


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Infantry

**Item number:** 23/7/15 PART 1

**Title:** 7th Infantry Brigade

November 1916 Appendices



AWM4-23/7/15PART1



## WAR DIARY

or

NOVEMBER 1916.

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
DERNAN-COURT MONTAUBAN CAMP.	1/11/16		Training carried on.	
	2/11/16		Orders received and issued to relieve 15th Brigade at MONTAUBAN CAMP on 2nd, and 14th Brigade in trenches on 3rd. Brigade moved out from DERNANCOURT at 6.30 p.m. Brigade Headquarters, 27th Bn. & 28th Bn. camped at MONTAUBAN CAMP. 25th Bn., 26th Bn., 7th Machine Gun Co., 7th Trench Mortar Battery, at MAMETZ CAMP. Advance parties from 27th, 28th Bns, 7th Machine Gun Co. & Trench Mortar Battery moved up to trenches.	Appendix 1.
Brigade H.Q. M.30.C.4.2,	3/11/16		Brigade moved forward, 27th & 28th Bns in trenches on front from N.19.A.5.8. to M.17.D.7.5. Brigade H.Q. at M.30.C.4.2. 25th & 26th Bns. at CARLTON CAMP. 8th Australian Infantry Brigade on right. 151st. Infantry Brigade on left.	
"	4/11/16		G.O.C. reconnoitred line. Orders issued to attack BAYONET TRENCH, MAZE & GIRD trench and supports. 27th, 25th & 28th Bns. to attack with three companies each.	Appendix 2. Ref. Map
"	5/11/16		G.O.C. wounded in the back when reconnoitring line. Lieut Col. Walker assumed command. 6th Brigade on right. Attack carried out by 27th Bn. on right, 1 company each of 25th, 26th, & 27th Bns in centre, and 28th Bn on left. Objective reached in places, but troops forced to retire by strong German resistance except in part of MAZE, where a portion of ground was retained. Casualties heavy. 3 prisoners passed through Casualty Clearing Station belonging to 5th Regt. 4th Guards Div. Advance parties of 5th Australian Infantry Brigade arrived. During night of 5/6th, 6th Brigade took over portion of front from Brigade, boundary - on right to M.24.b.9.8 $\frac{1}{2}$ . Brigade front redistributed between 25th, 26th, 27th & 28th Bns.	GUEDECOURT 1-10,000 TRENCH MAP Appendix 3 " 4
"	6/11/16		Enemy shelling not very heavy. Relief by 5th Brigade carried out during night, and completed at 1.25 a.m. on 7th.	
MONTAUBAN CAMP.	7/11/16		Whole Brigade concentrated at MONTAUBAN CAMP. Lt. Col. Wisdom, 18th Bn. took over command of Brigade.	
"	9/11/16		Working parties supplied for road and engineering work.	



CONFIDENTIAL

## WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118. 290

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.  
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages  
will be prepared in manuscript.

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
MONTAUBAN CAMP	12/11/16		26th & 25th Bns attached to 5th Brigade and moved up to trenches. 17th & 18th Bns attached to 7th Brigade.	
"	13/11/16		4 Companies 27th Bn. moved to BAZENTIN LE GRAND to do road work.	
"	14/11/16		25th & 26th Bns attacked GIRD TRENCH & MAZE under 5th Brigade.	
"	15/11/16		7th Brigade took over from 5th Brigade frontage M.24.b.7.6. - M.18.c.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .7. $\frac{3}{4}$ Brigade Headquarters at M.30.c.4.2. 27th Bn. right Bn in line. 28th Bn. left Bn. in line. 25th Bn. at SWITCH TRENCH. 26th Bn. at CARLTON TRENCH. 6th Australian Infantry Brigade on right. 149th Brigade on left.	Ref. Map GUEDECOURT 1/10,000 TRENCH MAP. Appendix 5
"	16/11/16		Portion of GIRD TRENCH from M.24.a.7.9. - M.18.c.2 $\frac{1}{2}$ .7. $\frac{3}{4}$ . lost. Troops retired on Jumping Off Trench and held that as front line.	" 6 " 7
"	17/11/16		Digging work carried out during night 17/18th. 27th Bn. dug trench from approx. M.24.b.0.4. - M.24.a.6 $\frac{1}{2}$ .4 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 28th Bn. deepened communication trenches to new front line. 26th Bn. deepened front trench on left flank. 6th Brigade took over line up to M.24.a.7.4 $\frac{1}{2}$	" 5
"	18/11/16		7th Brigade relieved by 5th Brigade on night 18/19th. Casualty reports attached.	" 5
"	19/11/16		Brigade concentrated at FRICOURT CAMP.	" 8
"	21/11/16		Brigade moved to BUIRE through MEAULTE, VILLE-SUR-ANCRE.	
"	22/11/16		Work of reorganization commenced.	
"	27/11/16		Fire in Billet occupied by 26th Bn.	
"	29/11/16		Brigade transport moved to FRANVILLERS.	" 9
"	30/11/16		Brigade entrained at BUIRE for VIGNACOURT. Brigade Headquarters, 25th Bn. 26th Bn. 7th Machine Gun Co., T.M. Battery billeted in VIGNACOURT. 27th & 28th Bns. at ST. VAAST. 7th Field Ambulance at LA CHAUSSEE.	" 10
			Monthly Casualty & Draft reports attached	" 11 " 12
	December 11th 1916.			

Colonel.  
tempy commanding 7th Aust. Infantry Brigade



## OPERATION ORDER NO. 42.

SECRET

2/11/16.

1. Brigade will march to MONTAUBAN - HAMETZ area this afternoon.
2. Bde H.Qrs., 26th 27th & 28th Battalions, 7th L/T/Mortar Bty. 7th M/Gun Coy., will be accommodated at MONTAUBAN, 25th Battalion at HAMETZ.
3. Order of march -
  - Brigade Headquarters
  - 27th Battalion
  - 28th       ,,
  - 26th       ,,
  - M/Gun Coy.
  - T/Mortar Bty.
  - 25th Battalion
4. Head of column to pass Starting Point VIVIER HILL at 6.30 PM
5. Route : MEUALTE - HAMETZ.
6. One blanket, 1 waterproof sheet, 1 sheepskin waistcoat will be carried and the waterproof capes of those to whom they have been issued.
7. 5th Aust Div. has been asked to furnish guides to meet Battalions at HAMETZ, X roads, F 5 c 2 l.
8. Infantry & vehicles must move in small echelon 50 yds between Companies, Transport and Battalions.
9. One day's ration will be carried on the man in addition to emergency ration.
10. 15th Brigade have been asked to ration the men left behind.
11. Acknowledge.

Issued at 4.45 PM.

*[Signature]*  
Capt.  
BRIGADE MAJOR,  
7th Aust Infantry Brigade.

Copy No. 1 25th Bn.  
2 26th Bn.  
3 27th Bn.  
4 28th Bn.  
5 M/Gun Coy.  
6 T/Mortar Bty.  
7 17th A.A.S.C.  
8 Bde T/O.  
9 5th Div.  
10 2nd Div.  
11 G.O.C.  
12 War Diary  
13 Staff Capt.  
14 File



290 SECRET.

COPY NO. 13

7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Operation Order No. 43.

3/11/16.

Reference 1/40,000 Map - ALBERT.

1. 7th Australian Infantry Brigade will relieve the 14th Infantry Brigade in the line on night of 3/4th November 1916.
2. 27th Battalion will be on the right.  
 28th       ,,       on the left.  
 26th       ,,       in Support at SWITCH TRENCH.  
 25th       ,,       in Reserve at CARLTON CAMP.
3. The dividing line between Battalions in the front line will be decided by G.O.C. 14th Infantry Brigade.
4. Details of the relief not provided for in this orders will be arranged mutually between the G.Os concerned.
5. Serviceable Stokes Mortars will be taken over in situ, a similar number being handed over from the Brigade Dump, DERNANCOURT.
6. All Defence schemes, trench stores, dumps, etc., will be taken over and receipts given, copies of which will be sent to Brigade Headquarters as soon as possible after relief.
7. Guides will meet Units at Advanced Divisional Headquarters, S 16 b 3 3 at noon on 3rd instant.
8. The following stores will be carried up to the line on the man.-  
 48 hours rations  
 2 Mills Grenades  
 4 sandbags  
 2 Very pistol lights  
 1 Red ground flare per 4 men.  
 After arrival the above will be collected and added to the existing Dumps.
9. Working parties are being relieved as soon as possible by the 5th Div.
10. Units will move in accordance with the attached March Table. No formed bodies will move forward of the line joining the N. edge of DELVILLE WOOD and HIGH WOOD before dark.
11. Blankets of Units going into Front line or SWITCH TRENCH will be dumped at CARLTON CAMP under a guard this afternoon.
12. G.O.C. 7th Bde will take over command of the area on completion of the relief.
13. Reliefs will be reported to 14th Bde Headquarters.
14. Acknowledge.

Copy No. 1 25th Bn.  
 2 26th Bn.  
 3 27th Bn.  
 4 28th Bn.  
 5 M/G. Co.  
 6 T/M. Bty.  
 7 Bde T/O.  
 8 14th Bde  
 9 5th Div.  
 10 2nd Div.  
 11 G.O.C.  
 12 War Diary  
 13 Staff Capt.  
 14 File

*J. H. W. Smith*  
 Capt.  
 BRIGADE MAJOR,  
 7th Aus Infantry Brigade.



7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

MARCH TABLE

3rd NOVEMBER 1916.

UNIT	STARTING POINT	TIME	ROUTE	GUIDES TO MEET AT	REMARKS
27th Bn.	X Roads in MONTAUBAN	12.15 p.m.	MONTAUBAN - S 21 d 8 8 - S 16 C 1 4 - S 16 d 3 6 Advanced Div H.Qrs.	Advanced Div. H.Qrs. S 16 b 3 3	
28th Bn.	do	12.30 p.m.	do	do	
7th M/G. Co.) 7th T/M. Bty) 7th Bde H.Q.)	do	1.0 p.m. 1.15 p.m.	do	do	
26th Bn.	do	1.30 p.m.	do	do	$\frac{1}{2}$ Bn will be at CARLTON CAMP
25th Bn.	do	1.45 p.m.	do		Bn will be billeted at CARLTON CAMP.

Platoons at 50 yards interval.

Appendix No. 1



Jan 18

Hunt Sabotage Brigade

3<sup>rd</sup> November 1946

Headquarters

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

4th Bn

5th Bn

1. Ascertain as soon as possible  
and report of all S.O.S. reports  
are in order, and men detailed  
to take charge of them. Know how  
to let them off.

2. Provokers and guides must be  
immediately familiarised with the  
area and location and routes  
to important camps and head-  
quarters.

3. Have you got your ground sheets  
and code letters for aeroplane com-  
munication? If not there must  
be set up at once, and also  
other signal gear.

Monmouth

Captain  
Hunt Sabotage Brigade



COPY.

B.M.18.

7th. AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

3rd. November 1916.

Headquarters.

25th Bn.

26th Bn.

27th Bn.

28th Bn.

1. Ascertain as soon as possible and report if all S.O.S rockets are in order, and men detailed to take charge of them know how to let them off.
2. Runners and guides will be immediately familiarised with the area and location and routes to important dumps and Headquarters.
3. Have you got your ground sheets and code letters for aeroplane communication? If not these must be got<sup>up</sup>/at once, and also other signal gear.

(Sgd) G. Rowan Hamilton,  
Captain,  
Brigade Major,  
7th Aust. Infantry Bde.

-----



## 1st Aust. Infantry Brigade

November 2<sup>nd</sup> 1916.

Headquarters,

25<sup>th</sup> Bn26<sup>th</sup> Bn27<sup>th</sup> Bn28<sup>th</sup> Bn

Bde Bomb Officers.

Bm 24

800 ladders to enable assaulting troops to leave the trenches are commencing to arrive at Rio Dump in N/ 30 & 5/ 4 at 10 am and will continue to arrive during the day.

These will be carried up and placed in the trenches ready for use.

Great care will be taken to avoid these ladders being exposed to view of the enemy, as he will be warned thereby of our intentions.

Parties of 8 men under an N.C.O. will report from 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> Bns every half hour commencing at 10 am to Brigade Bomb Officers at the dump.

N/ 30 &amp; 5/ 4.

Ladders should be first taken to the positions of the front line between the following points:-

- ① N/ 19 a 5/ 9 and N/ 24 b 9/ 8
- ② N/ 24 b 5<sup>th</sup> 6 and N/ 24 b 7<sup>th</sup> 6<sup>th</sup>
- ③ N/ 24 b 4<sup>th</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> and N/ 24 b 0/ 4
- ④ N/ 24 b 0/ 4 and N/ 24 a 8<sup>th</sup> 4<sup>th</sup>

⑤ Ladders should be placed not less than 300 yds apart.

For necessary communication will be responsible Central, so that there is no congestion of the trenches and communication.

H. W.

Captain  
Bde Major



7<sup>th</sup> Australian Infantry BrigadeSECRET

Operation Order No 44

3<sup>rd</sup> November 1916.

Reference 10,000 and 110,000 Maps.

The following alterations in the method of holding the line will come into force on the night of the 4<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1916.

25<sup>th</sup> Bn will take over a portion of the line now held by the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> Bns.

New frontages will be as follows:-

27<sup>th</sup> Bn from N 19 a 5 7 to N 24 b 5 1/2 6 1/2  
 25<sup>th</sup> Bn " N 24 a 5 1/2 6 1/2 to N 24 a 4 1/2 5 1/2  
 28<sup>th</sup> Bn " N 24 a 4 5 1/2 to N 17 d 7 1/2 5

O.C. 25<sup>th</sup> Bn will arrange to send up Advanced parties to reconnoitre the new area tomorrow morning, Nov 4<sup>th</sup>.

The following will report to Pde Headquarters at 8 a.m.

C.O.

Ad Company Commanders

One N.C.O per platoon.

Proportion of Specialists and runners.

O.C. 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> Bns will send two guides each to Pde Hqs by 7.45 a.m.

Relief will be carried out under mutual arrangements between Bns concerned.

Relief should be completed as early in the evening as possible; but no bodies of troops will pass over the Ridge between HIGH WOOD and DELVILLE WOOD before dusk.

Completion of relief will be notified to Pde Headquarters by wiring the names of Bns concerned. will call in at Pde Hqs in passing for instructions.

Acknowledged

J. W. G. G. G.

Copy Nos 1 to 4 Bns 10 5<sup>th</sup> Div  
 5 10 6<sup>th</sup> Div  
 6 10 7<sup>th</sup> Div  
 7 10 8<sup>th</sup> Div  
 8 10 9<sup>th</sup> Div  
 9 10 10<sup>th</sup> Div

17<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 18<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 19<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 20<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 21<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 22<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 23<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 24<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 25<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 26<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 27<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 28<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 29<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 30<sup>th</sup> Bn



7th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.Operation Order No. 45.

COPY No.

Reference 1/20,000, 1/10,000 and sketch maps issued.

1. A minor operation by 4th Army will take place early on November 5th.
2. The 7th Infantry Brigade will attack the German trenches from N 13 c 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  2 to M 18 a 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ . The 151st Infantry Brigade is attacking on the Left of the 7th Brigade. The 6th Brigade on the right is not attacking but is assisting with artillery and Machine Gun fire.
3. The attack will be delivered by the 27th, 25th and 28th Battalions. The 26th Bn will be in support at COBHAM TRENCHES. Assaulting ~~xxxxxx~~ Bns will be formed up by 5 a.m. on following frontages.-
 

27th Bn.	N 19 a 5 7 to M 24 b 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
25th Bn.	M 24 b 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ to M 24 a 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
28th Bn.	M 24 a 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ to M 17 d 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ 5

objectives are allotted as follows.-

27th Bn.	N 13 c 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2	to	M 24 b 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 9 $\frac{1}{2}$
25th Bn.	M 24 b 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	to	M 18 c 8 2
28th Bn.	M 18 c 8 2	to	M 18 a 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

There will be as little movement as possible after daybreak.

24th Bn will be in Brigade Reserve & will be accommodated in SWITCH TRENCH. This Bn will be responsible for ~~xxxxxx~~ detailing carrying parties to carry stores and ammunition, etc., up to the forward dumps under instructions from 7th Brigade Headquarters.

4. ARTILLERY. A programme of heavy artillery bombardments is being carried out daily. At zero time on the 5th inst. an intense ~~xxxxxx~~ barrage will be placed on the objective and on a line 150 yards in front of it.  
At 0.3 front of barrage creeps back at rate of 50 yds per minute till it reaches a line 250 yds behind the objective where it halts.

5. METHODS OF ATTACK. The assaulting Battalions will move forward in two waves as close to our barrage as possible, and with not more than 40 yds between the waves. The first wave will commence getting out of the trenches at zero by means of the ladders which are being issued for the purpose, followed at once by second wave. The O.C. the Assaulting Bns will detail special parties for each wave of (a) Trench Cleaners, (b) Carriers, (c) Bombing and Blocking Parties, (d) Signallers, and will issue definite instructions to each. The special parties of the 1st wave may be used before reaching the main objective. The remainder of the 1st wave and the whole of the 2nd wave will continue to advance close behind the barrage to the main objective.

Ground gained will be held and consolidated. In order to avoid losses from hostile shelling captured objective will be thinly held.

PATROLS. Lewis guns with some Bombers will be pushed out in front of captured position in shell holes and all communications trenches leading towards the enemy will be blocked. O.C. 27th Battalion will be responsible for detailing Bombing and Blocking Parties on his right flank, and for consolidating a defensive flank from N 19 a 5 7 to N 13 c 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  2.

O.C. 25th Battalion will be responsible for cleaning up the area known as the MAZE.

A proper understanding must exist between O.C. 28th Bn. and the Right Bn of the 151st Brigade regarding their respective objectives, and for touch to be maintained in the captured position. He will pre-arrange to form a defensive flank if the troops on his left fail to reach their objective.




6. The O.C. 26th Bn. (In Support) will not move unless ordered till dusk when he will send up two Companies to our original front line. One of these Coys will be on the right, in Support of 27th Bn. and the other on the left of 28th Bn. and will be available for carrying under the orders of O.C. 27th and 28th Bns. respectively. These Companies should carry up with them Bombs, S.A.A., Water, Sandbags, etc. to replenish the forward dumps.
7. O.C. 7th M/Gun Coy. will put one sub-section of 2 guns at disposal of O.C. 27th and 28th Bns. to assist in maintaining the captured position. He will also arrange for all communication trenches and the area behind the objective to be barraged during and after the attack. He will reinforce the original front line with two additional guns prior to the operation.
8. The 7th T/Mortar Bty. will co-operate in the bombardment of the MAZE in accordance with instructions issued separately, and will be prepared to engage any hostile machine guns that are holding up our advance.
9. O.C. 5th Pioneer Bn. will provide parties to work and maintain following communication trenches.-  
TURK LANE, GOOSE ALLEY and also to connect these up with captured position.
10. 14th F. Coy Engineers will dig Strong Points at the following places, after dark on the night of the 5/6th November.-  
N 13 c 4 2 , N 24 b 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> 9  
M 18 c 6 2 , M 18 c 3 9
11. Battalions in the line will be responsible for improving the jumping off trench during the night, so that troops will be able to get out of the trenches quickly.
12. Red flares will be let off on reaching the objective, and at every clock hour afterwards.  
Further instructions Appendix B.  
Sufficient Red flares to be issued to selected officers and other ranks.
13. Special instructions ~~xxxxxx~~ regarding -  

Intelligence	..	..	Appendix A.
Communication	..	..	,, B.
Rations and Water	..	..	,, C.
Prisoners of War			
& Stragglers.	..	..	,, D.
Medical arrangements	..	..	,, E.
S.A.A. and Grenades	..	..	,, F.
14. Not more than 20 Officers per Battalion will be taken into the attack, and a similar proportion (2/3rds) of other Units. If Units are below establishment in Officers only a similar proportion of Officers will accompany their Unit. Officers not accompanying the attack may return to CARLTON TRENCH CAMP on night of 4/5th November.
15. Liaison Officers will be provided by Battalions as under -  
 25th Bn for 6th Brigade at B 6 a 6 8.  
 26th ,, 151st Bde. at S 15 b 2 3.  
 27th Bn for Left Bn of 6th Bde at N 19 c 6 2.  
 28th Bn for Right Bn of 151st Bde at M 33 d 5 8.  
 Two runners with rations should be taken by each liaison officer.
16. Zero will be notified later to all concerned by the following message -  
 "Rations will be draw at - a.m.",  
 and will be acknowledged by sending the name of C.O. of Unit to whom message is sent.
17. Watches will be synchronised at Brigade Headquarters at 7 p.m. on 4th instant and 7 a.m. on 5th Nov.



- 290
18. 14th F. Coy. Engineers Dump will be at M 30 a Central.
  19. All ranks will be warned not to carry any documents that might possibly be of value to the enemy into the attack, especially code book A, which should be withdrawn to battalion headquarters.
  20. Reports to Brigade Headquarters.
  21. Acknowledge.



Captain,  
BRIGADE MAJOR,  
7th Aus Infantry Brigade.

Issued at 7.30 p.m.

Copy No. 1	25th Bn.
2	26th Bn.
3	27th Bn.
4	28th Bn.
5	M/Gun Coy.
6	T/M. Bty.
7	24th Bn.
8	6th Bde.
9	151st Bde.
10	5th Div.
11	G.O.C.
12	War Diary
13	File.



APPENDIX "A".INTELLIGENCE.

1. Battalions will take steps to obtain and forward immediately to Brigade Headquarters all information as to unit (Division, Regiment and Battalion) to which enemy dead or prisoners belong, giving time and map reading where found or captured. (Shoulder straps "Bolsbuche" or other documents will probably give the desired information.

The early arrival of this information is of the first importance. In the past this information has been sent about prisoners, but has not been made of enemy dead. Distinction must be made between I.R. (Infantry Regiment) and R.I.R. (Reserve Infantry Regiment).

2. It is the special task of all Intelligence Officers to obtain information as regard the enemy and to pass it on. Battalion and Battery H.Q.s should be located and searched at once. Documents of all kinds off dead or out of dugouts are to be forwarded without delay to Advanced prisoners Collecting Station where there is a Corps Intelligence Officer. Information and documents specially desired are-

- (a) Position of hostile batteries.
- (b) Ammunition States.
- (c) Telephone message books.
- (d) Maps and sketches.
- (e) Typed orders.

3. Officers and men will be separated at once on capture, and where possible, officers should be separated from one another. All prisoners will be searched immediately in the presence of an officer for documents which will be tied in bundles and labelled and sent along with them to Advanced Prisoners Collecting Station in S 10d. A tag should be attached to each bundle saying from which prisoner it was taken so that if any important document is found there will be no delay in identifying the owner and put a numbered tag on the documents taken from him. On arrival at the Advanced Collecting Station the officer or N.C.O. in charge of the escort will hand over all documents to the officer or N.C.O. in charge of the Guard at the Collecting Station and obtain a receipt for them. Escorts to and from Collecting Station will permit absolutely no interference with prisoners by unauthorised persons.

Pay books and identity discs are to be left on the persons of the prisoners.

Too much time should not be spent in the examination of prisoners on the ground.

4. Each Brigade will have 6 Bde Intelligence ~~officers~~ men whose duties will be to collect all papers from German dead and to search dugouts and cellars.

These men will each wear a yellow arm band and carry 3 sandbags marked with a yellow patch. As the sandbags become filled with papers they will be brought by the Intelligence men to Brigade H.Q.s who will forward them as quickly as possible to the advanced Prisoners collecting station. If one of these men becomes a casualty it is the duty of any officer to detail another man to adopt the badge and carry on with the work.



APPENDIX "B".SYSTEM OF LIAISON AND COMMUNICATION.

Alternative Methods of Communication. 1. Advanced Divisional Lamp and Helio (receiving) station at S 6 c 1 7 where messages can be received from GIRD SUPPORT in N 19 a and b and LIME TRENCH in M 18 d.

Communication with Kite Balloons and Aeroplanes. 2. (a) In front of Bde H.Qrs runners will be employed in pairs. (b) PIGEONS. Will be issued at a scale of 8 per Infantry Brigade. Care should be taken not to use up all the pigeons in the early stages of the fight as it may be impossible to replace them. (c) FLARES. (red) Will be carried by Officers, N.C.Os and selected men at the rate of 100 per Battalion in first instance. When they are used it means "We are here and so far as we know we are leading the infantry or within 50 yds of leading infantry".

They will be lit only -

- (a) On reaching each objective.
- (b) if checked before reaching the line given, or if specially desired by infantry to make position known.
- (c) On signal from contact plane "Where are you?". Which consists in firing a white Very light or in sounding a succession of hoots with a Klaxon horn.

(2) Mirrors will be used to attract the attention of aeroplanes on the order of Company or Platoon Commanders only.

(3) Signal Lamps, Helios and Signalling Screens will be used for communication between Brigade or Battalion Headquarters and contact aeroplanes XV Corps Contact aeroplanes are marked with a broad black band under the left hand plane. The position of headquarters will be indicated by white ground sheets as follows.-

Brigade Headquarters.

(with call letter)

Battalion (or advanced Bn H.Qrs)

(with call letter)

The following is the code of ~~xxxxxx~~ signals to be used -

Succession of "N's"	Short of ammunition
"Y's"	Short of grenades
"O's"	Barrage required
"H's"	Lengthen range
"X's"	Held up by m/gun fire
"Z's"	Held up by wire

(4) Day or night code, or "in cheer". XV Corps Balloon mark is -

- (a) By day black and white vertically striped pennant.
- (b) By night succession of dashes every 10 minutes. Balloon observer on seeing call, hauls up pennant or lamp to basket and drops again when ready to read. Messages will be sent "DD" - "DD" and repeated until acknowledged by lamp or pennant being raised and lowered 3 times.

Communication with Artillery. 4. S.O.S. rocket signal. The special signal when an enemy counter-attack is developing. Other requests should be made to the artillery liaison officer who will arrange with supporting groups.



APPENDIX "C".RATIONS AND WATER SUPPLY.

Rations. 1. Every man will carry his iron ration on his person in addition to the unexpended portion of the day's ration.

2. Rations will be taken by supply wagons to First Line Transport Lines in the usual way and by pack from First Line Transport lines to Dump at M 30 c 9 7.

Water. 3. Every man starts with a full water bottle. Great importance is attached to the supervision by regimental officers and N.C.Os of the use of water bottles.

4. Water can be drawn at the following points.-

S 21 d 5 0	for horses
S 27 c 5 2	for water carts
S 17 c 7 0	for horses and water carts.

There are also 7 wells in FLERS and one at FACTORY CORNER.

5. Carriage from water points by petrol tins and on mules 8 mules per Battalion carrying 12 gallons each (6 petrol tins). Each Brigade will be in possession of 400 petrol tins for hand carriage and storage in addition to the 48 per Battalion carried on mules.

6. A petrol tin dump is being formed at the Advanced Divisional Grenade Dump at P 6 a 8 2. Application for tins should be made to the Divisional Bombing Officer.

\*\*\*\*\*

I N S T R U C T I O N S .

Rations for the two front Battalions will be carried forward from the Dump at M 30 c 9 7 to the present front line by parties to be detailed by O.C. Reserve Battalion (2 parties of 10 men each).

The two front battalions will draw from the present front line when required.

The Support battalion, unless moved forward, will draw from its own pack transport at M 30 c 9 7, but if sent forward will draw from the present front line, and the Reserve Battalion will furnish another party to carry as far as present front line.



APPENDIX "D".PRISONERS OF WAR.

Attacking Battalions will be responsible for escorting prisoners back to TURKS LANE M 23 b 9 4 or M 24 b 4 4 where escorts from the reserve battalion will take them over and escort them to Bde H.Qrs and thence to S 10 d. One officer and 30 men of the reserve battalion will be stationed at each of the forward points mentioned, and will only send on prisoners when a reasonable quantity have been collected. About 2 men per 10 prisoners. Escorts will then rejoin their Unit. At S 10 d a guard of 1 officer and 15 men found by the troops of XV Corps Mounted Troops attached to the Division will be stationed.

STRAGGLERS.

O.C. Support Battalion will post 1 M.C.O. and 4 men at each of the following points - M 24 c 8 4 and M 24 c 1 2. These police will take all possible steps to turn back stragglers.

The Divisional Straggler Post Line will be formed by the A.P.M.

No. 1 Post S 15 a 10 10

No. 2 Post S 16 a 8 9

No. 3 Post S 16 b 10 5

The Divisional Straggler collecting ~~station~~ centre will be at S 16 a 3 9.

The Brigade Transport Officer will arrange to collect his stragglers from this post and conduct them to the Transport Lines of his Unit.

Any stragglers who reach the collecting station at S 16 a 2 9 will be handed over to the Straggler Collecting Centre there.

ROAD CONTROL.

Arrangements are in charge of the A. P. M.



The following is the line of evacuation of wounded by the Field Ambulances of the 5th Australian Division.

FIELD COLLECTING POSTS.

Goose Ally Post	M 30 a 2 4	2 bearer squads (12 men)
North Road Post	M 30 b 4 2	2 bearer squads (12 men)

BEARER RELAY POSTS.

Fliers Support Post	M 30 c 2 2	1 N.C.O. 24 men
McCormacks Post	M 35 d 6 4	1 N.C.O. 24 men.
Crest Trench Post	S 5 c 6 5	1 N.C.O. 12 men
Runners Post	S 10 b 9 9	1 N.C.O. 12 men
Turks Lane Post	S 10 d 5 0	1 N.C.O. 12 men

1 Officer patrols line between McCormacks and Turks Lane Posts.

2 Officers patrol line forward of McCormacks Post.

ADVANCED DRESSING STATION.

Thistle Dump            S 10 c Centre

FIELD AMBULANCE.

Medical Dump            ~~X~~ 29 d 4 5

CORPS MAIN DRESSING STATION.

Becordel.

CORPS COLLECTING STATION.  
(slightly wounded cases)

Becordel.

-----



APPENDIX "F".S.A.A., GRENADES, etc.

From front to rear the echelon of supply is as follows.-

1. On the man 170 rounds S.A.A. and 2 Mills grenades.  
Bombers carry 10 Mills grenades.
2. Forward Bde Dumps have been formed by the Brigade at  
M 24 a 0 4 and M 24 b 2 4.
3. Advanced Divisional Dumps at S 6 b 10 9 and M 30 b 6 2 1/2  
to be refilled under Divisional arrangements from the Main  
Divisional Dump.
4. Mills grenades will be issued detonated from Advanced  
Divisional Dumps.
5. Stokes Mortars ammunition will be drawn from Advanced  
Divisional Dumps and will be detonated under arrangements  
to be made by O.C. ~~the~~ 7th A/L/T/Mortar Battery.

INSTRUCTIONS.

- A. O.C. Reserve Battalion will detail parties to carry forward  
S.A.A. and Mills grenades from Advanced Divisional Dump at  
M 30 b 5 2 1/2 to the two Bde dumps at M 24 a 0 4 and  
M 24 b 2 4 and keep these dumps supplied.
- B. O.C. Support Battalion will detail parties to carry forward  
S.A.A. and Mills grenades from Dumps in present front line  
to positions captured and establish ~~new~~ fresh dumps there and  
keep them supplied.
- C. Each of the above parties are to be under an officer.



"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army 1  
(in pads of 100).  
No. of Message.....

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  .....Service.	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions:	Sent			Date.....
.....	At.....m.			From.....
.....	To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....
.....	By.....			

TO

26 <sup>th</sup>	78 <sup>th</sup>
------------------	------------------

Sender's Number. *	Day of Month. 5 <sup>th</sup>	In reply to Number.	AAA
-----------------------	----------------------------------	---------------------	-----

orders will reach you re digging  
M11805ki on a line M244 498 - M244 439 - M118 266  
Collect Tools etc for working  
Overies. There are none on dump.  
all have been sent up -  
Engineers will assist.

Sent verbally.

From	Roppy
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

750 000 W 2186-M509 H. W. &amp; V. Ltd. 6/16



Secret1<sup>st</sup> Aust Infantry Bde.  
Order No 46.

Copy No. 6

5 November 1916

In case the 151<sup>st</sup> Bde do not attack and capture EIRD TRENCH, following task will be carried out tonight as soon as it is dark.

The following line will be consolidated  
M 24 b 9 8 - M 24 b 3.9. (Junction of  
BITE and BRAYNET Trench) - M 18 d 1.1 -  
M 18 c 6 6 - M 18 c 1/2 5.

14<sup>th</sup> Dist Field Coy will dig 50 yards of  
Trench at following points

M 24 b 9 8 - M 24 b 3 9 -  
M 18 c 6 6 - M 18 c 1/2 5.

O.C. 26<sup>th</sup> Bn will be responsible for work  
on line M 24 b 9 8 - M 24 b 3.9.

O.C. 28<sup>th</sup> Bn will be responsible for work  
on line M 18 c 6 6 - M 18 c 1/2 5.

All preparations for new work, collection  
of tools etc, to be done at once.

Remainder of line will be con-  
solidated and units reorganized as  
far as possible.

O.C. 14<sup>th</sup> Field Coy will report to <sup>Leane.</sup>  
Major O'Donnell and Colonel ~~Leane~~  
early.

Copy Nos 25 Bn.

26<sup>th</sup> Bn.27<sup>th</sup> Bn.28<sup>th</sup> Bn.14<sup>th</sup> Field Coy.1<sup>st</sup> Aust Infantry Bde.

J. M. W. B. Smith

Captain

Brigade Major

1<sup>st</sup> Aust Infantry Bde.



November 1918

# Order No 46

- 1 5<sup>th</sup> Bde will relieve 7<sup>th</sup> Bde tonight.
- 2 Two Bns of 5<sup>th</sup> Bde will take over the front line now held by our four Bns in accordance with para 4, 2<sup>nd</sup> in French Order.
- 3 Orders will be as per table attached.
- 4 G.C. Bns will report at Haquied by 11 (Haquied less on their way back as the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. to command & wishes to see them (irrespective of the time)
- 5 French advanced parties may be sent on to new line during the day.
- 6 7<sup>th</sup> Bn or relief will be collected at Canton Trench Camp and will come under the order of G.C. 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Bde as a Bde. Bn. or Co.
- 7 G.C. 5<sup>th</sup> Bn may show the two Companies at CANTON TRENCH as a room as it is dark.
- 8 Stokes Mortars will be landed one in line and a company of machine guns drawn from 5<sup>th</sup> Bn at MONTAUBAN.
- 9 All Light Machine Guns - Maps and all photos, sketches etc. will be landed one and copies obtained. Copies of these will be sent to G.H.Q. as soon as possible after relief.
- 10 Command of 4<sup>th</sup> Bde will pass to G.C. 5<sup>th</sup> Bde on completion of the relief.
- 11 7<sup>th</sup> Bde H.Q. will move to MONTAUBAN on relief.
- 12 Completion of relief will be notified to the H.Q. by telephoning some of G.C. Bn. H.Q.
- 13 All tools, blankets etc. dumped at CANTON TRENCH will be picked up on the way to village.

14 H.Q. 1<sup>st</sup> Bde will be at 11.00

*[Signature]*

Captain  
1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Major  
1<sup>st</sup> Bde Infantry Bde

- 1 1<sup>st</sup> Bde
- 2 2<sup>nd</sup> Bde
- 3 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde
- 4 4<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 5 5<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 6 6<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 7 7<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 8 8<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 9 9<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 10 10<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 11 11<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 12 12<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 13 13<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 14 14<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 15 15<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 16 16<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 17 17<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 18 18<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 19 19<sup>th</sup> Bde
- 20 20<sup>th</sup> Bde



Van Brunt SECRET

17th Australian Brigade

Relief Table

6th November 1916

280

Unit	To be relieved by	Guides to meet returning unit at	On relief to	Remarks
2nd Bn	11th Bn	6th Bn	Montauban Camp	Guards will be carefully inspected by Platoon
7th Bn	17th Bn	do	MANGETZ Camp	
2nd Bn	10th Bn	do	CHARLTON TRENCH CAMP	
2nd Bn	15th Bn	do	MONTAUBAN CAMP	
7th Bn	11th Bn	do	do	
7th M/Gun Coy	5th M/Gun Coy	do	MANGETZ CAMP	
7th M/Gun Coy	5th M/Gun Coy	do	do	



Bm 135

~~Secret~~ 7<sup>th</sup> Aust. Infy Bde.  
Preliminary Order.

Headquarters,

25<sup>th</sup> Bn

26<sup>th</sup> Bn

27<sup>th</sup> Bn

28<sup>th</sup> Bn

116<sup>th</sup> Gun Coy

Trench Mortar Bty.

(not sent)

1. Brigade will probably be required to co-operate with 50<sup>th</sup> Division by attacking on a small front from about 17/18 c b. 2. to Bde Boundary inclusive.
2. Colonel Leane 28<sup>th</sup> Bn will be in command of attack, and following troops will be put at his disposal:-  
 2 Companies 25<sup>th</sup> Bn  
 1 Company 26<sup>th</sup> Bn.  
 These companies to be those which have had the fewest casualties, and least exertion during the past 12 hours.
3. O.C. Bns concerned will ascertain from Colonel Leane where and when Coys will report, and Officers Commanding Companies will report at Colonel Leane's Headquarters at 4 am 6<sup>th</sup> inst.
4. Zero time will be about 8 am on 6<sup>th</sup> inst.
5. Bns will be responsible for supplying attacking Coys with Bombs, flares, Tools, sandbags etc., from Dump at COBHAM Trenches. "6" Coy, 24<sup>th</sup> Bn under Capt. <sup>90883</sup> ~~McLarty~~ will be held in readiness to be also placed under Command of Colonel Leane, should Division so decide. A wire confirming this arrangement will be despatched as soon as definite orders are received.
6. O.C. 7<sup>th</sup> 116<sup>th</sup> Gun Coy will put 1 section at disposal of Colonel Leane.
7. Notify Bde Headquarters companies detailed for this duty by wire.
8. Very Urgent.
9. Acknowledge

*[Signature]*  
Captain  
Brigade Major.  
7<sup>th</sup> Aust Infy Bde



7<sup>th</sup> Aust. Infantry Brigade. BM 141

November 5<sup>th</sup> 1916.

Headquarters.

25<sup>th</sup> Bn ✓

26<sup>th</sup> Bn ✓

27<sup>th</sup> Bn ✓

28<sup>th</sup> Bn ✓

Every effort will be made to re-organize units before dawn.

A.C. 27<sup>th</sup> Bn will be responsible for holding from M/24 b 9.8. To M/24 b 5.6.

26<sup>th</sup> Bn from this point to M/24 a 9.4 (includes M/24.26)

25<sup>th</sup> Bn from this point to M/24 a 2.9.

28<sup>th</sup> Bn from this point to Left of Bde Sector.

28<sup>th</sup> Bn will detail 1 Coy as Bde Reserve, which will be accommodated in COBHAM TRENCH.

Each Bn will arrange for a Coy to be kept in support.

Coy's now attached to Units other than their own should remain their own units after stand-down.

Units will arrange to issue rations to Coy's of other Units attached to them. Any shortage should be reported to Bde Headquarters at once.

Report when re-organization is complete.

*[Signature]*

Captain  
Brigade Major.  
7<sup>th</sup> Aust. Inf. Brigade.



290

Secret17<sup>th</sup> Aust. Infy Bde

Preliminary Order

6<sup>th</sup> Nov 1916

1 17<sup>th</sup> Aust. Infy Bde will probably be retained by the 5<sup>th</sup> Aust. Bde on the night of the 6<sup>th</sup> of Nov.

2 Small advance parties are now in the trenches.

3 Two Bns will be taking over the front line.

4 A considerable number of guides will be required in order that the relief may be expeditious.

5 It is understood that Bns are very weak, but following parties will be provided.

per Bn 1000 & guides. Time will be notified later.

In addition 1 guide will be required per Bn to guide further advance parties which will arrive early in the day.

10 Bns  
M. L. C. Coy  
H. M. B. Coy.

Captain  
Brigade Major  
17<sup>th</sup> Aust. Infy Brigade



290

7th Light Infantry Brigade

6 November 1916

Headquarters

2nd Lt.

3rd Lt.

4th Lt.

5th Lt.

6th Lt.

7th Lt.

8th Lt.

In connection with operations  
early report is now required giving  
details of operations shortly

Following points should be  
commented on

Quality of barges

Punctuality of departure of attacking  
lines two waves sufficient depth for  
attack

Medical arrangements

Casualties and losses in material  
(machine guns etc.)

Notes or suggestions

In this connection any recom-  
mendations should be submitted with  
minimum delay

Yours  
The

Captain

Brigade Major

7th Light Infantry Brigade



Index  
Appendix 2



SECRET.  
Copy No. 7.

151<sup>st</sup> Inf. Brigade  
Operation Order No. 44.  
5 Nov. 1916.

1. 9<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. are in possession of BUTTE TRENCH from the QUARRY to a point East of THE BUTTE not clearly defined. It is reported that 6<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. hold a further portion of BUTTE TRENCH on the Right of 9<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. but the Right of 6<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. has not been defined. The remainder of BUTTE TRENCH, THE HOOK, and HOOK SAP are reported to be still in enemy hands.

The enemy still have a post on the North side of THE BUTTE.

2. Tomorrow (6<sup>th</sup> Nov.) 151<sup>st</sup> Inf. Bde. will continue the attack on such portions of THE BUTTE, BUTTE TRENCH, and GIRD TRENCH as are still in enemy hands and consolidate portions already in our hands.

Page 2.

3. The 5<sup>th</sup> Border Regt. will capture and consolidate GIRD TRENCH from M. 18. C. 1.9 to M. 17. b. 4.3, HOOK SAP, THE HOOK, and BUTTE TRENCH from THE HOOK to M. 17. b. 3.1.

The 6<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. will continue to act under the orders of O/C. 9<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. and will be utilised by him to establish continuous lines of defence along GIRD TRENCH and along BUTTE ALLEY and BUTTE TRENCH between the Right of 9<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. and the Left of 5<sup>th</sup> Border Regt.

The 9<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. will capture the North side of THE BUTTE with a Bombing attack to be delivered from either the East side or West side or both.

The 4<sup>th</sup> N.I. will be in Support on the Right Flank.

The 6<sup>th</sup> N.I. will remain in its present position as Left Reserve Battalion.

The 8<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. will be Right Reserve Battalion.

Appendix No. 2



4.

Details re attack by  
5<sup>th</sup> Border Regt:-

- (a). The Battalion will attack with 4 companies in line of companies in column of Platoons, i.e., in 4 waves, at 30 paces distance between waves.
- (b) Each wave will have a bombing squad specially detailed to deal with HOOK SAP, and BLIND TRENCH.
- (c) ~~The first wave~~ On the Right of the Battalion the objective of the ~~first~~ all four waves will be the GIRD TRENCH.  
On the remainder of the Battalion front the objective of the First and Third waves will be the GIRD TRENCH, that of the Second and Fourth will be THE BUTTE TRENCH.
- (d) The First Wave will have a Bombing Squad specially detailed to bomb outwards on the Right flank down the GIRD TRENCH to gain touch with 28<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Australian Inf. Bde. in that line.

4.

The First and Second Waves will have Bombing Squads specially detailed to bomb outwards on the Left flank to gain touch with 6<sup>th</sup> D.L.I. in GIRD TRENCH and BUTTE TRENCH.

- (e) Zero hour 8.0 a.m.
- (f) The attack will be preceded by a bombardment of the objective by the Heavy and Light Artillery from 6.30 a.m. to 7.45 a.m.  
At Zero hour an intense barrage will commence on HOOK SAP and BUTTE TRENCH. This barrage will lift at Zero plus three minutes till it reaches a line 300 yards ~~at~~ behind GIRD SUPPORT Trench.
- (g) At Zero hour the 5<sup>th</sup> Border Regt. will leave its assembly trenches, creep up to the barrage, and advance close under it to the assault.

5. The necessary reliefs to enable the above to be carried out have been ordered to take place between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight tonight, details being arranged between C.O.'s concerned.

290

Appendix No. 2

27



S.

6.

Acknowledge.

L.A. 1914

Captain.

Brigade Major.

151<sup>st</sup> Inf. Brigade.

Issued at p.m.

- To: 1 - 5<sup>th</sup> Border Regt.
- 2 - 6<sup>th</sup> D.L. 2.
- 3 - 8<sup>th</sup> D.L. 2.
- 4 - 9<sup>th</sup> D.L. 2.
- 5 - 4<sup>th</sup> Northd. Fus.
- 6 - 6<sup>th</sup> Northd. Fus.
- 7 - 7<sup>th</sup> Australian Inf Bde.
- 8 - 151<sup>st</sup> M.G. Coy.
- 9 - 151<sup>st</sup> Light T.M. B.
- 10 - 149<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde.
- 11 - 50<sup>th</sup> Division. G.
- 12 - War Comm. G.
- 13 - ~~Filed.~~



## Intelligence Report

6 AM 3/11/16 to 5 AM 4/11/16

## Our Artillery

At 8 AM our artillery started to bombard enemy front & second lines heavily - this was continued throughout the day until about 6 o'clock.

## Enemy Artillery

Enemy retaliated during the day with 5.9, 4.2, and a few shrapnel mostly falling in vicinity of supports M. 2nd C. Enemy Artillery fairly quiet during the night.

## Balloons

Three enemy balloons were up during the afternoon in the vicinity of LE BARQUE.

Situation at 5 AM. Normal.

Forwarded to  
for CO 28th Batta  
4/11/16



Intelligence Report  
5 AM to 5 PM. 14/11/16

Our Artillery

Has kept up a heavy bombardment on enemy front & second line systems all day.

At intervals during the day our heavies were falling short some within ten yards of our front line and at 2.30 PM 3 or 4 between front line and support & 5 or 6 more just clearing our support trench. - Most of these shells fell in vicinity of direction of M24 or 13.9.

Enemy Artillery

Enemy has replied spasmodically to our bombardment with a mixture of 77 cm, 4.2 & 5.93. M24 & vicinity of Bancourt & l'Abbay & especially Rabthey Road received the most attention.

Enemy Sniping

An enemy sniper firing from the left of our position has been very active and has accounted for 8 casualties near junction of TWR Trench & Support line - His position cannot be located as yet.

Aircraft

at 1.30 PM 6 enemy planes flew over our front line & front line of Battalion on our left. - Two of these planes opened fire on our front line - The plane crashed at 2 PM.

Movement in enemy lines and organization is seen.

No movement has been observed in enemy lines.

Cholgate Lt Col  
Commanding 28th Batta.  
4 PM. 14/11/16



Staff Capt

Please send carrying party  
to remove stretcher cases \*\*\*  
The bearers we have are  
absolutely played out \*\*\*  
I would suggest 30 men to  
do one carry and then be  
replaced so as not to tire them  
out \*\*\* The party can be  
relieved on arrival of party  
from ambulance already  
asked for

J. Kelly Cpt

GOOSE ALLEY M 30 255

reg and port

6-15 PM 4  
11  
16



"C" Form (Duplicate).				Army Form C. 2123.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.				No. of Message.....	
Service Instructions.			Charges to Pay.		Office Stamp.
			£ s. d.		
Handed in at..... Office..... m. Received..... m.					
TO	Intelligence Officer 7th Inf. Brigade				
Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number		A A A	
Intelligence Report					
<p>Our men were active throughout the day, sniping nine (9) Germans, of which they are sure and possibly more. The Batter. observers claim one (1).</p> <p>At 2 p.m. 2 German planes appeared over our lines, flying very low, and firing on our men with their machine guns. They disappeared within a few minutes, evidently driven off by our M.C.s.</p> <p>Enemy artillery activity has been normal during the day, at 5 p.m. the enemy barraged</p> <p>P.T.O.</p>					
FROM					
PLACE & TIME					



about 200 yds. in rear of  
our front line with light and  
heavy artillery.

Enemy sniping and machine guns  
fairly active throughout the  
evening.

Enemy shelled heavily in rear of  
our front line from 12.30 a.m. 5/11/16  
to 1.30 a.m., with light and heavy  
guns. They seem to be in constant  
fear of attack, for their bombardment  
was evidently caused by our own on  
the right, and it stopped when several  
red flares were sent up by the  
enemy. These red flares seemed to  
mean 'No attack. Cease fire!'

3 a.m.  
5/11/16

J. Cunningham etc  
Signal Officer  
27th B. Co.



JUN 15 1916

"C" Form (Original).				Army Form C. 2123.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.				No. of Message.....	
Prefix.....	Code.....	Words.....	Received	Sent, or sent out	Office Stamp.
		£ . s. d.	From.....	At.....m.	
Charges to collect			By.....	To.....	
Service Instructions.				By.....	
Handed in at.....			Office.....	m. Received.....	m.
TO <i>Intelligence Officer</i>					
<i>27th Bde.</i>					
*Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	A A A		
<i>Disposition Rpt.</i>					
<p><i>A portion of the front line has been taken over by the 25th Battalion, otherwise our front remains the same.</i></p> <p><i>A &amp; B' Coys are in close support line.</i></p> <p><i>27th Battalion Rpt. approx.</i></p> <p><i>M 24 10 1/2. 6 1/2.</i></p> <p><i>4 a.m.</i></p> <p><i>5/11/16</i></p> <p><i>Immaninghan</i></p> <p><i>27th Bde.</i></p> <p><i>Tricket Officer</i></p>					
FROM					
PLACE & TIME					





Intelligence Officer  
7th Inf Brigade  
Kis.

290

Appendix No. 2.

34



Intelligence Report.  
5 PM. 4/4/16 to 5 PM. 5/4/16.

During the night the situation was normal. Except that enemy shelling with 4.25 & 5.95 in areas "23d & M 24 C" between 8 PM & 10 PM was slightly heavier than usual.

A Patrol consisting of Pte Brown and two others was sent out to examine enemy wire. They report that though their movements were considerably hampered by the heavy rain that we were able to get close to enemy wire about opposite our centre sub-section and observed that although there were plenty of stables for some erected enemy had only a small quantity of hay in between the stables at the spot visited.

Enemy indulged in spasmodic indirect machine gun fire during the night. The fire however was very light.

W. H. M. Smith  
for CO. 24th Bn  
4 AM 5/4/16



"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C.2121  
(in pads of 100).  
No. of Message.....

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  .....Service.	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.				Date.....
Secret	Sent			From.....
	At.....m.			By.....
	To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
By.....				

TO {	25 - 21 - 28	
------	--------------	--

Sender's Number. * Bm	Day of Month. 5 <sup>th</sup>	In reply to Number.	AAA
--------------------------	----------------------------------	---------------------	-----

During 15 men arrived at 25/26 Bm  
It may be necessary to camp at night  
last the troops know the time and day  
26<sup>th</sup> Bm which is only way up.  
The 26<sup>th</sup> Bm will take  
charge of Centre attacks. AAA. 26<sup>th</sup> 23<sup>rd</sup>  
Bm will attack by foot 1 by at the  
disposal and 1 by 26<sup>th</sup> Bm is  
cross in the way of 1 report 1 Bm  
AAA 26<sup>th</sup> 23<sup>rd</sup> Bm will be sent  
up as the same and should be known  
in time the original notes will  
be corrected. Cos commandants  
will be informed of the above  
and will be sent to the  
commandant of the 26<sup>th</sup> Bm.

From		
Place		
Time		

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.



PEPPER 5/11/16.

POPPY. Our attack was launched in good order at 9.13 am. Casualties passing over No man's land were numerous. Objective was reached on right and at other parts of line but no connection was made with our troops in the MAZE.

Enemy counter attacked with bombs on both flanks and after severe fighting our men were obliged to withdraw.

The enemy in Bayonet trench is in great strength and his troops appear fresh.

Bayonet trench is similar to our own and very muddy.

Enemy is in sufficient strength to counter attack.

Reinforcements should not be delayed too long.

I do not wish to call for SOS unless hard pressed on account of our numerous wounds in No man's land.

Our men are worn and hungry but quite cheerful & in fairly good spirits.

Lt Lane Lt Col

"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/s of:	Recd. at
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.						Service.
Sent					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	From
At						By
To						
By						

TO

POPPY

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* F 32	5		

Our attack succeeded on right but have since been bombarded out. aac. No reports from left Coy or company in second wave aac. Have ordered support Coy. of PEACH about 50 strong to occupy old front line aac. Am having much difficulty in collecting remnants of my battalion aac. Nearly all my officers are wounded or missing. aac. Can you send me re-inforcements?

PEPPER

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix No. 3

37



PEPPER 5/11/16

POPPY

Can you send me  
some fresh stretcher bearers  
forward - Many of mine  
have been killed or wounded  
and there are numerous  
wounded men awaiting collection  
and removal  
I only have <sup>eight</sup> ~~five~~ stretchers

J. S. Law  
Lt Col

PEPPER



PEPPER 5/11/16

POPPY

Estimate about 200 men  
including company of PEACH  
still in action -

Hostile artillery fire ~~is~~  
intermittent but generally  
severe -

Verbal reports to effect that  
Capt MALPAS severely wounded.  
LIEUTS. SOMMERVILLE and  
REES. Killed. LIEUTS. BLACKET.  
and MEASDAY Wounded and  
not returned to our line -

No reports received from Capt.  
DEVONSHIRE and WARREN.

SITUATION somewhat serious  
but I think I can hang on.

A good deal of hostile M.G.  
fire.

Have sent down a few prisoners  
making use of same as  
Stelche bearers. - Two of these  
were killed while carrying our  
wounded -

Can you give me any  
information as to situation  
on Right and Centre?

Have reorganised front line  
but rather thinly held



I have no troops in support  
 Bombs, Saa, Water, and  
 (4) rations are urgently  
 needed in above order.

Am endeavoring to obtain  
 information of Devonshire  
 and Warren and have heard  
 that Devonshire has dug in  
 with a few men about 50 yds  
 in front of our front line.

Let Slane Lt Col

PEPPER

SOS Rockets are also  
 required - these were taken forward  
 and have not been brought back  
 Jcs



MACHINE GUNS - 5<sup>th</sup> Nov 1916  
- Report Concerning Right Flank -

To 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade Head Quarters  
As arranged a sub-section consisting of  
2 guns & 23 O'Flaherty's, under Lieut. Ernest  
went over with the attacking parties on  
the right flank (27<sup>th</sup> Battalion) - in the  
2<sup>nd</sup> wave. At 11.15 am a report was sent  
to the CO. Company by this officer to the  
effect that the attack was held up and  
the line very irregular and one (1) gun on  
left of "A" Company temporarily out of  
action owing to mud etc.  
Am moving other gun along to the right.  
We are with second wave in advanced  
position consolidating more guns killed  
going over etc.  
At 2 pm a message was again sent  
from this officer to the effect that -  
He had fallen back onto the original  
front line and was consolidating same.  
A few infantry have dug in on the  
front about 130 yds. And that he  
had also taken over charge of  
infantry there apparently there being  
no officers left.  
His two guns both in working order  
are now in the original front line  
along with the 4 there previously.

230  
I have already instructed this officer  
to bring his 2 guns out - they  
will be replaced by 2 from the  
Heavy Section and under his field.  
Up to the present the total  
casualties for the right flank  
are 1 killed.

Nicholls Capt  
O/C 7.17. Inf. C



St. Leonards 1916

MACHINE GUN  
Report on left flank

As arranged previously a sub-section consisting of 2 guns & 20 O.R. under left flank, held O.R. with the 2nd wave in the attacking party (28<sup>th</sup> Battalion). Up to the present I have received no information concerning this sub-section at all.

I have asked Mr. Hutton who is in charge of the 4 guns remaining in our original front line to furnish me with what information he can.

I have issued orders to the effect that Mr. Hutton will have the sub-section from Reserve attached to his section for the night only in case of counter attack. He will find suitable position before attack.

No 3 Vickers guns in original front line for to-night will then be 12 with 2 in reserve & any additional guns, unless any from Mr. Bennett's company

290

which will then be additional in Reserve.  
Am unable to furnish any Casualty report concerning left flank at present, except the one already reported to B.G. & B.G. as soon as day - i.e. - Bayonet wound in leg. The whole - 633

Nicholls Capt  
O/C 7 Bn. C



290

**"A" Form**  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.**

Army Form C. 2121

No. of Message .....

Prefix.....	Code.....m	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Reed. at .....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions					
		Sent		.....Service.	From.....
		At.....m.			By.....
		To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
		By.....			

TO

7<sup>th</sup> Bde H. Qrs

Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

A A A

\* 5/11

I have to report that two mortars were employed in the second jumping off trench at the head of Goose Alley in charge of 7<sup>th</sup> Bde H. Qrs 30 rounds per gun were got forward with the greatest difficulty. At 3 minutes a sweeping fire was directed on the maze with apparently good effect as a number of the enemy were observed running back from their trenches. Turkey reports that there was very little of our artillery fire on this area and it was with great difficulty that the mortars were kept in action owing to the softness of the ground. Two casualties occurred Sgt Stewart wounded & Cpl Morton killed. The whole of my personnel were engaged in the operation and they are now quite exhausted and will not be able to do anything tonight. Gun crews have been withdrawn to H. Qrs.

From

7<sup>th</sup> Bde H. Qrs

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

(S.O. 1019). Wt. W 5148/M 701 50,000 Pads. 8/18. M.C. &amp; Co., Ltd., London.



Headquarters  
7th Brigade

I have to report the action of my Battalion in the attack of today the 5th inst. I detailed 3 Companies for the attack, the remaining Coy being ordered to occupy the front line as soon as the attacking waves had moved forward.

Parties were told off in each Coy with definite tasks for assaulting, consolidating, mopping up and bombing the objectives to be captured.

Careful bearings were taken on the flanks of each coy in the front line and sticks placed 10 to 15 yards from our parapets to show the direction of the advance.

At 9.10 am the artillery barrage opened and the three coys formed up for the attack leaving our trenches in two waves and at a distance between waves of 40 yds.

The waves moved off in perfect order, dressing was good, and the pace steady although the ground was very sodden and broken by shell craters and holes, progress was not fast on that account.

After the leading wave had advanced about 100 yards they came under a very heavy fire from the enemy, rifles and machine guns. The enemy was holding his front trench very strongly and could be seen standing waist high above



2  
his parapet and firing on the advancing troops. The barrage appeared to affect him not at all, and our shells could be seen bursting well to his rear. The advance, although checked, was continuous, and a fair proportion of the men arrived at from 30 to 80 yards from the enemy's trench.

All reports are unanimous that the trench was quite intact, and appeared to be quite undamaged from our shell fire.

The men, at this stage, took cover in shell holes, and replied to the enemy's fire with their rifles and Lewis guns.

Apparently, direction was lost in the later stages of the advance, as each company lost touch with the other, and the enemy's sniping, together with the small proportions of men who arrived this far, made it impossible to pick up touch.

Wounded coming through at about 11 am reported that our first objective had been captured but that our casualties were very heavy.

At 11.50 am, an N.C.O. from the centre



3

Company reported to me that this Coy was held up and was not in touch with either the right or left Coy.

Believing that the right and left Coys had gained their first objective, I ordered two platoons from the support Coy to reinforce the centre.

These left their trenches shortly after noon and appeared to suffer no casualties while they remained in sight.

I sent out scouts to both flanks and ascertained that this Bde's attack on the right had failed and that the 151st Bde on the left had not gained any ground.

I also sent scouts to the front to locate ground occupied. Somewhat conflicting reports came in, but eventually I had to realise that the attack had been a failure and that the men of this battalion would have to be withdrawn or reinforced.

At 5.5 pm enemy opened a heavy fire on our front line and NO MANS LAND. At about 6 pm this ceased and wounded men commenced to come in. By 7 pm, officers from each Coy reported that they had withdrawn their men without waiting for orders, each one being under the impression that their parties were all that remained. Total casualties have not yet been ascertained, but will be collected in the early morning.

5/11/16.

Geo. Lane H. Cole  
Cdr 28th Bn



Position of the Right Battalion  
 of the 151<sup>st</sup> Brigade 112  
 This battalion which is on the left  
 of the 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade is at present  
 in the jumping off trench they  
 report that they were held up by  
 Machine Gun fire from The Hook.  
The Centre Battalion

Reports that its  
 right company were held back  
 in the ~~centre~~ and left companies are in  
 the Grid Line

The Left Battalion  
 of The Quarry and have taken The Butte  
 and have established a post

on the Dapaume Road about 114  
M. 16. B. 9. 9 and a post in the Grid Line  
 about M. 17. A. 4. 7.



This Brigade wishes to know  
your present disposition  
Kindly send message and  
mention names of Battalions  
as I have not the Brigade Code

W. T. Murphy



"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Prefix .....	Code .....	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  ..... Service.	Reed. at .....
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Sent			Date .....
		At .....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	From .....
		To .....			By .....
		By .....			
TO { 7th Brigade.					
Sender's Number.		Day of Month.		In reply to Number.	
* 4/63		5th		A A A	
<p>Reports from front show positions to be          now as follows. Aaa. Left Company advanced          past first line suffering heavy casualties and          small remnant now held up in shell holes          on extreme left AAA. Centre company          practically wiped out but about 20 men          and not more than the same number of          the two platoons sent to reinforce are          holding shell holes at M18c 7.3 to M18c 6.6.          Aaa. Enemy in great strength opposite this          sector and on both flanking trenches aaaa.          Right Coy cannot be located but very little          hope of survival. Aaa. Position hopeless          unless strongly reinforced aaaa. Suggest          withdrawal of remnants to old front line          at dusk. AAA. Send instructions</p>					
From .....					
Place .....					
Time 3:40am					
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.				(Z)	
Censor.				Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.	
* This line should be erased if not required.					
750,000. W 2183-M509. H. W. & V., Ltd. 6/16.					



290

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL



"A" Form.		Army Form C. 2121.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.			
Prefix	Code	Words	Charge
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		This message is on a/c of:	
Sent		Service.	
At		Date	
To		From	
By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
TO		POPPY.	
Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* HB 24	6		
<p>Re my men detailed by you to work for MAJOR O'DONNELL aaa Lt. Fry reports that Major O'DONNELL cannot give him any information (exact).</p> <p>Re the work he wants done aaa No reports from the MAZE as to situation have come in at all aaa I am <sup>not</sup> prepared to send out my men to go out patrolling in NO MAN'S LAND as my orders from DIVISION are to</p>			
From			
Place			
Time			
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.			
(Z)			
Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.			

"A" Form.		Army Form C. 2121.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.			
Prefix	Code	Words	Charge
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		This message is on a/c of:	
Sent		Service.	
At		Date	
To		From	
By		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	
TO			
Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
*			
<p>work when the situation has been reported clear. aaa This is not so aaa I must have a direct order from Division to do this.</p>			
From	OC. 14 <sup>th</sup> F. Co		
Place			
Time	3.10 am.		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.			
(Z)			
Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.			

Appendix No. 3

51



7th Inf Bde

Work done by 14th  
F. Co night Nov. 5th / 6th

On the line M. 24 to 8 1/2  
to M. 24 to 3 8 1/2 a  
rough line trench  
was dug at each  
end for a length of  
50' by connecting  
up shell holes

No work was done  
in the centre for  
Maj O'Donnell

H. B. told Maj  
O.C. 14th F. Co

9.10.

am



## MESSAGES

Prefix .....	Code .....	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Sent			Service.
		At.....m.			From .....
		To .....			By .....
		By .....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO

2<sup>nd</sup> Aust Div.

Sender's Number. * 20.60	Day of Month. 6	In reply to Number.	AAA
-----------------------------	--------------------	---------------------	-----

Intelligence Summary AAA.  
 attack carried out yesterday morning  
 at 9.10 a.m. from jumping off  
 point N. 17.5 9.25. - N. 19 A. 5.8 1/2.  
 As far as can be ascertained ~~first~~  
 objective was reached. but position  
 could not be maintained owing to  
 strength of enemy and heavy  
 casualties were sustained getting  
 to the objective. AAA. The present  
 situation of the front lines still  
 doubtful though it is certain that  
 the ~~right~~ <sup>left</sup> ~~front~~ have been forced  
 back to original front line  
 owing to heavy casualties. AAA  
 we have made slight progress in  
 the MAZE

From			
Place			
Time			

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

750,000. W 2166-M509. H. W. &amp; V., Ltd. 6/16.



Hops  
1-A1 Bde

Secret

6-11-16

Your memo of to day.

Reference the attached map which I think is fairly correct, though there are a number of small gaps & lengths of trench not shown <sup>on</sup> it, but these are in nearly every case unuseable.

ABGC - front line - continuous trench. fire stepped where it is too deep to fire over parapet - very muddy in places though there are small positions in which men can lie down fairly dry - mostly cut into the parapet.

I think that trench AB is not as straight as shown - aeroplane photo would show. Whole length of trench has good field of fire - no wire - no dugouts - no duckboards - no revetment.

There are two artillery boards in position on parados. Section on these boards

<sup>would check map position of trench</sup>  
TURK LANE - H DA - mostly good trench.

In very muddy part on each side of H one can walk over the top as it

2.  
not open to observation.

GK J & Turk Lane. CT in fair condition - useable.

DEF is fairly wet but is used by 2<sup>nd</sup> Pn for accommodation of part of support coy.

FG is in much the same condition and I intended to improve it and use it for the accommodation of my support coy.

~~LC~~ LC has not been reconnected but is certain to be very wet.

GOOSE ALLEY is useable but wet - knocked about in places.

MDC is useable but shallow.

Trench at N does not exist for about 15 yards at the point marked N. Trench PE provides for accommodation for one coy.


QR is about the same.

The above information which is reliable is based on personal reconnaissance by Capt Fletcher & myself.

W. F. N. Bridges Capt  
2<sup>nd</sup> Pn Cdg 2<sup>nd</sup> Pn



290



1st Printing Coy. R.E. IV Army Sect. (805)

Yards 100 0



To Staff Cpt & H. Ryd  
 and blankets  
 Short of stretchers through non-  
 return from Ambulance AAA  
 Water and rations especially  
 candles needed today AAA  
 Shell dressings running short AAA  
 Should like run ration for bearers  
 & Affleck Cpt

5 x 16

and 25th Btn

Goose

GOOSE ALLEY M30 a 58  
 REGIMENTAL AID POST for  
 25th & 27th Btns

with staff  
 with M.S. Col  
 with M.S. Col



Reps.

1<sup>st</sup> A.I. Bde

Intelligence report.

Report this cannot be full.

B Coy left jumping off trenches at  
M24 ~~at 4 30~~ to M24 at 4 30 5 1/2

Objectives were enemy trenches from  
M24 ~~at 4 30~~ M24 8.2 and his second  
line from to

The first wave of the attack  
reached points within 10 or 15  
yards of first objective. Apparently  
the barrage lifted too quickly and  
the attackers were mown down by  
machine gun fire. The Coy commander  
~~was~~ was killed 10 yards from first  
objective and McCannell wounded  
both by a M.G. which had been  
concealed in a shell hole. The  
first wave was practically  
destroyed by M.G. fire. The second  
wave hardly got clear of the  
jumping off trench when  
M.G. fire was opened on them

2.  
and they were forced back. Not  
many casualties were inflicted  
by shell fire. The lessons  
would seem to be

(1) That troops do not advance  
over rough ground in weather  
like the present at the rate of  
60 yards per minute.

(2) That the best chance of  
success would be given by a  
very strong first wave. This  
premises a capacious jumping  
off trench.

Casualties estimated at 55%  
of troops engaged. Two Lewis  
guns were lost.

The Bn scout officer made a  
reconnaissance of the vicinity  
of the maze. Report attached.

C Coy were occupied in  
consolidating position won by 26<sup>th</sup> Bn  
Report of ~~of~~ attached

6-11-16

W. F. D. Bridges Capt  
cdg 25<sup>th</sup> Bn



"A"

**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.**

Army Form C.212.  
(in pads of 100).

No. of Message.....

Prefix .....	Code .....	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent		Service.	Date.....
						From .....
			At.....m.	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		By .....
			To .....			
			By .....			

TO {

Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

AAA

\*

At 11:30 AM left our front line trench at 24 B & C. and went along sap towards enemy line slightly left. Enemy snipers were very active from 18 d. 11 (10) also very accurate. Shells were constantly used. I could see our party from 18 d. 11 holding trench parallel to enemy line very close to the enemy captured trench. We had a working party digging a sap from 24 B & C parallel to the trench captured today. The party was working under very difficult conditions and subject to very accurate sniping. I returned by the same route to same ally and went thence towards the left of our sector but was unable to locate the 28<sup>th</sup> in their position on the right.

From

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

750,000. W 2186-M509. H. W. & V., Ltd. 6/16.



Adj. 15th Bn.

Report on work on night of 5/6 Nov. 18

The party consisting of 200 ft 50 OR. waited for shovels till 10 pm. Work was commenced till 12:30 am & the party left at 5:30 am.

The sap from M. 14 at a 94.6 to M. 14 at a 88 about 100 yds was cleared out and deepened.

A jumping off trench was dug from M. 14 at a 88. for about 50 yds towards M. 14 at a 18. where the logs were also dug about 50 yds.

Owing to the wet weather, damp nature of the ground & numerous flares sent up by enemy & constant sniping work was slow and difficult & we were unable to connect up the

ends of the jumping off trench.  
We had 5 casualties  
two being fatal.

W. J. Downes  
1st Coy



~~Secret~~  
Hqs

#7<sup>th</sup> AIBde

Your BM 141

Reorganization is complete & front laid down for 25<sup>th</sup> Pz in your letter noted has been taken over ~~that~~ with the modification that CO. 25<sup>th</sup> Pz and I have mutually agreed to make the entrance to Trench ~~lance~~ lane (M 24 A 28) the boundary between 25<sup>th</sup> & 24<sup>th</sup> Pz and the sanction of the Bde Commander for this arrangement is requested.

The present disposition is  
Front Line B & D Coy  
Charley Trench A & C Coy & Pz Hqs

Eventually one Coy will occupy the Pz front & another the support trench parallel to it  
This move will probably be

complete by this afternoon.  
Trenches are very wet and muddy - It would at present be practically impossible for men to climb out of the trenches over the parapet.  
~~these~~

W. F. N. Bridges Capt  
acty CO. 25<sup>th</sup> Pz.



Intelligence Report 26<sup>th</sup> Batta  
6/11/16

General Information: As far as I can ascertain our centre company is the only one who has held on to objective; the remainder has developed into holding of shell holes;

Our Operations: - C Company relieved D Company in the front line during the night; -

Enemy Defences - Appears to be a very strong point of the enemy on the right of Bright Trench; machine gun and snipers very active from this point; -



290  
The H.Q. 7<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade.

Minor Operation Le Barque area. Centre Sector

In connection with operation on morning of 3<sup>rd</sup> instant I have to submit the following report. <sup>Centre Sector</sup> ~~Centre Sector~~ <sup>my own Coy on the Centre</sup> ~~Centre Sector~~  
Under my command. One Coy of 207<sup>th</sup> Bn on right & one 25<sup>th</sup> on my left.  
The barrage ~~everything~~ that could be desired not a break occurring throughout the line. Each time the barrage lifted it could be observed quite distinctly sweeping the front. There was a difficulty in the landing wave keeping up to edge of the barrage after the latter lifted for the first 50 yards on account of the heavy going on the ground and also through the men having so much mud on their boots. The barrage showed lift slower under these conditions.

Quality  
of  
Barrage.

Departure  
of  
Attacking  
Lines

Notwithstanding the difficulty of getting out of the <sup>jumping off</sup> trenches the waves moved out punctually. There was no loss on the Centre Company of the Centre Sector.

Medical  
Arrangements.

At the Regimental Aid Post a difficulty arose in getting wounded sent on from there. The cold was severe and the exposure whilst awaiting removal caused much suffering.

Casualties.

The proportion of casualties of those who were actually in the attack amounts to about 60%. These were mostly ~~caused~~ met with in the first part of the advance about 100 yds. from the jumping off point. A total of 5 officers and 132 <sup>OR</sup> ~~Casualties~~ <sup>were</sup> ~~Casualties~~. Of these 2 officers were killed and 27 OR killed and 3 officers 105 OR. are wounded & missing.

Waves.

All our Machineguns were used.

Under conditions prevailing on this point 2 waves would appear to be ample though the fact that the enemy M/Gs. came into action on the 2<sup>nd</sup> wave immediately after the barrage lifted would indicate that a third wave area have to some extent dealt with these

over



Sept 10. The Banage shone left very slowly - one minute for 50 yards left - is too fast for men to keep up on such boggy ground.

2. A very strong 1<sup>st</sup> wave should be provided as the enemy m/gunners would not have sufficient time to get into position.

3. More time should be given for all ranks to go into the details of the attack as not enough time was given in these meetings.

Recommendação

These follow on separate form.

Montebello  
6/11/16

~~FM Board Map~~  
0088 Br



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  Service.	Reed. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions						Date	
At						m.	
To							
By					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	

TO { Poppy

* Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
-------------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

I have examined position at daylight. Am still of the opinion that BITE trench was not reached. This is difficult to determine owing to snipers being very active and shelling fairly heavy too. 11 AM. Pepper's Co. returned to Gen H.Q. and I have ordered my right Coy to hold this position lightly with Gen H.Q. Bombs a lot of rifles.

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  Service.	Reed. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions						Date	
At						m.	
To							
By					(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By	

TO { Contin.

* Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
-------------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

The trench being dug (report from PEAR sent you this morning) would tend to improve the jumping off position for a further advance. This requires digging and bunkering. A strong point is suspected about M 24 B 89. Except for snipers & shells no activity on enemy part. Present trenches very boggy. Have ordered both companies to move on M 24 B 56 to M 24 B 94. Now in position & connected with

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix No. 3

64



"A" Form.				Army Form C. 2121.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.				No. of Message	
Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions			This message is on a/c of:		Recd. at m.
			Service.		Date
			(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		From
					By
TO {					
Sender's Number		Day of Month		In reply to Number	
*				A A A	
<p><del>Bn</del> PEPPER Bn and PEAR Bn.</p> <p>The draining of existing trenches requires urgent attention AMT. In my sector this could only be done by night. As several men killed by snipers through working on top instead of in the trench owing to very boggy condition</p>					
PEAR					
From		Place		Time	
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.				(Z) J.M. Dorr	
Censor.				Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.	
* This line should be erased if not required.					
(15491) S. & Co. Ltd. W 14142/641. 90,000. 4/15. Forms C 2121-10.					



6/11/16. 29/33  
Brief Report on operation 5/11/16.

1. Artillery barrage was much too light and would have been much more effective had it rested on Objective (Bayonet Trench) for 5 minutes.

The German Garrison was apparently untouched by our Artillery fire and was able to bring an accurate musketry & M.G. fire to bear on our advancing infantry.

The barrage passed much faster than the infantry waves.

Considering the mud, shell hole, etc., and the fatigued condition of the troops, a much slower "creep" would have been better.

2. The 1<sup>st</sup> wave consisted of C & D Coys and the second of A. Coy (with Shells) and the Bomb Platoon.

Both waves jumped off punctually but and advanced in good order but were too tired & mud-clogged to keep up to the barrage.

3. Two waves would have been sufficient depth had they been more dense

5. The medical arrangements proved quite inadequate. Aid post was as far forward as practicable.

Advanced dressing station was made use of as much as possible but even with the double relay of bearers it was found impossible to cope with the number of casualties.

In addition to battalion establishment many more stretchers should be kept in forward areas.

Extra bearers from Q.V.A.D. did not report.

6. Our casualties were chiefly due to M.G. & Rifle fire and were very heavy. 10 officers out of 13 having been placed hors-de-combat.

Estimated the Casualties R.O.R. at about 60% = 450.  
So far only 3 out of 8 Lewis guns have been brought in.

7. Prisoners. We secured about 25 prisoners some of whom were killed by shell fire after being brought in.

8. The sudden re-disposal of my support company prevented me



from sending assistance to  
small units whose flanks  
were "in the air"

9 Bayonet pluck was demonstrated at  
several points, notably on extreme  
right and a number of enemy  
were shot. Two Automatic  
rifles were captured but had to  
be destroyed.

The enemy was in superior  
strength but could have been  
overcome had our troops been  
better & better supplied with  
bombs.

10 The enemy counter attack  
by bombing our flanks &  
portions of trenches held by us  
succeeded after 90 minutes fighting  
and our survivors retired into  
shell holes & gradually made their  
way back to our lines.

### - Suggestion -

1. That troops destined to carry out an  
attack should perform no other  
duties for at least two days beforehand
2. That forward dumps of bombs  
ammunition and

material should be  
established before the arrival  
of the assaulting troops

That troops be informed well  
beforehand of the nature of  
attack contemplated and  
up to date maps supplied to  
all officers. These maps  
should show all trenches and  
differentiate between British  
and German.

That time for officers to thoroughly  
reconnoitre the position without  
undue haste & consequent  
fatigue be provided for.

That Artillery barrage be  
intensified about six fold  
(The Porsche on our front has apparently  
suffered no carnage from  
shell fire).

W. H. H. H.  
27/10/19



Copy of Report from P.M.O. 27th Batt.  
To A.D.M.S. 2nd Aust Div.  
7.11.16

Subject

Treatment of Sick and Wounded  
in Trenches from 3.11.16 to  
6.11.16

1. Wounded. An unsuccessful attack was made and casualties were heavy. A number of killed and wounded being in no man's land. About 100 wounded passed through the R.A.P. mostly walking cases.
2. Evacuation. The number of stretcher bearers was insufficient. Practically all the time there were 30 bearers and they had to carry two miles. Some of them had already done 24 hours duty in another part of the line. They did splendid work but became exhausted with the result that cases had to remain at the R.A.P.

2.  
Four cases after being dressed had to wait 12 hours on a cold night without blankets shelter or hot drinks. After repeated requests Brigade sent a squad of bearers (6) from 24th Batt. After this the congestion was not so bad.

3. Blankets. About a dozen were received from 6th Field Amb on 6.11.16

4. Water & Food Unfortunately no supply of food or water was available as Battalion arrangements broke down. Four gallons were carried from Thicket Dump several miles distant by two of my A.M.S. Details on 4.11.16. Two gallons were received on 6.11.16 from the Lieut Capt PERIN who with Col MOSELEY made every effort to assist us. Had a supply of water been



3.  
 available every man would  
 have received a hot drink.  
 The six gallons together with  
 water from shell holes was  
 the supply of water for two  
 B.M.O's and 6 A.M.S. Details.  
 Only in isolated cases was it  
 possible to give wounded  
 men a drink.  
 5. Candles should have come  
 from Battalion but none were  
 available.  
 6. Regarding the "Purvis" Stone  
 could not be kept going as  
 supplies of oil ran out.  
 7. Small numbers of men reported  
 sick - being exhausted.  
 As the tactical situation was  
 serious I was obliged to return  
 many men who were really  
 unfit for duty. A hot drink  
 and a short spell would  
 have gone far to recuperate  
 these men.

4.  
 8. That the greater number of  
 the Battalion are at present  
 suffering from an early  
 stage of trench foot.  
 There is slight swelling  
 redness, extreme tenderness  
 and burning pain. Some  
 cases show marked swelling.  
 A thorough rest will probably  
 get them right again. I have  
 accordingly made arrangements  
 whereby men can rest in hut.  
 9. Dressing Supplies were  
 sufficient being replenished  
 by Ambulance as required.  
 J. H. Schachay  
 B.M.O.



Report on operations during Nov. 4<sup>th</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> & 6<sup>th</sup> 1916  
by C. G. 7<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde Snipers.

The programme originally planned for adoption during the above operations was cancelled owing to self being taken over at the outset by the Bde authorities for duty on the Bde Staff. On the 4<sup>th</sup> & 5<sup>th</sup> I had men posted at points of vantage covering the right flank of the Bde sector where they sniped the enemy & accounted for five of them. The remainder of the section were either on duty at Bde Hqrs or were detailed off as carrying parties for the 26<sup>th</sup> Bn, at which work they continued, invariably helping with the stretcher bearers on the return journey from the front line.

At 11 am <sup>on the 6<sup>th</sup></sup> was instructed to post men along the line until dusk for the purpose of sniping. I manned eight posts & men accounted for seven of the enemy during the remainder of the day. We men suspect that they inflicted heavier casualties than this on the enemy but cannot swear to this. Although heavily shelled at times, our own casualties are nil, & our establishment of telescopes & telescopic rifles is intact.

7/11/16

G. Harty Lt  
etc 7<sup>th</sup> Bde Snipers



Australian Machine Gun Corps  
7<sup>th</sup> Company.

6 November 1916

To: Headquarters  
of Aust. Infantry Bde.

Report Concerning Machine Guns in recent  
- Attack -

Two (2) Sub-sections were detailed  
to assist the attacking infantry Companies.  
i.e. - 1 Sub-section in charge of officers  
to Right Flank.  
1 Sub-section in charge of officers to  
left Flank.

Acting under instructions these officers  
took their guns over, just in rear of  
the first wave and ahead of second  
wave of attacking infantry.

We find that by this way of  
assaulting - less casualties occur  
than otherwise - i.e. going over and  
last wave and afterwards.

The left Sub-section finding  
out that the infantry were held  
up - promptly dived into  
shell holes - and there awaited  
an opportunity to advance; or  
suitable targets - neither occurred  
so they remained in these shell  
holes all day (after the infantry  
had fell back) and came in  
at night. The casualties on this  
sub-section was 1 officer wounded  
and 1 Junior, wounded.

Damaged sustained to gun - i.e. -  
but 8 feet bones had to be  
left behind, as a shell landed  
amongst them, and damaged same  
beyond repair.

The Right Sub-section, also finding  
out they could not get into the trench  
fell back into suitable shell holes -  
awaiting opportunity, and targets - As  
the attacking infantry fell back, towards  
their own front line - the British  
Machine guns fell back with them.



And Consolidated in our original front line awaiting an attack from the enemy. They remained here until ordered back to Company Head Quarters. The Casualties in this last action were: 1 Gunner killed and 1 Gunner wounded.

Damage to guns. Nil.  
H. Bell boxes had to be abandoned. Expecting a Counter Attack from the enemy our front line was reinforced: to 10 Victoria Machine guns - which remained there throughout the night. At 8 am this position of guns was reduced to 8 of which 2 remained in front line and 2 in support. Although this amount of guns on so small a frontage appears excessive - It was found necessary on account of the Battalion being very weak in strength - and therefore the line could not be held back. Victoria Machine guns.

Total Casualties for attack as follows.

Officers	1	wounded
Gunner	2	"
"	1	killed

2 Gunners were wounded in our own trenches throughout the day.

1 Gunner evacuated sick.

Material Damage <sup>Total.</sup> 1 killed 1 wounded 1 sick

12 belt boxes abandoned.  
All other gear retained to our trenches.

Nicholls Capt  
o/c 7<sup>th</sup> A.M.S.C.



## MESSAGES

Prefix.....	Code.....m	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions		Sent		Service.	Date .....
		At.....m.			From.....
		To.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By.....
		By.....			

TO

7<sup>th</sup> Bde H Qrs

Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

A A A

\*

6/11

In connection with the operations of the last few days the work of the mortar was limited owing to the bad condition of the ground and the absence of prepared emplacements. It is practically impossible to use Stokes mortars on soft ground as the gun sinks in itself. There was no ammunition nearer than there and it necessitated the employment of the whole battery to prepare and work a supply to the front line for the attack on the morning of the 5<sup>th</sup>. A carrying party from the 24<sup>th</sup> Bde arrived at a late hour but failed to improve the supply owing to the difficulty in getting across the country. As reported previously the MARE was successfully bombarded during the preliminary bombardment. Two casualties occurring on the afternoon and evening a supply of 140 rounds were worked over from there and prepared and gun crews were held in readiness to move forward if required.

From

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

(S.O. 1019). Wt. W 5148/M 701 50,000 Pads. 8/16. M.C. &amp; Co., Ltd., London.



"A" Form.				Army Form C. 2121.	
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.				No. of Message	
Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			This message is on a/c of:		Recd. at.....m.
			Sent		Date.....
			At.....m.		From.....
			To.....		By.....
			By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")
TO { 7 <sup>th</sup> Australian Inf B de					
Sender's Number.		Day of Month		In reply to Number	
* 4.116		6 <sup>th</sup>		A A A	
From	report	received	from	POPPY	
it	appears	that	a	party	
of	PEACE	is	still	in	
occupation	of	objective	about	M 24 D 19	
also	that	one	company	was	
sent	last	night	to reinforce		
them	AAA	The	Divisional Commander		
orders	that	every	effort	be	
made	to	consolidate	the	ground	
gained	AAA	JAY	on	taking	
over	will	make	all	preparations	
to	renew	attack	early	against	
GIRD	and	GIRD	SUPPORT	from	
point	we	already	hold	to	
left	of	divisional	sector	AAA	
addressed	JAY	and	POPPY	AAA	
acknowledge					
From	2nd	Aust <sup>n</sup>	Dw <sup>n</sup>		
Place					
Time	10.25 A.M.				
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.			(Z)	A. H. M. J. L. R.	
Censor.			Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.		
* This line should be erased if not required.					
(T1809) Wt. 14142-641. 45000 pads. 4/15. Sir J. C. & S.					



Dear Murphy,

Enclosed find rough sketch showing position which we take over. the position of trenches can only be taken as approximate as the maps of the 25<sup>th</sup> & 28<sup>th</sup> differ the dotted lines in front are bocche trenches & ~~can~~ old communication trenches

I have shown how I propose to occupy position for tonight anyway.

The 28<sup>th</sup> Battr<sup>n</sup> will send guides for B & D Coys. and the 25<sup>th</sup> B<sup>n</sup> will send guides for C & A.

The S.O.S. etc. you will get from Brigadier H.Q. Warn Coys to see they take over all flares Rockets Bombs etc. & that they have very pistols. There is some question about Lewis gun & ammunition to be left here by outgoing units and ours swapped. I would prefer using our own guns

as they are clean however that will depend on whether the arrangement has been already made. If Coys are bringing up empty magazines they can be swapped for full ones on relief


Sipers are active very! near front & support trenches

There are two dugouts available for H.Q. at present I have selected the O at Cobham trenches. (25<sup>th</sup> & 26<sup>th</sup> Bn H.Q.)

Yours sincerely  
Lt Col.

6/11/16







7<sup>th</sup> Bde HQ's

I have sent parties of Scouts out on the both flanks to ascertain whether any men are left of these Companies. The position is quite hopeless unless strong reinforcements are available to dig in on the new line. The German is in great strength and has undoubtedly got most of my men.

All direct communication with you is cut and I am waiting your orders to withdraw men who are left. Wounded should be collected tonight.

The old front line needs another Company at least to hold it. Can this be made available

5.35 pm.

Col. Leane H. C. 28<sup>th</sup> Bde



H. O. S.

7th A.I. Bde

7-11-16

B 107

Report on attack on morning of 7th.

B Coy 25th Bn was for the purposes of the attack placed under the command of OC. Centre Section of the attack. Its strength was ~~about~~ 2 officers and about 100 other ranks on arrival in jumping off trench. It was the left coy of the three attacking coys of the centre sector. The 28th Bn was <sup>attacking</sup> on its ~~right~~ left.

The first wave Capt Nix, Lieut Carroll and about 50 other ranks jumped off to time. From accounts they appear to have directed too much lost direction slightly not keeping contact with the 26th Bn on their right and mixing a little with the 28th Bn on their left. They apparently never got right up under our barbed wire as it lifted too quickly for them. Heavy going + boots and legs heavy with mud were the reasons for this. Three men were bogged in the jumping off trench and were subsequently dug out. It will therefore be seen that getting out of the jumping off trench took time.

The men of the first wave however did go across No man's land in an approximate line. About 40 to 50 yards from the first German trench machine gun fire was opened on them. Capt Nix was ~~wounded~~ killed outright about 10 or 12 yards from the German trench. Lt Carroll was wounded when almost on the parapet but no man entered the enemy trench. Very few casualties were caused by enemy artillery fire - nearly all were caused by snipers and machine guns. Only a few men of the first wave survived and these saved themselves by dropping into shell holes.

The second wave never really became a formed line. Before the men were <sup>all</sup> clear of the jumping off trench enemy machine gun fire had commenced. This became intense by the time the bulk of the men of the second wave had gone 100 yards. These men would then be 50 to 100 yards behind the first wave. The attack collapsed. The casualties were as far as it

Appendix No. 3



3.

ascertained 2 officers and 55 other ranks.

Point 1. The barrage is generally stated by survivors to have been effective but to have moved too quickly. The enemy was clever and quick in taking advantage of this.

2. The waves were to have moved at 50 yards interval. ~~The~~ The second wave could not get clear of the jumping off trench in the time it took the first wave to go 50 yards. ladders being knocked over, men trying to climb over the parapet failing & having to move laterally along a boggy trench to a ladder etc would account for this.

3. Under these conditions therefore a third wave would probably have intensified the failure which ~~was~~ apparently was due to the attackers not being able to get or keep close up to the artillery barrage.

4. Men cannot in heavy wet shell-holed ground leave a muddy trench and maintain the rate of advance of 50 yards per minute.

5. A time longer than 3 minutes is

4.

required before the first bombardment commences to move.

6. Medical arrangements. A memo from the RMO of this Bn is attached. He was however at an R.A.P. through which casualties <sup>mostly</sup> from the Right sector passed. Six of the 25<sup>th</sup> Bn stretchers were in practically continuous use from the morning of the 5<sup>th</sup>. They however carried mostly casualties from the left Bn. Poziers showed that 8 stretchers per Bn were insufficient in an attack. Here the Right stretcher bearers had a shorter carry but heavier going equalised that. I think five stretchers per attacking company would not be too many to provide.

7. Material losses. Two Lewis guns were sent out - Both were <sup>temporarily</sup> lost but ~~it was~~ subsequently recovered at night from No man's land.

W. F. N. Bridges Major  
tempy Cde 25<sup>th</sup> Bn.

290

Appendix No. 3

79



Adj 25<sup>th</sup> Bn

insufficient bearers have been available to remove casualties consequently the few available have been worked to a standstill casualties have lain outside the dressing station for as much as 12 hours after dressing without shelter or blankets

No rations or water have reached ~~the~~ this aid post since Friday when 27<sup>th</sup> Bn took over or hot drinks would have been given to casualties and bearers

I consider there should be 100 bearers at 403 and if possible they should be relieved  $\frac{1}{2}$  way. They could help the regimental bearers when not needed on usual errands

A supply of water oil for stove and rations especially tea coffee & cocoa and milk is required also more blankets

290  
At present there are 30. 7<sup>th</sup> F amb. bearers available they arrived midday Sunday already exhausted

J. Kelly Cpt  
Adj 25<sup>th</sup> Bn

GOOSE LANE.

RAP of 25<sup>th</sup> & 27<sup>th</sup> Bns

8-15 AM

$\frac{6}{11}$   
 $\frac{16}{16}$

Appendix No. 2.







"A" Form.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form/C.2121  
(in pads of 100).  
No. of Message 47

Prefix .....	Code .....	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  ..... Service.	Recd. at .....	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date .....	
			At .....			From .....	
			To .....			By .....	
			By .....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		

TO { 1st Lt. E. J. White

Sender's Number. 72 Day of Month. Seventh In reply to Number. AAA

Attached report forwarded ~~for~~  
for future operations where  
it is difficult to get  
grenades forward immediately  
after the assault a  
provision on these lines  
would be most useful

From W. H. M.  
Place W. H. M.  
Time W. H. M.

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.

750,000. W 2186-M539. H. W. & V., Ltd. 6/16.



B.D.

7-11-16

26 Bln

I beg to bring to under your notice  
in connection with our 4.5 R.V. operation  
that it would be quite useful and beneficial  
to all taking part in the above mentioned  
if a proportion of Mills Rifle grenades  
were carried by the men in going over  
in the attack and also a number of  
adapted cartridges be carried by each  
man. These could be used immediately  
if necessary  
as often delay is caused getting the

grenades up and carried to the spot  
when required. This rifle grenade if  
carried could have rod unscrewed and  
carried in pocket, this would not inconvenience  
since the man in the least and the  
rod could be simply screwed on if  
grenade were required to be used as rifle  
I might state that opportunities present  
themselves immediately our troops  
occupy their objective which do  
not present themselves <sup>after</sup> sometime has  
elapsed.

Lt Stapleton B.D. 26 Bln



290  
1 Coy  
W. B. B. B. B.  
SECRET.

8th Nov. 1916.

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 7th AUSTRALIAN  
INFANTRY BRIGADE BETWEEN 3rd and 7th Nov. '16.

PRELIMINARY. 7th Brigade took over the line from 14th Brigade on the night of the 3/4th. On the morning of the 4th Officers of attacking Battalions reconnoitred area. G.O.C. held a conference at 2 p.m. when draft orders were issued. Complete orders were issued at 7.30pm.

Carrying parties were detailed to take up tools, bombs, ladders to the front line. Ladders did not arrive till late in the evening and could not be fully distributed.

The 25th and 26th Battalions were ordered to march from CARLTON CAMP in sufficient time to be in position for attack by 5 am.

Owing to lateness of arrival of rations (7.30 p.m. at transport lines) and the fact that the 25th Battalion rations were taken up to the forward area on packs instead of being dumped and issued at CARLTON CAMP before starting, the 25th and 26th Battalions were late in arriving.

Fresh orders had to be issued and the troops now ordered to take part in the attack of Centre Sector were -

1 Company	27th Bn.	(originally Support Coy.)
1	26th Bn.	(the first to arrive)
1	25th Bn.	(first Coy 25th to arrive)

This attack was under the command of Lieut-Colonel J. Walker, C.O. 25th Battalion.

Support Companies were detailed for Right and Centre Sectors from 26th Battalion as soon as they arrived, and the remainder of 25th (2 Coys) was in Reserve at COBHAM TRENCHES.

NOTE - 1 Coy. of each of 25th and 26th Battalions were not available as they had not yet returned from detached duties.

Two Companies of 24th Battalion were employed on night of 4/5th carrying bombs, etc., from FLERS Dump to Advanced Dump and COBHAM TRENCHES Dump.

In the early morning of the 5th instant Brigadier-General J. Paton went up early to the Front Line to ensure that the hurried arrangements made for the Centre attack were carried out. While there he was sniped and was wounded in the back.

Lieut-Colonel J. Walker, who was with the G.O.C., then became the senior officer and decided to remain in command of the Centre Section temporarily and direct the attack from his Battalion Headquarters. He returned to Brigade Headquarters at 2 p.m. having handed over the command of the Centre Sector to Major O'Donnell, 26th Battalion.

During the night 2 Stokes guns had been emplaced opposite the MAZE and 60 rounds of ammunition had been carried up.

The condition of the ground and the trenches made the work of carrying very laborious and exhausting, and the whole of the personnel who took part in the attack were hardly in a fit state to undertake the offensive, though keen to do so.

It was intended to issue bombs, etc., to the 25th and 26th Battalions on arrival at the forward Dump, but owing to their lateness this could not be done.

THE ATTACK. By 9 a.m. all Battalions reported they were ready start. At 9.10 a.m. punctually the barrage commenced and the wave of the attack left the jumping off trenches. The second wave followed at about 40 yards, but some men were bogged and dug out. At 10 a.m. 2 Coys. 24th Battalion were warned to readiness to move up to COBHAM TRENCHES.



- 2 -

At 10.20 a.m. a message received that GIRD TRENCH had been captured. At the same time a verbal message was received from Centre Sector to say that objective was captured and was being heavily shelled by the enemy. At 11 a.m. report from 27th Battalion that BAYONET TRENCH had been captured, but casualties heavy. About 12.39 p.m. Right Bn (27th Bn.) reported their attack had failed as a bomb attack had driven them out and they were retiring to their old line.

As soon as report was received that Brigade on Left had failed to reach their objective O.C. 28th Battalion was informed and instructed to look out for counter-attack and take necessary precautions.

It was hoped the 151st Brigade would attack again, in which case an effort would be made to reinforce and consolidate the line held by 28th Battalion, in order to keep touch with them. One Coy. 25th Battalion was, therefore, sent up to come under the orders of C.O. 28th Battalion.

Further reports indicated that we held a general line M 18 d 5 1 - M 24 b  $\frac{1}{2}$  9 - M 18 c 8 3 - M 18 c 6 6 - M 18 c 6 5, and a portion of trench from M 18 c 3 7 - 1 9.

Orders were then issued to all concerned to consolidate after dark the line M 24 b 9 8 - M 24 b 3 9 - M 18 c 6 6 - M 17 d 9 3.

The 14th F. Coy Engineers and 15th Pioneers co-operating, the party still holding N.W. of the sunken road M 18 c being withdrawn.

At dusk, however, accurate information showed that the German trenches were no longer occupied with the exception of a portion of the MAZE. O.C. Centre Sector therefore was instructed to clear up the situation and dig in if possible on the front M 24 b 9 8 - M 24 b 3 9 - M 24 a 6 9, connecting up the left with GOOSE ALLY.

Instructions were received from Division to say 7th Brigade would undertake a small attack in conjunction with the 151st Brigade on the following morning. Steps were therefore taken to rest two Coys of 25th Battalion as much as possible during the night. These two Coys were put at disposal of C.O. Left Sector, Colonel Leane, to carry out the attack. The order was afterwards cancelled by Division.

The frontage of Battalions were now re-allotted to facilitate reorganisation and Units ordered to reorganise before dawn. 6th Brigade took over a portion of line from Brigade junction to M 24 b 9 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  and furnished a party of 100 to assist in the consolidation of new line during the night. O.C. Centre Sector consolidated a portion of the MAZE during the night and the 14th F. Coy. with assistance of 6th Brigade working party dug a length of trench between M 24 d 9 8 and M 24 d 1 9. The 5th Pioneers made no report regarding work done and it is understood they did nothing. Two Coys of 24th Battalion were employed in carrying rations, water, etc.

The R.M.Q.O. and Battalion stretcher bearers were lent by Colonel Watson and a party of 80 as additional stretcher bearers. The O.C. 24th Battalion remained at Brigade Headquarters and assisted in every possible way on the morning of the 5th instant.

On the 6th instant the Brigade Snipers were sent up as hostile sniping was reported to be severe, and during the afternoon shot 8 of the enemy and caused further casualties which, however, could not be definitely sworn to.

3

GENERAL. The attack failed, principally for two reasons.-

(a) The hostile trenches were undamaged by heavy bombardments prior to assault.

(b) Barrage moved too quickly. The men of the assaulting wave being unable to keep up with it on account of the mud and their exhausted condition.



(c) On both the flanks of the attack the barrage appeared to be thin and seemed not to exist on the right flank.

The enemy were composed of fresh troops and were present in large numbers and there were numerous machine guns in BANK and BITE trenches amongst other places, which were able to fire in spite of our artillery barrage.

Fighting continued all day and our troops caused the enemy considerable casualties by sniping from shell holes and bombing from the Advanced positions held.

Stokes mortars fired 60 rounds at the Maze during the preliminary bombardment of 3 minutes and forced a portion of the garrison to retire. Our artillery barrage appeared to neglect this area. A further 140 rounds were brought up by the battery during the night of the 6/7th.

Three Brigade snipers' posts established to watch right flanks of our attack. Shooting from our trenches shot 7 of the enemy during the day of the attack (5th). No Snipers' rifles were damaged.

Two sub-sections of machine guns advanced behind the attacking waves and established themselves in shell holes, and when the attack failed they were ready to deal with any counter attack. All guns were brought in.

On the right the 27th Battalion took about 25 prisoners, but only 3 reached the Dressing Station owing to shell fire and other causes.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS. These were quite inadequate, and the casualties suffered unnecessary privation and hardship and several died of exposure. The rate of evacuation from R.A.P's. was very slow and ~~had~~ ceased altogether for a long period. No blankets were available at the Aid Posts. Water and rations were not available for the wounded. Extra stretcher bearers were arranged for, but the work was so exhausting that the casualties were collected very slowly.


DUMPS. 14th Brigade reported that forward Dumps existed but these were never found. The stock at the Advanced Divisional Dump was inadequate, and had to be supplemented under Brigade arrangements by carrying from FLERS Dump, some distance away. This resulted in a serious shortage of bombs, etc., in the front line, which would have been even more serious had the attack been a success. Tools were not available in any quantity, only 250 could be obtained from the Engineers' Dump. There were no Reserve rations or water in the Brigade area.

Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining guides (reliable) for the various carrying parties of the 24th Battalion, and others, as the Brigade had been such a short time in the area and no tracks or sign boards exist. A guide cannot be trained in this area in less than several days working by both night and day.

CONTACT AEROPLANES. The absence of aircraft made task more difficult.

NO ARTILLERY LIAISON. Was satisfactory except for one officer who had independent line.

Commanding Officers are emphatic on the point that the shortness of time available for reconnaissance and preparations for attack are a very great handicap and mitigate against the success of such difficult operations.

  
Lieut-Colonel,  
tempy commanding 7th Aust Infantry Bde.



Reports 4<sup>th</sup> - 7<sup>th</sup> Nov  
Appendix 3.

*[Faint handwritten signature or initials]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*

*[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side]*