

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/42/44 Part 3

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 1st  
Australian Division

September 1918



AWM4-1/42/44PART3



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KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Divisional Headquarters,  
9th September, 1918.INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES..SITUATION.

Our line runs East of ROISEL, HERVILLY, BERNES, FLECHIN, and POEUVILLY, SOYECOURT and VENDELLES have been reached by our Patrols and found unoccupied.

ARTILLERY.

During last few days enemy artillery activity has been slight and has caused slight hindrance to our recent advances.

The greater proportion of shelling was due to Field Batteries firing at long range and using shell fitted with instantaneous fuze.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

No new work is shown in the area W. of the HINDENBURG line. (Photographs dated 6th Sept). No new work is apparent on the HINDENBURG line itself from St.QUENTIN to VEDHUILLE. (Photos indistinct).

From 3rd Aust.Div.Summary of 7th Sept.

Body I.R. (Alpine Corps) Prisoners of the 1st Coy. give the strength of their coy, as 40 O.R. The order of battle is uncertain but it is stated that the 10th Res.Jager Bn. is in immediate contact with them on their right flank. All four coys. of the 1st Bn. are forward, and it is believed that the 3rd Bn. is also in line.

Both prisoners joined the 1st Coy. about 8 days ago, having come with a draft of about 100 "Convalescents" from depot in MUNICH; of this draft 2 men came to the 1st Coy. As to enemy intentions, prisoners state that further withdrawals are intended but to what line is unknown. They testify to the good shooting of our artillery, but deny heavy casualties. Moral seems fair.

P.T.O.



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19th Bav. I.R. 5th Bav. Div. Prisoners of the 11th Coy. state that their regiment came into support in vicinity of PERONNE about 12 days ago and, still in support, conformed to the retirement of the units in line. The strength of their coy. is stated to be 40 O.R. and 3 officers. Casualties, including sick wastage and prisoners, is stated to have been 30 O.R. since they came into this sector. They did not know where they were captured, neither did they know the dispositions of their own Bn. nor the order of battle - they were prisoners and were not worrying about anything else. They state the morale in their coy. to be indifferent.

95th I.R. 38th Div. Prisoner of 2nd Coy. states that 10th Coy. was immediately N. of them - he had apparently no idea of the order of battle or of the exact locality where he was captured. He stated he was captured whilst on reconnaissance duty with his Section Cdr - a Sgt. Major - but does not know what happened to the latter. Coy. strength is stated to be 55-60 O.R. and 2 officers. Prisoner stated that as far as he knew his regiment was to retire if attacked by us and that the enemy's withdrawal was to continue. He also states that it is common talk amongst the men of his coy. that the war will end in four or five weeks.

258th R.I.R. - late 78th Res. Div. Two prisoners of 7th Coy. one of whom was wounded - were captured this morning between TINCOURT and ROISEL. They state that their regt. came into this sector 6 days ago and were in support, but the exact locality is unknown - that they had communication with a Bav. Regt. (probably a regt. of the Alpine Corps) on their right, and that the 8th Coy. were on their left - and think it probable that the present retirement will continue until the old HINDENBURG line is reached; they had definite orders to withdraw if we attacked. The strength of the 7th Coy. is stated to be 65 O.R. and 1 officer. It is stated their casualties have been mostly through M.G. fire. The 7th Coy. received its last draft in June - the reinforcements for the whole of the 2nd Bn - 32 men - coming to the 7th Coy. The morale is indifferent.



Extracts from captured letters.Written by a man of 190 I.R. 220 Div. 26/7/18.

"We are lying here in a hellish position, no dugouts but all in funk-holes, with losses, and again losses and dead, so that one almost becomes mad. Since lying here I have been smoked out three times and if this still continues for long I shall cease to take part. You can be sure of that, for I am not hanging on so miserably here to get my limbs shot to pieces. We are not going out into rest. The orders here are to hold the position till the last man, and the coys. go into line here with 20 mannikins. My God, if the Tommies only knew that! Oh poor Germany."

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 Since the operations on August 22nd, the following have been captured:

183 Officers

Extract from Aust. Corps Intelligence Summary dated 7th Sept, 1918.

Since the operations on August 22nd, the following have been captured:-

183 Officers

6,165 O.R. Unwounded.

13 "

1,009 " Wounded.

196 "

7,174 " Total.

During the operations between August 8th and 21st, the following were captured:-

169 Officers

7,805 O.R. Unwounded.

27 "

793 " Wounded.

196 "

9,598 " Total.

Making a grand total of:-

392 Officers and 15,772 O.R.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DOCUMENT.

A memorandum on firing with machine guns on hostile aircraft from : experiences of German contact patrols in English ground defences states:

"The most valuable part are the motor, propeller, and cooling apparatus. They can be engaged most successfully when the plane is rising. Engaging the plane when it is descending secures success against the occupants. Allow the airmen to fly into the fire zone. When the plane is sideslipping, keep up heavy fire.

The existence of armoured English aeroplanes has up till now not been substantiated.



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"R" ammunition pierces. "S" and "K" (armour piercing) ammunition is not available. Small supplies of "S" and "K" ammunition may be indentured for all the same from Army Headquarters in order to make penetration into the motor more certain.

The moral effect of machine gun fire on an airman is already considerable as soon as the flash is observed and the shots go near by.

The actual effect is far greater than the troops who are shooting realise. The majority of damage incurred compels the plane to turn back at once and make a forced landing in the back areas.

Between the 9th and 30th April the 6th Army lost 23 contact patrol machines through A.A. and M.G. fire.

The English were able to do this in spite of the heaviest fighting on the earth, and for the most part he was dealing with armoured aeroplanes.

Considering this, our prepared defence against the unarmoured enemy must be made to provide better results.

For every aeroplane shot down out of control, a prize of 200 marks has been granted by the Ministry of War.

EXTRACTS FROM 4th ARMY SUMMARY dated 7th Sept, 1918.

RESERVES. (a) No fresh divisions have been identified during the last two days on the Army front.

(b) The 6th Div. has relieved the 6th Cav. Div. in the YPRES Salient. The 6th Div. is, therefore, no longer available to reinforce the Army front. It has been regarded as one of the fresh divisions available for an offensive, as it has not been identified for over a month.

(c) The 33rd Res. and 211th Divisions have been disbanded. In April, there were considered to be 242 German Infantry divisions in the field, there are now considered to be 228, a reduction of 14 divisions.

Of these 228 Infantry divisions, 193 are in the Western Theatre and 35 in the Eastern Theatre.

To sum up:—Until the enemy regain the HINDENBURG line, it is not considered that any fresh divisions will be employed. It is reported by prisoners that fresh divisions are now occupying the above-named line of defence. This is quite probable. They are likely to be divisions already engaged once since August 8th.

There are now 9 fit divisions in reserve, of which 2 are considered to be between the Sea and the OISE.

*McHaffey*  
Lt-Col. G.  
1st Australian Division.



KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Divisional Headquarters,  
10th September, 1918.INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.From 3rd Aust. Div. Summary 9/9/18.Information re 30 Fus. Regt. (P.S.)

Prisoner was captured taking coffee to the "Feldwache" consisting of 1 Corporal and 7 men - but lost his way.

Order of Battle. From N. to S. - 30 Fus. R. .... 31 I. R. ... 37 I. R.Strength of 8th Coy. 30 Fus. R. 55 O. R. Coy. received 12 men as reinforcements about 3 weeks ago. The 8th Coy. is stated to be the strongest Coy. in the Div. 1st Bn. stated to have been broken up at FONTAINE - now only 2 Bns. in the regt.Dispositions. Both 2nd and 3rd Bns. in front line - knows nothing of reserve troops in rear.Casualties. Few - except in prisoners.Reliefs. Regt. expects to be relieved shortly - by who not known.Intentions. No signs of counter-attack, but plenty of preparation for continued withdrawal.Effect of our air operations. The following extract from a somewhat incoherent letter by a German soldier in a labour battalion was written on the 19th August, 1918, during the SOMME fighting, and affords excellent evidence of the effect produced by our bombing:-

"Dear Brother.

After travelling for 12 hours and wandering about for 8 days, we are now quartered near PERONNE, and I can tell you that things have gone pretty badly with us.

The English have just taken the offensive, and no sooner had we detrained than a bomb landed on us, and we lost 14 men severely wounded and one man killed. That made us want to bolt. You can just fancy that 200 to 300 men like that attract attention, and those buggars of airmen came as low down as one story and we wanted to wriggle into the ground but it did not answer. You must remember that those buggars have got the same sort of engines as ours, so that we cannot distinguish them. At night the same sort of thing happened, they just hung out a light. So you can just imagine that we thought the world was going under; they have unloaded at least 300 bombs on PERONNE"

Reduction in number of German Divisions. The severe losses suffered by the German Divisions in the heavy fighting on the Western Front in 1918, and the impossibility of keeping them up to strength, have forced the German Higher Command to disband a number of divisions and regiments, and to send the remnants as drafts to other formations.

Since March 1918, 10 divisions have been disbanded and drafted to other formations.

In the case of 5 other divisions, the regiments and battalions which they comprised have gone intact to other formations or have become independent, so that the Staffs can no longer be considered as divisions.

During the early part of 1918, the METZ Garrison Det. is considered to have been reconstituted, which reduces the number of divisions disbanded to 14.

The breaking up of the above divisions has involved the complete disbanding of 103 infantry battalions.

The 242 German Infantry Divisions, employed in the various theatres of war at the beginning of 1918 are thus reduced to 228. They are distributed at the present moment as follows:-

Western Front	195
Eastern Front	35.



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From Corps Summary 9/9/18.

Extract from ARMY ORDER, 2nd Army, dated 25/8/18.

It is absolutely incomprehensible that inconceivable rumors have been spread about behind the front during the last few days by people who have lost their nerves. People with anxious temperaments saw everywhere squadrons of tanks, masses of cavalry, thick lines of enemy infantry. It is in fact high time that our old battle experienced soldiers spoke seriously to these cowards and weaklings and told them of the deeds that are done in the front line.

Extracts from FOURTH British Army Summary of 9th Sept, 1918.

Our troops advanced to a maximum depth of about 1,000 yards. Opposition has considerably stiffened along the entire front, and the enemy were located in the vicinity of EPEHY, on the high ground between TEMPLEUX-LE-QUERARD and JEANCOURT, the high ground east of VENDHUILLES, as well as in MARTEVILLE and VILLECHOLLES.

Hostile artillery fire increased along the entire front, more especially against the Northern Corps, where guns of heavy calibre were in action.

#### RESERVES.

The 30th Div. in reserve east of LAON has been resting for a month, and is considered fit for offensive operations. There are now 15 fit divisions in Reserve, of which 5 are between the Soa and the OISE.

#### ENEMY'S INTENTIONS.

The enemy's resistance stiffened considerably yesterday and more machine gun fire was experienced. His artillery fire also increased, and included guns of heavy calibre. No counter-attacks were, however, carried out by him.

There is no reason to suppose that our advance is being checked at present by troops other than rearguards.

The enemy's main line of resistance is still considered to be further East. No further information has been obtained as to the line on which he intended to make a stand.

#### GENERAL.

The resistance offered by the enemy yesterday increased, a greater volume of machine gun and artillery fire (including heavies) being encountered. The enemy made no counter-attacks.

It is considered that our troops are still opposed by rearguards and that the enemy do not intend to make a stand on their present front line.

*J. H. ...*  
Lieut. Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX VIII  
APPENDIX

12-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1.

From 1.a.m. 11-9-18. to 6.a.m. 12-9-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry. On taking over the line on the night 10/11th. the 1st. Aust. Inf. Bde immediately sent out patrols to ascertain the amount of resistance offered by the enemy.

The enemy offered strong resistance in every instance. At 5.30.a.m. 11th inst. Under cover of a specially arranged artillery barrage, the left Battalion attempted to advance the line by patrols. The high ground in L.8. and a line running approx N and S through L.8. Central was the objective. Considerable opposition was encountered by Machine Guns, but notwithstanding this all platoons reached their objective. A M.G. nest at L.14.A.6.8. was taken. Here 10 of the enemy and 4 M.Gs were captured and 20 - 30 of the enemy killed.

Consolidation was proceeded with under difficulties. Posts at L.8.A.6.3. and L.8.D.1.4. while digging in were subjected to very heavy M.G. fire from TEMPLEUX and to direct 77 mm gunfire from the quarries in L.3.A. and B. and HARGICOURT.

At about 11.a.m. under a heavy barrage, the enemy counter-attacked from the sunken road running N. and S. through L.8.A. forcing patrols of the left company to withdraw. Two or three badly wounded men could not be removed and were taken prisoners by the enemy.

The right Company of the left Battalion which had established posts at L.15. and 16. - L.14.D.7.5. and L.20. Central was thus brought under heavy Machine Gun fire from the high ground L.8. The Company was ordered to withdraw and managed to do so after some hard fighting. The enemy shelling being heavy and sustained and onfilade M.G. fire from L.8. being troublesome, the patrols withdrew at about 1.30.p.m. to the original front line position. Meanwhile the right Battalion had sent forward fighting patrols. The trench system in R.2.B. was rushed and occupied. Slight opposition was met with and 15 prisoners and 2 L.M.Gs were captured. Seven enemy dead were counted.

After this patrols pushed out into L.32.D. and L.33.C. but did not succeed in gaining touch with the enemy.

A post was established at R.3.A.1.6.

The night 11/12th inst was spent in adjusting Divisional and Battalion Boundaries and in consolidation for defence.

Our picquet line now runs along the trenches in L.7. L.13. L.19. L.25. L.31.

2. Infantry Arms. Lewis Guns had excellent opportunities to inflict damage. The Right Bn report having seen a large party of enemy marching in fours in vicinity of JEANCOURT. The party was engaged at the right moment and casualties estimated at 100 were caused. Stokes Mortars supported the operations of the right Battalion with excellent results.

3. Artillery. Our artillery was active. A creeping barrage was supplied during the morning of the 10th inst. During the day hostile infantry concentrations were engaged and in several instances broken up. At 7.30.p.m. 4 Brigades searched and swept the areas in front of the front posts. The start line ran L.27.C.4.2. - L.13.D.9.5. - L.1.D.9.6. Searching fire was delivered up to 1,000 yards E. of above line. It was noticeable that no enemy flares were sent up till the fire had almost reached the most Eastern line.

4. Aircraft. Bad weather hindered battle flying. At 4.p.m. a reconnaissance plane at the request of the infantry patrolled the front lines.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. The enemy generally fought well and to the last and in most instances had to be killed. One occasion is reported



when 6. of the enemy on seeing one of our men, they jumped back jumped out of the trench and observing only a small rifle and bomb fire. into the trench and were very active during the period. b. ~~Infantry~~ Trench Mortar bombs were placed on our line in L.7. and 13. lasting for 20 minutes.

c. Artillery. Has been active. At 4.30 a.m. a barrage of 10 and 15 cm shells was placed on front line in L.7. and 13. lasting for 20 minutes.

during the morning 11th inst, activity was sustained, following localities receiving most attention; - R.2. L.3. K.55.B.&D. - K.36.C. - K.27.D. - K.2. and HERVILLY Wood and vicinity. Between 10 and 11 a.m. a fairly heavy barrage was placed on our forward positions. The Valley in K.20.A.&C. and K.26.A.&C. was searched by 5.9s during the afternoon. The shelling was of 7.7.cm and 10 and 15 cm calibre. H.E. and gas.

d. Aircraft. At 2.30 p.m. and at 3 p.m. one E.A. was over our line.

## 2. Enemy Defences.

a. Enemy does not occupy L.32.C. or L.33.D.

b. Machine Guns, located at L.14.L.9.0. - L.20.B.4.5. - high ground in L.8.D. and L.15.P. - L.26.B.5.2.

c. Enemy is known to be definitely holding posts in L.8.Central L.14.Central. - L.20. and the western outskirts of JEANCOUET.

3. Movement. A considerable amount of movement was observed during the day in the neighbourhood of CAREZE COPSE and JEANCOUET and trenches in their vicinity. The artillery were notified and shot carried out which practically stopped the movement in the open.

4. Identifications. 4th Coy. 19th Bav. I.R. 5th Bav. Div. one unwounded prisoner taken in L.8. or L.14.

10th and 11th Coys 21st Bav. I.R. - 5th Bav. Div. - 6 wounded and 2 wounded prisoners taken in L.14. and L.20.

87th I.R. 21st Div. 15 unwounded prisoners taken in R.2.D.

Total prisoners 22 unwounded and 2 wounded prisoners.

5. Material. 6 Machine Guns.

Notes. 1. The enemy picquet line seems to run as follows; - High ground in L.8.C. - L.14.D. - L.20.B. - L.26.B. - Eastern outskirts of VERQUIER. Though aerial photographs are not available to confirm this some definite evidence exists as follows; -

(a) Patrols have met strenuous resistance along this line.

(b) The enemy counter-attacked when the high ground in R.8.C. was taken. It is obvious that the local Commander considered this high ground as important.

(c) The enemy was observed reinforcing this line, by means of the trenches in L.15.A.&C. - L.21.A. -

(d) Prisoners state that the "main line of resistance" runs through CAREZE COPSE. L.15.C.

(e) The position of enemy's flares as noted in A Para 3 Our Artillery - seems to confirm this.

Careful ground observation and reconnaissance by patrols and a study of aerial photographs when available, should accurately establish position of this picquet line and also the positions of out posts.

2. It will be remembered that the 5th Bav. Division was opposed to this Division on the 10th August just N. of LIHONS. Two regiments only came into line on the 10th, the other the 21st Bav. I.R. counter-attacked the 3rd A.I. Bde. on the morning of the 11th August. The counter-attack was broken and the 3rd Brigade resumed its interrupted advance. The 5th Bav. Div. has been in the line ever since that, though it has sideslipped a considerable distance to the left.

3. Prisoners state that a further limited withdrawal was to have taken place on the morning of the 11th inst. If this was so it was apparently anticipated and prevented by our patrol activity. A close watch of the enemy activity should be kept in view of the probability of a further limited withdrawal.

*[Signature]*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
1st Australian Division



SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

12-9-18.

RESULT OF INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF  
19th. and 21st. BAV. I.R. (5TH.BAV.DIV.)

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Order of Battle.

North - South. 19th. 21st. and 7th. Bav.Inf.Regts.

The 19th.Bav.I.R. still has its twelve Companies intact averaging 35 - 40 per Coy fighting strength. On the morning of Sept 11th. the outpost line had orders to fall back on the main line of resistance which in turn was to be withdrawn, but prisoners did not know how far. The opinion is prevalent amongst these men that the withdrawal is to continue to the old SIEGFRIED LINE where it is believed a stand will be made. They have had many losses lately from our aircraft. Their morale is low and the feeling against the PRUSSIANS is far from friendly.

The 2nd.Bn was forward, the 3rd in the Main line of resistance and the 1st Bn in reserve.

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The 21st.Bav.Inf.Regt has only 9 Coys, the 4th 8th and 12th, having been put up as reinforcements to the remainder. The remaining Coys are not numbered but known by the name of the Coy Commander. Thus, the old 9th, is now Company BENHARD, the 10th, Coy RAHNER and the 11th, Coy VON LOCHNER.

The 3rd Bn was manning the Main line of resistance, which was reported to run N - S through CARPERA COPSE, in 3 Company Sectors each about 200 yards wide. Each Sector held with about 20 men while the balance of the Coy Strength, in each case about 10 men, were doing outpost duties.

The Support Bn (II) was said to be in a trench system about 2 miles back. But prisoners were in no instance able to give even an approx location on the map. The 6th.Bav.Res.Div, which was stated to be in rest at CAMBRAI, should have relieved the 5th.Bav.Div on the 1st and again on the 8th of September, but nothing had been seen of them so far. There is a draft of about 150 men for the 3rd Bn waiting with the Kitchens about 3 miles behind the reserve line.

The 3rd.M.G.Coy is stated to have only 4 Heavy M.Gs left. No other troops have been seen in the vicinity by these men.

The Div. Commander is now Excellency VON KLAUS (rank uncertain) Brig - Commander still Major-General HEIMERAN. Regt Com. 21st.Bav.I.R. Major. HACKER.

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SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

13-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2.

From 6.a.m. 12-9-18. to 6.a.m. 13-9-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry. During the night patrols pushed forward and meeting with very little resistance took up forward positions and consolidated. Our front line posts are now established as follows;- L.8.C.3.2. - L.14.A.6.8. - L.14.A.6.2. - L.14.C.6.6. - L.20.A.4.9. - L.20.B.3.2. in trench system running through L.26.B.&D.

2. Infantry Arms. Every opportunity was taken to engage suitable targets. Vickers Guns expended 11,000 rounds in harassing fire. At 6.30.p.m. an enemy wiring party in L.8.C. was dispersed by Lewis Gun fire.

3. Artillery. Our Artillery fired intermittently throughout the period. 60 pounders were most consistent. 18 pdr shrap was observed bursting at L.15. and 21. 60 pdrs were firing on L.20.D.

4. Aircraft. Reconnaissance machines kept the front line under observation practically the whole day in spite of the inclemency of the weather.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.1. Hostile Activity.

a. Infantry. Enemy Infantry were much quieter during the period and it would appear that they have withdrawn their former line of outposts to a rear position. No large enemy parties were observed during the day. At 11.50.p.m. on night 11/12th an enemy party of about 15 attempted to raid our posts in R.3.A. They were observed approaching and were driven off by Lewis Gun and bomb fire. Patrols followed up immediately but were unable to obtain identifications.

b. Infantry Arms. No T.M. fire was experienced and M.Guns were not as active as during the previous period.

c. Artillery. Enemy artillery was fairly active. No concentrations were noticeable, with the exception of shelling of the villages of HERVILLY and ROISEL. The former was shelled at intervals during the night whilst the latter received much attention from guns of all calibre up to 8 inch.

At 6.p.m. Enemy heavily shelled the sunken road running through K.30.C.0.0. Between 7.p.m. and 8.15.p.m. ROISEL was shelled by 10. and 15 cms. A H.V. long range gun shelled E. edge of BUIRE WOOD J.16. during the late afternoon. Generally speaking the shelling was very scattered.

d. Aircraft. At 1.40.p.m. 4 E.A. flew high along the front line. This patrol was repeated at 6.50.p.m. At 7.p.m. one E.A. was over our forward area and was driven off by A.A. fire.

2. Defences. New earth observed along trench at L.15.A.5.2. - L.21.A.2.8. and L.15.C.3.6. Movement and work in progress was also observed at these locations. There appears to be a post at F.27.A.15. 63.

3. Movement. Was less than during preceding day and in most cases was individual. Movement observed in BROSSE and PIEUMEL WOODS and their vicinity and in CARPEZA COPSE. Throughout the afternoon much individual movement was seen in F.27.

4. Miscellaneous. (a) Double Red and Single White flares fired by the enemy brought down a light barrage on L.25. and L.31. lasting 5 minutes.

(b) In Yesterdays summary it was reported that one of our patrols surprised an enemy column marching in fours near JEANCOURT on the night 10/11th inst, dispersing the column with L.G. fire at close range. Our advancing patrols on reaching this spot last night found enemy dead and 20 discarded German rifles, showing that the enemy column had suffered heavy casualties.

5. Identifications. of dead killed night 10/11th inst near JEANCOURT 81st.I.R. 21st. Division.



**NOTES.** The slackening off of enemy M.G. fire, the lack of opposition to our advancing patrols, the nature of the slight individual movement point to the fact that the enemy has withdrawn his outpost line during last night. He has doubtless also withdrawn his picquet line as outlined in yesterdays Summary, to the TEMPLEUX - VERGUIER line of trenches. New work at L.15.A.5.2. - L.21.A.2.8. - L.15.C.3.6, probably indicates enemy outposts digging in.

*W. Campbell*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

#### INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

**3rd. Division Summary.** - Use of Light Minenwerfer in Raids.  
The following extract is from a captured order of the Sixth German Army dated 19-8-18.


"In a raid on the front of another Army, the British used Light Trench Mortars on flat trajectory carriages with great skill, and, unfortunately, with good results. These were moved from place to place to sweep trenches and to engage the defenders of the outpost zone (machine gun nests), who were distributed in depth.

"The enemy thus employed them as we do in an attack in the open warfare phase of a break through battle - (Zwischenfeldangriff der Durchbruchschlacht).

"The Army recommends a similar use of light Minenwerfer in our own raids.

**German Railway Mines.** On the 8th instant, on the B.G. railway some of the enemy charges for blowing up the railways were found. These charges are buried two feet under the centre of the track and consist of 10 boxes of perdite, with a detonator and a short length of fuse coming up to ground surface. On the surface end of the fuse there is a friction igniter which has a small loop of string tied to it, and it is fired by pulling the loop of string. The fuse takes 40 seconds to burn. The string is very harmless and might be picked up by any of the infantry on the track, so they should all be warned against touching them. The explosion makes a crater like the crater of an 8" shell and destroys the road bed and blows the rails and sleepers clear of the railway track.

Below is a sketch of this mine.





Army Summary.

Shortage of Raw Material for Ammunition. (from G.H.Q. Summary.)  
The following order of the 17th German Army was published in the orders of the 16th Div. on the 20th. Aug., 1918.

"Extensive measures will have to be taken immediately, in order to increase the return of empties. The quantity returned bears no relation to the original material supplied. Artillery Commanders will be held responsible for the return of empties, as the supplies of fresh ammunition depend upon it.

"Particular attention is drawn to the gravity of the situation in regard to raw materials, on which the output of ammunition depends.

"When artillery is re-grouped, all ammunition will be taken with it."

The Enemy's Rear Lines of Defence.

Since the 16th August, photographic reconnaissances have been made of the greater part of the area ST. QUENTIN - CAMBRAI - VALENCIENNES - MAUBEUGE, LE CATEAU. Numerous practice trenches are visible, but no work on defence lines appears to have been undertaken by the enemy in this area. Reports have also been received from other sources that no defence works have been observed in the following localities:- East and South-East of RENAIX, north-east and south-east of TOURNAI, the GRAMMONT - LESSINES - ATH Area, West of ORCHIES, south of THIELT. On the other hand, it is stated that work is proceeding on the fortifications of NAMUR and MAUBEUGE.

CAPTURED ORDER. The following are extracts from an order issued by German G.H.Q. dated 11-8-18, and signed by LUDENDORFF, dealing with the reasons for the defeat of the German Second Army:-

"According to the report of the Officers sent by G.H.Q. into the area of operations of the Second Army, the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army are as follows:-

1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of the tanks, and lost their heads when the tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under the protection of natural and artificial fog.
2. The fact that scarcely any positions or obstacles worth mentioning existed, either in the forward battle zone, or in the village and broken ground further back, to make a methodical resistance possible there.
3. The fact that the available artillery, allotted to the battalions at rest and to the reserve at the disposal of the Higher Command, was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had broken through, and against his tanks.

The following conclusions are drawn from these facts:-

1. As I have already ordered in my tel-writer message Ia.9718, Secret op. of the 8th August, considerably more must be done to obtain information regarding the enemy's intentions by taking prisoners, watching the ground by means of special observation posts, report centres, aerial reconnaissance and listening sets, as, owing to the present situation, we must also expect surprise attacks on other fronts. The closest vigilance is necessary at daybreak and in the early hours of the morning as surprise attacks usually begin at this time, and because a certain lassitude is often prevalent among the men in the morning, after the strain on their nerves and endurance during the night. The supervision of the troops at this time is especially necessary, in view of our late experiences. Sufficient has been said on my part with regard to the organization of infantry and artillery in depth.
2. Far more must be done than has hitherto been the case in the construction of trenches and in the construction of defences against tanks. The dislike of the troops for trench-digging must be



combated by all means possible. \*\*\*  
3. The principle that troops, even if they are enveloped, must, if necessary, defend their battle zone for days, to the last round and to the last man, if they do not receive any further orders, appears to have been forgotten. \*\*\*

Morale. The morale and discipline of the 46th I.R., 119th Div. now in line for the second time since the 8th August, have reached a very low standard. The 3rd Bn. of the 46th I.R., when retiring from the direction of FRANSART early in August, became absolutely disorganised, and, having lost heavily in officers, the majority of the battalion fled to NESLE which they looted.

Prisoners captured belonging to this regiment said they did not care who won the war as long as it ended soon. They agreed that the Army was beginning to lose its discipline; the N.C.O.s who were being promoted were too much in sympathy with the men to have much authority, and the Officers themselves were young, untrained and no longer respected as in the past. The drafts which were coming to the regiment were not keen on fighting; twelve men deserted from a recent draft, and on being arrested were brought to the regiment under military escort.

The 46th I.R. were known as the "Lions of CAMBRAI", they were told by their Officers that they would meet with little resistance from the British soldiers in this sector.

German Wireless Press. It is interesting to note that yestordays German Official Wireless reported, that in their counter-attack near GOUZEAUCOURT and EPHY, 3,000 prisoners remained in their hands. A maximum estimate of our losses in prisoners in this action is 300. This exaggeration on the part of the enemy, whose figures have in the past been fairly accurate, shows the great need which is felt by the German command of some encouraging news with which to sustain the morale of the German public.

Following from G.H.Q. 11.p.m. 12th.  
On GOUZEAUCOURT HAVRINCOURT front line reported approx as follows.  
Q.29.C.1.0. - Q.23.Cent. - EAST of TRESCAULT to Q.5.C. - East of HAVRINCOURT to K.22.Cent to K.20.B. - K.15.C. - K.9.A. Prisoners over 1,000. Our line has been advanced slightly east of RAILWAY TRIANGLE (S.W. of LA BASSE) and W of ARMENTIERES where it now passes through PONT DE NIEPPE as follows B.28.B.8.3. - B.23.B.8.5. B.17.A.4.0. Line reached by First American Army reported approx as follows VIEVILLE - THIAUCOURT - LAMARCHE - MONT SEC Z.E. and advance of over 4 miles on a front of about 12 miles. On West Flank of ST MIHIEL Salient line is as follows MOREMONT WOOD - HERBEUVILLE - LESARPARGES - Z.E. an advance of about 2 miles on a front of about 5 miles. Over 8,000 prisoners taken.



1  
SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

14-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.

From 6.a.m. 13-9-18. to 6.a.m. 14-9-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

I. Infantry.

(a) During the night our line was slightly advanced to L.20.B.3.8. - L.14.D.2.2. - L.14.A.9.1. - L.14.A.7.7. - L.8.C.3.2. - L.7.D.8.8. - L.8.C.0.5. - Bombing block established at L.20.C.9.7. - FERVAQUES SWITCH.

(b) Patrols. Flares were fired by the enemy from approx L.33.A.4.6. which point patrol tried to reach, but were prevented by very thick wire entanglements. Another patrol discovered trip and barbed wire at L.27.C.4.1. running from JEANCOURT - LE VERGUIER Rd Northwards.

A patrol of 7 other ranks went to a spot about 400 yards East of L.26.D.4.7. where they encountered a party of 6 of the enemy. The enemy was bombed and hurriedly withdrew. Two other enemy patrols of 2 men were encountered further N. but those made off on the approach of our patrol. Patrol moved 400 yards along FERVAQUE SWITCH without seeing any signs of the enemy. CARPEZE COPSE was found to be occupied by the enemy. Other information gained is summarised under Enemy Defences.

(c) Infantry Arms. During the night fire of all arms was limited owing to the depth to which our patrols penetrated.

2. Artillery. From 9.45. to 10.45.a.m. 18 pdrs fired 120 rds into CARPEZA COPSE. At 11.30.a.m. enemy movement was engaged along roads K.16.D.0.0. to junction R.23.A.8.3. and R.23.D.0.7. Shell storms were put down on wood in L.21. and special attention was paid to trenches in L.15.C. and earthworks in K.A.&B. 4.5" hows fired 100 rds on dugouts and enemy movement in L.3.A.&B. During the night about 800 rds were expended in harassing fire on roads and approaches and centres of activity.

3. Aircraft. Our planes were very active, particularly so during the afternoon. In every instance when over enemy lines they were heavily engaged by enemy A.A. fire.

At 3.30.p.m. 5 of our planes flew in direction of 3 enemy balloons. The balloons were withdrawn and the planes came under very heavy A.A. fire. Four planes only were seen to return.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

I. Hostile Activity.

(a) Infantry. Though several enemy patrols were encountered during the night, in no instance did they seem to possess an enterprising or combative spirit. Otherwise infantry were quiet during the period.

(b) Infantry Arms. Were not so active during the night. Enemy M.G. at L.14.B.5.9. was forced to abandon its position on account of our fire. M.G. at L.14.B.1.8. fired almost continuously during the night.

(c) Artillery. A slight decrease in artillery fire was noticeable, it is still very scattered. HERVILLY, HERVILLY WOOD and ROSIEL received special attention. Railway in K.35.B., L.25.C., L.31.A., K.30.D., K.36.A., together with the forward positions generally were subjected to intermittent fire. No heavy concentrations occurred. Shelling tables sent to D.A. At least one H.V. gun fired intermittently on to back areas during day and night.

(d) Aircraft. At 6.25.a.m. an E.A. flew over our forward area. At 7.45.a.m. E.A. flew over JEANCOURT and was turned by A.A. fire. At 7.p.m. an E.A. flying over Battalion on our right fired RED and WHITE flares and a barrage immediately fell on their front. During the early evening bombing machines crossed our area. Two were caught in the beams of searchlights and were brought down outside the Divisional area.



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2. Enemy Defences.

(a) M.Guns. Fire from HILL 140 - M.G. at L.14.B.1.8. is very active at nights. The southern ~~ruins~~ of TEMPLEUX contain many active M.Guns.

(b) Occupied Posts: - L.8.C.8.2. - L.8.D.2.3. - L.15.A.5.2. - Eastern edge of CARPEZA COPSE - trenches in L.15.A.8.C. are occupied and have been recently worked on - CARPEZA COPSE is occupied.

(c) Wire. Thick wire exists between our lines and L.35.A.4.6. - French and barbed wire exists at L.27.C.4.1. running from JEANCOURT - LE VERGUIER Road Northwards.

3. Movement. During early morning several men seen moving in vicinity of L.35.C.7.8. Movement in rear of mound in L.3.B. continues. During morning considerable enemy movement was observed on crest of ridge at L.22.A. Five 2 horse G.S. wagons and 4 horse men were observed here. At 1.30.p.m. small parties were observed on ridge in L.21.

4. Miscellaneous. Enemy balloons at grid bearings of 370 690 and 940 were up during periods during afternoon. O.P. K.27.B.1.4. During the night 12/13th L/Cpl GRAHAM MM. 4th Battalion was in charge of a small carrying party to the outpost line. In the darkness he lost his party and strayed into enemy territory. He was surprised and captured by 6 of the enemy who relieved him of his rifle and equipment but did not search him. While being escorted to the rear by this party one of our L.Guns opened fire and the escort threw themselves flat on the ground. L/Cpl GRAHAM seized the opportunity and dashed for our lines. Unfortunately one of our posts took him for an enemy and sustained Lewis Gun fire from several directions was brought to bear upon him, with the result that L/Cpl GRAHAM was forced to keep under cover in No Mans Land for over 2 hours. He made several attempts to get past our posts but in every case was observed and fired upon. Ultimately a No.3. stoppage in a particular L.Gun gave him his opportunity and he was able to regain our lines safely.

5. Prisoners. 4 wounded prisoners in addition to those already enumerated, were captured by the 4th Bn on the 11th inst, making the total for that day 24 other ranks.

The following information has been received from a General Officer who commanded a Brigade in this sector prior to the enemy offensive in March.

1. The Valley running N.N.E. through L.9.A. is a very suitable position for Field Guns.
2. The light railway running from TEMPLEUX to HARGICOURT through L.3.B. and D. and L.10.A. is almost sure to be used as a track by the enemy.
3. Sunken road at approximately L.3.C. central leads into quarries which contain large dugouts.
4. At L.10.A.4.7. a track runs S.S.W. and has tunnelled dugouts on Eastern side.
5. Round trees 150 to 200 yards N.N.E. of COTE WOOD in L.10.C. are a lot of tunnelled dugouts.
6. FERVAQUE FARM in L.16.C. has tunnelled dugouts North and South and overlooks a wide area of our country.
7. The quarries at L.3.A. and B. could give cover to a Brigade of Infantry and were at one time occupied by a Reserve Battalion. They contain large dugouts.

*Laughton*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

15-9-18.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.ARMY SUMMARY. - RESERVES.

(a) The 1st. Res. Div. (exhausted) reinforced the front in the LE VERGUIER area yesterday. This is the third occasion on which it has been sent into the fight since August 8th. It should not be in a condition to offer much resistance. It is apparently relieving the 21st Div.

(b) The 192nd Div. withdrawn after sustaining very heavy losses on August 8th, was found in line in the WOEUVRE during the Allied attack yesterday. It should therefore be deleted from the Fourth Army Situation Map.

CONCLUSION. The enemy still appears to be using up his exhausted divisions ~~from the front~~ and to be saving such divisions as are fresh for as long as possible.

INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY.

(a) Prisoners belonging to the 119th Div., captured yesterday state that it is generally rumoured that the HINDENBURG Line will be ready by the 20th inst.

(b) There are as yet no signs that the enemy intends to vacate the EPEHY line at present.

PRISONERS. The number of prisoners which passed through Corps Cages and C.C.S. since August 8th is 36,853 of which 847 are officers.

CONVERSION OF THE "MUSKETEN BATAILLONE" INTO MACHINE GUN MARKSMAN DETACHMENTS.

According to a German War Ministry Order of the 22nd April 1918, the 1st and 2nd Musketen Bns. formed on the 10th August 1915, will be converted into 2 machine gun marksman detachments under the orders of the Machine Gun Marksman Headquarters Staff. West.

They will be organized and equipped according to the establishments laid down for machine gun marksman detachments, but will retain their name and present uniform. In addition they will receive the badge granted to machine gun marksman detachments by the Emperor.



SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 4.

15-9-18.

From 6.a.m. 13-9-18. to 8.a.m. 15-9-18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. Infantry. On completion of relief of 1st Brigade by 2nd Brigade, patrols proceeded as under.  
Right Battalion. 2 patrols searched the Battalion front to a depth of 200 yards. The right patrol encountered no enemy, while the left patrol was sniped at from trenches in L.27.A.  
Left Battalion. A patrol from L.7.D.6.8. encountered enemy in a post at L.8.C.6.4. 2 M.Gs fired and bombs were thrown from this post. Our patrol bombed this post but could not silence the M.Gs. They withdrew and were fired on by a M.G. from approx. L.8.C.5.6.  
 2. Artillery. Our 18-pdrs successfully shelled CARPEZA COPSE in L.15.C. Heavies shelled GRANDPRIEL WOOD during the night but results could not be observed. In addition all calibres carried out considerable harassing fire on enemy back areas. Between 5.p.m. and 6.p.m. a 6" How strafed L.22.C. with good results. men being seen to run in all directions.  
 3. Aircraft. Throughout the day our planes were active over our and enemy's lines and engaged hostile planes and drove them off several times during the morning. Flying very low over Squares L.13. L.14. 19. 20. 25. 26. without interference by E. A.A. or M.G. fire. N. or S. of this area however they were engaged by both A.A. & M.G. fire.

B. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

1. Hostile Activity.  
 a. Infantry. Enemy infantry appears to be alert but not aggressive.  
 b. Machine Guns. M.Gs were located at L.8.C.5.4. (2.M.Gs) and (approx) at L.8.C.3.6.  
 c. Artillery. was more active during the period. The following places received most attention; ROSIEL. BOIS DECROSS. HESBE. COURT. HERVILLY. MONTIGNY. BERNES. were shelled with 4.2. and 5.9s H.E. and Shrapnel from direction LE VERGUIER and TRAPLEUX. During the night scattered fire over forward area with 77mm. From 12.30.a.m. to 1.20.a.m. Blue X, Yellow X, and phosphors concentration in 77mm. calibre on K.17. 22. 23. 26. 77mm. and .cm. H.E. over these area between 11.p.m. and midnight.  
 d. Aircraft. Repeated attempts were made by E.A. to cross our lines between 6.a.m. - 1.p.m. but in each case were successfully driven off by our planes.



APPENDIX 8

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Enemy Observation balloons at grid bearings of 470, 870, 910, and 950, from K.27.B.1.4, were forced to descend by our planes. At 10.30 a.m. an enemy balloon got adrift and disappeared at a great height; two observers were seen to descend in parachutes.

2. Defences. Posts located at L.27.A.8.3, and L.8.C.5.4. Gs located at L.8.C.5.4. (2) and L.8.C.3.8. (approx.).

3. Movement. Hostile movement in L.22, observed at intervals throughout the day was attended to by the artillery with good effect. No abnormal movement elsewhere.

4. Miscellaneous. A white flare sent up from BROUSE WOOD at 11.40 a.m. produced a brisk bombardment of rear areas.

At 9.30 a.m. a heavy white smoke screen was seen at 810.6.8. From K.27.B.1.4, appeared to be a dump on fire, no explosion was distinguishable.

*Robert Scott*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
1st Australian Division.



SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 5.

16/9/18.

From 6 a.m., 15/9/18 to 6 a.m., 16/9/18.

A. OUR OPERATIONS.

1. INFANTRY.

(a) Minor Enterprise. With the object of straightening our line a post was pushed out to L.27.a.2.1. and another to approx. L.20.d.3.8.

(b) Artillery. Throughout the period systematic harassing and destructive fire was maintained, the following being the chief targets engaged - FLAVAQUE FARM, QUARRIES in L.10.a., BROSSIE WOODS. Nos. 1 and 2 GRAND PRIEL WOOD, from L.22.c.8.3. - L.22.a.8.6 - L.17.c.0.0. - Copse at L.8.a.80.52 - trench at L.15.a.6.2. and movement in L.3.b.

(c) Machine Guns. 11,000 rounds were expended by our Vickers guns on trench systems and tracks in L.21.a. and c. Sunken road in L.8.a.8.8. Copse L.8.a. and B. and road junction at L.15.a.7.9.

(d) Trench Mortars. 22 rounds were fired on enemy trench from L.8.c.5.4. to L.8.c.8.3. Our patrols report that the shooting was good.

(e) Patrols. Our patrols report -

(a) An enemy trench from L.8.c.5.4 - L.8.c.8.3. was found strongly held and a vigorous resistance met with. The enemy used bombs, rifles, and M.Gs, our patrols retaliated and believes it inflicted casualties.

(b) M.Gs were active from L.8.a.8.1., L.8.a.9.6. and L.8.c.4.8.

(c) There is an enemy post of 6 to 8 men at L.26.d.9.6.

(d) A working party was seen at L.27.b.8.0.

(e) Old enemy posts and dugouts at L.21.b.2.0. and L.21.b.5.8. were examined and found unoccupied.

(f) No enemy patrols were encountered.

2. Identifications. Nil.

3. Aerial activity. - At 1-45 p.m. one of our planes brought down an enemy balloon in flames.

4. Hostile Artillery. - Activity: - Enemy fire was concentrated mainly on the roads from ROISEL to HERVILLY and TEMPLEUX, N.W. and S.E. outskirts of ROISEL, valley in K.10.a. and cross roads in K.12.a. Pronounced area shoots consisting of 10.5 and 15 cm. fire were put down in K.18.B. and D. and K.17.b and C. during the morning. From 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. 300 rounds of 15 cm. shell fell in K.22 and 25. A considerable quantity of blue cross gas shell was directed on K.23.c, K.29.a, K.9 and 13, K.26.a and MARQUIX.

5. Enemy's Attitudes. - Quiet, but alert.

6. Enemy's Defences. -

(a) Posts. Trench L.8.c.5.4 - L.8.c.8.3, - L.26.d.9.6. - L.8.c.9.5.

(b) Wire. On recent aeroplane photos a little wire is shown on eastern side of strong point in L.27.a and L.21.c from L.27.d.2.2. to L.28.a.20.99.

(c) Work. Trenches in L.28.a. are being renovated.

7. Hostile Aerial Activity. - During the day E.A. were quiet but at night many bombing planes crossed our line.

8. Movement. - Throughout the day individual movement was seen in G.14.c.

9. Miscellaneous. - At 8 a.m. one of our planes was forced to land in K.21.d. through slight damage caused by enemy A.A. fire.

R. G. Wertheim  
Capt

Lt Col. Liout-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

17-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 6.

From 6.a.m. 16-9-18. to 6.a.m. 17-9-18.

I... OPERATIONS.

Minor Enterprise. Posts have been established at L.8.C.20. 65, L.8.C.15.90 and L.8.A.0.0. and the trench from L.8.C.5.4. to L.8.C.8.2. is now occupied by us, the enemy having evacuated.

(a) Artillery. Continual harassing fire was maintained by batteries, the following being the chief targets engaged - FERVAQUE FARM, L.16.A, Quarries in L.10.A, CHATEAU at L.23.A.40. 10, Cross Roads L.16.A and earthworks in L.3.A. and B. Intermittent "shell storms" were placed from L.21.D.8.9, L.22.A.25.00, sunken road L.22.C.8.5, L.28.A.5.6, Wood No. 1. at L.21.B, L.27.A.5.3, and L.27.A.3.7.

(b) Machine Guns. The Vickers guns expended 10,000 rounds on the following targets - Sunken road in L.8.A.8.8., Copse in L.8.A. and road junction at L.15.A.7.9.

(c) Patrols. Our patrols report -

(a) That L.27.A.2.6, L.27.A.5.4, and L.27.A.3.8. are strongly held by the enemy who on our approach put up a strong resistance. We retaliated with rifle and hand grenades also machine gun fire and inflicted casualties.

(d) Aerial. At midday one of our planes fell in flames in F.19., apparently due to engine trouble.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

21. Bav. I.R. German killed in L.14.C. night of 16/17th.

3. Hostile Artillery Activity. displayed a slight decrease from the previous 24 hours HERVILLY and ROISEL were intermittently shelled with 4.2" and 5.9" from 11.a.m. to 11.30, and about 100 rds 77 and 4.2" fell in K.18.C. and K.24.A. Throughout the morning K.29.C. and K.28.A. and B. received heavy "strafing" of 77 - 4.2" and 5.9", roads and tracks appearing to be the enemies main objective. From 12.45. to 2.45.p.m. K.35.B. and K.29.D. were subjected to 4.2" shelling from the direction of HARGICOURT. In the afternoon Roads in L.25.C. and K.30.D. HERVILLY, K.30.A. and C. K.22.C. and K.35.B. were the chief points shelled. A marked decrease was reported during the night. At 1.30.a.m. 20 rounds of 8" fell in K.35.B. from the direction of HARGICOURT and at 3.a.m. an area shoot of 4.2" and 5.9" was put down on K.35.B. and K.29.D.

4. Enemys attitude. Defensively alert.

5. Enemy Defences. Posts Occupied posts were located at L.27.A. 2.6, L.27.A.5.4, L.27.A.3.8.

6. Hostile Aerial Activity. At night hostile bombing planes were active dropping bombs in rear areas, L.29, L.7.Cent. and L.7.D.C.C.

7. Movement. Considerable movement of small parties was observed at G.14.C.7.6. where work is apparently going on.

for R.B. Wortheim  
Capt  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

18-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 7.

From 6.a.m. 17-9-18. to 6.p.m. 18-9-18.

- I. OPERATIONS. At 5.20.a.m. on the 18th inst, our troops co-operated in the attack made by this Corps and our line from N to S. now runs A.25.D.0.0. - G.1.B.75.00. - G.1.D.30.50. - G.8.C.5.5. - G.14.A.60.00. - G.20.B.70.00.

2. PRISONERS AND MATERIAL.

The number of prisoners passed through the Divisional Cage up to 6.p.m. is 60 Officers and 1369 which added to 157 wounded who passed through the A.D.S. makes a grand total of -  
60 Officers and 1526 O.Rs.

Note. It is not known what number of the wounded are Officers.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS.

1st. Gd. Gren. Regt.	}	2nd. Gd. Div.
2nd. Gd. Gren. Regt.		
4th. Gd. Gren. Regt.		

94. I.R.	}	38. Divn.
95. I.R.		
98. I.R.		

19. Bav. I.R.	}	5th. Bav. Div.
21. Bav. I.R.		
7. Bav. I.R.		

3. R.I.R.	}	1st. Res. I.D.
1. R.I.R.		
59. R.I.R.		

161. I.R. ( 185. Div. )  
 10th. Bav. F.A.R.  
 5th. Bav. M.W. Coy.  
 22. Foot. A. Battalion.  
 1st. Res. F.A.R.  
 M.G. Marksman Detachments 37.  
 98. Labour Battalion.  
 91st. Listening Set Detachment.  
 237. F.A.R.

4. ORDER OF BATTLE. N. to S. -

1st. Gd. Gren. Regt.	}	2nd. Gd. Divn.
4th. do		
2nd. do		
96. I.R.	}	38. Divn.
94. I.R.		
95. I.R.		
19. Bav. I.R.	}	5th. Bav. Div.
21. Bav. I.R.		
7. Bav. I.R.		
3. R.I.R.	}	1st. Res. Div.
1. R.I.R.		
59. R.I.R.		

5. ENEMY ARTILLERY. The reply to our initial barrage was feeble mainly consisting of scattered shelling of 15.c.m. Hows and H.V. guns.

(P.T.O.)



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6. ENEMY ATTITUDE. In parts a stubborn resistance was encountered by our troops in their advance but all prisoners express their war weariness and are pleased to be captured.

*R. G. Wertheim*  
Capt.  
Lt. Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

The 4th. Aust. Division have in todays operation captured (wounded included) -

67. Officers. 1629. O.Rs.

The Division on our left report having taken over 600 prisoners up to 6.p.m.

Guns.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

GENERAL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS

18-9-18.

ORDER OF BATTLE. N. to S. -  
 1st. Gd. Gren. Regt. }  
 4th. Gd. Gren. Regt. } 2nd Guard  
 2nd. Gd. Gren. Regt. } Divn.

96. I.R. }  
 94. I.R. } 38. Div.  
 95. I.R. }

19. Bav. I.R. }  
 21. Bav. I.R. } 5th. Bav. Divn.  
 7. Bav. I.R. }

3. R.I.R. }  
 1. R.I.R. } 1. Res. I.D.  
 59. R.I.R. }

DRAFTS AND LOSSES. Within the last month only very small drafts have been received mainly consisting of returned wounded, '19 Class and men from disbanded divisions; losses have of course been heavy not only in prisoners but also in casualties, our artillery having inflicted serious losses so much so that the 38th, I. Res. and 5th Bav Divisions have today throughout only 3 instead of 4 company battalions.

Prisoners of the 3rd. R.I.R. state that two days ago they received drafts from the 373. I.R. 225 Div which latter has been disbanded; it is not known what formations the 18th and 217th R.I.Rs reinforced.

STRENGTHS. Companies have an average fighting strength of 35 and a ration strength of about 120.

UNITS IN REAR. As to these nothing definite could be ascertained but the consensus of opinion is that there are very few reserves opposite this front.

INTENTIONS. It is interesting to note that every unit had orders to hold its position at all costs. The enemy now intend to hold the HINDENBURG SYSTEM as their front line.

GENERAL. All ranks state that they were completely surprised by our attack.

NAMES. DIV COMMANDERS.  
 1. Res. Div. GRAF. WALDERSEE. (Lt. Gen)  
 185. Div. Lt-Gen. VON HORN.  
 38. Divn. Lt-Gen. SCHULTHEISS.  
 2nd. Gd. Div. Lt-Gen. V. FRIEDEBURG.  
 5th. Bav. Div. Lt-Gen. V. ENDRES.

INFORMATION RE SPECIALISTS.

91st. LISTENING SET DETACHMENT.

STRENGTH. 1 Off and 17 O.Rs (establishment is 1 Off. 25. O.Rs.)



EQUIPMENT. 1 LISTENING SET.

ORGANIZATION. Normally 1 N.C.O. and 10 men are forward with the apparatus the remainder being in reserve. Reliefs take place every four or five days.

GENERAL. This unit had only been emplaced in this sector 5 days ago and during that time no information of any importance had been picked up. Prisoners before capture succeeded in destroying their LISTENING SET.

98th. LABOUR BATTALION.

ORGANIZATION. The 98th. LABOUR BN consists of 3 Companies each of which is about 250 strong.

GENERAL. The prisoners were attached to a PIONEER Company and were employed in digging trenches, prisoners who only came into the forward area 2 days ago state that there are only few troops in rear of the front zone. BELLICOURT is having the trench system around it enlarged.

37th. H.G. MARKSMAN DETACHMENT.

ORGANIZATION. The detachment is subdivided into 3 companies, each company having 3 platoons.

EQUIPMENT. 2 heavy M.Gs to each platoon, 1,0, 18 heavy H.Gs to the detachment.

STRENGTH. 1st Company 1 Off. and 48 O.Rs.

NAMES. Commander - Cavalry Captain STEGEMANN.

GENERAL. This unit was seven days ago attached to 7th Bav. I.R., it had previously been resting at TONGERN in BELGIUM.

INFORMATION RE SPECIALISTS

1st. LISTENING SET

STRENGTH. 1 Off and 17 O.Rs (establishment 1 Off and 17 O.Rs.)



SECRET.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

19-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 8.

From 8.30 a.m. 18-9-18 to 6.30 a.m. 19-9-18.

## 1. OPERATIONS.

It is now possible to deal more fully with our attack which commenced at 5.20 a.m. on the 18th inst and was launched in co-operation with units on our flanks.

Our own men pay tribute to the artillery saying that the fire throughout was well directed, this is confirmed by prisoners statements; the initial barrage seems to have been particularly good.

Up to the first objective no very serious resistance seems to have been encountered, excepting in L.27.A. at L.22. Cent, and in one instance further North when hostile machine guns proved troublesome; in the latter case a tank did good work in removing the obstacle.

In the above phase of the operation great credit is due to the scouts who despite the heavy mist ably maintained touch with flanking units.

From the 1st objective onwards resistance became stiffer and one of our battalions was unable to keep up with the barrage owing to the intensity of the machine gun fire directed on it from the EAST of HARGICOURT; again strong opposition was encountered from the enemy in trench systems running through L.12. L.13. and L.24. and this was only overcome after very fierce fighting had taken place.

Notwithstanding the severe nature of the fighting our men persevered and owing to their dash and determination we gained the day.

Our line now runs from N. to S. A.25.D.2.0. - G.1.D.65.50. - G.2.C.0.0. - G.8.A.3.0. - G.2.C.5.0. - G.14.Central. - G.14.D.0.5. - G.20.B.3.7.

(a) Artillery. Our artillery did splendid work during the attack and after our objectives had been gained harassed enemy centres of activity, sunken roads, and trenches in G.8.A, G.8.D. and G.15.A.

down our machine guns  
also it is about the  
now the first (P.T.O.)  
quadrant but still and over



- 2 -

(b) Machine Guns. Machine guns fired 260,500 rounds in conjunction with the attack and co-operated with other branches in drowning the noise of our tanks.  
Detailed reports as to work done by the forward guns are not yet to hand.

(c) Patrols. Patrols maintained touch with flanking units during the night and in addition report:

(a) PEARL WOOD was found unoccupied.

(b) A.S. fire was encountered from G.S.L.5.E. and C.14.E. 7.0.

(c) Many enemy dead were seen.

(d) Aerial. Our planes though active experienced difficulty in keeping off the enemy.

2. Prisoners and Material. The number of prisoners (including wounded) taken by this Division since the morning of the 18th now amounts to -

33 Officers. 1576. O.Ms.

Up to the present 92 A.Gs have been counted, 2 Anti Tank Rifles and two 6" T. Mortars.

Guns at present located amount to 35 made up of

1 Anti Tank Gun.

1 8" How.

7 5.9" Hows.

10 4.2. Hows.

13. 77 m. Guns.

3. Identifications. As reported in yesterdays summary.

4. Hostile Artillery Activity. Very little retaliation was observed in reply to our morning barrage until 15 or 20 minutes after zero, when a very light and ragged barrage was put down along our forward system and in the vicinity of ROISEL and HERVILLY.

5. Enemy's Attitude. Since our attack his guns have been shelling our front line, but his infantry appears quiet.

6. Hostile Aerial Activity. Enemy planes were very active and shot down two of our planes and one balloon.

Battle flights were continuously over our lines and at 2.30 a formation of 9 was observed.

The machine which at 11.a.m. shot down our machines appears to be new or is otherwise an uncommon type, it is about the size of an S.B.5. with no stagger, a pronounced fish tail and overhang, and carries what appears to be a wireless installation forward of the front edge of the upper plane; it carries both pilot and observer and is armed with two machine guns.

This plane is reported to have come down as low as 200 ft.



1

- 3 -

7. Movement. Between 6.p.m. and 7.p.m. about 200 of the enemy in small groups appeared to occupy old trenches in G.2.A., otherwise only isolated movement in rear areas.

*R. L. Smith*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.

PRISONERS. The total number of prisoners (including wounded) taken as a result of the operations commenced by this Corps on the 18th inst has now reached,  
146. Officers. 3,935 Other Ranks.

GERMAN SUMMER TIME. German Summer time which commenced at 2.a.m. on the 15th April, ceased at 3.a.m. on the 16th September. Franco-British time will now be the same as German time until Franco - British summer time ceases, when German time will again be one hour in advance of FRANCO - BRITISH time.

FRENCH OFFICIAL. (Morning 13-9-18)

In MACEDONIA the advance is now on a front of about 18 miles and has proceeded to an average depth of 5 miles along the whole line, 4,000 prisoners and 30 guns have been taken.

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SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

20-9-18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 9.

From 6.a.m. 19-9-18 to 6.a.m. 20-9-18.

I. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry. With in the period under review we have established posts at A.29.D.20.85., A.29.D.2.6., and A.29.D.2.5., thence South our line runs A.29.D.20.00. - G.1.B.2.7. - G.1.B.50.35. - G.1.D.65.80. - G.1.D.6.8. - G.7.B.45.85. - G.8.A.0.1. - G.8.C.30.65. - G.14.A.5.9. - G.14.B.5.1. - G.14.D.4.5. -

(b) Artillery. During the day and night our artillery harassed the enemy forward area; our infantry report the shooting was very accurate.

(c) Machine guns. Indirect fire was carried out during the night the following targets being engaged; - G.19.D.80.00. to G.20.45.4., small Copse in G.20.C., G.30.A.1.6., G.2.D.8.5.

The whole of G.3.A.2.B. is being systematically harassed, 5,000 rounds were expended last night and a considerable amount of indirect fire was also done with German guns mounted at our positions.

(d) Patrols. Our patrols report; -

(a) An occupied enemy post at G.2.C.3.0.

(b) There are no enemy troops forward of main line running round crest of ridge from A.20.C.0.4. - A.26.Central. - A.26.D.4.0.

(c) There are enemy M.Gs at G.14.B.8.3. G.8.A.2.9. G.2.C.7.5. G.14.B.9.2.

(d) Flares were fired from G.8.A.8.3.

(e) QUARRY WOOD is reported unoccupied.

(f) Aerial Activity. Our planes were active contact machines being particularly in evidence; at 10.a.m. a D.H.4 dropped bombs on enemy positions in G.2.B. and at 1.30.p.m. six on G.26.A. At 3.50.p.m. an enemy plane was brought down at G.21.C.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS. One badly wounded prisoner was found in GRAND-PRINCE WOOD - 7.Bav.I.R.

3. Enemy Attitude. The enemy is displaying great activity reinforcing and strengthening his positions, and his artillery fire has shown a marked increase.

4. Hostile Artillery Activity. VILLERET was shelled intermittently by 5.9. and 4.2. howitzers. Harassing fire by 7.7. and 10. cm guns was directed on L.23. G.7.5. G.15.2.14. from the direction of MAUDRY. Gun flashes were observed at G.50.B.3.6. and from the sunken road at G.12.A.8.6.



## APPENDIX 8

5. Hostile Aerial Activity. Less active than during the last 24 hours. At 3.45 p.m. one of our R.E.8 planes fell in flames behind the enemy lines.
6. Enemy Defences.  
Posts. There is an occupied post at G.2.C.3.0. and the trenches running along the high ground from F.24.D.4.4. - A.20.C.0.5. - A.20.C.4.1, thence along QUEMONT TRENCH and PIT LANE - A.23.D.5.0., are held in force.
7. Enemy Movement. A considerable amount of movement both of transport and personnel was seen in rear of the front zone, roads in G.4. were much used; it is considered that either a relief is in progress or the enemy is being reinforced.

*R. G. W. H. Air - Capt.*

*for* Lieut-Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 1st Australian Division.



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

20-9-18.

MI NEKE.

PRISONERS. Since August 8th this Army has taken prisoner -  
977 Officers 41,750 O.Rs.  
of which number this Corps has captured -  
541 Officers. 19,900 O.Rs.

GERMAN MAN POWER. At the commencement of this year the German  
divisions in the field numbered 243 as against 226 now.  
Seventeen divisions have been disbanded and used to  
reinforce other formations.

ENEMY INTENTIONS. From captured regimental orders dated 13th, 14th,  
15th, 17th September it is clear that the enemy intended to  
hold the system of trenches we have just wrested from him.  
The Orders state "The position must be held even  
though it take the last man and the last cartridge and in the  
case of the position being lost it must immediately be retaken  
by an outflanking movement."  
Elsewhere is stated "It must always be borne in mind  
that our " present line is to be our winter quarters."

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SECRET.FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

21/9/18.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 10.From 6 a.m. 20/9/18 to 6 a.m. 21/9/18.1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry:- At 1 a.m. our Southern Brigade advanced its line 500 yards incurring only one casualty during the operation; the line established runs N to S G.14.a.4.7 - G.14.a.8.4 - G.14.b.1.2 - G.14.d.6.8 - G.14.d.7.5 - G.14.d.7.1 - G.20.b.6.3.

At 5-40 a.m. to-day our Northern Brigade attacked in co-operation with the formation on our left; the attack was quite successful and we took up a position from N to S. A.25.d.8.6 - A.26.c.2.4 - G.2.a.9.8 - G.2.a.8.0 - G.2.c.0.4; later in the day a counter attack was launched against the unit on our left whereon we moved our northern posts to a position better suited to the tactical situation. Our line now runs N to S. A.25.d.2.8 - A.25.d.3.0 - G.2.a.9.8 - G.2.a.8.0 - G.2.c.0.4 - G.8.c.3.7 - G.8.c.5.4 - G.14.a.4.7 - G.14.a.8.4 - G.14.b.1.2 - G.14.d.6.8 - G.14.d.7.5 - G.14.d.7.1 - G.20.b.6.7.

(b) Artillery:- Generally very active; apart from the barrage put down in conjunction with our attack shoots were directed on roads leading to BELLICOURT and NAUROY, RIQUAVAL RAVINE, G.6, G.10, A.30, B.25; at 7 p.m. heavy shelling was carried out on G.11, G.12, G.17 and 18.

(c) Patrols:- Our patrols report:-

(a) QUARRY WOOD was searched and found empty.  
(b) SKIN TRENCH was examined to a distance of 40 yards N. of QUARRY WOOD and found unoccupied.

(c) M.Gs were fired from G.8.d.9.2., G.2.c.6.5, G.8.b.8.6, and G.15.a.3.7.

(d) No hostile patrols were encountered but 5 Germans who made no attempt at resistance were captured at about G.14.d. central.

(d) Aircraft:- Our planes were very active; one enemy machine appeared to be captured and escorted to one of our dromes.

2. PRISONERS AND MATERIAL.

Within the last 24 hours 49 prisoners have passed through the Divisional cage.

As the result of our operations commenced on the 18th inst., prisoners now number

63 Officers and 1627 Other ranks.

P.T.O.



## APPENDIX 8

Guns captured amount to 49 comprising:-

1	-	8" How.
10	-	5.9" Hows.
8	-	4.2" Hows.
30	-	77 mm. Guns.

also 1 Anti Tank Gun, 5 T.Ms and 2 Anti Tank Rifles.  
Machine Guns now number more than 100.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS.

161 I.R.	185 Inf.Div.
7 R.I.R.	} 121 Inf.Div.
60 I.R.	

4. ORDER OF BATTLE N. TO S.

56 R.I.R.	} 121 I.D.
60 I.R.	
7 R.I.R.	

161 I.R.	} 185 I.D.
28 R.I.R.	

5. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. From Div.Arty.

Gun flashes were observed on magnetic bearings of 48° and 31° from G.20.b.3.6. and 32° from G.20.a.7.6.

Hostile artillery displayed a more aggressive attitude than during the previous period, especially during the hours of daylight. From 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. L.3.d., L.20., G.14.a. and C. L.8.b, and L.9.c., were continuously harassed with 77 and 4.2" and between 5-10 p.m. and 3-45 p.m. 300 rounds 4.2" and 5.9" fell on L.17. and L.18, and 40 rounds on L.25.E. and C.

During the night L.8.b, L.2.d, L.3.c, and L.4.c, were heavily shelled with 77 and 4.2" and 20 rounds 8" fell on L.17.c.5.8.

6. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE.

The enemy's artillery continued being very active. parties are at work improving the HINDENBURG LINE.



-3-

7. MOVEMENT.

Considerable individual movement was again noticed on roads, tracks and area around BELLICOURT and NAUROY. During the afternoon much motor and horse transport going in both directions was observed on roads in C.1.d, and C.7.b.

8. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.

During the night the enemy heavily bombed our batteries in L.19.a, L.17.c, L.16.c, and L.21.b.

*R. C. Wertheim*  
*Capt*

*fa* Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.

APPENDIX

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Interrogation of prisoners belonging to the  
3rd R.I.R. and 59 R.I.R. (1st Res.Div) captured  
within the last 24 hours.

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METHOD OF CAPTURE. The men of the 3rd and 59th R.I.Rs, were in a  
dug-out and whilst looking out were observed by one of our men and  
taken prisoner.

STRENGTHS AND LOSSES. Company strengths were said to average from  
30 to 40 throughout the division.

DRAFTS. None had been received recently.

INTENTIONS. Prisoners do not believe a counter-attack will be made  
on our front, they do not consider that sufficient troops are  
available to carry out any enterprise on a large scale.

MORALE. Poor.

Information from Prisoners of the 60th  
I.R. and 7th R.I.R. 121st Div.

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METHOD OF CAPTURE. When our barrage opened they were on outpost  
duty and surrendered as soon as our men approached thinking  
resistance useless.

ORDER OF BATTLE N TO S.

59 R.I.R.	}	121st Div.
60 I.R.		
7 R.I.R.		

161 I.R.	}	185 Div.
28 R.I.R.		

STRENGTHS. Battalions have only 3 companies; each of which averages  
from 60 to 70 men.

DRAFTS. Large drafts have been received from the 253 R.I.R.

INTENTIONS. It is considered that a further withdrawal will be  
made owing to the lack of reserves.

UNITS SEEN. Personnel of regiments belonging to the 38th Div.  
has been seen in rear.

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SECRET.  
KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 11.

From 6 a.m. 21/9/18 to 6 a.m. 22/9/18.

1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Infantry:- The 2nd Brigade relieved the 1st Brigade in the Northern Sector of the line; the relief was carried through without casualties or incident.

(b) Artillery:- Extensive harassing fire was carried out by all batteries and the following were among the chief targets engaged.

Trenches in G.3.d, G.9.a, and b. G.4.c, A.27.c., G.10, G.14, G.1.b, A.20.d.75.50 to A.20.d.30.20, A.23.b.7.7. to A.23.b.8.5 to A.23.b.9.0 and movement opposite Divisional front reported by F.O.O's and Infantry.

(c) Patrols:- Our patrols report

(a) H.Q.s were located at G.8.d.7.3 and G.8.b.90.05.

(b) SKIN TRENCH was reconnoitered and found unoccupied, in good condition, with a belt of wire on either side.

(c) There are empty dugouts at G.8.d.3.0, G.14.b.85.95. and G.1.c.9.3.

(d) 20 enemy dead were seen at N.E. corner of QUARRY WOOD.

(e) The enemy was located in a trench in G.21.b.

(f) No hostile patrols were encountered.

(d) Aircraft:- At night our planes bombed enemy areas.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY.

A considerable decrease was reported in hostile shelling throughout the period, although during the night areas on both flanks of the Divisional Zone were subjected to heavy bombardment.

F.29, 30, L.5 and 6 were intermittently shelled with 10.5 c.m. and 15 c.m. during the day. The majority of this shelling which up to 5 p.m. amounted to about 800 rounds came from the direction 31° and 97° from L.4.a.75.80.

At 2 p.m. 35 rounds 10.5 (H.V) c.m. fell in ROISEL and 60 rounds 15 c.m. in HARGICOURT.

The night was quiet, scattered light harassing fire being directed on to L.4, L.8 and G.16.

P.T.O.



## APPENDIX 8

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ENEMY ATTITUDE.

During the period under review the hostile artillery fire has slackened considerably and the infantry has maintained its passive attitude.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

M.Gs active from G.22.c.1.5, G.22.c.5.7 and G.9.c.1.1.  
Work. Work is going on at G.21.b.7.5, and on trench systems in B.25.c, G.6.b and d, and H.1.c.

MOVEMENT.

The abnormal movement continues. Areas which have shown themselves to be great centres of activity are G.10.b, 11.a, and b - Catolot - NAUROY Line through G.5.d, and G.11.b. To and from G.5.d through G.6 as far as FOLEMPRISE FARM (B.25.c). Trench systems in G.13.c. Roads much used by transport are - Sunken road between BELLICOURT and NAUROY - Road G.10.b East to Northern end of NAUROY. Road from FOLEMPRISE FARM to NAUROY. That portion of main road running N.E. from ESTREES was observed to be intensively used by traffic particularly during yesterday. Between hours of 10.30 a.m. and 1 p.m. about 800/900 men with equipment were observed to move mostly in single file along sunken road West from ESTREES past FOLEMPRISE FARM, thence in open formation in W.N.W. direction where they disappeared in low country in A.50. Other movement including transport was observed throughout the day, which increased as result of our shelling.

HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.

At night enemy planes bombed our forward and rear areas.

MISCELLANEOUS.

At 3 p.m. railway lines in G.5.c and d, were blown up by the enemy.

After our shelling of BELLICOURT, R.D CROSS wagons were seen coming out evacuating the wounded.

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
1st Australian Division



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APPENDIX VIII

KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 12

From 6 a.m. 22/9/18, to 6 a.m. 25/9/18.

1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Artillery:- In addition to carrying out our usual harassing of enemies roads, tracks, trenches and other centres of located activity the following targets received special attention - MALAKOFF WOOD, sunken roads in G.4 and G.10, house at G.4.c.1.2, traffic at G.10.Central and trenches in G.9.A and B.

(b) Patrols:- Our patrols report

(a) Trench from G.2.b.1.4 - G.2.b.4.7. is unoccupied and in a bad state of repair.

(b) No movement was observed in the trench which runs from G.3.d.6.5 - G.15.a.3.7.

(c) No hostile patrols were encountered.

(c) Aerial:- Our planes were active throughout the period.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

One enemy dead was found in QUARRY WOOD bearing the number 19 on his shoulder strap.

NOTE. It is not known how long the above has been deceased.

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY.

Activity was decidedly below normal. No outstanding shoots were put down.

The following areas were lightly harassed VILLETET - MARGICOURT - L.14., L.6.a., L.11.c., L.5.c., L.9.b., and L.10.d., chiefly by 77s, 10.5 cm and 15 cm.

4. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE. Passive.

5. ENEMY'S DEFENCES.

Posts. Occupied posts were located at G.3.a.3.7 and G.3.d.7.2. and one is suspected at G.3.d.8.9.

Work. Work is going on at B.15.b.36.65.

6. MOVEMENT.

During the period movement was mainly remarked around FOLEM-PRISE Farm, BELLICOURT, ESTREES, NAUROY, and in G.4 in the vicinity of CANAL tunnel.

P.T.O.



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HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.  
Not so active as hitherto.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A Red Cross flag is flying from building at B.9.b.2.2.

/18.

1a Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



## APPENDIX

~~SECRET.~~  
KR.

FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
21st September, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 84.

1. The 2nd American Corps, consisting of Corps Headquarters and the 27th and 30th American Divisions, will be employed in conjunction with the Australian Corps for the next series of operations.
2. In order to ensure uniformity of tactical methods and complete co-operation between the Australian and American Forces, an Australian Mission under the command of Major-General, E.G. SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN, C.B., D.S.O., will be detailed from the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions for attachment to American formations and units.
5. 1st Aust.Div. will provide the personnel for the 30th American Division.
4. (i) A Table of personnel to be attached is appended.  
(ii) Complete nominal rolls in duplicate of personnel collected by Brigades and Divisional units in accordance with attached Table will be forwarded to D.H.Q. without fail by noon on 23rd September.

(iii) It will be noted that certain Divisional personnel have already been selected by the G.O.C. Division, but their names will be forwarded on unit rolls.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

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Jan 1

Div. 2, 100

P.T.O.

is not A.I. but

Liout-Colonel.  
General Staff.  
1st Australian Division.



# APPENDIX

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## TABLE.

### ATTACHMENT OF PERSONNEL 1st AUST. DIV.

Attached to.	Scale of Attachment.	Total Nos.	Detail.
H.Q. 2nd American Corps.	1 G.S.O. 2 D.A.Q.M.G. 3 Senior Signal Officer.	3	Lt-Col. A.M. ROSS, CMG, DSO. Major R. KERR, D.S.O. Capt. V.D. BOWEN, M.C.
H.Q. 30th American Division.	1 Brigadier. 2 Brigade Major. 3 Staff Captain. 4 Signal Officer.	4	Brig-Genl. I.G. MACKAY, D.S.O. Major J.S.S. ANDERSON, M.C. Capt. H.A. MANN, M.C. 2nd A.I. Bde. Lt. R.F. STANISTREET, M.C., M.L.
H.Q. "A" Inf. Bde.	1 Battn. Comdr. 2 Signal Officer.		Selected by 1st Bde. " " 3rd Bde.
H.Q. "B" Inf. Bde.	1 Battn. Comdr. 2 Signal Officer.	4	" " 2nd Bde. " " 1st Bde.
H.Q. Each Regt. 1, c, 5 to each Regt.	1 B.M. Trainee. 2 Staff Captain or Q. Trainee. 3 Transport Officer (A.S.C.) 4 Q.M. 5 Senior Signal N.C.O.	20	1 per Bde (2 from 2nd Bde) 1 per Bde (1 from B.H.Q.) By C.O. Divisional Train. 1 per Bde (2 from 1st Bde) 1 per Bde (1 from Div. Sig. Coy)
H.Q. Each Bn. 1, c, Total 12 Bns.	1 B.I.O's. 2 Senior H.Q.Os. (R.Q.M.S. or C.Q.M.S. where possible)	60	4 per A.I. Bde. 15 per A.I. Bde.



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Attached to.	TO BE FOUND BY 1st Aust. M.G. Bn.		Detail.
	Scale of Attachment.	Total Nos.	
Each American Bde.	1. 1 Officer.	2	} To be selected by O.C. 1st Aust. M.G. Battalion.
	2. 4 Senior N.C.Os	8	
M.G. Bn. Each American Regt. M.G. Coy.	1 Senior N.C.Os	<u>4</u> 14	

TO BE FOUND BY L.T.M. Btys.		
Each American Regt. Stokes Mortar Platoon.	1 Senior N.C.Os	4
		1 per each L.T.M. Battery. (2 from 3rd L.T.M. Battery)
		<u>4</u>

Grand Total 109

Distribution.

- 1st Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 1st Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- 1st Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
- 1st Aust. Div. Train.
- 1st Aust. M.G. Bn.
- A.C.



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APPENDIX X  
FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX 10

QUARTERS  
134  
85/411

Divisional Headquarters,  
24th September, 1918.

Aust. Corps.  
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TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL LESSONS LEARNT FOR  
MONTH OF SEPT, 1918.

TACTICAL.

(1) In the operations during the month, the urgent necessity of the Machine Gun Battalion Commander having a more rapid means of Transport than is at present at his disposal, was very much in evidence.

To keep in touch with Brigades and his Company Headquarters in the line, and also with the Machine Gun Battalion's of Division on the flank is practically impossible.

It is suggested that a motor bicycle and side-car be issued as part of the Mobilization Equipment and also that a D.R. be attached for carrying urgent messages during operations.

(2) In future operations the Initial Machine Gun Barrage could be fired with German guns and S.A.A. A large number of these guns could be emplaced with sufficient filled belts. The advantage of this being as follows:-

- (a) A saving of men, as only 2 per gun would be required.
- (b) A saving of time in moving forward after barrage task completed. There would be no belt filling or gun cleaning to be done, and the guns and equipment could be left ready loaded on limbers, or whatever means of transport was being used for the advance. German guns and equipment could be left at Battery positions and salvaged after the attack.

(3) For guns advancing with, or just in rear of the Infantry during recent operations, it was proved that the full team of eight men was absolutely necessary, if good work is to be done during the attack and consolidation when objectives reached. If less men are used they are too tired to do their job properly.

TECHNICAL.

(1) An issue of Conversion tables for doing Indirect fire, with German guns and S.A.A.

(2) Pending the issue of expendable belts, the advisability of loading the bulk S.A.A. of the mobile echelon in salvaged German belts and boxes.

These belts have been tested in this Unit and found to fire without stoppages.

168  
Major-General.

Commanding 1st Australian Division.



## FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon... 1-9-18 1918.

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks.
	Off.	O. R.	Total.	Off.	O. R.	Total.	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	34	117	151	8	277	285	
DIV. ARTL.	93	2421	2514	3	17	20	
DIV. ENGINEERS.	23	590	613	2	23	25	
Div. Signal Coy.	17	353	350		57	57	
PIONEER BATTALION.	34	1127	1161	2	5	7	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	5	14	19	2	31	33	
1st Battalion.	32	564	596	1	3	4	
2nd Battalion.	28	516	544	-	2	2	
3rd Battalion.	20	479	499	1	3	4	
4th Battalion.	24	621	645	2	4	6	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery.	4	35	39		29	29	
1st A.M.G. Coy.							
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	7	22	29	2	40	42	
5th Battalion.	17	403	420	2	7	9	
6th Battalion.	16	286	302	1	3	4	
7th Battalion.	22	404	426	2	4	6	
8th Battalion.	23	390	413	2	3	5	
2nd A.L.T.M. Battery.	3	39	42				
2nd A.M.G. Coy.							
3rd INF. BDE. H.Q.	4	19	23	2	29	31	
9th Battalion.	25	50	525	1	2	3	
10th Battalion.	21	500	521		3	3	
11th Battalion.	24	463	487	3	6	9	
12th Battalion.	22	529	551	2	3	5	
3rd A.L.T.M. Battery.	4	51	55				
3rd A.M.G. Coy.							
DIVISIONAL TRAIN.	23	446	469	2	66	68	
1st Field Ambulance.	7	207	214		13	14	
2nd Field Ambulance.	10	214	224		16	17	
3rd Field Ambulance.	11	221	232		17	18	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	65	66		3	4	
Mob. Vety. Section.	1	16	17		2	3	
21st A.M.G. Coy. Bn.	42	74	776		23	24	
TOTALS.							



## FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon.....1918.

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks.
	Off.	O. R.	Total.	Off.	O. R.	Total.	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	34	107	141	8	267	275	
DIV. ARTL.	78	2136	2214	3	13	16	
DIV. ENGINEERS.	17	548	565	1	14	15	
Div. Signal Coy.	17	315	332		58	58	
PIONEER BATTALION.	35	884	919	2	5	7	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	1	13	14	3	41	44	
1st Battalion.	26	354	380				
2nd Battalion.	20	424	444	2	5	7	
3rd Battalion.	18	378	396	1	4	5	
4th Battalion.	27	427	454	2	5	7	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery.	3	29	32		19	19	
1st A.M.G. Coy.							
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	5	18	23	1	43	44	
5th Battalion.	25	378	400	2	4	6	
6th Battalion.	24	413	437	2	-	2	
7th Battalion.	25	410	435	2	4	6	
8th Battalion.	25	411	436	2	3	5	
2nd A.L.T.M. Battery.	3	40	43				
2nd A.M.G. Coy.							
3rd INF. BDE. H.Q.	4	12	16	2	37	39	
9th Battalion.	21	463	484	1	2	3	
10th Battalion.	24	396	420	2	5	7	
11th Battalion.	17	372	389	2	4	6	
12th Battalion.	17	470	487	2	4	6	
3rd A.L.T.M. Battery.	4	40	44				
3rd A.M.G. Coy.							
DIVISIONAL TRAIN.	22	395	417	3	81	84	
1st Field Ambulance.	7	179	186	1	11	12	
2nd Field Ambulance.	10	185	195	1	17	18	
3rd Field Ambulance.	9	206	215	2	16	18	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	64	65	1	6	7	
Mob. Vety. Section.	1	19	20	1	1	2	
21st A.M.G. Coy. Bn.	36	699	735	1	20	21.	
TOTALS.							



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1

Casualties for Month of September 1918.

Killed.  
Offs. O.Rs.

22. 154.

Wounded.  
Offs. O.Rs.

69. 1020.

Missing.  
Offs. O.Rs.

- 35.

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Sick Wastage for Month of September 1918.

Offs.

25M

O.Rs.

641.

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Number of Officers and Other Ranks joined for Month of September

Offs.

82.

O.Rs.

1061.

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