


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/42/43 Part 3

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 1st  
Australian Division

August 1918



AWM4-1/42/43PART3



KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Divisional Headquarters,  
18th August, 1918.

1. A Conference will be held at Divisional Headquarters at  
2-30 p.m. 19th inst.

2. The following officers will attend.

G.O.C. Brigades.  
Brigade Majors.  
C. F. A.  
B.M., D.A.  
O.C. M.G. Battalion.  
An Officer 5th Tank Brigade.  
O.C. Div. Sig. Coy.

3. Cars will be sent to 1st and 2nd Brigades.

4. Agenda is attached.

*Hamilton*  
for Major

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



A G E N D A.

1. Battalion, Company and Platoon formations and frontages in the attack.
2. Allotment of Stokes Mortars, how carried and used.
3. Signal Communications - Report Centres.
4. Liaison with flanks - Use of D.R.L.S. and Light Horse.
5. Forward reconnaissance by specially selected officers.
6. Co-Operation between Infantry and Artillery.
  - (a) Allotment of Brigades and Batteries.
  - (b) Forward sections.
  - (c) Positions of F.O.Os - Liaison.
  - (d) Affiliated Heavy Brigades.
  - (e) Ammunition supply.
7. Assistance given by Vickers guns to Infantry during the advance.

Use of limbers by M.G. Company.
8. Tank co-operation - Ground scouts.
9. March discipline. - Routes, times to complete.
10. Any suggestions made by Brigadiers.

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FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters.  
23th. August 1918.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
1st. M.G. Battalion.  
1st. Pioneer Bn.  
C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.  
A.Q.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM.

1. Training will commence on 30th inst.
2. Hours of work per diem laid down by the G.O.C. are -  
3 hours Infantry Training.  
1 hour compulsory Recreational Training.
3. Subjects will be progressive -  
(a) Tactical exercises for all Officers and without troops.  
Other Ranks will do specialist training.  
(b) Tactical exercises with troops.  
i. Platoon Exercises.  
ii. Company Exercises.
4. i. O.C. 1st. Aust. M.G. Battalion will arrange for M.G. Coys to attend and take part in the more advanced exercises by direct arrangements with Brigadiers.  
ii. Stokes Mortars will be exercised with Infantry and methods of carrying by mule practised.
5. Tactical rides can be arranged direct with G.S.O.I on the lines proposed before the recent battle, if G.Os.C. Brigades are so desirous.
6. C.R.E. will arrange with G.Os.C. Brigades for training of Pioneers and Field Coys.
7. The Australian Educational Scheme will be explained by BISHOP LONG at a conference which will be held at Headquarters 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade at 2.30.p.m. on 30th inst.  
The following will attend -  
G.Os.C. Brigades.  
Battalion Commanders ( or in absence, 2nd in Command  
O.C. 1st. Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
O.C. 1st. Aust. M.G. Battalion.

*Am. Ross.*

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



APPENDIX VII

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters.  
31st. August. 1918.

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Herewith some further notes on recent  
fighting, which may prove of interest.

*Am. Ross*

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

APPENDIX

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1/5



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

31-8-18.

NOTES AND LESSON FROM RECENT FIGHTING.

Operations for Capture of CHUIGNES VALLEY  
August 23-8-18 and exploitation on subsequent days.  
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1. FORMATIONS AND FRONTAGES.

Frontages for straight forward attack averaged 1,000 yards per Battalion.

Right Brigade had 2 Coys in first wave, ~~and~~ 2 in second wave per Battalion in line.

Left Brigade had to form a long defensive flank and had 2 Battalions in line one in support, one in reserve.

Frontage for assaulting companies varied according to Company strength.

In one Battalion one company had 600 yards, the other 400 yards.

Company formations also varied according to strength and frontage but in nearly all cases 3 platoons were in first line, one platoon with Coy Headquarters in 2nd line. In nearly all cases, platoon formations (on 3 section organisation) were 2 sections in line

namely from right to left  $\frac{1}{2}$  double L.M.G. Section, one rifle section,  $\frac{1}{2}$  double Lewis Gun section. Remaining rifle section plus Platoon Headquarters in 2nd line.

All moved in file distributed over platoon frontage.

The 2nd wave i.e., support companies moved 400 - 500 yards in rear.

File formation was maintained as long as possible. Platoon Commanders and Company Commanders of 2nd or support wave led their formations, so as to be able to see what was going on.

Accuracy of interval was not insisted on, units went for the tactical points or points of opposition within their frontages and let the ground between such points go.

2. MAP MESSAGE FORM.

This was found as useful as ever and is in great demand. Battalion Commanders suggest that the headings TIME and DATE should be printed in very prominent RED type so that a Platoon or Company Commander has little chance of forgetting to insert either.

3. STOKES MORTARS.

There is general agreement that pack mules should be used and single guns pushed forward with loading companies. The Bosche frequently used old artillery gun pits and broken lengths of trench as M.Gun nests and the Stokes is the best means of dislodging them from these.

4. NO. 36. RIFLE GRENADE.

The large majority of Junior Commanders would not be without these. The 4 Cup-dischargers per platoon is considered sufficient.

5. VICKERS GUNS.

As mentioned in previous Notes by this Division, the M. Gun Companies require much training in Offensive Action.

The Lewis Gun is not strong enough for targets at 800 yards or more.

Opportunities arose for Vickers Guns to deal with enemy artillery both Anti-Tank and Field.

The Vickers Section Commander should keep his sub-section Commanders up with the leading Company Commanders and forward guns should follow closely behind leading companies. Rear guns were directed beforehand to fixed localities for defensive and consolidation purposes.



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6. DOUBLE LEWIS GUN SECTIONS.

This is, of course, split for the assault. Half sections moved on the flanks of the platoon and co-operated instinctively, one say, taking on a Bosche Gun and the other working round or one hip-firing and the other advancing and reserving its ammunition. It is all a matter of training and intelligent bravery.

7. TANKS.

In many cases, Tank Commanders halted their Tanks under cover of banks or woods and ascertained the situation from Company or Platoon Commanders; Where this was done, good results accrued. The Liaison Infantry man in the Tank should keep the Tank in the vicinity of a strong point or nest which is giving trouble until he is sure that the infantry are well up and have got the local situation well in hand.

8. MOPPING UP.

This was left, by strict orders, to the 2nd Waves. First Waves pushed on with the barrage, so as not to lose it on any account. The place to be mopped up was generally indicated by the Tank movement or seen by the Commanders of following waves because they were leading their men.

9. Hip-firing with the Lewis Gun.

Very much used and especially by the 4th Battalion A.I.F., South of CHUIGNES. Very effective in keeping enemy from putting his head up as the barrage passes on. The Gun was carried by sling passing over the left shoulder.

10. PASSING BACK INFORMATION.

Battalion Commanders used one or all three methods.  
(a) An O.P. as far forward as possible, with a wire to it.  
(b) the Battalion Intelligence Officer or selected Officer followed close up with a wire.  
(c) relays of runners.  
In all cases, Battalion Commanders found that it was necessary to have their own direct means as well as the ordinary company channels.

11. SOUVENIR HUNTING.

The desire for Souvenirs appears to be becoming very prevalent. Platoon Commanders had difficulty in some cases in keeping their men together and well up with the barrage owing to the distraction caused by ZEISS Glasses etc. Troops should be warned as to the serious results of this.

12. ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY.

It was again proved that F.O.O's of forward sections or batteries should be actually with the leading company commanders and that communication by wire should be carefully arranged. Fleeting targets cannot be fired upon by artillery quickly enough if communication is by runner. Batteries to be used in aid of exploitation should be pushed forward as early as possible even at the expense of weakening the later stages of the barrage, so that Battalion Commanders can fix up communications to them. Further artillery notes follow.

13. EXPLOITATION.

Was done by strong patrols, supporting platoons or posts being pushed up to them on the principle of "bounds".

14. FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS. Principles therein again of proven value.



Appa

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AUSTRALIAN CORPS.Corps Headquarters.  
6th. August. 1918.

My dear General,

I am forwarding you herewith a Special Message to the whole of the Troops of the Corps, on a scale which will permit of its issue by you down to Infantry and Pioneer Companies, Artillery Batteries (Australian, including any Army Brigades attached), Field Companies, Sections of Field Ambulances, and Detachments of Light Horse, etc.

I should be obliged if you would ensure that a distribution is made of this Message in the forenoon of August 7th, and that it is read to the Troops by Company Commanders, or their equivalent, during the late after-noon of August 7th, before the Troops move into battle.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) John Monash.



XV CORPS. NO. 128/28.G.

Major-General T.W. GLASGOW. CB. CMG. DSO.

Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Before your magnificent Division leaves my Corps, I wish to thank you and all ranks under your command for the exceptional services rendered during the past four months.

Joining this Corps on April 12th during the Battle of the LYS, the Division selected and prepared a position to defend the HAZEBROUCK Front, and a few days later repulsed two heavy attacks with severe losses to the enemy. This action brought the enemys advance to a standstill.

Since then, the Division has held the most important sector of this front continuously, and by skilful raiding and minor operations has advanced the line over a mile on a front of 5,000 yards, capturing just short of 1,000 prisoners, and causing such damage to the troops of the enemy that nine Divisions have been replaced.

The complete success of all minor operations; the skill displayed by the patrols by day as well as by night; the gallantry and determination of the troops; and their high state of training and discipline have excited the admiration and emulation of all, and I desire that you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their fine work and my regret that the Division is leaving my Command.

(sgd) Beauvoir de Lisle.

XV Corps Headquarters.  
4th. August. 1918.

Lieutenant-General.  
Commanding XV Corps.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY  
FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ON THE 9th, 10th,  
and 11th AUGUST 1918. CULMINATING IN  
THE CAPTURE OF LIGNES.

Reference Sheets. 32.D. 1.40.000 and 32.D.3.E. 32.0. 5.W. 33.F. N.E.  
33.D. N.W. 1. 20.000.

1. MOVE TO THE SOLE.

On the 5th, 6th and 7th August the 1st Aust. Division entrained by Brigade Groups and B.A. Group at ST OMER, ARGUES, and WIZERNES and moved by rail to the SOLE, detraining at LONGPRE, HANGEST, and PONT RUY on the 3th and night 5th/7th August. On detraining the Divisional Artillery was detached temporarily and the 1st Aust. Inf. Brigade was detached and came under the orders of the 4th Aust. Division.

2. CONCENTRATION AND SUBSEQUENT MOVES.

(a) On detraining the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde Group was concentrated in the AILLY LE HAUT CLOCHER - BOURDON - ST OVEN area and the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde Group in the LONG - COCOURTEL - BRUCAMPS area. 1st Aust. Inf. Bde Group (less Brigade H. Grs, 4 Battalions and Bde Signal Section) was concentrated with the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde Group. On completion of concentration groups were placed under two hours notice.

(b) On the night 7/8th August 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde Group moved by bus to the CANON - QUERRIEU Area and the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde Group by bus to the COISY - POULAINVILLE - CARBONNETTE area, moves being completed by 5 a.m. 8th August and 12.30 a.m. 8th August respectively. Billetting accommodation in every case was bad and troops had little rest.

(c) On the afternoon of the 8th inst, the move forward was continued, the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde Group moving by march route to the AUBIGNY area and the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde Group to the HAMEL area. The weather was warm and the roads were very dusty. The move of the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde Group was completed by 6 p.m. and that of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde Group by 11 p.m.

In preparation for this move and subsequent fighting Packs and Blankets had been dumped and Nucleus personnel left behind. At daylight Officers of all Battalions went forward to reconnoitre in the direction of BAYONVILLERS and HARBONNIERES. On the afternoon of the 8th inst Advanced D.H.Q. was moved from ALLOUVILLE to VILLERS BRETONNEUX from where the subsequent fighting of the Division was directed. On the night 8th/9th 1st Aust. Divisional Artillery returned for duty to the Division.

3. APPROACH MARCH.

Late on the night 8th August Warning Orders were received from Australian Corps detailing the probable exploitation role of the Division in consequence of the complete success of the remaining Divisions of the Corps during the 8th August. Accordingly Warning Order was issued at midnight 8th/9th August for 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde to be prepared to move forward to positions about HARBONNIERES at 3 a.m. and for 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde to be prepared to follow one hour later.

This Warning Order was confirmed on the morning of the 9th inst. Communications which were maintained entirely by D.R. were becoming increasingly difficult and often caused delays in movements. By 3 a.m. all units of the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde were underway moving towards positions of assembly about HARBONNIERES. One hour later units of the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde were on the move to Square 3. South of BAYONVILLERS.



General Officers Commanding 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigades were brought to D.H.Q. at 3.a.m. to receive further and more complete instructions from the Divisional Commander, which were as follows:-  
Para 4 - Plan of Operation.

#### 4. PLAN OF OPERATION.

The Division with the 2nd. Canadian Division on the right and the 2nd. Aust. Division on the left was to continue on the 9th August, the advance of the previous day and capture the GREEN, RED, and BLUE lines as shown on attached map. The initial attack on the GREEN and RED Lines was to be carried out by the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde with the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde in support. The 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde in place of the 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde was placed under the Division and became Divisional Reserve Brigade. Should the GREEN and RED Lines be captured without very serious opposition, the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde was to continue the advance and capture the BLUE Line, but should the enemy resist strenuously, the advance beyond the RED Line was to be carried out with both the 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdes in line, 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde being on the right. The RED Line in any case was to be consolidated.

Zero hour :- 11.a.m.

The 3th Battalion on the right and the 7th Battalion on the left were the Battalions detailed for the initial attack, supported by the 8th Battalion and the 5th Battalion.

#### ARTILLERY.

1st. Aust. Div. Artillery. }  
293th. Army. Bde. R.F.A. }  
189th. " " }

were available for the operation and were placed under the orders of the C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div. Artillery was to be in position by 10.a.m. For the capture of the BLUE Line, should two Inf. Bdes be employed, it was arranged for the C.R.A. to allot 2 F.A. Bdes to each of the General Officers Commanding 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdes. There was to be no Artillery Barrage.

#### TANKS.

14 Tanks of the 2nd. Tank. Bn were available for the capture of the GREEN and RED Line and were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. In the event of the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. being needed for the capture of the BLUE Line, the tanks were to be distributed between the 2nd and 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bdes by direct arrangements with the Tank. Bn. Commander. The G.O.C. 5th. Tank. Bde agreed to the absence of artillery Barrage.

#### JUMPING OFF LINE.

As Zero hour was fixed at 11.a.m., and as it was realized the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde could not possibly reach the jumping off line by that hour, it was arranged that the 15th. Aust. Inf. Bde which was then holding the line from which the attack was to commence should advance in conformity with the Canadians on the right, whose left flank it was our duty to protect. The 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde when it arrived would then go through the 15th. Aust. Inf. Bde and continue the advance.

#### SUPPORT BRIGADE.

The 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde was to follow the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde in artillery formation and be prepared to deploy on the left of the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde on the RED Line preparatory to the attack on the BLUE Line.

#### RESERVE BRIGADE.

6th. Aust. Inf. Bde was to concentrate at 10.a.m. in positions about Square V.5. (Sheet 62.B.) and then to follow the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde at one mile's distance. On the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde reaching the RED Line and the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde deploying to the left, the 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde was to close up 1 mile behind 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.



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The right flank of the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde was to be on the railway throughout. The 6th Aust. Inf. Bde was to be prepared to subsequently pass through to the BLUE LINE. Divisional Report Centre was to be established at GUILLAUCOURT. W.8.D.9.1.

5. THE ATTACK. Instead of the two phases of the action as was anticipated, the battle developed into one of 3 Phases, each of 24 hours duration.

FIRST PHASE. At 1.40 p.m. the 7th and 8th Battalions were in position and they commenced their advance. By this time these Battalions had been marching for 5 hours in very hot weather along extremely dusty roads and across broken country with only the usual 10 minutes halt in each hour and no spell for a midday meal.

They had covered a distance of between 10 and 11 miles and had moved straight into the attack without a spell on the forming up line.

They had had in addition only two full nights rest in the previous eleven.

The ground over which the advance was to be carried consisted of a fairly level plain for the first 4,000 yards from the jumping off line, when it commenced gradually to rise culminating in a ridge on which is situated the village of LIHONS. This high ground dominated the whole country over which our troops were to attack and gave observation over the area well in rear of HARBONNIERES.

The weather was fine and hot.

Immediately the advance commenced, the troops came under artillery fire from 7.7. and 10 cm batteries posted on the LIHONS Ridge, but few casualties were suffered at this stage as the men were well extended. E.A. were also active, dropping bombs and using M.Gs from a low altitude on the advancing troops.

The 7th and 8th Battalions passed through the 15th Aust. Inf. Bde on the line approximately as marked on Map ... attached. They immediately came under heavy M.G. fire, principally from the left flank, for the left flank of the left (7th) Battalion was in the air, owing to the failure of the 2nd Aust. Div to advance in conformity with us.

Throughout the whole of the advance to the RED Line the 7th Battalion was troubled severely by this flanking M.G. fire as the enemy seemed quickly to realize the situation and moved his M.Guns to our exposed flank. (The 2nd Aust. Div did not pass the jumping off line until 4.30 p.m. or 2 hours and 50 minutes after our advance had commenced). On the right the chief opposition came from

ROSIERES RAILWAY STATION, but after a brisk fight, the enemy was driven out and the STATION with an immense amount of material, including a 21 cm howitzer, was captured.

By the time the infantry reached the GREEN Line all the Tanks had been put out of action, mainly by direct hits from the guns posted on the LIHONS Ridge.

They had not been of as much assistance as was expected. On the left they seemed to lose direction almost immediately after starting and veered to the right, leaving our left flank, the vulnerable point, unprotected.

However in one case, a M.G. nest was destroyed by one of their number. From now on the infantry had to advance without any assistance whatever.

In spite of heavy M.G. and direct artillery fire, progress continued to be made, but it was slow and casualties were heavy. By 4 p.m. we had reached the line F.4.A.5.2. to X.23.A.5.8. to X.23.A.1.9. to X.22.C.6.5. to X.15.A. (marked on Map attached).



By 5.p.m. owing to heavy casualties the attacking Battalions had to be reinforced. Accordingly the 8th Battalion was reinforced by one company from the 6th Battalion, while on the left the 5th Battalion sent one company to aid the 7th Battalion, while a second company formed a defensive flank on their left and outside the Brigade Boundary.

By now the advance had reached parts of the old French trench System of 1916. These trenches which had provided cover to the enemy now assisted us in our advance, enabling our men to move up under cover, bombing where necessary.

By this means a battery of 7.7. cm guns situated at X.29.C.7.7. which had been hampering our advance was put out of action and with the exception of one gun, which the enemy succeeded in getting away, fell into our hands.

Later in the evening he made a determined attempt with about 100 men to remove these guns, but failed with heavy casualties.

By 6.p.m. the RED Line approximately had been captured along the whole Brigade front. The 7th and 8th Battalions were in touch with one another, but the Canadians on our right were some 600 yards in rear, consequently it was necessary to throw back a defensive flank with one company. This company moved up again to the RED Line on the Canadians advancing their posts during the night. On the left it was also necessary to form a defensive flank, but at 8.45.p.m. that evening touch was gained with the 25th Bn, who were however still well in rear of the RED Line and some considerable distance to the left of their right Boundary.

As our casualties had been heavy and the men were very tired it was decided to consolidate on the RED Line with a view to continuing the advance to the BLUE Line on the following morning with the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde in line on the left of the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. This action was made necessary also by the halt of the Canadians whose flank we had to protect.

During the evening and night, patrols were pushed out to cover consolidation and to reconnoitre the ground in front. Some of these advanced beyond BOIS DE CREPY and reached the outskirts of LIHONS itself.

At 3.p.m. the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde advanced in artillery formation to Squares W.16. and to Squares W.18. 24. and X.13. and 19. at 9.30. p.m.

During Phase 1. we captured 63 prisoners and much material.

## PHASE 2.

(a) PLAN. At 12 midnight 9/10th August orders were issued for the continuation of the advance with the 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde in line on the left and the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde in line on the right.

The left Bde were attacking with two Battalions in line, 9th on right and the 11th on the left, 10th Bn right support, 12th Bn left support. The right Bde were attacking with 6th Bn on right and 5th Bn on the left in line, 3th Bn in support, and 7th Bn in reserve.

The BLUE Line was the objective. Boundaries as shown on attached Map.

2nd. Aust. Division and 4th. Canadian Divisions were to attack on the flanks. ZERO was to be 8.a.m.

As many Tanks as were available were to co-operate and the advance was to proceed under artillery Barrage, placed at least 700 yards clear of the RED Line at ZERO - 15.

During the night 9/10th the 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde had rejoined the Division and became for this action Divisional Reserve, taking up position about Squares X.14. X.20. X.26. at 8.a.m.

(b) THE OPERATION:- At 3.30.a.m. the Left Brigade moved forward in artillery formation the right Bn reaching the RED Line without casualties. By this time, it was realized that the left Battalion 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde on the extreme left were in places some hundreds of yards W. of the RED Line. The left Battalion 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde



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met heavy M.G. fire on reaching X.13.C. and suffered casualties from this point to the RED Line.

At 3.a.m. the Field Artillery barrage opened. It was weak and ineffective and seemed to fall too far away from the advancing troops.

At 7.50.a.m. the C.O. 6th Battalion (right of right Brigade) learnt through his liaison Officer that the Canadian Division was not advancing and that the Canadian left flank would remain approximately at F.3.A.3.7. until they received further orders to attack. No word of this postponement reached this Division until after our operation had commenced. The Canadians ultimately commenced their advance at 10.45.a.m.

In consequence of this, the right flank of the 6th Battalion was in the air throughout the greater part of the attack and consequently this Battalion suffered heavy casualties.

Immediately our men commenced to move forward in line of skirmishers, they came under heavy M.G. fire, the barrage having failed to silence these guns. The barrage was lost and the advance could only be continued by short rushes supported by covering fire. The morning mist had cleared and visibility was perfect.

At 9.30.a.m. we had reached the approximate line F.6.C.0.0. - F.5.B.6.2. to the E. edge of CREPEY WOOD. From CREPEY WOOD Northwards the line ran approximately along the RED Line, the left Brigade having made little progress owing to heavy M.G. fire from the left flank and from CREPEY WOOD, which swept the open ground continuously.

Enemy field guns at point blank range swept the road and approaches. Two platoons of the 9th Battalion, were sent forward under covering fire to attack CREPEY WOOD from both flanks and from the S.W. corner of the Wood. These platoons met with severe resistance and suffered casualties but they worked around the wood and established posts at X.50.A.8.5. X.24.C.2.2. X.30.C.4.5.

At about 10.30.a.m. the line had made no further progress with the exception of the 5 abovementioned posts.

These posts having been unable to gain touch on the flanks were withdrawn to the trenches just W. of the Wood.

At 10.30.a.m. a Tank detailed to assist the Canadians moved over on our front from the direction of ROSIERES and gave valuable assistance enabling our right flank to advance to HALT F.6.C.4.0.

By this time the left Battalion had been able to make some slow progress and the centre company had reached a line from X.23.B.7.0. to CAMP DES CHASSEURS (X.17.C.9.5.)

On the extreme left progress was still difficult on account of the heavy fire from the old French trenches in X.17.A. B. and C. The ground here is very open with a gentle slope E. towards the enemy positions.

At 1.p.m. the situation was as follows from N. to S. - approx along the RED LINE to about X.17.C.3.5. then S.E. to X.23.B.7.0. to X.23.D.4.6. to X.23.D.8.4. to trenches along the E. edge of CREPEY WOOD. - X.29.D.3.8. to F.5.B.7.7. to F.5.D.9.9. along road to Quarry F.6.C.5.1 then S. to railway at HALT. The right flank of the Division on the left was at approx. X.13.Central the Division having apparently lost direction.

On the right the Canadians supported by Tanks had by this time come up with our right and were slightly in advance of us at about A.7.B.5. At 1.p.m. a company of the 10th Battalion with a platoon of the 5th Battalion which had been sent forward independently by the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde attacked CREPEY WOOD and after much very stubborn resistance succeeded in driving the enemy out and established posts on the N. and E. side of the Wood.

The left Battalion after reinforcing the front line were still unable to make any appreciable progress owing to the continuous M.G. fire and doubtless due to this resistance, this Battalion had lost direction, its right flank being in rear of the centre of the 9th Bn. Meanwhile the Battalions of the right Brigade were endeavouring to continue the advance but though progress was made it was limited.



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owing to the Heavy M.G. fire from S.25. and S.26. to the heavy casualties suffered, and to the fatigue of the men. At about 2.p.m. a counter attack developed against the right and centre sops of the left Battalion, but was driven off with heavy loss, the Vickers Guns attached to the Battalion doing very good work. At 4.30.p.m. the line ran from N. to S. approx as follows;- Along the RED Line as at 1.p.m. to the N. edge of GREPEY WOOD. where posts were established, along the Eastern edge of the Wood to X.30.A.5.0. then S.E. to A.1.B.1.7. to F.3.C.2.3. then along road to railway as at 1.p.m. At 5.p.m. a second counter attack by about 300 of the enemy developed against GREPEY WOOD after an heavy artillery preparation by 10 and 15 cms pieces. Two posts were obliterated by artillery fire and the enemy after surrounding 2 other posts and driving in our posts East of the Wood, gained a footing in the Wood itself. The O.C. "A" Coy of the 10th Battalion immediately counter attacked with his Support platoons and after an hours bitter fighting drove the enemy from the Wood and the line was again restored. Though this Coy suffered severely the enemy left 90 dead behind. However by this counter attack the enemy had been enabled to bring M.Gun up to X.30.A.6.0. which playing across the front of the right Bde effectively prevented any further advance by that Brigade. At 9.p.m. the line and dispositions were approximately as follows from N. to S. Along the RED Line as at 4.30.p.m. to X.23.B.7.0. to X.25.D.4.8. along old trenches to X.23.D.8.4. along the tramway E. around the N. and E. edge of GREPEY WOOD to X.30.C.2.8. then South to railway as at 4.30.p.m. The Left Battalion (11th Battalion) of the 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde had all available troops in the line with 1 Coy of the 12th Bn in close support. The Battalion was in close touch with the Bn on the right and in touch by patrols with the Bn on the left. The right Bn of the Division on the left had been unable to come up and the line bent sharply westwards from the flank of the 11th Battalion. The right Battalion (9th Bn) of the 3rd.Aust.Inf. Bde had all available troops in the line with the remnants of 1 Coy 10th Battalion in addition. Remainder of 10th Battalion was in close support and well entrenched in old French lines in rear. Touch had been gained on both flanks. On the right the 7th and 8th Battalions were close up and supporting the 5th and 6th Battalions in the line. It was decided to consolidate on this line and re-organise preparatory to a further advance on the morrow. This was accordingly proceeded with and the night passed quietly except for fairly heavy shelling of our front positions by enemy artillery from 5.p.m. onwards. The left flank of the 4th Canadian Division rested in front of us in approx A.S. During PHASE 2. we captured 6 Officers and 137 other ranks and some material.

### PHASE. 3.

(a) PLAN. It was realized that the period of semi-open fighting had passed and that owing to the existence of the old French trench system a more or less set piece was necessary to advance further. In addition the enemy had brought up reinforcing troops and artillery.

TROOPS. 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde on the right with the 8th Battalion with one Coy 7th Battalion in line and 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde on the left with the 10th Battalion (less 1 Coy) and 12th Battalion under command of the C.O. 10th Battalion on the right and the 11th Bn. on the left.

TANKS. Four Tanks were allotted to the left Brigade and six Tanks to the right Brigade.



ARTILLERY. Two Field Artillery Brigades allotted to each Brigade and action was arranged direct between C.R.A. and Brigadiers concerned.

2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde arranged a creeping barrage starting on the grid line running from A.8.A.0.5. to S.25.C.0.8.

The 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde arranged a creeping barrage nearer to their front line troops but conforming to the barrage of the 2nd.Aust. Inf.Bde. Heavy Artillery was to fire on CHAULNES.

SUB-SECTORS. remained unaltered.

RESERVE BRIGADE was to close up to Squares X.21. - X.22. and X.23.

ZERO. 4.a.m. 11th August, to conform with operation to be carried out by the 2nd and 3rd.Aust.Divisions further to the North.

JUMPING OFF LINE. Troops were to form up on present front line and then to advance in rear of the Tanks who would closely follow the creeping barrage.

(b) OPERATION. The morning was very foggy and dark and great difficulty was experienced in maintaining direction. Except for this difficulty the dawn provided ideal conditions for attack. Our men followed the barrage, but all the Tanks except one were missing. This one assisted the left Brigade. It appears that some were late while others lost their bearings in the fog.

At 5.a.m. the remainder of those detailed for the left Brigade joined in the fight on the left. The Barrage was excellent but rather too fast (100 yards in 3 minutes) for the condition of the ground which was a maze of trenches.

Immediately the attack commenced heavy H.G. fire commenced.

Fortunately their fire was wild, doubtless due to the fog and the rattled state of the gun crews and most of them were mopped up before doing much damage. The right Company of the left Bde put out of action some light field guns which were on the E. side of the Village.

At about 5.a.m. touch was lost between the two attacking Brigades. This appeared to be due to the right centre company of the 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde veering to the right and the left centre Company moving too far to the left and falling behind the left Brigade. However the gap was filled and by the time S.25.D 5.8. was reached the advance was continuing as planned.

At 5.15.a.m. the BLUE Line in its entirety had been captured. Two Tanks were sent by the 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde and these with a mopping up company of the 7th Battalion succeeding in clearing all H.G. nests which had been over run by the rapidity of the advance out of the Village of LIHONS.

Consolidation was commenced immediately. We were now in a secure position, on a commanding ridge looking well over the Canadians on the right and well over the enemys country in all directions. We were in touch on both flanks, for though the Canadians had not advanced we had thrown back a defensive flank along the railway. The right flank of the 2nd.Aust.Division on the left was at X.17.B. 3.2.

COUNTER ATTACKS. The enemy launched a series of vigorous counter-attacks commencing at 3.a.m. These with one exception were beaten b with heavy loss to the enemy.

At 8.30.a.m. a number of the enemy succeeded in breaking our front line in S.19.D. and advanced towards CREPEY WOOD and the Hospital at X.24.C.3.8. Fierce fighting took place between CREPEY WOOD and the new line, in the course of which we inflicted heavy loss on the enemy and captured prisoners. The enemy continued attacking in S.19. and S.20. and at times succeeded in dribbling men forward through the complicated systems of trenches in this area. In spite of these continuous attacks the left Brigade succeeded at 4.p.m. in completely establishing the line only 300 yards W of the BLUE Line. The right Brigade during this time were also being counter-attacked, two attacks one at 9.30.a.m. and the other at 4.30.p.m. being particularly heavy. All these counter attacks were repulsed. The line being consolidated at this time ran as follows:-



- 3 -

The line being consolidated at this time ran as follows:-  
 X.11.D.1.2. thence along support line to X.23.B.4.3. - X.23.B.9.7. -  
 X.24.A.0.8. - X.24.A.8.5. - thence along trench to S.19.B.5.0. -  
 S.19.D.9.6. - S.26.A.5.7. - S.26.B.2.3. - S.26.D.7.7. then South  
 to the Railway.

On the night 11/12th August, the 2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde was relieved by  
 the 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde and moved back to Divisional Reserve.

On the 12th August the firing line of the old French system from  
 X.23.B.9.7. to X.11.D.4.0. was occupied without serious opposition  
 and a liaison post established with the 2nd.Aust.Division at  
 X.11.D.4.0.

On the morning of the 15th the line was again pushed forward to the  
 following line - S.19.B.6.0. - S.19.B.6.6. - X.24.A.8.8. - thence  
 along the old Front line trench to X.18.A.5.0.

#### 6. ACTION OF 1st.AUST.INF.BDE and 1st.Aust.Div.Artillery during period of detachment.

-----  
 The 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde did not participate in any attack, ether than  
 in a reserve capacity. The Brigade took over portion of the line  
 at MORCOURT under the 4th.Aust.Div. and also relieved the 2nd.Aust.  
 Inf.Bde at LIHONS on the 11/12th.

The activity of the Brigade while in the line on these two occasions  
 was confined to patrolling in which exercise however, several  
 prisoners were taken.

The Divisional Artillery. Sent its two F.A. Brigades into line  
 under the 2nd.Aust.Division. These Brigades took part in the  
 preliminary stages of the advance of the 6th August, but at Zero  
 plus 4 hours on the 6th, they returned to duty with 1st.Aust.  
 Divisional Artillery.

*M. R. A.*

Lieut-Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 1st Australian Division.



APPENDICES.

1. Prisoners and Trophies captured.
2. Notes and deductions on Operations forwarded on 28-8-18.

MAPS.

Attached Maps shows stages of the advance.



APPENDIX. I.Prisoners and Material captured .

We captured during the 5 days -

6 Officers and 203 Other Ranks unwounded.

- 2 21. cm. (approx) guns
- 12 10. cm howitzers.
- 3 anti-tank guns calibres 7.5.cm.
- 7 7.7.cm. Field Guns.
- 40. Minenwerfer and Light and Heavy Trench Mortars.
- 177. Machine Guns.

Much other material, including a huge dump at  
ROBIERES Station.

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APPENDIX XI

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

17-8-18.

Patrolling Operations, 1st. Aust. Division.  
July 11th and 12th. 1918.  
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The following is an account of the patrolling operations by which the front of the 1st. Australian Division was advanced on July 11th 1918. The operations began upon the initiative of Officers and men in the front line posts, but were permitted to extend under certain conditions and with certain precautions. The number of prisoners taken in these two days was -

3 Officers. 155 Other Ranks.  
13 Machine Guns were also captured.

Vigorous patrolling had been going on for some weeks. But the actual enterprises of July 11th originated with the 1st. Aust. Infantry Battalion, whose operations during this day may be divided into four parts - A., B., C., and D.,

*M. A. S.* Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

APPENDIX

11

130



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.NARRATIVE.

On July the 11th the 1st. Australian Infantry Battalion was holding the front line between STRAZELLE and MERRIS astride of the railway which runs to the South of both of these villages. The country consisted of fields of deep crop with scattered farmhouses, the farm buildings being mostly surrounded by small grass or garden enclosures bounded by hedges. The Battalion front was held by two Companies, each having 5 platoons forward and one in Support. Each of the three front line platoons in each Company formed a picquet. The battalion thus had 6 platoon posts in its front line. A third Company was in Support, and the fourth in Reserve.

The Company astride of the railway was holding three platoon posts. The central post (No.2) was actually touching the Southern side of the railway. The Southern post (No.1) was about 250 yards south of it. The Northern post was 150 yards ahead and slightly to the North of the railway.

OPERATION. A.

In front of No. 2 Post, 500 yards away, was a small house. This house was immediately south of the railway. The grass space surrounding the house was enclosed by a hedge and bordered on the railway. No. 2 Post and this grass plot each bordered on the South side of the railway, with about 250 yards of tall crop between them.

The platoon Commander of No. 2. Post, on taking over, had been told by the Officer whom he relieved that he believed this house to be occupied. The post however had a bad field of view, as the land rose slightly in front of the post and dipped again to the house. When daylight began to break the incoming platoon Commander sent out a Sergeant and one man along the ditch on the South side of the railway to a point near the top of the rise from which he could get a better view. They returned at 5.a.m. when a Corporal and one other man were sent out to take their place, for two hours. During this time the platoon Commander and the Corporal crept into a shell hole in the crop about 50 yards in front of their post and fired some rifle grenades at the house and the hedges around it. No movement of any sort was seen during these periods from No. 2. post. The platoon Commander reported to the Company Commander at 8.30.a.m. He learnt from the Commander of No. 3. Post (across the railway to the north) that when the rifle grenades were fired Germans had been seen to leave the house. Identifications were needed. It was therefore decided that a patrol from No. 2. Post should go out and examine the house and if possible obtain an identification.

At 9.30. the platoon Commander from No.2.Post took out the Sergeant and Corporal who had been patrolling up to that time as described above, and one other man. Each took a rifle, two or three bandoliers of ammunition and 4 bombs. The Officer and Sergeant had also revolvers. They crept along the South side of the railway till they reached the hedge enclosing the grass plot around the house. The railway afforded a very good avenue of approach to the house because it ran along an embankment about 9 ft high which shut off all view from anyone to the North. Along the bottom of the embankment on its South side ran a continuous hedge and along the South side of this hedge a ditch two or three feet deep. Immediately South of this ditch sprang the crop.

The party crawled along this ditch to the corner of the hedge near the house. The house stood on the far side (i.e, east) of the grass enclosure, about forty yards south of the railway. It was decided that the Officer and the Corporal should creep further up the ditch to a point north of the house (marked A in the sketch)



( 2 )

from which they could cover the surroundings of the house; while the Sergeant with the other man turned south along the western edge of the enclosure, and then along the southern edge of it, and so up to the back of the house, going round three sides of the enclosure and finally getting into the house from the back. This they did, the Sergeant and his companion crawling along the outer side of the hedge surrounding the enclosure. The house had been recently occupied - playing cards were found there but no clue by which the occupants could be identified. The Sergeant crept back to the Officer - going across the grass plot this time. From where the Officer and Corporal had been waiting there could be seen in the crop behind the house several very large shell-holes. The Sergeant was instructed to clear these shell-holes. He crawled back and across a cleared space behind the house into the edge of the crop and up to the shell-holes, the Officer and Corporal covering them from the same point beside the railway. The railway embankment prevented the Sergeant being seen from the N. The shell-holes were empty and had never been occupied.

The Sergeant returned and the whole party then crawled across the grass plot and southwards along the inner side of the hedge in front of the house until they reached the point marked B just inside the S.W. corner of the enclosure. Here they lay for a considerable time, the Officer searching with glasses the crop to the west of him (i.e. between him and his own post) and the Sergeant doing the same to the South. Three suspicious looking shell-holes were seen in the crop. These are marked X Y and Z in the Sketch. Part of the upturned earth of having been newly thrown up. In the case of Z the suspicion was made nearly certain by the fact that the edge of the shell crater had been camouflaged by laying on it the crop which had been cut around it.

The party crawled through the crop towards the nearest shell-hole. When twenty yards from it the Corporal and one man were left with instructions to cover especially the rear of the other two. Then the Sergeant and Officer worked quietly up to the back rim of the crater and together looked over the rim into it. A machine gun was mounted in it, facing the other way (i.e. towards our posts). The sentry was sitting down in the crater talking to another German who was lying on the bottom of it. The sentry had a revolver in its case on his belt. Both men looked up, completely surprised. They were being covered by revolvers and began at once to cry "Mer-ci". A threat induced them to be quiet. The Officer asked them where the other German posts were, and they pointed readily enough to the crater at Y - if they did not understand the words they understood the intention.

The Officer being already certain of the crater at Z this information made him sure that both shell-holes were occupied. They accordingly took the two prisoners back to the Corporal and the other man at W. The two Germans carried their machine gun with them as soon as they knew what was wanted they were very ready to do it. The Officer decided to rush the other two posts together. Accordingly he left the two prisoners with the two men at W; and then he crawled out towards the southern post (Y) while the Sergeant took the Northern one (Z). The distance to the Southern post was rather longer. It was arranged that the Sergeant, when he got into position, should wait until the Officer gave the signal; and they should then rush the posts together. It was necessary at intervals throughout to get the head above the crop in order to see the position. They each reached a point about ten yards from their respective posts. Then the Officer waved his hand and they rushed for the shell-holes.

The Sergeant found four Germans in his shell-hole, and the Officer eight. In each shell-hole was a machine gun pointing the other way. In each case as they came up a shot was fired at them from the shell-hole. They are uncertain whether the Germans

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( 5 )

had been aroused by some noise from the taking of the first post. Both the Officer and the Sergeant fired several shots from their revolvers. The Officer's second shot hit the N.C.O. in charge of the German post at Z in the arm, and the Germans held their hands up. The Germans did not know how many might not, behind the single man whom they in each case saw.

A bomb would in each case have settled the whole party in the shell-hole; but bombs were not thrown because the sound of one would have informed any Germans in the surrounding shell-holes that there was a fight in progress, whereas a revolver shot told them nothing. The whole party of prisoners was hurriedly disarmed and taken back to our post (No.2) by the shortest route. They were marched overland through the crop, with the best possible speed. They were seen by Germans from the houses 250 yards south at G, and were fired on but none were hit. On reaching the post the prisoners were pushed off at once under escort across the railway and to Company Headquarters.

Instructions were given that all shell-holes in the neighbourhood of the others were to be cleared. The same patrol accordingly went out at once, with the addition of two more men. It worked straight through the crop at all shell-holes near the German posts which had previously been captured. From these shell-holes 18 Germans were taken. These were observers or members of the machine gun crews, who used the various shell-holes near their guns for living in. The living position generally took the form of an undercut driven into the side of the shell-hole facing our posts, and then sunk some feet down. The opening was covered by a sheet, and was so unobtrusive that in certain cases even when looking straight down into the shell-hole it was not easy to discover them. During this operation the sniping from the house to the south continued and one man was hit. It had been decided to advance our line to the far side of the house near the railway which had first been visited. The Corporal and two men accordingly stayed out there to prevent the Germans from reoccupying it, and three Lewis Guns were sent up there in the afternoon. The remaining members of the patrol returned. Altogether the patrol had been out 3½ hours and had taken 32 prisoners, and three Light Machine Guns.

This finished Operation "A".

OPERATION "B". Meanwhile the left Picquet (No.3) which occupied the post north of the railway, from which (as stated above) a view had been obtained of Germans leaving the house near the railway, had embarked on a separate operation. Less than 200 yards in front of this picquet was an enclosure surrounded by a hedge and bordered by trees. This enclosure was known to be occupied. At the far Southern end of it was a house. The hedge and drain which made the Southern edge of this enclosure were continued out into the field in which No 3 Post was. About 10.30 a.m. a patrol consisting of an Officer, an N.C.O., with two others, left No.3 Post and crept under cover of this hedge and drain to the house. One man was left at the corner of the hedge nearest to our post (at point marked D on Map). The Southern edge of the enclosure, and the house, were found to be unoccupied.

The enclosure North of the house was known to be occupied. The patrol decided to search it. A covered in dug out was seen by the patrol (which was unobserved by those in the dug-out). The patrol approached it from the flank covered the Germans inside with a revolver, and these at once surrendered. Two more dugouts were captured in the same way.

The prisoners were then sent back in charge of the N.C.O. The man from the corner of the field (D) was brought up. This left the Officer with two men. They moved up the field, the Officer in



( 4 )

the centre, the men on either side of him at 10 to 12 paces interval. This enabled three more dugouts to be dealt with at once, and the occupants captured. In two dugouts at the Northern end of the field, however, some resistance was met with. It became necessary to fire several shots.

Quick action was clearly demanded, for the occupants of the remaining dugouts were aroused by the shooting, outside their immediate positions. Bombs were thrown into several of the dugouts and two of the patrol closed in and cut off the enemy's line of retreat.

The bombs demoralised the remaining garrison and they surrendered easily. Altogether 36 prisoners were taken, and 4 Light Machine Guns. The patrol finished its work shortly after noon. Later, when the battalion on the left (4th. Australian Infantry Battalion) had similarly cleared and captured the German posts to the North of this position, our line was advanced and a post sited in the field which was the scene of this operation.

OPERATION "C" Operations "A" and "B" were both the work of the Left Company of the 1st. Battalion. As they had been so successful it was decided to exploit them and advance the line.

This made necessary the capture of the farm buildings at C, from which the first operation had been steadily sniped. These houses were in an enclosure just south of a road running (roughly) east and west parallel to the railway line and 200 to 300 yards south of it. Across the same road, about 250 yards east of the houses, was No. 3. (Left) Picquet of the right Company of the 1st. Battalion.

A patrol had already left this picquet at 10 a.m. to explore the buildings with a view to an intended raid. An Officer and four men made their way up a drain in single file towards the farm. When about 40 yards from the place they formed in line at 5 paces interval, and crept in this fashion for 20 yards. They were not fired on. A N.C.O. and two men were accordingly detached to see if the hedge along the Southern corner of the farm enclosure was wired, and also to locate any enemy posts. This party came on the enemy at the point marked K in the sketch and captured seven men with slight resistance. This however roused the German post further south at L, and the party was fired on from there. The prisoners were taken back to our post, being covered by two members of the patrol during the process.

It had been by this time decided that the enemy should be cleared out of these positions on the right flank with a view to advancing the line. At 4 p.m. instructions were given that the farm buildings which were the subject of this operation should be taken by the Right Company. The method of attack was to be from the left flank and rear. No 3. Picquet, Right Company was moved northwards from its position across the road to No. 2. Post of the left company by the railway line, from which the first patrol had issued that morning. The post which was thus left vacant was garrisoned by another platoon, while a further platoon was moved up in close support. The three Lewis Guns at the house first captured near the railway line were ordered to give covering fire from the North, if needed. And several Lewis Guns facing the objective from the front were to do the same.

The attacking platoon moved No. 2. Post out towards the house by the railway line, and then southwards and south-westwards against the right rear of the farm which it was attacking. The platoon was formed in two lines of skirmishers, the first to attack, and the second to act as support and guard the flanks and reinforce if necessary. The Lewis Guns and rifle grenadiers in the hedge south of the house by the railway covered its advance. At about 30 yards from the German Post at K and from another post 100 yards north of it, the line was fired on.



( 5 )

with rifles and machine guns. The posts were at once rushed. Nine Germans and 2 machine guns were taken without a casualty. When the left flank of the platoon attempted to advance further, however, it came under heavy fire from the right. It was decided therefore to place the post immediately in front (East) of the farm buildings in the position captured.

From this position patrols of three or four men one after another worked out and took from the flank and rear the three German posts immediately south of them. But there were still other posts further south which were giving trouble by their machine gun fire. A patrol of an Officer and 4 other ranks was accordingly sent out from another platoon to silence them. Two posts were located, one on each side of a road 300 yards South west of the farm (marked E on the Map). The Sentry was sitting in the bottom of the post. These posts were tackled in a manner similar to those previously taken. There was a sharp fight in which 9 Germans were killed and 5 wounded. Fourteen prisoners and one light machine gun were taken; two other light machine guns were found but were not brought in.

In front of these posts the crops had been cut for a space of from 40 to 80 yards. This operation was over by 6.p.m.

OPERATION. D. The whole line had thus been advanced except the extreme right. Opposite the left of the next brigade in the line was a farm known as TERN FARM, held by the Germans. An advance by the right of the 1st Battalion would necessitate the capture of this farm and the surrounding hedges. Plans were therefore considered for an attack upon this position in co-operation with the battalion of the East Yorkshire Regiment which was on the right of the 1st Australian Infantry Battalion. The right post of the 1st Battalion was on the VIEUX BERQUIN Road. The road ran out from it to the South East diagonally across the front of the next brigade. TERN FARM was some 400 yards down the road.

On the evening of July 11th a patrol from this right post, consisting of an Officer and one man moved down parallel to the road and reached a German post about 100 yards down the road and slightly East of it. Three Germans were killed and two captured. The next morning (July 12th) the same Officer took out from his post, between 9.30. and 10.a.m. a patrol of 4 men. By methods similar to those employed in operations "A" and "B" they captured the garrisons of various German posts and brought in 28 prisoners and 4 machine guns. The whole of the enemy had been cleared for a depth of 200 to 300 yards in front of the right post of the 1st Battalion. A few men were left in the field which had been cleared, in order to prevent the Germans from reoccupying it. This was reported to Headquarters.

It was arranged with the battalion on the right to exploit this gain. The East Yorks were to take TERN FARM from the South West while the 1st Battalion was to help by fire from the north, and to try to establish a line running East of TERN FARM (i.e. beyond it) and connecting with the posts of the 1st Battalion already established further north. The right platoon of the 1st Battalion moved forward to the position already taken by its patrol in the morning. Its place was taken by a platoon of the support Company. The right platoon made a slight further advance from its new position, and captured 7 more prisoners and 2 machine guns. But the Germans were now alert, and harassing our men with machine guns. The East Yorks had taken TERN FARM. Further advance at that time would clearly need a more organised and powerful form of attack, and it was not considered that the objects to be gained rendered this worth undertaking. Touch was accordingly obtained with the East Yorks by pushing up the supporting platoon. And the plan of advancing the line East and North East of TERN FARM was given up.



—Div. T. S. N° 76.— 16.8.18.

—SQUARE E—  
—SHEET 36A—

## —PATROL CHART—

—Operations of 1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Inf. Batta during July 11<sup>th</sup> & 12<sup>th</sup> 1918.—

—Scale 5000.—

## —Legend.—

1<sup>st</sup> Operation in Red.  
 2<sup>nd</sup> do " Green  
 3<sup>rd</sup> do " Blue  
 4<sup>th</sup> do " Purple.


Original Front Line in Blue.  
 New do do do Red.

1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Inf. Bn. Occupied Dugouts thus ■ ■  
 Unoccupied do do □ □  
 Fortified Shellholes thus ○  
 Patrol Routes do ———  
 M.G.s do ○

Approx. Bn. &amp; Inter Coy. Boundaries are shown

2 Coys. of 1<sup>st</sup> Bn. were holding line.  
 1 Coy " " was in support.  
 1 Coy " " reserve.

Each line Coy. had 3 platoons forward each forming a picquet and 1 platoon in support.  
 Picquets are numbered 1, 2, and 3, on each Coy. front.





SECRET.

COPY NO.....

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Headquarters,  
15th. August. 1918.WARNING ORDER.

1. The Division will be relieved on the nights 13/14th and 14/15th inst, by 4th and 5th, Aust Divisions.
2. On relief the Division will probably move to the AUBIGNY Area.
3. The following are the co-ordinates of the line selected as a jumping off line for relieving Divisions, and this line will be prepared accordingly and handed over.

A.8.B.5.0.  
 A.3.C.0.7.  
 S.27.C.0.0.  
 S.26.D.8.8.  
 S.20.C.7.0.  
 S.19.B.5.0.  
 X.24.A.5.2.  
 X.24.A.0.5.  
 X.17.Central.

4. D.H.Q. Details will move (probably to TRONVILLE CHATEAU) on the 14th inst, Command will pass on completion of relief night 14/15th inst.

*Am Ross.*

Lieut-Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 1st Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.Copy No. Issued to.

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8	1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.	29. 5th.Aust.Division.
9	2nd.Aust.Inf.Bdo.	30. H.Q.Liaison Force.
10	3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.	31. 2nd.Canadian.Divn.
11	C.R.A.1st.Aust.Div.	32. Camp Commandant.
12	C.R.E.1st.Aust.Div.	33. A.D.C.
13	1st.Pioneer Bn.	34. A.Q.
14	1st.M.G.Battalion.	35. File.
15	1st.Div.Sig.Coy.	
16	1st.Aust.Div.Train.	
17	S.S.O.1st.Aust.Div.	
18	A.D.M.S.	
19	A.P.M.	
20	D.A.D.V.S.	
21	Mob.Vet.Section.	
22	D.A.D.O.S.	
23	No.2.San.Section.	
24	1st.Div.Salv.Coy.	
25	Aust.Corps.	
26	2nd.Aust.Division.	

Issued at 9.30.a.m.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters.  
21st. August. 1918.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
15th. L.H. Regt.  
A.Q.

Cancel this Office S/9388 of 18-8-18.

15th. Light Horse personnel will retain one section at each Brigade Headquarters at disposal of Brigade Commander. In addition the Hotchkiss Gun and team will report to 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade Headquarters by noon, tomorrow 22nd-8-18, for A.A. employment.

The remainder of the Troop are placed temporarily at the disposal of A.A. & C.M.G. for A.P.M. work.

*M. J. Mason*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

Copies for War Diary.



# APPENDIX XIV

1st Aust. Div.

DIVISIONAL  
GAS OFFICER,  
1ST AUSTRALIAN DIV.  
No. F.O. 543  
Date 1.9.18

War diary report for period  
1st to 31st August 1918 inclusive.

The Division was in the line in the  
main sector the 1st 2nd of the month,  
and in the line on the Somme  
front 10th to 15th and 21st to 26th of  
the month.

The outstanding feature of the enemy  
gas killing activity for the period  
under review was the exceptionally  
heavy and continuous gas shell  
bombardment on the morning of  
20th.

No new features in gas warfare  
have been observed in the Divisional  
sectors during the month.

Attached is a summary of enemy  
gas shell activity for period under  
review.

R. E. Birch Lieut.  
9. A. G. O. 1st Aust. Div.

111

Summary of Enemy Gas Shell Bombardments  
on 1st Aust. Div. Sector for period in the line from  
1st to 31st August 1918 inclusive

Bolt	Time	Locality	Stat No.	Approximate No. of Gas Shells	Nature of Gas Shells.
3 1/2. 8. 18	11 pm to 1 am.	W. 30. C. 17 D. X. 26. C. W. 18. B. W. 29. F. 1. C.	27.	230	Green Gas + Blue Gas
1. 8. 18	2.45 am to 3.30 am	X. 19. D. 47 D. X. 21.	27	150	Green Gas + Blue Gas
"	3.0 am	W. 24.	"	20	Green Gas
2. 8. 18	1.0 am to 2 am	E. 6. W. 30.	"	70	Green Gas + Blue Gas.
"	1.0 am	X. 29. C.	36. A. }	50	Yellow Gas
14. 8. 18	3.0 to 4.30 am	X. 29. B. X. 30. A.	62. D	100	Yellow Gas + Blue Gas

DIVISIONAL  
GAS OFFICER,  
1ST AUSTRALIAN DIV.  
No. F.O. 543  
Date 1.9.18



Date	Time	Locality	Shot no.	Approximate no. of Gas Shells	Nature of Gas Shells.
14.8.18	6.0 am	F.5.B F.6.A.	66.E	50	Yellow Cross
"	11.20 pm	F.6.A-4.8	"	30	Yellow Cross
15.8.18	4.20 am	X.30. A+B	62.D	50	Blue Cross
23.8.18	9. am	R.21.C. R.27.A.	"	30	Yellow Cross
"	10. pm to midnight	Q.23.C.	"	40	Yellow Cross
"	"	R.23.C	"	50	Yellow Cross
24.8.18	3 am to 5 am	R.16.B	"	70	Yellow Cross
"	10 pm to 1130 pm	R.26.	"	30	Yellow Cross
25.8.18	2.0 am to 6 am	R.35.A+B R.36.A.	"	12.000	Yellow Cross +
		R.30.A+C R.29.	"		Green Cross +
		R.23.C+D. R.24.C.	"		Blue Cross
	2.0 am to 4.45 am	R.16.C. R.17.D.	"	400	Yellow Cross +
		R.23.	"		Green Cross
	6.20 pm.	R.5. R.11.	"	40	Yellow Cross
	4.20 pm.	R.17.C+D	"	70	Yellow Cross
26.8.18	1.30 am	R.17.D	"	30	Yellow Cross
	1.0 to 1.30 pm	R.17.D	"	60	Yellow Cross
	4.20 to 4.40 pm	R.17.C+D	"	123	Yellow Cross

Date	Time	Location	Shot no.	Approximate no. of Gas Shells	Nature of gas Shells.
26.8.18	5.0 to 5.35 pm	R.17.D. R.23.A.	62.D	30	Yellow Cross
	6.20 pm	R.5. R.11	"	70	Yellow Cross.

Yellow Cross.  
Blue Cross  
Green Cross

("mustard")

Dichloroethyl sulphide.  
Diphenylchlorarsine.  
Diphogene.

A.E. Beach Lieut.  
9. D.G.O. 1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Div.



1st AUSTRALIAN  
DIVL ARTILLERY  
HEADQUARTERS.

No. 89/27  
Date 12-8-18

HEADQUARTERS.  
AUSTRALIAN F.A.

No. 9/317  
Date 12-8-18

APPENDIX XV

141

1st Aust Div Art.

Herewith report  
by Lieut G.A. Campbell, Liaison  
officer with G. Bn until  
8 pm 11-8-18

Althumphrey Capt  
Adj 3rd Army Base at Sea

C.R.A. Jnl

B.M. a.m.f.

R.O. Jnl

G.S.O. 1 1st Aus Div

Forwarded for your information  
H. Strong Lieut

12-8-18

Good War  
Jnl



Service Instructions		10. 8. 18		To.....
				By.....
Handed in at.....		Office.....m.		Received.....m.
TO		Intelligence Report 1st Battalion		
* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
<p>Battalion HQ. X 28B 35.90</p> <p>9th Battalion in the line with the 5th on their right and the 11th on their left</p> <p>Hostile fire</p> <p>During the evening the enemy heavily shelled the road running from X 28B 25.70 to X 21d 90.70.</p> <p>Apparent regeneration was carried out with a heavy caliber howitzer on about X 22Cn</p> <p>During the night intermittent fire was spread over our sector</p> <p>Machine Gun fire</p> <p>2 MG's were playing along road X 23C 10.90 to X 28C 00.20</p>				
FROM				
PLACE & TIME				

\* This line should be erased if not required.

Service Instructions				To.....
				By.....
Handed in at.....		Office.....m.		Received.....m.
TO				
* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
<p>also along old system of trenches and low ground, running parallel to the road</p> <p>Hostile aircraft fairly active during the early part of the night</p> <p>11. 8. 18</p> <p>At 4 AM a local attack was launched by the 9th Battalion their objective being the blue line.</p> <p>Our Artillery opened up at 4 AM and continued until 5.30 AM. by this time all objectives were gained 60 prisoners being taken and 6 MG's &amp; TM's</p> <p>The enemy casualties in killed was exceptionally heavy</p> <p>Our own casualties being comparatively light</p>				
FROM				
PLACE & TIME				

\* This line should be erased if not required.



Service Instructions

To.....

By.....

Handed in at.....Office.....m. Received.....m.

TO

\* Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

AAA

7 AM The S.O.S signal was sent up by the Infantry. Owing to the line being held weakly in one place, the enemy succeeded in getting through in one place, but were eventually cut off and 50 prisoners being taken the remainder being killed.

6 MG's were taken and a quantity of SAA.

13. 9.15 AM The situation which had assumed a critical aspect earlier, was again clear. And our Casualties were very light.

At 1.15 p.m. The enemy again counter attacked but

FROM

PLACE &amp; TIME

By.....

Handed in at.....Office.....m. Received.....m.

TO

\* Sender's Number.

Day of Month.

In reply to Number.

AAA

did not succeed in entering our lines.

2 PM. Word was sent down that the enemy was again advancing towards the Hospital in S19 but the attack was broken up by artillery fire and MG fire.

2.30 p.m. Enemy again attacks from S20 A. Central to S20 C, but without success.

3 p.m. Enemy massing for Counter Attacks were engaged by our Artillery Barrage which was most successful causing casualties and breaking up the attacks.

FROM

PLACE &amp; TIME

\* This line should be erased if not required.

APPENDIX

10

143




SIONAL  
RECEIVED  
1

Service Instructions		By.....	To.....	1
		By.....		
Handed in at.....		Office.....	m. Received.....	m.
TO				
* Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA	
<p>before it could be launched          4 P.M. Enemy Aircraft brought          down one of our observation          balloons both observers getting          out alright.</p> <p>During the afternoon a hostile          4.2 HV Gun was firing from          direction of wood in S13 B50.00          Searching the road from          X 2 8 B 25.70 6 X 21-D 9010          6.45 P.M. Hostile Aircraft very          busy over our lines but          were driven back by M.G. &amp;          A.A. fire</p>				
FROM	H. Campbell Lieut			
PLACE & TIME	8 P.M. 11. 8 18			

APPENDIX 144



APPX XVI1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Div. No. 82/607  
Date 30-8-18

I attach hereto my report on  
enemy gas still bombardment on  
early morning of 25<sup>th</sup> inst.

A. B. Smith Lieut.  
Q. B. G. O. 1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Div.

G. Lee  
then War Diary  
Am R





1st, Aust Div.

APPENDIX

16  
146

DIVISIONAL GAS OFFICER, 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIV.
No. F.O. 5341
Date 29.8.18

1 Report on enemy Gas Shell Bombardment on early morning of 25th inst.

On the morning of the 25th inst. at about 1 am the enemy put down a very heavy barrage of gas shells mixed with H.E. in practically the whole of the area captured by us the previous day. This shelling continued until about 5 am and in scattered positions on the Divisional Front lasted until 7 am but not heavy. At 6 am on the same morning I personally inspected the positions held by the 2nd Aust Inf Brigade which received by far the greater number of the gas shells. All precautionary measures were being carried out except in some cases of linesmen engaged in keeping up communication; these men were kept exceptionally busy and it was practically impossible for them to wear respirators all the time. During the bombardment all respirators were worn but owing to the length of time the shelling lasted it was found impossible to wear respirators while the gas still persisted, there being no gas-proof dugouts in the area.

WIND.

At 1 am the wind was blowing from the west at about 4 m.p.h.; about 1.30 am the wind changed right round to the east bringing with it a heavy fog. It continued in this direction during the bombardment and for several hours afterwards.

NUMBER OF SHELLS.

On the Divisional Front approximately 12,000 gas shells fell.

CALIBRE.

The calibre of shells used embraced 77, 4.2, 5.9, and probably shells of larger calibre.

NATURE OF GAS.

Mostly Yellow Cross gas was used with a fair percentage of both Green and Blue Cross mixed.

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES.

The number of casualties reported by the Divisional Gas Centre were:

From noon <sup>24th</sup> to noon 25th inst.	70
" "25th " " 26th "	497
	<u>567</u>
	===

The casualties were more noticeable from noon to midnight of 25th inst.

CAUSE OF CASUALTIES.

The high number of casualties was practically owing to the excessive and continuous shelling and the consequent persistency of the gas as respirators were adjusted immediately the bombardment commenced and all precautions were taken.

LOCATIONS.

The heaviest shelling was in the area R.35.a.&b., R.36.a., R.30.a.&c., R.29., R.23.c.&d., and R.24.c.; R.16.c. and R.17.d. also received a fair amount. All locations on sheet on Sheet No. 62D.

Nature of Country.

The nature of country was most suitable and lent itself to gas shelling, being a series of hollows, and at the time our front line was just forward of the gullies. The tactical situation did not allow of the withdrawal of troops nor for troops to be relieved.

29th August 1918.

A/D.G.O. *H. Beech* Lieut.  
1st Australian Division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

7/413.

Divisional Headquarters.  
19th. August. 1918.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
1st. M.G. Battalion.  
1st. Pioneer Bn.  
C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.  
C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.  
1st. Div. Sig. Coy.  
A.D.M.S.  
A.P.M.  
No. 2. San. Section.  
D.G.O.

---

Attention is called to the fact that the enemy has recently made use of 17. cm. Minenwerfer shell filled with Yellow Cross. These shells are fitted with time fuzes and some of them are burst in the air. In certain cases injuries received by troops were caused by drops of the liquid falling on them.

All ranks should be warned to look out for this method of attack and to adjust respirators at once as soon as minenwerfer shells bursting in the air are observed.

The destruction of the yellow cross vapour in the locality attacked is difficult, as no gas shell craters are formed and the liquid is spread over a considerable area. It is probably that the persistency of yellow cross from shells burst in the air will be less than from those burst on the ground.

In one case a bombardment of this nature was directed against a projector position. It is possible that the enemy is adopting this method for dealing with projector positions which are suspected or which have been observed.

*W. J. M. O'Connell*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

83/253.

Divisional Headquarters.  
27th. August. 1918.

1st. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
C.R.A. 1st. Aust. Div.  
C.R.E. 1st. Aust. Div.  
1st. M.G. Battalion.  
1st. Pioneer Bn.  
1st. Div. Salv. Coy.

The following received from Fourth Army is forwarded;-

" In the event of a general retirement on the part of the enemy it is certain that he will arrange for explosive and other devices to cause casualties to our troops.

All ranks will therefore be warned against such dangers and the following ruses which have already been employed by the enemy should be brought to their notice;-

(a) On hasty retirement.

The majority of the traps consist of small charges laid as land mines which explode when a heavy weight goes over them. These are usually found in "No Mans Land" and on roads which are not used ordinarily by transport.

(b) On deliberate retirement.

- (i) Small land mines in all roads.
- (ii) Delay action mines in road and railway embankments and bridges.
- (iii) Charges laid in or connected to the following;-  
Attractively furnished dug-outs.  
Single houses left standing where others have been destroyed.  
New work, new trench, or other equipment in the midst of recently disturbed soil, new metalling or trench boards.  
Souvenirs, such as helmets, shells, badges and bayonets left in conspicuous positions.  
Articles sticking in the ground such as stick grenades or shovels.
- (iv) Dug-outs infected with Yellow Cross and other gasses.

Units are warned against constructing camps or bivouacs near enemy ammunition dumps, as a delayed action device for exploding such dumps exists.

Attention is called to S.S.163. May 1917. "Hints on Reconnaissances for Mines and Land Mines in the Area evacuated by the Germans."

*Lawson*

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

139/560.

Headquarters.  
15th. August. 1918.1st.Aust.Inf.Bde.  
2nd.Aust.Inf.Bde.  
3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde.  
-----

1. It is probable that the Division will be in the reserve area for 5 - 7 days.  
The first two days will be spent in re-organisation resting and bathing, over-haul of equipment and in general cleaning up.  
Subsequent days will be devoted to Tank training. For this special arrangements will be made with 5th Tank Brigade, but the 1st.Aust.Inf.Bde will be prepared on any date after the 17th inst to provide a Demonstration Coy.  
This Coy will demonstrate in conjunction with Tanks to all other units of the Division, these units being practised themselves subsequently.  
Troops will be lectured by Officers of 5th.Tank. Brigade.
2. Strict attention will be paid to the matter of Guards, and Sentries and to Saluting.
3. Brigades should arrange for recreation during the afternoons.
4. Administrative instructions will be issued by A.Q. of the Division.

*A.M. Ross.*Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



Divisional Headquarters.  
27th. August. 1918.1st AUSTRALIAN  
DIVISION

85/411

Aust Corps.  
-----TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL LESSONS LEARNT FOR  
MONTH OF AUGUST. 1918.  
-----

TACTICAL. It has been proved in the recent open fighting that a Machine Gun Battalion Commander could do much better work were he supplied with a Motor bicycle and side car. Visiting Brigades and Company Headquarters in the line entailed often a ride of over 20 miles, and as a galloper was necessary two horses were used up daily.

The importance of training Officers, N.C.Os and men in the German Machine Gun was fully demonstrated, and in this Battalion cases occurred when their own Machine Guns had been disabled, fire was brought to bear from captured Machine Guns with excellent effect.

Section Officers should be taught to use their own initiative more. Future training should include tactical rides, including setting problems demanding quick decisions.

It is put forward as a suggestion that as the transport allotted Battalion Headquarters is insufficient, the establishment be altered to admit of the G.S. Limber being exchanged for a G.S.Wagon.

In the recent successful operations the attacking Battalions had a section of Machine Guns attached. The gun crews numbered 1 N.C.O. and 7 men, and 10 belt boxes were taken forward. This number proved ample, and with the establishment of Section dumps, S.A.A. was got forward to the guns as soon as possible. S.A.A. was also obtained through the agency of our aeroplanes.

The principle of refusing a flank to the enemy by the distribution of 4 or 8 Machine Guns was also fully availed of and justified. Infantry were by this means set free for urgent use elsewhere.

Direct Overhead covering fire was used with good effect in the operations just south of the SOMME on 23rd August. Ridges were swept from which enemy Machine Gun fire was suspected with the most effective results.

TECHNICAL. That an issue of wooden bullets be available for range firing - 25 yards - thus creating a saving in ordinary S.A.A. It is understood that the Germans use wooden bullets for this purpose.

*Major-General*  
Major-General.  
Commanding 1st Australian Division.