

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/46/4 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 3rd  
Australian Division

February 1917



AWM4-1/46/4PART2



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. February, 1917.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 3.A.

(1). The Divisional Reserve consists of 3 Battalions and three Machine Gun Sections as follows:-

Unit.	Billets & Hrs.	Transport.
"D" Bn. 9th. Inf. Bde.	H.6.b.6.3.	B.27.c.8.7.
"D" Bn. 11th. " "	I.11.a.2.5.	B.27.d.5.2.
"D" Bn. 10th. " "	O.26.c.6.6.	B.27.d.7.8.
1 Sect. 9th. M. G. Coy.	O.25.c.75.75.	B.27.c.8.7.
1 Sect. 11th. M. G. Coy.	I.9.c.70.95.	B.27.d.5.2.
1 Sect. 10th. M. G. Co.,.	O.25.c.5.5.	B.27.d.7.8.

(2). The following emergency roads for the movement of the Divisional Reserve are available (vide attached sketch). -

- (a). To assist Left Section, "W", "X", "Y" & "Z" Roads.
- (b). To assist Centre Section, "U" & "V" Roads.
- (c). To assist Right Section, "S" & "T" Roads.

(3). Brigade Staffs, Officers of Battalions, and Machine Gun Sections concerned, and a proportion of guides, will reconnoitre these Routes, and the best means of getting to them from their billets by day and by night. Brigades concerned are responsible for keeping the routes in their areas open and clearly marked.

(4). ACTION TO BE TAKEN.

The order for the Units in Divisional Reserve to "Stand By" or to "Stand to" will be given by Divisional Headquarters. These orders will be repeated to Units by Brigade Commanders.

On receipt of the order to "Stand By," all ranks will assemble in their billets and prepare to turn out fully equipped ten minutes later. First Line Transport will be packed and made ready to move. It is unlikely that it will be required to move except in the improbable event of the Divisional Reserve having to bear help to a Division other than its own. Transport must be warned to out-span, if not required.

Machine Gun Companies affected will issue the necessary instructions with regard to procedure to be adopted for the transport of the Reserve Sections.

On the order to "Stand to", Units will assemble at their alarm posts, and an Officer from each Unit will be sent to the Headquarters of the Brigade affected for liaison.

Units will not leave their alarm posts for the Rendezvous until orders to do so are received from Brigade Headquarters, unless telephonic communication is interrupted. In that case they will begin to move 15 minutes after receipt of the order "Stand to", if the rendezvous has been named.

Large concentrations of troops are to be avoided, and if ARMENTIERES is being heavily bombarded, men should be kept in the cellars, but as concentrated by platoons or companies as far as possible, ready to move.

P.T.O.



(2).

(5). ARMAMENTS & EQUIPMENT.

On receipt of the order to "Stand By", two extra grenades will be issued to each man to be carried in each top pocket of the jacket. An additional two bandoliers (100 rounds) S.A.A. per rifle will be issued. Brigades will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that grenades and S.A.A. as above are available, and are turned over frequently enough to prevent deterioration.

"Fighting Dress" as per "Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action" (Ch. XXXI. para 2, page 58) will be worn.

(6). Should the Divisional Reserve be required to move forward, the choice of roads will rest with Battalion Commanders and the O's.C. Reserve Machine Gun Sections. The rendezvous will, in all probability, be near, if not actually in, the Subsidiary Line.

During the Approach March, Units will move in such formations as will tend to minimize the effect of hostile shell fire.

(7). With reference to Para (2), the following points should be given consideration when making a choice of routes to be followed during the Approach March.-

- (a). The use of "Y" and "Z" emergency roads would involve crossing the River Lys, whilst "X" road is liable to flood.
- (b). The possibility of using parallel lines of approach in order not to debouch from a point, or to effect a partial deployment prior to reaching the rendezvous.
- (c). Gaps in our wire in case of a general movement over the top of the ground.

(8). WORKING PARTIES.

Working parties East of the ARIENSHEMME-WARNETON Railway and the line HALLEWY HOUSE-RAILWAY JUNCTION (1.2.c.0.8), will be assembled as follows.-

The Senior Officer with each party being responsible that the position and strength of the party is at once reported to Brigade Headquarters, both by telephone and Special Messenger.-

- (a). Parties working in, or near, the Subsidiary Line - under the nearest cover.
- (b). Other parties as follows.-

Right Brigade	:	RUE ALLEE and RUE FLEURIE.
Centre Brigade	:	FME des JARDINS.
Left Brigade	:	In the vicinity of WEDER AVENUE where it enters HOUBLINES.

(9). The foregoing applies to Reserve Machine Gun Sections in a general sense, but where technical considerations render their exact application impossible, O's.C. will act in accordance with the spirit of these instructions.

*J. H. H. T. ain*

Major.- G.S.

P.T.O. for Distribution.



(3).

DISTRIBUTION.

"G".	.....	.....	1. Copy.
9th. Aus. Inf. Bde.	.....	.....	3 copies.
10th. " " "	.....	.....	3 "
11th. " " "	.....	.....	3 "
2nd. ANZAC.	For information.	.....	1 copy.
3rd. Aus. Pnrs.	do.	.....	1 "
C.R.A.	.....	do.	1 "
C.R.E.	.....	do.	1 "
A.D.N.S.	...	do.	1 "



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

G 32/72

Divisional Headquarters,  
10/2/17.

"Q"		1 copy
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.		3 copies
10th	-do-	3 "
11th	-do-	3 "
2nd ANZAC.	for information	1 copy
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	"	1 "
C.R.A.		1 "
C.R.E.		1 "
A.D.M.S.		

AMENDMENT TO GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 32 A dated 2/2/17

Delete para. (1) and substitute.-

"(1) The Divisional Reserve consists of 3 Battalions and three machine gun sections, as follows:-

<u>Unit</u>		<u>Billets &amp; H'qrs.</u>	<u>Transport.</u>
"D" Bn.	9th Inf. Bde.	C.25.c.80.55.	B.27.c.8.7.
"D" Bn.	11th -do-	C.25.c.5.2.	B.27.d.5.2.
"D" Bn.	10th -do-	H.5.a.3.6.	B.27.c.9.9.
1 Section	9th M.G.Co.	C.25.c.25.50.	B.27.c.8.7.
1 Section	11th "	I.9.c.2.5.	B.27.d.5.2.
1 Section	10th "	H.6.d.93.65.	B.27.c.9.9. "

(sd) J.H.F.PAIN,

Major,  
General Staff.



4

Appendix No 17  
SECRET HEADQUARTERS  
No. 46/1  
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,  
17/1/17.

MINOR ENTERPRISE TO BE CARRIED OUT BY 10th INFANTRY BRIGADE.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS.

1. CHARACTER OF ENTERPRISE

The enterprise will be carried out by a portion of the 10th Infantry Brigade, about the third week in February. The objects are to thoroughly wreck a section of the enemy works, and to destroy or capture personnel, armament and stores. - Time allowed from 40 to 60 minutes. -

2. COMPOSITION OF FORCE

The attacking force should be from 800 to 1000 strong, inclusive of Vickers Guns, and Light Trench Mortar Personnel, - but exclusive of the co-operating Artillery or Medium Trench Mortars. - The force will preferably be a complete Battalion, either 37th or 38th Battalion, but, if the Brigadier advances good reasons, it may be a composite force drawn from both of these Battalions. - In either case a due proportion of Officers, N.C.O's and Specialists will not take part, - (in accordance with "Instructions for Training of Divisions for Offensive Action" O.B./1635, Section XXX.) The actual Infantry operations to be commanded by a Battalion Commander.

3. OBJECTIVE

The choice of the objective is governed by the possibility of concentrating upon it a sufficient Artillery fire. For this reason it cannot be near the flanks of our Divisional front. It will preferably lie between the ARMENTIERES-LILLE Railway, and the road from "LES 4 HALLOTS" to PERENCHIES. -

A suitable frontage will be 500 to 600 yards. It should be chosen so that -

- (a) Opportunities for the enemy to counter-attack or reinforce either from the flanks or from the rear are as meagre as possible. - There are several places where his main avenues are widely separated, and also where the depth of his front line system reduces to a minimum, thereby forming suitable flanks.
- (b) Opportunities for the enemy to hamper advance or withdrawal by flank action are reduced to a minimum. - For this condition, salients are the better objective

The following possible objectives should be specially studied, by

- (i) reconnaissance
- (ii) examination of photographs
- (iii) examination of patrol and intelligence reports.

viz:-

- A. The flat salient I.11.a.60.65 to I.5.d.15.55. This has only one avenue behind it, and is well shielded from flank action; but may possibly be only lightly held.

P.T.O.

*[Handwritten signature]*



-2-

### 3. OBJECTIVE (Contd.)

B. The pronounced salient C.29.e.60.65 to C.29.a.75.60.

This affords more promise of substantial results and the advance and withdrawal are well shielded, but there are several avenues feeding the salient.

Before finally selecting the objective every portion of the front under considerations should be investigated. The selection must be made as soon as possible and once made should be strictly adhered to, even though later information discloses that the objective is not the very best that might have been selected; because much preparatory work by both Artillery and Infantry, which must be immediately put in hand, would otherwise be wasted. - I shall make the final selection, after hearing the views of the Artillery, 10th Brigade & "G" Staff.

### 4. DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

In order to effect the necessary concentration of Divisional Artillery, the arcs of fire of a number of the guns will require extension, and in some cases new Battery positions will have to be selected, in cases where on the desired bearing, existing houses form a crest which the guns in their present emplacements cannot clear. - If it is decided to run any of the batteries out into the open, the preparation of platforms, camouflages, ammunition dumps, and the registration of the guns must be undertaken in ample time. - It may be desirable to form a regrouping of the batteries for this special operation. In this case special signal communications must be installed. -

The field gun barrages should be calculated on the basis of not more than 30 yards per gun. If possible there should be one gun per 20 yards.

All the 12 Divisional Howitzers should be made capable of being concentrated on the objective chosen. -

Special emplacements for all three Medium Trench Mortar Batteries should be prepared to permit of the employment of all 12 guns on the flanks of the objective during the operation. -

### 5. HEAVY ARTILLERY

Corps Heavy Artillery will be asked to co-operate in the Artillery preparation and during the attack, as well as to take part in Artillery diversions. -

### 6. ARTILLERY DIVERSIONS

The remainder of the Divisional Artillery will be employed upon diversions to one or both flanks, and upon action to prevent enemy interference from a flank. - The Artillery of the 34th and 25th Divisions will be requested to co-operate. - The diversions must be designed so as to draw off enemy retaliation upon our Infantry and Mortars and to confuse him as to our real intentions. -

### 7. WIRE CUTTING

The destruction of the enemy's wire, and interference with his efforts to repair it must be carried out energetically, commencing forthwith and continuing right up to the selected date. - While most attention must be given to the zone under attack, the cutting of wire must be general along the whole front.



-3-

8. MACHINE  
GUNS AND  
STOKES  
MORTARS.

Those from 10th Brigade will take part in the operation, the former by bringing indirect fire upon enemy communication trenches along which he can either withdraw or reinforce; and the latter by bombarding probable enemy M.G. Positions on the flanks. - The Machine Guns of other Brigades can usefully co-operate with indirect fire upon Communication trenches on both flanks likely to be used by the enemy for runners or for evacuation or supply, - also on ascertained tram routes in rear.

9. AEROPLANE  
CO-OPERATION

The assistance of aeroplanes to locate active enemy batteries and mortars to be secured if possible.

10. AERIAL  
PHOTOGRAPHS

The latest photographs of the selected objective and enlargements of same to be obtained as soon as possible, and held at the disposal of the Artillery, the Staff concerned, and the Infantry Commander.

11. COMMAND  
POST

A special Command post, bomb and splinter-proof, to be constructed as near as possible to our front line capable of accommodating say 3 officers and 4 others, and the telephone terminals.

12. BURIED  
CABLE

A special line, well and securely buried, to be laid from the nearest Battalion Headquarters to the Command post, to ensure uninterrupted communication with Brigade and Divisional Headquarters. - If time permits, an alternative line, with a terminal 50 yards to a flank, in a small bomb-proof post to be also prepared.

13. AMMUNITION

As the expenditure of ammunition of all kinds, bombs, and flare signals will be upon a more extensive scale than usual, arrangements must be thought out for establishing special forward dumps in suitable locations, and for carrying supplies forward if necessary.

14. TRAINING

The selected personnel will undertake about two weeks training of a general character, - bombing, revolver shooting, bayonet, lewis gun, &c., &c., and about 10 days rehearsal of organization, and team working upon a full replica of the enemy's trenches - on ground to be reconnoitred and made available in the STEENWERCK area. - The selected force must, as soon as possible, prepare its own bayonet courses, bombing ground, revolver school and Lewis Gun <sup>range</sup>. "G" Staff and C.R.E. must co-operate in this to all possible extent, so as to avoid any delay in commencing the training. - In order that the training may, throughout, be in proper conformity with the final action required by all taking part in the operation, this training will be carried out by the Commander under the direct supervision of the "G" Staff. <sup>Brigadier and</sup>

15. ORDERS

The Division will issue orders defining the objects and objectives, laying down the general plan for the operation, and co-ordinating the action of all arms and of neighbouring formations.

The Brigade will issue orders - supplementing the Divisional Order to the extent necessary to ensure the necessary co-operation of the several Units within the Brigade who are taking part, including Medical arrangements, dealing with prisoners, and collecting reports after the action.

The Commander will issue the actual detailed orders to the Infantry forming the assaulting force. -

P.T.O.



-4-

15 ORDERS  
(Contd.)

The Brigade and Force Orders will be submitted in draft to the Division for review and approval.

All orders for the actual operation will be most strictly confined to the operation itself, dealing with the action of every unit or man concerned from the preliminary assembly to the final withdrawals. - All instructions relating to equipment, preparatory measures of all kinds, dress, badges, and every matter that is capable of being dealt with beforehand will be issued separately in a prior order, so that the actual assault orders may be kept as brief and simple as possible.

16.

Other points for consideration are.-

- (a) The preparation of mobile charges and other means for demolition of dugouts, bomb stores, machine-guns, &c.
- (b) The carrying out of a secondary operation, on another portion of the front, in order to distract attention. This might be combined with one of the artillery diversions referred to in para. 6 above.
- (c) Careful preparation from the photos of large scale maps of enemy trenches to be raided, so that the leader of every party may have a map in his possession.
- (d) Methods of dealing with sunken wire in enemy BORROW DITCH
- (e) Best methods of assembly, and crossing of NO MAN'S LAND
- (f) Best methods of maintaining communication between the Command Post and the raiders.
- (g) Use of smoke bombs on the flanks to screen advance and withdrawal

*S. J. Monahan*

Major-General,  
Commanding Third Australian Division.

Issued to.-

"G" Staff ✓

"Q" "

C.R.A.

C.R.E.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th -do-

11th -do-

A.D.C.

Spare (2)



SECRET

G 6/1

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONDivisional Headquarters,  
30/1/17.AGENDA FOR ENTERPRISE BY 10th INFANTRY BRIGADE.Reference G 6/1 of 17/1/17.

(Objective has been decided upon. - Raiding force has been organized and is billeted at ERGUINGHEM)

G Staff.

- 1. Obtain air photographs of the zone to be attacked, and enlargements of the portion to be actually entered - 3 copies of each, 1 for D.H.Q., 1 for C.R.A., 1 for 10th Bde.
- 2. Prepare, from enlarged photos, a scale map of the trenches to be raided, say 1:2500
- 3. Get Air-photo. expert to identify M.G. and T.M. emplacements, dugouts, stores, disused trenches, wire behind front line, &c., &c., and mark them on this map.
- 4. Decide on "Points of entry" through enemy wire and let C.R.A. know.
- 5. Decide on position of Commander's dug-out and let C.R.E. know
- 6. Draft applications to Corps for Co-operation of Heavy Artillery an Army Brigade, and the Divisional Artillery of flanking Divisions.
- 7. Draft general plan of operation, as a guide to 10th Brigade to plan the Infantry action.
- 8. Secure the ground for the replica trenches.
- 9. Decide on co-operation to be given by No. 9 and 11 M.G. Cos. and L.T.M. Batteries.
- 10. Draft of final orders, - to be ready for discussion and decision at least 10 days before date of operation, to permit of ample time for careful revision.
- 11. Draft proposals for a secondary operation - simultaneous or otherwise.
- 12. Consideration of points raised in G 6/1 of 17/1/17, para. 16.

C.R.E.

- 1. Construction of Commander's dug-out at point decided upon, See G 6/1 of 17/1/17 para. 11.
- 2. Provide technical assistance for marking out the replica trenches
- 3. Preparation of demolition charges.

C.R.A.

- 1. Arrangements for wire-cutting at points of entry decided upon, and on other points to the flanks.
- 2. Arrangements for concentration of the greater portion of the Divisional Artillery in accordance with the Infantry plan, and the employment of the remainder on Diversions.
- 3. Arrangements for employment of (a) Artillery of flank Divisions on Diversions. (b) Heavy Artillery. (c) An Army Brigade of Artillery, - provided Corps makes all these available.
- 4. Preparations for the employment of 12 Mortars, on the flanks, during the operation.-

P.T.O.



Div. Sig. Co.

1. Bury two alternative lines, from nearest existing buried terminals to the Commander's dugout. -

9th Inf. Brigade.

1. Concert measures to systematically keep open gaps cut by us in enemy wire, by methodically telling off patrols to locate and direct fire upon enemy wire repairing parties.
2. Prepare exits at points required by 10th Brigade.

10th Inf. Bde.

1. Prepare draft plan of Infantry action, in accordance with general plan of operation.
2. Arrange for marking out the replica trenches.
3. Draft of Brigade order for the operation as a whole.
4. Organization for movement of personnel, all preparatory measures equipment, stores, munitions, and collection of information after the raid, also medical arrangements, &c., &c.
5. Arrangements with 9th Inf. Brigade for all co-operation required, both before, during, and after the operation.

O.E. Raid.

1. Physical and technical training of Raiding Force.
2. Organization of force into parties, in accordance with Infantry plan.
3. Team Training - prior to practice on replica trenches.
4. Digging of replica trenches.
5. Training on replica trenches.

N.B. - Above Agenda List is not exhaustive, but is intended as a guide only.

JOHN MONASH,

Major-General,  
Commanding Third Australian Division.

Issued to.-

"G" Staff.

"Q" "

C.R.A.

C.R.E.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th -do-

11th -do-

A.D.C.

SPARE (2)



SECRETTHIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

G 6/1

Divisional Headquarters,  
1/2/17.MAP REFERENCE. - HOUPLINES, Sheet 36 N.W.2 & N.E.1 (parts of)  
1/10,000 corrected to 5/10/16.

1. The attached agenda paper is forwarded to you in continuation of preliminary instructions for Battalion Raid issued under my No. G 6/1 on 17th inst.

FRONT TO BE DEALT WITH

2. The front to be dealt with extends from C.29.a.35.10 on the South to C.23.c.90.25. on the North. Second line from C.29.a.70.00. to C.23.d.10.20. Third line from C.29.c.77.95 to C.23.d.33.20.

DEPTH OF PENETRATION

3. The raiders will penetrate to the third line.

ARTILLERY PROGRAMME

4. The C.R.A. will submit programme for Artillery work indicating what trenches can be engaged simultaneously.

WIRE CUTTING

5. Gaps in the wire will be cut at the following points.- C.29.a.40.30, C.29.a.60.50., C.29.a.75.80., and C.23.c.90.08. Arrangements will also be made to deal with wire behind the front and support lines. Wire cutting will be proceeded with forthwith.

ALLOTMENT OF PARTIES

6. One company will be allotted to each gap at which 3 platoons will enter in platoon waves. The fourth platoon will be available for covering work, handling prisoners and wounded, parapet work, message carrying, &c. One platoon of the three entering will be detailed to deal with its allotted portion of the first line, another with the second line, and another with the third line. Detailed instructions regarding this will be issued by the O.C. Raid. He will also arrange for the necessary stops and Communication Trench Parties, but the Platoon organization will be adhered to as far as possible.

TIME OF RAID

7. The raid will be carried out on a foggy day or under cover of darkness.

SMOKE BARRAGE

8. The advisability of using smoke barrages on flanks will be considered.

DISTINGUISHING MARKS

9. Each Platoon will wear a distinguishing mark showing whether for 1st, 2nd, or 3rd line work.

DUGOUTS

10. The O.C. Raid will have his dugout in the vicinity of No. 10 Locality. C.R.E. will select exact position forthwith in consultation with Lieut-Col. DAVIS, and will proceed with the necessary construction work.

P.T.O.

96  
19



DUGOUTS  
(contd.)

He will arrange 2 dugouts, 1 for Lieut-Colonel DAVIS and the Artillery Liaison Officer, and 1 for the Signal Officer, Lieut-Col. DAVIS'S 2nd in Command and understudy to Artillery Liaison Officer. These dug-outs will be 5.9" proof.

BURIED  
CABLE

11. O.C. Div. Signal Co. and C.R.D. will arrange to have necessary cable buried right up to these dugouts. See para. 12 of G 6/1 of 17/1/17.

MAPS OF AREA  
TO BE RAIDED

12. G.S. "I" of the Division will issue large scale maps of the area to be raided, allowing for 1 to be handed to each officer. The map will include NO MAN'S LAND and our front line trench. It will be checked with most recent photographs before issue. scale will be 1/5,000

REPLICA  
TRENCHES

13. C.R.E. will prepare a similar map on a larger scale for marking out replica trenches on the ground. It will be checked and compared with the Divisional 1/5,000 map.

C.R.E. will then arrange with 10th Inf. Brigade to have the trenches put on to the Training area. This must be done at the very earliest date possible.

MOVING ALONG  
COMMUNICATION  
TRENCHES

14. IZ, after entering the enemy's trenches, there is the least difficulty in moving up communication trenches. Platoons will go over the top. C.R.A. will arrange wire cutting behind the line accordingly. Viz.- in the vicinity of communication trenches.

ALLOTMENT  
OF TASKS

15. Platoons should be told off to their allotted tasks forthwith.

EXITS FROM  
OUR TRENCHES

16. The O.C. raid will notify 9th Inf. Brigade where he wishes exits prepared for raiders to leave our trenches.

GAPS IN WIRE  
TO BE KEPT  
OPEN

17. The 9th Inf. Brigade will arrange to keep gaps open as wire cutting proceeds.

WIRE-CUTTING  
DIVERSIONS

18. Wire cutting for other minor raids will serve as diversions for this larger enterprise.

DISTRIBUTION

"G" Staff  
"Q" Staff  
C.R.A.  
C.R.E.  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th -do-  
11th -do-  
Div. Sig. Co.  
A.D.C.  
SPARE (2)

*R. H. Jackson*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff.



SECRET.THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Divisional Headquarters,  
18th. February, 1917

A.Q.

C.R.A.

" for Right Group.  
 " " Centre Group.  
 " " Left Group.  
 " " D.T.M.O.

C.R.E.

Div. Sig. Coy.

9th. Aus. Inf. Bde.

10th. " " "

11th. " " "

3rd. Aus. Pioneer Bn.

Lieut-Colonel DAVIS.

42nd. Squadron, R.F.C.

A.D.M.S.

A.P.M.

2nd. Aus. Tunnelling Coy.

"L" Coy., R.E.

2nd. ANZAC.

Right Flank Division.

Left Flank Division.

Reference the enclosed Third Australian Division  
 Order No. 16, paragraph 6. The Artillery Plan and Diagrams  
 are not attached, but will be forwarded later.

D.C.

Lieut-Colonel.-  
General Staff.

War Diary



**SECRET.**

SECRET.

COPY NO. 26 .....

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 16.

19th. February, 1917.

Reference 1/10,000 Map, Sheets 36 N.W.2, N.E.1 (parts of),  
Edition 7A. Trenches corrected to 5-10-16.

INFORMATION.

1. (a). The enemy's line from  $\frac{C.29.c.}{40.90.}$  to  $\frac{C.23.c.}{80.70.}$  is said to be held by 23rd. Bavarian Infantry.

The enemy generally puts his barrage down within 2 to 5 minutes of our guns opening. On a recent occasion he shortened on to his own front line within 7 minutes. He fired a 5.9" into his front line in C.29.a. on the 11th. February, showed a green light and thereupon lengthened.

At present he is believed to be holding his front line fairly strongly, but he appears to have two distinct courses of action when being raided. -

(1). Barrage our front line and a portion of NO MAN'S LAND, bomb his own wire vigorously, and open with flanking Machine Guns on night lines.

(2). Withdraw from his front line and put his artillery on to it.

On the night of the 11th/12th. February he sent a detachment out into NO MAN'S LAND to get on to the flank of one of our raiding parties.

(b). The enemy's wire is being cut at the following places. -

$\frac{C.29.a.}{40.30.}$	$\frac{C.29.a.}{60.50.}$	$\frac{C.29.a.}{75.80.}$	$\frac{C.23.c.}{88.20.}$
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

Plans of the enemy's trenches 1/2,500, compiled from the map and recent photographs, and diagrams of NO

P.T.O.

*War Diary*



(2).

MAN'S LAND 1/5,000 have been issued to all concerned. Positions of enemy's searchlights, machine guns and Trench Mortars, so far as known, are shown on the above plans.

INTENTION. 2. A party composed of 600 to 800 all ranks from the 37th. and 38th. Battalions, commanded by Lieut-Colonel DAVIS, will raid the enemy's trenches on the front  $\frac{C.29.a.}{40.20.}$  on the South, to  $\frac{C.23.c.}{90.30.}$  on the North, on Zero day and at Zero hour.

The second line will be raided from  $\frac{C.29.a.}{70.00.}$  to  $\frac{C.23.d.}{10.25.}$  - the third line from  $\frac{C.29.c.}{77.95.}$  to  $\frac{C.23.d.}{30.30.}$

The party will be accompanied by 8 other ranks R.E.

A party of the 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will raid the enemy's trenches at I.17.a. at the same time, Zero hours coinciding.

As the Infantry of the Main Operation leave the enemy's trenches, a second Diversion, carried out by Artillery, will open on the enemy's trenches in C.17. and opposite HOBBS FARM.

ACTION ON 3. Counting Zero day as "Z" day, and the day previous as "Y" PREVIOUS day, there will be artillery activity on the front of the DAYS. Main Operation on "W" and "X" days. On the latter day the artillery activity will be combined with a small Infantry Raid. Details for this will form the subject of a separate Operation Order to be issued by the G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. The C.R.A. will arrange the necessary Artillery Programmes. There will also be artillery activity at I.17.a. on "W" & "X" days.  
P.T.O.



(3).

The time for the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. raid on "X" night will be fixed by the G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde., but it should not be more than 3 hours later than the time fixed for the dummy bombardment on "Z" night.

OBJECTS OF RAID. 4. The objects of the Raid are as follows: -

1. To kill and capture more of the enemy than we lose ourselves in the undertaking.
2. To lower his morale.
3. To damage his defences.
4. To obtain a large tally of prisoners.
5. To capture or destroy machine guns and other technical weapons.
6. To capture a Medical Officer or his equipment, including Serum for Prevention of Gas Gangrene.

RAID ORDERS. 5. The 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. in consultation with

Lieut-Colonel DAVIS, will issue orders regarding the detailed arrangements, such as a plan for each of the 4 parties entering the enemy's trenches, organization for movement of personnel to points of exit in our trenches, equipment, collection of information and medical arrangements.

The 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will issue orders regarding the detailed arrangements for the Southern Diversion.

The C.F.A. will arrange the details of the Artillery Programme for the Main Operation and both Diversions.

In consultation with the Heavy Artillery, he will arrange the counter-battery work and neutralization.

Machine gun emplacements which cannot be knocked out must be neutralized.

P.T.O.



(4).

The C.R.A. will co-ordinate the work of the Light Trench Mortars on "Z" day. He will deal direct with the Infantry Brigades concerned. The action of these Mortars will be included in the Artillery plan.

4 Light Trench Mortars of the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will be made available to assist the 11th. Aus. Inf. Bde. in the enterprise directed against I.17.a.

The timings for the Artillery Programme are shown below. -

ARTILLERY. 6. The timings for the Artillery Programme are as follows: -

DUMMY BOMBARDMENT.

At 3 hours 50 minutes before Zero, a bombardment of the trenches selected for the Main Operation will commence, and will be carried out as follows: -

Zero minus 3 hours 50 minutes to Zero minus 3 hours 45 minutes, first and third lines and wire will be bombarded.

Zero minus 3 hours 45 minutes to Zero minus 3 hours 40 minutes, second and third lines will be bombarded, - the first line and wire being free from bombardment.

Zero minus 3 hours 40 minutes to Zero minus 3 hours 30 minutes, the first and third lines and wire will be bombarded.

At Zero minus 3 hours 30 minutes firing will cease.

This will ensure 15 minutes heavy bombardment on the first line and on the wire, with a lift of 5 minutes to allow hostile machine guns, &c., to come into action and be subsequently blotted out.

The same plan will be carried out at I.17.a.

REAL BOMBARDMENT.

Zero to Zero plus 5 minutes, first and third lines will be bombarded.

Zero plus 3 minutes, 4.5" Howitzers lift to the second line.

Zero plus 5 minutes, 18-prs. lift 50 yards, and 4.5" Howitzers lift to the third line. Infantry enter enemy trenches.

Zero plus 6 minutes, 18-prs. lift to the second line.

P.T.O.



(5).

Zero plus 7 minutes, 18-prs. lift to the 3rd. line, and 4.5" Howitzers and Heavies lift to Box and special tasks.

Zero plus 10 minutes, 18-prs. lift to Box.

Zero plus 55 minutes, Infantry begin to leave enemy trenches, and Northern Diversion opens.

Zero plus 65 minutes, Heavies and Howitzers cease fire.

Zero plus 75 minutes, all artillery fire ceases, unless asked before this to continue.

Zero hour will be such that it is sufficiently dark during the Dummy Bombardment on "Z" night to prevent the enemy from seeing whether Infantry are attacking or not during the 5 minutes lift off the front line.

#### SOUTHERN DIVERSION.

At Zero, artillery opens on front line.

At Zero plus 1 minute, artillery lifts to second line.

At Zero plus 3 minutes, artillery shortens on to front line again.

At Zero plus 5 minutes, artillery lifts to form box, and Infantry enter enemy trenches.

At Zero plus 25 minutes, Infantry leave.

At Zero plus 35 minutes, Artillery of Southern Diversion ceases fire.

The Artillery Plan in detail is shown in Appendix "A", and in Diagrams attached thereto.

MACHINE GUNS. 7. The G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will issue detailed instructions with regard to the action of Machine Guns and Rifle Grenade Batteries. He will consult the G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. regarding these.

AIRCRAFT. 8. A 'plane supplied by the 42nd. Squadron will fly from Zero hour to plus 1 hour, in order to drop parachute lights, with a view to preventing hostile batteries coming into action. The exact time that the machine will be up is subject to variation, and the possibility

P.T.O.



of its going up is subject to weather conditions.

CONTROL POST. 9. Lieut-Colonel DAVIS will control operations from C.28.b.  
80.85.

where there are two dug-outs connected by buried cable.

The C.R.A. will arrange for the necessary Artillery Liaison Officers to be with Lieut-Colonel DAVIS.

SIGNALLING. 10. The following <sup>message</sup> signal will be used in case it is desired to discontinue artillery fire during the Main Operation before scheduled time. -

~~This Blue Rocket will be sent up by order of Lieut-Colonel DAVIS from the vicinity of his dug-out, and will be repeated at short intervals until it is evident that it has been observed.~~

S.O.S. 11. The S.O.S. Signal will be inoperative on the front from C.29.a. to C.23.c. from minus 3 hours 50 minutes until 45.00. 80.67. being again brought into force by order received from 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. Headquarters.

It will similarly be inoperative on the front I.16.b. to I.17.a. from minus 3 hours 50 minutes until brought 75.00. 45.95. into operation by order of the G.O.C., 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

CONTROL OF FRONT. 12. The command of the 9th. Brigade front will remain in the hands of the G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde., and he will be responsible for taking any action that he may consider necessary for the safety of his line. He will, however, consult the G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. in regard to action likely to have a direct bearing on the conduct of the raid. Arrangements will be made for the G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. to be at the 9th. Brigade Headquarters

P.T.O.



(7).

During the conduct of the operation.

The G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will arrange that the raiders may remain in the subsidiary line at suitable points while the Dummy Bombardment, which commences at minus 3 hours 50 minutes, is in progress, after which they can be trickled forward to the front line.

CASUALTIES. 13. INFANTRY BRIGADE COMMANDERS  
HOSTILE RE-  
TALIATION.

Infantry Brigade Commanders will be particularly careful to thin their lines to the utmost opposite both Diversions and the Main Operation, in order to reduce to a minimum the casualties from hostile retaliation.

A few Lewis Gunners, with some Bombers and a small proportion of Bayonet Men, in suitable dug-outs, should be sufficient (if suitable look-outs are posted) to hold the lines on the fronts affected during the operations.

RECONNAISSANCE. 14.

Infantry Officers of Lieut-Colonel DAVIS' party will report to 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. Headquarters, through Lieut-Colonel DAVIS, on a date prior to Zero Day, whether the wire is, or is not, satisfactorily cut. It is essential also that Officers and N.C.O's of all parties shall be thoroughly conversant with the ground over which they have to move.

CONTRIBUTORY  
ACTION. 15.

The G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will arrange with the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. for any contributory action required by that Brigade.

P.T.O.



Appendix No. 17

(8).

ORDERS. 16. Attention is specially directed to Para 15 of G. 6/1 dated 17-1-17, with regard to Orders.

REPORTS. 17. Reports will be received at the Advanced Divisional Report Centre, from half an hour before Zero time.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES. 18. Watches will be synchronised by telephone from Divisional Headquarters on "X" and "Y" nights.

*G. H. Jackson*  
Lieut-Colonel.-  
General Staff.

*1 p.m.*  
Issued at ~~10 a.m.~~

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1	to A.D.C. for G.O.C.	}	By Hand.
2	"G" Staff.		
3	do.		
4	"AQ" Staff.		
5	do.		
6	C.R.A.		
7	" for Right Group.		
8	" " Centre Group.		
9	" " Left Group.		
10	" " D.T.M.O.		
11	C.R.E.	}	By D.R.
12	Div. Sig. Coy.		
13	9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.		
14	10th. " " "		
15	11th. " " "		
16	3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.		
17	Lieut-Colonel DAVIS.		
18	42nd. Squadron, R.F.C.		
19	A.D.M.S. ) By Hand.		
20	A.P.M. ) do.		
21	2nd. Aust. Tunnelling Coy.	}	By D.R.
22	"L" Coy., R.E.		
23	2nd. ANZAC.		
24	Right Flank Division.		
25	Left Flank Division.		
26	War Diary.		
27	File.		
28	Spare.		
29	"		
30	"		

D.C.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,  
20th. February, 1917.GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 37A.Reference 1/10,000 Map, Sheets 36 N.W.2, N.E.1 (parts of),  
Edition 7A. Trenches corrected to 5-10-16.

The following Secret Instructions are issued in connection with Third Australian Division Order No. 16 dated 19th. February, 1917 : -

GAS & SMOKE.

1. If weather conditions are favorable, Gas and Smoke will be released from certain portions of the Divisional Front in conjunction with the Operations taking place on "Z" day.

OBJECT.

2. The object of the release of Gas and Smoke is to confuse the enemy, provide Diversions, and give the impression that the smoke is also gas, thus forcing the enemy to put on his gas masks and thereby reducing his efficiency. The discharge of cloud gas and cloud smoke will both be carried out by the personnel of "L" Coy., R.E.

GAS SECTORS.

3. Sectors on which preparations will be made to release gas are as follows: -

207 cylinders (A) -  $\frac{I.10.b.}{98.42.}$  to  $\frac{I.11.a.}{00.65.}$  (Locality 4 and Gap "D").

98 cylinders (B) -  $\frac{C.23.a.}{20.00.}$  to  $\frac{C.23.a.}{20.40.}$  (Locality 13).

SMOKE SECTORS.

4. The Sectors on which preparations will be made to release smoke are as follows : -

(C) -  $\frac{I.5.c.}{50.90.}$  to  $\frac{I.5.a.}{50.20.}$  (Support Line behind Locality 6).

(D) -  $\frac{C.29.c.}{30.30.}$  to  $\frac{C.29.c.}{10.80.}$  (Locality 8).

(E) - Mobile, either Locality 12 or a portion of Locality 13, with the object of forming a smoke

P.T.O.

*War Diary*



(2).

barrage over the enemy's Salient at C.23.a.

WIND.

5. However favorable the direction of the wind may be, gas will in no case be released if wind velocity is less than 4 miles per hour.

Smoke will be discharged irrespective of the velocity of the wind, provided the direction is suitable.

The following Gas and Smoke Sections will become operative in the winds as stated below, but not otherwise. -

Wind North-West - (A) Gas, (C) Smoke, (D) Smoke,  
(E) Smoke. (See Fig. I).

Wind West-North-West - (A) Gas, (C) Smoke, (D) Smoke  
(E) Smoke. (See Fig. II).

Wind West - - (A) Gas, (C) Smoke, (D) Smoke,  
(B) Gas, (E) Smoke. (See Fig. III)

Wind West-South-West - (A) Gas, (C) Smoke, (D) Smoke  
(B) Gas, (E) Smoke. (See Fig. IV).

Wind South-West - (C) Smoke, Half of (D) Smoke,  
(B) Gas, (E) Smoke. (See Fig. V).

- PRECAUTIONS. 6. The front line from which Gas is to be discharged, will be cleared to a distance of 250 yards on either flank of the gas - sentries, machine gunners and Infantry Officers alone remaining. These will wear their gas helmets fully adjusted from Zero minus 7 minutes to Zero plus 30 minutes..

The Infantry Officer remaining in a Gas Section will keep in touch throughout the whole operation with the Officer of "A" Coy., R.E. in that Section.

In the case of Gas being released from (B) - (Fig. V)

P.T.O.



(3).

the front line to the North will be cleared as far as C.17.a. To the South it will be cleared the 60.10. normal 250 yards.

It is possible that the enemy may attempt to counter-attack through the smoke, in which case the Infantry garrison of the section of the trench from which smoke is being released will know how to deal with him. The enemy will have to advance through the smoke, whereas the garrison of the trench will be behind it, and should, therefore, obtain a favorable opportunity for coming to grips with the enemy.

CLOUD GAS  
& SMOKE  
PROGRAMME.

7. At Zero minus 5 minutes, gas and smoke commence.  
At Zero plus 15 minutes, gas and smoke cease.  
At Zero plus 55 minutes, smoke recommences.  
At Zero plus 65 minutes, smoke ceases.

SMOKE EDGING  
to GAS CLOUDS.

8. As an additional precaution, a little smoke will be released as an edging to each gas cloud, thus rendering the area covered by the gas more evident.

PATROLS.

9. Patrols must not be allowed to enter NO MAN'S LAND opposite gas sectors (A) and (B) until at least 1½ hours after Zero.

SOUTHERN  
DIVERSION.

10. In addition to the foregoing arrangements, plans are being concerted to project smoke bombs, in order to establish a cloud in I.17.a. and assist the Southern Diversion. This will be done irrespective of the direction of the wind. If the wind is suitable, the bombs will be fired so as to land on our side of the enemy's parapet. If the wind is adverse, the bombs will land on the far side of his parapet. If the wind is from the North, the bombs will be fired somewhat

T.T.O.



to our Left. If the wind is from the South, the bombs will be fired a little to our Right.

A small party to be detailed by O.C., "L" Coy., R.E. will also be prepared to emit a smoke cloud in conjunction with these bombs, if the wind is suitable. Arrangements will be made direct between the O.C., "L" Coy., R.E., or his representative, and the G.O.C., 11th. Brigade, or an Officer to be detailed by him.

MISCELLANEOUS.  
II. The smoke to be used will be entirely harmless and can be breathed with perfect safety in large quantities. The gas on the other hand is very poisonous, and it is important that any men who may by some mischance become casualties through gas poisoning shall be kept entirely still.

The decision as to whether gas and smoke clouds will be discharged or not, will rest entirely with the Officers of "L" Coy., R.E. actually in charge of the operations in the various gas and smoke sections.

The decision with regard to the smoke bombs opposite I.17.a. will rest with the O.C., Raid, who will be conducting operations in that area.

The non-release of a smoke cloud opposite I.17.a. will not be taken to mean that the smoke bombs cannot be used. Similarly it must not be inferred from the non-release of gas or smoke in one section, that it will not be discharged from the others - (See Figures).

The above Circular will be treated as strictly secret, as it is essential that the gas and smoke shall be a surprise. As few as possible should know of the intention. If the rank and file hear

P.T.O.



(5).

of it, they will undoubtedly discuss the subject, in which case it may quite possibly get through to the enemy.

Receipt of this Circular will be acknowledged.

*G. A. Jackson*


Lieut-Colonel.-  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1	to A.D.C. for G.O.C.
2	"G" Staff.
3	do.
4	C.R.A.
5	9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
6	10th. " " "
7	11th. " " "
8	Lieut-Colonel DAVIS.
9	42nd. Squadron, R.F.C.
10	A.D.M.S.
11	"L" Coy., R.E.
12	2nd. ANZAC.
13	Left Flank Division.
14	War Diary.
15	File.
16	Spare.
17	"
18	"
19	"
20	"
21	"



FIGURE I  
WIND N.W




Appendix No. 17

EEM  
22/17




— Figure II —  
Wind W.N.W.



Appendix No. 17




Figure III  
Wind W.



Appendix No. 17




Figure IV  
Wind W 311



E.F.M. 20.2.17.

Appendix No. 17





Appendix No 17



WAR DIARY      APPX 17

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,  
28/2/17.



Headquarters,  
End A. & H.E. Army Corps.

I beg to furnish the following report upon a raiding operation carried out by a composite Battalion drawn from the 10th Australian Infantry Brigade, with the co-operation of the Third Divisional Artillery, *and a Brigade of H.E. 2. Artillery.* the 9th Brigade Machine Gun Company, and the Stokes Mortar Batteries of this Division; also of "L" Company Special Brigade, and of a subordinate small raiding team drawn from the 11th Australian Infantry Brigade.

A detailed report of the Infantry portion of the action by Lieut-Colonel DAVIS, the Commander of the Raid, is furnished in extenso, as same contains a detailed and succinct narrative of the action of each of the four companies into which the assaulting force was divided. - I have nothing to add to this portion of the report, beyond saying that I consider that the Raiding Force was capably trained, organized, and led, and that credit is due to the Commander and his subordinate officers. This is particularly so in the case of "D" Company under Captain SIMONS, V.C. which met frontal opposition, and succeeded in penetrating into the enemy's position only after a stiff and determined fight.

The results of the operation may be briefly summed up as follows. - A section of the enemy defences in Square C.23 and C.29 for a length measured along his front trench of upwards of 800 yards, and for a depth extending to, and inclusive of, his third line was completely demolished, together with the whole of the defensive organizations met with, comprising a number of Mortar and Machine Gun emplacements, stores, dugouts, and Headquarters. The whole garrison of this section was either killed or captured, and a large quantity of materiel, some of which was of special interest and importance, was brought back to our lines. The total enemy losses in dead and prisoners which were actually counted, amount to 107, but this makes no allowance for numbers of the enemy who were undoubtedly blown to pieces and buried during the preliminary bombardments, nor of those who were



-2-

26/2/17.

undoubtedly caught by our longer range fire in the rear and on the flanks, nor of those who suffered from our artillery action in the southern and northern diversions in other parts of the enemy line. A most conservative estimate of the total casualties inflicted on the enemy must exceed 200.

Valuable assistance was rendered to the operation by "L" Company Special Brigade, who released several smoke clouds at various times and in various portions of the line. The enemy's gas alarm was clearly heard, and numbers of those found dead in his trenches were wearing their gas masks. The action of the Artillery was all that could be desired; their fire discipline and accuracy being beyond praise. The preliminary wire-cutting had been effectually and satisfactorily done.

Signalling Communications worked extremely well, and transmission of information, even from the interior of the enemy's defences, was promptly effected.

The identification obtained as the result of the raid was normal.

Considering the extent of the operation, and the intensity of the enemy artillery retaliation during same, our casualties which amounted to 14 killed, 18 so far unaccounted for, and 104 wounded (mostly slightly), must be regarded as relatively slight.

I consider that the operation has been most beneficial to the morale of this Division, as all ranks are now satisfied that with proper artillery co-operation they are able to enter and occupy the enemy's lines at any place and at any time.

*(Sgd) John Monash*

Major-General,  
Commanding Third Australian Division.



COPY - To accompany letter No. G 6/1 dated 28/2/17, addressed to 2nd A. & H.S. Army Corps.

10th Composite Raiding Battalion,  
27/2/17.

To:- 10th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

I forward herewith report of the raiding operation which was carried out at 12.30 a.m. today by this Battalion.

The Battalion marched to the locality of No. 2 Hutments, BRQUINGHEM - STENWERCK Road and were loaded into Mechanical Transport Waggon, and proceeded through ARMIANTIERES to HOUPLINES as directed by your Order No. 20 I preceded the waggons in a car with Captain LACY of the M.M.T. Company and at the HOUPLINES crossing I stopped the car and listened for the motor waggons. I heard them coming while they were a considerable distance away and they made such a noise that I took the responsibility of departing from Para. 3 of your Order No. 20 and directed all waggons to unload at the Railway crossing. They made such a noise that if they had proceeded to the TISSAGE and round by LITTLE MARY DUMP it would have been heard miles away in the wind that was blowing. All raiding companies however proceeded to their respective stations in the Subsidiary Line, awaiting the close of preliminary bombardment. At ZERO MINUS 2 HOURS 50 MINUTES our preliminary bombardment opened; at ZERO MINUS 2 HOURS 47 MINUTES enemy retaliated, and his retaliation did not cease till about ZERO MINUS 2 HOURS 10 MINUTES. Raiding Companies then proceeded to their respective stations in the front line. The communication trenches by which they moved had been much damaged by the enemy's retaliation and to some considerable extent retarded their progress. They were however all formed up and ready to jump off from their positions in our front line and adjacent communications at ZERO MINUS 30 MINUTES.

Leading Platoons of each Company moved out into NO MAN'S LAND followed by No. 2 Platoons of A, B, and C, Coys. and Nos. 2 and 3 Platoons of "D" Company and formed up opposite their objectives without loss and apparently unobserved by enemy. At ZERO HOUR our barrage opened, and all companies advanced to attack.

RIGHT ("A") ASSAULTING COMPANY.

While this Company was for a while held up in SPAIN AVENUE owing to damage caused to that Avenue by enemy's shell fire a bomb carried by Pte. KETTLE S.P. exploded accidentally killing 2 men and wounding 1.

Pte. BOLTON J. while moving up this Avenue slipped and fell, thereby fracturing his leg.

The enemy's wire was well cut and no mats were required to bridge same.

Immediately barrage lifted the first line parties entered enemy's trench. The Southern Blocking Party moved past PONT BALLOT to within 40 yards of our barrage. The other parties followed quickly after them. No dugouts that had not been previously destroyed were seen in this part of the line. Four were seen to have been destroyed, one just on PONT BALLOT which had telephone wires leading to it, and 2 steel doors, apparently an Artillery O.P. A destroyed trench mortar emplacement was found 50 or 60 yards South of point of entry. The Northern Blocking and Storming Party gained touch with "B" Company. In this part of 1st line one dugout was found with 3 men in it, 2 of whom were made prisoners and the 3rd shot as he would not surrender; the dugout was also demolished. This line of enemy's trench was almost completely destroyed by our Artillery fire, as was also the communication trench leading to 2nd line in which nothing was found.



-2-

The 2nd Platoon followed immediately behind the 1st Platoon and reached 2nd line almost as soon as barrage lifted therefrom. This line they found almost obliterated, the trench being hardly observable except for pieces of broken revetments.

There was no sign of dugouts or of the enemy in this line but a prisoner was taken in a shell hole near it.

The 3rd Platoon also reached the 3rd line when the barrage lifted therefrom and found this line in the same state as the 2nd line, 10 dead Germans were observed and it may be assumed that many were buried in the debris.

All parties began to withdraw at 1-10 a.m. and at 1.40 a.m. the evacuation of enemy's line was complete.

During retirement 7 or 8 Germans appeared in NO MAN'S LAND on the South but were dispersed by a Lewis Gun with, it is believed, several casualties.

The casualties suffered by this Company were 38, all except 4 being caused by shell fire, viz.-

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
KILLED	-	3
MISSING	-	3
WOUNDED	<u>1</u>	<u>31</u>
TOTAL	<u>1</u>	<u>37</u>

#### RIGHT CENTRE ("B") ASSAULTING COMPANY.

The leading Platoon also found the wire well cut and entered the 1st line almost immediately after the barrage lifted viz.- At ZERO PLUS 6 MINUTES. Very little opposition was encountered. 3 Germans, 5 dead and 3 wounded, were found in a dugout, the wounded were made prisoners. They had bandages on and appeared to have been wounded by the preliminary bombardment at ZERO MINUS 2 HOURS 50 MINUTES.

The dugout was demolished and communication was established with both flanking Companies.

The bodies of 8 other dead Germans, which were cold, were found in this line. These were probably killed by first bombardment. No other dugouts were found here, but this line was in a fairly good condition, being well revetted and with good parados.

The 2nd platoon followed immediately after the first and entered 2nd Line at about ZERO PLUS 10 MINUTES. These trenches were badly knocked about. There were no decent dugouts, only a few 1 man bivouacs which were destroyed by bombs. 2 Minenwerfer emplacements were found, together with 14 shells (approx. length 3 feet 9 inches) and a number of smaller shells (approx. 4 inches by 2 inches in diameter.)

Both emplacements and shells were blown up by demolition charges. One German found here was taken prisoner and from 12 to 15 German corpses were also seen in this line.

The 3rd line was entered at about ZERO PLUS 15 MINUTES. It was found to be very badly demolished by our shell fire, being hardly recognisable as a trench. Numerous portions of dead bodies were seen here but no dugouts located. 3 Germans were encountered here, 2 of whom were bayoneted and one taken prisoner. While in this line the 3rd Platoon came under fire of machine guns and rifle grenades from somewhere in rear of trench. A Very light disclosed the presence of a party of about 10 of the enemy in ground about 90 yards in rear of 3rd line. These were fired on by Lewis Gun and dispersed.

This company began to withdraw at 1.10 a.m. and at 1.25 a.m. the last party had left enemy's lines and all were over our parapet at 1.40 a.m.

When first line was entered by 1st party a number of the enemy were observed running around towards second line.



-3-

The casualties suffered by this Company, which were as far as is known, all caused by shell fire, were as follows. -

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
KILLED	-	5
MISSING	-	5
WOUNDED	3	26
TOTAL	<u>3</u>	<u>37</u>

LEFT CENTRE ("C") COMPANY.

The 1st Platoon of this Company entered 1st line without aid of mats through excellent gaps made by our artillery and with little resistance from enemy, at ZERO PLUS 6½ MINUTES. This line was badly knocked about by our artillery. It contained 5 dugouts, 2 of which had been destroyed by our artillery,

the other 3 destroyed by demolition party. In 1 dugout 8 Germans were found in this line and were made prisoners, 7 others were bayoneted by our men and 12 were found dead, apparently killed by our artillery. The dugouts were of concrete with sealed doors. In one, which was evidently a dressing station was found a very heavy Medical Chest from which samples of contents were taken; another contained a quantity of tinned food and black bread. A small grenade and ammunition dump was demolished.

A machine gun which had fired a few rounds when the 1st platoon had entered the trenches was found in a concrete emplacement at about 25 yards north of the point of entry. It was brought in and the emplacement was demolished. A searchlight was also found and brought in. Along this line was a wire with bells attached at every bay, apparently used as an alarm wire, this was destroyed. A trench mortar (pineapple) was found in this line and brought to NO MAN'S LAND and dropped there.

The 2nd Platoon entered 2nd line at about ZERO PLUS 10 MINUTES. On entering this line a number of enemy, estimated at 25, was seen running away towards 3rd line. 6 were shot and a Lewis Gun brought further fire to bear on them with unknown results. A German red-cross orderly was made prisoner here. This line had been so badly battered by our artillery as to be almost unrecognisable.

A few field dressing kits were discovered here in a small wooden dugout which was demolished.

The 3rd Platoon entered 3rd line at about ZERO PLUS 18 MINUTES. 2 dead Germans were discovered in a dugout that had been destroyed by our artillery. This line had also been very much battered by our Artillery. 4 dugouts, one evidently used as a timber dump, were demolished. A number of telephone lines were cut in this sector, also wires apparently used for searchlights. A circular construction of steel, ¼", embedded in concrete about 6 feet in diameter in which was found a M.G. ammunition belt was also demolished.

This company started to leave enemy's trenches at zero plus 50 minutes and all were over our parapet at zero plus 70 minutes. The casualties in this company, in which all but one, was caused by a M.G. bullet, were caused by shell fire, were as follows.

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
KILLED	-	4
MISSING	-	1
WOUNDED	-	13
TOTAL	<u>-</u>	<u>18</u>



LEFT ("D") ASSAULTING COMPANY.

At ZERO PLUS 2 MINUTES the leading Platoon was through the enemy's front line. The enemy at this time covered the gap in his wire, which was small, but sufficiently made, with a very heavy M.G. and artillery fire.

One machine gun fired on it from the direction of the GENSOR'S NOSE SALIENT, and the other apparently from the 3rd line in front.

The wire and bridging party were practically decimated. The O.C. No. 1 assaulting platoon then withdrew and moved to the north, again endeavouring to effect an entry.

The O.C. "D" Company also came up and endeavoured to get through but was wounded in the head.

O.C. No. 1 assaulting platoon at about ZERO PLUS 15 MINUTES at last effected an entrance, and was followed in various places by one officer and 15 other ranks, but the remainder of this company was prevented by the heavy enemy fire from entering and subsequently withdrew to our parapet.

O.C. No. 1 Assaulting Platoon with others who had entered moved along front line to the south until he linked up with "C" Company.

On his way he demolished a heavy water pump, 3 small wooden dugouts, and a steel and concrete emplacement with a painted iron rod protruding therefrom; 5 dead Germans were seen half buried amongst the debris in trench, which was considerably damaged by our artillery fire.

On completion of this work O.C. No. 1 assaulting platoon and party returned to our trenches.

The determined attempts at entry made by this company under circumstances as stated were very commendable and reflect credit on all concerned.

The casualties sustained by this Company were as follows. -

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
KILLED	-	1
MISSING	-	9
WOUNDED	1 (slightly)	29
TOTAL	<u>1</u>	<u>39</u>

OUR ARTILLERY The work of our artillery is praised by all ranks, who give grateful accord to the valuable assistance they received from this source. The punishment it inflicted on enemy's trenches was very severe, and undoubtedly caused him to practically evacuate the portion of his line attacked.

ENEMY ARTILLERY

The enemy's retaliation which opened at ZERO PLUS 2 MINUTES was fairly strong, but was not concentrated. He shelled our subsidiary line lightly but heavily shelled our front line, support line, and communication trenches, damaging them considerably. He also barraged his own wire and front line (more thickly on the flank of attack than in the centre) and NO MAN'S LAND. He further threw shells into area between his front and second lines which caused some casualties to our troops.

ENEMY'S LIGHTS

At ZERO PLUS 1 MINUTE enemy sent up first red light, and lights of this description were afterwards continuously sent up along his whole line during the operation. Several rockets breaking into three or green lights were also seen to go up from behind enemy's 3rd line, but except for heavy bombardment of his own wire on the left of our attack, no appreciable result was noticed in any other portion of his line. White lights were fired by enemy continuously during the operation.



ENEMY  
WIRE

Enemy wire was much knocked about by our artillery fire. In front on his first line parapet he has a trench or borrow ditch all filled with wire. On "A" Assaulting Company's sector there was no wire between his 1st and 2nd, and 2nd and 3rd lines. On "B" Assaulting Company's sector there was wire between 2nd and 3rd lines which was considerably damaged and was able to be crossed in places. On "C" Assaulting Company's sector there was wire between his 1st and 2nd lines, and 2nd and 3rd lines, all being damaged and able to be crossed in places.

ENEMY  
TRENCHES

All enemy's trenches appeared to have been well duckboarded and revetted with hurdles of wood and brushwood, but were damaged so much by our artillery as to be almost defaced.

STRETCHER  
BEARERS

The work done by the stretcher-bearers was excellent, and their devotion to duty cannot be too highly commended.

GUIDING  
LINES

The white tape lines used as guiding lines between our own and the enemy wire were of the utmost value in enabling members of all companies to both obtain their objectives and reach our own line on the conclusion of the operation most expeditiously, and their usefulness cannot be too highly commended. All future operations of this nature would be greatly helped by the use of such tapes.

(Sd) C.H.DAVIS,

Lieut-Colonel.  
Commanding "D" Battalion.

G.B.