


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/44/37 Part 4

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 2nd  
Australian Division

August 1918



AWM4-1/44/37PART4

Ref. Maps : 62.D. S.W. & S.E., 1/20,000.

Headquarters,  
17th August, 1918.

1. The Division (less artillery) will be relieved by 32nd Div (less artillery) in "B" Divisional sector and area between 17th and 19th August, 1918.
2. The 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery will be relieved by 32nd Div. Artillery on night 19th/20th August under orders to be issued later.
3. The 5th and 7th A.I. Bdes. will be relieved in reserve left and right by 97th and 96th Inf. Bdes. respectively on night 17th/18th August.  
The 6th A.I. Bde. will be relieved in the line by portions of 96th and 97th Inf. Bdes. on night 18th/19th August.  
Transport in each case will move by road on the day preceding the night of relief.  
Command will pass on completion of relief which will be notified by wire to D.H.Q.  
On debussing, Brigade Groups of 32nd Div. will come under the command of the G.O.C. 2nd Aust. Div. until 10 a.m. on 19th August.
4. Moves and reliefs will be carried out in accordance with the attached table. Brigade groups will be constituted as laid down in Warning Order of 16th instant.
5. Subject to the terms of this order details of reliefs will be arranged direct between Brigade commanders concerned.
6. The relief of M.G. Coys. in the line will be carried out under arrangements to be made direct between the G.O.C. 5th A.I. Bde. and 96th and 97th Inf. Bdes. The relief of reserve M.G. Coys. will be carried out under arrangements to be made direct between the M.G. Battalion Commanders.
7. The reliefs of Engineer and Pioneer units and of Medical units will be carried out under the orders of the C.R.E. and A.D.M.S. respectively.
- 8.(a). On completion of relief the following Field Artillery will pass under the orders of the  
Div. :-  
G.O.C. 32nd  
2nd Aust. Div. Artillery  
14th Army Bde. R.F.A.  
The C.R.A. 2nd Aust. Div. will continue to officiate in command of the Field Artillery of "B" Divisional Sector.
- (b) The following Heavy Artillery Brigade now affiliated with the 2nd Aust. Div. will, on completion of relief, become affiliated with 32nd Div. :-  
21st Bde. R.G.A.
9. On being relieved the Division will be in Corps Reserve and will be disposed as follows:-  
5th A.I. Bde. ... FOUILLOY area.  
6th A.I. Bde. ... AUBIGNY area.  
7th A.I. Bde. ... VECQUEMONT area.
10. Administrative instructions are being issued by "Q".

11. The G.O.C. 32nd Division will take over command from G.O.C. 2nd Aust. Div. at 10 a.m. on 19th August, at which hour D.H.Q. will close at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and open at ALLONVILLE.

12. Acknowledge.

*L. J. Bonville Major*  
for Lieut. Colonel.  
General Staff.  
Second Australian Division

Issued at 6 a.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.    To.

- 1    G.O.C.
- 2    G.
- 3    A.Q.
- 4    C.R.A.
- 5    C.R.E.
- 6    2nd A. Div. Sig. Co.
- 7    5th A. I. Bde.
- 8    6th A. I. Bde.
- 9    7th A. I. Bde.
- 10    2nd A.M.G. Bn.
- 11    2nd A. Pioneer Bn.
- 12    2nd A. Div. Train.
- 13    A.D.M.S.
- 14    A.P.M.
- 15    S.S.O.
- 16    D.A.D.O.S.
- 17    D.A.D.V.S.
- 18    2nd A.M.T. Coy.
- 19    D.B.O.
- 20    D.G.O.
- 21    Camp Commandant.
- 22/23    Aust. Corps.
- 24    Aust. Corps R.A.
- 25    Aust. Corps H.A.
- 26    1st A. Div.
- 27    3rd A. Div.
- 28    4th A. Div.
- 29    5th A. Div.
- 30    32nd Div.
- 31    14th Inf. Bde.    )
- 32    96th Inf. Bde.    ) through 32nd Div.
- 33    97th Inf. Bde.    )
- 34    Liaison Force.
- 35    Troop 13th A.L.H.
- 36    Platoon Cyclist Bn.
- 37    2nd A. Div. Wing, Corps Rfts. Camp.
- 38    5th Dec. Tank Corps.
- 39    5th Squad. A.F.C.
- 40/41    File.
- 42/44    War Diary.
- 45/50    Spare.

MOVE AND RELIEF TABLE.  
To accompany 2nd Aust. Div. Order No. 214.

Appendix

Date	Unit.	From.	To.	In relief of	Embus at	Debus at	Remarks.
Aug. 17th	Transport 5th A.I. Bde. Group.	Reserve left	FOUILLOY area.	-	-	-	By road during day.
	Transport 7th A.I. Bde. Group.	Reserve right	VECCUEMONT area	-	-	-	" " " "
Night 17/18 Aug.	97th Inf. Bde. Group.	BERTEAUCOURT.	Reserve left.	5th A.I. Bde. Group.	-	W.11.c.8.7. Facing East.	About 9 p.m. Guides as arranged between Brigades.
	5th A.I. Bde. Group.	Reserve left.	FOUILLOY area.	-	W.3.a.6.3. Facing N.W.	O.11.a.6.1. Facing N.W.	Embus about 9.45 pm.
	96th Inf. Bde. Group	COTTENCHY.	Reserve right.	7th A.I. Bde. Group.	-	W.11.c.8.7. Facing East.	About 11 p.m. Guides as arranged between Brigades.
	7th A.I. Bde. Group.	Reserve Right	VECCUEMONT	-	W.3.a.6.3. Facing N.W.	N.4.c.7.3. Facing West.	Embus about 11.45 pm
Aug. 18th	Transport 6th A.I. Bde. Group.	Line.	AUBIGNY area.	-	-	-	By road during day.
Night 18/19 Aug.	96th Inf. Bde. Group.	Reserve right	Line.	Portion 6th A.I. Bde.	-	-	-
	97th Inf. Bde. Group.	Reserve left.	Line.	-do-	-	-	-
	14th Inf. Bde. Group.	DOMART.	Reserve.	96th and 97th Inf. Bdes.	-	W.11.c.8.7. Facing East.	About 11 p.m. Guides as arranged between Brigades.
	6th A.I. Bde. Group.	Line.	AUBIGNY area.	-	W.11.c.8.7. Facing East.	N.6.d.5.4. Facing West.	Embus by units as they reach embussing point.

NOTE. Movement during daylight either of troops or transport must be made in small bodies East of VILLERS BRETONNEUX.

Appendix  
183

"A" Form  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121  
(In pads of 100.)

No. of Message.....

Prefix.....Code.....m.	Words	Charge.	This message is on a/c of <i>App No 52</i>	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions	Sent			Service.
.....	At .....	.....m.	.....	From .....
<i>D.R.L.S.</i>	To .....	.....	.....	By.....
.....	By .....	.....	(Signature of "Franking Officer")	By.....

TO { *All recipients O.O. 214.*

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
<i>GA.45</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>aaa</i>	

Reference Order 214 para. 9. Destination  
of Edes should read 6th VECQUEMONT 7th  
BUSSI AAA Necessary alterations will be  
made in table attached to Order.

*Wardray*

From	<i>2nd Aust. Div.</i>
Place	
Time	<i>9.10 am</i>
<i>The above may be forwarded as now corrected.</i>	
Censor.	(Z) <i>[Signature]</i> Major, <i>D.S.</i>
Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name	

\* This line should be erased if not required.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 201.

From 6.0 p.m., 16th, to 6.0 p.m., 17th August, 1918.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.1. OPERATIONS.

- (a) Infantry. Posts were established at R.35.c.20.15., R.35.c.4.1., R.35.c.4.0., X.5.a.40.85.
- (b) Artillery. Usual harassing fire over enemy lines, shrapnel over HERLEVILLE and CRUCIFIX at intervals. Heavies fired on S.P.a.
- (c) Trench Mortars. T.Ms. registered on CRUCIFIX and fired 50 rounds on this point later.
- (d) Machine Guns. M.Gs. fired 21,500 rounds on following targets:- Cross Roads in R.36.c.05.70., and roads searched for 200 yards; sunken road in R.35.d.5.2.; WOODS in R.34.b. and R.35.a.; roads in S.8.b.; south-west corner of STARRY WOOD.
- (e) Aerial Activity. Our machines were active bombing enemy areas at night.
- (f) Patrols.
- (i) Two Officers moved out from FAIDHERBE ALLEY X.18.a.7.8. to road X.18.a.9.9. No enemy were encountered. Flares were fired from S.13.b.2.5. M.Gs. fired from 200 to 300 yards from this point. FAIDHERBE ALLEY from forward post to road is in good order, no obstructions.
- (ii) Three Officers went forward from CASTELNAU TRENCH S.13.b.1.3. Trenches in bad order to within 40 yards of road and filled with wire. Enemy has had a post about 50 yards up trench from road, which appears to have been vacated during the last 24 hours. A M.G. was firing from approx. S.13.b.8.3.
- (iii) One Officer and 3 O.Rs. moved out from X.12.c.20.95. proceeding direct east and patrolled trench from X.12.c.4.7. to X.12.c.45.95. Trench was found very shallow and in bad condition. Signs were seen of recent occupation.
- (iv) Patrol proceeded to Gun Pits about 175 yards in front of X.5.d.3.7., and reconnoitred Gun Pits and found them empty. Whilst here the enemy could be heard talking from approx. X.5.d.75.80. Patrol then entered trench at X.5.d.5.4., worked up about 25 yards. Trench was about 3 feet deep and looked as though it had not been used lately. Enemy movement was observed near SUNKEN ROAD.
- (v) Patrol moved along both sides of old C.T. to approx. X.11.b.95.80. Patrol was sniped at from trench system in X.6.c. Position at X.11.b.95.80. was maintained until midnight. No signs of enemy movement was seen or heard. An active M.G. some distance on the right could not be accurately located. Bombing was going on on Right Bn. Sector and RED and GREEN flares were put up there. WHITE flares were put up in front of patrol at approx. X.12.a.3.8.
- (vi) A daylight patrol from Right Bn. moved to X.12.a.6.5. from whence enemy was seen occupying trenches X.12.a.7.3. and vicinity.
- (g) Sniping. Active. Fired 26 shots and report four probable hits.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Generally much quieter. A 15 cm. gun fired on area X.10.a. from 95° T.B. from X.10.a.7.2. X.16.a. also received attention. Fire from 77 mm. came from south of STARRY WOOD and also north of HERLEVILLE. During the day 10.5 cm. and 15 cm. shelled areas X.2., X.3., X.4., X.9., X.10., X.8. and X.12. Between 10 p.m. and midnight a few shells (BLUE Cross) fell in valley X.10.a.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Marked change; very much quieter.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES.

- (a) Trench Mortars. Spasmodically active.
- (b) Machine Guns. Active during night on Support line X.4.b. and d. and along valley in X.4.a. and c. An active M.G. from CRUCIFIX swept track at X.11.c.0.5. Others appeared to be firing from VERMANDOVIERS TRENCH in S.7.b. Four active M.Gs. firing on our 'planes from approx. R.35.d.8.4. to X.5.b.9.3. all in dead ground. One active against 'planes from X.12.c.5.8.

P.T.O.

- 6. ENEMY DEFENCES. (Continued).
  - (c) Flares. Very quiet until midnight, after which the usual number were fired.
  - (d) Sniping. Active from R.34.b.5.7. A fixed rifle is suspected here as Sniper only fires at the one spot R.34.d.4.1.
- 7. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. Some bombs dropped on rear areas at 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. No reconnoitring patrols reported.
- 8. MOVEMENT. Occasional Germans seen in R.28.d. and R.24.a.3.3. Much crawling between posts in R.35.b. and d. Isolated transport on roads in R.36.c. A considerable amount of movement was observed all day to the S.W. of HERLEVILLE WOODS in vicinity of R.35.b. central. Enemy occupy a system of scattered pieces of trenches here and occasionally crawled from one to another. Frequently seen standing in these pieces of trenches, also at two posts at R.35.c.7.4. and R.35.c.9.3. Enemy also seen at R.35.c.8.6., S.7.b.5.5. and S.13.b.2.3. to S.13.b.2.6.
- 9. MISCELLANEOUS. Five large RED flashes seen at 112° T.B. from X.8.b.9.6. at 9.5 p.m.

*W. Murray* Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

CAPTURED ORDER. The following order issued by LUDENDORFF emphasises the importance attached by the enemy to strict signal discipline:-

C.G.S. of the Field Army. G.H.Q.,  
Ia/Ic Nr 5798 op. 19:12:17.

From a map issued by the British Intelligence Service, captured at CAMBRAI, it appears that the enemy was completely informed regarding the distribution of our forces in the line and the divisions which had been withdrawn. On the other hand, he was almost completely in the dark regarding divisions newly brought into back areas of the Army.

Judging by the military situation at that time, it is to be supposed that the enemy obtained part of his information from prisoners' statements. The larger part, however, he undoubtedly obtained from his Intercepting Service.

The opinion has been repeatedly expressed by the troops that the enemy, during major operations, would not be able to make use of his Intercepting Service.

This opinion must be vigorously combated. The enemy, and particularly the British, installs his mobile intercepting stations even under the most difficult conditions.

The fact that our signal discipline frequently is completely wanting, particularly on battle fronts, plays directly into the hands of the enemy's intelligence. The fighting troops must understand the necessity for this discipline, otherwise there is grave danger that the enemy will learn prematurely our intentions, which are calculated on surprise, and will be able to take counter-measures accordingly.

(Sgd.) LUDENDORFF.  
(I.S. No. 240).

GERMAN ARTILLERY ORGANISATION.....

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES (Continued).

GERMAN ARTILLERY ORGANISATION. A captured document gives the following allotment and organisation of artillery in the 41st Division (VILLERS BRETONNEUX Sector) on 13:7:18.

	Field Batteries.			Heavy Batteries.			Total Btys.
	7.7cm. Guns.	10.5cm. How.	10cm. Gun.	15cm. How.	21cm. How.	15cm. Gun.	
<u>Close-range group.</u>							
Northern Subgroup.	2	1	...	...	...	...	3.
Southern Subgroup.	3	2	...	...	...	...	5.
Mobile anti-tank batteries.	2	...	...	...	...	...	2.
<u>Long-range group.</u>	...	...	1	2	1	...	4
Unclassified.	...	...	...	...	...	1	1.
	7	3	1	2	1	1	15

This gives a total of only 32 field pieces and 17 heavy pieces, exclusive of the two mobile batteries. In addition, each sub-group had one dug-in anti-tank gun.

Other points of interest shown by the document are:-

- (a) The allotment of two machine guns to every battery is confirmed; even the 15 cm. gun battery possesses them.
- (b) One 7.7 cm. gun battery (F.K.16) and the 10 cm. gun battery are detailed as UBERWACHUNGS BATTERIEN, for the engagement of fleeting targets. Wireless stations are allotted to these batteries and to the 15 cm. gun battery.
- (c) In each sub-group, one 7.7 cm. gun battery (F.K.16) is detailed as an Ifl. Batterie (INFANTERIEFLIEGER-BATTERIE), to deal with low-flying aircraft.
- (d) The organisation confirms that given in Ia/49054 of 15:5:18, though in this case there is no heavy artillery in the close-range group. This may presumably be attributed to the very low allotment of heavy artillery to the sector.

EFFECT OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS. An order of 21:7:18 of the XI Corps (in line astride the SOMME) mentions the heavy losses caused to enemy troops by our bombing; instructions as to the avoidance of casualties are given.

The following is a translation of this order:-

G.O.C., XI Army Corps.  
Ic. No. 18090.

Corps Headquarters,  
21:7:18.

Ref. - Enemy air raids - Defence, Protection and Alarm.

CORPS ORDER.

The bloody losses recently caused by enemy air raids on billets and camps within the Corps area show that the system of air raid alarms is not well organised, and that the protection available against bombs is inadequate.

It is nearly always possible to give warning of the approach of enemy machines long before the actual attack takes place, and troops have sufficient time to shelter in the cellars and dugouts specially set apart to protect them against air raids. A sufficiently large number of shelters to take all the troops in the village or the camp should be arranged for, and should be clearly marked. All commanders will strictly enforce orders and ensure that these air raid shelters are occupied by officers and men as soon as the alarm is given, and that everybody remains in them until they hear the "All Clear."

P.T.O.



INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES (Continued).

Town Majors and Camp Commandants are responsible for the organisation of an efficient system of alarms. The type of signal to be issued, (hooters, bells, whistles, bugles) depends on the size of the village or camp. In order to prevent troops leaving the air raid shelter before the raid is over, it is necessary that a special signal be agreed upon for the "All Clear." I request all commanders to test frequently the suitability of their system of alarms and the conduct of the troops, by holding practice air raid warnings.

In future, Town Majors and Camp Commandants will forward the following reports, through the official channels, whenever casualties are caused in villages or camps by air attacks:-

- (a) Time of the raid.
- (b) If and when the alarm signal was given.
- (c) Whether the casualties occurred in the air raid shelters, or not.

(Signed) KUHNE.  
(Corps Commander).

13th Infantry Division.  
Ia.U.No. 1557.

Division Headquarters,  
25:7:18.

To the Town Major, MORCOURT.

Camp Commandants will report by the 1st Aug. 1918, that this system of air raid warning, as laid down above, has been organised, and that the system has been tested. The Division has nominated a committee which will visit camps in order to hold practice air raid warnings. (I.S. No. 240).

SITUATION AUGUST 16TH AND NIGHT 16TH/17TH INSTANT.

Between LIHONS and ROYE hand fighting by strong patrols took place yesterday throughout the day. Canadians advancing their line to east of BLAUET WOOD - east of SCHWETZ WOOD - possibly east of LA CHAVATTE - East of FRANSART to old line in G.l.b. In FRANSART - captured during the day - prisoners of the Alpine Corps were taken. This Corps is now fully engaged and relieved the 119th Div. and 79th Res. Div. between the 13th and 15th instant. The 38th and 121st Divisions were identified on either side of it. Both these divisions must be rapidly becoming exhausted.

H.V. guns were very active against our back areas up to 2.30 p.m. in this sector when the fire suddenly stopped, opening again late in the evening against our forward areas. This strongly indicates that the enemy in the interim moved his heavy artillery further to the rear. (I.S. No. 242).

PRISONERS. The number of prisoners who passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. is 22,248 of whom 482 are officers. (I.S. No. 242).

ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

- (a) The observation of the action of hostile H.V. guns yesterday on the LIHONS - ROYE front, strongly indicated that batteries were withdrawn to the rear during the afternoon.
- (b) No counter-attacks have been delivered by the enemy since the afternoon of the 15th instant, in the DAMERY - FRANSART area, although PARVILLERS, DAMERY, FRANSART and probably LA CHAVATTE have been captured by the Canadians and GOYENCOURT by the French, thus penetrating what until a day or two ago was the German main line of resistance.
- (c) The German meteorological station moved from NESLE to HAM on the evening of the 15th instant.

From the above.....

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES. (Continued).

From the above it would appear that the enemy contemplates fighting a rear-guard action back to the SOMME.

On the other hand, prisoners belonging to the Alpine Corps captured yesterday know of no orders to retire, or of work being done on back lines of defence, (The latter statement is borne out by air photographs). (I.S. No. 242).

MORALE OF PRISONERS CAPTURED IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE SOMME. While there is no doubt that the enemy defended himself with spirit in the sector north of the SOMME, there is a marked depreciation in his morale as compared with that of prisoners captured on 21:3:18. Amongst officers the opinion was almost universal that a decision would be arrived at not on the battle-field, but by negotiation. They however, maintained that it would be impossible to vanquish a nation with Germany's resources and organising skill.

Amongst the men the universal wish expressed was that the war should come to an end in some way \* that things might be patched up. None of those examined expressed the belief that Germany could win the war, but a number thought she could not be beaten in the field.

Among both officers and men the submarine warfare and the German offensives on the Western front are both regarded as having failed to produce the desired results - the former because of the number of American troops now actually known to be in France, the latter because of the recent German retreat on the AISNE is felt to be the turn of the tide. Prisoners attribute their failure on the SOISSONS - REIMS front, not to a lack of striking power on the part of the Germans, but to the exact fore-knowledge possessed by the enemy of their intentions.

The probability of Russia ever re-entering the war as an ally of Germany was regarded as out of the question by both officers and men. (I.S. No. 242).

RESERVES.

(a) No fresh divisions have been identified on the Fourth Army front.

(b) Two fresh divisions (127th and 6th Bav. Div.) have been identified opposite the French.

(c) There are now 10 infantry divisions in reserve fit to fight between the Sea and the OISE and 22 divisions (plus 2 dismounted divisions) in reserve in the Western theatre available for immediate operations. (I.S. No. 242).

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. There was a slight increase in activity during the period. 54 E.A. crossed the line of which 11 were artillery 'planes and 43 were F.E.A. The former were more active in the Northern sector and the latter more active in the Southern sector. One strong patrol of 15 F.E.A. was seen. As a result of 24 combats, 5 E.A. were destroyed and 3 E.A. driven down out of control. A new type of monoplane was reported.

(c) Movement. Railway movement behind the enemy's front seemed slight throughout the day, and very little activity was seen in stations in the Army area. Negative reports could not be given in the early morning, owing to large patches of cloud. VALENCIENNES station was reported to be very full at 6 p.m. There was a certain amount of transport movement on roads north of the SOMME, in the SUZANNE, MARICOURT, CLERY and PERONNE areas about noon. A column of troops, estimated at 600 - 800 strong, followed by transport, was seen moving west through BOURSIES, on the CAMBRAI - BAPAUME road, at 10.45 a.m.; otherwise no road movement of importance was reported.

Night and Dawn Reconnaissances (17:8:18) No unusual rail or road movement was detected during night-flying. Stationary lights were seen in MORCHAIN village and PARGNY WOOD shortly before midnight. Dawn reconnaissance work was impossible early this morning.

2nd Aust' Div. I.S. No. 201).

P.T.O.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES. (Continued).

BOMBING RAIDS.

(a) By day. 30 112-lb. and 48 25-lb. bombs were dropped on PERONNE Station and sidings and 89 25-lb. bombs were dropped with good effect on OMIÉCOURT Dump, PERTAIN and the dump east of CHAULNES.

(b) By Night. 2 112-lb. and 188 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets including VERMAND, ATHIES and ROISEL. Three direct hits were claimed on ROISEL and trains were bombed with good effect. (I.S. No. 242).

ENEMY REAR ORGANISATIONS.

Bridges. There is no change in the following bridges which are intact:-

QUIQUERY, VOYEMNES, - NESLE, ROUY le PETIT. (205V2689) BRIE. (48V4747). PEUILLERES (48V4748). (I.S. No. 242).

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Work and Wire. Prisoners who escaped yesterday from the German lines (route followed:- HAM - NESLE - COURCHY - between FONCHES and FONCHETTE - east and south of HATTENCOURT) state that they had no difficulty in passing through the wire in front of OBERON TRENCH and saw no signs of any fresh work at any point they passed. (I.S. No. 242).

ENEMY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AIR OBSERVATION. The following captured order of the XIV Corps, dated the 19th May, 1918, and circulated to the 77th Res. Division, in line south of the SOMME, and to the Town Major of MORCOURT, affords indirect evidence of the casualties and damage previously caused in that area by our bombing and low-flying machines:-

Concealment from aviators.

Town Commandants are to be instructed to insist on strict adherence to the following measures:-  
All vehicles in yards are to stand close against the walls and to be concealed from the view of airmen. Field kitchens must be set up under sheds or gateways. When visibility is good, roll calls, concerts and ration issues are not to be held in the open air. (I.S. No. 242).

2nd Aust. Div. I.S. No. 201).

Reference Map,  
Sheet 82D. -  
1/40,000.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*\*

Ga. 50.

Location of Units as at 10 a.m., 19th August, 1918.

Divisional Headquarters. - ALLONVILLE.  
2nd Aust. Div. Arty. H.Q. - O.28.c.5.4.  
5th Aust. Inf. Bde. - FOULLOY Area.  
6th Aust. Inf. Bde. - VEOQUEMONT Area.  
7th Aust. Inf. Bde. - BUSSY Area.  
2nd Aust. M. G. Bn. - ALLONVILLE.  
 5th A.M.G. Coy. - With 6th A.I. Bde. Group.  
 6th do. - With 5th A.I. Bde. Group.  
 7th A.M.G. Coy. - With 6th A.I. Bde. Group.  
 22nd do. - With 7th A.I. Bde. Group.  
C.R.E. - ALLONVILLE.  
 Field Coys. - With respective Bde Groups.  
 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. - N.23.a.1.1.  
A.D.M.S. - ALLONVILLE.  
 Field Ambulances. - With respective Bde Groups.  
2nd Aust. Div. Train H.Q. ALLONVILLE.  
 D.A.D.C.S. - O.11.central.  
 D.A.D.V.S. - ALLONVILLE.  
 Div. Gas Officer. - ALLONVILLE.  
 A.P.M. - do.  
 Paymaster - do.  
 Div. Canteen. - O.8.c.7.2.

*M. S. Dunnington*  
 for  
 Lieut-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
 17th August, 1918.

NOTE. - Immediately on arrival in new area units will please forward exact locations to D.H.Q.

*War Diary*

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

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Appendix 55

 HEADQUARTERS,  
 2ND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,  
 GENERAL STAFF.  
 Copy No. ....

G.1/958.

 Headquarters,  
 17th August, 1918.
Instructions No. 2; Series "C."1. Policy.

With reference to Instructions No. 1, Series "C" of 15th August, 1918, the Artillery policy on the divisional front will be one of aggression. The intention is to hold the enemy to this front and to give time for the destruction of enemy wire and strong points.

2. Field Artillery.(a) Emplacement.

Artillery is to be disposed in depth and normal tasks carried out by batteries in their normal positions. Batteries in forward battle positions will only fire in the case of a serious attack.

(b) Ammunition.

Ammunition in vacated forward positions will not be removed. Until all ammunition is salvaged daily tasks will be carried out from old positions behind present battery areas. In active battery positions 100 rounds per gun will be maintained above that required for daily tasks. Daily task allotment will be about 50 rounds per gun and howitzer on the divisional front.

3. Enemy guns.

Arrangements have been made for the emplacement of a certain number of enemy guns and the firing of the enemy ammunition at present in the area.

4. Trench Mortars.

Medium Trench Mortars will be emplaced as soon as possible and be allotted tasks of wire cutting and destruction of strong points.

## 5. Acknowledge.

*L. B. Bourne*  
 Lieut-Colonel,  
 for General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	C.R.A.
2.	C.R.E.
3.	2nd A.D. Sig. Coy.
4.	5th A.I. Ede.
5.	6th A.I. Bde.
6.	7th A.I. Ede.
7.	2nd A.M.G. Bn.
8.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
9.	A.G.
10.	A.D.M.S.
11.	Aust. Corps.
12.	Aust. Corps R.A.
13.	Aust. Corps H.A.
14.	1st Aust. Div.
15.	3rd Aust. Div.
16.	4th Aust. Div.
17.	5th Aust. Div.
	18. 32nd Division.
	19/20. File.
	21/23. War Diary.
	24/28. Spare.
	29. D.G.O.

\*\*\*\*\*

War Diary

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 215.

Copy No.....

\*\*\*\*\*

Reference maps - 62D., S.W. & S.E.,  
1/20,000.Headquarters,  
18th August, 1918.

1. The 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery will be relieved by 32nd Div. Artillery in "B" Divisional sector on nights 18th/19th and 19th/20th August.

2. One section per battery will be relieved on night 18th/19th August, remaining two sections being relieved on night 19th/20th August.

3. All details of relief will be mutually arranged between C.R.A.'s concerned.

4. On relief 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery will move to CORBIE, billets being obtained from Area Commandant, CORBIE.

On night 20th/21st August, 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery will move to VEQUEMONT, billets being obtained from Area Commandant, DAOURS.

On relief Headquarters of 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery will be established at ALLONVILLE.

5. Command of Field Artillery covering "B" Divisional front will pass from C.R.A., 2nd Aust. Division, to C.R.A., 32nd Division, at 10 a.m. on 20th August.

C. Acknowledge

*A. J. Borwick Major*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
707 General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 12 noon.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>	
1.	G.O.C.	
2.	G.	
3.	A.Q.	
4.	C.R.A.	
5.	C.R.E.	
6.	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	
7.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.	
8.	6th do.	26. 1st Aust. Division.
9.	7th do.	27. 3rd Aust. Division.
10.	2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.	28. 4th Aust. Division.
11.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	29. 5th Aust. Division.
12.	2nd Aust. Div. Train.	30. 32nd Division.
13.	A.D.M.S.	31. Liaison Force.
14.	A.P.M.	32. Platoon, Cyclist Bn.
15.	S.S.O.	33. 3rd Squad. A.F.C.
16.	D.A.D.O.S.	34. 5th Bde. Tank Corps.
17.	D.A.D.V.S.	35. Area Commandant, CORBIE
18.	2nd Aust. M. T. Coy.	36. " DAOURS.
19.	D.B.O.	37/38. File.
20.	D.G.O.	39/41. War Diary.
21.	Camp Commandant,	42/44. Spare.
22/23.	Aust. Corps.	
24.	Aust. Corps R.A.	
25.	Aust. Corps H.A.	

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 202.

From 6.0 p.m., 17th, to 6.0 p.m., 18th August, 1918.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry. Action was taken by Right Bn. yesterday afternoon. Patrol moved up trench running north and south through S.7.b.2.0. to a point S.7.d.35.40. Some opposition was encountered and we were forced to withdraw to S.7.d.3.1. after a bombing fight. At 4.15 a.m. our Right and Centre Bns. attacked enemy front posts under an Artillery barrage. Strong opposition was met with but our objective was gained on the right. Our line now runs approx. S.13.b.3.1., thence north along SAURIEN ALLEY to junction with ENGLISH ALLEY at X.12.a.55.55., thence due north to X.6.c.5.2., thence west to original front line at X.5.d.8.1. One Officer and 10 O.Rs. have been taken prisoners and identifications of a new division established.

(b) Artillery. Usual harassing fire during night and 4.15 a.m. a barrage was placed on enemy front line. Further artillery assistance was requested and obtained in connection with this operation to cover our consolidation.

(c) Trench Mortars. T.M's. co-operated with Infantry operation.

(d) Machine Guns. M.G's. also co-operated by barrage fire on west side of HERLEVILLE and trenches on S.7.b. and S.8.a. and S.8.c. Two guns moved forward with attacking infantry. Harassing fire was also carried out during the night. Total number of rounds fired 31,000.

(e) Patrols. Nothing to report.

(f) Sniping. Over 200 shots fired yesterday during bombing operation on Right Bn. front. Shooting was so rapid that casualties caused could not be recorded, but it is considered that a number were inflicted.

(g) Aerial Activity. Our 'planes were active and predominant.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS. Prisoners of 28th R.I.R., 185th Div. were taken last night. Dead bodies also gave identifications of 65th I.R. and 161st I.R.

3. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND DISPOSITIONS.

185th Div. - North to South - 65th I.R.  
28th R.I.R.  
161st I.R.

Dispositions of 28th R.I.R. prisoners' statements did not agree as to detailed dispositions. Three Coys. of the 2nd Bn., however, were identified in line, these appear to have a platoon on outpost with remaining platoons echeloned in depth. The 1st and 3rd Bns. are stated to be some 500 - 600 metres to the rear in trenches, one Bn. being about 100 metres behind the other. The 8th Coy. of the 2nd Bn. appears to be in support, the 5th Coy. was also in support, but was called up to reinforce the line owing to our penetration during the last few days.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Heavy shelling of X.4. and X.10. between 6 p.m. and 7.25 p.m. consisting of 77 mm. and 10.5 cm. and again on same area from 7.55 p.m. to 8.10 p.m. Heavy on X.2., X.3. and X.4., X.9. and X.10. at intervals between 1.15 a.m. and 6.10 a.m. Mostly 77 and 105 mm. YELLOW Cross gas shells on X.4. at 10.45 p.m. Retaliation on our fire at 4.15 a.m. was fairly heavy and consisted of all calibres up to 15 cm. and L.T.M.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Alert and resisting, due to the presence of a fresh division in the sector.

6. ENEMY AIRCRAFT. An E.A. flew over our lines at 5.45 a.m., otherwise inactive.

8. MOVEMENT. Individual movement constant to north and west of SOYECOURT. Very little movement in forward area except during infantry operations.

P.T.O.

War Diary

9. MISCELLANEOUS.

Balloons up on T.B. 80°, 110° from X.8.b.9.6. Enemy snipers active. One at R.34.b.6.7. is very keen and accurate.

Reliefs. The 28th R.I.R. relieved the 376 I.R. three days ago. The 185th Div. was in line from 16th May to 3rd August in the ARRAS sector, then rested for 8 days at VILLERS, and moved down to MARCHELPOT, where it remained for three days. The whole division has now been identified in line by prisoners and shoulder straps of men killed on 17th instant.

Strengths. 5th Coy. 28 R.I.R. - 2 Off. 76 O.R. 4 L.M.Gs.  
6th Coy. 28 R.I.R. - \*2 Off. 80 O.R. 4 - 5 L.M.Gs.  
7th Coy. 28 R.I.R. - 1 Off. 60 O.R. 4 L.M.Gs.  
\*One now captured.

Moral. Though of poor physique, prisoners were of fair moral.

Condition of trenches and wire. Prisoners stated that trench systems they occupied to the rear were in poor condition, being overgrown with grass. No work had been done on these trenches, and they were not wired. No G.T's. were used, though some old overgrown and fallen in ones existed.

Light Signals. Prisoners' statements as to the signals for barrage, destructive fire and lengthen range did not agree.

Losses. Up to to-day's operation, few.

Intentions. Prisoners had no knowledge of any orders either for an enemy attack or for a withdrawal. They were told to expect an attack by us this morning. No orders were given by counter-attacks, which appear to be organised by officers on the spot.

*Hollings* Capt  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

SITUATION AUGUST 17TH AND NIGHT 17TH/18TH INSTANT.

North of the SOMME, the situation remains unchanged. No hostile patrols were encountered. The enemy heavily shelled the BOIS de TAILLES last night.

Between the SOMME and the AMIENS - ST.QUENTIN Road, our line was advanced to a depth of about 500 yards on a 500 yards front, and a minor enterprise carried out against LUC Wood (R.3.b.) resulted in the capture of prisoners. Fighting patrols in the PROYART area raided 3 strong posts and in spite of an immediate counter-attack succeeded in bringing back 7 prisoners and 3 machine guns.

Between LIHONS and ROYE, patrols pushed forward and established posts on the eastern edge of LA CHAVATTE. During the day our artillery bombarded the FRESNOY - HATTENCOURT line from 3 p.m. to 8.45 p.m. Retaliation was not marked until we put down a few minutes intense bombardment, when the hostile reply was considerable. Prisoners of the 121st Div. were again captured in the FRESNOY area. In the vicinity of ROYE, the French made considerable progress. From a Battalion Order captured during the fighting it is apparent that the 204th Division is very exhausted and that the enemy intend retiring to a line further in rear. Elements of this Div. have been also captured by our troops.

Since 16th August the First French Army has advanced 3 k.m. on a front of 12 k.m. and captured over 1000 prisoners. (S.I. No 245).



INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES. (Continued).PRISONERS.

The number of prisoners who passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. up to 6 p.m. last night is 22,276 of whom 484 are officers.  
(I.S. No. 243).

RESERVES.

- (a) The 185th Div. from reserve is now wholly engaged in the HERLEVILLE sector.
- (b) The Jaegar Div. from reserve has gone into line near SOISSONS, hence is not available to reinforce this front.

40 divisions (plus elements of another division) have now been engaged in the battle, of which the Fourth Army has taken prisoners belonging to 27.

There are now 20 Infantry divisions fit to fight in reserve in the Western theatre, of which 9 are between the Sea and the CISE.

MORALE OF THE 204TH DIVISION, HOLDING THE LINE ASTRIDE THE ROYE ROAD, AND THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS IN THAT AREA.

A battalion order dated the 15th August and issued by the O.C., 1st Bn., 14th R.I.R. (204th Div.) was captured by the French and is given below:-

1. The garrison of the advanced zone must be disposed of in such a manner as to give the enemy the illusion that the old line of principal resistance is still being held with the same effectives.

The lack of men must be compensated for by great activity and mobility. The command of advanced "Groups" must, before all, be very mobile, and for this purpose the best men must be chosen.

2. The withdrawal to the new principal line of resistance must be made step by step, (constant contact with the enemy must be maintained, and the longest resistance possible must be offered at every available point).

3. Every man in the battalion must be convinced that I am perfectly aware of the deplorable state of my troops. I have taken full notice of it, and have advised the Higher Command to the best of my ability.

I have explained that the excessive exhaustion of my men is an immediate danger for the sector they are holding. However, our duty towards our country demands that we should make our last efforts to accomplish the heavy tasks which have been assigned to us. Every man must remember that the country is at present in the greatest danger, and that we have been called to avert this danger from her.  
(I.S. No. 243).

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Hostile aeroplane activity was below normal. 4 artillery and 54 F.E.A. crossed the line. Artillery machines were evenly distributed over the whole front, but F.E.A. decreased in the Northern sector and increased over the central and southern sectors.

One strong patrol of F.E.A. was seen flying high and several smaller ones were seen chiefly over the southern sector.

As a result of the fighting yesterday two H.A. were destroyed. None of our 'planes are missing.

No long distance reconnaissance flights were reported.

(c) Movement. Flying was impossible yesterday morning, owing to strong wind and clouds; conditions improved slightly later. The amount of train movement seen was slight, but observation of railways

in the Army area .....

5/196

in the Army area was intermittent. Road movement centred in the area north of the SOMME, where a great deal of transport traffic was repeatedly seen during the day. The CONTREMAISON - BAZENTIN, FRICOURT - MONTAUBAN, and GARNOY - MARICOURT roads were chiefly used; during the afternoon the main trend seemed to be towards the line. In the evening the army on our left reported increased transport activity, with an eastward tendency, in the BAPAUME District.

The above seems to indicate reliefs north of the SOMME. The enemy's anti-aircraft was especially active against our machines reconnoitring that area. (I.S. No. 245).

#### LIGHT SIGNALS.

An order issued by the 121st Division on the 13th August, states that from 10 p.m. on 13th instant, Light Signals will be as under:-

- ANNIHILATING FIRE - Green with shower; or, green double stars at regular intervals.
- BARRAGE FIRE. - Green, with one star.
- LENGTHEN RANGE. - Yellow, where possible with wave bullets.
- SHORTEN RANGE. - Red, where possible with parachute. (I.S. No. 243).

#### SHORTAGE OF HORSES IN THE GERMAN ARMY.

(a) The shortage of horses in the German Army is emphasised by Ludendorff in a secret order dated 10:7:18, from which the following passage is taken:-

"We must take care of our horses as they cannot be replaced. The men must thoroughly understand that this is absolutely necessary in order to continue the war until victory is reached."

(b) The drastic measures now being adopted to obtain remounts in the German Army are illustrated by the statement of a prisoner of the 214th Division to the effect that, a fortnight ago, 900 remounts had been received by the division which were nearly all riding horses taken from officers. (I.S. No. 243).

#### DISBANDING OF GERMAN REGIMENTS.

According to prisoners of the 52nd Res. Div. captured on the 9th August North of KEMMEL, the 609th Inf. Regt. a draft producing unit, which was employed on guarding the Dutch frontier, and had never left Germany, was disbanded on the 25th February, 1918. It was sent to the recruit depots of various divisions, 500 N.C.Os. and men being allotted to the field recruit of the 52nd Res. Div. (I.S. No. 243).

2nd Aust. Div. I. S. No. 202.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Ga.61.

Ref. Map  
Sheet 62D.  
1/40,000.  
-----Location of Units as at Noon, 20th August, 1918.

<u>Divisional Headquarters -</u>		ALLONVILLE
<u>G. R. A.</u>		ALLONVILLE.
<u>2nd Aust. Div. Arty Units.</u>		In Line under 32nd Div.
<u>G. R. E.</u>		ALLONVILLE.
5th Field Coy. A.E.	Billet 44	FOUILLOY.
6th do.	" 9	DAOURS.
7th do.	H.35.c.5.6.	
<u>5th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>	0.5.c.2.0.	
17th Battalion	0.9.d.8.7.	
18th do.	0.11.a.8.4.	
19th do.	0.10.c.8.8.	
20th do.	0.5.c.5.4.	
5th A.L.T.M. Bty.	0.5.c.1.0.	
<u>6th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>	Chateau.	VECQUEMONT.
21st Battalion	0.1.c.1.3.	
22nd do.	0.1.c.1.3.	
23rd do.	N.6.d.6.5.	
24th do.	N.6.d.3.5.	
6th A.L.T.M. Bty.	N.6.d.6.5.	
<u>7th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>	Billet 16	BUSSY.
25th Battalion	H.35.b.4.8.	
26th do.	Billet 5.	BUSSY.
27th do.	H.35.b.cent.	
28th do.	Billet 66	BUSSY.
7th A.L.T.M. Bty	Billet 76	BUSSY.
<u>2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.</u>	N.23.a.1.1.	
<u>2nd Aust. M.G. Battalion H.Q.</u>	N.6.d.35.00.	DAOURS.
5th Aust. M.G. Coy.	N.6.d.3.0.	DAOURS.
6th do.	0.10.a.cent.	FOUILLOY.
7th do.	N.6.d.60.05.	DAOURS.
22nd do.	H.35.d.3.9.	BUSSY.
<u>A. D. M. S.</u>		ALLONVILLE.
5th Field Ambulance	0.4.d.4.0	FOUILLOY.
6th do.	N.6.c.9.3 The Marie	DAOURS.
7th do.	The Marie	BUSSY.
<u>2nd Aust. Div. Train H.Q.</u>	N.12.a.5.8.	DAOURS.
15th A.A.S. Coy.	0.18.c.5.3.	
16th do.	0.15.b.3.7.	
17th do.	0.10.b.5.0.	
20th do.	0.18.a.5.9.	
<u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u>		
D.A.P.O.S.	0.11.central	
D.A.D.V.S. and Paymaster		ALLONVILLE.
2nd Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	N.12.b.7.2.	
Div. Gas Officer and A.P.M.		ALLONVILLE.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
19th August, 1918.

*J. J. Bowrick Major*  
for  
Lieut. Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Corrections to be notified to D.H.Q. at once.  
TO BE DESTROYED ON RECEIPT OF A LATER ISSUE.

*War Diary*

DAILY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.From Army I. S. No. 244.SITUATION AUGUST 18TH AND NIGHT 18TH/19TH INST.

North of the SOMME, a post was established by our troops east of TAILLES WOOD, but other attempts to gain ground met with resistance.

Considerable movement of transport and infantry has been seen during the last 24 hours on roads in the PERONNE - COMBLES - MONTAUBAN - MARICOURT area. This strongly indicates that a divisional relief is in progress. It is possible that the 58th Division, from FLANDERS, has arrived in this vicinity, and may be relieving the elements of the several divisions engaged between BRAY and DERNANCOURT. Confirmation of this is required.

PRISONERS.

The number of prisoners who passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. up to 6 a.m. to-day, 19th, is 22,295 of which 484 are officers.

ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

(a) Prisoners captured yesterday belonging to the 185th Div. state that they have received orders to hold the line and are ignorant of any intention on the part of the enemy to withdraw.

(b) Our Right Corps reports that every prisoner recently captured, who has knowledge of orders, states that if attacked strongly the line is to be withdrawn.

A prisoner belonging to a pioneer battalion, captured by the French near ST. MARD, west of ROYE, states he has been employed in laying mines on roads, etc., and that intention is to retire, starting on night 19th/20th instant, to general line NESLE - AVRICOURT, and that heavy artillery is already moved east.

RESERVES.

(a) It is possible that the 58th Div., from FLANDERS, and the 46th Res. Div. from the MARNE front, may be about to reinforce the line N. of the SOMME, and in the ROYE area respectively. This is given with reserve.

(b) Forty (40) divisions, plus elements of another division, have now been engaged in the present battle.

There are now 19 infantry divisions, fit to fight, in reserve in the Western Theatre, and 9 of these Divs. are between the Sea and OISE.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Enemy aircraft activity showed a considerable decrease, probably on account of the less favourable flying weather. Seven F.E.A. crossed the line. The decrease in the number of F.E.A. seen was more noticeable in the southern sector. No combats took place.

(b) Artillery. (up to 6 p.m., 18th August, 1918).

In the ALBERT sector, hostile artillery activity was below normal. BUIRE was lightly shelled and the area N. of the village was subjected to light gas shelling. A 15 cm. H.V. gun fired on HEILLY.

Between the ANCRE and the SOMME, there was little hostile fire except during the night. At 1.40 a.m. a heavy barrage was put down on TAILLES WOOD and the front line. Gas shells also were fired into the Wood and the front line. Gas shells also were fired into the Wood 10 minutes after the barrage commenced. MORLANCOURT was intermittently shelled by all calibres up to 21 cm. and gas shells were directed against one of our battery positions west of the village. Several points in GRESSAIRE WOOD were registered with aeroplane observation.

P.T.O.

War Diary

(b) Artillery (Continued).

Between the SOMME and the AMIENS - CHAULNES railway, enemy shelling was moderately active. At 6.30 p.m. and again at 6.50 p.m., a burst of fire in the nature of a barrage was put down on our trenches astride the ROSIERES - HERLEVILLE Road.

During the night, harassing fire was kept up against villages and communications in the forward areas. MORCOURT and PROYART were subjected to continuous fire during the day, and activity against forward areas continued. H.V. guns shelled ROSIERES and the road between HARBONNIERES and VAUVILLERS.

South of the AMIENS - CHAULNES railway, hostile shelling was less active, though harassing fire continued. A 10-minute barrage was put down, at 8.40 p.m., on the forward area between CHILLY and FOUQUESCOURT.

During the day harassing fire was carried out against villages in the captured area, and against two battery positions north of QUESNOT.

Long range guns from the direction of NESLE heavily shelled the southern portion of MEHARICOURT. A certain number of guns in this sector, especially H.V. guns, are reported to be firing at nearly extreme range.

Hostile artillery planes carried out 13 flights, of which 8 were ranging. Seven targets were engaged, with varying success. Activity was chiefly between DERNANCOURT and BRAY-sur-SOMME, and in the RAINE-COURT - VAUVILLERS neighbourhood.

(c) Movement. Only slight railway activity was reported yesterday, but reports are incomplete owing to clouds over the Army area all day. Rolling Stock in the various stations was much below normal, excepting at OLERY (see below), and at PERONNE, where about 200 trucks were seen, at 7.30 p.m.

Roads north of the SOMME were again abnormally active. Fifty M.T. were seen entering PERONNE from AIZECOURT, and about 60 M.T. scattered between PERONNE and FRICOURT, at about 1.45 P.m. Shortly afterwards, about a battalion of infantry marched west on the MARICOURT - BRAY road, accompanied by M.T., and a party of about 100 men marched towards OLERY from PERONNE. PERONNE was active, and Rolling Stock for 5 trains was seen at OLERY. Large clouds of dust were also seen on roads in the VAUX - FRISE area. It seems evident that reliefs have been taking place during the last 48 hours on the front north of the SOMME.

Movement in the southern reconnaissance area was noticeably slight, where observation was possible.

Night Reconnaissance. No unusual activity was seen in forward or back areas. Stationary lights were reported in CROI, MARTINPUICH, LONGUEVAL and CONTALMAISON WOOD.

Dawn Reconnaissance. (4.50 - 8.50 a.m. 19th). Visibility good. There was a good deal of train movement round PERONNE and on the main line between HAM and JUSSY Junction, at about 6 a.m. - movement showed no particular trend. Several trains were seen going north on the BUSSY - GUISCARD - HAM line during the same reconnaissance. No abnormal transport traffic was observed, and no troops on the move.

BOMBING RAIDS.

(a) By day. 60 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets.

(b) By night. 4 112-lb. and 302 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets, including BRAY, FOUQUESCOURT, CHAULNES and activity east of GAPPY.

Explosions were caused, and a fire started in a wood near CONTALMAISON. It is thought a S.A.A. dump was hit. A fire was also caused at CARNOY Station.

Direct hits were claimed on rolling stock at HAM and on billets in DEVISE. Trains and transport were attacked with good effect.

ENEMY DEFENCES.....

ENEMY DEFENCES.

A study of photographs of the 16th instant gives the following information as to the trenches occupied by the enemy:-

A3 AE B.272. Shows that the portion of HARPIES AVENUE, N.W. of OMIECOURT is occupied.

A3 AE A 907, 908 clearly show from the railway to N. of the LIHONS - CHAULNES road the trenches occupied as a front line by the enemy running N. and S., west of MIEG and POLYGON WOODS. There appear to be dugouts at A3.c.00.80. and in the front line at A.2.b.80.50. approximately.

A3 AE A 909 shows that SATRAPE ALLEY in S.21.b. and d. is occupied as a support position, at least from POLYGON WOOD to S.21.d.central.

A3 AE A 910, 915. These photographs show CHAURRIOS ALLEY occupied from the road in S.20.b. north to at least S.14.central.

UNITS IN REAR OF THE FRONT.

(a) Prisoner of 87th I.R. (21st Div.) saw men with the following numerals on shoulder-straps in PERONNE on 17th instant.

107 ... 107th I.R.? (58th Div.). Relieved on 6th Aug. in LOCRE.

(b) Prisoner of the 60th I.R. (121st Div.) captured night 17th/18th, states he saw men belonging to the 216th R.I.R. in the back areas about 4 days ago. He was told by his company commander that they were in touch on the left with the 214th R.I.R., 46th Res. Div. The 46th Res. Div. was last identified in the line near BUZANCY, south of SOISSONS, at the end of July.

COMMAND.

A captured German order of the 15th June, gives the following details regarding the changes in the distribution of Corps Staffs in the Second German Army, which took place in June:-

"According to an order from General Headquarters, the XIII and XIV Corps Staffs are to be withdrawn from the Second German Army. The LIV Corps Staff is joining the Second Army.

"The LIV Corps will take over the sector of the XIII Corps (north of the SOMME). The XI Corps, by side-slipping north, takes over the sector of the XIV Corps (just south of the SOMME), on the 17th June, at 10 a.m. The LI Corps, while continuing to hold its former sector, will extend north on the 16th June, at 10 a.m. to take over the front previously held by the XI Corps."

CLOSE DEFENCE OF ARTILLERY.

The following is an extract from an order of the 13th Artillery Command, 13th Div., dated 27:7:18:-

"Hand Grenades in Battery Positions. The number of hand grenades hitherto allotted to batteries is too small. In future, each gun is to be provided with 40 hand grenades, which are to be kept ready for immediate use."

DRAFTING OF THE 1919 CLASS TO UNITS IN THE FIELD.

1. - The following precis of an order issued by the C.G.S. of the Army in the Field on the 27th December, 1917, show how the 1919 Class was drafted to the Field:-

From the beginning of 1918, divisions on the Western front will receive drafts of the 1919 Class which will be sent to the divisions as follows:-

P.T.O.

(a) PRUSSIAN CONTINGENT. - Division proceeding from the Eastern front to the Western front, after the end of December, will take 600 recruits with them. Orders will be issued later about drafts to divisions on the Western front.

(b) BAVARIAN CONTINGENT. - Excepting the 30th and 39th Bav. Res. Divs., and the 1st and 6th Bav. Ldw. Divs., all Bavarian divs. on the Western front will receive 300 recruits per division at the beginning of January, February and March. The 10th Bav. Div., which has 750 recruits, will only receive 150 more, and the Bav. Ers. Div., which has 800 recruits, will receive 300 more.

(c) SAXON CONTINGENT. - The Saxon divisions on the Western front will receive 300 recruits per division at the beginning of January, February and March. The divisions transferred from the Eastern front to the Western front, which already have 600 recruits, will receive 300 more at the beginning of March. The 30th Div. will receive at the beginning of January, February and March, 100 recruits for the 105th Inf. Regt.

Add to (b) and (c) - Bavarian and Saxon divisions which are later transferred from the Eastern front will receive by the beginning of March 300 recruits for each regiment, after arrival on the Western front.

(d) WURTEMBERG CONTINGENT. - Orders will be issued later.

Recruits of the 1919 Class are entirely at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, and, until further orders, it is forbidden to draft them into front line units.

The recruits will be put into separate companies in the field recruit depots and will receive special training in open warfare, in addition to training in trench warfare. The divisional commander will be responsible for their training.

The training is to be planned on a period of 2 to 2½ months.

2. - On the 5th April, 1918, an order was issued that the 1919 Class in the field recruit depots of the divisions of the Second, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Armies were released for service in front line units.

NOTE. - The above order shows that the 1919 Class was distributed evenly among divisions up to the end of March, 1918. To supply drafts of 900 men to each division for the infantry alone would absorb about 200,000 men. Drafts of the 1919 Class were sent to the Eastern front and also to artillery units, prior to the drafts sent to the field recruit depots on the Western front referred to above.

Prisoners of the 1919 Class should be examined as to the date of their joining the divisional field recruit depot, as it is important to ascertain if many have joined since March, 1918.

#### GERMAN TANK DETACHMENTS.

The following information is given in War Ministry order No. 994/18. Secret. A.7.V., dated 7th July, 1918:-

Organization. - The 1st - 3rd Tank Detachments (Sturm-Panzerkraftwagen - Abteilungen) each consist of 5 German tanks (Geschütz - Panzerkraftwagen A.7.V.-wagen). Other detachments, numbered from 11 upwards, each consist of 5 captured tanks (Beutetanks), 2 male (Geschütz-) and 3 female tanks (M.G.-Panzerkraftwagen).

GAS MASKS FOR GERMAN MESSENGER DOGS.....

GAS MASKS FOR GERMAN MESSENGER DOGS.

According to a captured document, the German messenger dog's attendant carries a box containing a gas mask for his dog, either slung over his shoulder or hooked on to his belt.

The mask consists of a pointed nose-bag, which is secured over the dog's head by a broad fur-lined collar band, in which there are holes for the dog's ears. This collar fastens on the dog's neck with a hook and eye and under his throat with a strap and buckle tapes. The eye-pieces are similar to those of the men's masks and are either of glass or mica. The mask can be put on over the dog's collar should there be no time to remove the latter.

It is stated that the material (not leather) of which this mask is made is impregnated with a particular solution and when dry should be moistened with water.

NOTE. - German gas masks and anti-gas equipment for dogs, pigeons and horses are required for examination.

From Corps Summary No. 226 of 18:8:18.

TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS.

1. - A captured order of the 225th Div. dated 5:7:18, after stating that attacks with limited objectives, such as that at HAMEL, must be expected also in the sector occupied by the division, specifies certain methods for protection against such attack. Special stress is laid on communication to the division of everything of tactical importance. Two examples were given:-

"The 21st Division only learnt of the enemy's attack on a post near CASTEL, which took place at 5 p.m., 2nd July, on the afternoon of the 3rd."

"The 109th Division only received information very late from their troops about the fight at HAMEL."

This is further evidence of the disorganization which followed our attack on HAMEL, and explains the absence of any immediate reorganisation or counter-attack.

2. - Extract from a captured order of the 225th Division, dated 12:7:18.

"During the night of 9/10 July, the further edge of HANGARD WOOD (109th Division) was shelled apparently with mustard gas. The personnel of an anti-tank gun, stationed there, were found dead in their dug-out. The leader had to report sick."

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2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
20th August, 1918.



DAILY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.From Army I.S. No. 245.SITUATION AUGUST 19TH AND NIGHT 19th/20th INST.

North of the SOMME the situation is unchanged. A successful raid near the BRAY road (L.13) identified the continued presence in the line of the 27th Wurttemberg division. The reason of the recent movement of troops and transport north of the SOMME has not yet been ascertained. The MORLANCOURT area was heavily shelled and TAILLES WOOD Valley and DERNANCOURT were gas shelled during the night.

On the SOMME - LIHONS front at 10.30 a.m. yesterday (19th) one Coy. of the 161st Regt. and about 24 men of the 65th Regt. (both 185th Div.) attacked between HERLEVILLE and LIHONS and succeeded in entering our lines at two points.

The enemy was immediately counter-attacked and driven out. Our whole line is completely restored. The object of the attack was to regain some trenches captured by our troops on the 18th instant, and was a purely local affair. Two prisoners were left in our hands and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The attack was preceded by a fairly heavy barrage. During the day H.V. guns on this front were inactive but field guns active east and S.E. of LIHONS and against our lines east of PROYART both in connection with the above mentioned attack and also during the afternoon.

In addition to the identifications obtained of the 185th Div., it has also been ascertained that the 127th Div., is still in the line astride the AMIENS - ROYE road.

LIHONS - ROYE front. Hostile artillery activity yesterday calls for no comment.

Posts were established by the Canadians east of CHILLY. The newly gained ground was four times unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy. The attacking troops belonged to the 38th Div., and one Officer and 5 O.R. remained in our hands.

During the last 24 hours prisoners belonging to the 60th I.R. (121st Div.) were also captured.

Opposite the French, it seems very probable that the 1st Res. Div., has replaced the 75th Res. Div. If correct this will be the second time in 10 days that this division has been employed. It lost in prisoners alone 3 officers and 449 O.R. during its first engagement.

PRISONERS.

The number of prisoners who passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. since the 8th instant is 22,340, of whom 485 are officers.

ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

Prisoners belonging to the 185th Div., who were captured as the result of the German attack yesterday morning state they have orders to hold the line, and know of no intention to withdraw.

RESERVES.

The number of divisions engaged in the battle since 8th August remains at 40 (plus elements of another division).

There are now 19 infantry divisions, fit to fight, in reserve in the Western theatre - 9 of these divisions are between the OISE and the Sea.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Enemy aircraft activity showed an increase over yesterday but was again below normal. 39 planes crossed the line. Of

P.T.O.

These, 8 were artillery and 31 F.E.A. The latter were more active over the Southern sector. One R.E.A. at 6,000 feet was seen over COURCELLES and MARCELCAVE at 5.35 a.m. A patrol of 5 monoplanes was seen operating over the central sector at 14,000 feet at 8.25 a.m. As a result of 9 combats, 2 E.A. were destroyed and 3 were driven down out of control. Two of our 'planes are missing.

(c) Movement. The BAPAUME - ETRICOURT - PERONNE and CAMBRAI - EPEHY - PERONNE lines were active yesterday morning, movement shewing a southward tendency towards PERONNE. DOINCT Station contained rolling stock for 6 - 7 trains at 10.30 a.m. during our bombing raid.

SAILLY SAILLISEL dump was also very active, rolling stock amounting to 6 trains being seen there at 9.50 a.m. A long distance reconnaissance reported 7 trains with steam up in CAMBRAI, three in BUSIGNY and four in HAM, at 7.0 a.m. approximately; the last-named continues to be the chief centre of railroad activity in the southern portion of the Army area. No unusual amount of transport movement was recorded.

No air reconnaissance work was possible after midday. Night and dawn reconnaissances (20th) had also to be abandoned owing to inclement weather.

#### ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS.

Bridges. Photograph A3 AE A 924 though indistinct, appears to shew the bridge at BRAY in a damaged condition.

#### GERMAN CENSORSHIP.

The following is the translation of a captured German document issued by the Second German Army on 24:5:18:-

2nd Army,  
Io.Nr.151/VII. Secret.

Army H.Q.,  
24:5:18.

A special examination of the homeward mails, ordered by the Army Commander, has disclosed the fact that the postal regulations laid down for the Army Area are being extensively disregarded. Many letters contain precise indications of the location of the writer's unit, accounts of enemy successes (e.g. the destruction of trains by aircraft), exaggerated reports of our casualties and false statements as to inadequate supplies of food, clothing, etc.

The postal regulations must again be made known and frequently re-published, and the men must be taught to realize thoroughly the object of such regulations. It must also be made clear to the men that the moral at home is very sensibly influenced by news coming from the front, and that it is an offence, by sending home pessimistic letters, to arouse anxieties for which there is, in reality, no ground.

#### MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION.

Paper Belts. - A German machine gun belt has recently been captured, of which the weft is of fine paper yarn and the warp apparently of sized flax.

Prisoners have stated that belts, partly made of paper yarn, have been used behind the line for training purposes, but that these were never used in the front line.

Steel cartridge cases. - An order of the Second German Army, dated 27:7:18, states that, in future, the S.A.A. issued with coppered steel cartridge cases would be used with machine guns. Hitherto, this ammunition had been used with rifles only. The order further states:-

"As the result of numerous complaints received from the troops, it is announced for information that steel cartridge cases, in which splits occur up to within 5/16ths of an inch from the base, can usually be regarded as serviceable and for the time being must be accepted."

Para.(h), page 50, "Handbook of the German Army in War" (S.S.356) should be amended accordingly.

#### GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SECRECY.....

GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SECRECY.

A captured German document entitled "Instructions regarding Secrecy," issued on 3:2:18 by General von QUASt, commanding the Sixth German Army, contains a preface, of which the following is the translation:-

6th Army,  
Ia/Ig/No. 1765. Secret.

Army H.Q.,  
3:2:18.

(i) The more our order of battle, intentions and troop movements, prior to the coming decisive battles, remain undetermined and obscure to the enemy, the smaller will be our sacrifices and the more certain our success. The enemy's Intelligence Service uses every conceivable means to get information. From the smallest facts, it may draw far-reaching conclusions.

Every soldier in the Army, whether at the front or on the lines of communication, must actively co-operate in covering all our preparations with the veil of secrecy, even those which seem to be of no importance. Final success is dependent, in part, on the prudence of each individual man.

(ii) The object of the following instructions is to ensure secrecy. The necessity for them must be impressed on all ranks by careful instruction. All officers will make it their duty to see that these instructions are closely followed, and supervision will be carried out by airmen, balloon and ground observers, officers at intercepting stations, the censorship staff, and by officers specially detailed by Army, Corps and Divisional H.Q. and by the G.O.C., L. of C.

(iii) Breaches of these instructions will be severely dealt with without respect of rank, and the particulars of the offence and the punishment will be published in routine orders. Such offences will be treated as "disobedience of orders;" they will not, therefore, be punishable by death or the severest form of imprisonment, as in the case of "treachery" or "betrayal of military secrets." In cases where such offences may have disastrous results, a sentence of imprisonment of three years may be awarded, but where disastrous results are actually occasioned, imprisonment for life may be awarded.

(Sd.) von QUASt, General der Infanterie.

GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS.

The following is an extract from a captured document, issued on 30:5:18 by the 29th Artillery Command (108th Div.):-

"Counter-battery work is only profitable when the enemy's detachments are actually serving their guns. During a long battle, when the enemy is obliged to fight his guns and to replenish ammunition, destructive fire

(as well as gas concentrations) is to a certain extent effective. A hostile battery will be far more damaged by a short, sharp, accurate concentration than by continuous and deliberate fire for effect, during which the personnel has either time to leave the position or to take refuge in dugouts.

"The enemy's counter-battery work has recently given proofs of this; for example, a short concentration of 20 rounds, directed against one of the heavy howitzer batteries of the division, put out of action three of its pieces, three men were wounded and an ammunition dump was destroyed. On the other hand, a deliberate shoot directed against another battery had no effect, although 1,500 rounds were expended and the shooting was good.

"It is therefore proposed, by the aid of aeroplanes, survey sections and balloons to carry out ranging on a definite system whereby our own batteries are to register one hostile battery. Should any hostile battery of that type then become troublesome (or for other reasons), we can at once concentrate the fire (H.E. or gas) of several of our own batteries on the battery registered. For the rapid execution of this order, it is essential that the telephone system of the survey sections and balloons be constructed of better material than is now available.

Traffic centres, .....

"Traffic centres, camps, rest billets, etc., must be registered in the same way, with the help of observation groups, balloons and aeroplanes, so that at any moment well-directed concentrations can be put down on them. Until batteries are registered, concentrations must be carried out by map shooting. Against points which the enemy must constantly use, persistent harassing fire with single rounds is considered very useful.

"Fleeting targets and other remunerative targets are to be engaged by batteries independently."

EFFECT OF OUR LOW-FLYING MACHINES.

The following is an extract from Second German Army (in line from ALBERT to the AVRE) orders of the 8th July:-

"In the last few days, our infantry, when advancing, has suffered heavy casualties caused by machine gun fire from low-flying enemy machines. The infantry must endeavour to protect itself against machine gun fire from the air, just as it does when under the fire of ground machine guns. It should advance in extended order and lie down as soon as the airman opens fire. If low-flying machines are continually circling over the infantry, the latter will advance by successive rushes. Ground machine guns must bring concentrated fire to bear on the enemy aeroplanes."

The above probably refers to experiences gained during the fighting about HAMEL, on the 4th July and following days. Two local counter-attacks were carried out by the enemy during these operations.

ANALYSIS OF 16,470 PRISONERS CAPTURED SINCE 8TH INSTANT.

<u>CLASSES.</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PRISONERS.</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE.</u>
1920.	23	0.14.
1919.	1925	11.68.
1918.	1561.	9.48.
1917.	1612.	9.79.
1916.	1369.	8.31.
1915.	1305.	7.92.
1914.	1004.	6.09.
1913.	638.	3.88.
1912.	337.	2.05.
Active men prior to 1912 class.	616.	3.74.
Reservists.	1213.	7.37.
Landwehr 1st Ban.	617.	3.75.
" 2nd Ban.	372.	2.26.
Ersatz Reserve.	1364.	8.68.
Landsturm 1870/1874.	48.	0.30.
" 1875/1879.	312.	1.89.
" 1880/1884.	527.	3.20.
" 1885/1889.	817.	4.96.
" 1890/1894.	624.	3.78.
" 1895/1900.	186	1.13.
	<u>16,470.</u>	<u>100%</u>

These include a small percentage of "FREIWILLIGE."

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
21st August, 1918.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

OPERATION REPORT - No. 4.Operations of the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. on 18:8:18.

The following is the report of the G.O.C., 6th Aust. Inf. Bde., on the operations on morning of 18th August, 1918:-

"In pursuance of your instructions to work gradually and secure the Red line objective to the east of HERLEVILLE my brigade daily moved forward encountering opposition of a slight nature at all points. The position of our line was such that it was inadvisable to carry our whole line forward owing to the line on our left being too far back, and the country on its front dominated my left flank, it was therefore decided to make a major push on our right flank and bring up the centre in conformity.

"On the morning of the 18th the line held by the brigade was as shown on attached map in Blue. It was decided to advance this line on the front of the right and centre battalions by attacking, under Artillery and Machine Gun barrage, at three points. When these points were secured the attacking units were to endeavour to squeeze outwards and make the new front continuous, the 24th Battalion on the extreme left advancing its right flank in conformity with the general advance. The operation was to be in the nature of a series of raids with the exception that the raiding parties were to remain in the positions attained. The operation on the right was eminently successful; some 1,250 yards were taken from the enemy and the dominating feature - called the CRUCIFIX - was secured to us. The stubborn resistance encountered here proved clearly the value set on its retention by the enemy. The attack on the left flank was not successful. The point allotted to the attackers was the Northern point of the trench at X.5.d.70.00.; this represented an advance of about 230 yards from our front line and was to be carried out by a company of the 22nd Battalion, whilst the 24th Battalion on its left had to move up its posts in the front line to positions on the road running north-west from X.5.d.70.00. The Artillery barrage came down to time, and about 200 yards from the waiting attackers; but, immediately, heavy machine gun fire was encountered from positions on the flanks; this depleted the ranks of the raiders, but progress was made and posts of the enemy were overcome; - the delay occasioned by this mopping-up lost for the party the barrage, and strong posts of the enemy having been left on the flanks and a concentration of enemy machine guns from neighbouring positions successfully held up the parties. In the meantime, the posts of the Left Battalion overcame its opposition and succeeded in getting to the positions allotted them and dug in. The enemy consisted of troops from the 28th I.R., 65th I.R. and 161st R.I.R. They had just come into our sector, fresh from a quiet area and had not experienced any of the recent fighting. The units were strong and particularly aggressive, quite the antithesis of the troops that had recently confronted us.

"The unit of the 22nd Battalion, fighting gamely, was eventually surrounded; the enemy, moving down a sunken road, converged on the left flank and posts on the right flank squeezed inwards and completely recovered the ground.

"Similar tactics were adopted by the enemy on the posts of the 24th Battalion - the men of two of these were all rendered casualties and the third was eventually overcome.

"The casualty list is now complete and for the whole operation is as follows:-

P.T.O.

61

	OFFICERS.	O.R.'s.
Killed.	2	16
Wounded.	4	61
Missing.	1	12
Missing believed P.O.W.	3	18
	<u>10.</u>	<u>107.</u>

"The operation gave us 1,250 yards of the enemy's trench system, called SAURIAN ALLEY, marked RED on attached map, with the commanding position at the CRUCIFIX - a very good trench with the highly satisfactory communication trenches, FAIDHERBE ALLEY and CASTLENAU ALLEY joining up with a splendid support trench.

"Fifteen prisoners were taken (including one officer) and two machine guns - the enemy's casualties were known to be severe."

... the front of the right and centre battalions by attacking under...  
 ... were secured the attacking units were to advance outwards...  
 ... and make the new front continuous, the 24th Battalion on the extreme...  
 ... left advancing its right flank in conformity with the general advance...  
 ... The operation was to be in the nature of a series of raids with the...  
 ... exception that the raiding parties were to remain in the positions...  
 ... attained. The operation on the right was eminently successful; some...  
 ... 1,250 yards were taken from the enemy and the dominating feature...  
 ... called the CRUCIFIX - was secured to us. The stubborn resistance...  
 ... encountered here proved nearly the value set on its retention by the...  
 ... enemy. The attack on the left flank was not successful. The point...  
 ... allotted to the attackers was the northern point of the trench at...  
 ... X.5.470.00; this represented an advance of about 250 yards from our...  
 ... front line and was to be carried out by a company of the 24th Battalion...  
 ... whilst the 24th Battalion on its left had to move up its posts in the...  
 ... front line to positions on the road running north-west from X.5.470.00...  
 ... The artillery barrage came down to time, and about 300 yards from the...  
 ... attacking effect; but, immediately, heavy machine gun fire was...  
 ... encountered from positions on the flank; this displaced the ranks of...  
 ... the raiders, but progress was made and posts of the enemy were overcome...  
 ... the delay occasioned by this mopping-up lost for the party the barrage...  
 ... and strong posts of the enemy having been left on the flank and a con-...  
 ... centration of enemy machine guns from neighbouring positions success-...  
 ... fully held up the parties. In the meantime, the posts of the left...  
 ... Battalion overcame its opposition and succeeded in getting to the...  
 ... positions allotted them and dug in. The enemy consisted of troops from...  
 ... the 18th I.R., 55th I.R. and 16th I.R. They had just come into our...  
 ... sector, fresh from a quiet area and had not experienced any of the...  
 ... recent fighting. The walls were strong and particularly aggressive...  
 ... quite the antithesis of the troops that had recently confronted us...  
 ... "The unit of the 24th Battalion, fighting gamely, was eventually...  
 ... surrounded; the enemy, moving down a sunken road, converged on the left...  
 ... flank and posts on the right flank exposed inward and completely...  
 ... recovered the ground...  
 ... "Similar tactics were adopted by the enemy on the posts of the...  
 ... 24th Battalion - the men of two of these were all rendered casualties...  
 ... and the third was eventually overcome...  
 ... "The casualty list is now complete and for the whole operation is...  
 ... as follows:-

E.T.O.

Headquarters,  
21st August, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 62.

Defence against Gas.

1. (i) The pamphlet S.S. 534 - Standing Orders for Defence against gas - will be taken as a general guide for gas measures in the present Corps area.
- (ii) The more specific instructions contained in Paras. 4 - 7 of 1st ANZAC General Staff Circular No. 109 dated 22nd November, 1917 (issued under this office G.13/270 of 25th November, 1917) hold good generally.
2. The Western boundaries of the gas zones in the present Corps area will be as follows:-

ALERT ZONE. ROSIERES - HARBONNIERES - MORCOURT -  
CHIPILLY - K.21. (all inclusive).

READY ZONE. IGNAUCOURT - MARCELCAVE - P.13. -  
I.24.d. (all inclusive).

*L. G. Bourne Maj.*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
for General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

C.R.A.  
C.R.E.  
2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.  
5th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
6th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
7th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.  
2nd Aust. Div. Train.  
A.D.M.S.  
D.A.D.V.S.  
A.P.M.  
Camp Commandant.  
No. 1 Aust. Sanitary Section.  
D.A.D.O.S.  
A.Q.  
D.G.O.

*War Diary*

DAILY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.

Ga.88.

SITUATION WIRES.3rd Aust. Div. Message, Timed 7.45 a.m., 22nd August.

9th Bde. report line runs CRUCIFIX inclusive L.15.a.4.0., L.9.d.0.0., L.10.e.0.4., L.10.c.2.6., Left Bn front little obscure. 141st Bde. on Left report through 9th Bde; Whippets passed K.12.c. moving forward. Some 141st Bde. cavalry moving forward.

Aust. Corps Message - Timed 9.15 a.m., 22nd August:

3rd Aust. Div. and 47th Div. gained all objectives. Left Bn 3rd Aust. Div. captured 10 Officers and 133 O.Rs, including whole Headquarters of 124th Regt; Bn Commander, Adjutant, M.G. Officer and Artillery F.O. Officer. No definite information of situation on left of 3rd Corps, but it is believed that they have gained their objectives.

SITUATION AUGUST 20th and NIGHT 20th/21st INSTANT.

North of the SOMME, our patrols were, as usual, active. The situation at ALBERT is unchanged, and the enemy continues to hold posts in the eastern portion of the town. Two hostile patrols, 15 - 20 men strong, were seen east of MORLANCOURT. They refused combat. Hostile artillery fire decreased.

On the SOMME - LIHONS front, a patrol encounter E. of PROYART took place, the hostile patrol being driven off by rifle fire and hand grenades. It appears that all three regiments of the 185th Div. took part in the attack in the HERLEVILLE area on the morning of the 19th instant, as prisoners (since dead) belonging to the 28th R.I.R. were captured S. of the village.

Hostile artillery fire showed no change. It was chiefly directed against forward areas.

On the LIHONS - ROYE front the situation remains unchanged. Hostile artillery heavily shelled VRELY (with H.V. guns) and PARVILLERS.

It appears that in the recent fighting one battalion of the 60th I.R. (121st Div.) was withdrawn owing to heavy casualties, and replaced by a battalion of the 56th R.I.R. (same division).

On the night 19th/20th, a German wagon, complete with rations, was driven by mistake into our lines S. of the CHAULNES railway.

No further information of the presence of the 46th Res. Div. has been obtained, but prisoners state that the 221st Div. is about to relieve the 121st Div. in the FRESNOY sector. If true, this will be the second time since the 8th inst. that the 221st Div. will have been employed.

PRISONERS.

The number of prisoners who have passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. since the 8th inst. is 23,064, of which 486 are Officers.

ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

(a) A prisoner belonging to the Jager Regt. captured on the 16th inst. in the HATTENCOURT sector, states that his company has orders to hold the line at all costs. The line is being worked on, and new wire being put up.

*Mardian*



(2)

(b) Prisoners belonging to the 121st Div. captured in the FRESNOY sector, state that they believe the Germans will withdraw, as they have seen railway lines being dismantled in back areas (whereabouts not yet ascertained).

#### RESERVES.

There are still 19 infantry divisions fit to fight in reserve in the Western Theatre, 9 of which are considered to be between the Sea and the OISE.

#### ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Enemy aeroplane activity was much below normal, even allowing for the unfavourable weather. 2 artillery planes crossed the line. 2 indecisive combats took place.

(c) Movement. Observation of movement was impossible until evening. Evening reconnaissances reported only slight movement on railways in the Army area, and no abnormal rolling stock was seen in the stations. There was a certain amount of motor transport traffic on roads in the TERTRY and GERMAINE areas with an eastward tendency, and a few convoys were seen on roads around HAM and NOYON. At 7.30 p.m. about 400 infantry were reported moving west in four parties from CLERY to MARICOURT, and at 7.50 p.m. three parties of 100 men each were observed going east from NOYON towards LARBROYE. The roads running south-west from MARCHELEPOT were in frequent use by horse transport.

#### GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS.

The following is the translation of a captured German order issued by the Crown Prince RUPPRECHT'S Group of Armies on 24.5.18:-

"The occasional very heavy losses of artillery material through enemy counter-battery fire point to the advantages of the system adopted during the FLANDERS battle to minimise such losses.

Alternative positions are chosen for all such batteries as are under enemy observation or are particularly exposed to counter-battery fire. These alternative positions are so utilised that active gun is always left in the position newly vacated, whilst the remaining guns take up the new position and open fire therefrom. These alternative positions are occupied in turn as hostile counter-battery fire dictates. This procedure has deceived the enemy as to our artillery strength and distribution, has compelled him to disperse his fire, and as a consequence, has minimised our losses.

The dummy positions provided with blank cartridges and dummy puffs, have not succeeded in deceiving the enemy's efficient service of observation. The deception of the enemy by the use of smoke rings maintains its former importance so long as it is used in strict conjunction with the battery actually firing."

(Sgd.) von KUHLE.

#### SHORTAGE OF ARTILLERY HORSES.

The following is the translation of a captured German document:-

Crown Prince RUPPRECHT'S Group of Armies. Army H.Q.  
Art. No. 48403. 18.4.18.

To 4th, 5th, 17th and 2nd Armies.

According

(3)

According to a communication received from G.H.Q. whole regiments or independent Abteilungen of divisional or Army Field Artillery are said to have had their horses taken away from them in order to replace casualties without the matter being referred to higher authority.

This procedure is forbidden, and is equivalent to breaking up the unit concerned. See also Army Group Order Inf. No. 6413 secret, dated 25.3.18. G.H.Q. is not in a position to bring these regiments and Abteilungen up to strength again in horses. Should the Quartermaster General, in conformity with G.H.Q. Ic.No. 83041 op. of 15.4.18 (Army Group Order No. 48150 of 16.4.18) be unable to fully comply with the demands for horses submitted, a readjustment must be carried out within the field artillery regiment, a part being made mobile at the expense of the rest, which must lose its horses and be left behind; for instance, batteries will horse only 3 or even 2 guns and 4 wagons. A return will be rendered stating whether, and, if so, in which field artillery regiments or independent Abteilungen the procedure mentioned at the outset has been ordered.

(Sgt). von KUHLE.

Note. - The Second Army rendered a nil return to the above. The returns of other Armies are not shown.

The following are EXTRACTS from the Divisional Intelligence Summaries of the 41st German Division, and apart from their general interest, go to shew -

- (1) How our prisoners, though perhaps involuntarily, are giving away information.
- (2) The close observation under which our line is kept, and the necessity for concealment of movement in forward areas, and also in back areas, when hostile reconnaissance flights are overhead.
- (3) The value of concealment and good camouflage. (See second last para.).

SPECIAL.

A post of the 2nd Bn, 152nd Regt. noticed with certainty that the enemy is making use of dum-dum bullets; rounds which struck near the post were distinctly seen to burst into pieces. Further evidence of this is to be at once reported.

ACTIVITY.

(Summary No. 10, dated 28.7.18.)

The battle headquarters of the 18th Regt. in MARCELCAVE was fired on during the night.

RECONNAISSANCE.

Movement. Very slight during the day; only a few men were seen on Hill 1047. On the evening of the 26th, considerable movement was observed north-east of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX in about the old French front line, which points to a relief of the British support troops.

AIR ACTIVITY.

Owing to unfavourable weather, activity was slight. Leaflets were dropped over and south of, the sector of the 148th I.R.

(4)

ACTIVITY. (Summary No.11, dated 30th July).

During the nights 28th/29th and 29th/30th, artillery activity increased considerably. During the night of the 29th the battery area in the vicinity of LAMOTTE and the village itself were bombarded with gas from 12 o'clock onwards. At 1.30 a.m. an intense artillery bombardment was opened mainly north of the SOMME, without extending to our sector. Strong infantry attacks followed north of the river and the right wing of the Corps was pressed back to the main line of resistance. During the night of the 29th/30th, the back area between LAMOTTE and MARCELCAVE was bombarded with 2500 rounds of gas shell by 20-25 batteries, principally the FOUILLY Group. At daybreak a very intense bombardment was opened in the vicinity of ALBERT.

RECONNAISSANCE.

Movement. Picket b. of the 152nd I.R. saw a large number of men, wearing full packs, in the trenches in 5715, 20. An internal relief within the division is probable.

Machine Guns. In 5716, 6.c.3., further machine guns have been located in 5716, 18.c., 5814, 12.b.4., and at the aeroplane in 5815, 11.d. (right hand corner).

"Minenwerfer". Fired from the trenches in 5715, 20 and from the south-west corner of the fruit garden in 5913, 10.B. central.

SPECIAL.

Two officers were observing with maps in 5814 v.

ACTIVITY. (Summary No.12, dated 1.8.18.).

An operation carried out by the 152nd I.R. against the enemy's front line north of the ROMAN ROAD was ineffectual. The assault troops found the trenches, the potato-patch (?) south of the Roman Road, and the post which had been previously located at this point, unoccupied by the enemy.

RECONNAISSANCE.

Movement. Considerable movement was observed during the afternoon of the 30th on Hill 104 (altogether about 200 men).

Special. Division on our left reports that the enemy has placed what appear to be "concentrated charges" against the wire. These are fired on the approach of our raiding parties.

AIR ACTIVITY.

Very active on the 31st. Low-flying aeroplanes over the forward area and numerous reconnaissance patrols as far as the vicinity of CHUIGNOLLES. One of our planes of the 219th Flight was brought down by hostile anti-aircraft fire in the neighbourhood of HARBONNIERES on the 31st, a second came down on the evening of the 31st north of "Husaren" Farm.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Indications of a relief in front of this sector have not been confirmed. On the morning of the 1st August, a prisoner was brought in from in front of the left flank of the 18th I.R. His capture shows that the 2nd Australian Division is still opposite us.

RECONNAISSANCE. (Summary No.13, dated 2.8.18.).

Machine Guns. Were located at the following points:- 5715, 24.d. central, etc., etc. (see attached tracing).

Movement. Was considerable during the night in the trenches near the Akazienwaldchen. On Hill 104 single men were seen.

SPECIAL.

Preliminary statements made by the prisoner brought in by the 18th I.R.: Prisoner belongs to the 22nd Battalion of the 6th Australian Bde. of the 2nd Australian Division. He only came out of hospital on the 25th July, and therefore knows nothing about units on the flanks. The brigade disposes of two battalions in the front line, each battalion having two companies in front and the other two companies close behind in support. A Company has 14 light machine guns. Each platoon has 3, and 2 are in reserve with the company commander. Machine gun team consists of three men, two of whom still carry rifles. Relief is not expected, and he knows nothing about any offensive intentions. There are many Americans in the back areas.

RECONNAISSANCE. (Summary No.14 dated 4th August).

Movement. On the 3rd, movement in the back areas was fairly considerable. A column 3 kilometres long on the march from the north towards PONT-NOYELLES, about 50 motor lorries between PONT-NOYELLES and LAHOUSOYE were observed. There was considerable traffic of pedestrians during the afternoon on Hill 104. Detachments of 20 - 30 men were moving into position, altogether about 200 men.

Posts. Posts were discovered by patrols 100 metres north-west of 5914, m. on the road. The post on the railway embankment was again confirmed. It stands about 50 metres east of the bridge half way up the slope.

SPECIAL.

During the night of the 2nd/3rd, "C" Company 18 heard considerable noise of motors in VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, as if tanks were being moved about. The enemy was apparently attempting to drown this noise by carrying out a vigorous artillery fire at the same time. Careful reconnaissance from the air produced no further evidence of the presence of tanks in VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Patrols of the 109th Division who advanced upon a hostile post established the presence of British troops. From prisoners captured, the relief of the 5th Australian Division by the 18th British Division in front of the right flank of the Corps has been established.

SITUATION WIRES.

Message from 3rd Army, timed 6.40 p.m. of 21st inst.

3rd Army situation report gives line as follows:- Along railway S. and East of BEAUCOURT to neighbourhood of BAILLESCOURT FARM, thence N.E. round MIRAUMONT which our patrols entered at 1.30 p.m., thence along railway to old line N.E. of MOYENNEVILLE except between G.15.d. and Brick Works in G.9.b. where our troops are west of railway and between A.28.b. and A.11.c where they are east of it. There has been stiff fighting on line of railway. Captures so far reported 1100 and 2 guns. French 10th Army has taken BLERANCOURT, whence line runs to PONTOIS inclusive and along river to SEMPIEGNY, where in touch with 3rd Army. French have taken PLEMONT and LASSIGNY.

-:-

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q..  
22nd August, 1918.

DAILY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.

From Army I.S. No. 247.

SITUATION AUGUST 21st and NIGHT 21st/22nd INST.

North of the SOMME, our troops attacked at 4.50 a.m. this morning between ALBERT and BRAY. From information received, the final objective has been reached S. of the BRAY - CORBIE road, where about 6 officers and 120 O.R. belonging to two regiments of the 27th Div. (normal) have been captured.

North of the BRAY road, where the final objective is more distant from our front line, the first objective has been reached, and our troops are already pushing on to the final objective. Two regiments of the 54th Res. Div. and one regiment of the 233rd Div. (both normal) have been identified.

Field artillery fire is dying down. It is understood from an officer captured in the MEAULTE area that the attack was expected, and that his company was 'standing to.'

PRISONERS.

The number of prisoners who have passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. since the 8th instant is 23,064 of which 486 are officers.

RESERVES.

No fresh reserves were identified in yesterday's fighting by the Third Army.

There are still 19 infantry divisions, fit to fight, in reserve in the Western Theatre; 9 of these are considered to be between the Sea and the OISE.

As the successes of the Third Army will necessarily draw in reserves to their front, the number of divisions available to meet our attack to-day is limited, and will probably consist of those divisions already employed in the recent operations. The most probable are as under:-

26th Res. Div.)	
243rd Div.)	Previously engaged.
3rd Naval Div.	Milked battalions.
58th Div.	Fresh.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Enemy aircraft showed a slight increase, but still remained below normal.

Twelve artillery 'planes and 5 F.E.A. crossed the lines. Activity was evenly distributed over the whole area, but a higher percentage of R.E.A. and artillery machines was observed.

Two R.E.A. were observed over the northern and one R.E.A. over the southern forward areas.

Three long distance flights were carried out as follows:-

1 p.m., 1 R.E.A. at 19,000 feet over CACHY - AMIENS.  
1.47 p.m. - 1 R.E.A. at 19,000 feet over VIGNACOURT.  
6.15 p.m., 1 R.E.A. at 20,000 feet over GENTELLES.

One enemy aeroplane and one balloon were destroyed during the period. Another balloon was driven down in a deflated condition.

(c) Movement. Train movement in the Army area was again slight. PERONNE station showed no signs of activity. Rolling stock equivalent to six trains was reported in DOINGT station at 2.20 p.m.; PERONNE contained rolling stock for two trains only, TINCOURT for four, and NOYON for six. Railways in both forward and back areas were reported quiet during the evening. There was a fair amount of transport traffic on roads around CLERY yesterday morning, and some westward M.T. movement from HERBECOURT and through VILLERS-CARBONNEL. About a battalion of infantry was seen marching north-west from CUGNY towards HAM.

Road activity.....

*Mar diary*

Road activity caused by operations on the front north of ALBERT included a good deal of northward movement on the PERONNE - BAPAUME main road, during the afternoon; traffic appeared to extend as far north as BEAULEN-COURT, then branch off westwards. SAILLY-SAILLISEL was particularly congested. Westward movement was also considerable along the BAPAUME - CAMBRAI road, especially at BEAUMETZ and BEUGNY which were full of troops. At 4.20 p.m., about 800 troops were seen marching from HAPLINCOURT to BANCOURT

The main CAMBRAI - BAPAUME and PERONNE - BAPAUME roads were reported practically clear again at 7.25 p.m., and, excepting a column of infantry moving from PERONNE to CLERY at 7.40 p.m., no movement of importance was observed on other roads.

Night Reconnaissance. Visibility was very good, but little movement was seen on roads and railways in the Army area.

Dawn Reconnaissance (22nd). No abnormal train movement was seen in the Army area. Lines converging on ST. QUENTIN seemed active (6 - 6.20 a.m.). Little activity was seen in BAPAUME, PERONNE and ROISEL stations. There was a certain amount of movement southward into PERONNE shortly after 6 a.m.

At 5.55 a.m., 40 M.T. were seen moving N.E. from LE SARS towards BAPAUME, and 30 M.T. south from BAPAUME to SAILLY-SAILLISEL. On the ALBERT - BRAY front, with the exception of about 30 M.T. moving east from MARICOURT towards PERONNE, little traffic was reported before 8.10 a.m., at which time about a battalion of infantry was seen going west along the main road at FRICOURT. At 8.20 a.m., 20 M.T. and scattered groups of Germans were seen going east through FRICOURT.

At 8.30 a.m., about 50 M.T. moving S.W. from MARICOURT towards BRAY, and 40 M.T. and limbers near CEYLON Wood, were attacked by our aeroplanes. At the same time, 12 groups of about 100 men each were seen marching east between CONTALMAISON and LONGUEVAL and 10 groups of about 100 men each marching east from MARICOURT to CLERY.

BOMBING RAIDS.

(a) By Day. 14 112-lb. and 24 25-lb. bombs were dropped on DOINGT station and sidings. One direct hit was observed on the dump and one on the northern station. Four direct hits were observed on the village.

14 112-lb. and 48 25-lb. bombs were also dropped on PERONNE station and sidings. Bursts were observed on hutments south of the station, and on the railway.

(b) By Night. 51 112-lb. and 176 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets including FEULLAUCOURT bridge, FRESNES, NESLE station and trains and transport. Bursts were seen near the bridge, and direct hits claimed on the road.

ENEMY REAR ORGANISATIONS.

Bridges. From photographs taken to-day (22nd) together with those taken within the last ten days, it appears that five new traffic bridges have been constructed and a sixth is under construction, across the SOMME between FRISE and EPENANCOURT; fifteen new footbridges are also shown between these two points. Practically the whole of this work has been done within the last ten days.

Two of the traffic bridges and six of the footbridges are south of PERONNE, whilst 3 traffic bridges and 9 footbridges are W. of the town.

ANTI-TANK RIFLE.

Allotment. A captured order of the 26th Res. Div. states that the division had been allotted 10 anti-tank rifles. The 119th Res. and 121st Res. Inf. Regts. would each be allotted three of these, and the 180th Inf. Regt. the remaining four rifles. These anti-tank rifles were to remain in the divisional sector and be handed over on relief. Battalion machine gun officers would be held responsible for the care of them.

Employment.

Employment. Postscripts to the above order show that the four rifles allotted to the 180th Inf. Regt. were sited by the battalion in line as follows:-

2 with O.C. "A" Coy., covering HEBUTERNE - BUCQUOY, GOMMECOURT - PUISIEUX cross roads.  
 1 with O.C. "B" Coy.  
 1 with M.Gs. Nos. 6 and 7) enfilading the HEBUTERNE - PUISIEUX road.

#### GERMAN DISCIPLINE.

A secret order of the 18th May, 1918, signed von Tschischwitz, Chief of Staff, Second German Army, runs as follows:-

"It has recently become known that, on the 24th March, our troops shot down one of our own contact patrol machines at CLERY and secretly buried the dead occupants. An official inquiry has been arranged.

"Should one of our airmen by an unfortunate mistake attack our own troops, the troops in question should make known their identity by sending up a white signal rocket and report the matter as soon as possible. Such a procedure as that described above is unworthy of the German Army.

"The episode must be used as an object for instruction, and it should at the same time be explained that contact patrols in the attack have to open fire upon the enemy's lines while they are still over their own troops. This may produce a mistaken idea among the troops that they are themselves being fired upon."

#### CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

The translation of correspondence between the 13th Division and the 26th Infantry Brigade (then in line north of VILLERS BRETONNEUX), regarding protection of the infantry against our machines, is given below.

The document shows the system in use in the Second German Army for warning pursuit units of our activity, and also emphasises the shortage of officers in the German Air Service:-

"26th Inf Bde.  
 No. 212.

Brigade Battle Headquarters,  
 17th July, 1918.

To the 13th Division.

Urgent requests for protection from enemy aeroplanes have of late been frequently forwarded from the front line. The transmission of these requests wastes time. The Brigade, therefore, suggests that an Air Service Liaison Officer (Fliegerverbindungsoffizier) be permanently attached to Regimental Battle Headquarters; this officer should be in a position to demand protection from an aircraft unit direct.

(Signed) HAGENBERG."

"13th Inf. Division.

Divisional Headquarters,  
 19th July, 1918.

To the 26th Infantry Brigade.

In accordance with instructions from Corps Headquarters, it is not possible to attach an Air Service Liaison Officer to a Regimental Headquarters, as the Air Service is already so short of officers that N.C.O.'s. have to be employed as observers.

The transmission of requests for protection from aeroplanes is ensured, as far as possible, by "Air Protection" officers (Luftschutzzoffiziere). In the Second Army area, the following are available:- "Air protection officer, north" on Hill 107, north of BRAY, and "Air protection officer, South," at WIENCOURT. Both are in direct communication with the pursuit groups, and demand the engagement of our scouts as soon as they notice an increase in enemy aerial activity over our lines. If recent requests from the infantry for protection from hostile aeroplanes have not been met with sufficient dispatch, this is to be attributed to the fact that, at the moment, there are very few scouts available.

(Signed) v. BORRIES."

F.T.O.

MORAL EFFECT OF OUR AIR POLICY. The following letter shows the effect produced on German moral by the activity of our machines behind the enemy's lines:-

Letter from a Pole belonging to 29th Res. Inf. Regt., 13th Res. Division.

FRESSAIN, 25th June, 1918.

My very dear Brother,

I received to-day your letter of the 15th, for which I thank you very much. You say that I ought to tell you of my experiences. At the present time we are at rest at FRESSAIN, between DOUAI and CAMBRAI. Before arriving here, we were at HAPLINCOURT, near BAPAUME; from there, we marched here, a distance of 70 kilometres.

At HAPLINCOURT (20 kilometres from the front), we were always in danger. The English bombarded us even there with heavy artillery and with gas. Every day, English aviators came and dropped bombs on us. A few hundred metres from us was our second battalion. On one occasion, English aviators came and threw bombs on them; I saw all the bombs fall; there were 20 killed and 70 wounded.

When the German aviators see the English, they take to flight as from the devil. When they cannot get away by flight they fling themselves - as if hit by a bullet - almost perpendicularly towards the earth, and when they are within about 100 metres from the ground, they continue their flight. I have several times seen German machines brought down in German territory. When I was at GREVILLERS, I saw seven German machines escaping from four English as best they could.

When I was in the trenches, I noticed all day and all night a number of English aeroplanes flying above us, while not a single German machine was to be seen. Also, on one occasion, I was carrying the rations in pails (as a milkman carries the milk) on my shoulders 8 kilometres to the front line trenches. We left at 8.30 p.m. and returned at 7 a.m. We were on the way all night. We had to go these 8 kilometres at night across valleys with great shell holes and under fire. We were fired on every ten minutes and were forced to go forward under this fire. We also had to cross rising ground which was all under fire. In addition, on the way, English aviators dropped bombs on us. When we were nearly at the end of our journey, we were received by shell and machine gun fire.

I had to go like this 11 times for the rations. On one occasion, 8 out of 27 men were wounded. On the way, I saw dead men, and we had to endure the stink of corpses and dead horses, and at the same time the Prussians treated us worse than dogs. I was also two days without food.

-----oOo-----  
SITUATION WIRES.

Following from 3rd Aust. Div. timed 9.17pm., 22nd:- "3rd Aust.Div. holding original Green line throughout. Left flank has not fallen back. M.G. and L.G. Strong Point established at L.2.d.9.5. commanding HAPPEY VALLEY firing up hill. A few stragglers 47th Div. in this post. Situation there quite satisfactory and left flank secured by a Coy. of reserve Bn. going to L.3.c. between CHALK PIT and post L.2.d.9.5. Our gun strafed enemy coming over hill in F.27."

Following from French timed 4pm. 22nd:- "Advance continuing between AILETTE and AISNE. We occupy VILLERS LA FOSSE VAUX PREZIS and POMMIERS. Considerable material abandoned by enemy, over 200 guns already counted."

Following from 1st Aust. Div.:- "Right Bde. reported at 7.50am. left Bn. on Green line and Right Bn. also believed on final objective. Left Bde. reported at 6.15am. line runs R.9.b.2.9. - R.10.a.9.7. - R.10.b.8.5. - R.10.d.8.8. - CHIGNOLLES WOOD taken and in touch with right and left flank Bdes. Prisoners up to 9am. 33 Off. 1,195 O.Rs."

32nd Div. reports 96th Bde. at 8.10am. - Left Coy. at CRUCIFIX reports situation satisfactory. Centre Coy. on objective except at C.T. S.13.b.5.5. Right Bn. 97th Bde. on objective. Left Bn. on objective except Left Coy. who are believed there. Situation of junction of 32nd Div. and 1st Aust. Div. rather obscure. Enemy appears to be still in N. outskirts HERLEVILLE and in HELLEVILLE Wood. This is being dealt with. Prisoners of 32nd Div. over 200. 4th Aust. Div. under cover of barrage advanced their left flank shortening line, and taking 37 prisoners. A great many enemy reported to have been killed.



DAILY SUMMARY OF INFORMATION.

From Army I.S. No. 249.

SITUATION AUGUST 23RD AND NIGHT 23RD/24TH INST.

North of the Somme. In continuation of information given in yesterday's Summary, it appears that the hostile counter-attack in the HAPPY Valley area, on the afternoon of the 22nd instant, was carried out by elements of the 25th, 27th and 13th Divisions.

Yesterday, east of ALBERT, our successes gained on the previous day were exploited, and TARA HILL was captured. Identifications were normal - prisoners belonging to the 233rd Div. Information was obtained that the 13th Div. was in back areas. The correctness of this was proved last night by the capture of prisoners belonging to this division. It must be very exhausted, as it was in line on 8th August, and 3,198 prisoners belonging to it were captured.

Last night, our attacks were renewed between BRAY and ALBERT, the HAPPY Valley being captured, and ground gained S.E. of BECORDEL. BRAY is also in our hands. It is reported that counter-attacks are now in progress S. of FRICOURT. During these operations, several hundred prisoners have been captured by our troops. They chiefly comprise men belonging to the newly arrived 25th and 13th Divisions.

Hostile artillery fire yesterday was heavy at times, but was somewhat erratic, and seemed to come from some distance.

South of the SOMME. At 4.45 a.m. attacks were launched on a front of 8,000 yards. The villages of CHUIGNOLLES, CHUIGNES and HERLEVILLE were captured: heavy fighting took place in the vicinity of HERLEVILLE, ST. DENIS Wood, ARCY Wood and CHUIGNOLLES Wood, where very heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

Later in the afternoon, a daylight patrol, beyond the flank of the attack S. of HERLEVILLE, succeeded in capturing 50 prisoners, while on the extreme north, LA NEUVILLE-les-BRAY was also secured.

As a result of these operations, 80 officers, 2,463 O.R. and 16 guns, as well as a large number of machine guns and trench mortars fell into our hands. The prisoners belonged to the 21st, 107th, 185th, 243rd and 43rd Res. Divs. Of these, the 243rd Div. arrived during the morning in support of the 107th Div. astride the AMIENS - ST. GOENTIN road. It is very weak (Coy. strength, 45 rifles) and is now engaged for the second time since 8th August. The reply of the enemy's artillery to our barrage was fairly light.

PRISONERS. In the operations commencing the 22nd instant, our captures have been as under:-

North of the SOMME - 53 Off. 2121 O.R. (including 3 Bn. Commanders). In addition, one 10.5 cm. How. battery (latest pattern) complete, and one heavy trench mortar battery (latest pattern) complete have been captured.

South of the SOMME. - 80 Off. 2463 O.R. (including all 3 Bn. Commanders of the 232nd R.I.R.), 107th Div.

We have also taken 16 guns, one of which is a 38 cm. railway gun.

The total number of prisoners captured by the Fourth Army since the 8th August who passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. is 29,216 of which 660 are officers.

RESERVES.(a) North of the SOMME.

- (i) The whole of the 25th Div. is now engaged north of BRAY.
- (ii) The 13th Div. (reported in the MARICOURT area yesterday) is now engaged S.E. of ALBERT.
- (iii) The 225th Div. is in the LONGUEVAL - CONTALMAISON area. It must be very weak, as 3,335 prisoners belonging to it have been captured since the 8th August.
- (iv) Nothing further has been heard of the 26th Res. Div.
- (v) The Third Army have taken prisoners belonging to the 82nd Div. (fresh from reserve). This Div. relieved the 3rd Naval Div. on the 19th August, hence the enemy holding the line beyond our left flank should be fairly strong.

P.T.O.

(b) South of the SOMME.

- (i) The 243rd Div. has reinforced the front near FOUCAUCOURT.  
 (ii) The whole of the 43rd Res. Div. must be considered to be in line astride the SOMME, as prisoners belonging to 2 Regts. have been taken on the N. and S. banks of the river.

(c) Summary.

No fresh reserves are believed to be in back areas at present, and it is considered that reinforcements will be continued to be supplied by Divs. already engaged on this front.

(d) Although there are now only 7 Divs., fit to fight, in reserve between the Sea and the OISE, owing to the engagement of the 25th and 83rd Divs., yet there are still 19 fresh divs. in reserve on the Western front, as a fit div. has been withdrawn from line into reserve in the WOEUVRE, and a div. re-fitting in ALSACE has completed its month in reserve.

ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Aircraft. Enemy aeroplane activity remained slightly above normal. Thirty eight artillery 'planes and 22 F.E.A. crossed the lines. There was a considerable increase, both in artillery 'planes and F.E.A. in the central sector, with a corresponding decrease in the S. sector.

The percentage of artillery 'planes remained high. At 10.45pm., 1 R.E.A. at 17,000 feet was seen over QUERRIEU. Otherwise there was a noticeable absence of R.E.A. Twelve combats took place, as a result of which 5 E.A. were destroyed and 4 driven down out of control. One enemy balloon was destroyed.

In addition to the above, two low-flying enemy 'planes over the Australians were engaged by M.G. fire from the ground and brought down within our lines. An E.A. was also hit by A.A. fire and crashed near CHIPILLY. One of our 'planes is missing.

(b) Artillery.

North of the SOMME, hostile artillery was less active than during the previous 24 hours. Throughout the night, hostile shelling was active against our forward system on the left. This activity increased towards dawn, TAILLES Wood being shelled with both H.E. and gas. Hostile retaliation in connection with the resumption of our attack in the ALBERT sector was light at first, but increased later, especially against ALBERT. At 8.40am. a heavy barrage was put down W. of the town, and heavy harassing fire was directed against the eastern exits. At 9.35 a.m., a barrage was put down N. of BRAY. MEAULTE was gas shelled during the morning.

South of the SOMME, hostile shelling was less active south of the AMIENS - NESLE railway, but was considerably more active at times against the front of our attack. There was the usual harassing fire at night on the forward areas, and battery areas were shelled at intervals. The reply to our barrage at 4.45 am., was prompt, but light. Hostile field artillery soon became silent, fire being continued by heavier howitzers and H.V. guns only. Our new positions and the forward areas were shelled during the day. H.V. guns were active, except on the right.

Hostile artillery 'plane activity was normal, activity being chiefly confined to the CHILLY - DAMERY sector. Eighteen flights were carried out, of which 11 were ranging. Thirteen targets were engaged, 6 with varying success. N.F. calls point to a considerable concentration of hostile batteries in CEYLON wood, BILLON Wood, the area N. of SUZANNE and in the vicinity of MARICOURT.

(c) Movement.

Movement seen on roads behind the front of operations was not very considerable, but the poor visibility throughout the day must be taken into consideration. Westward movement of troops, transport and guns on the ESTREES - SOYECOURT roads, observed about noon, probably indicated the arrival of units of the 243rd Div. A body of 300 men was seen approaching the line in the BRAY sector, at 12.20pm., and at dusk some troops were reported moving S.W. from MARICOURT towards BILLON Farm; probably elements of the 25th Division. Road activity seen during the afternoon and evening

showed a very .....

showed a very distinct eastward trend, and included 4 companies of infantry accompanied by mixed transport moving from ESTREES to VILLERS CARBONNEL, at 2.30pm., about 240 men in 8 groups going from ESTREES to HERBECOURT at 3.30pm., and some scattered troop movement on the road from MAMETZ through MONTAUBAN, towards COMBLES, between 3 and 4pm. The movement N. of the Somme probably indicated the relief of tired units belonging to the 233rd and 54th Res. Divs. by the 13th and 25th Divs. Little rail activity was seen. The ESTREES sidings in M.23 and M.29 were in use, about 60 trucks being observed there at 9.40pm.

Night and Dawn Reconnaissance (24th). Night flying had to be abandoned owing to bad weather conditions. The only movement seen during the dawn reconnaissance was a convoy of 15 M.T. on the main road near ESTREES, and 12 H.T. possibly guns, moving N.E. into MARICOURT from the direction of BRAY. Visibility very poor.

#### ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

(a) The 27th Div. was ordered to counter-attack from the Chalk Pits (L.3.d., N. of BRAY) this morning. Counter-attacks against TARA HILL were ordered for 2 a.m., by the 448th Regt. (233rd Div.). These were forestalled by our own attacks.

(b) Counter-attacks were carried out this morning in the HAPPY Valley area.

(c) No reliable information has been received that the enemy intend to withdraw further than to the high ground E. of BRAY, nor have prisoners captured south of the SOMME any knowledge of a possible withdrawal.

(d) A map captured yesterday shows defence lines drawn subsequent to the enemy's retirement E. of the ANCRE.

(i) LA BOISELLE (incl.) due S. to F.S.central.

(ii) CONTALMAISON Wood-Peake Wood to FRICOURT (inc.)

These lines probably, at present, represent the enemy's main line of resistance.

#### (e) Conclusions.

In view of the good resistance offered to our advance S. of the SOMME, and the counter-attacks carried out by the enemy N. of the SOMME, the enemy apparently does not intend, at present, to make a voluntary withdrawal.

#### BOMBING RAIDS.

##### (a) Ours.

(i) By Day. 40 112-lb. and 84 25-lb. bombs were dropped on TRONES Wood station, HERBECOURT and FLAUCOURT, and 32 25-lb. bombs were dropped on ground targets in the battle area. Bursts were seen in HERBECOURT and FLAUCOURT. Fires were caused in both villages, and an explosion in HERBECOURT.

(ii) By Night. 1 112-lb. and 134 25-lb. bombs were dropped on billets, roads, railheads and general activity E. of the line MONTAUBAN, ECLUSIER, ESTREES. One direct hit was obtained on a dump at HERBECOURT, explosion s took place at intervals, and a fire was caused.

##### (b) Enemy.

Thirty eight bombs were dropped last night in the forward area.

#### ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Hutments. About 15 huts have been erected between the two small copses just west of MONCHY LAGACHE, V.17.a. and a certain amount of activity is shown here. This is new since 14th August.

(b) Wireless Station. A document states there is a Station at S.27.c.7.2. (MONTAUBAN).

(c) Headquarters. A Divisional H.Q. is suspected at the northern end of FAVIERE Wood, west of HARDECOURT. (Document).

(d) Trenches. .....

(d) Trenches.

The single lines of trench reported yesterday, running S. from SOMME Copse, and N. from VOYENNES are now shown to be one continuous line passing just E. of VILLEBOURT. (205.V.2947, 2950).

A section of trench, 500 yards long, and two shorter pieces have been dug, running N.W. and S.E., E. of FALVY village. Two short lengths have also been constructed S. of the village, and one in the village itself. This is new since the 10th August. (205.V.2952, 2948).

On the N.E. side of HERBECOURT in H.26.b. 27.a. and c., six short lengths of trench are to be seen running N.W. to S.E. (205.V.2969, 2970). This is new since the 11th August.

Photograph 25 i 6494 shows a length of trench along the crest of the spur immediately W. of BIHUCOURT; part of this existed on the 16th August; it appears to be new, but no previous photograph is available. (cf. 25 i 6266).

Prisoners state that about 100 pioneers are working partly on bridges east of CAPPY and partly in old trench systems between the front line and PERONNE. Men are also said to be working on trenches between HERBECOURT and BERNY.

(e) Bridges. New footbridges have been built, as follows:-

C.23.b.1.2. - N. of BETHENCOURT; new since 12th inst. (205.V.2951).

C.11.c.1.9. - At PARGNY; new since 13th inst. (205.V.2950).

I.35.c.8.o. - Between BACQUENCOURT and BREUIL; a causeway to bridge is also under construction. (205.V.2945).

J. 7.a.3.6. - N. of VOYENNES; new since 14th instant. (205.V.2947).

66D. I.12.b.6.7.) - Two; new since the 11th instant, the former having and 1.8. ) a causeway. (205.V.2947).

A small piece of causeway has been built N. of PONT les BRIE at O.26.b.5.1.; new since 14th August, (205.V.2940).

(f) Fires. A large explosion took place yesterday afternoon at the N. end of CONTALMAISON. The dump at MARICOURT was burning all night, on the 22nd/23rd inst., and fires were again seen, during the same night, S. of ST. QUENTIN.

ENEMY DEFENCES. There is very little work to report either in the forward or the back areas of the Northern Corps front, and there are no signs of the digging which the 25th Division were supposed to have done East of BRAY.

GERMAN PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE SECRECY.

The following is the translation of a secret order, issued by LUDENDORF on 29:4:18:-

"Several cases have occurred in which secret official publications have been lost owing to the fact that they were despatched in locked despatch-boxes on railway journeys. I draw attention to the fact that every officer is responsible for the papers entrusted to him, and that the conveyance of secret documents in boxes handed over to the railway for despatch does not offer sufficient security; officers should carry such documents about with them on their person.

Further, it is frequently reported that unauthorised communications, regarding events, which take place in the theatre of operations, are made over the telephone. Especially in private telephone conversations, it is frequently apparent that the duty of observing reticence towards everybody even towards one's nearest relatives, is not sufficiently realised. The same applies to communication by letter.

I request that orders may be issued that the regulations prohibiting the communication of unofficial statements to unauthorised persons are to be brought to the notice of every member of the Army at regular intervals. As regards officers, their sense of duty should render any infringement of this order impossible."

AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY.....

An officer of the 59th Austrian Heavy Field Artillery Regt. captured on the 21st August near COURCELLES, states that his regiment, which has 4 batteries, each of 4-15 cm. howitzers, left BRIXLEGG in Tyrol about a month ago, travelled for 2½ days, and detrained near CAMBRAI. Previously the 59th Austrian Heavy Field Artillery Regt., was engaged with the 16th Austrian Div., on the Italian front.

The prisoner states that the 23rd Austrian Field Artillery Regt., is in the vicinity and that the 11th Austrian Heavy Artillery Regt., is in the ARRAS sector.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE.

(a) A captured order of the Second German Army, dated the 12th June, 1918, lays down that divisions in rest in the Lines of Communication areas are to be responsible for the defence of their billeting areas against hostile aircraft; field guns on special mountings were to be employed.

The order states that this measure is dictated by the shortage of anti-aircraft units in the Second German Army.

(b) Another document shows a new type of mounting for light machine guns, used on transport vehicles. This consists of a moveable bracket, fixed on the tail of the vehicle, to which the gun is attached by means of a pin and collar. Although the gun can be pivoted in all directions, the field of fire is better when shooting at a machine approaching the front of the vehicle, than at one approaching from the rear.

EFFECT OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS.

A leave train in DOUAI was hit by a bomb early this month, and about 30 men were injured. Owing to this bombardment, leave trains now start from WALLERS.

-----oOo-----

SITUATION WIRES.

FROM AUST. CORPS, TIMED 11am., 25:8:18.

Following from Fourth Army, timed 9.10 a.m.:-

3rd Army have taken CONTALMAISON and line now runs east of COURCELETTE - west of LE SARS + east of WARLENCOURT - BEAUCOURT. Following also in our hands:- AVESNES LES BAPAUME, SAPIGNIES and BEHAGNIES, thence line runs western outskirts MORY - east of ST. LEGER - western outskirts CROISELLES - east of HENIN and ST. MARTIN.

TIMED 11.35 a.m., 25:8:18.

Following from 3rd Corps timed 10.10am.:-

Centre Div. report that they have reached MAMETZ and are pushing on to MONTAUBAN - CARNOY road. Left Div. have been directed on MONTAUBAN and TRONES WOOD. Centre Div. on to the BERNAFAY - MARICOURT road and right Div. on to MARICOURT. Right Div. report opposition in BILLON WOOD which is being dealt with.

----oOo----

War Diary ✓

Appendix



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 216.

SECRET.

Copy No. 40

Ref. Maps - Sheets 62C. & 62D. -  
1/40,000.

Headquarters,  
26th August, 1918.

1. The 2nd Aust. Div. (less Artillery) will relieve the 1st Aust. Div. (less Artillery) in "C" Divisional Sector and area on night 26th/27th August.

2. 2nd Aust. Division will move into 1st Aust. Division area by Bde. Groups, under orders issued separately.

3. The forward divisional boundaries will be -

On the North - The SOMME Canal (inclusive to 2nd Aust. Div.)

On the South - The grid line running E. and W. between Squares R.12. and R.18.

4. (a) The 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. will relieve 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. and portion of 1st Aust. Inf. Bde. in the line on night 26th/27th August; all details of relief to be arranged between Brigadiers concerned.

(b) The 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. will move into support <sup>Bde. area</sup> Squares Q.12 and 18, R.7 and 13, on night 26th/27th August.

(c) The 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. will move into reserve Bde. area, Squares Q.15 and 21, on night 27th/28th August.

Command of front line will pass to G.O.C., 6th Aust. Inf. Bde., on completion of reliefs which will be notified by wire to H.Q., 1st Aust. Division.

5. The 5th and 7th Aust. M. G. Coys. will be under command of G.O.C., 6th Aust. Inf. Bde., who will arrange direct with Brigadiers concerned for relief of the M.Guns of 1st Aust. Division.

6. The reliefs of Engineer and Pioneer units and Medical units will be carried out under the orders of the C.R.E. and A.D.M.S. respectively.

7. (a) The following Field Artillery will pass under the command of G.O.C., 2nd Aust. Division, on the assumption of command of "C" Div. Sector by him:-

6th Army Bde. A.F.A.  
14th Army Bde. R.F.A.  
189th Army Bde. R.F.A.  
293th Army Bde. R.F.A.  
5th Army Bde. R.H.A.  
16th Army Bde. R.H.A.

C.R.A., 2nd Aust. Division, will assume command of the Field Artillery covering divisional front at same time.

(b) The following Heavy Artillery Bde. will on completion of relief become affiliated with 2nd Aust. Division:-

21st H. A. Bde.

8. Administrative instructions are being issued by "Q."

9. 2nd Aust. Div. Advanced H.Q. will be established in dugouts at Q.13.a.3.6. on evening of 26th August.

2nd Aust. Div. Rear H.Q. will remain at ALLONVILLE.

P.T.O.

10. The G.O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. will take over command of "C" Div. Sector on completion of relief of front line by 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. on night 26th/27th August.

11. Acknowledge.

*L. J. Bowick Major*

Issued at 3.0 a.m.

Lieut-Colonel,  
for General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.      To.

- 1. G.O.C.
- 2. G.
- 3. A.Q.
- 4. C.R.A.
- 5. C.R.E.
- 6. 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
- 7. 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 8. 6th do.
- 9. 7th do.
- 10. 2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.
- 11. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- 12. 2nd Aust. Div. Train.
- 13. A.D.M.S.
- 14. A.P.M.
- 15. S.S.O.
- 16. D.A.D.O.S.
- 17. D.A.D.V.S.
- 18. 2nd Aust. M. T. Coy.
- 19. D.B.O.
- 20. D.G.O.
- 21. Camp Commandant.
- 22/23. Aust. Corps.
- 24. Aust. Corps R.A.
- 25. Aust. Corps H.A.
- 26. 1st Aust. Div.
- 27. 3rd Aust. Div.
- 28. 4th Aust. Div.
- 29. 5th Aust. Div.
- 30. 32nd Div.
- 31. 2nd Aust. Div. Wing, Corps Reinft. Camp.
- 32. 5th Bde. Tanks.
- 33. 3rd Squad., A.F.C.
- 34. Area Comdt., BUSSY.
- 35.       "       VECQUEMONT.
- 36.       "       FOUILLOY.
- 37.       "       ALLONVILLE.
- 38/39. File.
- 40/42. War Diary.
- 43/46. Spare.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

Copy No.....

G.3/1/993.

Headquarters,  
26th August, 1918.

1. The following are the arrangements for the move of 2nd Aust. Div. to "C" Div. Sector.

2. The 6th A.I.Bde. Group consisting of -

6th A.I.Bde.  
5th and 7th Aust. M. G. Coys.  
6th Field Coy.  
6th Field Ambulance.

moved to Squares Q.12 and 18, R.7. and 13. on night 25th/26th August.  
6th A.I.Bde. H.Q. is established at about R.7.d.5.3.

3. The 5th A.I.Bde. Group consisting of -

5th A.I.Bde.  
6th Aust. M.G. Coy.  
5th Field Coy.  
5th Field Ambulance.

will move by bus to Squares Q.12. and 18., R.7. and 13 (vacated by 6th A.I.Bde.) on night 26th/27th August under arrangements to be made by G.O.C., 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Embussing: Head of column at O.12.c.0.0. on road running from O.11.central, facing S.E. Busses to be in position at 6.45 p.m. and move off at 7.30 p.m.

Debussing: Head of column at Q.24.b.5.7., facing North.  
5th A.I.Bde. H.Q. will be established in vicinity of 6th A.I. Bde. H.Q. at R.7.d.5.3.

4. 7th A.I.Bde. Group consisting of -

7th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.  
7th Field Coy.  
7th Field Ambulance.  
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.

will move by bus to Squares Q.15 and 21 on night 27th/28th August, under arrangements to be made by G.O.C., 7th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Embussing: Head of column at N.5.d.7.0.  
Busses to be in position at 6.30 p.m. and move at 7.15 p.m.

Debussing: Head of column at Q.20.b.6.4., facing North.  
7th A.I.Bde. H.Q. will be established in dugouts in vicinity MORCOURT.

5. All necessary arrangements for guides at the debussing points will be made by Bdes. concerned.

6. 2nd Aust. M.G. Bn. H.Q. will be established in dugouts in vicinity of MORCOURT by 8 p.m. on 26th instant.

7. Arrangements for forward move of Div. Train, Mob. Vet. Section and Div. Salvage Coy. will be made by "Q."

P.T.O.



67

8. One Squadron of 13th A.L.H. Regt. will be attached to Division, and will rendezvous at J.34.central at 6 p.m. on 26th instant.

9. Acknowledge.

*A. J. Bourke Major*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
for General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.      To.

- 1. C.R.A.
- 2. C.R.E.
- 3. 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
- 4. 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 5. 6th do.
- 6. 7th do.
- 7. 2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.
- 8. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- 9. 2nd Aust. Div. Train.
- 10. A.Q.
- 11. A.D.M.S.
- 12. A.P.M.
- 13. D.A.D.O.S.
- 14. D.A.D.V.S.
- 15. S.S.O.
- 16. D.B.O.
- 17. D.G.O.
- 18/19. File.
- 20/22. War Diary.
- 23/26. Spare.

SECRET.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Ga 130

Ref. Map. 62D.Location of Units as at 6 a.m. 27th August, 1918.

<u>DIVISIONAL H.Q.</u>	Q.13.a.3.6.	
<u>C.R.A.</u>	Q.13.a.3.6.	
16th Army Bde. R.H.A.	R.11.a.4.2.	
5th Army Bde. R.H.A.	G.25.d.4.4. (Sheet 62C)	
298th Army Bde. R.F.A.	B.35.b.5.5.	
2nd Aust Div. Art. Units	- In line under 32nd Div. "A" Div.	
<u>C.R.E.</u>	Q.13.a.3.6.	
5th Field Coy.	Q.12.c.9.1.	
6th Field Coy.	R.4.c.2.2.	
7th Field Coy.	H.35.c.5.6.	
<u>5th Aust. Inf. Bde.</u>	R.7.d.5.3.	
17th Bn.	R.7.c.2.7.	
18th Bn.	Q.12.d.7.6.	
19th Bn.	Q.18.c.9.7.	
20th Bn.	Q.18.b.8.7.	
5th A.L.T.M. Bty.	R.7.d.5.3.	
<u>6th Aust. Inf. Bde.</u>	L.34.central.	
21st Bn.	G.22.a.2.9. (62C)	LINE left.
22nd Bn.	G.32.a.2.9. (62C)	LINE centre.
23rd Bn.	L.34.b.5.0.	RESERVE.
24th Bn.	M.8.c.2.4. (62C)	LINE right.
6th A.L.T.M. Bty.	R.5.a.1.1.	
<u>7th Aust. Inf. Bde.</u>	BUSSY.	Chateau.
25th Bn.	H.35.b.4.8.	
26th Bn.	BUSSY	Billet 5
27th Bn.	H.35.b.central.	
28th Bn.	BUSSY	Billet 66.
7th A.L.T.M. Bty.	BUSSY	Billet 76.
<u>2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.</u>	N.23.a.1.1.	
<u>2nd Aust. M.G. Bn.</u>	R.1.d.15.20.	
5th A.M.G. Co.	L.34.central.	
6th A.M.G. Co.	R.13.c.4.0.	
7th A.M.G. Co.	L.34.central.	
22nd A.M.G. Co.	H.35.d.3.9.	
<u>A.D.M.S.</u>	ALLONVILLE.	
5th Field Amb.	Q.18.a.4.2.	
6th Field Amb.	Q.16.a.4.2.	
7th Field Amb.	BUSSY.	MERCOURT.
<u>Miscellaneous.</u>		
D.A.D.O.S.	O.11.central.	
Sqdn. 13th A.L.H. Regt.	Q.13.a.3.8.	
A.P.M.	Q.3.d.4.4.	
D.A.D.V.S., Paymaster and Gas Officer	at ALLONVILLE.	

*E. B. ...*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff, 2nd Australian Div.

2nd Aust. D.H.Q.  
26th Aug. 1918.

*War Diary*

Ref. Map - 62D.

Ga.156.

Location of Units as at 6am., 28th Aug. 1918.

DIVISIONAL H.Q. - Q.13.a.3.6.  
 2nd Aust. Div. Arty. H.Q. Q.13.a.3.6.  
 Right Group.  
 16th Army Bde. R.H.A. R.11.a. 1.5.  
 Centre Group.  
 298th Army Bde. R.F.A. G.25.d.3.4. (62. C).  
 Left Group.  
 5th Army Bde. R.H.A. G.25.d.3.4. (62 D).  
 2nd Aust. Div. Arty. Units. - In line under 32nd Div. "A" Div.  
 C.R.E. \* Q.13.a.3.6.  
 5th Field Coy. - R.4.central.  
 6th do. - R.4.c.2.2.  
 7th do. - Q.12.c.2.9.  
 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. R.1.c.6.8.  
 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. R.8.c.6.5. (opening L.34.central, 11am.).  
 17th Battalion. - L.34.b.3.0.  
 18th do. - R.4.b.8.3.  
 19th do. - R.10.b.9.8.  
 20th do. - R.5.b.5.0.  
 5th A.L.T.M. Bty. - L.34.a.8.0.  
 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. - L.34.central.  
 21st Battalion. - G.33.c.6.3. (62L.). LINE Left.  
 22nd do. - G.33.c.6.3. (62C.). LINE Centre.  
 23rd do. - G.32.a.7.2. (62C.). Reserve.  
 24th do. - M.8. *d36* (62C.). LINE Right.  
 6th A.L.T.M. Bty. - R.5.a.1.1.  
 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. - R.7.d.4.2.  
 25th Battalion. - R.7.c.2.9.  
 26th do. - R.7.d.central.  
 27th do. - Q.18.c.9.7.  
 28th do. - Q.18.d.8.7.  
 7th A.L.T.M. Bty. - R.7.c.5.3.  
 2nd Aust. M.G. Bn. - R.1.d.15.20.  
 5th Aust. M.G. Coy. - L.34.central.  
 6th do. - R.4.a.9.2.  
 7th do. - L.34.central.  
 22nd do. - R.13.c.4.0.  
 A.D.M.S. - Q.13.a.3.6.  
 5th Field Amb. - R.9.d.7.5.  
 6th do. - Q.16.a.4.2. MORCOURT.  
 7th do. - Q.17.b.7.7.  
 2nd Aust. Div. Train. - Q.9.b.1.4.  
 15th Coy. A.A.S.C. - Q.16.c.7.3.  
 16th do. - Q.16.d.8.8.  
 17th do. - Q.10.c.2.2.  
 20th do. - GUILLAUCOURT.  
 Miscellaneous.  
 D.A.D.O.S. - O.11.central.  
 Sqdn. 13th ALH. Regt. - Q.16.d.8.6  
 A.P.M. - Q.13.c.  
 D.A.D.V.S.)  
 Paymaster.) - ALLONVILLE.  
 D.G.O. )  
 2nd Aust. Mob. Vet. Sec. Q.2.d.5.7.  
 P.O.W. Cage. - O.17.c. (east of MORCOURT).

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
 27th August, 1918.

*E. J. Bagley Capt*  
 Lieut-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.

TO BE DESTROYED ON  
 RECEIPT OF A LATER ISSUE.

*War Diary*

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 203.

From 6.0 p.m., 26th, to 6.0 p.m., 27th Aug. 18.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry. During the period our line has been advanced by means of silent penetration and now runs as follows:- Road North and South-east of FONTAINE in M.9.d. - M.10.a.O.8. + M.4.d.1.9. - G.35.a.O.O. - G.29.central - G.23.d.O.O.

(b) Artillery. During the 26th instant movement observed in the enemy forward area was engaged by 18-pdrs., and harassing fire was carried out at night; approaches to DOMPIERRE being kept under fire. At 5 a.m. on 27th instant batteries of the Centre Group fired vigorously for 10 minutes on SALMON WOOD. At 6.30 a.m. 4.5" Hows. engaged an active 10.5 cm. battery suspected at H.31.b.90.90. Right Group fired on M.10.b. between 12 noon and 2 p.m.

(c) Aerial activity. Our 'planes were active throughout the period patrolling, reconnoitring and bombing. A special reconnaissance of three machines flew over the MAUREPAS, HERBECOURT and CHAULNES area. At 12.30 p.m. a large amount of horse transport (40 vehicles) was observed in B.20.a. and c. and B.26.a. and c. and an "LL" call was replied to by artillery with good results. At 12.30 p.m. a column of 8 horse transport in B.21.a. moving west was machine-gunned, and was turned southwards into valley in B.26.a. A special patrol of three machines bombed about 60 horses in B.20.a. and c. between 2.45 and 3.15 p.m. and observed numerous casualties. Heavy machine gun A.A. fire was encountered from M.23., 29., 35. and S.6.

(d) Patrols.

Right Bn. sent out patrol which proceeded to vicinity of house at M.9.5.7.5. and were fired on from left by rifle and M.Gs. Our patrol retaliated and enemy evacuated. Patrol then pushed on to about 150 yards from Factory when strong opposition with M.G. and Mills bombs was encountered. Patrol opened fire with L.G. and rifles during which enemy sent up three flares of two REDS. Fire appeared to come from both sides of factory, and opinion of O.C., Patrol, the Factory was strongly manned.

Centre Bn. Considerable opposition was met with in G.34.c. with result that casualties were inflicted on both sides. A good deal of M.G. fire was brought to bear on our patrols from about M.4.a. and c. Limbers that were making towards back areas of roads and across country were fired on by our riflemen and L. Gunners and the horses either killed or wounded. At 6 a.m. when a barrage opened on the Bde. on our left a battery of 4.2 H.E. was galloping into position in G.34.c. L.G's. were brought to bear on them with the result that the number of casualties inflicted prevented them from coming into action.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

7th and 10th Coys.,	18th I.R.)	
2nd Coy.,	148th I.R.)	41st Division.
6th Coy.,	152nd I.R.)	

Prisoners (normal).

The 41st Division was in line opposite our Division front on 8th August. It was afterwards withdrawn to the PERONNE area and moved forward again about the 24th.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE AND DISPOSITIONS.

The order of battle N. to S. is stated to be -

18th I.R.  
148th I.R.  
152nd I.R.

Dispositions. 18th I.R. unknown (This Regt. is stated to have been withdrawn during the night 26th/27th). Confirmation is required.

148th I.R. All three battalions in line. (P.S.).

152nd I.R. 1st and 2nd Bns. in line, 3rd Bn. 200 metres behind.

Owing to the continuously changing front, these dispositions cannot be taken as being in any way permanent. (P.S.).

P.T.O.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY.

Little activity has been displayed by hostile batteries. R.10.a. received a few rounds 10.5 cm., and R.3.b., 30 rounds 7.7 cm. Intermittent activity on M.7.d. and M.8.c. mainly 10.5 and 15 cm. sneezing gas. CHUIGNOLLES was intermittently shelled by 15 cm. during the period; CAPPY and G.32.d. also received some attention from 7.7 cm. and 10.5 cm. at 5 a.m. 7.7 cm. and 10.5 cm. fired on OLYMPIA WOOD (G.31). CHUIGNES and the high ground in R.18.a. were lightly shelled by 10.5 cm. at intervals during the morning. 1.40 p.m. 30 rounds 7.7 cm. on G.27.a. and G.28.a.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Alert. The outpost line has apparently been ordered to withdraw if pressure is brought to bear on it.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES.

(a) Flares. Few, and fired from well in rear.

7. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY. Bombing 'planes were active over rear areas.

8. MOVEMENT. Air reconnaissances report back areas and roads clear of traffic.

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 41ST DIVISION.

The 41st Division has already been heavily engaged since 8th August, and has suffered several thousand casualties in prisoners alone (see "Information from other Sources" in previous Summaries). It can be regarded as an exhausted division, and its morale is poor.

Coy. Strengths, in the Coys. above mentioned, appear to average 2 or 3 Officers, 40 O.R., 3 or 4 L.M.Gs.

Intentions. A prisoner of the 152nd I.R. stated that he had been sent out with a Sergt. Major and had been told by an officer to recall an outpost as the battalion was going to withdraw. He did not know the extent of the withdrawal. A prisoner of the 148th I.R. spoke of rumours of a withdrawal to the SOMME, but know nothing definite.

Mines and Traps. Prisoners had no knowledge of any, but do not deny the possibility of their existence.

Roads and tracks in back areas are stated to be good.

Moral. Poor. All regiments are badly disorganised and the men exhausted. They talk now only of peace, not of winning the war.

(P.S.)

M. E. Dering  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

Prisoners and Material. Since 22nd August, 82 Officers and 2,648 O.R. unwounded, and 4 Officers and 358 O.R. wounded have been captured, making a total of 86 officers and 3,006 O.R. Grand total since 8th August - 295 Officers and 11,849 O.R. - *Captured by Aust. Corps.*

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

Ca.184.

Ref. <sup>Maps</sup> 62D. & 62C.

Location of units as at 6 a.m. 29:8:18.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS	Q.13.a.3.6.	
2nd Aust Div. Arty. H.Q.	Q.13.a.3.6.	
16th Army Bde., R.H.A.	M.16.a.7.9.	RIGHT Group.
298th do. R.F.A.	G.33.c.1.6.	CENTRE Group.
5th Army Bde., R.H.A.	G.22.c.central.	LEFT Group.
4th A.F.A. Bde. H.Q.	MERICOURT.	Billet No. 94.
5th A.F.A. Bde. H.Q.	MERICOURT.	do.
2nd Aust. D.A.C.	P.35.d.4.5.	
C.R.E. ...	Q.13.a.3.6.	
5th Field Coy.	G.31.d.0.5.	
6th do.	G.32.a.9.3.	
7th do.	R. 4.c.	
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	R. 1.c.6.8.	
5th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	G. 21 d.5.7.	
17th Battalion.	G.26.c.6.2.	LINE.
18th do.	G.28.b.9.4.	LINE.
19th do.	G.28.b.9.5.	
20th do.	G.26.c.7.7.	
5th A.L.I.M. Bty.	G.26.c.7.7.	
6th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	G.32.a .2.9.	(Forward Stn. G.35.d.0.0.).
21st Battalion.	-	RESERVE. G.26.c.10.05.
22nd do.	-	LINE Centre. G.36.c.8.6.
23rd do.	-	LINE Left. G.30.a.0.1.
24th do.	-	LINE Right. M.10.d.2.9.
6th A.L.I.M. Bty.	G.32.a.2.9.	
4th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	L.34.central.	
25th Battalion.	R. 5.b.	
26th do.	R.10.b.6.5.	
27th do.	L.34.b.	
28th do.	R. 4.b.8.4.	
7th A.L.I.M. Bty.	L.34.d.	
2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.	G.25.d.8.8.	
5th Aust. M. G. Coy.	G.32.a .2.9.	
6th do.	G.26.c.6.6.	
7th do.	G.32.a .2.9.	
22nd do.	R. 4.c.	
A.D.M.S. ...	Q.13.a.3.6.	
5th Field Amb.	G.25.d.4.8.	CAPPY.
6th do.	Q.16.a.5.5.	MORCOURT.
7th do.	L.15.c.7.7.	
2nd Aust. Div. Train.	R. 7.d.4.3.	
15th Coy., A.A.S.C.	R. 7.d.4.3.	
16th do.	R. 7.d.4.3.	
17th do.	R. 7.d.4.3.	
20th do.	W.14.c.8.0.	GILLAUCOURT.
MISCELLANEOUS.		
D.A.C.C.S.	O.11.central.	
Squad., 13th A.L.H. Regt.	L.34.central.	
A.P.M.	Q.3.d.4.4.	
D.A.D.V.S.	Q.13.a.3.6.	
Paymaster.	CERISY.	
D.G.O.	Q.13.a.	
2nd Aust. Mob. Vet. Sect.	Q. 5.d.7.4.	
P.O.W. Cage.	R.3.b.9.4.	
French Mission.	Q. 3.d.1.3.	CERISY.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
28th August, 1918.

CERISY. *W. B. Bayly*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

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INSTRUCTIONS No 1 - SERIES "D".

-----

Headquarters,  
28th August 1918.

Reference Maps 62C NW and SW 1/20,000.

1. POLICY.

An offensive policy will be adopted by the division in as much that constant touch will be maintained with the enemy and every opportunity seized to advance our line without becoming involved in heavy fighting.

2. OBJECTIVE.

The first objective of this phase of the operations is the enemy trench system in E.11, thence running east of DOMPIERRE, through G.36.central, and then in a general northerly direction to the SOMME at H.13.b.0.5.

3. PLAN OF ADVANCE.

The advance will be carried out on a one brigade front, remaining two brigades disposed in support and reserve. The forward movement of the line brigade will be maintained until, under instructions from D.H.Q. the support brigade passes through it and continues the advance.

4. DISPOSITIONS.

Units will remain organised in brigade groups, as at present, under the command of respective G.O's.C. Brigades. The support and reserve brigade groups will conform to the forward movement of the line brigade group maintaining a distance of approximately 3000 to 6000 yards respectively from the front line.

The dispositions at present are:

6th A.I.Bde.	Group in line.
5th A.I.Bde.	Group in support.
7th A.I.Bde.	Group in reserve.

5. FIELD ARTILLERY.

(a) Field Artillery - The divisional front is at present covered by three field artillery brigades organised into three groups:

Right group -	16th Army Bde. R.H.A.
Centre group -	298th Army Bde. R.F.A.
Left group -	5th Army Bde. R.H.A.

C.R.A. will arrange the necessary liaison between headquarters of brigades and battalions in line and artillery groups.

(b) Heavy Artillery - 9th Brigade R.G.A. is affiliated with 2nd Aust. Division.

6. MEDICAL.

All necessary arrangements for evacuation of casualties will be made by the A.D.M.S.

7. ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.

Field companies will work in conjunction with brigade with which they are grouped. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will work under orders of C.R.E.

8. LIGHT HORSE.

One squadron 13th A.L.H. Regiment is attached to 2nd Aust. Div. One troop of this squadron is attached to the brigade group in the line for work under orders of G.C.C. Brigade.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*J. P. Bowick Major*

Lieut-Colonel.

General Staff, 2nd Aust. Division.

Distribution overleaf.

*War Diary*

Distribution.

- Copy No 1 G.O.C.
- 2 G.
- 3 A.Q.
- 4 C.R.A.
- 5 C.R.E.
- 6 Div. Sig. Coy.
- 7 5th A.I. Bde.
- 8 6th A.I. Bde.
- 9 7th A.I. Bde.
- 10 2nd A.M.G. Bn.
- 11 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- 12 A.D.M.S.
- 13 Aust. Corps.
- 14 1st Aust. Div.
- 15 3rd Aust. Div.
- 16 4th Aust. Div.
- 17 5th Aust. Div.
- 18 3rd Sqdn. A.F.C.
- 19 Sqdn. 13th A.L.H. Regt.
- 20)
- 21) File.
- 22/24 War Diary.
- 25/27 Spare.

1. DISPOSITION  
 Units will remain organized in brigade groups, as at present, under the command of respective G.O.C.'s. The support and reserve brigade groups will conform to the forward movement of the line brigade group maintaining a distance of approximately 5000 to 6000 yards. The dispositions at present are:  
 7th A.I. Bde. Group in reserve.  
 5th A.I. Bde. Group in support.  
 6th A.I. Bde. Group in line.

2. FIELD ARTILLERY  
 (a) Field Artillery - The divisional front is at present covered by three field artillery brigades organized into three groups:  
 Right group - 13th Army Bde. R.H.A.  
 Centre group - 20th Army Bde. R.H.A.  
 Left group - 5th Army Bde. R.H.A.  
 C.R.A. will arrange the necessary liaison between headquarters of brigades and battalions in line and artillery groups.

(b) Heavy Artillery - 3th Brigade R.H.A. is affiliated with 2nd Aust. Division.

3. MEDICAL  
 All necessary arrangements for evacuation of casualties will be made by the A.D.M.S.

4. ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS  
 Field companies will work in conjunction with brigade with which they are grouped. The Aust. Pioneer Bn. will work under orders of C.R.E.

5. LIGHT HORSE  
 One squadron 13th A.L.H. Regiment is attached to 2nd Aust. Div. One troop of this squadron is attached to the brigade group in the line for work under orders of G.O.C. Brigades.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE  
 Distribution overleaf.  
 General Staff, 2nd Aust. Division.  
 Lt. Col. [Signature]



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

SECRET.

Ref. Maps - 62C. N.W. & S.W.  
1/20,000.

Headquarters,  
28th August, 1918.

Copy No. 24

Gx.45.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 2 - SERIES D.1. POLICY.

The advance to the SOMME will be continued on 29th instant with the utmost determination.

2. PLAN.

The 5th A.I.Bde. will advance on the left. The 7th A.I.Bde. will pass through the 6th A.I.Bde. on the enemy trench system running approximately North and South through HERBECOURT at 7.30 a.m. on 29th instant. The inter-brigade boundary will be the east and west grid line between Squares H.20. and H.26.

3. OBJECTIVES.

The objective of 5th A.I.Bde. is the trench system on the high ground in Squares I.9., I.10., I.17. and I.23. Two Bns will cross the river by the causeway in the river bend at H.12. and remaining two Bns. at the dry Canal du Nord in I.19.c.

The objective of 7th A.I.Bde. is DOINGT and the trenches south-east of PERONNE.

4. ARTILLERY.

The 5th A.I.Bde. will be supported by 5th Army Bde. R.H.A. The 7th A.I.Bde. will be supported by 298th Army Bde. R.F.A. and 16th Army Bde. R.H.A.

5. MACHINE GUNS.

One M.G. Coy. will remain attached to each Inf. Bde. On passing into divisional reserve one M. G. Coy. at present attached to 6th A.I.Bde. will pass to command J.O.C., 2nd A.M.G. Bn.

6. RESERVE BDE.

On 7th A.I.Bde. passing through 6th A.I.Bde., the latter will be reorganised and will conform to the easterly movement of the attacking brigades.

7. MEDICAL.

All necessary arrangements for the evacuation of casualties will be made by the A.D.M.S.

8. ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.

One Field Coy. will remain attached to each Inf. Bde. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will move to the neighbourhood of CAPPY on 29th instant, and be employed under instructions of C.R.E.

9. LIGHT HORSE.

H.Q., of Squadron and one troop of 13th A.L.H. Regt. will be attached to 5th A.I.Bde. One troop will be attached to each of 6th and 7th A.I.Bdes.

P.T.O.

10. DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q. will close at 0.13.3.6 and reopen at dugouts at G.25.d.2.3. on the afternoon of 29th instant, at an hour to be notified later.

*J.P. Brown, Major*

Lieut.-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

11. Acknowledge.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.	To.
1.	G.O.C.
2.	G.
3.	C.R.A.
4.	C.R.E.
5.	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
6.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
7.	6th do.
8.	7th do.
9.	2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.
10.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
11.	A.Q.
12.	A.D.M.S.
13.	2nd Aust. Div. Train.
14.	A.P.M.
15.	Aust. Corps.
16.	1st Aust. Div.
17.	3rd Aust. Div.
18.	4th Aust. Div.
19.	5th Aust. Div.
20.	3rd Squad., A.F.C.
21.	Squad., 13th A.L.H. Regt.
22/23.	File.
24/26.	War Diary.
27/30.	Spare.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 204.

From 6 p.m., 27th, to 6 p.m. 28th August, 18.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry. The line was advanced during the period, and now runs M.12.d.5.0. - M.12.b.6.7. - thence BRUNEHILDE TRENCH from N.7.b.7.2. to N.1.d.6.2. - thence N.1.central - H.31.a.5.0. - back along DELS CATESES ALLEY to BLACK WOOD, along HELENE and SOPHIE TRENCHES - E. of HOSPICE WOOD - E. of BOUCHER WOOD, thence H.19.a.7.5., and along most eastern of three trenches to H.13.b.0.6.

(b) Artillery. Liaison maintained with covering field artillery, who successfully engaged several targets asked for. Shooting was good in trenches G.30. and BULLS WOOD, and targets North of Wood. Harassing fire on FRISE, HERBECOURT, MIREANCOURT WOOD, and areas H.19., H.25., during night.

(c) Trench Mortars. 15 rounds were fired.

(d) Machine Guns. Active over the front. L.G's. fired on hostile M.G's. and movement. Three enemy hit at G.30.a.3.3.

(e) Aerial Activity. Our 'planes were active reconnoitring and patrolling.

(f) Patrols. During the night liaison patrols kept touch with flank Bns. Forward patrols stated that contact with enemy in front could not be made, also reported fires in rear of enemy lines.

(g) Snipers. Snipers were active and claim two hits.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

4th Guard Gren. Regt., 2nd Guard Div.	Prisoner.
67th M. Gun Sharp Shooter Detachment.	2 Prisoners.
1st Coy. Pioneer Bn. 21, 21st Div.	Prisoner.

3. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

Order of Battle of Second Guard Div. is stated to be, North to South - 2nd Guard Gren. Regt.  
1st Guard Gren. Regt.  
4th Guard Gren. Regt.

As the Second Guard Gren. Regt. was identified in the LONGUEVAL area to-day in a counter-attack, there are obviously other Regts. of the Division between this Regt. and the other two. The prisoner was positive that the 1st Guard Grenadiers were on his right. Confirmation is required.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Very active towards evening. Principal areas shelled - M.7.d., M.8.c., M.8.d., M.9., M.3.c. and d., G.27., G.33., G.28.a. and c., G.34.a. and c., BULLS WOOD and OVAL WOOD. All calibres were used, and fire for greater part of time was very intense, a large number of sneezing gas shells being mixed with H.E.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE. Rearguard action showing a determined attempt to arrest our advance at good defensive positions.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES.

(a) Machine Guns. Active particularly from G.35.c., M.4.d., G.29.b. and d., G.35.d.

(b) Flares. Fairly numerous until midnight.

7. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Very active. Several large flights of about a dozen over our lines during the day. At 8.10 p.m., 7 enemy 'planes crossed our lines about M.9.d. but were driven back by A.A. and M.G. fire. Balloons on T.B. of 72° from M.8.d.3.6.

8. MOVEMENT. Much movement observed about BULLS WOOD. This was successfully engaged by artillery.

P.T.O.

War Diary

9. MISCELLANEOUS. Enemy snipers were active against all movement over-land and took advantage of targets whenever they presented themselves.

INFORMATION REGARDING SECOND GUARD DIVISION.

Movements. Suffered severely in MARNE battle, was in rest for 3 weeks, being reinforced by the 259th R.I.R. from the disbanded 78th Res. Div. Moved from RETHEL to HAM by train. Two Regts. are reported in line near TRONES WOOD and the third has been identified opposite our front.

Strengths. 6th Coy., 4th Guard Gren. Regt., 1 Off. 140 C.R. 4 L.M.Gs.

Intentions. A withdrawal is expected <sup>to</sup> east of the SOMME where there are some good trenches some 600 metres east of the river.

Reliefs. The 4th Guard Gren. Regt. relieved the 478th Regt. of the 243rd Div. on the night 27th/28th. (P.S.).

Disbandment of 78th Res. Div. The 78th Res. Div., consisting of the 258th R.I.R., 259th R.I.R., 260th R.I.R., has been disbanded, the 258th having gone to the 185th Div.(?), the 259th to the 2nd Guard Div. and the 260th to the 20th Division.

Dispositions of 4th Guard Gren. Regt. - II Bn. in line.  
I Bn. in support.  
III Bn. in reserve.

Moral of Prisoner. - Poor.

INFORMATION REGARDING THE 67TH M.G.S.S. DETACHMENT.

This unit has been in line nine days. M.G. Sharp Shooting detachments are sector troops and are allotted to divisions in line as required.

Strength of 2nd Coy. - 3 Off. 113 C.R. and 12 Heavy M.Gs.

Intentions. Prisoner's Coy. withdrew to the HERBECOURT line at midnight 27th/28th. A further withdrawal to east of the SOMME is expected. (P.S.).

Mines and Traps. Some cross roads have been blown up, but not thoroughly, and Engineers have been seen about on this work. (P.S.).

Moral. Prisoners were of good physique, particularly one who was a Corporal. He stated that the 243rd Div. had gone out on the previous night badly demoralized and with Coys. only 18, 20 and 30 strong. Everyone, he stated, was tired of the war and there was no spirit in the troops, who only wanted peace.

*Kellum is left*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
2nd Aust. Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

PRISONERS.

Since 8th August the total number of prisoners captured by Aust. Corps is 301 Officers and 12, 168 O.Rs. (I. S. No. 236).

RESERVES. (I.S. No. 253).

There are now 15 Divs. fit for offensive operations, in reserve, of which 4 are considered to be between the Sea and the OISE.

To sum up - Beyond the possible presence of the 232nd Div. in back areas, there would only appear to be available to reinforce this front divisions withdrawn exhausted since August 8th.

Continued pages 1a & 2a.

1a.  
INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

GERMAN TIME FUZES.

A captured document, dated 30:11:17, issued by German G.H.Q., states that numerous complaints have been received from the troops with regard to the irregular shooting obtained with time fuzes in which the action is dependent on the burning of a powder composition. These indifferent results are attributed to the following causes:-

- (a) Deterioration in the quality of materials such as charcoal, saltpetre, felt and resin.
- (b) The substitution of iron for brass in fuze bodies.
- (c) Unskilled workmanship.
- (d) Lack of training on the part of gunners.
- (e) Lack of care in storage.

The order states, in conclusion, that many of the present sources of error would be eliminated by the introduction of mechanical time fuzes (clockwork fuzes) for all calibres. This was not possible at present, however, and in the meantime, thorough training and care in storage must be insisted upon.

NOTE. - The Germans already employ clockwork fuzes with their new 15 cm. gun (1916 pattern) and with 15 cm., 24 cm., 28 cm. and 38 cm. naval guns on land mountings.

REDUCTION IN THE STRENGTH OF BATTALIONS.

According to the statements of prisoners of the 13th Res. Infantry Regt. (13th Reserve Division), captured near MERCKEM on the 19th August, each of the three battalions of that regiment has been reduced to three companies, the fourth company in each case having been dissolved. The battalions of the 3rd Jager Regiment (200th Division) are said to have been reduced in a similar manner.

Further, a prisoner of the 13th Inf. Regt. (13th Div.), captured on the 24th March, south-east of ALEERT, STATES THAT THE SAME PROCEDURE HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN HIS REGIMENT, THE 4TH, 8TH AND 12TH Companies having been broken up and distributed each among the other companies of its battalion.

There is no further evidence that this practice has become general, and it is possible that the above are isolated instances, rendered necessary by the heavy losses suffered by these three divisions. It is probable, however, that all divisions which have been heavily engaged may have to resort to similar measures, since it is known that, in the majority of cases, the company strengths of divisions in the Western Theatre are much below establishment.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DIVISIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

The following Austrian Divisions were identified, on the 25th instant, on the Western front:-

<u>Unit.</u>	<u>Sector.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
1st Austro-H. Div.	SAMOGNEUX (N.W. of VERDUN).	Prisoners.
35th Austro-Hungarian Div.	N. of ST. MIHIEL. (WOEUVRE).	Prisoners; Div. appears to have replaced the 235 (German) Div.

In addition to the above divisions, the 14th Austro-Hungarian Div. and another unidentified Div. are considered to be on the Western front. (I. S. No. 252).

GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS.....

2a.

GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS.

The following is an extract from an order issued by the 13th Artillery Command, 13th Div., dated 8:7:18:-

"We must endeavour gradually to secure a period of quiet between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 a.m., so that it may be possible to carry out reliefs, and bring ammunition, stores, rations, etc., right up to the front line. Full advantage must be taken, however, of these morning hours as being the best time for us to observe; it is only during these hours that aeroplanes, balloons, and observation groups can get good observation over back areas.

"Consequently, during this period, the engagement of forward targets, ranging, the testing of barrage and destructive fire, and concentrations must be eliminated as far as is possible; on the other hand, it is the obvious and only time for the shelling of back areas, registration or checking registration on batteries, harassing fire, etc."

GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SECRET.

A captured order of the LI Corps, dated 12:5:18, shows how the Army order regarding secrecy, issued by the Second German Army on 22:1:18 has been carried into effect:-

The following are extracts from the LI Corps order:-

- (a) All movement of transport and of large bodies of troops in close formation west of the line eastern exit of DEMUIN - VILLERS-aux-ERABLES - PLESSIER by daylight and in clear weather is forbidden. Divisions must post traffic controls within their sectors on the roads along this line. In addition, the 10th Balloon Detachment will employ both its balloons to observe the traffic in this area and will report results to Corps H.Q.
- (b) All new construction in the trenches, as well as in camps, must be frequently controlled by aviators.
- (c) The divisional signal commanders and the commander of No. 651 Group Wireless Station will supervise the wireless and telephonic communications, and will report the results of their examination to the security officers.

References in above-mentioned order to both Divisional and Corps Security Officers confirm the evidence as to the Security organization in the German Army,

ENEMY LOSSES THROUGH BOMBING.

Prisoners state that PERONNE is empty as regards troops, but that there are transport horses in stables in the town. Many casualties have been caused among these horses by our night bombing. Personnel are billeted in the N. and N.E. part of PERONNE.

(I. S. No. 252).

PRISONERS.

Since the operations on 22nd August, the following have been captured by this Corps:-

Unwounded.	99	Officers.	3,039	O.Rs.
Wounded.	6	"	507	"
Total.	<u>105</u>		<u>3,546</u>	

(I. S. No. 235).

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.,  
28th August, 1918.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.  
Ga. 219.

Ref. Maps - 62D. &amp; 62C.

Location of Units as at 6 a.m. 30-8-18.DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.2nd Aust. Div. Arty. H.Q.

16th Army Bde., R.H.A.

298th do. R.F.A.

5th do. R.H.A.

4th A.F.A.Bde. H.Q.

5th A.F.A.Bde. H.Q.

2nd Aust. D.A.C.

C.R.E.

5th Field Coy.

6th do.

7th do.

2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.

5th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.

17th Battalion.

18th do.

19th do.

20th do.

5th A.L.T.MM Bty.

6th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.

21st Battalion.

22nd do.

23rd do.

24th do.

6th A.L.T.M. Bty.

7th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.

25th Battalion.

26th do.

27th do.

28th do.

7th A.L.T.M. Bty.

2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.

5th Aust. M. G. Coy.

6th do.

7th do.

22nd do.

A.D.M.S.

5th Field Amb.

6th do.

7th do.

2nd Aust. Div. Train.

15th Coy., A.A.S.C.

16th do.

17th do.

20th do.

MISCELLANEOUS.

D.A.D.O.S.

Squad., 13th A.L.H. Regt.

A.P.M.

D.A.D.V.S.

Paymaster.

D.G.O.

P.O.W. Cage.

French Mission.

- G.25.d.1.3.

- G.25.d.1.3.

- N.11.a.60.80.

- H.32.b.50.60.

- H.20.d.50.00.

- H.19.c.10.75.

- G.24.c.20.50.

- G.26.central.

- G.25.d.1.3.

- G.18.d.3.6.

- G.28.b.8.5.

- N.4.b.8.1.

- G.33.c.1.7.

- H.19.a.8.0.

- H.21.a.5.1.

- H.15.c.3.3.

- H.15.c.3.3.

- H.15.d.1.9.

- G.28.b.9.4.

- H.19.a.8.0.

- G.30.b.7.5.

- H.26.c.8.3.

- H.26.c.8.1.

- H.26.a.central.

- H.19.a.8.0.

- H.32.c.6.8.

- N.6.d.2.8.

- O.7. central.

- H.36.b.3.8.

- O.1.central.

- N.4.a.0.5.

- G.25.d.8.8.

- H.26.c.1.4.

- H.19.a.1.1.

- H.19.c.9.2.

- H.32.c.9.9.

- G.25.d.1.3.

- H.32.a.0.8.

- G.25.d.2.8.

- L.15.c.7.7.

- R.7.d.4.2.

- G.28.a.6.4.

- R.7.d.3.2.

- R.7.d.3.2.

- R.8.c.9.7.

- R.4.a.8.4.

- H.26.c.1.7.

- G.25.d.1.3.

- Q.13.a.3.6.

- CERISY.

- CERISY.

- Q.13.a.

- R.3.b.9.4.

- Q.3.d.1.3.

RIGHT Group.

CENTRE Group.

LEFT Group.

HERBECOURT.

CAPPY.

CERISY.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.  
29th August, 1918.

*E. J. B. [Signature]*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

TO BE DESTROYED ON RECEIPT OF A LATER ISSUE.*War Diary*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

No. 208.

From 6 p.m., 28th, to 6 p.m. 29th August, 18.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry. During the night the enemy withdrew his main forces east of the SOMME. Our line was advanced accordingly and now follows the western bank of the SOMME. Posts have also been established on the eastern bank of the SOMME Canal at I.25.a.2.8 and O.9.b.25.90.

(b) Artillery. Liaison was maintained with covering artillery.

(c) Trench Mortars. 80 rounds Stokes fired on selected targets. Fire on system of trenches in H.13.c. was very effective, over a dozen enemy being found dead. The enemy was also forced to leave trench system and in their attempt to reach MEREAU COURT Wood were cut off, 48 being taken prisoners.

(d) Machine Guns. M.G's. were employed in covering ground that could not be covered by the rifles of the infantry.

(e) Patrols. Constant patrols to establish touch with the enemy.

(f) Snipers. Snipers were active and availed themselves of every opportunity.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

28th R.I.R., 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Companies. 14th Assault Coy, 14th Bav. Div. 25th Bav I.R. 14th Bav. Div. 576th Bearer Coy., 185th Div. 27 F.A.R., 46 I.R.

3. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

East of the SOMME, unknown.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Fairly heavy up to 9 p.m. particularly on DOMPIERRE, G.24.c., G.36.c and d., N.1.c., and M.6, all calibres being used. Enemy appears to be firing at long range.

5. ENEMY ATTITUDE

Unchanged and holding line of SOMME for the present.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES.

(a) Machine Guns. Fairly active until 11 p.m.

(b) Flares. Not a great number fired, and these were from a good distance in rear. DOUBLE REDS were fired. These brought down intense barrage on our rear battalion sector.

7. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY. - Inactive.

9. MISCELLANEOUS.

Enemy Intentions. Unknown. No prisoners captured by this Division were able to say if a further withdrawal was intended. (For probable intentions see Information from Other Sources.)

*M. S. Dering*  
Li ut-Colonel,  
General Staff, 2nd Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

Prisoners state mines are laid ready to blow up in the station at PERONNE. They state their retirement is eventually to reach the old CAMBRAI - ST. QUENTIN line but they believe a temporary stand will be made at PERONNE. PERONNE and surrounding villages are stated to have been cleared of stores and material. -Corps Ig.604.

*Bar Dier*



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

SECRET.

Copy No. ....

G.1/970.

Ref. Maps - 62.C.N.W. &amp; S.W. 1/20,000.

Headquarters,  
30th August, 1918.INSTRUCTIONS No. 3 - SERIES "D".1. POLICY.

The advance will be continued on 30th August.

2. PLAN.

During night of 29th/30th August footbridges will be thrown across the River SOMME under Brigade arrangements. At 5 a.m. on 30th August 7th A.I.Bde. on the right and 5th A.I.Bde. on the left will cross and attack the enemy positions on the eastern side of the river.

3. OBJECTIVE.

The objective of 7th A.I.Bde. is high ground in vicinity of I.35. central.

The objective of 5th A.I.Bde. is high ground in vicinity of MONT St. QUENTIN and spur in I.1. and I.2. east of CLERY.

4. ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

The attack will be supported by an artillery bombardment arranged directly between C.O's C. Bdes. and Artillery Bde. Commanders with whom they are co-operating. The 5th Aust. Div. Arty. have been asked to bombard le MESNIL and wood as far north as southern divisional boundary.

5. RE-ADJUSTMENT OF DIVISIONAL FRONT.

During 30th August the 7th A.I.Bde. will be relieved in its battle position by a brigade of 5th Aust. Div. Details of relief will be arranged directly between Brigade Commanders concerned.

The divisional boundaries for future operations will then run as on attached map.

The 6th A.I.Bde. group will then be in support and 7th A.I. Bde. group in reserve.

6. RE-ALLOTMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

The 5th A.I.Bde. will be supported by an artillery group composed as follows :-

4th A.F.A.Bde.

5th A.F.A.Bde.

5th Army Bde. R.H.A.

After relief of 7th A.I.Bde. the 16th Army Bde. R.H.A. and 298th Army Bde. R.F.A. will pass into divisional reserve.

7. MEDICAL.

All necessary arrangements for the evacuation of casualties will be made by A.D.M.S.

8. ENGINEERS.

Field Companies will remain attached to Inf. Bdes. as at present.

P.T.O.

9. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Prisoners of war will be taken over by A.P.M. at Bde. Hd. Qrs. and examined by Div. Intelligence Officer at Div. Cage G.30.a.O.O.

10. Acknowledge by wire.

*G. H. Dowrick Major*  
Lieut. Colonel.  
General Staff.  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 12.30 a.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	G.O.C.
2. %	G.
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6. %	5th A.I.Bde.
7. %	6th A.I.Bde.
8. %	7th A.I.Bde.
9. %	2nd Aust. M.G.Bn.
10.	2nd A.Pioneer Bn.
11.	A.Q.
12. %	A.D.M.S.
13.	2nd A.Div.Train.
14.	A.P.M.
15.	Aust. Corps.
16.	1st Aust. Div
17.	3rd Aust. Div.
18.	4th Aust.Div.
19.	5th Aust. Div.
20.	3rd Squad. A.F.C.
21. %	Squad. 13th A.L.H. Regt.
22/23.	File.
24/26.	War Diary.
27/30.	Spare.

Note. - % Map attached.

63

Headquarters,  
31st August 18.

G.1/ 972.

Ref. Maps - 62C NW 1/20,000  
Ed. 413.

INSTRUCTIONS No 4 - SERIES "D".

1. PLAN.

The 5th A.I.Bde. having captured the enemy trench system in I.7.a. and c. and I.13.b will continue the attack at 5 a.m. on 31st August.

2. OBJECTIVE.

The objective is the high ground in the vicinity of MONT ST. QUENTIN as far east as the MONT ST. QUENTIN - ST. DENIS road.

3. ARTILLERY.

The attack will be supported by the five field and horse artillery brigades at present forming the divisional artillery, firing on selected enemy trench systems. The heavy artillery affiliated with the division will fire on selected targets.

4. MACHINE GUNS.

The M.G. Company at present in divisional reserve will pass under command of G.O.C. 5th A.I.Bde. at 9 a.m. on 31st August.

5. SUPPORT AND RESERVE BRIGADES.

The divisional front now having been adjusted to a one brigade front the 6th and 7th A.I.Bdes. will be in support and reserve respectively, remaining in their present locations.

Acknowledge by wire.

*Lt Col Berwick Major*

Lt Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff, 2nd Australian Division.

Distribution:-

Copy No	1	G.O.C.	13	2nd Aust. Div. Train.
	2	G.	14	A.P.M.
	3	C.R.A.	15	Aust. Corps.
	4	C.R.E.	16	1st Aust. Div.
	5	2nd A.Div. Sig. Co.	17	3rd Aust. Div.
	6	5th A.I.Bde.	18	4th Aust. Div.
	7	6th A.I.Bde.	19	5th Aust. Div.
	8	7th A.I.Bde.	20	3rd Sqdn. A.P.C.
	9	2nd A.M.G.Bn.	21	Sqdn. 13th A.L.H.Reg.
	10	2nd A.Pioneer Bn.	22/23	File.
	11	A.Q.	24/26	War Diary.
	12	A.D.M.S.	27/30	Spare.

*War Diary*

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

Copy No. ....

G.1/973.

Ref. Maps - 62C., N.W. -  
1/20,000 - Ed. 4.D.

Headquarters,  
31st August, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 5 - SERIES "D."1. PLAN.

The 5th A.I.Bde. have captured all their objectives on the morning of 31st August. The advance will be continued in a North-Easterly direction.

2. OBJECTIVE.

The objective is the line D.19.central - East of AIZECOURT-le-Haut - J.8.central.

3. PLAN OF ATTACK.

The 6th A.I.Bde. are now moving to support positions in Squares I.14. and I.20. After clearing ground in I.20., I.21. and I.26., 6th A.I.Bde. will pass through 5th A.I.Bde. and continue the advance as set forth above, the 5th A.I.Bde. then passing into support.

4. ARTILLERY.

The advance of 6th A.I.Bde. will be supported by an Artillery Group composed as follows:-

Group Commander - Lt-Col. CALLAGHAN, D.S.O., 4th A.F.A. Bde.

4th A.F.A. Bde.

16th Army Bde., R.F.A.

5. RESERVE BDE.

The 7th A.I.Bde. will move from its present location at 12.30 p.m. to reserve position in Squares I.7. and I.30/3. On 6th A.I.Bde. vacating area in Squares I.14. and I.20, the 7th A.I.Bde. will move forward to latter position and remain in Divisional Reserve.

6. MACHINE GUNS.

On 5th A.I.Bde. passing into support one of the M.G. Coys. at present attached to 5th A.I.Bde. will pass under command of O.C., 2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.

7. ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.

C.R.E. will arrange to open up traffic bridges over SOMME as soon as possible. At least two bridges East of CLERY must be capable of carrying mechanical transport.

8. MEDICAL.

All necessary arrangements for the evacuation of casualties will be made by the A.D.M.S.

9. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Prisoners of War will be taken over by the A.P.M. at OLD QUARRY H. 15.c.3.3. from 5 p.m. on 31st August, where they will be interrogated by D.I.O.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

Necessary arrangements will be made and instructions issued by "Q" Branch.

11. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

*D.P. Bowick, Major*

Lieut-Colonel,  
7<sup>th</sup> General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 12 noon.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. . . . To.

1. G.O.C.
2. G.
3. C.R.A.
4. C.R.E.
5. 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
6. 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
7. 6th do.
8. 7th do.
9. 2nd Aust. M. G. Bn.
10. 2nd Aust. Pioneer En.
11. A.Q.
12. A.D.M.S.
13. 2nd Aust. Div. Train.
14. A.P.M.
15. D.I.O.
16. Capt. MENZIES (Liaison Officer, attached 3rd Aust. Div.).
17. Aust. Corps.
18. 1st Aust. Div.
19. 3rd Aust. Div.
20. 4th Aust. Div.
21. 5th Aust. Div.
22. 3rd Squad., A.F.C.
23. Squadron, 13th A.L.H. Regt.
- 24/28. File.
- 26/28. War Diary.
- 29/32. Spare.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

No. 206.

Ref. Maps - HAZEBROUCK 5A.,  
LENS, Sheet 62C.,  
1/40,000.

Headquarters,  
31st August, 1918.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT.OPERATIONS.

In the YPRES - GIVENCHY Sector the enemy has withdrawn his line, and the approximate British line now runs - West of GROOTE VIERSTRAAT, East of MT. KEMMEL, East of LINDENHOEK, one kilometre east of DRANOUTRE, two kilometres east of BAILLEUL, one kilometre south of STEEN MILL, N.E. of Rue PROVOST, East of NEUF BERQUIN, West of ESTAIRES and LA GORGUE, VILLE CHAPELLE, LABOUTURE, Rue de l'EPINETTE, FESTUBERT, thence as before.

North of the SOMME the line runs - West of BOUCHAVESNES, east of COMBES, MORVAL, LESBOEUF and GUEUDECOURT, West of BANCOURT, FREMICOURT, West of VAULX-VRAUCOURT and ECOUST-ST.MAIN, North of BULLECOURT, west of REINCOURT, HEMDECOURT, East of ETERPIGNY, BOIRY and ROEUX, GAVRELLE, OPFY, thence as before.

SUMMARY of 13 Officers, 594 O.Rs. captured during our operation of 31st Inst.

<u>Regiment.</u>	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
1st Guard Gren. Regt. (Alexander) ) 2nd Guard	5	267
4th Guard Gren. Regt. (Auguster). ) Div.	4	183
2nd Bearer Coy. ... ..	-	5
80th Fusilier Regt.)	1	10
81st I.R. ) 21st Division.	3	55
Pioneer Bn. 21. ... ..	-	23
94th I.R., 38th Division. ... ..	-	11.
447th I.R., 232nd Division. ... ..	-	18
25th Bav. I.R. )	-	12
14th Assault Coy.) 14th Bav. Div. ... ..	-	2
14th Bearer Coy. )	-	4
107 F.A.R. ... ..	-	1
Foot Arty. Regt. 14. ... ..	-	3

NOTES ON DIVISIONS IDENTIFIED.

21st Div. Very weak. Relief by 2nd Guard Div. completed during night 30th/31st. A captured document shows that the 81st I.R. was moving to CARTIGNY - HANCOURT area.

2nd Guard Div. The 1st Guard Gren. Regt. and 4th Guard Gren. Regt. were apparently withdrawn after being identified by us a few days ago. They moved forward again during the night 30th/31st.

232nd Div. A fresh Division from VERDUN, which moved into line on the night 28th/29th. This division is in line north of the 2nd Guard Div.

14th Bav. Div. Has been in line for about a fortnight, and is now South of the 2nd Guard Division. This division has already suffered in the battle.

38th Division, which has been in line on this front before, was withdrawn, but was again pushed in this morning owing to our attack. So far only the 94th I.R., has been identified. A prisoner states, however, that the situation has necessitated the other two regiments being pushed in. It is uncertain where this division has been pushed in between the above-mentioned divisions.

P.T.O.

80

Intentions. The enemy undoubtedly intended to hold the MT. ST. QUENTIN - PERONNE - DOINGT line at all costs for a few days at least. There are rumours of a further withdrawal, but nothing definite is known by prisoners.

Morale. Poor. Prisoners, even the Guardsmen, were pleased to be captured, and were eager in expressing this.. The morale of the officers appeared to be good. Amongst the officers captured were two Battalion Commanders -

Rittmeister VON BUSCHE, of the Cavalry, now commanding a Bn. in 1st Guard Grenadiers.

Hauptman VON BRANDT, 81st I.R.

Miscellaneous. A recent Intelligence Summary of the 185th Div. contained the following extract:-

"The latest identifications show that the 2nd Australian Division is in line from North of RAINECOURT to half way along the FRAMERVILLE - LIHONS road. South of this is the 1st Australian Division. Both divisions are known as first class assault divisions."

*M. S. Dering*  
for

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

GERMAN TRAPS. The following types of "traps" have been reported recently:-

- (a) A large bomb actuated by a trip wire concealed in a wire barricade placed across a road.
- (b) An object resembling a small book lying on a window ledge. When picked up the object exploded, blowing off the hand of the finder.

(I.S. No. 255).

COMMAND. Prisoners belonging to the 2nd Guard Gren. Regt. captured on the 29th instant stated that the H.Q., 9th German Army, has relieved the H.Q. of the 7th German Army, and that the H.Q., 7th German Army, is commanding the troops opposite this front.

Prisoners belonging to the 2nd Guard Gren. Regt. and 4th Guard Gren. Regt. stated that the 7th German Army has relieved the 2nd German Army, and that the last-named Army H.Q. is going to ITALY, together with the 1st Guard Div.

GENERAL. Opposition yesterday north of the SOMME considerably increased. It was, however, entirely broken this morning by a most successful surprise attack, which resulted in the capture of MT. ST. QUENTIN and the high ground south of BOUCHAVESNES. It is estimated that over 1,500 prisoners have already been captured. This success, which must result in the capture of PERONNE, will undoubtedly have very seriously interfered with the German plan of an orderly retirement. He will now be forced either to counter-attack immediately or to withdraw, probably to the high ground TEMPLEUX-LA-FOSSE -- TINCCURT.

(I.S. No. 256).

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NOTES ON OPERATIONS OF 2ND AUST. DIV. ON 8TH AUGUST, AND SUCCEEDING DAYS.1. CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS.

On the morning of the 8th August, the fog was so thick that the usual Tank Co-operation by signal could not be put into practice. Parties of Infantry worked with a Tank independently of troops or Tanks on their flanks, and went straight for their objectives. The experiment of placing an Infantry Observer in each Tank on 8th August had excellent results. This is of course only practicable where the observers have previously been able to watch the country over which they are advancing. During the afternoon of the 9th August the co-operation between the Infantry and those Tanks which got through was very good; the previous training of the Infantry with Tanks helped considerably in dealing with enemy strong points. It is considered, however, that Infantry should not work too close to the Tanks, as by doing so they suffer unduly from the fire directed at the latter. It would be better if the Infantry platoons worked in the ground between the Tanks.

On the afternoon of the 9th August, the Tanks suffered considerably from enemy anti-tank guns and field guns firing over open sights at short ranges. Tanks should not be employed in daylight unless there has been a definite artillery preparation and sufficient artillery support during the advance which must include counter-battery work. The use of smoke shell in the barrage would aid materially in screening the movements of the Tanks from the enemy Infantry and Artillery.

It is suggested that all Tanks carry a carefully swung Compass to ensure that direction is kept at night or in a fog. The natural tendency for Infantry advancing in a fog or in semi darkness would be to follow the sound of the engines of the Tanks and thus they could be lead direct to their objectives without any fear of going astray.

2. CO-OPERATION WITH R.A.F.

During the early morning of the 8th August the fog was too thick for aircraft to co-operate with the attacking Infantry. Later, however, during the morning and on the 9th and 11th August, our 'planes effectively dealt with enemy aircraft which attempted to interfere with our attacking troops.

After sunrise the tin discs carried by the Infantry materially assisted our 'planes in picking up our positions.

3. CAVALRY. No Cavalry took part in any of our operations.

4. ARTILLERY ACTION.

One Brigade reports "The Artillery action on the 8th and 11th August left nothing to be desired. All ranks are unanimous in their praise of it on the above occasions. The condition of the prisoners was also a fair testimony of its effective nature."

Another Brigade reports "In an attack such as that on 8th August, where Tanks and Infantry co-operated, a shrapnel barrage is preferable to an H.E. barrage. It is thought the barrage on the morning of 8th August was too slow. Not only were casualties caused by our Infantry getting into our own barrage, but also the enemy was able to run away before our barrage could reach them. In case of such a slow barrage, unless it is of great depth, say of about 1,000 yards, the enemy is able to fire through the barrage for an appreciable time before clearing out or taking cover. It is recognised, however, that the barrage is fixed for the whole front of the attack, and must, therefore, be based on the possible speed of the slowest."

During the.....



During the advance on afternoon of the 9th August, there was no Artillery co-operation in the form of a covering barrage. Several sections were pushed forward to deal with fleeting targets, but F.O.Os. were repeatedly out of touch with their batteries owing to their lines breaking and thus many excellent targets were missed. During this action many enemy field guns firing over open sights until the last moment put a large number of our Tanks out of action and heavily barraged our advancing Infantry.

One Brigade has suggested that in operations of a similar nature to those of the afternoon of 9th August, definite sections of field artillery should be attached to Infantry Battalions to work in close touch with them.

The need for much closer liaison between Heavy Artillery and Infantry was borne out during the operations of 8th, 9th and 11th August. Although the co-ordinates of the front line were repeatedly given to the Heavy Artillery Officers, there were many instances of short shooting. Brigades very often experienced difficulty in obtaining definite information regarding the action of Heavy Artillery, the liaison officers being invariably junior officers.

#### 5. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

On the morning of the 8th August, Signal Communication was good, all battalions, brigades (Infantry and Artillery) Artillery Groups and Div. H.Q., being linked up by buried cable. Cable burying in this Div. sector was carried out up to the night 5th/6th August, the necessary working parties being found from the Infantry.

At zero, 8th August, Brigade Forward Signal parties, starting from their respective cable heads and moving in rear of the rear Infantry waves, laid two pairs of lines overland to their respective advance signal stations situated just in rear of the GREEN line in each Brigade sector. These ground lines proved to be more reliable than is generally conceded, owing no doubt to the fact that the enemy artillery was neutralised from the outset, thus preventing any heavy concentration of fire which would probably have destroyed the ground lines.

Simultaneously with the moving off of Brigade Forward Signal parties a "5 pair" poled cable route was pushed out from cable head approx. along the inter-brigade boundary. By 11 p.m. on the 8th August, the poled cable route was constructed as far forward as BAYONVILLERS, 2,000 yards ahead of this Div. objective line for the morning. At this point, on the morning of the 9th August, a telephone exchange was installed and traffic accepted from all units in the vicinity. Many units in the forward area (not belonging to this Division) availed themselves of this exchange, running lines to it and thus getting into touch with their higher formations.

On the afternoon of the 9th August, attacking brigades moved forward again and three pairs of cable were then poled forward from BAYONVILLERS exchange to the dual Brigade H.Q. at HARBONNIERES, giving a direct line to D.H.Q. from each Brigade. On the 10th August, the poled route from BAYONVILLERS to HARBONNIERES was increased to 5 pairs, two pairs being allotted to flanking Divisions.

D.H.Q. was in touch with Brigade H.Q. by wireless throughout the operations of the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th August. Trench sets in conjunction with the Amplifier proved very satisfactory over long distances up to as great as 10 kilometres.

Motor Cycle and Horse D.R's. were of inestimable value in carrying despatches between Brigade H.Q. (Infantry and Artillery) and D.H.Q.

Visual Signalling was impossible in the early stages of the advance on 8th August, on account of the dense fog. After the GREEN line had been gained and the situation became more settled, a good deal of use, well forward, was made of lamp signalling, both by Infantry and Artillery.

Pigeons proved of little value during the operations of the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th August.

On the 10th.....

On the 10th August a Div. Signal Store and cable dump was established at BAYONVILLERS exchange from which all units requiring signalling equipment could draw same without delay. This proved of great value.

The principle of concentrating on the construction of a strong route forward with the establishing of a series of exchanges as far forward as possible in the Div. sector renders good communication for operations similar to those of 8th August, and succeeding days, almost certain. To work in with this, Infantry and Artillery Brigade H.Q. and Battalion H.Q. should as far as possible assemble in groups and then the keeping in touch of units with higher formations on a main channel of wireless and telegraph communication becomes comparatively easy.

The buried system and poled route forward of D.H.Q. were both constructed and maintained by the 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.

During 8th August the buried route was used by 2nd Aust., 5th Aust. and 2nd Canadian Divisions and Aust. Corps H.A. Later it was used by 4th Aust. Division.

The poled route was used during the operations by 1st Aust., 2nd Aust., 4th Aust. and 5th Aust. Divisions and Corps H.A.

#### 6. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The evacuation of wounded during the operations was excellent. In one Brigade 8 Stretcher Bearers from the Field Ambulance were attached to each Infantry Battalion, and materially assisted the Battalions in rapidly clearing the battle field of wounded. Ford Ambulance cars were used very boldly, being pushed up just in rear of the Infantry objectives, thus saving the wounded a long and painful carry by stretcher.

#### 7. INTELLIGENCE.

- (a) - It is necessary to establish a Divisional cage in a central position, as far forward as possible, to open soon after zero hour. The Divisional Intelligence Officer should be here, and in telephone communication with Brigades and Divisional Headquarters.
- (b) - During a big advance, the rate of progress is so rapid, that by the time prisoners reach Divisional Cage, the local tactical information they are able to give is already valueless, as the ground has already been passed over by the attacking Infantry. As it is impossible for the Divisional Intelligence Officer to be with all Brigades, the necessity for reliable and trained German Speakers with Brigades and Battalions becomes imperative. In the operations on the 8th August, 10 Speakers were employed, whom had been previously trained by the Divisional Intelligence Officer during a period of rest. By means of these Speakers, Battalions were able not only to obtain and forward identifications immediately, but also to obtain local tactical information of value to units. These Speakers were run as a Divisional Section, and were allotted to units as required. This method has been found to work satisfactorily, and it is suggested that a definite establishment be provided for such a section, just as with Corps Intelligence Police. They should be provided with distinguishing brassards.
- (c) - Documents. Two Searchers per Battalion were allotted, to search for documents during the advance, and large quantities of papers began to arrive at the Cage shortly after zero. These searchers also wore distinguishing brassards.
- (d) - Collecting of prisoners. In order to obviate the necessity for fighting troops to have to escort prisoners back an ever increasing distance as the advance continued, and to ensure that no batches missed the cage, three collecting posts were established immediately behind the front line, and a screen was provided by a platoon of the Reserve Brigade, whose duty it was to direct prisoners and escorts to the collecting posts.

At the latter .....

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Appendix 81

At the latter, receipts were given to Battalion escorts, who then were able to return to their units, and the prisoners were led back to the Divisional Cage. This system was found to work satisfactorily. Military Police should escort prisoners back from the collecting posts.

2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.  
5th September, 1918.

- (a) It is necessary to establish a Divisional cage in a central position, as far forward as possible, to open soon after zero hour. The Divisional Intelligence Officer should be here, and in close communication with Battalion and Divisional Headquarters.
- (b) During a big advance, the rate of progress is so rapid, that by the time prisoners reach Divisional cage, the local tactical information they are able to give is already valueless, as the ground has already been passed over by the attacking Infantry. As it is impossible for the Divisional Intelligence Officer to be with all battalions, the necessity for reliable and trained German speakers with battalions and for reliable accounts of progress in the operations on the front, is obvious. In previous wars, when had been provisionally trained by the Divisional Intelligence Officer during a period of rest. By means of these speakers, battalions were able not only to obtain and forward tactical information immediately, but also to obtain local tactical information of value to units, and were able to report this information to the Divisional Intelligence Officer, and it is suggested that a similar system should be provided for such a section, that as with other intelligence battalions, they should be provided with a communication system.
- (c) Documents. The Battalion war section were allotted to search for documents during the advance, and large quantities of papers were written on the same machine after zero. These documents also were distributed to the battalions.
- (d) Collection of prisoners. In order to obviate the necessity for the Battalion to have to escort prisoners back to their own area, as the advance continued, and to ensure that no prisoner was lost, three collecting posts were established between the zero and front line, and a screen was provided for the protection of the reserve battalions, whose duty it was to escort prisoners and escorts to the collecting posts.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
-----Statement of Personnel sent to Schools during Month of  
August, 1918.  
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Nature of School.	G.H.Q.		Army.		Corps.	
	Off.	O.Rs.	Off.	O.Rs.	Off.	O.Rs.
Liaison Inf. & Arty, A.F.C.	-	-	-	-	1	-
Artillery. ...	-	-	2	3	-	-
Bombing. ...	-	-	-	-	5	22
Cookery. ...	-	-	-	11	-	11
Commanding Officers.	-	-	3	-	-	-
Company Commanders.	-	-	15	-	-	-
Engineers & Pioneers.	2	4	-	-	-	-
Gas. ...	-	-	3	-	8	22
Horse Management.	-	-	1	2	-	-
Infantry. ...	-	-	-	3	9	22
Intelligence. ...	-	-	-	-	4	9
Lewis Gun. ...	5	10	-	-	2	18
Musketry. ...	1	2	14	14	-	-
P.T. & B.F. ...	1	2	-	-	-	-
Signalling. ...	-	1	1	8	5	18
Wireless. ...	-	-	1	3	-	-
Power Buzzer. ...	-	-	-	-	-	8
Sniping, Obs. & Scouting.	-	-	4	10	-	-
Stokes Mortar. ...	-	1	-	-	4	18
Trench Mortar. ...	-	-	3	51	-	-
	9	20	47	105	38	148

GRAND TOTAL 94 273  
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W. Drury