


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/42/43 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 1st
Australian Division

August 1918



AWM4-1/42/43PART2

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

1-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. NO. 109.

From 6.a.m. 31-7-18 to 6.a.m. 1-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry. Protective patrols were out during the hours of darkness, no enemy were encountered. In an isolated post at F.2.A.1.3. a man was found, and taken prisoner. An enemy post was located and found unoccupied at F.2.A.5.7. A large dump (15 cm. shells) was located at X.26.D.8.6. A hostile post was located at F.2.C.5.7. In F.2.A.4.C. No Mans Land was penetrated to a depth of 400 yards without enemy being encountered. Movement was seen at F.7.D.5.7. An enemy party of about 25 was observed digging a post at about F.7.A.2.2. with a screen of three covering them. Our patrol was hotly engaged by rifle and was also fired on by a M.G. from about F.7.A.15.25. The hostile party was much superior in numbers and was too alert for our small patrol to engage. Papers taken from dead Hun at F.1.D.8.3. Several patrols operated in MERRIS as a result of which 9 of the enemy were taken prisoners.

a. Infantry Arms. 150 rounds were fired from our Stokes Mortars, targets receiving particular attention included, enemy post at E.12.C.6.2. and X.27.C.3.5. and harassing fire on to Railway in F.7.A.4.B. Rifle grenades were fired on enemy post at F.2.A.50.65. Vickers Guns. Mainly inactive during the period. Guns of the Right Line Company engaged targets in F.7.C.4.D. expending 7,000 rounds of S.A.A. Anti-Aircraft Guns. Were used vigorously against enemy planes when targets were within range. About 3,000 rounds were fired at enemy aircraft during the day. Snipers of the Left Battalion Left Brigade were active against enemy movement on the eastern side of the METEREN BECQUE results unknown. Two casualties are claimed by our Right Battalion Left Brigade.

B. Aerial. Our planes were again very active, and large formations frequently crossed well into enemy territory. At 11.a.m. our planes brought down two enemy balloons. One of our planes was forced to land at 7.p.m. in enemy lines on a grid bearing of 1380 from W.29.B.6.4.

3. Artillery. Apart from our usual harassing fire programme, very little shooting was done. Our harassing fire directed mainly against roads, tracks, hedges and positions of assembly, was increased by 50% from 4.30.a.m. onwards in reply to hostile shelling on front line and supports about that time.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Enemy continues to fire M.Gs on the least movement. This is particularly noticeable opposite the left Battalion of our left Brigade front, where many Verey Lights are also used. M.G and Verey Lights opposite MERRIS were practically inactive.

b. Artillery. heavy harassing fire throughout the period and especially during the night. From 4.a.m. to 4.20.a.m. our front line from NORD HELF to MONT DE MERRIS was fairly heavily shelled, the supports being gassed with mustard gas and phosgene at the same time. From 9.p.m. to 1.a.m. W.21.B. STRAZEELE and PRADELLES were intermittently shelled, whilst from 1.a.m. to 2.a.m. BORRE became the target.

c. Trench Mortars. During the fog early yesterday morning 5 light M.W. bombs fell at X.26.B.9.6. and during the night a few heavy M.Ws fell at X.26.D.8.4. otherwise T.Ms were inactive.

d. Machine Guns. Generally speaking hostile M.Guns were not quite so active as they have been the last few days. The left Battalion front of the left Brigade received particular attention.

(2)

e. Aerial. With few exceptions the E.A. remained on their own side of the line throughout the day. One plane flew low between METEREN and MERRIS at 9.p.m. and dropped bombs in X.19.C. At 10.45.a.m. one E.A. at about 2,000 feet flew over STRAZELLE Station. At 8.30.p.m. 3 low flying E.A. flew over MERRIS. At midnight a bomb was dropped on W.30.A.3.2.

2. Movement. Individual movement was observed at F.3.A.4.2. and one man seen to enter ruins at F.2.C.9.9. at 5.30.p.m. At 9.30.a.m. two men walked along railway at F.7.D.5.7. During the early morning a good deal of movement was observed on the OUTERSTEINE Ridge.

3. Defences. Posts: F.2.A.50.65. (5 men distinctly seen here), X.26.D.20.25., F.7.A.15.25. (suspected) F.2.C.5.7.

M.Gs. BELLE CROIX Farm, X.26.D.20.25., F.1.D.8.1., F.2.C.5.7.

Work. Enemy heard working at the BECQUE about X.27.A.4.3.

appeared to be building a bridge or wiring) F.7.A.15.25.

Wire. No wire, excepting the probable wiring mentioned has yet been located.

4. Identifications.

1 Prisoner belonging to 10.Coy. 140.I.R. 4th Division. captured

F.2.A.1.2. - 9 prisoners belonging to 8th.Coy. 14th.I.R. 4th.Div.

Geo. A. P. H. H. H.

Lieut *for* Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

1-8-18.

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CAPTURED THIS MORNING.

Identification. 1 prisoner taken this morning in F.2.A.1.2. belonged to 10th Coy. 3rd Battalion. 140.I.R. 4th. Division.

9 belonged to 8th Coy. 2nd Battalion. 14.I.R. 4th Division.

Method of capture. The prisoner of the 3rd Battalion. 140.I.R. was a deserter, and wandered as near to our lines as he could get and waited to be taken prisoner. The other 9 prisoners had spent 3 days in a cellar in the vicinity of MERRIS and were unaware that they were surrounded by our troops.

Order of Battle. N. to S. 49.I.R. 140.I.R. 14. I.R.

Intentions. Prisoners were all certain no attack was likely on this front as far as they were concerned, and they did not contemplate a counter attack on MERRIS.

General. The deserter who was a Pole, in private life a "country lad" volunteered the following information. Whilst he was talking the other day to a Polish friend, his friend told him that he had been employed unloading large quantities of artillery ammunition from barges on the Canal at SAILLY, when all of a sudden about a week ago, they had to put it all on the barges again, and it was sent elsewhere. That in his Company there were 13 Alsations and 15 Poles many of whom were waiting the opportunity to desert; it was common talk amongst themselves, the possibilities and probabilities of success.

Miscellaneous. Extracts from documents and correspondence taken in MERRIS.

Light Signals. Signal post is at Company Headquarters.

YELLOW. = Barrage fire.
RED. = Destructive fire.
GREEN. = Lengthen range.

WHITE with 2 Pearls = Shorten range.

General Orders headed "The enemy"

Everyday the enemy tries to penetrate our outer defences, to gain prisoners. The greatest attentiveness must therefore be observed by day and night. He tries to locate single posts and attack them whilst bombard, the others with Rifle Grenades and T.Ms. It is evidently the best to harass the enemy with Rifle Grenades and T.Ms. Gas Shells have not been noticed the last few days. Although the last Coy was shelled with them. The enemy tries continually to gain successes by surprise on the left flank.

Distribution of Strength. On account of shortage of men inf posts are to be placed only a few yards on either side of M.Gs formerly there were 3 now only 11.

Defence. By diligent observation at the post and continual readiness to fire. The enemys small attack must be repulsed. Should by a stronger attack the line be pushed back the outposts will fall back to support line, which must be held at all costs, and when all are clear, the Signal White and 2 pearls will be fired. After the breaking of the enemy attack by our Artillery fire an immediate counter attack carried out with strength will usually restore our position.

It is interesting to note, that the 1st Aust. Division have identified no less than 12 German divisions opposite them, since they have been in the present line. The following are the divisions identified.

38th. Division.	15th. Res. Div. (Twice)
11th. Reserve Division. (Twice)	214th. Res. Div.
12th. Division (Twice)	4th. Bavarian Division.
39th. Division. (twice)	4th. Division.
48th. Reserve Division (Twice)	207th. Division.
81st. Reserve Division (Twice)	
79th. Reserve Division.	

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

2-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 110.

From 6 a.m. 1-8-18. to 6 a.m. 2-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry. Liaison patrols maintained lateral communication with flank units during the night. Reconnaissance patrols left our lines by day and night, and the following information was obtained.

A daylight patrol discovered hostile evacuated posts at F.7.A.2.6. and moved across open space to another unoccupied post at F.7.A.6.5. They then moved to F.7.A.8.6. and then to F.7.A.5.8., where a light M.G. and a wounded prisoner were found and brought in. About this position at least 50 dead Huns were counted. Enemy post at F.7.A.1.3. was unoccupied. A hostile post was located at F.7.A.7.2. and as soon as garrison observed our patrol, they hurriedly left post containing L.M.G. and bolted towards the railway. The L.M.G. was brought into our lines.

A small unoccupied post at X.27.A.3.5. was found and although containing various articles of equipment, no identification could be obtained. Unoccupied dugouts discovered at X.27.A.2.3. A large working party was heard about X.27.A.6.0. Shots were fired at this party which was dispersed.

a. Infantry Arms. Our L.T.M. expended a number of rounds on the following enemy positions:- Post and M.G. at about F.7.A.2.2. M.G. at F.1.D.8.1. and post X.27.C.5.5.

The left Battalion of our right Brigade fired 50 rifle grenades against hostile position opposite their front, and as cries of pain were heard, it is reasonable to suppose that casualties were inflicted. Snipers from the same battalion engaged movement in the vicinity of BELLE CROIX farm and one hit is claimed.

2. Artillery. Our usual harassing fire was carried out during the period, special attention being paid through the night to cross country tracks and communications in view of a suspected enemy relief. At 1.35 a.m. all Batteries of the 1st Bde put down a 5 minute shell storm on enemy forward system in retaliation to hostile shelling on our forward system. 45th Battery fired 50 rounds on houses in X.27.C.8.7. and X.27.D.2.7. Many direct hits were observed. BAILLEUL Station and BELLE CROIX Farm received special attention during the afternoon. 47th Battery engaged an A.A. Battery but unfortunately after a few ranging rounds had been fired, observation was spoiled by mist.

3. Aerial. Large formations crossed over enemy territory on many occasions and bombing was carried out both by day and night. One contact with unknown results was observed at 1.15 p.m. R.E.8's observed shoots for our artillery.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Enemy throughout the day kept very quiet, and practically no movement was seen in the forward area, however during the night he adopted the nervy alert attitude recently displayed. On approach of our patrol, a hostile garrison at F.7.A.7.2. hurriedly evacuated their post leaving behind a L.M.G.

b. Trench Mortars, were inactive.

c. Machine Guns. Activity increased on the right battalion left Brigade front, and remained very active on left Battalion front during the period under review. Left Battalion reports all indirect M.G. fire comes from Eastern side of METIEN BECQUE.

d. Artillery. Enemy activity is still above normal and his harassing fire has increased considerably during the last few days. Our front line and supports were shelled at intervals, and METIEN, METIEN and STRAZELLE were intermittently shelled both day and night. Roads and tracks in the vicinity of supports and especially road running through W.22.B. were badly harassed throughout the night. The bulk of the shelling was from the direction of OUTTERSTEENE and DOULIEU.

c. Aerial. Enemy planes were more active than has been the case for some days past. Seven planes were observed during the day, as well as the machines which are always over at dawn and dusk. At 1.30 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. planes tried to cross our line, but were driven back by A.A. fire. At 8.30 p.m. E.A. flew low over E.10. Central.

2. Movement. Individual movement was observed as follows:-

4.20 p.m. 2 men at F.3.C.6.8. 8.30 p.m. 1 man at F.3.C.6.8. and at 8.45 p.m. a man on horse back indistinctly seen at same position. A little movement was also seen at BELLE CROIX Farm and TERRAPIN House during the day.

5. Defences. Posts at F.7.B.5.6. F.7.B.25.40. X.26.D.70.22. H.Guns. F.2.A.70.65. F.2.A.5.4. and E.12.C.7.2. the latter garrisoned by night with M.G.

4. Miscellaneous. Enemy, fired into his own posts opposite Loft Battalion and immediately double red flares were sent up and repeated in relays to the rear, whereupon enemy artillery ceased fire.

5. Identifications. 8th Coy 14th B.R. 4th. Division. wounded prisoner brought in from F.7.A.5.8.

Geo. H. Price May 1919

Lieut. Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

ARMY SUMMARY.

Reserves. The 216th Division from FLANDERS has come into line North of the MARNE. The 117th Division, reported in reserve on the battle front, is considered to be still in FLANDERS.

The relief of the 51st Division in the VOORMEESELE Sector, and its transference to ST. NIHIEL reduces the reserves of Prince RUPPRECHT'S Group of Armies by one division. These reserves now stand at 27 Divisions fit for fighting.

ENGAGEMENT OF DIVISIONS.

72 Divisions have now been engaged since July 15th in the SOISSONS - CHAMPAGNE battle, of which 49 have been put in from reserve. Of these 49 divisions, 11 have been transferred from Prince RUPPRECHT'S Group of Armies.

In these 11 are included 6 or 7 which were engaged in the original attack on 15th July, having therefore been transferred prior to that date.

MORAL.

The moral of the 4th Division cannot be considered as good, although the division had been out of the line for over 10 weeks, when efforts were made to raise the moral of the troops by providing cinemas and various other entertainments.

The men have now given up all hope of the war coming to an end this year, and are convinced that Germany can no longer gain a decisive victory, although the troops had been led to believe that after the continued German successes on the SOMME and on the AISNE the Allies were not in a position to offer any further serious resistance. The chief reasons for their low moral are:-

- i. Heavy losses amongst relatives and friends.
- ii. Bad food conditions, especially at home.
- iii. The hardships that the people at home have to put up with; depressing letters from home.
- iv. All faith has been lost in the U boat campaign.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

11-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. NO. 1.

to 6.p.m. 11-8-18.

Reference
HARBORNIERES Sheet.
1. 40.000.
-----I. OUR OPERATIONS.

On the morning of the 8th inst at 4.20.a.m. the Australian Corps in conjunction with the Canadian Corps on the right and the 3rd Corps on the left attacked and defeated the enemy. By nightfall the line was consolidated.

On the 9th inst, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades marching from the CORBIE - AUBIGNY area went through the 15th and 8th Brigades in line and carried on the advance. The advance of the Infantry was supported by Tanks, Artillery and Aircraft. Flank Divisions also advanced.

By nightfall our troops had consolidated on a line running from North to South through X.10.C., X.16.A. X.16.D. X.23.A.&.C. X.29.A.&.C. F.5.A.&.C. Very little opposition was encountered. At 8.a.m.* the advance was continued by the 2nd Brigade on the right and the 3rd Brigade on the left. The enemy defence was found to be stronger and in parts our troops were held up by strong H.G. fire. By 5.p.m. our troops were consolidated along the line X.16A&.5. - X.17.C.0.0. - X.23.Central - X.24.C.4.2. - X.24.C.9.0. along E edge of CREPEY WOOD then due South to Cross Roads at F.6.C.4.7. to F.6.C.9.3. then S to Railway. The line of the Canadian Division on the right extended in a S E direction from the Railway at A.7.A.5.7.

At about 8.p.m. under cover of a heavy bombardment the enemy developed a counter attack against CREPEY WOOD. This was repulsed.

On the 11th inst, the advance was continued by the 2nd and 3rd. I. Bde with the 4th Canadian Division on the right and the 2nd Aus. Division on the left. Tanks and Artillery co-operated with the Infantry. Latest advices show the Infantry consolidated on a line X.17.A.1.9. - X.17.A.3.0. - X.17.Central - X.17.D.8.0. - X.24.A.1.0. X.24.C.9.7. - S.19.C.5.7. - S.20.C.3.3. - S.26.B.4.0. - S.26.D.7.0. thence S to Railway.

During the morning at 5.30.a.m. and at 8.50.a.m. and again at 1.20.p.m. the enemy counter-attacked our positions and made progress at points. The situation was however wholly restored by our Infantry. Another counter-attack against the right Brigade in the afternoon was repulsed.

Captures to date -

6 Officers and 200 O.Rs.

Material Captured (approximately only)

1. 21.cm. Gun. 4 15.c.m. guns. 19. 7.7. Cm.Guns.
8. 15.cm.Hows. 172. M.guns. 18 Trench Mortars.
12. Locomotives (Light) 73 Trucks (light) a complete
C.C.S. with 500 beds. Much ammunition and other War
Material.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

9th. Inst. 18th.R.I.R. - 225. Division.
26th.R.I.R. -)
376th.I.R. -) 109 Division.

10th.Inst.

7th. Bav.I.R. -)
19th. Bav.I.R. -) 5th.Bav.Division.
26th. R.I.R.)
2nd. Gren.Regt.) 109th. Division.
11th. Gren.Regt. - 117th.Division.
232nd. R.I.R. - 107th.Division.

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2. Identifications (continued)10th. Inst.

Light Inf. Gun. detachment. No. 34. attached 5th
Bav. R.I.R.

88th. Bn. Heavy Artillery. (Forward Observer)

11th. Inst.

94th. I.R. - 38th. (Saxon) Div.

21st. Bav. I.R. -)

19th. Bav. I.R. -) 5th. Bav. Div.

26th. R.I.R. - 109th. Div.

Order of Battle.

It is difficult to outline an enemy Order of Battle as the Divisions are more or less disorganised. At the beginning of our attack on the 9th, it would appear that we had opposite us elements of the 109th Div and elements of the 225th Div. The relief of the 109th Div by the 117th Div was in process at the time of the first attack on the 8th inst. As each of the 3 Battalions of the 3 Regts of the 117th Div had been identified on the 8th inst, and as only 1 odd prisoner has been taken since then, it is safe to assume that the remaining elements of this Division have been withdrawn.

However on the 9th inst, there were still elements of the 109th Div in the line. This Division having been relieved was not completely engaged until the 9th inst.

On the 10th inst prisoners of 4 Divisions (viz 5th Bav Div - 109th Div - 117th Div - and 107th Div) were captured.

It appears that the 5th Bav Div was alarmed in the CAMBRAI area on the evening of the 8th inst and was rushed up by train. They marched to the line via VERMAN DOVILLERS and reinforced the 109th Div during the night 9/10th.

Only 2 Regiments (the 7th. Bav. I.R. and the 19th. Bav. I.R.) of this Div were engaged on the 10th, and these Regts being fresh and not disorganised they were able to more or less stabilize the enemy defence immediately opposite us.

At nightfall 10th inst it appears certain that the enemy Order of Battle of this Division from N to S was as follows:-

Elements of 107th Div and 109th Div (in a highly disorganised state) - 7th Bav I.R. and 19th. Bav. I.R. 5th Bav Division (with 21st Bav I.R. in Reserve)

Today (11th inst) the remaining Regt of the 5th Bav Div came into action being used for counter-attack purposes principally against our Left Bco. In addition the 94th I.R. (38th Div) was identified.

Prisoners of the 94th I.R. state they were alarmed at CAMBRAI two days ago and rushed up to the front in Motor Vehicles. The evidence seems to point to the fact that this one Regt has not been put into the line as a Regt but has been used during the night 10/11th and today to reinforce different portions of the front as the need arose, or it is possible, the 94th I.R. has taken over the line and the elements of the other Divs have not yet been withdrawn.

The enemy situation seems to be now from N to S as follows:-

Elements of 109th Div. (exhausted) - Elements of 5th. Bav. Div. (With 1 Regt the 21st Bav. I.R. badly shattered) - Elements of the 94th I.R. scattered along the line (a comparatively fresh Regt).

As a local reserve the enemy may now be expected to have the other 2 Regts of the 38th Div (95th and 96th I.R.) available as reinforcements or for counter-attack purposes.

3. Prisoners Statements. Prisoners are unanimous in their statements as regards the confusion existing in rear lines and the haste with which units were rushed up by Trains and Motor Vehicles. Prisoners state that casualties have been very heavy, this is supported by the evidence of R.

M.O. captured. Prisoners show signs of the strain imposed on them, and seem to realise that the initiative has departed from their Army.

They speak with great respect of the R.A.F. and state that the harassing of their communications is almost unbearable.

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(3)

On account of our Artillery and Air activity Transport has been much demoralised and several prisoners have been without rations for several days.

Little information of military value has been obtained from prisoners owing to their ignorance of the situation.

[Signature]
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

Prisoners taken by the 4th Army since the 8th Inst total 18,831 of whom 476 are Officers.

About 300 Guns have been taken by the Army.
On the right of the British the French have penetrated more than 20 Kilometres into the enemy defences.

Line of First French Army runs E of LESHELLE - STAURN - ARMANCOURT - DANCOURT - RODINCOURT - TILLOY. Line of 3rd French Army runs 1 Kilometre N. E. of LE PLESSIER High ground (83 N of ROYE SUR MATZ 1 Kilometre W of ROYE SUR MATZ-CANNY FARM WOOD. Several thousand prisoners and several hundred Guns have been taken by the French.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

12-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2.

From 6.p.m. 11-8-18. to 6.a.m. 12-8-18.

1. OUR OPERATIONS.

General. No further attacks were launched and the consolidation of our new positions was proceeded with.

Artillery. Our artillery was very active on enemy centres of activity.

Aerial Activity. Our aircraft was very active up to 9.p.m. and after dawn patrolling enemy rear and forward areas.

Prisoners and Material. During the period three unwounded prisoners were captured.

Identifications. 19. Bav. I.R.)
21. Bav. I.R.) 5th. Bav. Divn.
52. R.I.R. - 107th. Division.

Hostile Artillery. The enemy has now organised a definite S.O.S. line running approx through A.7.B., F.6., X.30., and X.29. to CREPY WOOD; and intermittently shelled portions of this line especially in the vicinity of CREPY WOOD with 4.2. and 5.9.

A large fire was started by hostile artillery in ROSIERES at 11.p.m. X.30.A.&C. and vicinity of ROSIERES received occasional bursts of 4.2. and 5.9.

Enemy Attitude. The enemy Infantry is much quieter than hitherto but appears alert.

Hostile Aerial Activity. Enemy planes were active at night dropping many bombs around HARBONNIERES and rear areas. At 7.p.m. one of our balloons was brought down in flames.

Miscellaneous. A hostile battery was observed firing on a T.B. of 1070 from S.19.C.9.9.

R. B. Wertheim
Capt

for Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

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FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

12-8-18.

Preliminary Examination of prisoners
captured this morning.Identifications.

19. Bav. I.R. }
 21. Bav. I.R. } 5th. Bav. Div.
 52. R.I.R. - 107. Div.

Method of Capture. The prisoner of the 19th Bav. I.R. who is a Company Signaller was found in a dug out in X.24.A. but he of the 52. R.I.R. had a more adventurous tale to unfold. Apparently he and a friend were going to the front line when suddenly owing to the advances of a shell the latter became a casualty; having bound up his friend the victim to be proceeded on his way and seeing two men approached them only to be at once confronted by a bayonet. Judging by this, ^{that} his eye had been deceived not only by "The quickness of the hand but also by that of his feet" he deemed "Discretion the better of valour" and surrendered.

Order of Battle. No light was thrown on the Order of Battle according to all accounts great disorganisation is prevalent in enemy ranks.

Names. Commander 52. R.I.R. Major. STEINKOPF.
 " 19. Bav. I.R. do. MELOHIO.

Morale. All prisoners appeared to be happy at being captured and gave glowing accounts of the intensity of our artillery fire which they said had caused heavy casualties in their ranks; they expressed their delight at still being alive.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX

2

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13-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.

6.a.m. 13-8-18 to 6.a.m. 13-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

I. Infantry.

(a) Patrols. At 5.30.p.m. a party moved out to ascertain if MADAME WOOD S.13. was occupied. The enemy was found to be in occupation of the Wood and in posts on the right and left of the Wood. A T.M. with a covering party was accordingly moved down a trench and fire was brought to bear. Infantry patrols attempted to advance simultaneously on either side of the Wood. The enemy was found to be occupying the Wood in strength, and the patrols and the T.M. were withdrawn to our consolidated lines. Another patrol at the same time was sniped at from Hill 90.(X.18.A. 0.3.) and from MADAME WOOD. After examining trench spurs in vicinity of X.17. and 18. patrol withdrew having discovered no other signs of the enemy.

At 2.a.m. a patrol at X.17.D.8.4. was bombed by an enemy patrol. A bomb fight with indiscernible results ensued. Trench from X.17.D.4.6. to X.18.C.0.6. was entered but no enemy was encountered. Other information gained is summarized under heading "Enemy Defences."

(b) M.G.s. Were mainly occupied with E.A.

(c) T.M.s. Except for a few rounds on MADAME WOOD T.M.s were inactive.

2. Artillery. Field Guns were not so active, but heavy artillery was much more active than hitherto. Particular attention was paid to MADAME WOOD (S.13.) - STARRY WOOD (S.8 A.&B.) - LIHOU FM. and WOOD (S.20.). All active and promising targets were engaged.

3. Aircraft. Exceptionally active by day and night. During the night a fire was observed near CHAULMS apparently caused by our air bombing.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

I. Enemy Activity.

(a) Infantry. Enemy Infantry showed no enterprise during the period except for the one patrol which engaged our patrol at 2.a.m. at X.17.D.8.4. Otherwise he appeared to be very nervous and showed no hesitation in engaging movement by M.G. and rifle fire. An exceptional number of flares were used during the night. Attempts to bomb our posts on the extreme right were repulsed.

B. Artillery. Was active. X.23.A.2.C. - X.22.A.&C. - X.29.A. - X.27.B. - LIHOU - GREPEY WOOD - AUGER WOOD - X.30. - S.25. - F.5. and F.6. F.5. and 6 received particular attention throughout the night. In addition heavy shelling was brought to bear on Cross Roads X.28.B. 15.70. - road X.29.B.6.2. to corner of road X.29.B.99.20. chiefly with 7.7.cms, 15 cm. 21 cm. H.E. and gas. Between 3.a.m. and 4.a.m. the rate of fire quickened, and had the appearance of a counter-preparation shoot.

The 15.cm. fire seemed to come from direction of ABLAINCOURT (S.18.D. and S.24.B.) while the 77 cm shooting seemed to come from STARRY WOOD (S.8.B.) - VERMANDOVILLERS. HERLEVILLE area and TRIANGULAR WOOD.

c. Infantry Arms. Machine guns were very active during the day. T.M.s did not fire during the day, but during the night a few rounds were fired on positions of the front line of the Left Brigade. Snipers were active.

d. Aircraft. Very active, E.A. apparently seizing every opportunity when our planes were inactive to cross our lines.

At 8.p.m. one plane nationality unknown crashed at about X.8.Central. During the night from 10.p.m. to midnight bombing planes were very active.

2. Enemy Defences. The enemy appears to have a strong post in MADAME WOOD with posts on either flank of the Wood. He also occupies trench and road E of the Wood running N. and S through S.13.B.&D. and S.19.B. Other posts were located S.20.A.15.55. - S.20.A.6.4. M.Guns. A.2.D.8.1. - A.8.B.85.95. - A.8.C.7.8. Sniper. S.13.D.7.5.
3. Movement. At 8.30.a.m. 3 parties of about 30 men each in fighting order, entered MADAME WOOD coming from the direction of STARRY WOOD. Considerable movement was observed in S.14.A.&B. S.21.D., S.27.B. throughout the day. At 5.30.p.m. horse drawn G.S. Wagons moved along road through S.28.B. to S.22.C. and then in N.E. direction to S.23.Central. Wagons seemed to be laden with wooden boxes. At 4.p.m. two horsemen entered BLOCKHOUSE COPSE. (S.21.A.) Much movement was observed along the VERMANDOVILLERS ABLAINCOURT road during the afternoon.
4. Identifications. Sniper killed in vicinity of our post at A.2.E.3.1. belonged to 96th.I.R. 38th Divn. Later, Wounded prisoner taken this morning (13th inst) is reported to belong to 81st.I.R. 21st.Div. Prisoner has since died.

NOTES. The enemy has been forced to fight a kind of delaying action or to put up an offensive defence as illustrated by his recent counter-attacks. Instead of putting his reserve regiments such as the 21st. Sav.I.R. into the line and thus stiffening the defence of the rapidly weakening line, he elected to use this regiment for counter attack purposes against certain sensitive points, such as CREPEY WOOD. The possession of this locality would undoubtedly prevent any advance N of the railway. Under cover of these counter attacks he was undoubtedly preparing a defensive line in rear. The evidence of patrols and ground observers would seem to place this line of defence from N to S as running in front of SAURIN ALLEY (S.7.B.&D.) - S.13.A. - MADAME WOOD to SATRAPE ALLEY trench at S.20.A.15.50. - LIHU Farm. From LIHU FM South to the A. Squares no touch has been gained with the enemy infantry. S.E. of LIHONS the enemy line seems to run quite close to our front posts. There are signs that the enemy has dug during the last 2 or 3 days a trench system in this locality. The above locations are merely approximate and will necessarily remain so until aerial photographs are available.

Yesterday the 96th.I.R. was identified. Thus two regiments of the 38th Divn have been identified in line. It is probable that the remaining regiment the 95th is in reserve. If the enemy is of the opinion that our advance has ceased it is more than probable that this regiment will remain in reserve and will not be used for counter attack.

The identification secured this morning though not yet completely confirmed is yet not unexpected. The 21st Div has been in reserve in the CAMBRAI area.

Identification of the one regiment, the 81st I.R. has been secured. Whether the remaining regiments, the 80th Fusilier and the 87th I Regiments will come into line, or remain as Divisional Reserve, or be used for counter attack, it is impossible to say. Further prisoners and identifications may throw more light on this point.

Branghins Capt
 for
 Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

14-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4.

6.a.m. 13-8-18. to 6.a.m. 14-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.I. Infantry.

a. Patrols. At S.19.B.6.6. signs of the trench having been occupied by the enemy within the last 24 hours were observed. Lieut. BINNS and 3 other ranks of the right Brigade at 3.p.m. moved to the road running diagonally through S.20.B. An enemy listening post was driven in and the occupants of an enemy post were aroused. The post, whose strength is estimated at 40 rifles, opened up a heavy fire with the result that Lieut. BINNS was killed. The remainder of the patrol bombed the post inflicting 8 casualties and then withdrew. A fighting patrol of 1 Officer and 15 other ranks was immediately organised and moved to within bombing range of the enemy post and more casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The patrol was again forced to withdraw owing to the cross fire of Machine Guns.

Enemy posts at S.20.A.7.3. and S.19.D.6.5. were also bombed and casualties inflicted on the enemy. Patrols operating from the right Battalion at 5.p.m. under Lieut. BAIRD came across a party of 20 of the enemy who were enjoying a quiet chat outside a dugout. One of them was shot by the patrol and bombs were thrown at the remainder. Heavy M.G. fire again forced the patrol to withdraw. Other information is summarised under "Enemy Defences".

b. Infantry Arms. Owing to the scarcity of targets activity was limited. Practice against low flying E.A. was indulged in by Lewis and Vickers Gunners.

2. Artillery. Intermittent harassing fire was carried out by Brigades, special attention being paid to enemy roads, tracks and approaches to CHAULNES. Bursts of fire were put down at intervals on to roads in S.21.A., S.21.Cont. and S.22.C.&D., MADAME COPSE, and other reported centres of enemy activity.

Excellent observed shoots were carried out by the 2nd.F.A. Brigade on Machine Guns and Snipers in the vicinity of MADAME WOOD and occupied trenches in S.20.Mentral and S.14.A.

3. Aircraft. At 4.30.p.m. as a result of a combat, one of our planes was driven down in flames opposite the right Division. Later, another of our planes was forced to land in the same locality.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.I. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Remains very alert, but seems quieter than usual. A decrease in the use of unaimed rifle and M.G. fire was noticeable. At night enemy was heard working opposite the right Brigade, apparently wiring. Opposite the left repeated calls for artillery support were made.

b. Infantry Arms. M.Guns were much quieter than usual especially during the night. At one period for over an hour opposite the right Brigade there was an absence of M.G. fire which is unusual. Trench Mortars showed increased activity on the front lines of both Brigades.

c. Artillery. Displayed increased activity. Squares.F.5., F.6., X.29., X.30., S.26., X.16., X.22., X.23., were treated to harassing fire. X.16. - X.17.C.&D. - X.22.B. - X.23. and 24. - CREPEY WOOD - Cross roads in X.13.D. were subjected to short shell storms at intervals.

Road from VAUVILLERS to HARBONNIERES was subject to searching fire from a H.V. Gun. Railway Siding in X.13.A.&B. received attention from 15 and 21 cm guns and hows. AUGER WOOD also received considerable attention. A certain amount of gas was placed on our extreme left.

2. Enemy Defences. Posts. Enemy is holding trench from S.13.C. 35.50. to S.13.A.20.55. Fresh earth observed by patrol at S.13.C. 1.9. Trench from S.26.D.8.8. to S.26.D.95.05. appears to be occupied. Enemy post at S.20.B.3.3. is very strongly held. Posts at S.20.A.7.3. - S.19.B.6.5. MADAME WOOD strongly defended. M.Guns. S.20.C.9.9. - MADAME WOOD - Evidence points to the fact that the enemy brings forward M.Guns at night and withdraws them at dawn. T.Ms. A L.T.M. was observed firing from approx. S.27.A. 70.75. Work. What seemed to be sounds of wiring heard opposite right Brigade. A great amount of trench work is in course of construction in S.21. and S.27.

3. Movement. Much movement observed in S.21. and S.27. A group of huts in S.27. is the scene of much activity and apparently contains valuable material which the enemy has been working hard to remove. The fully laden limbers reported in yesterdays summary as moving 1. and E. through S.27. and S.28. were apparently being used for the transportation of this material. Much traffic was observed along road from S.28.B.2.8. to VERMANDOUILLE. Individual movement was observed in vicinity of trenches in S.3.D.

4. Identifications.
 (a) 5rd.Bn. 7th.Bav. I.R. 5th. Bav. Div.
 (wounded soldier who had been lying helpless for 2 days)
 taken East of LIHONS.
 (b) 81st.Prussian I.R. - 21st.Div. - wounded prisoner (since died)
 taken East of LIHONS.
 5. Material. 1 L.M.G. found by right Brigade S. of CAIN COPSE.

NOTES.

(1) The peculiar behaviour of enemy M.Guns opposite the right Brigade and the sounds of talking and movement in F.9. during the night suggests either a local relief in this locality or attempts at reorganisation.

(2) The identification of the 81st.I.R. 21st.Division E of LIHONS is confirmed.

(3) A superficial study of the enemy artillery fire suggests the following conclusions:-

(1) More guns have been brought into line during the past 24 hours.

(2) The enemy artillery does not know the exact location of our front line.

(3) Owing to the loss of observation most of the shooting is necessarily blind and inaccurate.

(4) The enemy is apprehensive as to our intentions (This is supported by his aerial activity)

(4) Further reports of ground observers and patrols confirm (and a study of aerial photos) the enemy line of resistance as tentatively defined in yesterdays summary viz:-
 SAURIEN ALLEY (S.7.B.2.D.) to MADAME WOOD to SATRAPE ALLEY (S.13.D.) - trench running S.E. at S.20.A.15.50. - then across to LIHU FM (S.20.B.) From LIHU FM to CAIN COPSE (S.26.D.) no touch with the enemy has been gained, but it is very probable that the enemy mans the trench S.20.B. 6.1. - S.20.D.4.5. - S.26.B.7.3. - to S.26.D.8.8.
 From S.26.D.8.8. the line seems to run S. along the trench to S.26.D. 95.05. It has not yet been possible to definitely locate the enemy further to the South, though there is no doubt that he occupies trenches recently dug in A.3.A. and A.2.D.
 Along the line as defined above the enemy may be expected to offer resistance.

(5) Attention is drawn to the Annex to this Summary containing a translation of a German document captured by the 3rd.A.I.Brigrado. The document is an interrogation of several of our men captured a few days before the recent attack. This document shows among other things -

(1) the importance of keeping projected operations as secret as possible. (2) The amount of information probably unwittingly given away by the privates who were captured. (3) The pathetic attitude adopted by the

(5)

Sergeant to be the only safe one.

It is suggested that the contents of this translation be communicated to all ranks.

W. J. Campbell
Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

ARMY SUMMARY.

Situation August 12th & Night 12/13th Inst.

North of the SOMME, the remaining hostile positions between ETINHEM and ERAY fell into our hands. The enemy delivered no counter-attacks in this part of the front. Elements of the 54th Res. Div. are still in the line, other hostile formations being the 245th and 26th Res. Divs. Of these two Divisions however, only 1 Regt in each has been identified by prisoners hence it is not possible to estimate their fighting value with any degree of accuracy.

Between the SOMME and the AMIENS - ST QUENTIN road, HERICOURT, CATEAUX Wood and ST. GERMAIN Wood, as well as the Village of PROYANT, were captured by the Australians, together with over 300 prisoners. The units identified consisted of elements of the 15th, 107th and 108th Divisions.

In the LIHONS area it was thought that a possible concentration of hostile troops was taking place yesterday afternoon. A special low flying recon. plane proved this to be incorrect, but reported that the hostile trenches were strongly manned by men who appeared to be wearing dark blue uniform. These troops are very probably a JAEGER formation (dark green) and corroborate the statements of prisoners captured yesterday, that Jaegers have arrived on the battle field. It is not at present certain whether this indicates the arrival of the Alpine Corps or whether a dismounted Cavalry Bde., to which a Battalion of Jaegers has been attached, is in the line. From information received it appears that the latter is more probable. From the fact that Regts. of the same Division have been identified some distance apart, it is apparent that the enemy are still very disorganised. A new division was identified yesterday near FOQUESSCOURT. The enemy are now in greater strength between this village and ROYE than in other parts of the front. It is anticipated that a fresh Division will be identified today astride the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN Road.

PRISONERS. The number of prisoners who passed through Cages and C.C.S. since the 8th inst., now amounts to 20,585 of whom 507 are officers.

Prince RUPPRECHT has now at his disposal 10 fresh divisions, while the Crown Prince has 9 fit to fight.

In addition there are 4 fresh divisions in rest in the Southern Group of Armies.

Lieut. BILIK, the German Airman who is reported to have brought down 21 of our planes and who is believed to belong to the 1st Pursuit Squadron (RICHTOFFENS), was forced to land in our lines on the 10th.

EFFECT OF OUR LOW FLYING PLANES. Prisoners are unanimous in their statements concerning the great moral effect and material loss caused by our low flying planes. On several occasions roads were completely blocked by direct hits on transport, and serious casualties were inflicted. Losses were frequently inflicted on parties of the enemy by machine gun fire.

GERMAN LOSSES. An aviator prisoner states that it is a matter of common knowledge that the German air losses are very much higher than the figures officially published. The prisoner knows of a definite instance when the publication of losses was suppressed; this was on or about the 6th August, when five enemy two seaters were crashed by us on the German side of the lines on the MERVILLE front, the crews of three being killed, and of the other two badly wounded.

In the Army Aviation Commanders orders of the 9th August, in which a weeks casualties were published, no reference was made to these machines.

GENERAL. One small counter-attack was made yesterday near FOUQUESCOURT. It was repulsed. No fresh divisions have been identified since yesterday morning. The Germans appear to be strongest in the FOUQUESCOURT - ROYE area. There are no signs, however of any intended counter-attack.

The enemy appear now to be weak astride the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN road, and it is anticipated that a fresh division will shortly be identified in this area.

Train and road movements yesterday afternoon and early this morning show there are no signs of the arrival of fresh division.

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FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

14-8-18.

Interpretation of captured document in W.24. Sheet 62.D.

Examination of 1 Sgt and 5 privates of "A" Company 51st Battalion, 15th Aust. Inf. Bde. 4th Aust. Division, taken prisoners at 4.a.m. in HOURS.

War Organisation.15th Bde.12th Bde.4th Bde.

49th. Bn.

45th. Bn.

13th. Bn.

50th. Bn.

46th. Bn.

14th. Bn.

51st. Bn.

48th. Bn.

15th. Bn.

16th. Bn.

Attached to formation 4th Aust. Pioneer Battalion; other attached details unknown. The breaking up of the 4th Battalion of the 13th, and 12th Brigades took place 2 months ago. The 4th Bde. has 4 Battalions. The 4th M.G. Coy. are absorbed in the 4th M.G. Bn. Commanders. 4th Australian Division - Major-General. McLAGHLAN.
13th Aust. Brigade. - Brig-General. GLASGOW.
4th Aust. Brigade. - Brig-General. BRAND.
51st. Battalion. - Lieut-Col. CRISTY.

Employment. The Brigade has been in this Sector since 31st. July 1918. as also has the 51st Battalion.

Relief. They relieved the French - possibly the 332nd Inf. Regt.

Flanks. One of the prisoners had heard that French troops are on each flank, the other prisoners could not say.

Other troops. On the night they came into the line, 31/7/18, one prisoner saw a detachment of Americans about 500 strong, one to two kilometres west of HOURS, marching towards the front. Whether they went in and where is unknown. Another prisoner heard that an American M.G. Coy. was in support or Reserve to the 13th. Inf. Bde.

Class. Average men up to 30 years, only a small percentage between 30 and 40 years.

Losses. Numbers could not be given by prisoners but they were light. The prisoner knew nothing of the casualties in the attack.

Depot. The last big draft (140) men came to the Battalion at the end of April; latterly only a few returned sick.

Weapons. Leo-Enfield rifle; three platoons have two Lewis guns and the fourth platoon on the other hand one Lewis gun.

Gas Protection. Not much could be gleaned.

Rations. Very good and sufficient.

Position. The forward trenches are in good condition; no dugouts are in them only shelters. Wire defences are very weak. About the reserve and support trenches, mortar and machine gun positions, they could say nothing as up till now they have been only in the forward line. There are endless defences in the rear well wired.

Route to front. AMIENS - ROYE Road.

Attack Intentions. Were denied. Neither attack practised nor preparations are in progress.

History. The Battalion was relieving about 17th, June in the SAILLY Sector by the 12th. Brigade and came back near DAOURS for about 8 days, there they did light work. From June 26th to August 6th. they were in the HAMEL Sector in Support and in Reserve. After the attack on HAMEL they were sent forward for some days to bury the dead and do salvage work. From here the 2nd. Battalion of the Brigade went to RIVERY near AMIENS and the 1st. Battalion of the Brigade to GLISY where the Brigade remained until July 31st.

Method of Capture. After a short German artillery preparation they were attacked in rear by German Infantry resistance appeared useless so they surrendered to superior numbers.

Disposition in Sector. The prisoners' platoon No. 2 lay on both sides of the AMIENS - ROYE Road, North from there lay a third platoon and further north "C" Company of their Battalion. On the South they were connected with the 1st. Platoon. "B" and "D" Companies were in Support and Reserve. The 50th. Battalion was Brigade Reserve.

Headquarters, Brigade Staff. Position unknown.

Strength. 4 Platoons of 26 to 28 men per company - 110 men 4 Officers. 4th. Platoon consists of Specialists, Signallers, clerks, runners, officers' servants - ration strength of this unknown.

Personal. Prisoners are young men 21 - 31 years of age. They give one a good soldierly impression although their military knowledge is limited. The Sgt. who was the only one who has served a long unbroken period with the troops refused to make any military statement and could not be shaken in his resolve by any means employed. The remainder were, some a short while with the Battalion, others on account of wounds, a long time in hospital and convalescent. Whether their statements are pretence or truth there is no means of proving, all were reticent and only after a lot of talking to did their tongues become loose.

General Feeling. Confident - they speak a great deal of the American assistance.

The number sick with Gripes is small - no reports could be got from them about lights, air service, meteorological service, very lights, dirigible balloons, captive balloons, firing butt for Lewis gun, long range shooting, spanning of artillery to mechanical limbers, bombing of back areas, and defence against Yellow Cross Gas.

(sgd) SCHACHT.

Lieut. & Liaison Officer.
Imperial Headquarters.
5-8-18.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

15-8-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.5.

6.a.m. 14-8-18. to 6.a.m. 15-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.1. Infantry.

a. Patrols. Squares X.17.D. X.18.C. and X.24.A. were searched but no signs of the enemy were observed. Patrols report the enemy to be abnormally quiet.

b. Infantry Arms. Vickers guns engaged targets in MADAME WOOD. POLYGON WOOD. AMBERG COPSE. MIEG WOOD; Lewis Guns took advantage of all moving targets presented to them. Stokes Mortars silenced a M.G. at A.9.A.0.0. during the night. Enemy movement also was engaged by Stokes. Right Battalion Snipers claim one hit near enemy post at A.2.B.9.2. Rifle Grenadiers of the right Brigade did some firing.

2. Artillery. Very little firing was done by our field Batteries during the period. Special attention was paid to the thorough searching and sweeping of enemy activity in MADAME WOOD during the evening and early morning. At 12.15.p.m. 102nd How. Battery carried out a shoot on E.W. position located at S.27.A.7.7. The Mortar has since remained silent.

At 2.30.p.m. H.A. shelled SOYECOURT - ABLAINCOURT. Roads where much traffic was reported and also CHAULNES were shelled during the period. At 3.30.a.m. in answer to an increase of enemy fire, our batteries increased fire. The enemys fire seemed immediately to decrease.

3. Aircraft. Our aircraft displayed much activity and enemys front and rear areas were constantly patrolled throughout the period. Our fighting squadrons had many encounters with enemy formations during the period. At 8.p.m. as a result of a combat over POLYGON WOOD one of our CAMEL machines was forced to land in A.3.A.0.0. The machine made a safe landing and the pilot is probably a prisoner. At about the same hour one of our DE HAVILLAND machines crashed in S.19. One of our R.E.8 machines was also forced to land and caught fire in the vicinity of VAUVILLERS.

All our planes were heavily engaged by A.A. and M.G. fire upon approaching enemy territory.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Is not aggressive, but remains on the alert and is obviously in a very nervous state of tension.

b. Machine Guns. Were quiet during the day. At night the right flank of the left Brigade was enfiladed by M.Guns shooting wildly. It is noteworthy that no M.Gs fired from MADAME WOOD during the night.

c. Trench Mortars, were inactive. M.W. at S.27.A.7.7. was silenced by our Artillery.

d. We gave Enemy Snipers no opportunities for practice.

e. Artillery. An increase in the volume of hostile fire is noticeable. Targets at Squares selected for harassing or destructive fire were ; - CREPEY WOOD - AUGER WOOD - X.30.A. - S.25.B. - X.27.B. - LIHONS - X.9. - X.10. - X.29.A.2.B. - X.15.D. - X.16. 17. 22. 23. 24. Most of this fire seemed to come from sound bearings of 58 - 60° and 66 - 68° from X.23.0.4.6.

In addition to these harassing and destructive shoots the enemy indulged in what appeared to be practice barrages. These fell about every two hours, fire lasting from 2 to 10 minutes.

Areas so treated were CREPEY WOOD and rear, LIHONS and rear and all other possible areas of troop concentration.

FRAMERVILLE and back areas were treated to fire by a H.V. gun and 15 and 21 cm guns. CREPEY WOOD - X.17. - S.30.A. received a considerable concentration of gas shells, 7.7. cm. 10.cm. 15.cm. and 21 cms. H.E. and shrapnel being mixed with the gas in the proportion of about 3 H.E. and Shrapnel to 1 gas shell.

Location of Guns. 15 cm gun located at approx S.15.A.7.0. Successful engaged by C.Bs.

f. Aircraft. Hostile planes showed a marked increase in activity throughout the day and night. Whenever possible our planes and formations were engaged by enemy formations and reconnaissance patrols were carried out at regular intervals during the day. From 8 to 7 p.m. a flight of 10 FOKKER Biplanes flew S. along our lines and accounted for two of our scouting machines. Bombing Squadrons were also active during the night. All hostile machines were engaged by our M.G. fire.

Balloons were observed on the following grid bearings during the day from F.6.C.3.2. - 850, 65 $\frac{1}{2}$ 0, 1420, 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ 0, 1190, 990.

2. Enemy Defences. Posts. Trenches at A.9.C.2.9. are occupied. Whilst our patrols were operating no flares were fired from trench running E. of MADAME WOOD, which was reported occupied in our last Summary. M.Guns. A.9.A.0.0. - X.8.C.9.4. - S.13.D.5.2. approx.

3. Movement. Individual movement seen from HART COPSE to trenches in S.27.B. along road near the Three Apple Trees in S.22.D.1.1. - MERGURE Trench (S.14.A.) along road S.8.C. disappearing in vicinity of trench at S.8.C.2.2. - S.8. and 9. - VENUS trench (S.14.A.) - trenches A.9.C.2.9. Between 1.30. to 2 p.m. there was

considerable traffic of motor vehicles backwards and forward on road between SOYECOURT and ABALINCOURT in S.4. and 5.

Several single vehicles in addition were noticed on this road during the afternoon. A train was observed at 2 a.m. in vicinity of CHAULNES.

4. Miscellaneous. Red Cross Flag seen flying from building in S.9. on Western side of VERMANDOVILLERS.

NOTES. (1) The absence of Infantry activity in MADAME WOOD, which before hand showed considerable liveliness, is noteworthy and needs investigation. It is possible that our incessant harassing of this locality has forced the enemy to withdraw from the position.

(2) The increase in enemy heavy artillery fire and in gas shelling is noteworthy.

Langh's Capl
for Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

ARMY SUMMARY.

Situation August 13th and Night 13/14th Instant.

Beyond a small attack carried out by the enemy with about 200 men, in the FOUQUESCOURT area yesterday morning, no hostile infantry action has been reported.

N. of the SOMME, from identifications obtained, it appears that hostile units are very disorganised, as battalions belonging to the 233rd 54th Res., 108th, 27th, 43rd Res., and 26th Res. Divisions were identified by prisoners and documents between MORLANCOURT and BRAY yesterday morning. A company of the 17th Pioneer Bn. (43rd Res. Div.) was also identified by prisoners. They had been sent forward to reinforce the line W. of BRAY.

From an air reconnaissance last night, it appears that a considerable number of moving lights were seen on the roads in the MONTAUBAN, GUILLIMONT and COMBLES area, possibly denoting the arrival of a fresh division, though no movement was seen yesterday pointing to this possibility.

South of the SOMME, between the river and the main AMIENS - ST. QUENTIN road, the same disorganization of units exists, prisoners belonging to the 13th, 108th and 26th Divisions being captured.

(3)

It was anticipated that a fresh division would arrive in this area yesterday, but there is nothing to show that this supposition is correct. In the LIHONS area, elements of the 21st Division were identified. This division was formerly in the line south of the AVRE, and had only been recently relieved prior to the 8th Aug. Its fighting value should not be great, and it will probably not have been brought up to strength.

No change in the order of battle is reported between CHAULNES and ROYE. The enemy appear to have strengthened their artillery in this sector, and the shooting has improved in quality.

BOMBING RAIDS.

By Day. 20 112-lb and 8 25-lb bombs were dropped on PERONNE Station. Two direct hits were observed on sidings. In addition, 46 25-lb bombs were dropped on dumps at CHAULNES; bursts were seen on the dump, and 3 direct hits were observed on Rolling Stock on Sidings.

By Night. 3 112-lb bombs and 353 25-lb bombs were dropped on various targets including ST. CHRIST and FALVY bridges and roads. A direct hit on a train at TINCOURT was claimed, and also two fires caused. The areas MONTAUBAN, MARTINPUICH and COMBLES and DOMPIERRE and HERBECOURT showed a large number of lights. These could not be seen by subsequent machines, after the areas had been bombed.

21st.Div. 81st.I.R. N. LIHONS. Aug. 13th. Man Killed.

This division was relieved in the CASTEL Sector on the 26th July by the 14th.Bav.Div. After resting in the ROSIERES - CHAULNES area till the 3rd August, it moved off to CAMBRAI. It is now probably in close support, ready to send a regiment to reinforce the front where needed.

EFFECT OF OUR LOW FLYING MACHINES. A British prisoner of War, who escaped during the last few days from PERONNE, stated that he saw on the 8th inst, a large amount of transport and stores of different regiments retiring through PERONNE. They were attacked by one of our low flying machines, which caused a very great deal of confusion and a considerable number of casualties.

ENEMYS INTENTIONS PREVIOUS TO THE ALLIED ATTACK ON THE SOMME.

A captured secret document of the 26th.Inf.Bde. 13th. Div., dated 8-7-18, states that preparations for attacks were being made along nearly the whole of the Western Front at that date, and that the brigade had been ordered to make preparations for a limited attack in the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Sector, to be ready within two weeks. The necessity for secrecy and the concealment of all work which could be seen from the air is emphasized.

GENERAL. Hostile units are much disorganised between DERNANCOURT and the main AMIENS - ALBERT Road. It is considered that this front must very shortly be reinforced by fresh troops. Between CHAULNES and ROYE, artillery activity has increased, and the strength of the enemy appears greater here than on other parts of the front.

No hostile counter-attacks have been delivered during the last 24 hours, and no signs of preparations for counter-attacks have been seen.

Aust.Corps.Summary. Since the beginning of operations on August 8th, 168 Officers 7,773 O.R. unwounded, and 27 Officers, 783 O.R. wounded, have been captured by this Corps, making a grand total of 195 Officers, 8,556 O.Rs.

P.T.O.

TRANSLATION.ORDER OF THE DAY.TO FRENCH ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

Four years of efforts with our faithful Allies; four years of hardships stoically endured, begin to bear their fruits.

Smashed in his fifth attempt of 1918, the invader retires. His fighting strength decreases, his spirit wavers, whilst by your sides your American brothers, just landed, make the disconcerted enemy feel the power of their blows.

Always at the vanguard of the Allies, you have prepared tomorrow's triumphs.

I said to you yesterday;

Obstinancy, patience; the comrades arrive ---

I say to you today;

Tenacity, audacity, and you will force victory.

Soldiers of France, I salute your colours, endowed with a new glory.

(signed) Potain.
G.H.Q. 8/8/1918.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Translation of a Document captured by us 23-6-18.

107th. Inf. Div.

Secret - Urgent.

Div. H.Q.

21-8-18.

10.a.m.

DIVISIONAL ORDER.

1. All work in the forward lines is to be cut down as far as possible. Only necessary work to be done. As far as labour is available, this should be employed in the improvement and building of the Main Line of Resistance, especially of Strong Points and M. Gun nests therein, to give our Infantry in case of an overwhelming attack a place of resistance, as referred to in our order I.A. 2072. O.P. of 14th inst. Every man must know that the Main Line of resistance is the line where the decisive battle must take place. This position will be held not only by the outpost troops which withdraw to this line, but also by the counter-attack, support and reserve troops, however far behind they may be.

The M.G. zone of fire must also cover the Valley North of HERLEVILLE so that an attack up this Valley can be dealt with. Parts of the M.G. Coy of the 2nd. Bn. 122nd Fus. Regt. (243rd Divn) can be used for this purpose.

The Pioneer M.G. Coy remain in Divisional Reserve. Their position N.W. - W. and S.W. of FOUCAUCOURT will be prepared by the 213th. Inf. Bde. Also to the South the Tank Gun arc of fire is to be so placed that any enemy attacks over HERLEVILLE can be thrown back.

2. The 2nd. Bn. 122nd. Fus. Regt. will remain as at present, i.e., in reserve to the Divisional front. The 2nd. Bn of the 81st. Regt. (21st. Div) remains the main counter-attack Bn near FAY (see Para 3 below). The 213th. Inf. Bde has to keep in touch with the 2 abovenamed regiments. They will only come into action under orders of the Division. The Battalions in reserve to man the defence lines of the 21st. Div. Battle Zone (on the right) are near CAPPY and DOLPIERRE.
3. The 213th. Inf. Bde and D.A. will keep themselves acquainted with the situation of the 2nd. Battle Zone, with the object of garrisoning this zone. In case of a mass attack the 213th. Bde will take up the defence of this line with their remaining reserves (3 Nucleus Battalions), and the artillery will man the artillery positions with their reserves (? Nucleus) troops which will be for the present under the orders of the 243rd Div. for tactical purposes, will on the night 21/22nd be reinforced in the Divisional Sector by the 2nd. Bn. 81st. Regt.
4. We must still be prepared for a surprise attack by the enemy. Fog preparations are to be carried out carefully, even if it necessitates the weakening of fighting infantry units.

(sgd) HAVENSTEIN.

N.B.

213th. Inf. Bde is the Inf. Bde of the 107th Division. The rest of the Div is made up of Arty and Div units. Regiments of the 213th. Inf. Bde. are 227th. R.I.R. - 232nd. R.I.R. - 52nd. R.I.R. The 122nd. Fus. Regt. belongs to the 247th. Bde of the 243rd. Divn.

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DIVISIONAL ORDER.
107th. Division.

25-8-18.

21-8-18.

" We have passed through a period of heavy fighting. The British have tried to follow up their successes of the 8th inst by pushing their best Divisions forward. Nevertheless his "attacking-lust" has been broken by the Battle scarred troops of our 2nd. Army. All arms have vied with one another in their heroic effort. Our line remains intact and our will is unshaken not to yield to the enemy another foot of ground. I therefore offer my warmest thanks to all troops concerned and I am sure the 2nd Army will again shatter all enemy attacks if called upon to do so.

However it must again be pointed out to the Army that the enemy must not be permitted to take us by surprise. This can only be prevented by keen observation of the enemys movements, of his artillery and transport, and by the activity of numerous patrols."

MARWITZ. "

EXTRACTS.

Captured Documents of the 213th. Inf. Bde. 21-8-18.

Protective Patrols must in foggy weather, be pushed far out to locate enemys advanced positions and immediately recognise movements of attack.

Such Patrols should be fitted with Telephones so that they can communicate immediately to front line and Tank Guns any suspicious enemy movements.

To prevent mistakes such patrols will be issued with white bands.

Army Order No. 19.

19-8-18.

(a) A Tank Commander taken prisoner by a neighbouring Army states -

" That M.Gs are the Tanks worst enemies. Especially in the enemys last attack M.G. fire had been the cause of making a number of Tanks turn back. Even though ordinary M. Gun bullets does not penetrate the Armour plating, The crew suffers great inconvenience, as the impact of Bullets on the plates causes flame points to appear on the inside. The great effect of M.G. fire even without Special Ammn, and at short range is again pointed out to the infantry.

In these latest attacks French tactics were to send a few Tanks in advance and follow up with a stronger wave of Tanks shortly afterwards.

This points to the necessity of the Tank defences being always kept in readiness for the stronger second wave, after the 1st weaker one has been repulsed.

* * *

The 21st. Division meanwhile had 3 regiments in the line, of which 1 Bn was in line, one Bn in support, and ~~one in reserve~~, except in the case of the 81st. I.R. These 2 reserve Bns were about CAPPY and DOMPIERRE. During the morning of the attack we captured several prisoners of the line and support Bns of the 3 regiments. When the attack paused, the two reserve Bns reinforced the other Bns and dug in on the slopes of HILL 90. Many prisoners of these reserve Bns of the two regiments were captured by the 3rd Bde in their subsequent advance. So that we have engaged and defeated on the front of these two German Divisions, all Battalions of each Division (except the 2nd. Bn. 81st. Regt which presumably is still manning the 2nd. Main Line of the 107th Div.) In addition we have engaged the 122nd Fus. Regt of the 243rd. Divn. and other miscellaneous details.

Langhorne Capt
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

APPENDIX

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5.a.m. 25-8-18. to 6.a.m. 24-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

At 4.45.a.m. supported by Artillery and Tanks our Infantry advanced the line according to plan and decisively defeated the enemy.

Phase I. The objective line ran roughly from S. to N. along the old French defences in R.36. - R.50. - R.24. - R.17. to CHUIGNOLLES inclusive to jumping off line and was to be gained by 2 Brigades by a set-piece attack. Forming up by infantry and Tanks was completed without incident in good time.

The artillery barrage opened well and the infantry were immediately able to advance under its protection along the whole front of attack. The enemy retaliated almost immediately with a light scattered barrage, which proved no hindrance to our advance. The enemy occupying the outpost lines offered very little resistance and the advance suffered no check until the line of woods R.35. - R.29. - R.23. - R.16. R.10. was reached. These woods were found to be defended strongly by Machine guns. By this time Tanks had become engaged and with their valuable co-operation the resistance was very soon broken down. Machine Guns in ST. DENIS WOODS. (R.35.) - the small wood R.29. Central - the Southern portion of ST MARTIN WOODS (R.29.A.) - CHUIGNOLLES WOOD (R.10.B.). the "pot holes" lining the cliff on the E. side of the Valley in R.17. were manned and put up a strong resistance, machine guns sweeping the ROBERT WOOD re-entrant. Many of these guns were inaccessible to Tanks and were finally put out of action by Infantry. By about 6.5.a.m. the right Brigade was approximately on its objective. The position of the extreme right Battalion in relation to the Division on the right remained obscure but was finally cleared up without trouble.

Snipers and M.Guns held out in HIRLEVILLE WOOD R.29.D. but these were successfully mopped up later on.

In the meantime the left Brigade was steadily dealing with the opposition offered by the enemy and by about 6.30.a.m. was on the objective line except on the right where they were held up in R.17. This was rectified by our troops moving down the ROBERT WOOD Gully, and breaking down the enemy resistance. They then gained their objective.

Phase 2. Consisted of exploitation by the left Brigade without artillery support. Patrols were pushed out and wherever possible the line was advanced until finally it ran at about 9.30.a.m. as follows from N. to S. LUC WOOD. (R.3.) - LONG WOOD (R.4.) - CHUIGNOLLES WOOD. (R.10.B.) inclusive - Surlier road R.10.C. - R.1.A. to trench R.17.F.5.9. - R.10.C.7.7. then R.13.C.7.7. - R.19.B.3.8.

Between the completion of this phase and the commencement of the third phase, the enemy opposite the left Brigade withdrew to a defensive line along the S. and S.W. lower slopes of Hill 90. L.55.D.

This line was reinforced later in the morning and the enemy was observed to be digging in and manning trenches already in existence along the rough line CHUIGNES - R.5.D.3.C. - R.5.A. - L.34.D. - FROISSY BRACON (L.34.B.)

Machine Guns and sniping fire from this line interfered to a certain extent with our consolidation. At about 11.a.m. our artillery opened heavy fire for half an hour on the above positions, after which enemy M.G. fire decreased considerably.

Phase 3.

During the morning the Reserve Brigade had assembled in the Valley in R.5.C. and D. and R.14.A. At about 10.a.m. one Battalion was moved forward and by 2.p.m. had established itself S. of and around LUC WOOD (R.3.B.) as a flank protection to the Brigade which with Tank and Artillery support, at that hour commenced its forward movement with two Battalions in the line.

The enemy made a strenuous resistance at all points. The enemy fought very well, Machine Gunners in particular using their weapons with great skill and determination. CARENNA WOOD and Sunken roads in R.5.B. were difficult to take, but were finally surrounded and mopped up. Garrisons of MARLY WOOD and the Chalk pits in R.5.A.C.2.D. also fought well, but when once these positions were taken, the enemy began to retire in disorder. Parties of our infantry followed the enemy to GAPPY Village inflicting on him heavy casualties all the way. They then withdrew to the pre-arranged line.

Result of the Operations.

(1) Line. As a result of this operation our line now runs from N. to S. approximately as follows; - L.28.D.3.5. - L.35.D.4.0. - L.33.C.8.4. - R.6.A.4.0. - R.12.A.9.8. - M.7.B.5.0. - M.13.B.5.0. - M.19.B.5.0. - R.24.C.8.0. - M.25.B.0.0. - M.25.D.0.0. - R.36.A.5.0.

(2) No of Prisoners etc.

No of Prisoners captured during the operation is as follows; -	
	Unwounded.
Left Brigade.	24
Right Brigade.	37
Reserve Brigade.	-
	51. Offs. 2.164. Other Ranks.

In addition to this number 86 other ranks were evacuated from Divisional P.O.W. Cage as being unfit to walk further. Total number of wounded prisoners evacuated through M.D.S. to date is 571 other ranks which probably includes the 86 other ranks mentioned above. A large number of the enemy were killed particularly in areas where resistance was made.

(3) Material Captured. The following is a conservative estimate; -

- One 15 inch Naval Gun (blown up by the enemy)
- 1 battery 10.cm. Howitzers.
- 18 7.7.cm. or anti-tank guns.
- T.Mortars and M.Guns not yet counted.
- One broad gauge railway engine and several trucks, Amplifier set.

(a) Infantry Arms. effectively co-operated in every phase of our attack. Vickers Guns in several instances were able to seize fleeting opportunities afforded by the enemy when retiring and inflicted heavy casualties on them. Gun teams who were well forward with the advancing infantry were able to support them on several occasions. Stokes Mortars were used with advantage particularly during the opening stages of each phase of the attack.

(b) Aircraft. Our contact and reconnaissance planes (R.E.8s) were much in evidence and except during the rather frequent intervals when scouting E.A. drove them off, were continually over our lines, calling for flares, dropping ammunition, machine gunning the enemy etc etc.

(c) Tanks. were of great assistance to our advance, especially in the opening stages of the battle. Excellent liaison between infantry and tanks was maintained throughout.

(d) Artillery. Supplied very effective barrage fire for the infantry advance and engaged subsequent enemy movement when opportunities occurred.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Infantry. During the operation, the enemy fought well and stubbornly. Machine Gunners particularly fought their guns in many places. A considerable amount of M.G. fire was directed

(b) Artillery. The reply to our attack though prompt, was not formidable. The enemy however was very quick in shortening range in accordance with our advance. Within one hour of zero he was shelling ST MARTIN WOODS and the vicinity, and within 90 minutes of zero, he was shelling the N. and S. GULLY. During the day, all ridges and woods were shelled heavily. During the night 23/24th artillery fire of light calibres showed a considerable decrease.

Enemy Defences. Complete knowledge of the enemys new dispositions and system of defence has not yet been gained.

Opposite the right Brigade the enemy seems to have established an outpost system, but the main line appears to run along the old French System M.32.A.2.0. - W. of FOUCAUCOURT - to M.26.B.7.0. then North to LAPIN WOOD. North of this point enemy dispositions remain obscure.

Identifications.

		<u>Prisoners.</u>	
		7. Offs.	243. O.Re.
80th.Fus.R.)			108.
87th.I.R.)			471.
81st.I.R.)		14.	18.
21st.M.W.Det)	21st.		56.
21st.Pnr.Bn.)	Div.	1.	8.
21st.Signal.Co)		1.	
27th.F.A.Regt)			
227th.R.I.R.)		3.	124.
232nd.R.I.R.)		26.	391.
52nd.R.I.R.)	107th.	5.	113.
213.Pionner Coy	Divn.		13.
107th.Bearer Coy			5.
107th.M.W.Coy.)		1.	24.
122.Fus.Regd.)	243rd.	2.	105.
253rd.PioneerCo.)	Divn.		15.
122nd.Signal Co.)			3.
60th.Field.Bakery.Column.			4.
107th.F.A.Regd.			8.
221st.F.A.Regd.			2.
72nd.Listening Set.			3.
41st.Wireless Detachments.)			
128th. " "			4.

NOTES.

(1) Undoubtedly the enemy was expecting our attack though the date was apparently unknown.

(a) Prisoners state our attack was expected.

(b) Number of prisoners taken and number of enemy dead is abnormally large (For instance the no of prisoners captured by the right Brigade alone is about 75% of the total number of the attackers of the right Brigade)

This suggests that the enemy had thickened his defence in preparation for our attack.

(c) No identified in close support to the 107th Division, the 243rd Division which had been previously identified N. of the SOMME and which it was presumed had been withdrawn. This suggests that the 243rd Division was intended to either relieve the 107th Division in the near future or to "stiffen" the Defence as suggested above.

(2) The extensive use of Machine Guns against Tanks which was very noticeable during the operation is apparently the result of an order which we captured to the effect that M.G. fire against Tanks is very effective and was to be employed whenever possible.

APPENDIX

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A translation of this document will appear in a future summary.

(5) An examination of the captured territory reveals some interesting facts from which conclusions can be drawn.

(a) Several of the enemy outposts are very cleverly camouflaged and do not show upon our aeroplane photographs.

(b) Practically all enemy stables had small dugouts or "graves" dug for the horse pickets, and very many huts and shelters had underground splinter proof dugouts adjacent.

This points to the efficacy of our aeroplane bombing.

(c) A great number of dead horses were found in and around the N. and S. valley where many stables were situated. This also points to the efficacy of our aeroplane bombing and artillery shooting.

(4) All identifications were normal except that of the 243rd Div. which as stated above, was presumed to have been withdrawn. All regiments of the 21st and 107th Divisions were identified. Each regiment had 1 Battalion in line, 1 in support and one in reserve. At least 2 Battalions of each regiment were engaged. The troops who manned the defences of Hill 90 during the morning 23rd inst were battalions of the 21st Divn, probably the reserve Battalions.

As a result of this operation, it can almost certainly be said that the 21st Division ceases to be a "fresh Division" and elements still in line will probably be relieved in the near future. The 107th Division also which before our attack was classed as a "tired division", will now obviously be shortly relieved.

Whether these reliefs will be carried out by the 243rd Division or other Divisions it is impossible to say.

Langhin Capt

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX

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24-8-18.

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ANNEXE TO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.1.

1

The following identifications were established by the 1st. Aust Division during the operation commencing the morning of the 23rd August 1918.

		Offs.	Captures. O. Rs.
<u>21st. Division.</u>			
80th. Fus. Regt.	1st. Battalion.	7	221.
"	2nd. " "		1.
"	3rd. " "		19.
	Signal Coy.		2.
		7	243.
87th. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.		6.
	2nd. " "		5.
	3rd. " "		97.
			108.
81st. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	6.	180.
	3rd. Battalion.	8.	281.
		14.	461.
21st. M. W. Detachment.			18.
21st. Pioneer Battalion.		1.	56.
21st. Signal Coy.		1.	
27th. F. A. Regt.			8.
		2.	82.

Total unwounded from the 21st. Division. 23. Offs. 904. O. Rs.

<u>107th. Division.</u>			
227. R. I. R.	1st. Battalion.	2.	34.
	2nd. " "		52.
	3rd. " "	1.	34.
	Signal Company.		4.
		3.	124.
232. R. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	8.	171.
	2nd. " "	8.	90.
	3rd. " "	10.	123.
Battalion & Regimental Staffs.			7.
		26.	391.
52. R. I. R.			
	1st. Battalion.	2.	54.
	2nd. " "	1.	24.
	3rd. " "	2.	35.
		5.	113.
213th. Pioneer Coy.			13.
107th. Bearer Coy.			5.
107th. H. W. Coy.		1.	24.
		1.	42.
Total unwounded for the 107th Division.		35 Offs.	670. O. Rs.

<u>243rd. Division.</u>			
122. Fus. Regt.	2nd. Battalion.	2.	105.
253. Pioneer Coy.			15.
122. Signal Coy.			6.
		2.	126.

APPENDIX 2

- 2 -

76 Prisoners of the following Various Units were also captured.

60. Field Bakery.	4.
107. Field Artillery Regt.	8.
221. Field Artillery Regt.	2.
72. Listening Set.	3.
41. & 128. Wireless Detachments.	4.

Other prisoners arrived at the Divisional Cage and were evacuated direct to the Corps Cage without being classified in detail.

Total prisoners for the Division evacuated through Divisional P.C.W. Cage.

Unwounded.
Offs. O.Rs.
61. 2.134.

Wounded.
Offs. O.Rs.
86.

Total captured by Division. -

Unwounded.

Offs. O.Rs.
61. 2.134.

Wounded passed through M.D.S.

571.
61. 2.535.

24-8-18

Short Preliminary Interrogation and conversation with prisoners, gives us the following Summarised information.

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21st Division.

General. The prisoners belonging to the 21st Division, were by far the finest men physically, and their morale was of a much higher standard, than that of the 107th Division, or 243rd Division. They all agreed that our attack was expected in the near future, but nevertheless the execution of the attack was a complete surprise.

Officers and N.C.Os individually remarked, that the rapidity and dash of our troops, astounded them and assisted materially in their defeat. When our barrage opened a special alarm was given, all were told to stand to, but they were too late and before they realized or appreciated the situation, hand to hand fighting was in progress, our troops not only attacking from the front, but from the rear and flanks. The front line troops became demoralised and the confusion soon spread to the rear; By this time Tanks were assisting in spreading havoc and were extending the demoralizing effect to the enemy support lines.

Strength. The average company fighting strength throughout the Division was about 50.

Order of Battle. From N. to S. 87.I.R. 80.Fus.Regt. 81.I.R.

Dispositions. 1 battalion in line 1 in support and 1 in rest.

Reliefs. The 21st Division had been told that they should be relieved any day but the relieving division was unknown.

107th Division.

They had been in the line for 11 weeks and had been constantly promised relief but the majority of them had never even had a glimpse of the rear areas for months. Had they not been relieved of the monotonous existence by being taken prisoners they state that serious consequences might have arisen within the Regiments of the Division.

The Battalion Commanders and the other Officers of 232.R.I.R. all state that their division was thoroughly exhausted and in spite of the fact that they were ordered to stand to throughout the night it was impossible to get men to obey the order. With the exception of one Battalion Commander, who had recently joined the battalion from a Jager Zu Fuss Regiment, prisoners were quite delighted with their new conditions.

The Battalion Commander above mentioned, was apparently disliked by his battalion, for when escorted to the Divisional Cage, he was met with subdued giggles and guffaws, from the remainder of his battalion who were at that time on parade.

Order of battle. North to South - 232.I.R. 227.R.I.R. 52.R.I.R.

Strength. The average company fighting strength throughout the division was between 25 and 30.

Relief. Relief had been expected for the last few weeks, and the result of our recent operations, would make it an immediate necessity.

243rd Division. (122. Fus.Regt.)

General. The 122.Fus.Regt. was identified in R.30. 1 Battalion of the regiment being in close reserve to the 232.R.I.R. 107.Division the two other Battalions being in rear. The men appeared to be of good fighting material but lacking the necessary moral.

Strength. The average strength of companies according to prisoners statements should be about 40 or 45.

Miscellaneous Information.

The Pioneer Company 253. had sent a party of 28 men to build dugouts for the regimental staff of the 122.Fus.Regt.

Field Bakery Column 60, is a Corps unit, and in this case is attached to the 51st.Corps. 2nd.ARMV. The personnel consists of a

6.a.m. 24-8-18. to 6.a.m. 25-8-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry.

The Right Line Battalion left Brigade improved their position during yesterday and pushed forward their posts 200 yards without opposition. A Bomb-stop was erected in trench at R.6.C.9.6. At 6.30.p.m. a party moved out from this point along trench towards enemy positions and after proceeding 200 yards, encountered the enemy drove them out of their posts. Our party then withdrew and erected a new bomb-stop 100 yards in advance of the first.

Left Line Battalion left brigade advanced their position during the night with artillery support and established a new line as follows: L.29.D.6.3. - L.29.D.6.0. to L.35.B.6.6. - thence in front of Square Wood to L.35.B.8.0. - L.35.D.8.5. - and L.36.C.25.30. During the move forward heavy machine gun fire was encountered from Sunken Road in L.36.A. and from the CANAL.

a. Patrols. An enemy party was encountered at M.31.B.7.2. This party threw a few hand grenades and then hurriedly retreated. Otherwise though our patrols pushed well out into No Mans Land, none of the enemy was encountered.

b. Infantry Arms. Were active on profitable targets. M.W. at M.51.D.6.2. was silenced. Three captured M.Ws emplaced at R.30.A.1.8. were used and 38 rounds were employed in searching fire on M.25.B.3.D. and M.26.A.3.C.

2. Artillery. Was active, shelling FOUCAUCOURT, Windmill in M.32.A. E. and W. road in M.26.C.3.D. and other targets. From 8.50.p.m. to 9.20.p.m. and again at 2.50/4.10.a.m. Squares L.36. and M.1.3.2. were subjected to barrage fire.

3. Aircraft. Moderately active. It was noticeable that during the afternoon our planes over forward areas were heavily engaged by A.A. Batteries.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Was very alert and nervous and called for artillery support on frequent occasions without apparent reason. The slightest movement in our forward areas is shelled. Opposite the right Brigade, enemy hurriedly, after throwing a few grenades when our men approached.

b. Infantry Arms. Were active opposite the left but less active opposite right of our sector. 12 Pineapple bombs were fired from the direction of EARLS WOOD (G.31.D.)

c. Artillery. Opposite the left Brigade hostile artillery was very active during the period, but opposite the right Brigade artillery were only active at night.

CHUIGNES - L.54.B. - ravines in R.4. 5. 11. FROISSY BEACON - PROYART - R.10. - R.8.A.B.3.D. - L.34.D. and L.34.A. - L.3.5.C.3.D. - were shelled. During the night the enemy used a considerable number of gas shells (Yellow Cross mixed with H.E.) Gullies in R.23. R.29. R.35. ST MARTINS WOODS - R.35.C. - and Valley in R.5.C. and E.11.A.3.B. were freely gassed.

d. Aircraft. Between 7 and 3.a.m. and 5. and 8.p.m. single E.A. patrolled our forward areas particularly on the left. At 5.p.m. 5 E.A. flew over forward areas of right Brigade. Bombing machines were busy at night on rear areas.

2. Movement. Individual movement observed in FOUCAUCOURT and the vicinity of windmill in M.32.A. Men who appeared to be digging were observed on ridge in the vicinity of G.32.0.

3. Enemy Defences. Sunken road in L.36.A. contains active M.Guns. M.Gun located at M.32.A.3.5. (approx). Posts were located at M.31.B. 6.2. - M.25.D.7.1. and suspected at M.26.C.7.5. - M.26.D.2.9. - M.26.B.3.2. - M.26.B.4.3. - M.26.B.5.5. - M.32.A.6.6.

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It would appear that opposite the right Brigade the enemy is holding the trench running from H.20.B.5.8. to H.26.D. thence S.W. through H.28.D. and E.32.A. with a few outposts pushed out in front.

4. Identifications. 37th.I.R. - 21st.Division: 2 unwounded prisoners by left Brigade. 202.R.I.R. 43rd.H.Div. 1 wounded prisoner by left Brigade.

5. Captures. Prisoners captured since 23rd inst now total.

UNWOUNDED.

Offs. O.Rs.

61 2164.

WOUNDED.

O.Rs.

373.

Grand Total 2599 all ranks.

Notes.

Attached are rough translations of documents captured during the recent operations.

The Divisional order of the 107th Division dated 21st inst is interesting and allows us to form a pretty accurate idea of the enemy dispositions before the battle.

In the first place, the document shows that the enemy was undoubtedly expecting us to attack in the near future.

The order also shows that the enemy forces were still in a considerable state of disorganisation evidenced by the attachment of regiments of other Divisions to the 107th Div etc etc.

An examination of the document combined with identifications given the following facts:-

Before the battle the enemy order of Battle in front of us was from N. to S.

87th.I.R. }

80th.Fus.R. }

31st.I.R. }

21st.Divn.

S. Boundary E. AND W. through centre of ST MARTINS WOODS.

232.I.R. }

227.R.I.R. }

52.R.I.R. }

107th.Divn.

Each regiment had 1 Bn in line, one in support and one in reserve. However the enemy had apparently "milked" the 21st Divn of one Bn. for the 2nd Bn. of the 31st.I.R. which before had been the main counter-attack Bn near PAY, came under the orders of the 213.Inf. Bde of the 107th Divn. on the 21/22nd.

Which Bn replaced the 2nd Bn. 31st Regt in the 21st Div is not known.

The 107th Division had apparently organized its defence into

(a) outpost line - (b) 1st.Main line of Defence, (c) 2nd Main line of Defence.

The 1st.Main line ran approximately just E. of the N. and S. Valley.

The 2nd.Main line apparently ran roughly N. and S. through FOUCOU-COURT.

The 2nd.Main line was to be garrisoned by Nucleus Bns or remaining reserves, which however were reinforced on the 21/22nd by the milked 2nd Bn of 31st Regt.

Apparently in our advance we broke through the 1st.Main line of Defence, for we captured considerable numbers of men of every Bn in the 107th Division. But we apparently stopped our advance before reaching the 2nd.Main line, for we did not capture a single man of the 2nd.Bn. 31st.I.R.

But before we broke through the 1st.Main line of resistance, the 107th Divisional Commander threw into the fight all his reserves, which consisted of the 2nd.Bn. 122nd Fus.Reg and the 213th. Pioneer Coy, of which we captured a number of prisoners.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,
7th August, 1918.

FORECAST OF MOVES.

1. (1) 1st Aust.Div. (less Artillery and Infantry of 1st Aust.Inf.Bde) is in Corps Reserve grouped as follows:-

D.H.Q.

2nd Brigade Group.

3rd Brigade Group.

ALLONVILLE.

CAMON QUERRIEU.

COISY POULAINVILLE.

(ii) Remainder of 1st Brigade Group is at present in the RIV ERY area and rationed by 2nd Brigade.

2. No definite orders have been received, but should the operations in hand be successful, the Division will probably be disposed as follows:-

(1) On the 8th inst., the 2nd Brigade Group will move to the

AUBIGNY area.

The 3rd Brigade Group will move to the
HAMEL area.

(ii) Attached map shows the above areas. These areas will be reconnoitred by Brigades on the morning of 8th inst.

(iii) These two Groups for this purpose will be composed as under:-

H.Q. and Sig.Sect.

L.T.M.Battery.

Infantry Brigade.

1 M.G.Coy.

1 Field Coy.

1 Coy.Div.Train.

(iv) Should the above move take place, the remainder of the 1st Brigade Group plus Headquarters, M.G.Bn, 21st M.G.Coy, and Pioneer Bn. will remain in the RIV ERY area under direct orders from Division and rationed under Divisional Train arrangements.

(v) Field Ambulances will remain in present locations pending further orders.

3. (1) Should the move outlined in para. 2 take place, advanced D.H.Q. will be established in VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.

(ii) Rear D.H.Q. and divisional details will remain at ALLONVILLE.

Gm Ross. Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

92

-2-

Distribution.

2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.
3rd Aust. Inf. Bde.
1st Aust. M.G. Bn.
1st Aust. Pioneer Bn.

A.Q.

O.R.E. 1st Aust. Div.

A.D.M.S.

1st Aust. Div. Train.

S.S.O. 1st Aust. Div.

D.A.D.V.S.

Camp Commandant.

A.P.M.

Maps to 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.

3rd Aust. Inf. Bde.

A.Q.

(i) On the 2nd inst., the 3rd Brigade Group will move to the
the
The 3rd Brigade Group will move to the
HALLS area.
(ii) Attached map shows the above areas. Those areas will
be reconnected by bridges on the morning of 2nd inst.
(iii) These two groups for this purpose will be composed as

under:-
1 Coy. Div. Troop.
1 Field Coy.
1 M.G. Coy.
1 Infantry Brigade.
1 T.M. Battery.
1 R.G. and Sig. Bde.

(iv) Should the above move take place, the remainder of the
1st Brigade Group plus Headquarters, M.G. Bn., 2nd M.G. Coy., and
Pioneer Bn. will remain in the RIVER area under direct orders
from Division and rationed under Divisional Train arrangements.
(v) Field Ambulance will remain in present location pending
further orders.

(vi) Should the move outlined in para. 2 take place, advanced
D.H.A. will be established in VILLAGE-BENTONHEUX.

(vii) Rear D.H.A. and Divisional details will remain at
ALBOVILLE.

General Staff.
Lieut-Colonel.
1st Australian Division.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
19th. August. 1918.

FORECAST.

1. Operations by the Corps are to be resumed on Z day.
Zero hour will probably be about dawn.
2. i. 1st.Aust.Division is to launch its attack from the present front of the 5th.Aust.Division.
ii. The method will be for the 5th.Aust.Division to leave its line Battalions in line and 1st.Aust.Division to form up on a taped line during Y - Z night.
iii. 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde will attack on the right, 1st.Aust.Inf. Brigade on left. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde will be in Divisional Reserve.
iv. The objective, the Divisional and the inter-brigade boundaries are shown on attached map (limited issue).
3. Moves preparatory to the attack will be effected on X day.
4. Artillery available will probably be 8. F. A. Brigades.
A creeping barrage will be put down 200 yards in front of the infantry start line for a period of 3 minutes.
The barrage will then lift at the rate of 100 yards in 2 minutes for 3 lifts and thereafter lift at rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes.
5. About 24 tanks will be available.
These will be moved to the Tank start line early on Y - Z night and will pass through the infantry start line at zero.
6. i. 21st.M.G.Coy will join 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde Group when the move forward is made.
ii. Subsequent to providing covering fire for the attack the 1st.M.G.Coy will probably be withdrawn into Divisional Reserve.
7. The role of the Pioneers will be to assist in consolidation. C.R.E. will arrange for 2 Coys to be placed at the disposal of each attacking Brigade.
Portions of these Coys will be told off to carry forward material for splinter proof cover for Headquarters and to assist in digging such Headquarters.
Field Coys will be used to assist in taping the forming up line and subsequently in consolidation and wiring. Arrangements will be made to carry forward concertina barbed wire.
8. All Nucleus Battalions will be located in CORBIE.
9. Brigadiers will arrange to effect reconnaissance as early as possible.
Headquarters Right Brigade 5th.Division. Q.29.D.
" " Left " " " " Q.16.A.3.4.
" " Reserve " " " " Q.20.B.2.0.
Advanced Headquarters 5th.Aust.Division. P.7.A.1.3.
10. Signal Instructions will be issued separately.
11. G.OsC. Brigades will each forward tomorrow to D.H.Q. the names of 1 Senior Officer who would be left out of the line for this operation, and whom they can recommend to be used as a liaison Officer with flanking Divisions as forward reconnaissance Officer to assist the Divisional Staff.
12. All ranks will be reminded of the order as to secrecy concerning operations.

Am. Ray

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. Issued to.

- 1 - 4 D.H.Q.
- 5 - 7 War Diary.
- 8 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.
- 9 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bdo.
- 10 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
- 11 1st.M.G.Battalion.
- 12 1st.Pioneer Bn.
- 13 C.R.A.1st.Aust.Div.
- 14 C.R.E.1st.Aust.Div.
- 15 1st.Div.Sig.Coy.
- 16 A.D.M.S.
- 17 A.P.M.
- 18 1st.Aust.Div.Train.
- 19 A.Q.
- 20 S.S.O.1st.Aust.Div.
- 21 File.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO.1.Headquarters.
7th. August. 1918.INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

During the forthcoming battle the Division may be called upon

- (1) To form a Defensive flank to the Corps Front
- (2) To exploit the success gained by the Divisions in the battle.
- (3) To Reinforce or relieve fighting Divisions.

The following general instructions are issued for observance in any of the above eventualities.

1. Battalion Intelligence Personnel.

Wherever possible one German speaker and 2 searchers should be allotted to each Battalion for use as follows;-

(a) German Speaker.

1. To secure immediate identification quickly.
2. To secure any immediate tactical information of the enemy required by the Battalion Commander.
3. To be in charge of the two searchers and separate important documents, orders, maps etc, translate and convey any information of value to the Battalion Commander.

(b) Two Searchers.

The two Searchers should systematically search the battle field, enemy positions, suspected headquarters, dead etc, for documents and maps. Unless required by the Battalion Commander for immediate exploitation, documents etc should be packed in sand bags properly labelled and sent through the usual channels to the Divisional Cage as quickly as possible.

2. Searching of Prisoners.

(a) Officers and N.C.Os.

Officers and N.C.Os will be searched as soon as possible after capture by an Officer or N.C.O, and all documents taken will be sent back (in sacks labelled by regiments if the number of documents etc is large) to the Divisional Intelligence Officer, whose position as determined by the Situation will be notified to Brigades.

(b) Other Ranks.

Other Ranks need not be searched, but escorts and guards will be warned to take special precautions to prevent prisoners from destroying papers. All ranks should understand that a prisoners pay-book, identity disc, and personal belongings should not be taken from him.

3. Separation of Officers N.C.Os and Men.

Care will be taken that Officers, N.C.Os and privates, are separated and are not allowed to communicate.

Interrogated prisoners should not be allowed to communicate with uninterrogated prisoners.

4. Notification of Locality of Capture.

Information as to place of capture will invariably accompany prisoners. The Battalion making the capture is a useful indication.

5. Authorized persons only to converse with prisoners.

No Officer or N.C.O except those duly authorized should be allowed to interrogate or converse with prisoners.

6. Advanced Divisional Prisoners of War Collecting Cage.

The Divisional Intelligence Officer will be forward at this Cage. The position of the Cage will necessarily be determined by the battle situation, but when decided on it will be notified to all concerned.

7. Disposal of Prisoners.

The A.P.M. will arrange for the evacuation of all Prisoners of War from Brigades to the Advanced Divisional Collecting Station and from there to the Advanced Corps Cage at VECQUEMEONT (N.11.B.8.7.) Traffic Control personnel should be made conversant with the method of disposal of Prisoners. The evacuation of Prisoners should be as rapid as possible.

8. Identifications.

The importance of pressing on all identifications as rapidly as possible cannot be over-estimated. The locality of identifications will always be stated.

9. Observation Posts.

The important results advanced by mobile Brigade and Battalion Observation Posts may give to Commanders should be borne in mind.

The possibility of maintaining telephonic or visual communication should also be considered.

If possible locations of Observation Posts should be determined before hand.

Harry Meyer
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters.
7th. August. 1918.

Secret

The following extracts from Australian Corps Orders and Battle Instructions are forwarded for information.

1. An operation to advance the BRITISH line in this sector, in conjunction with the CANADIAN Corps on our Right, and the III Corps on our Left, commences on 8th inst.

1st. Aust. Division. 2. The 1st. Aust. Division is in Aust Corps Reserve and may be used to exploit a success or to reinforce the leading Divisions. Conditions of open warfare may develop.

H.Qrs of Other Divns 3. Headquarters of -
2nd. Aust. Division will be at GLISY.
5th. " " " will be at O.25.C.7.3.
3rd. " " " will be at BUSSY.
4th. " " " will be at CORBIE.

Communi- cation. 4. Report Centres, in advance of the heads of Buried Cables will be selected in each Divisional Sector.
Wireless Telegraphy will be exploited to the full.

Tanks. 5. Tanks and Armoured Cars are co-operating and can be distinguished by three broad painted bands coloured WHITE RED WHITE. Armoured Cars may also fly the French Tricolour. As Tanks are liable to surge all ranks should be warned to keep well clear of them, especially at starting. Some Tanks are detailed for carrying.

Aircraft. 6. Air co-operation is probable - To notify the position of Infantry, RED ground Flares may be burnt by leading troops only, or 4 or 5 Rifles may be laid on parapet about 18 inches apart or tin discs may be flashed even in dull weather. Special Planes will carry the following markings. Contact patrol machines - Rectangular panels 2' x 1' on both lower planes about three feet from the Fuselage. S.A.A. Planes will carry 2½' black tips under lower plane. Machines working with Tanks - Black band on middle of Right side of tail. A certain number of planes will carry S.A.A. To indicate where S.A.A. should be dropped Vickers Guns will display a White V point towards enemy - Arms of V each 6' x 1'.

Lawson Major
for

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.
1st. M.G. Battalion.
1st. Pioneer Bn.
1st. Div. Sig. Coy.
A.Q.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copy No.....

9th, August, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO. 2.

1. The attack will be resumed on 9th Inst. Zero hour will be 11.a.m. The final Objective of the Corps are shown on attached Map.
The 1st. Aust. Div will be the right attacking Division. The boundaries of the Division are shown on attached Map.
2. The attack will be carried out as follows;-
 - (a) Phase A. by 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
The 8th. Aust. Inf. Bde will be on the left.
The X Brigade 2nd. Canadian Division on the right.
 - (b) Phase B. by 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde on right.
The 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde on left.
 - i. The inter-Brigade boundary will be the grid line running East and West through X.20. Central and X.21. Central. and will be adjusted by direct arrangements between Brigadiers.
 - ii. The 2nd. Aust. Division, having passed through the 5th. Aust. Division will be on the left.
 - iii. X Brigade 2nd. Canadian Division will be on the right.
3. The RED Line will be consolidated pending further orders.
4.
 - i. The Artillery available for the Division for the Two Phases is, - 1st. Aust. Div. Artillery.
298th. Army Bde R.F.A.
189th. Army Bde R.F.A.
 - ii. C.R.A. will arrange for the above Artillery to be disposed by 10.a.m.
 - iii. Phase A. This Artillery will act under the Orders of C.R.A.
 - iv. Phase B. C.R.A. will arrange to allot two Field Artillery Brigades to each the G.O.C. 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
5. Tanks. 14 Tanks of the 2nd Tank Battalion are available, and will be placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde for Phase A.
For Phase B these Tanks will be distributed between the 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdes by direct arrangements with Tank Battalion Commander.
6.
 - i. The 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde will move at 10.a.m. to assembly positions about Square V.5. and will be in Divisional Reserve.
 - ii. Reconnaissance will be made by this Brigade of the Forward Area of the Division.
7. A report centre for both attacking Brigades will be established at Square W.9.C.O.O. (GILLAUCOURT Station)
8. As the Operations are to conform to that of the 2nd. Canadian Division the closest liaison will be maintained between the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde and the left Brigade of the 2nd. Canadian Divn.
9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

DISTRIBUTION.

2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. 2nd. Tank. Bn.
 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.
 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde. 5th. Aust. Division.
 2nd. Canadian Divn. 1st. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
 A.Q.

Am. Row

Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

G. and

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO.3.

APPENDIX

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
9th. August. 1918.

89

1. The attack will be resumed on 10th Inst.
Zero hour will be 8.a.m.
The Objective of the Corps is the BLUE Line as shewn on Map issued with Battle Instructions No.2.
2. The Jumping Off Line will be the RED Line.
The attack will be carried out as follows -
 - i. The 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde will attack on the right of the Division,
The 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde on the left.
 - ii. The Inter-Brigade Boundary will be the line of the HARBONNIERES - LIHONS Road through X.29. and X.30. continued through S.26.D.8.4, road inclusive to 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
The 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde will, during the night 9th/10th inst take over that portion of the front at present held by the 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde as far South as the new Inter-Brigade Boundary by direct arrangement between G.Os.C. Brigades concerned.
3. The 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde will be in Divisional Reserve and will move at 8.a.m. on 10th Inst to position about Squares X.14. X.20. and X.26.
4.
 - i. The C.R.A. will arrange for a creeping Barrage to be put down 700 yards clear of the RED Line at Zero minus 15. Lifts of 100 yards in 2 minutes, commencing at Zero. On reaching the BLUE Line a protective Barrage will be put down; fire will cease at request of G.Os.C. Brigades.
 - ii. The Corps Heavy Artillery will co-operate preparatory to and during the operation.
5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Am Rds
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.	Issued to.
1 - 4	D.H.Q.
5 - 7	War Diary.
8	1st.Aust.Inf.Bde. and Map.
9	2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
10	3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
11	2nd.Aust.Division.
12	5th.Aust.Division.
13	1st.Div.Sig.Coy.
14	2nd.Canadian Divn.
15	C.R.A.1st.Aust.Div.
16	A.Q.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO. 5.

10th. August. 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO. 4.

1. Tonight the operation will be continued by the 2nd and 3rd Aust. Divisions.
2. The 3rd. Aust. Division is to push forward to the following Line -
 CROSS ROADS. R. 28. C. 5. 4.
 CHUIGNOLLES.
 River at L. 33. C. 0. 7.
 Tanks will co-operate.
3. The 2nd. Aust. Division will conform by pushing forward to
 X. 11. C. 0. 0.
 R. 35. C. 0. 0.
 R. 28. C. 5. 4.
4. 7th. Aust. Inf. Bde will be on the Right of 2nd. Aust. Division.
5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Haig
Major

Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Issued to.</u>
1 - 4	D.H.Q.
5 - 7	War Diary.
8	C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.
9	1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10	2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
11	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
12	2nd. Aust. Division.
13	1st. Div. Sig. Coy.
14	File.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
11th. August. 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO.5.

1. The advance will be resumed today in conformation to the 4th Canadian Division.
Zero hour will be notified later.
2. Boundaries will be altered to run as follows -
 - i. Southern Divisional Boundary
A.8.D.O.2. - A.4.Central. - T.25.Central. - T.21.Central.
 - Northern Divisional Boundary.
S.7.D.O.O. - Cross Roads S.8.C. - S.9.Central. - S.6.Central. - N.33.Central.
Alterations to take effect from Zero hour.
 - ii. New Inter-Brigade Boundary.
X.19.Central. - Just North of LIHU Wood - Cross Roads S.15.B. (to Left Brigade inclusive) - BOVENT.
Alterations to take effect from Brigade reliefs during night 11/12th inst.
3. The 2nd and 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bdes will conform to the advance of the 4th.Canadian Division today.
4. During the night 11/12th inst the following re-adjustment will be made -
 - i. 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde will relieve the 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde and portion of the 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde on the frontage of the New Right Sub-Sector of the Divisional Front.
 - ii. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde will take over the now Left Sub-Sector on a 1 Battalion frontage.
 - iii. 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde will be withdrawn into Divisional Reserve just West of LIHONS.
 - iv. Completion of all reliefs to be wired to D.H.Q.
5. On completion of reliefs detailed in para 4. C.R.A. will arrange for 3 Field Artillery Brigades to be allotted to G.O.C. 1st.Aust. Inf.Brigade and 1 Field Artillery Brigade to G.O.C. 3rd.Aust.Inf. Bde.
6. 1 Section 15th. Light Horse Regiment will be attached until further orders to each of 1st. 2nd and 3rd.Infantry Brigades.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Wm. S. ...
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. Issued to.

1 - 4 D.H.Q.	13 Aust Corps.
5 - 7 War Diary.	14 C.R.A. 1st.Aust.Div.
8 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.	15 A.D.M.S.
9 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.	16 A.P.M.
10 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.	17 C.R.E. 1st.Aust.Div.
11 2nd.Aust.Division.	18 A.Q.
12 4th.Canadian Divn.	19 1st.Div.Sig.Coy.
	20 File.

Issued at 2.p.m.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
11th. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO. 6.

1. Paras 1 3 and 4 (iii) of Battle Instructions No. 5. are cancelled.
2. The policy to be adopted for the present throughout the 4th Army is - i. to hold the present line defensively.
ii. to make reconnaissance and preparation for a set-piece attack in the near future.
3. To effect the above, the G.O.C. 1st and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdes after the relief on the night 11/12th inst is completed will
 - i. dispose troops in depth so as to avoid casualties, full use to be made of affiliated M.G. Coys.
 - ii. Carry on with an active policy of patrolling.
 - iii. Make every effort to form a suitable and clearly defined front line which can be used for jumping off, and barrage purposes. The front line will be wired.
4. G.O.C. 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde will arrange to take over to the Northern Divisional Boundary in X.11.A. establishing a liaison post with 2nd. Aust. Division.
5. On relief on the night 11/12th inst, the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde will be withdrawn into Divisional reserve about Squares X.20., X.21., and X.27.
6. i. Brigade Headquarters will be established as follows;-
Right Brigade X.26.D.5.2.
Left Brigade W.24.B.5.C.
Reserve Brigade W.24.E.
ii. C.R.E. will arrange for the preparation of an Advanced Divisional Headquarters at BAYONVILLERS.
7. C.R.E. will arrange for 2 Coys 1st. Aust. Pioneer Bn to be allotted to the Right Brigade, One Coy to the Left Brigade. These Coys will be employed on Support and Reserve Lines and in perfecting communications.
8. Maps showing the dispositions of Brigades will be forwarded to D.H.Q. as soon as possible on 12th August.
9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A.M. Ross Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.Copy No. Issued to.

1 - 4	D.H.Q.	15.	C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.
5 - 7	War Diary.	16.	A.D.M.S.
8	1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.	17.	A.P.M.
9	2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	18.	1st. Div. Sig. Coy.
10	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.	19.	1st. M.G. Battalion.
11	Aust. Corps.	20.	1st. Pioneer Bn.
12	2nd. Aust. Division.	21.	S.S.O. 1st. Aust. Div.
13	4th. Canadian Divn.	22.	A.Q.
14	C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.	23.	File.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

11th. August. 1918.

AMENDMENT TO BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO. 6.

Para 4. - Amend co-ordinate to read X.11.C.3.0.

Handwritten signature

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

Issued to all recipients of
Battle Instructions No. 6.

APPENDIX

4

93

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO. 5.....

13th. August. 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. NO. 7.

1. The 1st. Aust. Pioneer Battalion will move to the VILLERS BRETONNEUX Area today 13th inst, on completion of the midday meal.
2. Location to be notified to this Office on completion of move.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

W. J. M. Major
 Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

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10	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdo.
11	1st. Pioneer Bn.
12	1st. M.G. Battalion.
13	1st. Div. Sig. Coy.
14	A.D.M.S.
15	A.P.M.
16	D.A.D.V.S.
17	1st. Aust. Div. Train.
18	S.S.O. 1st. Aust. Div.
19	Camp Commandant.
20	A.D.C.
21	A.Q.
22	D.G.O.
23	File.

SECRET

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Headquarters,
20th. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. SERIES "B". No.1.Intelligence and Disposal of Prisoners of War.

Instructions contained in Paras 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 8. and 9. Battle Instructions No. 1. issued 7th inst, will be adhered to during forthcoming battle.

In the light of the operations of the 9th inst and succeeding days, the following points and additional instructions are issued and emphasized.

1. Searching for and Forwarding of Documents:-

Captured Documents except those upon which Battalion and Brigade Commanders can take immediate action, will be forwarded to D.H.Q. as quickly as possible. German official instruments and apparatus should also be forwarded.

2. Notification of Locality of Capture:-

It is essential that the locality where documents are found or prisoners captured be reported.

The number of the Battalion making the capture is a useful indication, though if possible the actual location should be stated.

3. Advanced Divisional P.O.W. Cage:- The cage will be established in the vicinity of the MORCOURT - PROYART Road in Q.17.C.or.D. The Divisional Intelligence Officer will be in attendance. Numerous sign boards will be in position indicating the cage.4. Collection and Disposal of Prisoners:-

During recent operations the following points were noticed -

- (1) Escorts lost their way and prisoners were delivered to other divisional cages.
- (2) Infantry escorts who should have been fighting were found escorting prisoners several miles behind the firing line.
- (3) Unnecessary delay in delivering prisoners to the cage.

Therefore in order to effect economy in personnel and in time, the following method for the collection and disposal of prisoners during forthcoming operations will be used.

(a) The A.P.M. will have a screen of Mounted Military Policemen stationed along the divisional front, at an approximate distance of 1 mile from the front line. This screen will cover all routes from the front line in the divisional area. Adjacent routes in flanking areas will also be watched.

(b) Battalion escorts will be instructed to take Prisoners of War to the rear and to deliver them to the first 1st.Aust.Div. Mounted Military Policeman they meet, who will hand the escort a typed receipt. Escorts will be instructed that in the unlikely event of missing members of the M. M. P. screen, they will proceed to the Divisional P. O. W. Cage on the MORCOURT - PROYART Road.

(c) The A.P.M. will keep a reserve of M. M. P. at the Divisional Cage for filling gaps in the screen and at Headquarters of Brigades in the line for prisoners who may be mis-directed.

(d) Close touch between the Divisional Cage and D.H.Q. will be maintained and any information of value gained by the Divisional Intelligence Officer will be immediately forwarded to those concerned.

Attempts will be made to maintain direct touch between Headquarters of Brigades in the line and the Divisional Cage.

(e) The A.P.M. will keep a close check of the number of prisoners taken by particular units.

[Signature]
 Captain
 for Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

- 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.
- 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
- 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
- C.R.A.1st.Aust.Div.
- C.R.E.1st.Aust.Div.
- 1st.M.G.Battalion.
- 1st.Pioneer Bn.
- A.P.M.

1. Collection and Disposal of Prisoners:-
 During recent operations the following points were noticed:-
 (1) Prisoners lost their way and prisoners were delivered to other divisions.
 (2) Infantry escorts who should have been fighting were found escorting prisoners several miles behind the fighting line.
 (3) Unnecessary delay in delivering prisoners to the cage.
 Therefore in order to effect economy in personnel and in time, the following method for the collection and disposal of prisoners during forthcoming operations will be used.
 (a) The A.P.M. will have a screen of Mounted Military Police stationed along the divisional front, at an approximate distance of 1 mile from the front line. This screen will cover all routes from the front line in the divisional area. Adjacent routes in divisional areas will also be watched.
 (b) Battalion escorts will be instructed to take prisoners of war to the rear and to deliver them to the first M.P. screen. Mounted Military Police will be instructed that in the unlikely event of missing members of the M.P. screen, they will proceed to the Divisional P.O.W. Cage on the MONROE - PROYANT Road.
 (c) The A.P.M. will keep a reserve of M.P. at Headquarters Divisional Gage for filling gaps in the screen and at Headquarters of Brigades in the line for prisoners who may be mis-directed.
 (d) Close touch between the Divisional Gage and P.O.W. will be maintained and any information of value gained by the Divisional Intelligence Officer will be immediately forwarded to those concerned.
 Attempts will be made to maintain direct touch between Headquarters of Brigades in the line and the Divisional Gage.

APPX. IVa

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters.
21st. August 1918

With reference to Battle Instructions Series "B" No.1.
Para 5. -

Advanced Divisional Prisoners of War Cage will be established
in Q.18.D. near a crashed aeroplane.

Sample Cell

for Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.
2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.
C.R.A.1st.Aust.Div.
C.R.E.1st.Aust.Div.
1st.M.G.Battalion.
1st.Pioneer Bn.
A.P.M.
A.Q.

APPENDIX

46
97

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO....

Headquarters.
20th. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 2.T A N K S.

1. Units of the 5th Tank Brigade are allotted to Divisions and Brigades as follows;-

8th. Tank Battalion with 12 Mark	V Tanks to the 32nd Division.
13th. Tank Battalion with 12 Mark	V Tanks to the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.
2nd. Tank Battalion with 12 Mark	V Tanks to the 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.
No. 4. Tank Supply Coy with 3 Mark	4 Supply Tenders to each of
the 1st and 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bdes	
2. Tank Battalion Commanders are already in touch with Brigades concerned and will arrange all details direct with them. Brigades will notify Tank Battalion Commanders of the time of Zero hour and will arrange synchronisation of watches with them. Tank Coy Commanders are responsible for liaison with the Infantry to which they are allotted.
3. (a) Tanks for the operation will be assembled in the MORCOURT VALLEY by dawn on August 22nd.
 (b) On Y - Z night Tanks will commence to move forward at 9.30. p.m. to the Tank Start Line, which will be approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the infantry taped line. They will move to a line not nearer to the Tank Start Line than 3,000 yards under full engines. From there they will continue the movement to the Tank Start Line moving slowly and as quietly as possible.
 (c) Tanks are to reach Infantry taped line at zero hour in order that they may be deployed in front of the infantry when the barrage lifts at zero plus 3 minutes.
 (d) To conceal the noise of the Tank engines the 5th Brigade R.A.F. are arranging to have aeroplanes flying continuously over the Corps area from 9.30.p.m. until 1.a.m. on Y - Z night, and from Zero minus 1 hour onward to Zero.
4. When the Tanks of the 8th Tank Battalion have seen the 32nd Division firmly established on their objective they will turn North to assist the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde if the high ground in R.24. and 30. and H.19. 25. and 31. is still holding out.
5. Half^{an} hour after the infantry are established on their objective Tanks will be released automatically by the infantry, and will then rally in the MORCOURT VALLEY.
6. The details regarding the supplies to be carried by the Mark IV Supply Tenders will be arranged direct between the O.C. No. 4. Tank supply Coy and G.Os.C. Brigade concerned.
7. Advanced Headquarters of Tank Battalion will be notified later.
8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A.M. Ross.

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 2.

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- 11 1st. M.G. Battalion.
- 12 1st. Div. Sig. Coy.
- 13 C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.
- 14 C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.
- 15 A.D.C.
- 16 A.Q.
- 17 - 18 Aust. Corps.
- 19 32nd. Division.
- 20 3rd. Aust. Division.
- 21 5th. Aust. Division.
- 22 File.

Issued at. 11. P.M.

When the Tanks of the 6th Tank Battalion have been the 32nd Division firmly established on their objective they will turn North to assist the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. in the high ground in R. 24. and 30. and N. 19, 25, and 31. is still holding out.

Half hour after the Infantry are established on their objective Tanks will be released automatically by the Infantry, and will then rally in the MORGENTHAU VALLEY.

The details regarding the supplies to be carried by the Mark IV Supply Tank will be arranged direct between the C.O. No. 4. Tank Supply Coy and 6.02nd. Brigade concerned.

Advanced Headquarters of Tank Battalion will be notified later.

1st. Australian Division.
General Staff.
Lieut. Colonel.

DR R. M.

MOVE TABLE TO ACCOMPANY BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 2.

COPY NO. 6

Serial. No.	Date.	Unit.	From.	To.	Relieving.	Route.	Remarks.
1.	August 21st.	3rd. A.I. Bde. Group.	VAIRE. area	Reserve Bde area "C" Divn.	8th. A.I. Bde.	HAMEL - CERISY. Road.	Move in afternoon to complete move by 7.p.m.
2.	"	1st. Aust. Pioneer Battalion.	HAMEL Area.	5th. Pioneer Bn. Area.	5th. Pioneer. Battalion.	CERISY - MORCOURT.	To start at 8.p.m.
3.	"	1st. A.I. Bde. Group. 21st. M.G. Coy. H.Qrs. M.G. Bn.	VAUX. Area.	Support pos- itions in old trenches Sqs. R.7., R.13. Q.12. and 18.	Troops 15th Bde less front line troops and 15th. M.G. Coy.	HAMEL - CERISY MORCOURT Road.	Not to start before 8.p.m. 21st. M.G. Coy. to March as ordered by 1st. A.I. Brigade.
4.	"	2nd. A.I. Bde. Group.	HAMEL. Area.	Support pos- itions in trenches Squares. R.19. & 25. Q.30.	troops 14th. A.I. Bde. less front line troops. and 14th. M.G. Coy.	HAMEL thence WARFUSE - FOUCAUCOURT Rd as far as Q.20.	Not to start before 8.p.m.
5.	22nd.	Advanced. D.H.Q. H.Qrs. Div. Engrs.	CORBIE.	Q.13. A.3.8.			Office opens at 6.p.m.

NOTES.

- i. Standing Orders as to distances and A.A. Defence will be observed.
- ii. Tracks alongside main roads will be used where possible.
- iii. All Groups will move less tent-sub-divisions of Field Ambulances.
- iv. Advance parties will be sent on early on 21st inst.
- v. Completion of all moves will be wired to D.H.Q.

APPENDIX

42/100

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters.

20th. August. 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 13.A E R O P L A N E S.1. Contact Aeroplane.

(a) Red Ground Flares will be lit to indicate infantry positions. Flares will be lit by the most advanced line of infantry only. Not the whole of the flares will be lit at the first call, a proportion will be kept back and lit on subsequent calls.

(b) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the objective at Zero plus 2 hours.

Call for flares is a succession of 'A's. on the Klaxon horn and the firing of a White Very light.

If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately it will call again after 10 minutes. If it fails to obtain a reply it will repeat its call at half hour intervals.

These aeroplanes are distinguished by Rectangular panels two feet by one foot on both lower planes about 3 feet from the Fuselage.

(c) O.C. Div.Sig.Coy will arrange for a message dropping station near Advanced D.H.Q.

(d) Metal discs will be flashed to indicate position of most advanced infantry.

Positions will also be indicated by laying three or four rifles parallel to one another at regular intervals across the top of the trench.

2. Counter-attack Aeroplanes.

From Zero hour counter-attack aeroplanes will, constantly in the air. The Signal to infantry when enemy are preparing for a counter attack is a White parachute flare fired in the direction of the impending counter-attack.

3. Ammunition carrying Aeroplane.

(a) These Machines have the under side of the lower planes painted Black for a distance of 2½ feet from the tips.

(b) Ammunition will be dropped for Vickers Guns.

O.C. 1st.M.G. Battalion will arrange for White 'V's to be displayed at points where ammunition is to be dropped.

The arms of the 'V' will be .3 feet long and 1 foot wide, the apex of the 'V' to point towards the enemy.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A.M. Row.

Lieut-Colonel.

General Staff.

1st Australian Division.

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10 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde.

11 1st M.G. Battalion.

12 1st Div. Sig. Coy.

13 C.R.A. 1st Aust. Div.

14 C.R.E. 1st Aust. Div.

15 A.D.C.

16 A.Q.

17 - 18 Aust. Corps.

19 32nd Division.

20 3rd Aust. Division.

21 5th Aust. Division.

22 File.

General Instructions.

Issued at 11 p.m.

Ammunition carrying Aeroplane.

- (a) These machines have the under side of the lower planes painted black for a distance of 25 feet from the tips.
- (b) Ammunition will be dropped for Vickers Gun.
- (c) 1st M.G. Battalion will arrange for White-V's to be dropped at points where ammunition is to be dropped.
- The arms of the 'V' will be 2 feet long and 1 foot wide, the apex of the 'V' to point towards the enemy.

1st Australian Division.
General Staff.
Lieut.-Colonel.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
21st. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 4.L I A I S O N.

1. Following Officers are detailed for liaison duty.
32nd Division. - Capt. T.K. MATLBY. 5th. Battalion.
3rd. Aust. Divn. - Capt. R. WALLIS. MC. 8th. Battalion.
O.C. 1st. Div Sig Coy will allot a Motor Cyclist D.R. to the
Officer detailed to 32nd Division.
Liaison Officers and Cyclists will report to 1st. Aust. D.H.Q.
at noon, and to Units at 3.p.m. on the day before attack.
Liaison Artillery officers will be detailed in Artillery Instructions.
2. Tank Company Commanders will be at the Headquarters of the Infantry
Brigades to which their Tanks have been allotted.
One Infantry Liaison man will be carried in each Tank, and will
be provided by the infantry Unit affiliated.
3. 1st. and 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigades will detail Officers with runners
to act as Liaison Officers with flank Brigades and Battalions.
3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade will detail similarly Officers for Liaison with
1st. and 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigades.
Direct Liaison will be established between Battalions and Companies
of 1st. and 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigades.
4. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade will arrange for Liaison infantry parties to
meet similar parties of the 97th Inf Brigade at the following points
during the operation :-
(a) S. E. Corner of WOOD. R.36.A.0.0.
(b) On the objective M.31.B.5.0.
5. 1. A general Staff Officer from D.H.Q. will act as forward direct
Reconnaissance Officer and report the Situation from time to time ,
to D.H.Q.
ii. 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade will detail an Officer to report the
progress of the fight.
For this purpose O.C. 1st. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy will lay a wire from
1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade H.Qrs to a point on the CHIPILLY Spur, to be
arranged direct between G.O.C. 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade and O.C. 1st.
Div. Sig. Coy.
6. Headquarters for the operations will be as follows:-

1st. Aust. Div. Headquarters.	Q.15.A.3.8.
2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade. "	R.26.D.9.3. (move later to R.28. C.5.3.)
1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade. "	MORCOURT.
32nd. Division. H.Q.	BAYONVILLERS.
Left (97th Bde) 32nd. Divn.	W.18.C.5.6. (probably move later.)
Left forward Bn 97th. Bde.	
(10th. Bn. A. & S. Highlanders)	X.4.A.6.5.
1st. Aust. M.G. Battalion.	MORCOURT.
3rd. Aust. Division.	J.22.C.9.1.
9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.	K.26.D.7.5.

Am. Ross.

Distribution as for Instructions.
No. 3.Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff
1st Australian Division.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Headquarters.
21st. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. SERIES "B" NO. 8.1. D. H. Q.

- i. Advanced D.H.Q. will be established at Q.13.A.3.8. at 3.p.m. on 22nd inst.

Composition.

G.O.C., A.D.C., G.S.O. I., II., III., D.I.O.,
A.A.C.Q.M.G., D.A.A.G., D.A.C.M.G.
C.R.E. and Adjutant.
5 Officers, 40. O.Rs Div.Sig.Coy.
Intelligence personnel of D.H.Q.
2. O.Rs Mapping section.
Two "G" Clerks and all Orderlies.
Two "A" Clerks and 1 Orderly.
Batmen and Mess Servants as detailed by Camp
Commandant.
5 Cars and Drivers.

- ii. Rear H.Q. will remain at CORBIE.
2. Light Horse and Cyclists are already allotted.
3. COMMAND.

i. Troops of the 1st and 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde Groups on arrival in the forward area on 21st will pass under the command of the G.Os.C. 15th. and 14th. Brigades respectively.

ii. G.Os.C. 1st. and 2nd.Aust.Inf.Brigades will take over Command of all troops in their respective sub-sectors from G.Os.C. 15th and 14th.Aust.Inf.Brigades at 10.a.m. on 22nd inst.

iii. G.Os.C. 1st. and 2nd.Aust.Inf.Brigades will each send forward on 21st inst a representative for attachment to 15th. and 14th. Brigades respectively until such time as they take over.

4. Synchronisation of Watches.

i. Officers from D.H.Q. will leave Advanced D.H.Q. at about 2.p.m. and 8.p.m. on Y day and will synchronise watches with units as under. -

3rd.Aust.Division.	}	One Officer to be detailed later.
1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.		
3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.		

2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.	}	One Officer to be detailed later.
32nd. Division.		

These Officers will report to G.S.O. II. at Q.13.A.3.8. at 2. p.m. on Y day.

ii. C.R.A. and representatives from Headquarters units will synchronise watches at D.H.Q. at 6.p.m. on Y day.

5. S.O.S. Signal.

S.O.S. Signal at present in use is a rifle grenade Signal. RED over RED over RED.

Same distribution as
Instructions No. 3.

Am. Row.

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
21st. August. 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 6.

1. TANKS.

(a) In order to drown the noise of tanks during their approach to the Tank start line and should the weather not permit of air work.

i. Field Artillery will carry out desultory harassing fire of normal volume, but all artillery fire of this kind will stop 15 minutes before Zero.

ii. Normal machine gun harassing fire will be maintained.

(b) Should stout wire entanglements be encountered, the infantry will call upon Tanks to precede them. Parties of infantry following Tanks will improve Gaps so made.

(c) Unless the situation urgently demands their further employment. Tanks will be released automatically 2½ hours after Zero and will re-assemble in the Valley N. of PROYART.

This amends para 5. of Battle Instructions Series "B" No. 2.

2. SMOKE.

i. Artillery Smoke Screens will be placed on BRAY SPUR in L.23. and across the mouth of the CHUIGNOLLES VALLEY.

ii. Aircraft will drop smoke bombs on the southern side of the Knoll in Sq. 35.D. continuously throughout the operation.

iii. Infantry will be informed that no special percentage of smoke will be put down to define the fall of the creeping barrage, the barrage halt of 15 mins, or the final protective barrage.

3. FORWARD ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS.

i. The forming up on the taped line will be carried out under brigade arrangements.

ii. Assaulting troops will be formed up on the taped line one hour before zero.

iii. Troops of the 5th. Aust. Division will remain in front line positions until forming up is completed, but will all be west of the forming up line one half hour before Zero and will move back at once to the old trenches in R.13. 19. and 25. when they will revert to the Command of the G.O.C. 5th. Aust. Division.

4. ACTION OF RESERVE BRIGADE.

The Reserve Brigade will move at Zero hour to positions in squares R.19.B. & D. and R.25.B.

5. CONSOLIDATION.

The GREEN Line will be consolidated as a Main Line of Resistance.

Consolidation will be in depth. Opportunities will be taken to exploit success within the limits of the protective barrage, and subsequently further forward at the discretion of G.O.C. Brigades.

6. DIVISIONAL REPORT CENTRE.

A Divisional Report Centre will be established at Q.16.A.2.B. MORCOURT. (Forward)

7. ARTILLERY.

i. The Corps Heavy Artillery will fire on selected targets until Zero plus 135 minutes when fire will cease except for the purpose of counter-battery work or at special call.

ii. The S.O.S. will be inoperative on the Divisional front for 15 mins before Zero.

4a

106

- 8 -

8. SUCCESS SIGNAL.

This Signal will be a rifle grenade signal
WHITE over WHITE over WHITE.
200 of these signals have been issued to each assaulting
Brigade.

Am Ross

Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Australian Division.

Distribution same as

For Instructions Series "B" No.2.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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~~Headquarters.~~
21st. August 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 7.

1. Infantry Forming up tape line will be as laid down in Para 2 (v) of Battle Instructions Series "B" No. 2, which is in accordance with F.A. Barrage Map issued to all concerned.
2. The forming up line will be taped by Field Coys of this Division under the supervision of General Officers Commanding 1st and 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigades.
3. Acknowledge.

A.M. Ross.
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

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FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO.....

Headquarters.
22nd. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 8.1. EXPLOITATION.

The line of the final objective as shown on the Field Artillery barrage map will be the main line of resistance at the conclusion of the operation.
G.Os.C. Brigades will subsequently advance their observation line and take every opportunity of exploitation as far as the original GREEN Line.
This amends line 1 of para 5 Battle Instructions No. 6.

2. AEROPLANE SMOKE SCREEN.

R.A.F. have arranged to screen from view the following points

CEYLON WOOD RIDGE.
Squares L.11, 17, 23.A. & B.
FROISSY BEACON.
The line L.35. central - Cross Roads at R.5.B.4.O.
R.6.C.1.O.
DOMPIERRE.
Squares M.3, 4, 5, and 11.
The western edge of FOUCAUCOURT to Sq. M.32.B.9.2.
The road from S.6.Central to S.11.Central.

3. HEADQUARTERS.

With reference to para 6 Battle Instructions No. 4.
Battle Headquarters of 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde will be at Q.18.C.Central.
" " " " 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde, " " " Q.20.B.3.O.

4. ZERO HOUR.

Reference 1st.Aust.Div. Order No.124. of 20th August.
Date of operation 23rd inst.
Zero hour. 4.45.a.m.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Am. Ross Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

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13 A.D.M.S.
14 Div.Sig.Coy.
15 1st.M.G.Battalion.
16 A.P.M.
17 5th.Aust.Division.
18 3rd.Aust.Division.
19 32nd.Division.
20 -21 Aust.Corps.

SECRET.

REDACTED AMERICAN REVENUE

Headquarters.
22nd. August. 1918.BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 9.

1. Should the attack by the 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde prove successful the situation will be exploited.
2. 1. As soon as the protective barrage ceases the 1st.Aust.Inf Bde will push forward patrols to the general line marked Red on attached Map.
 - ii. To enable this to be done -
 - (a) The smoke barrage to be put down by the 3rd. Divisional Artillery across the mouth of the CHUIGNOLLES Valley will stop at 5.45.a.m. This smoke barrage will then switch on to the line joining L.34.Central to R.5.Central and will be maintained there until 6.30.a.m. and will then stop altogether.
 - (b) No other Artillery fire from the North of the SOMME is to be employed on the area in question.
 - (c) The Heavy Artillery will lift off all targets which lie South of the SOMME and West of a North and South line running through R.5.Central, at 5.45.a.m. - The Heavy Artillery will lift off all targets West of a North and South Line through CHUIGNES Village, at 6.30.a.m.
3. 1. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde will move at Zero to assembly positions North of PROYART and not as ordered in para 4 of Battle Instructions No. 6.
 - ii. 'A' Brigade 5th.Aust.Division will be disposed in the positions vacated by 3rd.Aust.Inf.Brigade. At Zero hour this Brigade will pass under orders of the G.O.C. 1st. Aust.Division for defensive employment.
4. 1. As soon as the 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde has reached the general line marked RED on attached map, but not before 6.30.a.m., the 3rd.Aust. Inf.Brigade will continue the forward movement, passing through the 1st.Aust.Inf.Brigade and establishing itself on the general line marked BLUE on attached Map.
 - ii. For this purpose a minimum of two F.A. Brigades will be placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Brigade. On completion of barrage tasks, 1st.H.G.Coy will also be at the disposal of G.O.C. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Brigade.
 - iii. At the same time an inter-brigade boundary between 1st. and 3rd.Aust.Inf.Br Brigades will come into force. This boundary will run along the line shown in Black on attached Map.
 - iv. The left of the 1st.Aust.Inf.Brigade will be advanced to conform to this boundary and as soon as touch is established troops of the 1st.Aust.Inf.Brigade will be withdrawn South of the New inter-Brigade boundary.
5. The objective of the 3rd.Aust.Inf.Brigade will be consolidated as a main line of resistance and every opportunity will be taken of exploiting a further line of observation.
6. 1. The 3rd.Aust.Division is to attack at the same Zero hour as the 1st.Aust.Division on 22nd inst. The final objective line of the right of the 3rd.Aust.Division is the Spur N. of BRAY. A portion of the objective is shown in RED on attached Map.
 - ii. When launching his attack. G.O.C. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Brigade will arrange for strong liaison parties to gain touch with the 3rd.Aust. Division South of LA NEUVILLE LES BRAY.

7. 'A' Brigade .. of the 5th Aust. Division will send an Officer to report to Advanced D.H.Q. at 6 a.m. on 23rd inst to act as liaison Officer.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Am Ross

Lieut-Colonel.

General Staff.

1st Australian Division.

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- 9 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 10 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 11 C.R.A. 1st Aust. Div.
- 12 1st Div. Sig. Coy.
- 13 5th Aust. Division.
- 14 3rd Aust. Division.
- 15-13 Aust. Corps.
- 17 1st M.G. Battalion.

SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO....

~~Headquarters~~
22nd. August 1942BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES "B" NO. 10.

1. Regarding Battle Instructions No. 9. para 6.
 1. The 3rd. Aust. Division will NOT now carry out an attack.
 G.O.C. 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde will therefore after making good his
 objective throw back a defensive flank on the line Square WOOD -
 FROISSY BEACON.
 Liaison party will meet similar party of 3rd. Aust. Division
 at the Canal Crossing just North West of FROISSY BEACON.
 ii. Tanks of the 2nd Tank Battalion after completion of task
 in conjunction with 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde will co-operate with 3rd.
 Aust. Inf. Brigade in movement towards Knoll 90 in Square L.35.D.
 This will be arranged mutually between G.O.C. Brigades
 concerned.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE.*Am Ross.*

Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.
 1st Australian Division.

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- 11 5th. Tank. Brigade.
- 12 3rd. Aust. Division.
- 13 C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.
- 14 File.