns of 1st Pioneer Bn. placed at disposal of Bde. were allotted 4 to 6th Bn. and 4 to 5th Bn. Patrols went forward to investigate NO MANS LAND and covering parties protected the working parties.
- 16th & night The line was extended to the left to R.34.D.69 to gain touch with the 1st Bde. whose right was to rest at that point.
- 16/17th Patrols sent forward by day from the left subsector reported no signs of enemy or occupied works within 200^x but an old and battered German trench was found and it was decided to dig a line from R.35.C.48. to meet this trench at about R.35.D.06. The extra Lewis guns were of great service in that they enabled many more men to be spared for digging operations while they took over the garrison.
- 17th & night Normal conditions prevailed throughout the day except for one period of an hour on the right subsector which underwent an intense bombardment.
- 17/18th The night was again given to digging operations along the line X.5.B.88 to R.35.B.42 to R.35.D.05 and D.06 to R.35.C.48. Covering parties protected the working parties and patrols were pushed further forward still. Good progress was made especially on the flanks where the trench was well made deep and narrow, but work in the centre was retarded by shell fire. Orders having been issued for an attack, the 5th Bn. was relieved by the 7th and 8th Bns., the 8th taking the line from MUNSTER ALLEY (inclusive) to the tramway (inclusive) and the 7th Bn. from the left of the 8th Bn. to BAPAUME ROAD inclusive. The relief commenced at 0600 and was complete at 0930.
- 18th & night Work on the new line was carried on during the day specially in the centre in order to get a complete line, shelling was continuous but more directed at OG2 than the new line, where it was heavier than normal. Before nightfall the new line DOT TRENCH was complete except for two breaks, one of about 40 yards midway between the tramway and BAPAUME ROAD and one of 160^x at the BAPAUME ROAD.
- 18/19th All companies for the attack were in position and had been checked at 2045 and at 2100 the attack was launched. Two companies of the 8th on right and 2 coys. of the 7th in the centre, both Battalions attacking by two half companies in line; 2 Coys. of the 6th Bn. went forward to complete the line from their right at R.34.D.06 to the left of the 7th Bn. ~~xxxxxxxx~~ as was hoped, in the objective. The attack was launched but was thrown back. The Right Bn. were met by well directed M.G. fire from the right flank and by bombs from in front; the centre Bn. opposition came from the left-front. Our barrage was maintained and the Bns. went

forward the second time but were again repulsed. The M.G. Coy. L.T.M.Bty. and Medium T.M.Bty. co-operated as shewn in orders attached.

After the second failure the right of the 6th Bn. being well forward of their original line connected back along the BAPAUME ROAD to the left of the 7th Bn. and as there were No 7th officers present, all being casualties, reorganised the men and set them to work on the construction of a S.P. to the right of the road while the 6th connected up the two Bns. and constructed a S.P. to the left of the road. During the action the 5th Bn. and Engineers provided working parties to clear up and keep open the communication trenches, also one company of Pioneers. The enemy artillery retaliated throughout the night and morning up till 0700, when the shelling eased off to normal.

19th &
night
19/20th.

DOT TRENCH was ordered to be tenaciously held and improved. The enemy searched vigorously with artillery during the day but did not correctly locate DOT TRENCH except on the right of BAPAUME ROAD where the S.P. was completely destroyed. The 7th and 8th were reorganized in the line and the 5th and 6th carried on with repairing the damage done by shell fire. Sapping forward was continued from DOT TRENCH and patrols sent forward to search for wounded. Patrols from the 6th Bn. were ordered to investigate the old German trench shewn as running from R.35.D.06 to R.35.D.46 and the ground to the North of it; they found it but reported it almost as unrecognisable as a trench being absolutely blown to pieces. Nevertheless work was commenced cleaning it out. The 7th Bn. investigated the objective of the night before and prepared (with bombers from all Bns.) to attack the objective with a bombing party from a sap head. This party was ready at 0200, but the patrols reported that the enemy were relieving and had strong groups out in front; G.O.C. Division cancelled the enterprise and our artillery shelled the enemy trenches. Enemy's retaliation was not very heavy and became normal at 0400.

20th.

The improvement of DOT TRENCH and the pushing forward of saps were the works for the day. Sniping by us was active in the early morning as the enemy were seen to be leaving their trench in small groups, probably the relief had been delayed by our shelling. The enemy for the first time used a trench mortar, operating against our left flank near MUNSTER ALLEY. Three special bombardments were carried out by our artillery during the 20th and 21st to which each time the enemy retaliated heavily. Saps had now been pushed forward in varying lengths from 30^x down to 5x. Two companies of the 5th Bn. relieved two companies of the 6th Bn. as this Bn. had been continuously in the line since taking over from the 12th Bde.

21st.

Sapping work and improvement of DOT TRENCH carried on. Five enemy planes flew over lines and evidently located the new trench as it was at once ranged on and normal shelling brought up from OG2 onto it.

Orders for relief by 5th Bde. were received and the details arranged.

Another special bombardment by our artillery was carried out at 1800.

Relief was complete at 0010 on the 23rd. and Brigade located at BRICKFIELDS near ALBERT while command of line passed to G.O.C. 5th Bde.

Appendices.

Brigade Order No. 39	1.
Narratives 5th Bn.	2.
6th Bn.	3.
7th Bn.	4.
8th Bn.	5.

NOTES ON TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES DURING ACTION
of POZIERES 16/8/16 to 24/8/16.

TRANSPORT.

All first line transport except "Cookers" was brigaded in BRICKFIELDS area on main ALBERT-BOUZINCOURT ROAD W.21.A. Cookers of 3 Battalions ~~of ~~XXXXXX~~~~ in forward area and afterwards of 4 Battalions in front line and support were located in the vicinity of the Bde. Ammunition dump X.11.A.2.1 $\frac{1}{2}$. Although the Cookers were only slightly "dug in" only two were damaged by shell fire.

SUPPLIES.

Daily rations were brought up to the Cookers daily about 4 p.m. and hot meals man-handled to men in front line and supports. Water was brought from ALBERT as far as Cookers in Watercarts and petrol tins carried on limbers and man-handled to men in front line.

Ammunition and R.E. Stores.

S.A.A., Grenades, flares, rockets and Stokes bombs were drawn from the Divisional dump at CHALK PIT and carried to the Bde. dump on Bde. limbers and man-handled from there to the front line.

R.E. Stores were drawn from CHALK PIT dump and various R.E. dumps in forward area. 8 pack horses supplied by this Bde. for transport of stores from CHALK PIT to forward dumps were chiefly used for left Bde. and very little for this Bde., which occupied the right sector.

Expenditure.

Expenditure of S.A.A. averaged less than 1000 for rifles, 1000 for LEWIS MACHINE guns and 10,000 for VICKERS MACHINE Guns daily. Expenditure of MILLS grenades, varied with operations but amount drawn from Bde. Dump for use in front line amounted to about 6,000 in 6 days. It is not possible to say how many of these were actually expended. Over 20,000 sandbags were drawn from Bde. dump during 6 days but again it is not possible to say how many were used.

TOOLS.

Each Bn. took two thirds of its regimental reserve of picks and shovels into front line with it and the Bde. reserve of tools was distributed half at the Bde. forward dump and half at Bde. Hqrs. At some time during the operations as many as 600 shovels and 500 picks were issued from the Bde. dump for use in the forward area. Although pack horses, riding horses, water-carts, G.S. and limbered wagons were constantly used to their full capacity as far forward as the Bde. dump, and often through an enemy barrage, the only casualties or damage sustained were two damaged cookers.

2nd AUST INF BDE ORDER NO. 39.

1. 2nd Aust Inf Bde will attack the enemy from the left of the 15th Division X.6.A. 2 1/2 .6 1/2 . to R.35. D.46. and will join this point to the present line at about R.35.C.4.8.

Strong points will be established -

(1) Near the tramway X.6.A.

(11) R.35.D.47.

2. Artillery. The operations will be immediately preceded by a bombardment of heavy guns.

Programme of bombardment and time table of artillery barrages will be issued separately. Barrage will begin 50 yards forward of our newly constructed starting line running from X.6.A.24. to R.35.C.48.

No troops will be in advance of this line at the time of attack. Assaulting troops will follow barrages closely.

3. Engineers. Engineers will be detailed by C.R.E. for work on the strong points. They will be sent forward under the orders of the Inf. Bde Commanders.

4. Dispositions. (a) The 8th and 7th Battalions, will attack the enemy line between MUNSTER ALLEY (X.6.A.2 1/2 .6 1/2 .) to and inclusive of BAPAUME ROAD the 8th Bn on the Right and the 7th on the Left.

Dividing lines between Battalions, will be Communication Trench "C" from O.G.2. to new forward line this trench is the one nearest the tramway on Northern side of tramway it will be solely at the disposal of 7th Bn, for feeding up into position prior to the attack.

7th Bn, will be responsible for strong point near tramway X.6.A. Bns will form for attack each with two Companies in line in the front on half Coy frontage with one Coy in support and one Coy in Reserve.

(b) 8th Bn will move forward and complete the line from the left of the 7th Bn, to point about R.35.C.48. connecting the Right of their present newly made forward line with the left of the 7th Bn at R.35.D.46. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(c) Medium Trench Mortars. 2 Guns will co-operate from left flank of 44th Inf Bde, 15th Division operating on enemy strong point on left of enemy line to be attacked.

(d) L.T.Mortars will also co-operate from same point on same objective as Medium T.Mortars.

(e) 2nd Machine Gun Coy (8Guns) will co-operate from North of CHALK PIT with indirect fire on to all roads in rear of enemy position.

M.Guns of 44th Bde will co-operate from same vicinity as Trench Mortars firing along the rear of enemy trench and on to BAPAUME ROAD.

5. Aircraft. Contact Aeroplane will fly over the line at 7.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. on 19th inst when flares will be lit.

6. Time. Zero hour will be 9 p.m. Watches will be synchronised with the Bde Sig Coy at 12 noon and 5 p.m.

7. Consolidation. Patrols and post with Lewis Guns will be pushed out in advance of the line when established.

When captured ground is entered by enemy trenches strong block will be constructed. For this work special parties will be told off beforehand and provided with the necessary stores.

Bombers will be specially told off for the protection of all such blocks. Bombing parties will be detailed to push along the enemy trenches leading forward from the captured line.

8. Two days rations and full water bottle to be carried by all ranks.

9. Acknowledge.

(sd) T.F.Ulrich. Major.

Bde Major. 2nd Aust Inf Bde.

On the morning of 15th August this Battalion took over the section of front line trench between MUNSTER ALLEY and the ALBERT-BAPAUME ROAD. At the time of taking over, our front positions consisted of trenches O.G.1 and O.G.2. with four strong points pushed out about 100 yards in advance of O.G.2. The trenches taken over were in a very bad state both as regards repair and sanitation. Trenches had been heavily shell-ed daily prior to our arrival and consequently they were practically levelled to the ground over most of our sector, and a great number of dead men still remained unburied, and large quantities of equipment, rifles and other stores were lying everywhere.

Work was at once put in hand to connect up the T headsof all four strong points to form a continuous front line trench. This work was practically completed during the first day and night. The next constructional work undertaken was to push out saps from the head of the communication trench in each strong point with a view of making another line of strong points further out. This work was pushed ahead with all possible speed as it was realized that NO MANS LAND to a depth of 300 to 400 yards on our immediate front was only lightly held by a few enemy detachments posted in shell craters. About this stage parties from our Battalion working in conjunction with Engineer detachments and parties from the Reserve Battalions of the Brigade commenced to dig a trench across NO MANS LAND from the Eastern end of MUNSTER ALLEY to the WINDMILL (This trench has since been named DOT TRENCH).

The object of this trench was to form a "jumping off" trench for the capture of enemy positions in front of us, and also to straighten our line and reclaim a fair area of ground commanded by us but into which the enemy ventured at night. The saps under construction forward from our line at that time were to form the communication trenches to this new trench when completed. Owing to the needs of the situation ~~the~~ these works were pushed ahead as much as possible both day and night notwithstanding an almost continuous bombardment sometimes reaching great intensity, and a lot of attention from a few hostile machine guns worked from shell craters out in front of our works. These Machine Guns when they could be located, were silenced by our artillery fire and by rifle grenades. One hostile Machine Gun after being put out of action with rifle grenades by us working from MUNSTER ALLEY was brought in by a patrol sent out for the purpose by the unit holding that trench.

Working parties at night were always protected by strong covering patrols pushed out in advance of our positions.

When ever possible during our stay in above trenches we had parties engaged in disposing of the dead, and in clearing up the trenches, and in removing all valuable stores. The progress of this work was much restricted by the activity of the enemys artillery and also by the urgency for rapid progress in our constructional work.

On the 18th Aug. this Battalion was relieved from the front line by Companies from 7th and 8th Battalions whose place we took in Bde Reserve. While in Bde Reserve we had Companies attached to the Battalions holding the front line as required during the offensive operations carried out by those Battalions on night 18/19th August.

(sd) F.W. Le Maistre. Lt Col.

C.O. 5th Battalion.

25/8/16.

Reference Map. POZIERES 1/5000

Appendix No. 12

- 15/8/16. 6th Battalion took over trenches from 48th Battalion at day-break on the morning of the 15/8/16. Front line trenches were 061 and 062 bounded on the right by BAPAUME ROAD ~~from~~ and on the left by the point R.35.C.48. Support trenches were UNION TRENCH and TRAMLINE TRENCH. 062 was non-existent and 061 was badly knocked about so line was taken over as follows :-
One platoon each of C. and D. Coys. occupied 061 with Lewis Guns and with standing patrols out in and in front of 062.
C Coy. was on right of D. Remaining platoons occupied UNION TRENCH and TRAMLINE TRENCH.
A & B Coys., acting as reserves were placed in SUNKEN ROAD TRENCH about X.11.A.0.3. Bn. Hqrs. at X.4.B.9.6. and signal relay stn. at X.10.B.95.
Throughout the day the men in UNION TRENCH and those in 061 were subjected to a heavy bombardment. 061 being thinly held had few casualties but casualties in UNION TRENCH were severe. Later in the afternoon TRAMLINE TRENCH was also shelled causing more casualties. It is thought that these men were observed cleaning and improving their trench and hence the shelling. Also, the last 100 yards of SYDNEY ST between UNION TR. and 061 ~~was under observation~~ were in the open and all movement to 061 was under observation.
Throughout the night more improvements were carried out on all these trenches under an intermittent shelling. Enemy's barrage was very intense along TRAMLINE TRENCH near Battn. Hqrs, continually cutting wire and making work of ration parties difficult.
- 16/8/16 In the early morning, Battalion were ordered to take over extra frontage to the left to R.34.D.69.
Four Vickers guns came up to our support trenches. Enemy again shelled our trenches throughout the day and as trenches were poor, men felt strain rather badly.
In the afternoon we received 4 Lewis ~~Guns~~ from 1st Pioneer Battn. and were able to relieve the guns on the extra portion of front taken over in the morning.
In the evening we were ordered to dig a strong post as near as possible to R.35.D.06. For this purpose a screen of bombers, ~~scouts~~ scouts and Lewis guns went out while 20 men worked at post. This post was actually made at about R.35.D.05. Some casualties were sustained in the covering party. Post was occupied by rifles and bombers.
- 16/8/16 At 0300 A & B Coys. moved up from SUNKEN ROAD TRENCH and relieved C & D Coys.
In the evening, A & B Coys. went out in front behind a covering party of bombers, scouts and rifles and dug a trench from R.35.C.48 to R.35.D.06. Men worked hard throughout the night and as well as making this new trench passable a communication YARRA BEND trench was dug on left from R.35.C.26 in 061 to R.35.C.48. About 80 yards of this trench on the right ~~was~~ in places disconnected. At day-break party withdrew leaving 1 platoon each of A & B Coys. in the new line supported by Lewis Guns.
Meanwhile parties has been working on SYDNEY STREET & UNION TRENCH and had improved these.
- 18/8/16 Enemy's artillery was much quieter today. As much as possible without rendering themselves conspicuous, our men worked on new line and communications. New line was not shelled at all.
In the evening 7th & 8th Bns. on our right were at 2100 to make an effort to capture enemy trenches running S.E. from about R.35.D.4.6. at which point 7th Bn. were construct a strong point.
Our Battn. had to connect up the right of previous nights trench to this strong post of 7th Bn.
This task was allotted to C Coy. who went out at 2100 with the usual covering party in front. Bombing officer was on our right. He and the platoon commander there got to their position saw the 7th ahead and then fell back.
With the help of a Sgt. they collected the left flank of the 7th and brought it up and then by swinging our own flank slightly to rear, thorough connection was made but slightly behind point aimed at.

8.355
Our trench then ran from R.35.D.06 to D.2½.5½. to D.3.4½. where we joined the 7th Battn.

At the same time two platoons each of A & B Coys. started a communication trench from 061 near the forward HQ. at about R.35.C.52 to R.35.D.06 (approx). A platoon of B Coy worked hard on the lower part of SYDNEY STREET while another platoon of A Coy. worked and finished right through the upper part.

By day-break C Coy. had dug a good trench and A & B had vastly improved their front trench and two communication trenches through were completed.

19/8/16

The whole of C Coy. remained in their position of the line. Throughout the day enemy was exceptionally quiet. Now that all communication trenches were completed and the men in all coys. did no visible work, enemy could not see us and did not shell. Our new positions were over the ridge and from them we had a great view of COURCELLETTE and country about there and also of parties of enemy from 150 to 1000 and further distances. In order that enemy would not discover our position, our men did not fire at these parties.

20/8/16

Throughout the night all trenches were improved. Another very quiet day. All men very tired and fatigued, so arrangements were made to have Battalion relieved by the 5th.

21/8/16

At 0000, three Coys. of 5th Battalion made into two relieved our Battn. as follows :-

One Coy. with 8 Lewis Guns took over DOT TRENCH while the other relieved the support trenches.

6th Bn. C. & D. Coys. Lewis Guns and bombers moved to SUNKEN ROAD and were placed at disposal of 5th Bn. C.O. as part of reserve Bn., while A & B Coys. moved back as reserve to this line.

Two more Cickers guns came up as our supports.

H.Q. of 6th Bn. still controlled line and relief was completed without casualties at 0200.

(Sgd) H.G.BENNETT. Lieut.Colonel
Cmdg. 6th Battn.

7th. BATTALION . A.T.F.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 15th./ 21st. AUGUST 1918.

- 14/8/16. 1. On night 14th. inst Battalion received orders to move via Sausage Valley and relieve 46th. Battalion in close Support trenches in Sunken Road.
- 15/8/16. Accordingly, as locality was known, to C.O. the 2nd. in command, and Coy. Commanders left the bivouac Brickfields Area at 9 A.M.
2. The Battalion left bivouac by platoons at 200 yards intervals at 1230 and arrived at bottom of Sausage Valley at 2 P.M., where it was met by C.O. 2nd. in command and units led direct to the places in the trenches.
- The relief was completed by 4 P.M. without a casualty though enemy was intermittently shelling the vicinity of Sunken Road.
3. The forward communication trenches to firing line (Near MUNSTER ALLEY and POZIERES) were reconnoitred and 4 guides then attached to each Coy., for use in case any portion of the Battalion was required for support.
- 16/8/16. 4. On 16th. the day was devoted to improving trenches and small parties of Officers went forward to reconnoitre forward lines and observe conditions and methods of defence.
- A party of 1 Officer and 80 men under Lt. Hopkins was employed under supervision of Engineers, constructing "Jumping off trenches" running Northwards from MUNSTER VALLEY. Though this was done in the day time, it was unobserved by the enemy, who were on the reverse slope of the ridge. A further party of 4 Officers and 310 men was detailed to be provided at 0230 on morning of 17th., but later this was cancelled, and 10 P.M. 16th. substituted.
- At 4 P.M. G. 624 was received; and at 6 P.M. the C.O. left Battalion H/Qrs. and reported at Bde H/Qrs., Sausage Valley, where the plans for the assault on the enemy trench were discussed with G.O.C. Bde., and C.O. 8th. Bn.
- 17/8/16. 5. (a) On the morning of the 17th. instant, the C.O. again visited Bde H/Qrs, and afterwards endeavoured to observe the enemy line; but, as this was everywhere, on the reverse slope of the ridge, nothing could be seen.
- However from map, and from a three days old aeroplane photo, the attached appreciation was made and sent to Bde H/Qrs. On afternoon of 17th, Officers of Coy's assembled and plan was explained to them.
- (b) The Engineers on the night of 16th. inst had had considerable difficulty in placing the large working party they had asked for, viz :- 310 men. From reports of the Officers in charge (Capt Harris, Lts. Tubb, Pubrick, Anthony, Kozminsky), the party paraded on time at the dump with tools and were met by sapper guides.
- No Officer of Engineers was present then, tasks were not explained to the Officers, neither were they divided into smaller parties. The guide led the head of the column into Munster Alley (though fairly heavy shelling

MARKED "A"

of O.G.1. and vicinity of its junction with Sunken Road), and when some distance up the trench, the guide reported to Lt. Tubb that he had lost his way and did not know whether to turn to the right or left.

As they had several times before had to "About Turn" and move back, Lt. Tubb ordered the column to stand fast, and he would endeavour to find the Engineer Officer on the new work and find out where the parties were required. While he was so doing, a Captain of Engineers, came up to the column at the junction of O.G.1. and Munster Alley; and led the rear portion out, leaving the larger forward portion still in Munster Alley.

Lt. Tubb eventually found an Officer of Engineers, and led the portion last mentioned above to their task, but this was considerably after One o'clock.

(c) The parties working on the left were considerably harried by enemy machine guns and shrapnel, and eventually had to cease work as the moonlight was too clear.

(d) However the report of the Engineers was that from Munster Alley to and for some distance across the tram line, the trench was complete; there was then a gap of about 40 yards; and about 200 yards of trench (In prolongation of the above mentioned portion) extending to near BAPAUME ROAD.

(e) The Engineers referred to were not the 2nd. Field Coy., but the unit from which they took over.

(f) Work on the Jumping Off Trench during the day of 17th inst. was impossible, as during that day and the night of the 17th/18th., the bulk of the enemy fire (which had previously been directed against our lines North of BAPAUME ROAD (in the vicinity of the windmill) was directed against the locality between Tram line and BAPAUME ROAD.

(g) On the night of 17th./18th., the shelling and machine gun fire was so severe that the working parties had to be withdrawn, with very little progress made.


18/8/16. 6. (a) At 0700, on the morning of 18th. the portion of front from Tram Line to BAPAUME ROAD, was taken over from the 5th. Bn. by portion of B and C Coy's 7th. Bn., the front being divided, each Coy having one platoon in the Jumping Off Trench (since called J.O.T. trench) and two platoons in O.G.2 (which it is important to realize, though far from being a trench, was the only habitable portion of the area between WALKERS AVENUE and J.O.T. North of the tram line, the other trenches (though still shown on maps) having ceased to exist.) On the line where O.G.1. had been the enemy's systematic shelling and barrage during the day, made it sheer waste of men to place them there; and therefore the remaining two platoons of each of the assaulting Coy's were kept at the head of Sunken Road near the entrance to O.G.1. till required to assemble for the assault.

(b) During the morning, it became apparent that the section of J.O.T. near BAPAUME ROAD (C Coy) was not in the stated relation to the right portion, and it was not till early afternoon by means of personal reconnaissance, and by daring work of scouts that it was discovered that the left of the greater portion, (the right) of J.O.T. was laterally 40 yards from the right of the left ("C Coy") portion, but there was also a forward gap of about at least 100 yards; and the left bent back almost at a right angle.

(c) As regards the positions of the J.O.T. North and South of BAPAUME ROAD, neither the 6th. Bn. nor myself could discover the relation between the two till late afternoon, when it was reported that this ^{North} portion was some distance in front of that occupied by "C" Coy.

(d) It will therefore be seen that the following was

(3)
the difference between the "expected" preliminary disposition and the "actual".



Further, several communication trenches into T heads were shown on the map as running out from O.G. 2, but owing to the consistent heavy shelling these were filled up, and the only communication to "B" Coy (in the left of the right portion of J.O.T.) was through the 8th. Bn. which rendered constant communication with that unit throughout the operation imperative.

7. To take advantage of the intense bombardment and follow up the barrage was of the greatest importance, and careful arrangements were made for "C" Coy. to move forward just prior to the assault over the churned up "No Mans Land" till level with "B" Coy. For this, in the dark, there was plenty of cover, but the joining up of a line in the dark needed cool Officers and men, and meant much to the direction of the charge when the assault was launched. Pegs and tapes were therefore provided and parties arranged for laying out the lines.
8. As the junction of the roads at R. 35 D 43 was an enemy strong point, and commanded the rest of the enemy trench, the Reg Bombers under Lt. James were ordered to move on the left of "C" Coy along BAPAUME ROAD to assist to clear the trenches, and cover consolidation.
9. As BAPAUME ROAD was the left flank of the attack it was necessary to include the Northern side of the road in the assaulting line in order that the strong point might be engaged over as much of its front as possible.
10. To prevent the enemy pushing reinforcements ~~over~~ up the two communication trenches to this strong point after the lifting of the barrage etc., arrangements were made with the O.C. 2nd. M.G. Coy. for two V.M. guns to bring indirect fire on each trench about 100 and 200 yards from its junction; while similar arrangements were made with O.C. L.T.M. Batty. to act similarly with Stokes Mortars. The machine guns were undoubtedly effective, but unfortunately the ~~Stokes~~ Stokes Mortars were blown out very early in the assault.
11. At 230 P.M. the order for the assault was received from Bde H/Qrs and final arrangements made. Battalion order ratifying same was issued at 520 P.M. (Copy herewith marked "B")
12. At 758 P.M. as no barrage time table had been received the following was sent to Bde H/Qrs.
"Reference Bde order No 39 para 2. "This has not been received A.A.A. As it takes at least half an hour to communicate with Coy. could durations and localities be 'phoned to me using (Say) two as zero instead of the one mentioned in the order A.A.A. "
13. At 8.45 P.M. the barrage time table was received, but it

(4)

could only be sent to advanced Coy's by 'phoning to advanced report centre in the following abbreviated form at 8.50 P.M. :-

" Barrage lifts fifty yards a minute for three " minutes after zero."

From this it was sent by runners to front Coys but received too late to communicate to the majority of the men.

Had Bn H/Qrs. been in O.G.L., it is doubtful if the message would have been received at all, as it would take another ten minutes, and the messenger would have to go laterally through the barrage of fire which continuously played along this trench making Runner communication almost impossible.

14. About 8.40 P.M. (As soon as dusk made movements possible

" C" Coy. commenced to creep forward over the shell craters to take up their alignment on the left of "B" Coy.

Enemy H.E. and shrapnel were very heavy, and unfortunately about 8.50 P.M. Capt. Campbell (The O.C. of the Coy)

Lt. Anthony, C.S.M. Townsend, and two Sergeants were buried by a number of shells within a few minutes of each other. For a period no one knew of the occurrence, but Lt. Jenkins and Lt. Salthouse, took charge and brought the men forward just in time to follow the lift of the barrage, but without gaining touch with "B" Coy. The Reg. Bombers on BAPAUME ROAD kept touch with the left of "C" Coy, and when the barrage lifted, their advanced portion got into the enemy strong point, but suffered considerably from rifle and machine gun fire from the left and right fronts.

15. From the statements of wounded (which were obtained while the Bn was halted at WARLOY), the bombing party systematically bombed several of the dug outs, and were joined by Lt. Jenkin (since missing) and a number of men of "C" Coy. Lt. James Reg. Bomb Officer, was wounded on the way over. These men also stated that the trench running along the road, running North from BAPAUME ROAD, was little damaged, and it was from that direction that they were suddenly subjected to such a severe bomb assault, that they were driven out, and fell back along the road, where they encountered the right of the 6th. Bn., and portion of "D" Coy 7th. Bn., who, combined, made another assault but were beaten back again, and dug in across ~~10/11/12/13/14~~ BAPAUME ROAD.

16. With regard to the action of "B" Coy on the night. The J.O.T. was a narrow deep trench through the shell craters in which it was just possible for one man to move with equipment, and, where, to pass, one had to crouch in the bottom of the trench while the other clambered over. Therefore the forming up of the assaulting lines was made outside the trench and when the barrage lifted, the Coy dashed forward, led by Capt. Hoad, Lt. Nixon, Lt. Purbrick, Lt. Plant.

17. At this point, the opposing trenches are closest together, and the centre portion of the Coy got well to the trench. Lt. Nixon was wounded near the parapet and Capt. Hoad was seen to throw up his arms and fall almost on the parapet.

~~As there was no officer left with them,~~

The flank portions of the Coy. suffered severely from oblique machine gun fire and bombs from the front and right front, and were forced to withdraw to J.O.T. where they

8-360
(5)
became mixed with the left Coy. of the 8th. Bn. and joined with them in their further attempts to get forward.

As there was no Officer left with them, this explains why no tidings were heard of them till dawn.

Lt. Purbrick on the left, found himself in the left of J.O.T. with only a few men, and after sending message to the rear (which never arrived) commenced to sap towards BAPAUME Road to link up with the left Coy.

A later message was received from him by Capt. Oates in which he stated he had struck the road and was now sapping forward toward the objective.

18. About the same time, word was received by a Sergeant, that every thing was all right in the captured trench; and accordingly Capt. Oates set the remaining portion of his Coy. to digging communication trenches forward; and also endeavoured to pick up touch with the front line.

Both Lt. Purbrick and Capt. Oates thought the road referred to was was BAPAUME ROAD. The action of Capt. Oates was in accordance with his instructions; but, in daylight, it can now be seen that what was taken by Lt. Purbrick for BAPAUME ROAD is a row of tree trunks (not shown on the map) running diagonally South East from BAPAUME ROAD.

19. One platoon of "D" Coy under Lt. Hopkins, (who though wounded, continued to act till next day) reinforced Lt. Purbrick in J.O.T., went forward again with the 8th. Bn. but were beaten back.

20. The reserve Coy. "A" under Capt. Harris, only consisted of 32 men (100 being on Divisional fatigue at Puchvillers.) These were pushed forward to assist in linking up trenches.

21. "A" Coy of the 5th. Bn was available, and as units of the 7th Bn. were moved forward, it was moved into O.G.2 and J.O.T. were, as the advance was impracticable, and neither Officers and N.C.Os were familiar with the ground, they assisted to consolidate.

22. As mentioned earlier, tapes were provided for communication purposes; but those of "C" Coy were buried with Capt Campbell; and no information is available as to what action was taken by Capt. Hoad to use those issued to him, as he is missing.

23. Towards dawn on the 19th. inst it was apparent that the right Coy ("B") had been unable to hang on to any portion of the enemy's line (if entered) while it was definitely ascertained that the point where the left of the 7th. Bn joined with the 6th. Bn (North of BAPAUME Road) was some distance on our side of the objective (enemy's strong point R 35 D 45). Accordingly when instructions were received to "Bomb down captured trench; and endeavour to link up with "B" Coy". it was pointed to G.O.C. Bde that, as we were not in the enemy trenches at any point, this was not practicable.

24. During the day further instructions were received that aeroplanes reported movements suggesting that portion of "B" Coy were still holding portion of German trench opposite where "B" Coy had attacked; but, as Germans had been seen carrying in our wounded in this vicinity; and as they were sniping from there during the day, it was pointed out to G.O.C. Bde and G.S.O.3. that we were not in possession.

25. During the 19th. the enemy kept up a persistent and heavy bombardment; but during the morning the remnants of "B" and "C" Coys were withdrawn and re-organized, and the front divided between "A" Coy (who linked up with the 8th. Bn. on the right) and "D" Coy (who linked up with the 6th. Bn on the left). During the day the trenches were improved and endeavours made to locate our actual position on the map.

8-361
(6)
26. On the night of the 19th. instant, the construction of strong points on the BAPAUME ROAD and at R 35 D 61 was pushed on with, while three saps were pushed out from J.O.T. towards enemy.

27. At 12.10 A.M. on the morning of the 20th inst, an order was received "To carry out a bomb assault on portion of the enemy trench opposite the centre of my position, to occupy, and consolidate same", to carry out which a Coy of 5th. Bn was placed at my disposal.

As I was personally acquainted with the front, the difficulties of forming up, and getting men over "No Mans Land" before enemy could concentrate on them, I considered it my duty to point out that, though a determined attempt would be made, I could hold out very little hope of success.

Patrols were sent forward, who later reported craters in front occupied by Germans, and Germans in trench.

The 5th. Bn were asked to supply 40 bombers. They could supply 14 only. The bombers of the 7th. Bn counted 9, and were required in the defence of the point strong point on BAPAUME ROAD, while the 8th. and the 6th. Bns. could supply none.

Therefore the attack would have to be carried out with 14 bombers, and a Coy of another Bn, neither of whom knew the communications, the direction of the attack, the alignment of the forming up trench, nor the ground in front, which fact was again reported to Bde, and word received to await instructions. The report of a later patrol discovered that a German relief was taking place.

Later, instructions were received that the order for bomb assault was cancelled and that our artillery were to open. Patrols were therefore withdrawn and units of the 5th. Bn were ~~therefore~~ instructed to return to their bivouacs.

28. During the 20th, the enemy consistently shelled the left of "D" Coy from their advanced position on BAPAUME ROAD; but as soon as the shelling ceased Capt. Oates, Capt. Harris, and Lt. Poole, consistently led parties of "D" Coy forward, and re-constructed.

29. Enemy fire on J.O.T. at other parts, though severe, was not accurate and though men were constantly buried, casualties were not serious.

30. Similarly on 21st. enemy shelling on salient on BAPAUME ROAD and O.G.L. was severe, but did little damage to our front line and communication trenches on the right, till very late in the evening when his firing became more accurate, probably owing to his aeroplane observation during the day.

31. The Bn was relieved at 10 P.M. by the 19th. Bn. to the O.C. of whom full details of the situation, trenches, enemy, and neighbouring units were pointed out. A map was also left showing the few portions of trench (though many are marked on map) which are recognisable or usable. (Copy attached.)

32. I am of the opinion that the failure of the assault was due to :-

- (1) The inaccurate information supplied re the different portions of the jumping off line.
- (2) The loss of 2 Officers and 3 N.C.Os of "C" Coy while moving forward to assaulting alignment, (which also meant the loss of communication tapes and control).

(7)

- 8-362
- (3) The enemy were awaiting the assault; as seen by his switching off his heavy fire from the Windmill area on to this portion of the front during the two previous days and nights.
 - (4) The difficulty of knowing and replacing casualties of Officers, even when reserve Officers are waiting at Bn H/Qrs, instead of at Bde wagon lines,
 - (5) The fact, that strong points were not sufficiently damaged; the portion on Sunken Road being almost intact.
 - (6) The difficulty at night, after launching an attack over such churned up ground, of preserving control, of re-organizing, or of obtaining clear information from scouts and runners.
 - (7) The impossibility of dealing with enemy machine guns, in rear and to a flank, which cannot be located.
 - (8) The fact that once an assault has failed, it can only be made again by the valiant work of small parties, influenced by the local personality of an intrepid Officer or N.C.O.; as, reforming in any force in the dark with conditions of ground and trenches as they are, is an all night undertaking.

33.

In conclusion, I do not think that any other Officers and men under such circumstances, could have fought better, or shown greater initiative under the extreme circumstances; and though the operation was not the success that was intended, it has enabled us to gain commanding positions, at R 35 D 34 and R 35 D 61, & maintain same, where the whole of the road to BAPAUME and the country on either side can be commanded; and if these points are linked up by sapping (as recommended to C.O. 19th Bn), .

34.

A position along the forward crest will be maintained.

35.

It is regretted that this report is so late, but as the matter so vitally affects the reputation and record of the 7th. Battalion, I have endeavoured to get from all sources accurate information as to actual happenings, and the chief cause of delay has been in rendering the report:-
"What to leave out".

I would wish to say for the Officers and men that though under fire and without sleep from the morning of the 15th. till night of the 21st. inst no sign of faintheartedness was seen nor were requests for relief ever made.

The men of "D" Coy, who from the morning of the 19th till the night of the 21st. were constantly being blown out of the strong point on BAPAUME ROAD, and who as persistently rebuilt it, are deserving of the highest praise, as I personally was a witness on one occasion when the strong point was blown in, and can realize the nerve racking effect of such frequent occurrences.

26.8.16.

C. H. Jones
Lieut Col
Co 7th Bn. A.I.F.

8/363

Copy

"A"


Appendix No. 12

366

Appreciation of Situation East of O.G. 2From MUNSTER ALLEY (Exclusive) toBAPAUME Road at R.35 D.24 (Inclusive).

1. OUR POSITION. (a) The present firing line in O.G. 2 is on the reverse slope of the ridge between the 150 contour running from MOQUET FARM towards HIGH WOOD.
(b) The jumping off trench now under construction is just on or on our side of the crest line, except between tramway and MUNSTER ALLEY.
2. ENEMY POSITION. Junction of Roads (with communication trenches along each) at R. 35 D 24 is undoubtedly a strong point on ridge or spur running N. E. down to (word) MARTINPUCH and if not taken, would command enemy trench towards X 6 A 28, besides which the two communication trenches allow it to be re-inforced, or counter attacked with bombs if taken.
(b) The objective trench runs round the enemy's side lower than the crest, and therefore he is able to get a grazing fire on the attacking force either from the trench itself, or the lower ground behind.
(c) The knot of enemy trenches at X 6 A 77 also forms a formidable strong point which if not taken or completely smashed by gun fire commands the objective trench towards the N.W.
(d) Enemy trench cannot be swept by rifle or machine gun fire from any part of our line.
3. COURSES OPEN TO US. (a) The strong point at R 35 D 24 must be taken, and therefore the assault must include the N. side of BAPAUME ROAD; while to prevent enemy receiving reinforcements or counter attacking up the communication trenches from R 35 D 47 and R 36 A 54 respectively, a barrage of artillery and indirect machine gun fire should be maintained after the infantry attack is launched, about 100 yards at least from junction of roads.
(b) A bomb assault should co-operate on the left and clean out any portion of trench running from R 35 C 74 towards R 35 D 37 which may still be occupied by the enemy, and which could bring flanking fire on to the left of our assault on Strong Point at R 35 D 24.
(c) To make as rapid and strong assault on enemy line after the barrage lifts, to prevent enemy getting aimed or concentrated rifle and machine gun fire on our assaulting lines while they are silhouetted on the crest line.
(d) To ensure that strong points at X 6 A 77 if not taken by the 8th. BN. is kept continuously shelled, or neutralised with T.M's from our right.
4. COURSES OPEN TO THE ENEMY. When bombardment starts to vacate trench except strong points on the flanks, and push garrison forward towards us.
It is not likely he will do this, as it would lessen

It is, of course, a certainty that a certain number of posts, probably with few machine guns will be encountered in no man's land, but as it is not thought that the trench proper can yet be fitted with deep dug outs, a probable scheme of defence by the enemy is as under:-



5. COURSES OPEN TO US. (a) Bombard strong points A. and B previously and during

(b) When barrage lifts barrage to still be maintained on enemy communications to strong points about 100 yards in rear.

(b) When barrage lifts barrage to still be maintained on enemy communications to strong points about 100 yards in rear.

(c) Remainder of barrage to lift and search all ground within 100 to 200 yards in rear of enemy trench

(d) Bombardment to be steady and intermittent during afternoon, to be intense for very short period, assaulting lines to be as close as possible and to follow barrage as closely as possible in order to get over the skyline and into the trench, before enemy machine guns can get grazing fire.

6. PLAN.

Two companies to form assaulting line with one Company as close support which will move from O.G.2 into Jumping off line immediately barrage lifts. Reg. Bombers to operate with left flank in assault on R 35 D 24 . 6th. BN to push bomb assault down old German Trench towards road at R 35 D 46.

Wm L. Col

1. The 7th Battalion in conjunction with the 8th Battalion will attack the enemy trench running from R 35 D 46 to X 6 A 25 at — tonight.

2. The 8th Battalion on the night will operate against enemy trenches to about 120 yds. north of TRAMLINE, the 7th Battalion being responsible for seizing from that point to include junction of roads at R 35 D 46 & will establish a strong point at R 35 D 47.

Engineers will be detailed to assist.

3. The operations will be preceded by a bombardment of heavy guns, the program for which & the barrages will be issued separately.

Barrage will begin 50 yds forward of our newly constructed starting off trenches running from X 6 A 24 to R 35 C 48.

No troops must be in advance of the line prior to opening of barrage, but as barrage lifts move forward assaulting troops must follow up closely to allow enemy no time to organize after barrage lifts.

4. Dispositions

B Coy will form for attack from left of 8th Battalion (which will be about 80 yds. N. of the Troneline in jumping off trench) to old GERMAN Communication trench at R 35 D 41.

C Coy will form for attack on the left of B Coy & will include BAPUME ROAD in their left.

Detachments of Regimental Bombers under Lt. James will assemble with C Coy & assist in assault on strong point at R 35 D 46 & will assist in series construction of Strong Point at R 35 D 47.

Above Coys. will be formed in two lines of 1/2 coys. in or in vicinity of jumping off line & will maintain lateral communication with each other & neighbouring units.

D Coy. will assemble in vicinity of O.G. 112 from Troneline to BAPUME ROAD & as assaulting force moves forward so will this coy. move forward so that when second line of assaulting force leaves

66: "jumping off line" he will not be less than 60 yds. in
 or will occupy the jumping off trench, ready to
 assist to push home the attack if asked or hold
 jumping off trench in case of enemy counter attack.
 In the event of B.C. Coy. being sufficient to carry the
 position O/C. D Coy. will arrange to assist or
 construct communication trenches from T off
 line to new line from

(a) Along BAPUME ROAD to strong point at
 R 35 D 47.

(b) Continuing old German Comm. trench from
 X 5 B 08 1/2 to new line.

The portion of A Coy will keep in touch with D Coy. in
 vicinity of WALKER AVENUE 041 or 042. & will
 assist either in carrying, construction of communica-
 tion trenches or in occupying jumping off line in
 case of enemy counter attack.

Assistance.

Infantry on left. 6" Batter. will move forward
 to complete line from junction of roads at R 35 D 47
 to their present firing line.

(b) Stokes Mortars will also assist by bombarding
 R 35 D 46 & when barrage lifts will increase 150 yds.
 & keep on both enemy roads.

(c) 2 V.M. Guns will also assist on each road in
 similar manner to (b) above.

Aircraft.

Contact plane will fly over line at 7.30 A.M.
 & 10 A.M. of 19" iral when position will be disclosed
 by towels, white sheets etc. or in the event of these
 failing by lighting flares, unless definite dis-
 positions before those times have been sent back
 to Batter. Hd. Qrs.

Time Zero hour 9 P.M. Watches will be synchron-
 ized with Batter. Hd. Qrs. at 0530.

Consolidation

The carrying of and construction of strong point
 at R 35 D 46 must be carried out & held at all costs.

The remainder of the front line after capture should not be held too heavily, but men should be employed:-

(a) constructing traverses against oblique or enfilade fire

(b) constructing deep zig zag trenches back over the crest.

Dumps of Ammunition, Bombs, Sandbags etc are already at R 35 D 22 & at present Hd. Qrs. of B & C Coy.

Head Quarters. Bn. Hd. Quarters will not move from present location, but as advanced report centre is established at present Hd. Qrs. of B & C Coy at X 5 centre.

Notes. (a) Men should be warned to follow barrage closely but not to run into it.

(b) When objective is reached, not to pursue small groups of men, but to follow with fire. If our men reach foot the object they will run into our own barrage of artillery & m. gun fire.

(c) Impress on all ranks that the words RETIRE, EVACUATE or not to be obeyed & no excuse will be accepted for troops withdrawing on such commands.

N Coo. should particularly be warned that they must not take such orders from anyone, but until received from a known superior they must stick & keep their men with them.

(d) Men who have stood through an enemy bombardment have nothing to fear from his infantry attacks when his artillery lifts.

(e) N Coo. should be informed of all described action & be ready to take the place of any officers casualties.

(f) Reports must be sent frequently to ensure that supports & stores are sent forward.

5.20 p.m.

Signed. C.H. JESS Lt. Col.


C.O. 7th Bn.

POZIERES

EDITION 2. CANCELLING
ALL PREVIOUS ISSUES.

SECRET.

1:5,000



YARDS: 250 200 150 100 50 0 500 750

The numbers are co-ordinates. The square in which a point is
should in all cases be quoted (see instructions on normal series of
maps, scales 1/10,000 and 1/20,000).

TRENCHES CORRECTED TO 16.8.16

18/8/16

|||||

Wiped Out

Proposed new work

① Taken over today by 17th BN. It
is undoubtedly the place for
support Corps of 19th BN. I
would suggest 5th BN be
asked to go away.

Ammon & Col.
19/8/16

2369

Report on Operations POZIERS from 15th to 21st, August 1918.

15/8/18. Battalion left BRICKFIELD bivouac at 4 p.m. and occupied trenches in SAUSAGE VALLEY at about X 21 A 3 6.

16/8/18. Position of front line and enemy positions reconnoitred by Battalion Officers.

17/8/18. Working party digging new trench in front of our position heavily shelled. Casualties 2 K. 3 Wounded, Battalion Officers. Again reconnoitred position. Instructions received to relieve 5th Battalion in front line from MUNSTER ALLEY to TRAMLINE.

18/8/18. One Company moved from SAUSAGE VALLEY at 0730 and took over right portion of line held by 5th Bn, other three Companies moved to occupied trenches in SUNKEN ROAD.

At 1700 Brigade Operation Order received (copy attached) Appendix 1. In accordance with this order the disposition of the Battalion for attack was "A" Coy on Right, "C" Coy on Left in 2 lines of 1/2 Companies, the front half of each Coy occupying DOT TRENCH the rear half in LUXTONS trench COUCHMANS CUT and O.G.I. D Coy in support B in Reserve.

At 2045 the rear 1/2 Coy's of A & C moved up in rear of DOT trench and the Support and Reserve Coy's to their allotted places.

The barrage time table was received at 2050 too late to be communicated to attacking Coy's. As the barrage lifted the attacking Companies moved forward and the right of A Coy immediately came under heavy fire from Bombs and Machine Guns the centre and left also suffered heavily from M.Guns from the left. The fire was so heavy that the line withdrew and was reformed and again attacked but as enemy strong posts and trenches had apparently not suffered from our Artillery fire they had an immense superiority of fire and our attack was beaten back. I then ordered "B" Coy to reinforce "A" and make a further attempt but though this time reached the enemy positions it could not gain a footing and retired to DOT trench. Our left Coy was under a galling Machine Gun fire from both flanks and could make no progress and also fell back to its original position. I attribute the failure to gain our objective to:-

(1) Our artillery fire did not succeed in keeping down fire from enemy M.Guns at Strong posts and also failed to successfully open the enemy trenches, the enemy was thus intact and their morale unaffected.

(2) The enemy strong posts at about R 36 C 22 were still intact and had suffered little from Trench Mortars or Artillery. These posts should have been attacked by the Division on our Right in Co-operation with our attack.

(3) Had the attack been made in daylight (say 8 o'clock p.m.) it would have had a greater chance of success.

(4) The digging of the jump off trench gave the enemy every indication of our intentions and he was thus prepared.

As all the Officers in the two Front Companies A & C are casualties I have been unable to obtain a report from them.

25/8/18.

(sd) G. Coulter. Lt Col.
O/C 8th Battalion.

2ND. AUST. INF. BDE. ORDER NO. 30.

Headquarters,
2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

18 / 8 / 16.

1. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. will attack the enemy from the left of the 15th. Division at X 5A 2 1/2. 61/2. to R. 35 D, R. Y. and will join this point to the present line at about R. 35. C. ~~XXX~~ 4.8.

Strong points will be established -

- (1) Near the tramway X. 6. A.
(11) R. 35. D. 47.

2. Artillery. The operations will be immediately preceded by a bombardment of heavy guns.

Programme of bombardment and the time table of Artillery barrages will be issued separately.

Barrage will begin 50 yards forward of our newly constructed starting line running from X. 6. A. 24. to R. 36. C. 48. No troops will be in advance of this line at the time of attack. Assaulting troops will follow barrage closely.

3. Engineers. Engineers will be detailed by G.R.E. for work on the strong points. They will be sent forward under the orders of the Inf. Bde. Commanders.

4. Dispositions. (a) The 8th. and 7th. Bns. will attack to the enemy line between MONSTER ALLEY (X. 6. A. 2 1/2. 6 1/2,) to and inclusive of BAPAUME ROAD, the 8th. Bn. on the right & the 7th. Bn. on the left.

Dividing line between Battalions will be communication trench "C" from O. G. 2. to new forward line. This trench is the one nearest the tramway on Northern side of Tramway, it will be solely at the disposal of 7th. Bn. for feeding up into position prior to attack.

7th. Bn. will be responsible for seizing enemy strong point at R. 35.D. 46. and establishing strong point as per Para. 1 (11).

8th. Bn. will be responsible for strong point near Tramway, X. 6.A.,

Battalions will form for attack each with 2 Coys. in line on the Front onnhalf Coy. frontage with 1 Coy. in support and 1 Coy. in reserve.

(b) 6th. Bn. will move forward and complete the line from the left on the 7th. Bn., to point about R. 35. C. 42 connecting the right of their present newly made forward line with the left of 7th., Bn., at R. 35. -). 46.

(c) Medium Trench Mortars. 2 Guns will co-operate from left flank of 44th. Inf. Bde., 15th. Division operating on enemy strong point on left of enemy line to be attacked!

(d) L. T. Mortars will also ~~XXX~~ operate from same point on same objective as Medium T. Mortars.

(e) 2nd. M. G. Coy. (6 Guns) will co-operate from NORTH of CHALK PIT with indirect fire on to, all roads in rear of enemy position. M.Guns of 44th Bde will co-operate from same vicinity as Trench Mortars, firing along the rear of enemy trench and on to the BAPAUME ROAD.

5. Aircraft. Contact Aeroplace will fly over the line at 7.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. on 19th. inst. when flares will be lit.

6. Time. Zero hour will be 9 p.m. Watches will be Synchronised with the Bde. Sig. Coy. at 12 noon and 5 p.m.

7. Consolidation
~~Consolidation~~. Patrols and posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out in advance of the line when established.

When captured ground is entered by enemy trenches strong blocks will be constructed. For this work special parties will be told off beforehand and provided with necessary stores. Bombers will be specially told off for the protection of all such blocks.

Bombing parties will be detailed to push along the enemy trenches leading forward from the captured line.

8. Two day's rations and full waterbottle to be carried by all ranks.

8-272
3RD. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Appendix No. 12

REPORT ON OPERATIONS ABOUT MOUQUET FARM and POZIERES19th. to 23rd. AUGUST 1916.Reference 1-5,000 Sheet FMEdeMOUQUET and 1-20,000 Sheet 57D.S.E.

1. The 3rd. Infantry Brigade Relieved the 1st. Infantry Brigade on the 19/20th. August 1916 taking up a line as shown on 1-5,000 map. A, attached hereto (Appendix I).

2. The Brigade was disposed as follows:-

(a) 1st. Battalion (attached to 3rd. Infantry Brigade for the operation) from O.G.2 - 34B60 to R34A9.9 - this Battalion had one Company (about 40) in support in COPSE AVENUE near the COPSE (1-20,000) (the Battalion was little over 400 strong) Battalion H.Q. at R34D3 $\frac{1}{2}$ -4 $\frac{1}{2}$.

(b) 10th. Battalion from R34A9.9 to R28C7 $\frac{1}{2}$ -1, with a ~~strong~~ bombing post about R28C8.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ to R34A2 $\frac{1}{2}$.8, including the strong point in the road cutting.

Had two companies Battalion Reserve in Sq.15C (1-20,000). 4 Lewis Guns in front line. 4 In Reserve. Battalion H.Q. at R34A91.

(c) 12th. Battalion from R34A2 $\frac{1}{2}$.8 to R33B55 (Strong point inclusive).

This Battalion had 2 companies in the front line with 4 Lewis Guns and 2 platoons in support. 2 companies and 4 Lewis Guns Battalion Reserve in WIRE TRENCH. Battalion H.Q. at X4A49.

(d) 9th. Battalion from R33B5.5 to R33A8.1, but as the Brigade on our left was not watching ^{it} a further length of trench to R33C6.9 was held by this Battalion.

2 companies and 4 Lewis Guns (less 1 platoon) held the front line - 1 platoon in support 4th. AVENUE, and 2 companies and 4 Lewis Guns were in Battalion Reserve in WIRE TRENCH. (1-20000) Headquarters at X⁴A3.9.

(e) 3rd. M.G. Company.

Headquarters at X16A5-2

8 Guns distributed, ~~XX~~ 2 at each of the following points, viz:-

2 at X10 A 3 $\frac{1}{2}$.7

Continued.-

2 at X10A2 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$
 1 at X10A1 $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$
 1 at X10A $\frac{1}{2}$.6 $\frac{1}{2}$
 1 at X4C3 $\frac{1}{2}$.0
 1 at X4C6.5

(f) 3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery.

Headquarters at X16A5.2 with 6 mortars -

2 mortars at R34A6.5

(g) Brigade Reserves.

11th. Battalion at Sq. X14B. This Battalion was very weak and was nearly wholly employed in duties of carrying to the front line.

3rd. M.G. Company Headquarters and 8 guns near X16A5.2

3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery Headquarters and 6 mortars near X16A5.2.

(h) Brigade Headquarters.

At about X16C5.6.

3. Three Battalions were placed in the front line, in view of early offensive operations being contemplated, towards NW and MOUQUET FARM.

COMMUNICA-
tions and
CONSOLIDATIONS

4. Owing to hostile shell fire having broken up the communication trenches, movement in and about the position and in rear of front lines was only possible by men being exposed to view and at night, consequently, it was necessary to dig hard all 20th. and night of 20th/21st. August.

As stores of ammunition, bombs, grenades, water, etc etc, were very low in and near the front line a special effort had to be made to take up supplies during night of 20/21st. This was carried up notwithstanding severe shell fire all night, and forward Battalion and Company Dumps formed which never ran short during the action.

FORMING UP
TRENCHES

5. There were no forming up places for supports and reserves, consequently arrangements were made to construct them and improve old trenches, since filled in by ^{hostile shell} trench fire. This work was greatly hampered (i) by hostile shell fire (ii) by continuous traffic of carrying parties.

Continued.-

ORDER FOR
OFFENSIVE.

6. (i) On the evening of 20/8/16 Order No. 51 was received from the Division ordering the Brigade to attack the position R28C9.5-66-36-08-01-R27D9.1-R33B5.9-55, at 6 p.m. on 21st. instant.

(ii) On this was issued a Brigade Operation Order No. 29 (Appendix ii) - Instructions on this order (~~Appendix iii~~) - Instructions re Engineer and Pioneer Parties for the operation (~~Appendix iv~~). Smoke Barrage (Appendix v) - Message amplifying objectives and defining Objective for each Unit, omitted from the Brigade Operation Order No. 29, (Appendix vi).

(iii) In addition special instructions to the 3rd. M. Gun Company and 3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery were issued to O's C. the Units by the Brigadier.

HOSTILE
SHELLING.

7. The enemy shelled all our positions and barraged the communications all night 20/21st. and several times during the day of 21st. being especially violent from 5 p.m. onwards

HOSTILE
AIRCRAFT.

8. Several (5 to 8) hostile planes crossed our lines on the morning of 21st. August and one or two were very active at different periods during that day and it was evident, from after gained information from prisoners, that the enemy saw the movement of troops getting into position, and was ready for the attack when it was launched.

Partial proof of this is that the enemy opened rifle and machine gun fire through our barrage when it started.

9. Troops detailed for the attack:

10th Battalion, 2 raiding parties 11th. Battalion, 12th Battalion, guns of M.G. Company, Light Trench Mortars, were ordered to be in position by 5.30 p.m.

I regret that the 11th. Battalion parties by a concatenation of circumstances failed to do this; chiefly on account of very heavy hostile shell barrages.

Continued,

9. ^{continued} At about 3.30 p.m., to provide in case the 11th. Battalion were late, I ordered 9th. Battalion to send 2 platoons with their bombing teams to 34A6.5 to 34st. (Message received by 9th. Battalion at 4 p.m.) to (i) Act as a support to 11th. Battalion attack if all 11th. Battalion were not in position in time (6 p.m.) and if O.C. Battalion required them; or (ii) if 11th. Battalion did not come up when barrage started at 6 p.m. these platoons were to move forward across the line 34A2 $\frac{1}{2}$.9 $\frac{1}{2}$, 34A1 $\frac{1}{2}$.7 and keep connection between left of 10th. Battalion and right of 12th. Battalion.

These platoons were portion of Brigade Reserve of 9th. Battalion at about 33D5.7. I also sent my Brigade Intelligence Officer to see O.C. 9th. Battalion to explain the action required of these two platoons.

As regards their action O.C. 9th. Battalion reports as follows:

".....at 1630 (4.30 p.m.)these platoons moved off,
 " but owing to ^{the} congested state of the trenches a delay occurred
 " and the rendezvous was not reached until 1755 (5.55 p.m.),
 " five minutes before the attack was timed. On arrival
 " great confusion ^{trench} existed & there was only one ~~thing~~, which
 " was filled with 11th. Battalion, Engineers etc. Apparently
 " no one was in charge and the Senior Officer in charge of the
 " Platoons was told they would not be wanted. However he
 " waited and sent an Officer to me informing me of the situa-
 " tion - I informed Brigade and asked for instructions....."

I received this message, which was as follows "....O.C. two
 " platoons sent to assist 11th. Battalion has just returned AAA
 " He states 11th. Battalion had full complement AAA These pla-
 " toons now in jumping off position AAA Please advise what they
 " had better do AAA I understand 12th. Battalion requires
 " assistance AAA Will I send these two platoons to help 12th.
 " Battalion AAA I await reply AAA 9th. Battalion ends".-

Received at 2212 (10.12 p.m.)

Continued-

OBJECTIVES

10. Objective was the hostile line
R28C9.5-C66-C36-C03-C01-R27D9.1-R33B5.7-B46.

This was further subdivided by message sent to Battalions attacking (Appendix vi).

10th. Battalion to attack .95 to 36 to 100 yds NE of 03

11th. " : " from left of 10th. Battalion to
03 to 01 to 91, inclusive.

12th. Battalion from left of 11th. Battalion to B4.6.

3rd. M.G. Company to barrage front and cover flanks of
hostile lines.

3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery to bombard all strong points known
and probable.

TIME

11. Attack was timed to commence at 6 p.m. and the leading
lines were to advance under cover of a five minute's barrage
and rush the hostile ~~lines~~ lines. The 10th. Battalion being
warned that they had at least two lines to rush and that they
were to have clearing parties to clear first hostile line with
their second wave.

12. Narrative,

(i) Enemy heavily bombarded our front line and communica-
tions several times on 21st. but a specially severe bombard-
ment from 5 p.m. onwards. This caused over 120 casualties
in the 10th. Battalion leading lines alone, and necessitated
their being reinforced from the rear waves in support and
leaving B.C. 10th Battalion only 2 platoons in reserve. This
Battalion had a little over 600 men all told in its attacking
waves, including all specialists. Other Battalions suffered
like
but nothing so heavily.

(ii) 11th. Battalion was not in position to attack by
hour named and eventually started forward at 8 p.m.

(iii) Dispositions of each Battalion etc. were as follows:-

10th. Battalion

Frontal attack- 2 companies plus one platoon in 4
waves.

Right flank- One company with Battalion Bombers to
make good right flank and protect the right. 2 platoons in re-

Continued.

12. 3 platoons in Reserve.
 4 Lewis guns with frontal attack.
 2 " " " right flank Company.
 2 " " " with reserve 3 platoons.

Eventually a second platoon was sent in to make good losses by hostile shell fire and the 2 reserve platoons made 4th. wave (Reserve) with 2 Lewis Guns.

11th. Battalion.

2 raiding parties of 50 each up O.G.1 and O.G.2 and 2 parties of fifty as supports, one to each, 1 Lewis Gun with each party of 50.

Remainder of Battalion (about 200) as Brigade Reserve.

12th. Battalion.

2 Companies detailed for first 2 waves.

2 " (less 2 platoons Battalion Reserve) for second 2 waves. Owing to heavy shell fire all these had to be closed up to the leading, or fire, trench.

2 platoons Battalion Reserve close up to above in shell holes.

Lewis Guns, 4 with 2nd wave, 4 with 3rd. and 4th. waves.

Battalion Bombers on left with objective, trench 55 to 48 to 59.

9th. Battalion. in position 33B55 to 100 yds SW of 33A81 with one Company as Battalion Reserve and one Company as Brigade Reserve at about trench in 33D56. NB. 2 platoons of this Company were detailed (see para 9) to take the place of 11th. Battalion should they be late.

3rd. M.G. Company. As in 2 (e) except that 2 guns were put in position at about X4A0.5 (in 2nd. AVENUE)

Continued.

12. 3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery.

(a)	2	mortars	at	about	R2807.1
(b)	2	"	"	"	R34A2.8
(c)	2	"	"	"	R33B5.5
(d)	2	"	"	"	R34A6.5

(a) & (b) & (c) for action against hostile strong points.
 (a) & (c) to cover flanks after barrage.

(iv) At 6 p.m. barrage started and attack went forward with the exception of 11th. Battalion and 2 platoons 9th. Battalion (vide para 9).

10th. BATTALION.

The 10th. Battalion was heavily fired at by machine gun and rifle fire, through our barrage, and the enemy's, and lost a good many casualties getting out of the "jumping off trench", having all its officers hit except one and he was hit immediately on reaching the objective. Notwithstanding, this Battalion went forward and took its ultimate objective except .95; near which the enemy were very thick and had several machine guns both near the point and to the NE of it. The Company of the 10th and bombers detailed to cover the right flank and make good the points 93 and 95 lost heavily, only 4 men of ^{the} two bombing teams being not hit.

The right of the 10th. failed to make good and the flank was thrown back from about half way between 95 and 86 to 93. The men however tried again and again to advance but lost considerably and made no headway. The whole of the men in the 95 - 36 trench, meanwhile, were under a heavy enfilade fire from the right, and were being fired at from about 79 and 69 and the trenches leading South from them, from the left.

11th. BATTALION)
 2 PLATOONS)
 9th BATTN.)

Meantime the 11th. Battalion parties detailed for the centre attack and the 2 platoons 9th. Battalion also detailed to keep touch between 10th. and 12th. Battalions, failed to materialize (see para 9).

12th. BATTALION.

The 12th. Battalion went over the parapet as our artillery barrage started and obtained their objective with very little opposition but the left were carried away in pursuit of the flying enemy, entered the MOUQUET FARM and bombed the dug-outs

Continued.

12. securing a few prisoners, and eventually fell back into line with the right.

Meanwhile the bombers of A company on the right attacked and bombed a strong post at R27D91 killing over 20 of the enemy taking 3 prisoners and a machine gun. (afterwards blown to pieces by a 5.9" shell).

The left party under 2/Lieut Hale report about 100 to 150 dead Germans near the row of trees SE of MOUQUET FARM, who had been killed partly by our artillery but a good many by our hand and rifle grenades and machine gun fire. This party "dug in" in line with the right and report being on or near the "crest" and having a good view over the ground in front, and also of THIEPVAL, from their trench.

A left bombing party under L/Cpl Lord worked up the trench from 55 to 48 bombing 4 large dug-outs about that point, killing many of the enemy who had cleared out of the front trench (objective). This party also bombed dug-outs in the Farm.

2nd. PHASE

(v) 10th. Battalion.

Between 6.30 and 9 p.m. the men of the 10th. Battalion in the advanced (objective) trench had been losing casualties ^{steadily} heavily and had become very weak for the front held, and felt the pressure on their flanks, O.C. 10th. Battalion had used his 2 remaining platoons reinforcing them and the party opposite point 95, and the extreme left flank gradually gave way. The refused right flank too was gradually giving ^{ground} way, and the Company protecting the right had gradually to draw in and could make no headway to the NE or towards the point 95. Eventually the line fell back between 9 and 10 p.m. and took up and held a line from about 28C32 to 28C41 to 28C21½. O.C. battalion was not informed of this until 10 p.m. or a little after and the information reached me ^{at} about 11.15 p.m.

Continued-

12. (v) At about 11.40 I ordered 1 Company 9th. Battalion to reinforce 10th. Battalion, reporting at point 34A65, and also 2 guns of M.G. Company. This Company on arrival was at once sent up to support line in rear (100 yds) of new line. The 2 guns were posted at about 2803 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1 to cover the right flank. 11th. Battalion had meantime made ground and linked up with 12th. Battalion at 91 and 10th. Battalion at 21.

12th. Battalion Consolidating.

SITUATION 5 a.m. 22nd. (vi) The situation at 5 a.m. was that we held a line from the left of 1st. Battalion at about 2803 $\frac{1}{2}$.0 to 08.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 28041 - 28021 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 001 - 27D91 to 40 yds from SE corner of MOUQUET FARM TO 33D56 to D55 via QUARRY to 81 and 100 yds to SW of same.

In reserve 2 Vickers Guns ^{and} about 200 (all told) of 11th. Battalion.

The Brigade was reduced by about 500 casualties and further offensive operations on any but a small scale were out of the question, especially as the men were short of sleep and shaken by shell fire.

(vii) Heavy shelling took place on the front line and communications most of the day and increased from about 5 p.m. onwards. Notwithstanding this, consolidation proceeded ^{slowly} and methodically but as fast as trenches were dug or cleared they were "crumbled" and filled in by hostile shelling.

Hostile aircraft were active and patrolling over our line again this day, especially at 11.15 a.m., 2 p.m. and about 4 p.m.
(viii) At about 1500 (3 p.m.), on 22nd. the 11th. Battalion sent a bombing team under an officer and with a Lewis Gun to bomb from 27D91 up to D73 with a view (i) to ascertain if it was strongly held and (ii) if not, to occupy it. This party met with very strong opposition from about 50 yds N of 91 but eventually established a post at about that point and made a "block".

The 9th. Battalion also sent a bombing team ~~to 28041~~

22nd. AUGUST
SHELLING and
HOSTILE AIR-
CRAFT

BOMBING
PARTIES

Continued.

12. (viii) up towards point 33B27, at about 3 p.m. They worked up ~~to~~ the trench running from 55 to 27 and found it unoccupied and completely destroyed from about 150 yds SE of point 27 to 27. Meeting with no opposition this party entered the MOUQUET FARM and searched the Dug-outs there, finding a steel helmet, accoutrements, bombs, "Very" pistols and cartridges, some of which they brought back. There were no papers.

A bombing post was formed at about 33B45, and a block formed ahead of it.

RELIEF

(ix) Relief by 6th. Infantry Brigade commenced at about 1400 and continued throughout the night 22/23rd. and concluded at about 4.30 a.m. on 23rd. During the greater part of the time, hostile shelling was intense and accurate on the front lines and communications.

STORES

(x) Although very few stores were taken over from the previous Brigade, a fair supply of war stores, water and food, was handed over to the relieving Brigade.

COMMUNICATIONS

13. I have again to bring to notice the excellent arrangements made by Lieut. FERGUSON 3rd. Brigade Section, 1st. Divisional Signalling Company for communication with the Division and with Battalions and the good work done by the Signal Section, Battalion Signallers, and runners. The linesmen were out continually under very heavy hostile shell fire and did gallant and excellent work. The O.C. Signalling Section worked again with untiring energy and resource.

SUPPLIES

14. An enormous quantity of Mills Grenades, (hand and rifle) over 100,000 rounds of ammunition, continual supplies of water and some rations were sent to the front line. The Q.M.G. Department of the Division kept the Divisional Dump at CHALK PIT full and the transfer thence to Brigade and Battalion Dumps was organised and kept going by Capt. HEMING, Brigade Bombing Officer who deserves great credit for his untiring work and zeal.

Continued-

8-382
COMMENTS,
WORK OF SUC-
CESS, 10th.
BATTALION.

15. I am of opinion that, much as I regret the lack of success of the 10th. Battalion attack on the night, it was no fault of the Battalion which (under the circumstances) did very well. Its whole organisation for the attack was broken up by heavy shell fire before it started, most of the officers with the leading lines were casualties at once and it stood a bad hammering by oblique and enfilade shell fire (both shrapnel and H.E.) and heavy casualties for a considerable time and then only gave way slowly, eventually establishing itself some 50 to 100 yds forward of its original line. I also consider that Major REDBURG who was in command, commanded the Battalion with credit used his reserves wisely and kept his head under very trying circumstances. The Battalion had 3 officers killed and 7 wounded and 336 casualties out of about 620 in the fighting line, most of which occurred prior to it falling back.

WORK OF STAFF
AND C.O.'s

16. (i) My Brigade Staff worked with zeal and entire devotion to duty.

(ii) My C.O.s rendered continual and good reports by telephone, except for one period when all lines but one were cut badly where runners and pigeons were used- and during a few periods where heavy hostile barrages delayed the obtaining of information from the firing line.

Lieut.Colonel ELLIOTT commanding 12th. Battalion made very good arrangements for his attack and handled his command well- Major REDBURG 10th. Battalion see (para 15)

RECOMMENDA-
TIONS.

17. I propose to submit as soon as they can be obtained and verified, names of officers and other ranks for honors and rewards.

18.

APPENDICES


18. I attach the following appendices:-

1. Map showing situation on taking over on 19/20th. instant.
2. Map showing situation at 5 a.m. 22nd. instant and on handingover on 22/23rd. instant.
3. Brigade Operation Order No. 29 with instructions and corrigendum.
4. Order for smoke barrage. (Neither Barrages were put up and the fact was reported to Division).
5. List of casualties: Officers and other ranks.

27th. August 1916.

E. G. Sinclair MacLagan.....Brig-General.
Commanding 3rd. Aust. Infantry brigade.

87. BLUE LINES SHOW POSITION OF APPENDIX I
3RD BRIGADE BEFORE ATTACK ON
FERME DU MOUQUET. 21ST AUGUST 1916



SS = Strong Pos's.

Contours From Captured German Map.

MAP SHEWING

Latent POSITION BEFORE
ATTACK ON *Hesperia photo* 21ST
AUGUST

1916

8-385

Appendix No 12

388


3rd Aus Inf Bde

Positions at 5 a.m. 22/8/16

and on handing over night 22-23/8/16

FERME DU MOUQUET.

Appendix II

B
BBombing posts completed between
5 a.m. 22/8/16 and night 22-23/8/16

3RD. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

OPERATION ORDER NO. 29.

Keep file

Appendix

COPY NO.

Appendix No. 12

Headquarters,
20th. August 1918

Reference FERME DU MOUQUET SHEET 1/5,000 and Sheet 57D-SE 1-20,000

- FORMATION. 1. Information as per situation reports as issued from time to time.
- ATTENTION. 2. The 3rd. Aust. Infantry Brigade will attack the hostile positions R.28.C.9.5-C66C3.6-C.03-C01-R27D9.1-R33B5.7-B4.6 at zero hour on 21st. instant.
- ARTILLERY ACTION. 3. (As per Divn Order No. 51 dated 20/8/18).
- ACTION OF INFANTRY. 4. The infantry will be disposed as under 30 minutes before zero hour ready to attack in four waves:-
- (i) 10th. Battalion.
In trenches, R28C3.0 to 34A2.9 (east edge of cutting exclusive) R34A9.8 to R34A6.5 (inclusive). Right Defensive Flank party in trenches East and South of Point R28C-3.0
- 11th. Battalion. (less 2 Companies, Battalion Bombers and 4 Lewis Guns) In trenches, R34A2.9 to R34A1.6 (cutting and strong point inclusive) and R34A65 (exclusive) to R34A34 (inclusive). Remainder of Battalion (Brigade Reserve) in trenches WIRE TRENCH.
- 12th. Battalion.
In trenches R34A1.6 to R33B5.5 (strong point inclusive and R34A4.3 to R33D7.3
- 9th. Battalion.
Remain in present positions and cover left flank of the attack but will hold one Company in a position of readiness in R33D
- 1st. Battalion.
Will remain in present positions.
- (ii) Method of Advance.
Under cover of the artillery barrage the infantry will press close up to the hostile positions and rush them as soon as the barrage lifts. It is essential to do this at once to prevent enemy manning his parapets, especially where there are two lines to be rushed as in Square R28C. Clearing parties to be arranged to follow with second wave jumping off trench to be manned by 3rd. wave simultaneous with advance of first wave.
5. 3rd. Machine Gun Coy. will arrange for indirect barrage on hostile lines of approach and in case of counter attack. Special arrangement being made to protect the flanks of the attack. Special instructions as to disposition have been issued to O.C. Brigade reserve 4 guns at X16A3.2. Position of O.C. Machine Gun Coy at GIBRALTAR where O.C. Battalions will communicate requirements direct. The O.C. Machine Gun Coy informing the Brigade
6. 2 mortars at about each of the following points R28C7.1-R34A2.8-R33B5.5 to assist in destroying hostile strong posts and machine gun positions and to cover flanks in case of hostile counter attack. 2 mortars at R34A6.5. H.Q. 3rd. A.L.T.M.B. at R34A9.1.
7. 2 guns and crews of 1st. Pioneer Battalion will report at Headquarters of each of following units by 3 p.m. 21st. August
- Viz.,
- | | | |
|-----------------|----|---------|
| 1st. Battalion. | at | R34D3.5 |
| 10th. " | " | R34A9.1 |
| 9th. Battalion | " | R34C2.0 |
| 12th. " | " | X4A5.8 |

(2)

CONSOLIDATION. 8. Positions captured are to be consolidated as soon as possible.

(a) Strong points to be constructed at:-

- (i) R2809.5
- (ii) R2803.6
- (iii) R2800.5
- (iv) R2800.1
- (v) R2709.1
- (vi) R3385.7

Parties of engineers will be detailed to move forward and report to G.O.'s concerned as early as possible after the attack.

(b) Patrols and posts

Patrols and Posts with Lewis Guns will be pushed out into shell holes in advance of the line when established.

(c) Blocks.

Where there are enemy trenches leading from the captured position, strong blocks will be constructed as far forward as possible. For this work special parties will be detailed beforehand and will be provided with the necessary stores. Bombers will be detailed for the protection of these blocks. Special measures will be taken to protect the right flank.

(d) Right Flank.

O.C. 10th. Battalion will take special measures and detail special unit to protect the right flank. Arrangements will be made to join up point R2809.5 by a trench with the present right at about R2803.2

(e) Communication Trenches.

- (i) From R2803.2 to 09.5
- (ii) " R2803.1 to 06.6
- (iii) " R34A2.9 to A0.1
- (iv) " R34A2.7 to 2709.1
- (v) " R3385.5 to B4.6

Parties to construct these are to be detailed by O.C. 1st. Pioneer Bn.

As far as possible CENTRE WAY will be kept for evacuating wounded.

9. Attention is called to standing orders.

10. Contact aeroplanes will fly over the line at 7.30 p.m. on 20th. instant and 8 a.m. and 11a.m. on 22nd. instant. Flares will be lit on each occasion.

11. Watches will be synchronised with Brigade Signal Section at 0915 and 1815.

12. Reports to Brigade H.Q. at X1504.5.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Immediate 130

.....Captain.
Brigade Major, 3rd. Infantry Brigade.

Copies to :-

- | | | | |
|---|---------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 1st. Battalion. | 8 | 11th. Battalion. |
| 2 | Pioneer Bn. | 9 | 12th. Battalion. |
| 3 | Engr. Liaison Offr. | 10 | 3rd. M.G. Coy. |
| 4 | 144th. Brigade | 11 | 3rd. A.L.T.M. Battery |
| 5 | 2nd. Inf. Bde. | 12-13 | Retained. |
| 6 | 9th. Battalion | 14 | 1st. Australian Division |
| 7 | 10th. Battalion | 15-16 | Spare |

8389

Addendum and corrigendum to 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade Order No.29.

para 2 for "Zero hour" read "6 p.m."

para 4 (1) at end add "Objectives limits"


10th. Battalion. points 95 to 36 to 100 yds NE of 03.

11th. Battalion. from left 10th. Battalion, to 03 to 01 to 91 inclusive.

12th. Battalion from left 11th. Battalion, to B4.6.

Arrange ample flares to show positions to our planes.

(Issued under B.G.57 and B.M.100, dated 21/8/16)



BRIGADE OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1.

Appendix No. 12

3RD AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brigade Headquarters,
21/3/18.

Reference Brigade Operation Order No. 29, 20th. instant, para 4.

The intention is that Battalions 10th. and 12th., shall have 4 waves ready for the attack,

- Viz., (a) Two waves in fire trench.
(b) Two waves in assembly trench in rear.

2. That the second wave follows about 50 yards in rear of first.

3. That as soon as first wave leaves fire trench third wave leaves assembly trench across open and rapidly pushes on and into place left vacant by first wave.

Position when hostile trench is taken,-

- (a) 2 waves in hostile trench.
(b) 1 wave in our old fire trench.
(c) 1 wave in assembly trench.

4. Should the whole of the a Battalion attack not succeed and be held up, the third wave should at once push in and carry remnants of first and second forward with it and fourth wave move up to fire trench if ordered to do so by O.C. Battalion.

Should portion only be held up the third wave Commander will push up sufficient men to complete the task.

5. The 11th. Battalion will carry out these task in accordance with verbal instructions already issued.

6. It is essential that Battalions keep touch and that their action is as simultaneous as possible.

7. The position once won is to be held at all costs.

8. Water tins should be emptied and returned to Battalion dumps as early as possible to enable the supply of water to be kept up. There is at present a great shortage of tins.

9. Units will report when they are in position ready to advance.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued at 1100.

W. H. Allen

.....Captain.

Brigade Major, 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

Copy No.

- 1 - 2 Retained.
3 9th. Battalion.
4. 10th. Battalion.
5 11th. Battalion.
6 12th. Battalion.
7 3rd. M.G. Company.
8 Spare

8390

S E C R E T.

1st. Battalion.
9th. Battalion.
10th. Battalion.
11th. Battalion.
12th. Battalion.

Attached instructions with regard to Engineer and Pioneer working parties are forwarded for your information with reference to to-day's operations.

21/8/16.

.....Captain.
Brigade Major. 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade

ENGINEERS WORKING PARTIES.

Appendix III

Party for 28C.9.5. to be in position in trench at 34A.9.7. before 6 p.m.

2. Party for 28C.3.6. to be as far N. in CENTRE WAY as they can say to O.G.2 by 6 p.m.

Both parties to make way to working positions immediately hostile barrage permits.

Remainder of Engineers in parties at CHALK PIT to be in touch with Signal Station, 3rd. Infantry Brigade, there to be in position by 6 p.m. Orders will be sent from 3rd. Brigade Hd. Qrs for these to proceed to firing line

8.392

Appendix III

PIONEER WORKING PARTIES.

For communications:-

Will proceed by "1st. Avenue" to their working positions so that the Head reaches X3B4.4 at 9 p.m. (2100).

Officers to be sent to Hd.Qrs. of 10th. and 12th. Battalions to report at 2000 for instructions and guidance.

Parties for 11th. Battalion, i.e. for Communication trenches (iii) R34A2.9½ and (iv) R34A2.7. to report at 2000 to 11th. Battalion. at N.W. end of WIRE TRENCH at X8B9.0.

393 1st Battalion
9th "
10th "
11th "
12th "

Smoke barrages will be arranged as under in connection with to-day's operation by Special Brigade R.E. -

Left Barrage. W of road running through R33 B 5.5, 4.8 and MOUQUET FARM.

Time Zero to + 20 minutes

4 Mortars to be employed. Special attention to be paid to Enemy trench R33 B27 to R27 D12.

Mortars to be placed about R33 B32.

No smoke to blow E of above road.

Right Barrage.

Smoke screens E of point R28 C95 with 4 mortars.

Time Zero to + 20 minutes.

No smoke to blow W of R28 C95

Mortars to be placed about R34 A98

Special efforts to be made to screen enemy's view from his new trench, R28 D37-50 and continued in R34 B.

Personnel of Special Brigade will wear Green, Red and white Brassards

21/8/16.

Brigade Major, 3rd
Captain
1st Inf.
Brigade

3RD. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

CASUALTIES 18th. August 1916 to 23rd. August 1916.

UNIT.	OFFICERS.			OTHER RANKS			TOTAL	REMARKS.
	Killed.	Wnd.	Missg.	Killed.	Wnd.	Missg.		
3RD A.L.T.M.Bty.	-	-	-	-	13	-	13	
3rd. M.Gun Coy.	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	
9th. Battalion.	3	2	-	24	110	24	163	
10th. Battalion.	4 3	7	1	48	165	112	336	
11th. Battalion.	-	3	-	14	44	13	79	
12th. Battalion.	-	3	1	42	148	43	242	
TOTAL	6	15	2	128	488	202	841	

TOTAL Officers CASUALTIES 23
 " Other Ranks " 818
 841

OFFICERS CASUALTIES.

3rd. A.L.T.M.Battery.....NIL.

3rd. A.M.Gun Company.....NIL.

9th. BATTALION.

Killed
 Capt. R.W.L.CHAMBERS 21/8/16
 Lieut. J.H.PETTIGREW "
 2/Lieut. S.A.MCKENZIE 20/8/16

Wounded
 Lieut. J.B.RAMKEMA 21/8/16
 2/Lieut. R.B.SALISBURY 19/8/16

10th. BATTALION.

Killed
 Lieut. H.A.KINNISH 22/8/16
 2/Lieut. W.W.BAKER "
 " E.KENT "

Wounded
 2/Lieut. T.HILL 22/8/16
 " S.W.COOMBE 21/8/16
 Lieut. A.P.WALKER "
 2/Lieut. J.DAVIDSON "
 " H.W.CROWLE "
 " A.E.WILMER "
 " D.CHISHOLM 21/8/16

Missing
 2/Lieut. P.G.M.DEY.

Slightly at duty

11th. BATTALION.

Capt L.L.LenAY Wounded 22/8/16
 " J.S.D.WALKER "
 2/Lieut. ELLEMORE "

12th. BATTALION.

Capt. A.LOVE Wounded 22/8/16
 Lieut. L.NEWTON "
 " E.L.A.BUTLER "
 " A.J.HEARPS " r/missing

Since died of wounds

Appendix No. 12
REPORT OF WORK OF 1st AUST. PIONEER BATTALION.
DURING OPERATIONS POZIERES-MOUQUET FARM 15th-22nd
AUGUST. 1916.

HEADQUARTERS,
1st AU T 398
DIVISION.

No. 124/23
Date 25/8/16

On going into action the front line trenches were found to be in bad condition and with exception of FIRST AID TRENCH the communication were most inadequate.

x The first effort was to arrange for an in and out series of trenches for each Brigade front.

On the 1st Brigade front 1st AVENUE was widened, deepened and connected with KAY (Western) TRENCH at 4th AVENUE - about 2500 Yards long including 400 yards new construction.

CENTREWAY. The only communication at first available was in very bad condition. Enemy shelling on POZIERES constantly smashing it. This was opened through the ruins of the village connected with TRAMWAY TRENCH which was continued to KAY TRENCH at the CEMETERY giving an alternative route as far as TOMS CUT.

From this point there were no trenches therefore KAY TRENCH was re-made to RATION TRENCH the latter cut to NIX TRENCH which was continued to the road near QUARRY giving communication to the LEFT Battalion front.

To give communication to RIGHT Battalion PARK LANE was excavated and on night of advance to MOUQUET FARM a trench constructed to the front line of 12th Battalion at R.27.d.9.1. The road N.E. of the farm.

The net result of this section of work was to give communication to the advanced line as taken, and maintain them in a moderate state of efficiency.

On 2nd Brigade front. Better communication existed FIRST AID TRENCH was good. SUNKEN ROAD safe to use and COPSE AVENUE fair except near 6th Battalion Headquarters.

To follow up the 2nd Brigade attack was very difficult as a constant fire on O.G.1 was maintained demolishing trenches approaching that line. Once forward of where O.G.2 had been work was easier. Each Battalion front was connected. The 6th Battalion N.E. of the WINDMILL. The 7th Battalion midway between WINDMILL and MUNSTER ALLEY and the 8th Battalion by constructing a new trench from O.G.1 to MUNSTER ALLEY.

WALKERS AVENUE was reconstructed and joined to O.G.1. SYDNEY STREET similarly carried through, and COPSE AVENUE connected with CENTREWAY by remaking TRAMWAY TRENCH.

The Battalion was worked in 16 working parties of one platoon each with an extra party composed of batmen, spare cooks, and general hands sent out to clean up and maintain trenches. One day was spent on Roads at request C.R.E. 4th Division which would have been invaluable in the trenches before the 1st Aust. Division came in.

GENERAL. The work of the Battalion was very smoothly carried out, showing improvement on the first attack on POZIERES. The steadiness of working parties under fire was very marked. Every Officer fully grasped his duties and the N.C.Os have greatly improved.

SUGGESTIONS. The trenches are too narrow, a minimum of 3 feet is necessary and 4 feet is not too much. A high explosive striking within 10 feet of a trench blows in the side of a narrow trench completely blocking it, while if the trench is wider there is frequently still some cover remaining. Trenches should be 5 feet deep as a minimum with 1' 6" widely spread parapet and 6 feet should be aimed at. The main essential appears to allow room for two men to pass, thus enabling trenches to be used as Assembly or Refuge trenches as well as Communications.

396 If possible shell slits should be made into which men assembling should be placed ~~before~~ leaving main communication free.

The practice of cutting 'Pozzies' by individual men is productive of serious losses and much extra labour.

If men can be controlled and made to widen and deepen the whole of the trench in which they are assembled better individual protection is gained and generally communications are improved instead of being ruined.

The want of system in laying telephone wires is very marked. In CENTREWAY there were over 20 different wires interlaced and crossing the trenches frequently. To Infantry carrying equipment and probably water or rations these wires are really a serious hindrance.

The leaving of dead bodies in the trenches is an objectionable practice. Nearly every trench had numerous bodies or portions of bodies which from being walked in became covered with earth, gradually they form an insecure footing and at all times lessen the cover available. Burial parties should patrol trenches and systematically remove such obstructions.

There frequently appeared to be some doubt as to Infantry positions. It is suggested that as the exact point has to be determined in making trenches this Battalion could be of use in giving positions.

Notice Boards were erected in all trenches and were effective in daytime



Lieut-Col.

COMMANDING OFFICER 1st AUST. PIONEER BATTN.