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REPORT ON OPERATIONS SEPTEMBER, 17th-22nd.

PRELIMINARY.

1. During the first week in September the Division was given the general plan of attack, and on the 9th Sept. a preliminary Divisional order was issued allotting objectives to Inf.Bdes. and giving an outline of the arrangements for artillery support.

RECONNAISSANCE.

2. Reconnaissance was commenced as soon as the plan of attack had been definitely formulated and by the 18th Sept. every officer of the attacking brigades had reconnoitred the routes forward, the position of assembly by day and by night, and in addition as much of the ground, over which the attack was to be made, as could be seen from our lines. In addition to the above reconnaissance large parties of officers and N.C.O's were sent to the model near OUDERDOM, on which the configuration of the ground and the various phases of the attack were carefully explained.

OUTLINE OF PLAN OF ATTACK.

3. (a) The attack was ordered to be carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Aus.Inf.Bdes. commanded by Brig-General J.HEANE, C.M.G., D.S.O. and Brig-General H.G.BENNETT, C.M.G. on the right and left respectively, and with the 1st Aus.Inf.Bde. commanded by Brig-General W.LESSLIE, C.M.G. in Divisional Reserve. (vide 1st Aus. Div.Order No. 35 dated 18th Sept. 1917. attached)

(b) The three objectives allotted to the Division are shown by RED, BLUE, and GREEN lines respectively on map "A" attached.

(c) The Brigades were each ordered to attack the first objective with one battalion, the second with a second battalion and the third objective with the remaining two battalions.

(d) In order to allow time to ensure complete mopping up during each stage of the advance, and to give battalions detailed for the second and third objectives time to form for attack a pause of $\frac{3}{4}$ hour was ordered on the first objective and a pause of 2 hours on the second.

PRELIMINARY MOVES.

4. (a) On the night 16/17th Sept. 1st Aus.Inf.Bde. took over the Divisional battle front extending from J.14.c.25.90. to J.8.c.70.60. relieving the 47th Division in the line, and on the following day, the 17th Sept. the battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades detailed for the first objective (6th and 11th Battalions) moved forward to ZILLEBEKE BUND and HALFWAY HOUSE respectively.

(b) On the night 18th/19th Sept. the 6th and 11th battalions took over the battle fronts of the 2nd and 3rd Aus.Inf.Bdes. respectively, the relief being carried out under the orders of the G.O.C. 1st Aus.Inf.Bde.

(c) By 3 p.m. on 19th Sept. the Headquarters and Infantry of the Division were disposed as follows :-

Divisional Headquarters WALKER CAMP. H.27.b.7.7.

1st Aus.Inf.Bde.

Headquarters

1st Battalion.

2nd Battalion.

3rd Battalion.

4th Battalion.

1st M.G.Coy.

1st A.L.T.M.Bty.

HALFWAY HOUSE.

CHATEAU SEGARD.

HOOGE SUPPORT.

DICKEBUSCH.

DICKEBUSCH.

BATTLE LINE.

BATTLE LINE.

2nd Aus. Inf. Bde.
 Headquarters.
 5th Battalion.
 6th Battalion.
 7th Battalion.
 8th Battalion.
 2nd M.G. Coy. (less 1 Sect)
 2nd A.L.T.M. Bty.

DICKEBUSCH AREA.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 BATTLE LINE.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.

3rd Aus. Inf. Bde.
 Headquarters.
 9th Battalion.
 10th Battalion.
 11th Battalion.
 12th Battalion.
 3rd M.G. Coy.
 3rd A.L.T.M. Bty.

DICKEBUSCH HUTS.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 BATTLE LINE.
 HALFWAY HOUSE.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.
 CHATEAU SEGARD.

POSITION OF ASSEMBLY.

5. (a) For some days prior to the attack, the enemy's barrage lines were closely observed. As the result of this observation it was considered that if the major portion of the attacking Brigades could be assembled so as to clear our front line before the enemy could put his barrage down, numerous casualties could be saved. With this in view it was decided to assemble the attacking brigades with one battalion on a taped line in advance of our front line, one battalion approximately on our front line, and the two rear battalions in line immediately in rear of our front line, the whole on a depth of about 200 yards. (See Map "B" attached) On the 14th Sept. the 141st Brigade 47th Division attacked a German post at J.14.c.65.80. and captured it, thus straightening out our line of posts and considerably facilitating the operation of forming up, both for ourselves and the 23rd Division on our right. The enemy counter-attacked the post at about 20 minutes before Zero hour on the 20th Sept. using a flammenwerfer without success. The barrage put down in connection with this counter-attack just caught the tail of our right Brigade which was slightly late in forming up, for reasons given below, without, however, interfering seriously with our arrangements.

(b) During the night 19th/20th the assembly positions were carefully taped out under the supervision of Brigade Intelligence Officers. The taped line for the leading battalions was laid parallel to our barrage line, which was not parallel to our front line, and flank tapes were co-ordinated with those of flanking Brigades. By 11 p.m. this difficult and important work was successfully completed.

6. (a) At 10 p.m. on the 19th Sept. the G.O's.C. 2nd and 3rd Aus. Inf. Bdes. took over command of their respective battle fronts from the G.O.C. 1st Aus. Inf. Bde. and established their advanced Headquarters at HOOGE.

(b) Each of the attacking Brigades were allotted a separate track for the move forward to the assembly area. These tracks were carefully marked out and picketted. (See Map. "C" attached).

(c) By 5-10 p.m. 20th Sept. both the attacking Brigades were in position according to orders. with the exception of the rear Coy. of the 8th Battalion. This battalion had been led astray in its approach march by a tape which had been laid across its path as a guide for Tanks. The mistake was, however, soon noticed and notified.

(3)

(d) At Zero hour (5.40 a.m. 20th Sept) troops of the Division were disposed as under :-

2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	Assembly position) vide map B
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	" " " " " " " "
1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.	H.Q. HALFWAY HOUSE.
2nd Battalion.	HOOGE SUPPORT TRENCHES.
1st Battalion.	CHATEAU SEGARD.
3rd. Battalion.	CHATEAU SEGARD.
4th. Battalion.	CHATEAU SEGARD.
1st. 2nd. 3rd. Fld. Coys.	ZILLEBEKE BUND.
1st. Aust. Pioneer Btn.	ZILLEBEKE BUND.

Capture of 7.

First Objective. (a) At Zero hour 5.40 a.m. the barrage was put down and all Battalions of the attacking Brigades commenced to move forward. It was intended as soon as the rear Battalions of each Brigade had cleared our front line that all Battalions except those detailed for the capture of the First Objective should halt and allow distances to be adjusted. Generally speaking these arrangements were adhered to, but it appears that there was a tendency for the men of the rear Battalions to press on closely behind the leading Battalions instead of halting at the appointed time, this tendency was, however checked in time and no evil consequences resulted.

(b) The first opposition was met with after the advance had progressed about 50 yards. The enemys strong point in GLENCORSE WOOD at J.14.b.2.9. offered some resistance but was quickly rushed, and the first objective was gained with slight loss and up to time (vide barrage map attached) at 6. a.m. prisoners of the 4th and 15th R.I.R. of the Bavarian ERSATZ Div began to come in.

(c) As soon as the First Objective had been gained the work of consolidation was put in hand and the 5th and 12th Btns passed through the 6th and 11th Btns respectively preparatory to the commencement of the advance on the second objective.

Capture of 8.

Second Objective. (a) At 7.3. a.m. the advance on the second objective commenced. The 5th Battalion of the 2nd Bde on the right met with considerable resistance on its right. particularly at LONE FARM, but this resistance was overcome with the assistance of the Right Support Company. On the left the 12th Battalion of the 3rd Bde reached its objective without a check capturing no less than 12 machine guns in its advance.

(b) While the consolidation of the second objective was in progress, the barrage appeared to lift slightly and uncover BLACK WATCH CORNER on which heavy machine gun fire was immediately opened from that position. It was at once realised that the Btns detailed for the capture of the final objective would be unable to form for attack under the fire. a party of 5th Btn therefore rushed BLACK WATCH CORNER capturing 1 Officer, 25 men. and 2 M.G.'s.

Capture of

9. At 9.53. a.m. the advance to the GREEN Line commenced as soon as the attacking Btns moved forward they were opposed by detached posts of the enemy holding concrete structures. The defence of these posts was not very stubborn. One of them which was inflicting considerable damage on our men, was rushed by an Officer and four men of the 8th Btn the garrison consisting of 6 Officer, 60 other ranks and 3 M.G.'s. being captured. On the left the 10th Battalion suffered a temporary check, but was able finally to gain its objective without

(4)

Appendix No. XXIII

CONSOLIDATION. 10.

(a) Consolidation was carried out very rapidly and in great depth. The defensive areas in which each of the attacking Battalions consolidated the ground gained are shown on Map D attached.

(b) The 2nd and 3rd Field Coys attached to the 2nd and 3rd Aust. Inf. Bdes respectively moved forward from ZILLEBEKE BUND at Zero hour. One section, with a carrying party of 25 men, was detailed for the construction of each of the strong points mentioned in Para 1 of Instructions No. 6 issued under Divisional Order No. 31.

The work on these strong points proceeded very rapidly, and reports were received from time to time at Divisional Headquarters stating what progress was being made.

A garrison of one platoon for each of the above Strong Points was told off prior to the advance and assist in their construction.

COUNTER-ATTACKS. 11.

On several occasions the enemy was seen to be massing for counter attacks, especially in the vicinity of the BUTTE at J.10.A.1.8. but were invariably dispersed by our artillery. It was not until darkness was falling that the enemy was able to deploy against the Brigade front. At 7.10. p.m. the S.O.S. was put up as the enemy was barraging our new positions and was seen to be advancing on our left. Our barrage was prompt and effective. At 8. p.m. the barrage slackened and the situation became quiet for the night.

EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE BRIGADE.

12. At zero hour the battalions of the Reserve Brigade moved as follows:-

3rd and 4th Battalions into the old front line. 1st and 2nd Battalions into HOOGE support trenches and HALFWAY HOUSE respectively. The Brigade then remained disposed as above throughout the operation and was eventually used to relieve the 2nd and 3rd Aust. Inf. Bdes in the new front line on the night 21st/22nd Septr. Bde H.Q. then moving to HOOGE. The Brigade was finally relieved by the 69th Bde of the 23rd Division on the Right and the 14th Bde of the 5th. Aust. Div. on the left, during the night 22nd/23rd Septr, and withdrew to the DICKEBUSCH AREA.

MACHINE GUNS.

13. The Machine Gun barrage was most effective. It has been suggested that there are times when the enemy is preparing counter-attacks when the machine gun barrage would be sufficient to deal with this without calling for Artillery support. This would necessitate a separate S.O.S. Signal for M.G. Fire. The Machine Gun Companies of the two attacking Brigades were placed at their disposal. These guns moved forward in rear of the attacking Battalions and were of great value in strengthening the positions gained. In addition to these guns numerous German machine Guns were brought into action and materially assisted in strengthening the defence.

STOKES MORTARS.

14. One subsection of a Light T.M. Battery advanced with each attacking Battalion for use in the reduction of enemy strong points. The subsection with the 8th Battalion was instrumental in dealing with three hostile strong posts, but otherwise no opportunities of using Stokes Mortars during the advance occurred.

(5)

LIGHT HORSE. 15. A Squadron 13th Light Horse was placed at the disposal of the Division for the operations under review.

Officers and N.C.O's of this Squadron carried out a thorough reconnaissance of our area before the attack commenced with a view to their employment as guides. Two specially ~~size~~ selected patrols were stationed at the ZILLEBEKE BUND at zero hour. Two of these patrols were subsequently employed as under. At 9.20. a.m. on the 20th Sept no information had been received as to the situation of the right of the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. A patrol of Light Horse was therefore given the following order. "The situation of the Right Brigade (2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde) is not clear ~~aaa~~ Move by the South of GLENCORSE WOOD and BLACKWATCH CORNER and report if the latter place has been taken by us".

At. 1.30. p.m. the above patrol reported as follows:- the message being sent by the Wireless Tank. "8th Btn occupying BLACKWATCH CORNER ~~aaa~~ 7th and portion of 8th Btn have reached third objective in front of BLACKWATCH CORNER. Enemy massing in vicinity of CAMERON HOUSE.

At. 1.30. p.m. the second patrol was sent forward with the following orders:-

"Contact aeroplane 10-55 a.m. reported flares in trench running from J.16.a.0.2. to J.16.a.05.50. This trench is considerably in advance of our final objective. It is therefore possible that the contact plane has made a mistake. Send patrol to move via LONE HO and CARLISLE FARM on the trench which runs from J.16.a.0.2. to J.16.a.05.50. and report following. Is LONE HO being consolidated as Strong Point. Do we hold CARLISLE FARM and trench J.16.a.0.2. to J.16.a.05.50.

At. 4. p.m. Lieut. DEEGAN commanding the patrol reported from HOOGE by telephone as follows:- "Trenches in ~~ix~~ vicinity of CAMERON HOUSE are not occupied by our troops. CARLISLE FARM is occupied and the 8th Battalion is consolidating on the GREEN LINE.

GENERAL.

16. The attacking Brigades remained in their consolidated areas which they improved until the nights of the 21/22nd when they were successfully relieved though not without casualties by the 1st Brigade which in its turn was relieved on the 22/23rd and 23/24th by the ~~4th~~ Bde of the 5th Australian Division. Adequate time had been allowed for preliminary preparations and reconnaissance and the troops entered on their task with dash and confidence. They speak most highly of the barrage and Artillery support which were prominent factors to the success of the operation.

Major-General.
Commanding 1st. Australian Division.

APPENDIX I.CASUALTIES.2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

	Killed.	Died of Wounds.	Wounded.	Wounded remained at duty.	Missing.	TOTAL.
Officers.	12	3	24	6		45
O. Ranks.	178	5	661	16	108	968.

3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Officers.	9	1	26	1	4	41.
O. Ranks.	72		507		180	759.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Officers.	6		22		1	29
O. Ranks.	93		416		24	533.

APPENDIX 2.

CAPTURED MATERIAL.

The 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde Captured 35 Machine Guns
and 4 Trench Mortars.

The 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde captured;-

- 1 W.M.M. Field Gun.
- 22 Machine guns.
- 3 Light Machine Guns.
- 1 Belt filler.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. captured;-

- 1 Flammenwerfer.

APPENDIX 3.NARRATIVE OF OPERATION ON 20th SEPTEMBER 1917.

The Artillery covering the 1st. Australian Division for this operation was under the command of Brig. General. W.A. COHEN. D.S.O., C.R.A. 1st. Australian Division.

It consisted of Five Brigades of Field Artillery made up of the 3rd. Aust. Div. Arty., and the 3rd, 6th, and 12th Army Field Artillery Brigades.

These were organised in two Groups, "A" and "B" Groups, "A" Group being on the right and "B" Group on the left. "A" Group consisted of the 3rd, 6th and 12th Army Field Artillery Brigades and was commanded by Lt. Col. H.E. COHEN. D.S.O., with Headquarters at HALFWAY HOUSE. "B" Group consisted of the 7th and 8th Brigades of the 3rd. Aust. Div. Arty., and was commanded by Lt. Col. W.G. ALLSOP, with Headquarters at LILLE GATE. "A" Group covered the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade and "B" Group the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. The 3rd Army F.A. Brigade of "A" Group was superimposed in the barrage and was at the disposal of the G.O.C. 1st. Aust. Div. if required.

Lieut.-Col. G.I. STEVENSON. C.M.G. acted as Liaison Officer with 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. and Lt. Col. H.D.K. MACARTNEY. with 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. One Subaltern Officer was also provided as liaison officer with each of the four battalions attacking the final objective.

Zero hour was at 5.40. a.m.

The barrage came down well together at zero hour and crept at an average rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes up to a point 200 yards in front of the RED LINE, which point was reached at Zero plus 35 minutes. The first line of 18-pdrs remained on this line as a protective barrage until Zero plus 88, while the remainder of the barrage searched the ground in front.

At Zero plus 88 the whole barrage moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes up to a line of 200 yards in front of the BLUE LINE. This was reached at Zero plus 136.

The first line of 18-pdrs again remained on this line as a protective barrage while the rest of the barrage searched the ground in front.

At zero plus 253 the whole barrage again moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes up to a line of 200 yards in front of the GREEN LINE, which was reached at Zero plus 277. The first line of 18-pdrs and the second line of 18-pdrs and 4.5." Hows. mixed, remained on this line as a protective barrage while the remainder of the barrage searched backwards and forwards over the ground in front. This continued until zero plus 488 when the barrage died away.

All objectives were taken up to time and the programme was not interfered with in any way.

Throughout the day reports were received from aeroplanes and from liaison officers and F.O.O's, of hostile massings of troops in different places. These were engaged on every occasion and, from reports received, with most effective results, the troops being dispersed in each case before the counter-attack developed.

Hostile retaliation on our battery positions was very light. Not a round was received until 11-30 a.m. when light shelling with 4.2.'s. was reported.

Our final S.O.S. line, arranged in consultation with the G.O.C's. of the 2nd and 3rd Aust. Infantry Brigades ran as follows -

J.16.C.3.8. - J.16.A.25.83. - J.9.D.90.45 - J.9.D.75.95. J.9.B.9.
J.10.A.1.9.

At 7.30. P.M. an S.O.S. signal was received when all

(2)

guns opened fire. Fire continued until a report was received from the 3rd. Inf. Bde. that the counter-attack had been smashed when our fire was gradually slowed down and ceased about 8.15. p.m. A quiet night followed.

The casualties for the day were very light consisting of 1 Officer and 16 other ranks in the Divisional Artillery Group.

From 6. P.M. 19/9/17. until 6. P.M. 20/9/17. 48,575 rounds of 18-pdrs and 11,687 rounds of 4.5." Howitzer ammunition were fired by the 1st. Australian Divisional Artillery Group.

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ORDER OF BATTLE.Appendix No. ~~XXIII~~

<u>Formation or Unit.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>
1st Australian Division	Major-General H.B.WALKER, C.B., D.S.O.
1st Aus.Inf.Brigade.	Lt-Col. (T/Brig-Genl) W.B.LESSLIE, C.M.G. R.E.
1st Battalion.	Lt-Col. B.V.STACY. D.S.O.
2nd Battalion.	Lt-Col. S.L.MILLIGAN. D.S.O.
3rd Battalion.	Lt-Col. D.T.MOORE. D.S.O.
4th Battalion.	Lt-Col. I.G.MACKAY. D.S.O.
1st A.M.G.Coy.	Captain. J.W.RICHARDSM
1st A.L.T.M.Bty.	Lieut (Temp.Capt) F.E.PAGE.
2nd Aus.Inf.Brigade.	Colonel (T/Brig-Genl) J.HEANE, C.M.G.D.S.O.
5th Battalion.	Lt-Col. D.A.LUXTON. D.S.O.
6th Battalion.	Lt-Col. C.W.D.DALY. D.S.O.
7th Battalion.	Lt-Col. E.E.HERROD.
8th Battalion.	Lt-Col. J.W.MITCHELL.
2nd A.M.G.Coy.	Captain. J.M.HOGG.
2nd A.L.T.M.Bty.	Lieut (Temp.Capt) J.D.JOHNSTON.
3rd Aus.Inf.Brigade. x	Colonel (Temp.Brig-Genl) H.G.BENNETT, C.M.G.
9th Battalion.	Lt-Col. L.M.MULLIN, D.S.O.
10th Battalion.	Lt-Col. M.WILDER-NELLIGAN. D.S.O.
12th Battalion.	Lt-Col. R.A.RAFFERTY, D.S.O.
12th Battalion.	Lt-Col. C.H.ELLIOTT. D.S.O.
3rd A.M.G.Coy.	Captain. L.GHENT (Killed)
3rd A.L.T.M.Bty.	Lieut (Temp.Capt) A.J.NEWLANDS.
1st Aus.Div.Artillery.	Colonel (T/Brig-Genl) W.A.COXEN, D.S.O.
1st Aus.Div.Engineers.	Lt-Col. A.M.MARTYN, D.S.O.
1st Field Coy.	Major. R.J.DYER. D.S.O.
2nd Field Coy.	Major. L.F.S.MATHER. D.S.O.
3rd Field Coy.	Major. P.J.SAVAGE, D.S.O.
1st Aus.Div.Sig.Coy.	Major. G.G.S.GORDON. D.S.O.
1st Aus. Pioneer Battn.	Lt-Col. W.A.HENDERSON.
21st A.M.G. Company.	Major. W.R.FFRENCH. M.C.
1st Aus.Div.Train.	Lt-Col. J.T.MARSH. C.M.G.
No. 2. Company.	Captain. L.F.McQUIE.
No. 3. Company.	Captain. W.O.STEVENSON.

Formation or Unit.Commander.

No. 4. Company.

Captain. C.G.FARMER.

A. D. M. S.

Colonel. R.B.HUXTABLE. D.S.O.

1st Field Ambulance.

Major (T/Lt-Col) E.T.BRENNAN. M.C.

2nd Field Ambulance.

Major (T/Lt-Col) W.E.KAY.

3rd Field Ambulance.


Lt-Col. A.G.BUTLER. D.S.O.

HOOGE

Battery Positions
(Possible strong points)

- Probably Timber or Camouflage
- Probably Concrete.

EDITION 3




GERMAN TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION
RECEIVED UP TO 13-8-17.

Listening Post • L
Observation Post • ●
Buried Cable

1st complete
POSNS. BNS. 540am, 20-9-17
ETC!

YPRES



As for the position of a station within a square the divided system is used, as illustrated on the 1:250,000 and 1:500,000 maps, whereby the area is divided into four parts. (As used in measurement, two of each 500 yard square area maps are divided into four small blocks). This system indicates the position of a station and approximately. By a close examination it may be possible to fix a point more accurately, by considering the sides divided into 100 parts, and a few squares.

DIAGRAM

A 10x10 grid with points A, B, and C plotted. Point A is at (2, 2), point B is at (1, 1), and point C is at (3, 3). The x-axis is labeled 1 through 10 at the bottom, and the y-axis is labeled 1 through 10 on the left side.

urway, July 1917. 3

Abbaye, Abb ^e	Abbey.
Abbrévié, Abbr ^s	Watering-place.
Abri de douaniers	Custians-shed.
Adieu	Sole write.
Aiguilles	Points (narrow).
Allée	Alley, narrow.
ancien - ne, Aun ^t	Old.
Aqueduc	Aqueduct.
Arche	Tunnel.
dentelle	fin-fanage.
décharré	" bare.
fourchu	" staked.
incisé	" incited.
poignée	" leaming.
Arbre	Small tree.
Arch.	Arch.
Artisierais, Ard ^r	Slate quarry.
Astucieux	Wily.
Auile	Asylum.
des alarides	Lunatic asylum.
de charité	" Asylum.
des pauvres	" "
Bain de refuge	Bath.
Anberg, Aub ^e	Inn.
Aune	Alder-tree.
Bac	Ferry.
Banc à truelle	Dredge.
Baign.	Bathing.
Place aux bains	Bathing place.
Balais	Broom, broom.
Banc de sable	Sand bank.
" vase	Mud-bank.
Baraque	Hut.
Barricade	Barricade.
Berrière	Gate, stile.
(Machine à) Bascule	Weigh-bridge.
Bâtiment	Building.
"d'échouage	Tidal dock.

Bassin de radoub	Dry dock
Bateau phare	Light-ship
Baignoire	Laundry
B ³ (basse mille)	Mile stone
B ³ (borne kilométrique)	
Boulangerie	Bolt Factory
Bois de bûche	Boozy
Bouée	Bow
Boulevard, Bras ³	Brickfield
Brique, Briques	Brickwater
Brisse-lance	Brush
Bureau	Custom house
B ³ de domane	Butt. Mound
Buite	
Cabane	Hut
Calvaire, Cal ³	Int.
Calvaire, Cal ³ marin	Superstructure rubble
Calvaire, Cal ³	Calvary
Canal	
Canal d'irrigation	Irrigation canal
Fais ³ de canalis	Rubber factory
Canivette, Can ³	Quarry
Canot	Gravel-pit
Canot d'irrigation	Barnack
Canonne	Can
Champ de courses	Drill ground
Can ³ manœuvres	Rifle range
Can ³ tir	Build up
Chantier	Ship yard
	Dock yard
Chantier de construction	Ship-way
Chapelle, Ch ³	Chapel
Chaudière	Boiler
Chaudière d'eau	Water tower
Chausée	Causeway
	Highway
Chemin de fer	Railway
Cheminée, Ch ³	Chimney
Cheminée, Ch ³	Chimney
Cheminée, Ch ³	Cemetery
Clocher	Belfry
Clocher	Water-lacey
Colombier	Dove-cot

Coron	Workmen's dwellings
Cour des marchands	Goods yard.
Covent	Covent.
Craiser	Slag heap.
Croir	Cross
Dame	Inner dock.
Dan	Destroyed.
Débit et C. Débit	
Déversoir	Weir.
Digue	Dike, causeway.
Distillerie, Dist ^e	Distillery.
Douane	
Douane de douane	Custom-house.
Entrepôt de douane	Custom warehouse.
Dynamiterie, Dynam ^e	Dynamite
	Explosive magazine.
Dynamierie	Dynamite factory.
Ecluse	Stoic, Lock.
Echassette, Ec ^h	Stoic.
Ecole	School.
Eglise	Church.
Emallerie	Emmal works.
Embarcadere, Embar ^e	Loading place.
Estaminet, Estab ^e	Ins.
Etang	Pond.
Fabrique, Fab ^e	Factory.
Fab ^e de produits chimiques	Chemical works.
Fab ^e de faïence / Faïencerie	Pottery.
Fab ^e de soie / Filature, Fil ^e	Farm.
Fonderie, Fond ^e	Spinning mill.
Fonderie, Fond ^e	Foundry.
Forgerie, Forger ^e	Foundry, foundain.
Forêt	Forest.
Forme de radoub	Dry dock.
Forge	Forge.
Fosse	Mine, Pit.
Fossé	Mold, Ditch.
Fout	Kiln.
Fout à chaux	Lime-kiln.

Four à coke	Coke oven.
Ganterie	Glove Factory.
Garniture	Buttress.
Garnure	Warren.
Garnison	Garrison.
Gascogne	Gascogne.
Glaçerie	Mirror Factory.
Fab' les glaces	Ice factory.
Glace	Crane.
Gru	Sentry box, Tower.
Guirée	Signal-bell (Ry.).
à signaux	
Halle	Hall.
Hanger	Shed, Hangar.
Hopital	Hospital.
Hôtel de Ville	Hotel, Town hall.
Houillère	Colliery.
Huilerie	Oil factory.
Imprimerie, Imp ^{re}	Printing works.
Jérée	Fair.
Laminage	Rolling mills.
à haute	High water mark.
Loaise	Low
de basse marée	Low "
Maison Forestière	Forester's house.
Mais-jonc	Mail-house.
Marbrerie	Marble works.
Marais	Marsh.
Marais salant	Salt marsh.
Marché	Market.
Marteau	Hammer.
Moule	Beck.
Mouton	Mine.
Moulin	Machinery.
Moulin, M ^{re}	Mill.
à vapeur	Steam mill.
Mix	
criviale	Loose-holed wall.

Nacelle	Ferry.
Orme	Elm.
Orrhalant	Outrigger.
Ouvrage	Oak-bark.
Ourage	Fort.
» hydraulique	Water works.
Papeterie	Paper-mill.
Parc	Park, yard.
» aéronautique	Aviation ground.
» à charbon	Coal yard.
» automobile	Automobile garage.
Passage à niveau P.N.	Level-crossing.
Passepartout	Foot-bridge.
Pâturage	Pasture.
Peuplier	Poplar tree.
Pile	Light-house.
Pilier	Pillar.
Plaine d'atterrissage	Drift ground.
Pompe	Pump.
Port	Harbour.
Poste	Bridge.
» de levée	Dam/bridge.
» de garde	Cannon guard post.
Station	Post station.
Potau pu	cote
Poudre	Powder.
Poudrière, Poudr.	Powder magazine.
Magnate à poudre	
Puits	Well.
» artésien	Artesian well.
» de saignée	Bleeding shaft.
» ventilateur	Ventilating shaft.
» de sculpure	Boring.
Quai	Quay, Platform.
» aux bœufs	Cattle platform.
» au charbon	Coal platform.
» des glaces	Glass platform.
Raccourcement	Junction.
Raffinerie	Refinery.
Régulateur de sucre	Sugar refinery.

Remède	Embankment.
Rennin ^{des} machines	Engine-shed.
Réserve, ^{des} machines	Engine-house.
Route vicinale	Brick road.
Rubannerie	Ribbon Factory.
Ruine	Brick road.
En ruine	Ruin.
Huile	
Sablonnerie	Sand-pit.
Sablonnier, Sablon ^{ne}	Sand-pit.
Saie	Fir tree.
Saule	Willow tree.
Sauterie	Saw-works.
Sauvage	Saw-mill.
Sondage	Boring.
Sourcil	Spring.
Succrerie, Suc ^{re}	Sugar factory.
Tannerie	Tannery.
Tar, ^{de} chaux	Brick range.
Tissage	Weaving mill.
Tourne	Rolling mill.
Tourneau	Ball mill.
Tour	Tower.
Tourbère	Peat bog, Peat-bog.
Tourterie	Small tower.
Tuilerie	Tile works.
Uaine à gaz	Gas works.
— électrique	Electricity works.
— d'électricité	Electricity works.
— hydraulique	Metal works.
— à vapeur	Brickworks factory.
Verrerie, Verre ^{re}	Glass works.
Viduit	Viaduct.
Vivier	Fish Pond.
Vain chargement	
— déchargement	
— d'érosion	Siding.
— formation	
— manœuvre	
Zincerie	Zinc works.

ZILLEBEKE.
SHEETS 28 N.W. 4 & N.E. 3 (parts of).
EDITION 6. A

Scale 1 : 10,000

INDEX TO ADDING SHEETS.

- Legend**
- German Trenches
 - M.G.s
 - O.P.s
 - German Strong Point
 - Concrete Structures
 - Block Houses
 - Dugouts

Part of Sheet 28
1 in 5000


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
- LEGEND**
- Batt^y Hd. Qrs.
 - M.G.
 - Strong Point
 - T.M.
 - Trench Mortar
 - Line under Construction
 - Posts

1st Aust Div.

FINAL DISPOSITIONS AFTER ATTACK OF 20.9.17



Scale 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Yards



Abbaye, Abb'	Abbey.
Abbrévier, Abb'	Watering-place.
Abrir de donnaner	Coatsman (fly).
Abrir de sonner	Soot swells.
Aiguilles	Pistons (sh.)
Allée	Alley, Narrow
	way.
Amisier - ne, Am'	Old.
Amisier	Amusement.
Arauc	Tree.
- éventail	fan-shaped.
- déclaré	bar.
- échauffé	boiled.
- isolé	isolated.
- penché	leaning.
Artémisier	Small tree.
Arch.	Arch.
Archinoir, Arch'	Slate quarry.
Asile	Asylum.
- des	Lanatic sayings.
- de charité	
- d'oblation	Asylum.
- des pauvres	
- des sages	
Aubergé, Aub'	Inn.
Aune	Alder-tree.
Bac	Ferry.
à traîlle	Bath.
Bains	Bathing place.
Balles	Boon, Boon.
- de sable	Sand, Bank.
- vase	Mud-bank.
Baraque	Hut.
Barrière	Gate.
(Machine) à Bascule	Gate, Scale.
Bassin	Weigh-bridge.
d'échauffe	Hot pond.
à décharge	Tidal dock.

Bassin de radoub	Dry dock
Départs phase	Lightship
Huancherise	Laundry
M. M. (en millier)	Mile stone
¹ /4	
Kilométrique	
Boulangerie	Bakery
Boulevard	Bolt factory
Boute	Bayou
Boulevard, Bras	Branch
Briqueterie, Brick	Brickfield
Bris-lames	Breakwater
Bureau	Post office
Bus	Custom house
Butte	Butt, Mount
Calane	Hut
Calatr, Cabr	Inn
Calatr, Cabr	Submarine cable
Calvins, Calv	Calvary
Canal de	
Canal d'irrigation	Irrigation canal
Canal de caoutchouc	Rubber factory
Canal, Can	Quarry
Canal, Can	Gravel pit
Canonne	Barracks
Champ	Field
Champ, manouvres	Drill ground
Can, Can	Roller
Can, Can	Roller
Can, Can	Ship yard
Can, Can	Dock yard
Chantier de construction	Slip-way
Chapelle, Chapel	Chapel
Chapelle, Chapel	Chapel
Châtains d'eau	Water tower
Chemin de fer	Causeway
Cheminée, Chim	Chimney
Cheminée, Chim	Chimney
Cimetière, Cem	Cemetery
Clocher	Belfry
Clocher	Belfry
Colombier	Dove-cot

[illegible]

Four à coke	Coke oven.
Ganterie	Glove Factory.
Gare	Station.
Garniture	Warren.
Garnison	Garrison.
(jaquette)	Gaucher.
Glacière	Mirror Factory.
Fab ^r de glaces	Ice factory.
Glacière	Ice.
Grue	Cran.
Usine	Factory.
Usine	Factory.
à signaux	Signal-box (Ky.).
Halle	Hall.
Hanger	Shed, Hangar.
Hôpital	Hospital.
Hôtel-de-Ville	City hall.
Houillère	Colliery.
Huilerie	Oil factory.
Imprimerie, Imp ^r	Printing works.
Jete	Pier.
Laminerie	Rolling mills.
Ligne de haute	High water mark.
de basse marte	Low
Maison Forestière	Forester's house.
M ^{ns} P ^{ns}	
Maillerie	Malt-house.
Marbrerie	Marble works.
Martinet	Martinet.
Marais salant	Salt marsh.
Marché	Market.
Maré	Pool.
Moulo	Mill.
Mairie	Min.
Ménagerie	Monastery.
Moulin, M ^{ns}	Mill.
à vapeur	Steam mill.
Mur	Wall.
à cricelle	Loop-holed wall.

Nacelle	Ferry.
Orme	Elm.
Orphelinat	Orphanage.
Ouvrier	Work-bell.
Ouvrage	Fort.
Ouvrages	Water works.
hydrauliques	
Papeterie	Paper-mill.
Parc	Park, yard.
" arboricole	Arbor ground.
" à charbon	Coal yard.
" à pétrole	Petrol store.
Pavé, pavé au treuil P.N.	Even crossing.
Passeville, Pass ²	Foot-bridges.
Peuplier	Poplar-garden.
Pessier	Turkey.
Pier	Light-house.
Pilier, Pil ²	Post.
Puits d'aérage	Drill ground.
Puits	Well.
Poncaou	Culvert.
Pont	Bridge.
" à levier	Swing-bridge.
Pont de garde	Coast-guard station.
"	"
Potau, Pot ²	Pot.
Poudre	Flour.
Poudrière, Poud ²	War magazine.
Magasin à poud ²	Water supply.
Puits d'eau	Pit-head, shaft.
" artésien	Artesian well.
" d'usage	Water.
" ventilateur	Ventilating shaft.
" de sondage	Boring.
Quai	Quay, Platform.
" aux bœufs	Cattle platform.
" aux marchan ²	
" des	Goods platform.
Raccordement	Junction.
Raffinerie	Refinery.
Régulateur de niveau	Steam-refinery.
Régérie	Root-mast factory.

Rembais	Embankment.
Remparts des Machines	Engine shed.
Réservoir, l'az	Reservoir.
Route de la rivière	Rifle road.
Ruaberie	Rifle Range.
Ruine	Ruin.
En ruine	Ruin.
Ruins - e	
Sablère	Sand-pit.
Sablonnière, Sablon ^{ne}	
Sapa	Fire tree.
Sapin	Willow tree.
Sauterie	Salt-works.
Sierrie, Sica ^h	Saw-mill.
Sierre	Boring.
Sources	Spring.
Sucrerie, Sucr ^{ie}	Sugar factory.
Tannerie	Tannery.
Tir à la cible	Rifle range.
Tissage	Weaving mill.
Tour	Boiling mill.
Tombau	Tomb.
Tour-	Tower.
Tourbière	Peat-bog, Peat-
Touffle	Small tower.
Tuilerie	Tile works.
Usines à gaz -	Gas works.
" électrique	Electricity work.
" d'électricité	
" métallurgique	Metal works.
" à vapeur	Brickworks.
Verrerie, Verre ^h	Glass works.
Viaduc	Viaduct.
Vivier	Fish Pond.
Voie de chargement -	
" de chargement	
" d'embarquement	Siding.
" formation -	
" manœuvre	
Zinguerie	Zinc works.

ZILLEBEKE.
SHEETS 28 N.W. 4 & N.E. 3 (parts of).
EDITION 6. A

Scale 1 : 10,000

[illegible]

Appendix No. XXIV

"A" Form
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121
(in pads of 100).

No. of Message.....

Prefix.....	Code.....m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of: Service. (Signature of "Franking Officer.")	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions:		Sent			Date.....
		At.....m.			From.....
		To.....			By.....
		By.....			

TO

1st Aus Div

Sender's Number. * DM67.	Day of Month. 25	In reply to Number.	AAA
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Herewith report on action
of Machine guns in
recent successful offensive

War diary

From	DM60	1 st Aus Div
Place		
Time	11-0 PM	
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.		(Z)
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.	

* This line should be erased if not required.

(18965.) W.L. W12952/M1224. 137,500 Pads. 1/17 M.C. & Co., Ltd. (E. 818.)

Report on Operations carried out by 64
Machine guns in right sector of 1st Anzac
Corps front during advance on forward of
GLENCORSE WOOD & NONNE BOSCHEN on 20 Sept 1917

Companies engaged were the 1st 8th 15th & 21st
Aus. M. G. Companies - disposed as follows
32 guns of 8th & 15th Aus. M. G. Companies
were used as a creeping barrage group
their task was to fire a creeping barrage
in conjunction with the artillery barrage
to stand by for 48 hours after zero to fire
on a pre-arranged line as a protective
barrage in case an enemy counter
attack succeeded in driving our troops
back.

This group was under the command
of Capt C. HOLMES 8th Aus M G Co.
The 1st & 21st Aus. M. G. Companies
were merged in what was termed
the S.O.S. Group consisting of 4 batteries
of 8 guns each.

Their task was to fire on certain
defined limits on the S.O.S. signal
being observed.

This group was under the
Command of Capt. J. W. RICHARDS
1st Aus M G Coy.

The Creeping Barrage group fired at a specified rate of fire & maps were issued laddered from 'A' to 'N' in 100 yards lifts

The S. O. S group also were given detailed instructions as to rate of fire & duration of same

Ammunition Expenditure

Creeping Barrage Group	512,000
S. O. S. Group	<u>155,000</u>
Total	<u>667,000 rounds</u>

Casualties

Personnel

Creeping Barrage Group	4 K. 19 W.
S. O. S. Group	13 K. 36 W.

Material

Creeping Barrage Group	3 guns destroyed
S. O. S. Group	5 - do -

4 chronometers were also destroyed
also 183 belt boxes & 164 belts.

Several guns sustained minor injuries -
these were quickly repaired, however, by
the Gun Company artificers at Group HQ.

Communication Lines were laid to jump HQ from the batteries but in the case of the S.O.S. jump telephone communication was lost five minutes after zero owing to heavy enemy shelling. Communication was, however, well maintained by runners.

The Creeping Barrage jump line held with the exception of one break of 40 minutes.

Position of D.M.G.O. was at Advanced Brigade HQ. The proximity of the two Bde HQ made the task of the D.M.G.O. (acting as a liaison officer) comparatively simple.

Touch was maintained by telephone to Creeping Barrage jump by runners to S.O.S. jump until zero plus 24 hours when telephone communication was established.

The Creeping Barrage jump opened fire as per this time-table & carried on without mishap until + 4 hrs. 13 mins. when fire was ceased & these guns stood by for S.O.S. Signals when they were to fire on targets as ordered by D.M.G.O. By information received from men actually participating in the advance the timing of the lifts, the clearances, & general carrying out of instructions issued to the two Companies doing the work was done in the most praiseworthy manner. It is known for certain, that severe casualties were inflicted on the enemy & in addition the moral effect on our troops, by hearing the continuous stream of bullets whistling overhead, was very great. Capt C. HOLMES, the jump Commander, handled his jump with marked ability.

The S.O.S. group experienced a trying time as their position was between two barrage lines & the ones from the one & the shots from the other fell amongst them. Their response to the S.O.S. call at 1810 on 20 Sept 1917 was very prompt. They again opened fire for ten minutes at a reduced rate in answer to a call shown on extreme right at 0445 on 21/9/17. At 1900 on 21/9/17 S.O.S. signals were observed to our left front & maximum rate of fire, as laid down in their instructions, was fired on S.O.S. line. In the case of this group, also, the feeling engendered by our bullets whistling overhead was very much appreciated by our infantry. During night of 21st Sept. two guns from each battery kept playing continuously on the bridge at J10D15.70. Capt. J.W. RICHARDS, the O.C. group was always cool & reliable, both his work & that of his battery commanders is highly commended.

Remarks 'Yukon Packs' were found most useful for carrying ammunition, gun - gear, & supplies.

It is evident that the establishment of M.B. Coy should be increased, as owing to the order that 25% of personnel be withdrawn before an offensive, the remainder of the personnel are hard put to it to supply gun teams, belt fillers, runners etc. also, owing to extra telephones being required to link up batteries, groups & D.M.S.O. it will be necessary to have more signallers. Suggest 8 & 1 NCO.

The 32 attached men from the infantry were most useful for carrying purposes etc. Suggest also that a S.O.S. M.B. group be always positioned, & reliefs arranged so that on an enemy attack being launched a machine gun barrage in conjunction with the artillery could be available. 25 Sept 1917. Whitcomb Major D.M.S.O. 15th Div.

3rd. AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY.

OPERATION REPORT.

19th. Septr. The Company fell in at 1100 (Capt. GHENT having returned from CAMIERS SCHOOL at 1830, being then in command), and proceeding by 3rd. Brigade Route, arrived at HOOGE CRATER at 20th. Septr. about 0200 on 20th. instant, having been delayed for some time by the passage of another Unit which crossed our route.

At HOOGE CRATER, our guns and ammunition in belt boxes, which had previously been dumped there by our transport, were collected and Capt. GHENT gave me instructions to lead the Company to the assembly point, and in the event of his non arrival at that point to carry on, as he was not certain that Brigade would allow him to take over command of the Company in the line.

When the last Company of the 12th. Battalion had moved off the MENIN ROAD, I followed on with our Unit, until the Company front halted near WEST edge of CHATEAU WOOD, when I ascertained that there was uncertainty as to the further route. I therefore left our unit for a short time until I had put the 12th. Company on the right road, and then led our unit in their rear, till the assembly point was reached. Here I considered the troops in front were not sufficiently advanced to permit of the maximum of safety from hostile barrage, to troops forming up in our rear, as I had seen that barrage in operation a few days previously. I accordingly advised Capt. MCLEOD of 12th Battalion to press forward, and gave my unit instructions to form up as quietly as possible on the flanks of the 12th. and to get outside the flanks if the 12th showed no signs of moving forward. Unfortunately as orders had to be passed in a whisper only part of the Company had moved when the enemy barrage opened. I at once called out to all ranks to move forward, and we took up positions in shell holes and a trench running along WEST side of GLENCORSE WOOD where we remained until our own barrage opened magnificiently at about 0545, when we at once rushed forward, mixed up with various infantry units, but unfortunately having lost as we afterwards learned nearly 50% of our Officers and other ranks. When the enemy barrage opened, Lieut. A. BAKER-FINCH had been on the point of leaving to report to advanced Cable Head, but was compelled to move forward instead. I next met him as we advanced through GLENCORSE WOOD, and gave him instructions to remain with me, as the enemy barrage cut off communication with Cable Head.

RED LINE
CAPTURE.

During our advance, we saw some very pretty work done by some of the 12th. Battalion under Lieut. L. BUTLER. of that Unit, the men advancing along a trench and bombing a hostile machine gun crew, in splendid fashion. On arrival at the RED LINE, 7 guns were at once placed in positions to guard the flanks, and a report from Lieut. LEHMANN was soon afterwards received to the effect that he had found the S. Post at J.8.D.1.4. to be unapproachable owing to water surrounding it, but had 2 guns in position in vicinity.

Guns in RED LINE vicinity were sited at -
J.9.C.1.5. - J.9.C.1.5. - J.9.C.05.50. - J.9.C.05.60.
J.9.C.0.8. - J.8.D.9.7. - J.8.D.9.2.

On arrival at the RED LINE I established Company Headquarters at J.9.C.1.4. in captured block house and at 0800 sent report to 3rd. Bde. H.Q. to announce location of same and of the 7 guns in RED LINE.

CONSOLIDATION. of block houses

BLUE LINE. While the work of consolidation was in course of progress in RED LINE. I received information that Lieuts. JAMIESON and CORNWELL, section and sub-section Officers respectively, of No. 2 Section which I had detailed to establish guns in vicinity of BLUE LINE had been wounded. I accordingly sent Lieut. MCLEOD FORWARD with as many men as he could collect and at 1055 received from him the following report - "I have established No. 2 Section in the second objective, two of our own guns and one German gun which was given me by 12th. Battalion, also any quantity of ammunition. The 3rd. Objective is just taken and consolidated. No enemy movement so far. ".

A few minutes later I received a verbal report, that Lieut. MCLEOD was wounded, and that Lieut. WILLIAMS - HUGHES had been killed at the assembly point. At 1100 I sent another report to 3rd.Bde.H.Q. giving locations of 7 guns in RED LINE three (including German one) in BLUE LINE, and 2 at J.8.D.3.3. and reporting Lieuts. JAMIESON, CORNWALL and MCLEOD as wounded, and Lieut. WILLIAMS - HUGHES as reported killed, but later on was much relieved to find that Lieut. MCLEOD was unharmed. In this report I also repeated locations of my Headquarters, and notified Brigade of Lieut. BAKER-FINCH'S presence with me. At 1600 I received a message No. A.W.H. 38. from 3rd.Bde. directing me to send 2 more guns to BLUE LINE and report location, and a little later sent to report this operation having been carried out and locations of guns as follow.-

J.9.C.4.8.
J.9.C.5.7.
J.9.C.5.4.
J.9.C.5.6.

21st. SEPT. At 0120 received message S.C.10. asking for news of Capt. GHENT. This was the first intimation I had that he had apparently left Brigade Headquarters at HOOGE. I replied to that effect. Eleven hours later certain news was brought to me of his death, and a report to that effect was sent to Brigade Headquarters at once.

As by this time we were fairly established in Company Headquarters, Morning reports, and all information possible were now forwarded regularly, giving various locations, casualties, enemy movements, etc.

On visiting Battalion Headquarters at Sunken Road J.14.B.1.9 I was requested by Cpl. MULLINS. to place a gun at strong post at J.9. Central to defend his front. I accordingly visited this location and found it unsuitable. Sent following report to Col. MULLINS. "Have visited 3rd. Objective, and reconnoitred position Nuts central. This is not high enough for giving good covering fire, but have a gun at Nuts Luke 75 90 to protect your front, which is also completely swept by 2 guns at Nuts Luke 65 and Nuts Luke 45, and another at Nuts Luke 83".

About 1700 today, received report from L/Cpl. FENDLEY that Lieut. LEHMANN had been killed. Ordered him to bring his guns to RED LINE, and hold them in reserve in Company Headquarters.

CONSOLIDATION. Consolidation of all gun positions was carried on continuously but it was difficult to establish any position that could resist the devastating effects of the enemy's shell fire. Gun position on left flank of RED LINE were repeatedly blown in, one shell killing 3 of the crew of one gun, after which I ordered guns and crews to be established in rear of block houses, where they dug themselves in and suffered no further casualty, and the line became in consequence practically impregnable.

(3)

COUNTER-ATTACK. Hostile counter attacks were easily disposed of by our artillery barrage fire, but Lieut. MCLEOD was able to dispose of 5,000 rounds of German S.A.A. to great advantage, amongst some hostile troops which were massing on dump in J.10.A. between 1800 and 1900 on 21st.Inst.

RELIEF. The Company was relieved by the 14th. and 15th. Machine Gun Coys. at 2100 on 23rd. The relief having been arranged by 14th Brigade. I advised a relief earlier in the afternoon, that being usually the the quieter time, and as events turned out the afternoon in question was the quietest we had had. One of the M.G.Coys. which relieved us at the later hour was caught in the enemy barrage and suffered 4 casualties. When we moved out, things were quiet again and we reached Camp in safety at 0300 on 24th Inst. During the afternoon I sent away all men who could be spared, and each gun team as it was relieved was sent off as soon as possible, under an Officer to HOOGE, where all gun gear was dumped, and picked up by our limbers which were there by arrangements previously made.

LESSONS LEARNT.

1. It is useless to send Vickers Machine Guns with attacking party as ammunition dumps cannot be established with sufficient rapidity to feed them. So many of our belt carriers were hit in the first hour before the advance, that a counter attack by the enemy delivered at once, when we had attained our 1st.objective would have found us very much handicapped for want of ammunition.
2. Second in Command should be left at some rear Company Headquarters with clerk, to carry on administrative work, while O/C goes into the line.
3. The inestimable value to all ranks in our units, of the model earth map, the study of which enabled every man to find his way to the 1st.Objective without difficulty.
4. The absolute necessity for any officer who is going to lead men into any position to reconnoitre the track thereto.
5. That Hotchkiss guns are not effective as anti-aircraft weapons, owing to the shortness of their bursts of fire.
6. That the practice of arming M.G. rank and file with Mills grenades in place of rifles is a very sound one, as it enables them to dispose of an enemy who by reason of the shell packed nature of the ground might come within bombing distance of the gun, while more or less safe from rifle fire.
7. That led by a barrage such as that put up by our artillery and Vickers Machine Guns on 29/9/17, the A.I.F. will capture anything required.

With regard to (1) it is suggested that Vickers guns should operate from the rear if at all, until the 1st. Objective is taken, and ammunition dumps established. Then advance and take up positions according to the requirements of the situation.

HOTCHKISS GUNS.

Three gun teams of 15 men in all, with 3 guns, under a sergeant, were attached to our Unit for anti-aircraft work. One gun was destroyed by enemy barrage before our advance, and one man killed and another wounded.

The sergeant collected the remainder of the men, and with two guns, carried out a.a. work in RED LINE under Lieut. HOGE, but owing to shortness of bursts fired by these guns they did not appear to have much effect in repelling hostile aircraft, in consequence of which the Vickers Machine Guns in same line, were obliged to co-operate in anti-aircraft firing.

(sgd) F.P.BETHUNE. Lieut.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon Sept 1st. 1917

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks
	Off.	O. R.	Total	Off.	O. R.	Total	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	21	70	91	11	276	287	
DIV. ARTL.	71	2222	2293	3	26	29	
DIV. ENGINEERS	29	737	766	-	17	17	
Div. Signal Coy.	11	280	291	-	73	73	
PIONEER BATTALION	45	1113	1158	1	10	11	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	5	20	25	5	53	58	
1st Battalion	38	897	935	2	1	3	
2nd Battalion	33	869	902	-	-	-	
3rd Battalion	40	916	956	-	2	2	
4th Battalion	34	814	848	-	2	2	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery	2	46	48	-	4	4	
1st A.M.G. Coy.	6	145	151	-	-	-	
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	21	24	5	54	59	
5th Battalion	52	1026	1078	2	8	10	
6th Battalion	45	1225	1270	2	35	37	
7th Battalion	57	1153	1210	3	8	11	
8th Battalion	47	1226	1273	2	6	8	
2nd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	5	80	85	-	1	1	
2nd. A.M.G. Coy.	12	199	211	1	2	3	
3rd. INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	9	12	3	73	76	
9th. Battalion	37	1016	1053	1	7	8	
10th. Battalion	38	913	951	1	6	7	
11th. Battalion	29	922	951	2	10	12	
12th. Battalion	38	938	976	2	11	13	
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	12	182	194	-	2	2	
3rd. A.M.G. Coy.	4	67	71	-	-	-	
DIVNL. TRAIN	23	407	430	2	51	53	
1st. Field Amb.	10	271	281	1	2	3	
2nd. Field Amb.	10	222	232	1	39	40	
3rd. Field Amb.	8	245	253	2	17	19	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	69	70	-	-	-	
Mob. Vety. Sect.	1	23	24	1	12	13	
21st. A.M.G. Coy.	10	184	194	1	35	36	
2nd. Aust. Sanitary Sect.	1	25	26	-	9	9	
TOTALS.							

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon...Sept-29th 1917

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks
	Off.	O. R.	Total	Off.	O. R.	Total	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	20	68	88	13	288	301	
DIV. ARTL.	80	2399	2479	3	25	28	
DIV. ENGINEERS	27	684	711	-	18	18	
Div. Signal Coy.	10	297	307	-	75	75	
PIONEER BATTALION	39	949	988	1	11	12	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	7	21	28	6	22	28	
1st Battalion	34	755	789	1	1	2	
2nd Battalion	26	732	758	-	-	-	
3rd Battalion	36	810	846	-	2	2	
4th Battalion	32	847	879	-	1	1	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery	3	45	48	-	11	11	
1st A.M.G. Coy.	6	114	120	-	-	-	
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	21	24	6	50	56	
5th Battalion	44	729	773	2	7	9	
6th Battalion	42	1003	1045	2	6	8	
7th Battalion	50	973	1023	2	23	25	
8th Battalion	45	980	1025	2	8	10	
2nd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	5	69	74	-	-	-	
2nd. A.M.G. Coy.	7	160	167	-	20	20	
3rd. INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	9	12	4	73	77	
9th. Battalion	37	783	820	1	8	9	
10th. Battalion	34	626	660	1	6	7	
11th. Battalion	26	710	736	2	10	12	
12th. Battalion	34	750	784	2	11	13	
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	3	59	62	-	-	-	
3rd. A.M.G. Coy.	12	143	155	-	2	2	
DIVNL. TRAIN	23	399	422	2	55	57	
1st. Field Amb.	9	243	252	3	3	6	
2nd. Field Amb.	8	203	211	1	39	40	
3rd. Field Amb.	10	225	235	1	18	19	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	65	66	-	61	61	
Mob. Vety. Sect.	1	22	23	1	7	8	
21st. A.M.G. Coy.	12	158	170	-	2	2	
2nd. Aust. Sanitary Sect.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTALS.							

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.OFFICERS and OTHER RANKS sent to SCHOOLS duringSEPTEMBER, 1917.

School.	Nature of Course.	Duration.	Number sent			Remarks.
			Off.	NCOs.	O.R.	
<u>G.H.Q. Small Arms School-</u>						
Lewis Gun Branch, Le TOUQUET.	"A" for instruction of Coy. Commanders in use of Lewis Gun.	One week.	4	-	-	Covers 4 Courses.
	"B" for training Officers and N.C.Os for battalions and instructors for schools.	15 days.	4	10	-	Covers 2 Courses.
Vickers M.G.Branch, CAMIERS.	For advanced training of Officers and other ranks of Machine Gun Companies.	18 days.	1	4	-	
Musketry Instructors Branch, CAMIERS.	For training of Musketry Instructors.	16/17 days.	-	1	-	Special course.
2nd Army School of Cookery, HAZEBROUCK.	For training men who show aptitude for Officers, N.C.Os, and mens' cooks.	About 3 weeks.	-	-	13	Covers 4 courses.
2nd Army Central School of Instruction, WISQUES.	General Training.		10	12	-	

Appendix No. 1

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1917
XXVIII

School.	Nature of Course.	Duration.	Number sent			Remarks.
			Off.	N.C.Os.	O.R.	
2nd Army Scouting, Observation, and Sniping School MONT DES CATS.	For training officers and men in use of telescopic rifle &c.	About 17 days.	1	5	-	
2nd Army Grenade and L.T.M. School. TERDEGHEM.		12/13 days.	5	11	-	Covers 2 courses.
2nd Army Anti-Gas School, OXELAERE.		About 1 week.	-	6	-	Covers 2 courses.
2nd Army Signalling School, ZUYTPEENE.	"A" Course for Officers. "B" Course for N.C.Os and men. "C" Course Wireless for Officers and N.C.Os.	About 3 weeks.	3	12	5	
Corps School, Gough Huts, AVELUY.	General Training.	6 weeks.	7	12	7	
	Signalling.	12 days.	2	4	5	
	Stokes Mortar.	" "	3	13	-	
	Bombing.	" "	3	4	-	
	Intelligence.	" "	2	13	-	
Corps Cookery School, AVELUY.	Lewis Gun.					
		About 21 days.	-	-	8	
Corps Armourers Course, Corps Workshops.	Instruction of Armourers.	1 month.	-	2	-	

Appendix No. 28
Appendix No. XXVIII

School.	Nature of Course.	Duration.	Number sent			Remarks.
			Off.	NCOs.	O.R.	
Instruction in Transport Duties, ABBEVILLE.			1	1	-	
Bridging School, AIRE.	Instruction in Bridging.	4 days.	3	-	30	
Courses at Veterinary Hospitals.	Instruction in Veterinary Duties.	10 days.	3	11	-	Covers 3 Courses.
Signalling School, DUNSTABLE.			1	-	-	
School of Farriery, ABBEVILLE.				1(-	