

AWM4
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/48/29 Part 3

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 4th
Australian Division

August 1918



AWM4-1/48/29PART3

APPENDIX 58

New Army

SECRET.

Copy No. _____

FOURTH

AUSTRALIAN

DIVISION.

AMENDMENT to Divisional Order No. 147 dated 23.6.18.

1. Reference Relief Table issued with 4th Aust. Div. Order No. 147.

Cancel SERIALS No. 12 and 13 and substitute the following:-

Date	Serial No.	Unit.	From	To.	Route	Relieving Unit.
August 24/25th	12.	Divisional Artillery.	Line	CORBIE Staging Area.	BAYONVILLERS LAMOTTE-EN- SANTERRE FOUILLOY.	Artillery of 34th French Division.
August 25th.	13.	do.	CORBIE Staging Area	CANON LAMOTTE AUBIGNY BREBIERE VECQUEMONT. Area.	FOUILLOY	None.

2. Divisional Headquarters will remain at VILLERS BRETONNEUX for the present and will open at ALLOUVILLE at a date and time to be notified later.

Headquarters,
24th August, 1918.

L. Craig. Capt
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Issued to all recipients of Div. Order No. 147.

For Official Use Only.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 327.

From 6 a.m. 23rd to 6 a.m. 24th August, 1918.

NOT to be taken into the Front Line.

1. OUR OPERATIONS.

(a) Artillery. Harassing fire and synchronised shoots were carried out on roads, trenches, tracks, woods and hostile battery positions in A.4, A.5, A.6, A.9, S.21, S.22, S.23, S.24, S.25 and S.26. A concentration was put down on the dump in S.13.C. at 7.45 p.m. ABLAINCOURT was harassed at 7 p.m.

(b) Trench Mortars. 3" Stokes fired 60 rounds on A.9.C.1.9, A.8.B.7.7, A.3.C.8.8 (M.G. silenced) and A.9.A.05.99. Medium T.M.'s. fired on MIEG WOOD, A.9.A. T.M. at S.27.C.6.6 and trenches A.9.B.1.9 to A.9.C.95.90.

(c) Machine Guns. M.G.'s. (two guns) assisted in the operations of 23rd instant. Indirect fire was directed on A.15.A.4.9, A.9.C.1.6, A.9.A.1.9, A.9.A.9.5. 14,000 rounds were fired.

(d) Snipers. One enemy sniped on right battalion front.

(e) Patrols. On left brigade front no enemy movement was seen, but many flames were fired. On the right brigade front enemy were encountered near A.2.D.9.4 (trench block), and S.26.B.5.2 where an enemy patrol of 5 men was fired on. Talking was heard at A.6.B.85.25, and enemy were found to be occupying trench from A.3.C.1.5 to A.3.A.2.0. Patrols located occupied posts and directed T.M. fire on to the same.

(f) Aircraft. Active on reconnaissance work.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS. Nil.

4. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Our front and support lines were actively shelled during the later afternoon and evening in reply to our concentrations. LIFONS and battery areas were heavily shelled. There was also scattered shelling of the whole area. Hostile batteries were located at S.18.C.8.8, S.26.D, S.27.C and KALNER WOOD.

5. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE. Alert.

6. ENEMY'S DEFENCES.

- (a) Work. Patrols report enemy consolidating the trench from A.3.C.1.5 to A.3.A.2.0.
- (b) Wire. A wiring party was noticed near the trench block at A.2.D.9.4.
- (c) Machine Guns. Enemy guns were active during our barrage yesterday morning. Active M.G.'s. were located at S.21.C.7.8 and A.6.B.9.2.
- (d) Trench Mortars. Slight activity from region of S.21.C against right brigade front.
- (e) Snipers. Slight activity.
- (f) Posts. Posts are located at A.3.C.15.80, A.2.D.9.4, A.2.D.6.2, A.6.B.8.3 and fresh work is visible at S.21.C.2.1.

7. HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY. E.A. crossed our lines several times during the afternoon and evening, and were also busy bombing forward areas at night.

8. MOVEMENT. Men. Considerable movement about trenches in S.11.Central and S.12.A. At 2 p.m. 20 men came East from ABLAINCOURT along road in S.17.D. Several parties of 30 men in each moved about area S.16.C. unloading wagons (artillery action was taken).

P.T.O.

(b) Transport. There was heavy traffic all day on main roads through areas N.28.0 and D. Limbers passed between ABLAINCOURT and S.11. Central at 10 a.m. At 7 p.m. Motor and horse transport travelled to area S.16.0 by the road in S.16.A, and returned after being apparently unloaded.

10. MISCELLANEOUS.

- (a) Signals. A red signal lamp was working from vicinity of ABLAINCOURT.
 (b) Explosions. Many explosions were heard in enemy rear area during the night.

VISIBILITY. Poor.

Bates M
J.W.

Lieut.-Colonel,
 G.S., 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Reports to 11.45 a.m.

Prisoners through Australian Corps Cage and C.C.S. as a result of yesterday's operation now total close upon 3,000.

The left division of the Corps early this morning attacked and occupied BRAY advancing our line forward of the town.

Fighting is in progress on the general line LA BOISELLE - THIEPVAL - GRANDCOURT, the enemy still holding MIRAILMONT. We are attacking in the direction of BIEFVILLERS, MORY COPSE and HALLY COPSE. JUCAS FARM is reported held by us. Since the 21st, 3rd and 4th Armies have captured over 14,000 prisoners and 60 guns, 2nd Army carried out a successful local operation N.E. of NEUF BERQUIN last night.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution of Units.

Unit.	Ref. Sheet, 1/40,000	Location.	Remarks.
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.	53D	O. 29. D. 5. 6	VILLERS BRETONNEUX.
A Branch,	and 68E		CORBIE.
4th Aust. Div. Artillery H.Q.			CAMON
10th A.F.A. Bde.		CAMON	Staging CORBIE en route to CAMON.
11th " "		CAMON	
4th Aust. D.A.C.		LONGEAU	
4th D.T.M.C.		CAMON	
4th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		COISY	
13th Battalion.		POULAINVILLE.	
14th " "		CARDONETTE	
15th " "		ALLONVILLE.	
16th " "		COISY	
4th A.L.T.M. Bty.		COISY	
12th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		LONGPRE	
45th Battalion.		VAUX en AMIENS	
46th " "		LONGPRE	
48th " "		ST. VAAST.	
12th A.L.T.M. Bty.		VAUX.	
13th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		HOSPICE, RIVERY	
49th Battalion.		RIVERY.	
50th " "		"	
51st " "		"	
13th A.L.T.M. Bty.		"	
4th Aust. Div. Engineer H.Q.		LONGEAU	
4th Aust. Field Coy.		M. 28. B. 4. 3	LONGEAU
12th " " "		M. 28. B. 4. 7	"
13th " " "		M. 28. B. 5. 2	"
4th Aust. Pioneer En.		LONGEAU.	
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.		VILLERS BRETONNEUX.	
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.		LAMOTTE - BREBIERE	
4th Aust. M.G. Coy.		" "	
12th " " "		" "	
13th " " "		" "	
24th " " "		" "	
A. D. H. S.		VILLERS BRETONNEUX.	
4th Aust. Field Ambulance.		ALLONVILLE WOOD	
12th " " "		VAUX	
13th " " "		RIVERY.	
4th Aust. Div. Train H.Q.		H. 25. D. 1. 9	
7th Coy. A.A.S.C.		CARDONETTE	
14th " " "		CAMON	
28th " " "		LONGPRE	
27th " " "		RIVERY	

P.T.O.

144 176 APPENDIX 60 (2).

RAILHEAD.	62D and 66E	AMIENS.	
4th Aust. Div. M. T. Coy.		O. 8. B. 6. 6	AUBIGNY
4th Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sec.		M. 3. C. 8. 0	
4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.		P. 7. B. 2. 6	
4th Aust. Div. Reinforcement Wing.	CORBIE	VEQUEMONT.	
13th A. L. H. Regt. (1 troop)		W. 24. B. 3. 8	
Aust. Cyclist Bn. (1 platoon)		O. 29. D. 0. 3.	VILLERS BRETONNEUX.
D. A. D. O. S.		G. 32. D. 8. 4	
A. P. M.		VILLERS BRETONNEUX	
D. A. D. V. S.		CORBIE	
Div. Camouflage Officer.		"	
Div. Paymaster.		"	
Div. Claims Officer		"	
O. C., S. A. A. Section.		RIVERY.	

Any alterations or amendments to be notified to Divisional Headquarters as soon as possible.

T. G. Clark Major-General,
Commanding 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

As at 8 a.m. 25th August, 1918.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,
24th August, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 85.

REORGANIZATION & TRAINING.

1. During the present period out of the line Formations and Units will take immediate steps to effect a thorough reorganization. The following is to be completed within three days after the relief :-
 - (a) Reorganization of personnel within their sub-units, (Sections, Platoons, etc.)
 - (b) Careful and complete overhaul of arms, equipment, clothing, boots, vehicles, etc.
 - (c) All possible action as regards repairs, and the replacement of deficiencies.
2. (a) Training will begin on the fourth day after coming out of the line.
 - (b) It is to be systematic and progressive and must be carried out in such a manner as to ensure the full and detailed training of the Infantry Platoon, the Artillery Section, and corresponding units in other arms and services, as the tactical unit.
 - (c) Actual unit Commanders, (e.g. in the Infantry the Platoon Commander and platoon sergeant), must train their respective units, the work being carefully supervised by Company and Battalion Commanders in the Infantry, and similarly in the other arms.
 - (d) Every man in the Platoon is to be made available for the Platoon Commander at the same time for at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours in the forenoon. Working parties, specialist training, sick parades, etc., must be arranged so as not to interfere with this. Necessary working parties are to be detailed by complete units, (Sections, Platoons, etc.), under their own commanders, and not by numbers of men.
 - (e) $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 hours actual work at training every day will be sufficient if full use is made of the time. The Divisional Commander wishes, however, to emphasise the fact that the Division has lacked time for training hitherto, and that the best possible use must now be made of such time as is available. This can only be done if programmes of work are carefully thought and worked out, and the work for successive days arranged in detail, by the officers concerned, a day in advance.
3. (a) A short period in each day must be devoted to steady drill, handling of arms, saluting, and guards and sentries, so as to inculcate and restore discipline and smartness.
 - (b) Training programmes will also include the following :-
 - (1) Physical Training and Bayonet Fighting.
 - (2) Musketry, - including rapid loading (daily), range practice, fire control and discipline, fire direction and quick recognition of targets, covering fire, instruction of snipers, and care of arms.

P.T.O.
.....

146

APPENDIX

61

(2)

(iii) Open warfare drill and training, including, -

- (a) attack with and without tanks.
- (b) advanced, flank and rear guard action.
- (c) outposts
- (d) defence

(iv) Hopping up tactics.

(v) March Discipline, (daily, and at all times when troops are on the move.)

(vi) Patrolling and Scouting, (every man to be instructed).

(vii) Whring and entrenching.

(viii) Specialist Training in Lewis Gun, Bombing, Rifle Bombing, and Signalling.

(ix) Daily lecturettes will be given on the past actions of the Division and the lessons to be drawn therefrom. Lecturettes will also be given on saluting, and the payment of compliments generally, (including the attentions which should be paid to flagged cars, and the meaning of the various flags).

(o) Officers are to be instructed in the duties and responsibilities of platoon commanders and will be set small tactical schemes. Particular attention is to be paid to their training in the use of the comp by day and by night.

They must also be made fully acquainted with the rules and reasons for, and the paramount importance of, March Discipline

Definite steps must be taken to instil into all officers the realisation of their responsibilities as officers.

A special point is to be made of their behaviour on all occasions, more especially when detached from their units.

4. The Divisional Commander wishes the Field Artillery to carry out as much training as possible in manoeuvre and open warfare tactics, march discipline and steady drill, (including gun drill with open sights,) on the general lines laid down above.

5. The Divisional Engineers and the Pioneers are to carry out training on the general lines laid down in paras. 2 and 3, together with such technical training as can be arranged by the C.R.E. and C.O. Pioneer Battalion, respectively, as time may allow.

6. Mounted Units and transport personnel are to arrange for training in stable management and horsemastership. Watering and feeding, stable picquets, etc., are to be carried out under proper supervision.

7. Games and Recreational Training are to be freely indulged in, under proper organization and supervision.

8. All formations and units will submit programmes of work contemplated, giving details as to subject, time, and place, to higher formations sufficiently early to enable Commanders and Staffs to visit units when at work.

(3)

9. The Divisional Commander intends, so far as time allows, to carry out inspections of all Units in the Division at an early date.

D. Lavarack

Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff,
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution:

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	(22)
12th " " "	(17)
13th " " "	(17)
4th " Div. Arty.	(20)
4th " M.G. Bn.	(8)
C.R.E.	(4)
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.	(5)
A.D.H.S.	(3)
4th Div. Signal Coy.	(4)
AUST. Corps.	(1)

APPENDIX

62 War Diary

148.

FOURTH

AUSTRALIAN

DIVISION.

Distribution of Units.

Unit.	Ref. Sheet. 1/40,000	Location.	Remarks.
<u>DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.</u>	62D	0.29.D.5.5	VILLERS BRETONNEUX.
<u>A Branch</u>	and 66E		CORBIE.
<u>4th Aust. Div. Artillery H.Q.</u>		CANON.	
<u>10th A.F.A. Brigade</u>		CANON	
11th " "		CANON	
4th Aust. D.A.C.		LONGEAU	
4th D.T.M.O.		CANON.	
<u>4th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>		COISY	
<u>13th Battalion.</u>		POULAINVILLE	
14th " "		CARDONETTE	
15th " "		ALLONVILLE	
16th " "		COISY	
4th A.L.T.M.Bty.		COISY	
<u>12th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>		LONGPRE	
<u>45th Battalion.</u>		VAUX en AMIENOIS	Billet 25.
46th " "		LONGPRE	
48th " "		ST. VAAST	
12th A.L.T.M.Bty.		VAUX en AMIENOIS	Billet 52.
<u>15th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.</u>		HOSPICE, RIVERY.	
<u>49th Battalion.</u>		RIVERY	
50th " "		"	
51st " "		"	
13th A.L.T.M.Bty.		"	
<u>4th Aust. Div. Engineer H.Q.</u>		LONGEAU.	
<u>4th Aust. Field Coy.</u>		M. 28. B. 4. 5	LONGEAU
12th " "		M. 28. B. 4. 7	"
13th " "		M. 28. B. 5. 2	"
<u>4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.</u>		LONGEAU	Billet 57.
<u>4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.</u>		VILLERS BRETONNEUX.	
<u>4th Aust. M.G. Bn.</u>		LONGPRE	
<u>4th Aust. M.G. Coy.</u>		"	
12th " "		"	
13th " "		"	
24th " "		"	
<u>A. D. M. S.</u>		VILLERS BRETONNEUX.	
<u>4th Aust. Field Ambulance</u>		COISY	School.
12th " "		VAUX EN AMIENOIS	
13th " "		RIVERY.	
<u>4th Aust. Div. Train H.Q.</u>		H. 25. D. 1. 9	
<u>7th Coy. A.A.S.C.</u>		CARDONETTE	
14th " "		CANON	
26th " "		LONGPRE	
27th " "		RIVERY.	

P.T.O.

APPENDIX 62

(2).

RAILHEAD 32D
and
4th Aust. Div. H.T. Coy. 66E
4th Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sec.
4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.
4th Aust. Div. Reinforcement Wing.
D.A.D.O.S.
A.P.H.
D.A.D.V.S.
Div. Camouflage Officer.
Div. Paymaster.
Div. Claims Officer.
O.C., S.A.A. Section.

AMLENS.
O.S.B. 6.6
M.3.C. 8.0
P.7.B. 2.6
POULAINVILLE.
G.32.D. 8.4.
VILLERS BRETONNEUX.
CORBIE
"
"
"
RIVERY.

Unit
AUBIGNY
DIVISION

Any alterations or amendments to be notified to Divisional Headquarters as soon as possible.

H. Bray Capt
Major-General,
Commanding 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

As at 8 a.m. 26th August, 1918.

4th Aust. Div. Train Bn.
V.A. Coy. A.S.O.
Mch "
Roch "
Wch "

APPENDIX *63*

Wm. D. King

SECRET.

Copy No. *77*

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

1. Para. 2 of 1st Amendment to Divisional Order No. 147 is cancelled.
2. Divisional Headquarters will close at VILLERS BRETONNEUX at 11 a.m. on 37th instant and reopen at BUSSY-LES-BOURS at same hour.

L. Craig Capt
for Major,
General Staff.
4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution: Normal.

Extra Copies to -

25	}	AUST. Corps.
26		
27		32nd Division.
28		1st Aust. Div.
29		2nd Aust. Div.
30		3rd Aust. Div.
31		5th Aust. Div.
32		8th Tank Bn.
33		Camp Commdt.

APPENDIX

SECRET.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Distribution of Units.

UNIT.	Ref. Sheet 1/40,000	Location.	Remarks.
Divisional Headquarters.	62D.	BUSSY.	
4th Aust. Div. Artillery H.Q.		CAMON	
10th A.F.A. Brigade.		CAMON	
11th "		CAMON	
4th Aust. D.A.C.		LONGEAU.	
4th D.T.M.O.		LONGEAU.	
4th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		COISY.	
13th Battalion.		POULAINVILLE.	
14th "		CARDONETTE	
15th "		ALLONVILLE.	
16th "		COISY.	
4th A.L.T.M. Bty.		COISY.	
18th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		ARGOEUVES	
46th Battalion.		VAUX en AMIENOIS	Billet 25.
46th "		LONGPRE	
48th "		ST. VAAST.	
12th A.L.T.M. Bty.		VAUX en AMIENOIS	Billet 52.
13th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.		Hospice,	RIVERY.
49th Battalion.		RIVERY	
50th "		RIVERY	
51st "		RIVERY	
13th A.L.T.M. Bty.		RIVERY	
4th Aust. Div. Engineer H.Q.		LONGEAU.	
4th Aust. Field Coy.		M. 28. B. 4. 3.	LONGEAU.
12th "		M. 28. B. 4. 7.	"
13th "		M. 28. B. 5. 2.	"
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.		LONGEAU.	Billet 57
4th Aust. Div. Signal Coy.		BUSSY.	
4th Aust. M.G. Bn.		LONGEAU.	
4th Aust. M.G. Coy.		"	
12th "		"	
13th "		"	
24th "		"	
4th Aust. Div. Train H.Q.		BUSSY.	
7th Coy. A.A.S.C.		CARDONETTE	
14th "		CAMON.	
26th "		LONGPRE	
27th "		RIVERY.	

P.T.O.
.....

APPENDIX 64

A.D.H.S.

4th Aust. Field Ambulance.

12th " " "

13th " " "

62D.

BUSSY.

COISY

School.

FREMONT.

RIVERY.

RAILHEAD

4th Aust. Div. M.T. Coy.

4th Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Section.

4th Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.

4th Aust. Div. Reinforcement
Wing.

D.A.D.O.S.

A.P.M.

D.A.D.V.S.

Div. Camouflage Officer.

Div. Paymaster.

Div. Claims Officer.

O.C., S.A.A. Section.

AMIENS.

O.F.B. 6.6.

AUBIGNY.

M.3.0.8.0.

P.7.B.2.6.

POULAINVILLE.

G.32.D.8.4.

BUSSY.

BUSSY.

BUSSY.

BUSSY.

BUSSY.

RIVERY.

Any alterations or amendments to be notified to Divisional
Headquarters as soon as possible.

L. Craig. Capt.
for Major-General,

Commanding 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION..

As at 8 a.m. 31st August, 1918.

17605 *Wm Drury*
APPENDIX *65*

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,

REPORT ON OPERATIONS

AUGUST 7th to AUGUST 10th

1516.

1. The first intimation that was received of the intention of the Fourth Army to carry out an offensive operation in conjunction with the French was communicated verbally to the G.O.C. on 31st July. The utmost secrecy was maintained regarding the intentions of the Australian Corps and it was not until August 1st that the information was passed to the Brigadiers, G.R.A. and G.R.E. at a Divisional Conference held at COISY when the general plan was explained. Every effort was made to ensure that only those whose duty necessitated their having any knowledge of the impending attack were informed of the scheme. The wisdom of this precaution was subsequently proved when on night 2nd/3rd August the enemy raided the 13th Aust. Infantry Brigade near HUGUES, and captured five prisoners. From enemy documents secured during the advance on 8th August it was shown that this personnel were entirely in ignorance of the coming attack. No information whatever was gleaned from these men who on the contrary informed the enemy that no preparations were being made and that there were no indications of an offensive about to be launched in this Sector.

2. On August 5th the Division was relieved in GENTELLES Sector by the 2nd Canadian Division, but owing to the fact that the enemy had secured the identification of the 13th Aust. Inf. Bde. it was decided by higher authority that this Brigade should remain in the line distributed along the whole Canadian Corps front allotted for the attack. The 1st Aust. Infantry Brigade was attached to the Division to replace the 13th Aust. Inf. Bde. and arrived by bus in the AUBIGNY Area during night 6th/7th August. This alteration naturally caused additional work for the Staff and arrangements were promptly made for the 1st Brigade to fill the role selected for the 13th Brigade. Reconnaissances were carried out and all details completed prior to August 8th.

3. GENERAL PLAN.— The Australian Corps, with the Canadian Corps on the Right and III Corps on Left, attacked on a two division front from the CHAULNES - VILLERS BRETONNEUX Railway to the R. SOMME. The attack was carried out in three phases. Divisional boundaries and objectives were as shown on Map 'A'.

(a) First Phase.— The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions formed up on a taped line prior to Zero hour, which was 4.20 a.m. on August 8th, and launched their attack against the first objective under cover of a creeping barrage and assisted by Tanks. Their objective is shown in GREEN on Map 'A', which when secured was consolidated.

(b) Second Phase.— The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions, organised in Brigade Groups, advanced in open formations through the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively and attacked the second objective, shown in RED on Map 'A'. This attack was carried out without a barrage, each Infantry Brigade having a Brigade of Field Artillery working under the command of the Infantry Brigadier. Tanks also co-operated in this advance.

(c) Third Phase.— The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions after having established themselves on the second objective, exploited their success and pushed forward till the old AMIENS Line, shown in BLUE on Map 'A', was reached where consolidation was carried out.

/In the...

APPENDIX 65 (11)

In the Second and Third Phases, the front allotted to this Division was divided as shown on Map 'A', the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. attacking on the right and the 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the left, with the 1st Aust. Inf. Bde. in Divisional Reserve. The advance from the GREEN line was timed to commence at 8.20 a.m. The operation was divided into two stages:-

- (a) The advance to the RED line in which each Brigade attacked on a two battalion front, with one battalion in readiness to move through to BLUE line. The 4th Brigade on the left detailed one battalion (15th) in addition to seize GERISY.
- (b) The exploitation of the success by advancing to the BLUE line in which each Brigade employed one (the reserve) Battalion.

4. ASSEMBLY.

After having been relieved in the GENTILLES Sector the Division was concentrated in the vicinity of VAIRE and AUBIGNY in bivouacs. While in this area assembly positions were reconnoitred and final preparations were completed for the operation. Brigade Groups for the attack were constituted as follows:-

4th Aust. Inf. Bde. Group.	12th A. I. Bde. Group.	Divisional Reserve,
4th Aust. Inf. Brigade.	12th Aust. Inf. Bde.	1st A. I. Brigade.
10th Aust. Field Arty. Bde.	16th Bde. R. H. A.	11th A. F. A. Brigade.
1 Coy., 4th Aust. M. G. Bn.	1 Coy. 4th A. M. G. Bn.	2 Coys. 4th A. M. G. Bn.
2 Sections, A. M. G. Bn.	2 Sections A. M. G. Bn.	(each less 2 Secns).
3 Troop 13th A. L. H. Rgt.	3 Troop 13th A. L. H. Rgt.	12th Field Coy.
4th Field Coy. Engineers.	1 Coy. 4th Pioneer Bn.	Engineers.
1 Coy. 4th Pioneer Bn.	Bearer sub-division.	1 platoon Cyclist
Bearer sub-division.		Bn.

In addition three Artillery Brigades, (3rd Army Bde. A. F. A., 7th A. F. A. Bde., and 8th A. F. A. Bde.), were under Divisional control for defensive purposes, and one 60-Pounder Battery, (12th H. A.), for offensive action.

5. TANKS.

The Div. allotment of Tanks contained:-

24 Mk. V Tanks.
18 Mk. V* Tanks.
9 Supply Tanks.

These were sub-allotted as follows:-

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	-	12 Mk. V Tanks.
		9 Mk. V* Tanks.
		4 Supply Tanks.
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.	-	12 Mk. V Tanks.
		9 Mk. V* Tanks.
		4 Supply Tanks.
1st Aust. Inf. Bde.	-	1 Supply Tank.

The Mk. V and Mk. V* Tanks assembled on night 7th/8th about Square P.2.C. where they refilled. From this time onwards close touch was maintained with Infantry Brigades. The Supply Tanks were ordered forward by the Tank Brigade to rendezvous in the Orchard, O.29.C., near VILLERS BRETONNEUX on night August 8th/7th and unfortunately a chance enemy shell struck one at about 3 p.m. on August 7th causing it to explode..

(U)

explode and set fire to the camouflage concealing the remainder of the tanks. The ultimate result was that with one exception the whole of our supply tanks were destroyed. It would appear to be unwise to park tanks close together when within short artillery range.

B.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS.

6. For several days prior to the operation the weather had been inclement, but the rain was not sufficient to make the ground surface very muddy, or to interfere with preparations. The weather was unsuitable for aeroplanes hence the enemy were unable to gather information regarding the concentration of Troops or guns by aerial reconnaissance. On the eve of the Battle it became fine, and August 8th dawned with a heavy fog which was almost impenetrable and somewhat hampered the movement forward from the 1st Assembly Position to the 2nd Assembly Position and later during the advance to the Jumping Off Position. The Tanks particularly were handicapped by the fog, though later in the day this disability probably proved to be their salvation.

By 4 a.m. on August 8th both attacking Brigades were assembled with their Tanks in the 1st Position of Assembly, as shown in Blue on Map "A". At 4.20 a.m. the Barrage opened which was to cover the advance of the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions and Flank Divisions. The enemy's reply was comparatively weak, and no casualties were suffered while in 1st Assembly Position.

The Mark V and Mark V* Tanks moved up to the 2nd Assembly position, shown in Purple on Map "A", at 4.30 a.m., and were followed by the troops of the 4th and 12th A.I. Brigades who advanced in Artillery Formation an hour later. The assembly of all troops in the 2nd Position was completed by 7.20 a.m. The fog still remained thick and it was by the judicious use of prismatic compasses that direction was accurately preserved. At 8.50 a.m. the 1st Aust. Inf. Bde. was reported to be in its second assembly position.

From this position Battalions moved to the Jumping Off Tape which had been placed in position and labelled. The Order of Battle was - 46th Battalion - 47th Battalion, with 48th Battalion in Support, 500 yards in rear, - 15th Battalion - 14th Battalion - 15th Battalion, with 13th Battalion about 500 yards in rear in Support. The skill with which Battalions were got into positions during the fog was due to the thorough organisation and extreme keenness of Intelligence Officers and Scouts detailed for guiding their Units. In spite of the difficult conditions everything worked according to plan and our troops were formed on the Jumping Off Tape in ample time.

At 8.20 a.m. the protective barrage which was covering the GREEN Line ceased and the 4th and 12th Brigades advanced towards the RED Line supported by their respective Brigades of Field Artillery, which up till then had been carrying out barrage work covering the advance of the 3rd Australian Division. Our troops were subjected to light hostile Artillery fire from the commencement, and the left Battalions encountered considerable machine gun and artillery fire from the high ground North of the River SOMME. On leaving the GREEN Line the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. was short of one Mark V* Tank, while the 4th Aust. Inf. Brigade had a deficiency of four, all being due to engine troubles. Several others were almost immediately put out of action by enemy shell fire.

P.T.O.

=====

APPENDIX 65

The fog, which up till now remained very dense, commenced to lift and on leaving the GREEN Line visibility was fair up to about 100 yards, and improved as time went on. The advance from this position was carried out in Artillery Formation, covered by a thin screen. Touch was maintained between all Battalions during the attack, the 48th and 16th Battalions which were detailed to capture the BLUE Line Objective, moved about 300 yards in rear, in similar formation, accompanied by the Mark V* Tanks. Specially selected personnel were detailed to maintain direction and carried out their duties successfully.

The attacking units advanced in good order, slight resistance was met on the right from LEMA WOOD which was speedily overcome and 4 Light Field Guns were captured. Prisoners were coming in freely throughout the advance to the RED Line and many field and heavy guns were captured. In many localities machine gun nests were encountered but they were either dealt with by tanks or speedily outflanked and rushed. In cases where woods were met by the Right Brigade during the attack the leading Companies of the Battalions outflanked the woods while the rear Companies mopped them up.

Good progress was made by the 4th Brigade from the start in spite of their being subjected to considerable Field Gun and Machine Gun Fire from the Northern bank of the R. SOMME as they advanced owing to the 58th Division on our left flank having failed to achieve their objectives. A message timed 9.30 a.m. was received stating that the 13th Bn. had succeeded in capturing CERISY with 2 Field Guns, 19 Machine Guns and 300 prisoners. Shortly afterwards MORCOURT fell and yielded 100 prisoners and several M.G.'s.

At 9.40 a.m. the enemy North of the SOMME had concentrated a number of 77 mm. Field Guns and Machine Guns on CHIPILLY Spur. These caused many casualties to the 4th Brigade and several Tanks were put out of action by the field guns. The 39th Battery A.F.A. with great dash came into action S.W. of DUDGEON WOOD and together with some of our Vickers Machine Guns, engaged this concentration silencing both the machine guns which were enfilading the advancing infantry, and the 77's.

At 10 a.m. the leading Companies of the 4th Brigade were reported to be on the RED line and at 10.19 a.m. the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. were also on their objective. Consolidation was proceeded with forthwith.

At 10.55 a.m. the 48th Bn. on right and 16th Bn. on left were on their Jumping Off places, which were previously reconnoitred and the advance to the BLUE Line commenced. At this stage only four Mk. V* tanks remained in action with the leading lines of Infantry as the enemy guns had been able to engage them over open sights from the high ground North of the River with disastrous effect. The 48th Bn. advanced quickly over the ridge in Q.30 under heavy machine gun fire and the centre and left Coys. re-organised in MORSE WOOD GULLY while the right company pushed on in skirmishing order assisted by two tanks. The 16th Bn. were also subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire, the majority of it coming from direction of CHIPILLY SPUR. Every advantage was taken of the folds in the ground and cover afforded by crops to push on, and the vigorous manner in which it was carried out reflects much credit on the units engaged. Again when M.G. nests were encountered the troops worked round them and were successful in capturing or killing the crews.

At 12.10 p.m. our Battalions were reported to be on the BLUE Line and were in touch with the right division. Owing to the position on left having failed, the flank of the 16th Bn. was dangerously exposed and was swung back along a line approx. - grid between Q.12 and Q.16 running E. and W. and thence along the road in R.13.A. junctioning with 48th Bn. at R.13.Central. The 13th Bn. advanced at 2 p.m. and took over right sector of 4th Brigade front.

/The advance ...

(A)

The advance from the RED line proved expensive to the left Battalion whose left flank was exposed to enfilade fire from CHIPILLY Spur throughout the advance.

Strong fighting patrols were pushed forward to the final objectives to afford protection during consolidation and to take advantage of any opportunities that might be offered. By 2.p.m. re-organisation had been completed.

As it now became clear that the country North of the River SOMME including the CHIPILLY Spur had not been captured by the 58th Division the 1st Aust. Infantry Brigade which had remained in Reserve was ordered to establish an outpost line along the Southern bank of the River SOMME from MORCOURT to BOUZENCOURT inclusive to protect our flank. Three battalions were distributed in suitable positions and the fourth took up position in reserve about Squares Q.7.D. and Q.8.C. On completion of this move the 15th Battalion withdrew from OERISY and formed a reserve for the 4th Aust. Infantry Brigade. 4.25.p.m. Contact aeroplane reports received at confirmed previous reports of the capture of the BLUE line.

Map "B" attached, shows dispositions of Battalions at 10.p.m. on night August 8th/9th.

No counter-attacks were launched during the night, and with the exception of Artillery and Machine Gun fire from the Northern bank of the SOMME the situation was quiet and unaltered.

Consolidation proceeded unmolested.

August 9th passed quietly. A patrol from 1st Battalion crossed the River at 8.p.m. and entered CHIPILLY through which they moved for the purpose of ascertaining what was checking the attack of the 2nd London Regt., and to render them any assistance possible. This patrol succeeded capturing 73 prisoners, but being too weak to escort this number brought in 20 and handed balance over to British Troops. The 13th A.I. Bde. rejoined the Division and relieved the 1st A.I. Bde. occupying the positions vacated by them. The 1st Brigade assembled in Squares W.17.A., W.11.C., W.16.A., W.10.C. and returned to the 1st Australian Division. During the afternoon at about 6.p.m. the 58th Division and 131st American Regt. launched an attack North of the SOMME which was ultimately successful and CHIPILLY Spur was captured. On the night 9th/10th August the 4th A.I. Bde. moved forward towards MERICOURT and established itself on the original BLUE line, as its Left flank was now covered. The 2nd Aust. Division on our Right participated in an advance which necessitated the 12th A.I. Bde. swinging their Right flank up to LA FLAQUE in order to maintain touch. Patrols of 12th Brigade pushed forward to outskirts of PROYART.

After the CHIPILLY Spur had been captured the 50th Battalion was moved across the River and occupied a supporting position, ~~and~~ on the reverse slope of the Ridge from N. of CHIPILLY to Q.5.C. Central, to support the right of the 58th Division.

At 1.35 a.m. on August 10th orders were received that the 4th Aust. Division would assume command of the battle front North of the SOMME to the BRAY-CORBIE Road and that the 131st American Regiment and elements of the 173rd and 174th Infantry Brigades would be taken over. These Units were in a disorganised state and the Americans were found to have been 48 hours without water or rations when command was assumed at 8.a.m.

A Conference was held at Divisional Headquarters, the Corps Commander, G.O.C. 3rd Aust. Division, G.O.C. 4th Aust. Division and G.O.C. 13th A.I. Brigade, to discuss operations for the capture of the

/high..

APPENDIX

(6)

high ground round PROYART and the ETINEHEM pocket during the night 10th/11th August. The capture of the ETINEHEM pocket was allotted to the 4th Australian Division.

At about 9.30 p.m. August 10th the 3rd Aust. Division relieved the 4th and 12th A.I. Brigades and passed a brigade through 12th Brigade and attacked towards PROYART. At the same time 13th A.I. Bde. with the ETINEHEM Spur as objective, launched their attack which met with slight resistance and was entirely successful.

Command of the Sector South of the SOMME passed to G.O.C. 3rd Aust. Division during the night and the 4th and 12th A.I. Bdes. crossed the River and occupied bivouacs in the vicinity of SAILLY-LE-SEC.

7. **ARTILLERY.**— During the advance on August 8th the 16th R.H.A. Brigade and the 10th A.F.A. Brigade rendered invaluable services to the attacking Infantry, with whom they closely co-operated, and on several occasions engaged machine guns and hostile artillery, which were hindering the advance, over open sights.

The offensive Field Artillery Brigades, 10th A.F.A. Bde., 11th A.F.A. Bde., and 16th Bde. R.H.A. were close behind the 12th and 4th A.I. Brigades when the latter passed through the GREEN line at 8.20 a.m. In the case of the 10th Artillery Brigade independent sections, and in one case a complete battery, went forward with individual Battalions, and worked in close co-operation with great effect throughout the advance. This system worked well and enabled Brigade Commanders to still retain 4 gun batteries under their control.

The 16th Brigade R.H.A., on account of their superior mobility did not find it necessary to detach sections to individual Battalions but followed the 12th A.I. Brigade very closely and effectively.

The 11th A.F.A. Brigade moved forward in close support and greatly assisted the Tanks, Infantry and 10th A.F.A. Brigade by engaging hostile artillery and machine guns which were enfilading our troops from the high ground north of the SOMME about HALARD WOOD, LES VELESTINS WOOD, and CHIPILLY SPUR.

Immediately the above Artillery Brigades cleared the GREEN line, the Defensive Brigades, (3rd Army, 7th and 8th A.F.A. Brigades,) moving by different routes, advanced to previously allotted positions and covered the RED and BLUE Lines. These Brigades were in action in their final positions at 10.20 a.m.

After the capture of the BLUE Line, Artillery Brigades were at once organised into Defensive Groups as under, and Group Commanders established their H.Q. with Infantry Brigades concerned :—

RIGHT Group:	16th Army Bde. R.H.A.	} Covering 12th A.I. Brigade.
	7th Aust. F.A. Brigade	

LEFT Group:	10th Aust. F.A. Brigade	} Covering 4th A.I. Brigade.
	8th Aust. F.A. Brigade	

and SUPERIMPOSED Group:	11th Aust. F.A. Brigade
	3rd Army Bde. A.F.A.

The counter preparation scheme had been arranged beforehand and promulgated.

Two Anti-Tank 15-Pdr. B.L.C. Guns, with 50 rounds each, were emplaced at Q24048 and Q23862 during the night 8th/9th August.

Four 3" Newton Medium Trench Mortars were in action by 6 a.m. on 9th August and 2 more by 10 a.m. and all registered.

/Both...

(M)

Both during and after the attack all effective enemy guns and howitzers captured were manned and turned against their original owners. 998 rounds of 4.2", and 840 rounds of 5.9", in addition to a considerable amount of 77 mm. ammunition, were fired.

The reconnaissance, selection, and quick occupation of Battery positions throughout the advance were most effectively carried out.

The normal method of ammunition supply by mobile echelons was employed after clearing the GREEN Line and worked well. Divisional and Brigade Ammunition Columns were equally flexible and bold in following batteries.

The alternate Grouping of the Artillery, first as Barrage Groups, then as Artillery and Infantry Brigade Groups, and again to Defensive Artillery Groups on reaching final objective, demanded considerable "flexibility" and co-operation on the part of all Commanders, and the smooth and uninterrupted manner in which these changes were effected, is no small feature of this operation.

8. MACHINE GUNS.— Four Machine Gun Companies operated on the Divisional front and were allotted as follows :—

4th A.M.G. Coy. 16 guns — 10 guns for exploitation of BLUE Line. These were conveyed in the Mk. V* tanks together with 16 Lewis Guns of the 16th Battalion. 6 Guns carried on limbers for defence in depth between RED and BLUE Lines, left Sector.

12th A.M.G. Coy. 16 guns — 10 guns for exploitation of BLUE Line. These were conveyed in the Mk. V* tanks together with 16 Lewis Guns of the 48th Battalion. 6 guns carried in limbers for defence in depth between RED and BLUE Lines, right Sector.

13th A.M.G. Coy. 16 guns — 8 guns attached to 4th A.I. Bde. as mobile guns to assist in taking RED line. These were again allotted at the rate of 2 per battalion. 8 guns formed a barrage group and supported 3rd Aust. Div. attack to GREEN line, and then joined 1st A.I. Bde. at 7 a.m. in Divisional Reserve.

24th A.M.G. Coy. 16 guns — 8 guns attached to 12th A.I. Bde. which were allotted to attacking Bns. as mobile guns. 8 guns formed barrage group and supported 3rd Aust. Div. to GREEN Line, and then joined 1st A.I. Bde. at 7 a.m. in Divisional Reserve.

At dusk on 7th August the 16 guns detailed to assist in the 3rd Aust. Div. Machine Gun Barrage moved into position in Sq. P.10.B. Cent., P.4.D. General. These guns were laid on barrage lines by 11 p.m.

/During..

During the advance to the RED Line the mobile guns rendered great assistance to the infantry with whom they closely co-operated. Many opportunities for overhead M.G. fire presented themselves and full advantage was taken by the Infantry to push on under its protection. On arrival at the RED Line the mobile guns all came into action quickly against the retreating enemy and assisted in the consolidation. At 11.30 a.m. a hostile battery of 77 mm. guns was engaged by machine guns causing it to rapidly gallop off.

At 4 p.m. these machine guns were organised defensively in depth covering the RED line and the crossings from CHIPILLY across the SOMME.

When orders were issued to 1st A.I. Brigade for the establishment of a defensive flank south of the river 8 guns of 24th A.M.G. Coy. which were in reserve were moved, 4 to positions in Q.9.B. and D. and 4 in Q.8.B. Four guns of the 13th A.M.G. Coy. were sent to Q.15.B. and 4 remained in reserve positions in Q.7.A. The teams of these guns dug in without casualties.

When the advance from the RED line commenced at 10.55 a.m., of the 16 Mk. V* tanks detailed with Vickers and Lewis Guns to exploit to the BLUE line, only 8 were available, the remainder failed to materialise. 12 Vickers guns were brought forward in Limbers to the RED line. As the infantry were not meeting with serious opposition the guns held back until the infantry were half way to the BLUE line when the limbers rushed them forward and rapidly withdrew, thus saving the crews the exertion of carrying guns and accessories unnecessarily. These guns took part in the fight for the BLUE line and followed the retreating enemy with their fire.

Final dispositions in the Sector were as shown on Map "B". Water, rations and six guns to replace casualties arrived during the night 8th/9th August.

9. COMMUNICATIONS. Ten pairs of lines of the buried cable which ran via the two attacking Brigade H.Qs. at QUARRY, P.7.C., to Cable Head at P.9.A., were allotted to the Division. After the capture of the GREEN Line the Brigade Headquarters were advanced, 4th Brigade to Q.7.C.3.5., 12th Brigade to P.24.B.8.5. and 1st Brigade to P.17.Central. Cable wagons left D.H.Q. at 5.20 a.m. Though difficulty was experienced owing to the fog the new H.Q. were wired up in good time. The Brigades' Headquarters were finally established, 4th A.I. Bde. in MORGOURT, 12th A.I. Bde. JEAN WOOD and 1st A.I. Bde., and communication established by ground lines.

Lines were laid to advancing Battalion H.Qs. and touch was maintained almost continuously during the battle. Cable was conveyed forward as far as P.24.B.2.5. by limber and in advance of this by pack mule.

Considerable trouble was experienced in keeping communication with Field Artillery Brigades owing to the amount of cable, personnel and equipment at the disposal of the Artillery Signal Officer and the fact that in some cases early notification of the location of H.Qs. was not forthcoming.

Visual Signalling was not used extensively, the positions of H.Qs. and the ground, especially in left Sector, being unsuitable. When employed by 12th Brigade satisfactory results were obtained.

Pigeons played very little part in the operation. Forty birds were allotted to the Division which were issued as follows -

Artillery 8. Right Bde. 16. Left Bde. 16. They could not be released during the fog.

/Motor..

APPENDIX 65

(9).

over and over again were extensively used and gave excellent results.

Light horsemen attached to Brigades for mounted orderly duties rendered invaluable assistance, and performed their duties most gallantly.

10. SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS. - Railhead was at AILLY - Sur-SOMME, from there H.T. delivered to refilling points as under :-

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	...	H. 34. B.
12th " " "	...	N. 1. A.
1st " " "	...	S. 5. D. 7. 9
Divisional Troops.	...	H. 25. B. 5. 7

Train wagons to Brigade transport lines and forward by units transport. An extra iron ration and filled water bottle per man were carried by the assaulting troops. A supply of Pea Soup and solidified alcohol was also issued. Hot Food containers and pack saddles on the basis of 30 per Brigade were supplied.

AMMUNITION. 230 rounds of S.A.A. and two bombs per man were carried on the person. Divisional Ammunition Dump was established at O. 10. A. 1. 1 with S.A.A. Section of D.A.C. close by at O. 3. C. 4. 4.

WATER - Each Brigade and Divisional Artillery were supplied with a G.S. Wagon carrying one 200 gallon and one 100 gallon Tank in addition to their own water carts. 300 petrol tins per Brigade were issued and filled prior to the operation.

SUPPLY TANKS - These were loaded under Brigade arrangements at O. 1. C. 0. 5 on 7th August. An average load per tank was as follows -

Wire, barbed, coils	124
Pickets, screw, long	150
" " short	300
Sheet, iron corrugated	43
Stokes Bombs	150
Mills Grenades	240
S.A.A., rounds	10,000
Water, gallons	100

In addition to above the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. had arranged for these Tanks to convey the whole of their Stokes Mortars forward.

Arrangements were made for these tanks to return for a second load and dumps were established at P. 4. C. 3. 3 and P. 20. B. 1. 1 accordingly. As already reported eight of the nine supply tanks were destroyed by enemy action on the evening of August 7th, which necessitated fresh arrangements being made at the last hour. The A.S.C. and D.A.C. rendered invaluable services in conveying Ammunition and Engineer material forward, ammunition being delivered in limbers within 200 yards of the furthest objective, the BLUE Line.

11. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS. It was realised prior to the operation that in the event of our being successful provision would have to be made to rapidly advance the Dressing Stations. On the other hand should the advance have been held up heavy casualties would have been suffered and arrangements were made accordingly. The medical units of the 3rd and 4th Aust. Divisions were pooled and Ambulances were disposed to meet both eventualities.

/The evacuation ...

The evacuation schemes from ZERO Hour to capture of GREEN Line were as indicated in Appx. 1, from after capture of GREEN Line as shown in Appx. 2, from after capture of RED Line as per Appx. 3. Appx. 4 shows a graph illustrating the number of wounded evacuated through the joint stations. Those of the 4th Aust. Division are inserted in RED.

The Hospice, ECUILLOY was prepared during 6th and 7th Aug. and opened as a Walking Wounded Dressing Station at 5 a.m. on 8th August. At 9 a.m. this was converted into the Advanced Dressing Station - at 10 a.m. the A.D.S. was established in front of HAMEL but being shelled moved back to P.3.C.9.1. The Hospice then became the M.D.S. and a D.C.S. was opened at W.4.C.9.2.

The Medical arrangements worked splendidly. The only difficulties in the evacuation of cases was caused by the distance to C.C. Stations. This entailed a great strain on the M.A.C. Ambulances.

12. CAPTURES. - Prisoners of War captured by this Division and passed through the Divisional Cage at CORBIE and C.C.S's. up till midnight August 10th numbered 1951 all ranks.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	=	1,011
18th " " "	=	890
13th " " "	=	11
1st " " "	=	28*
		<u>1,951.</u>

(* 1st Aust. Inf. Bde. handed 1 Off. and 44 O.Rs. over to 2nd London Regt. together with 9 M.Gs. which are not included in these figures).

MATERIAL.

Heavy Guns.	=	13.
Field Guns	=	32
Anti-Tank Guns	=	2
		<u>47.</u>

Heavy Guns included 3 - 8" Hows., 5 - 5.9" Hows. and 5 - 5.9" H.V. Guns.
Field guns included 8 - 5.2" Hows. and 24 - 77 mm. guns.

Machine Guns	-	Heavy	=	31.
		Light	=	93.
				<u>124.</u>

Minerwerfers 11.

Miscellaneous:

- 1 Aeroplane
- 61 Horses.
- 1 Kitchen, travelling.
- 1 Cooker.
- 1 Search Light & Engine.
- 1 Machine Gun Limber.
- 1 Wireless set, complete.
- 1 Wagon Load Telephones and accessories.
- 2 Sleigh Mountings and fittings.
- 50 coils telephone Wire.
- 2 Periscopes.
- 20 Gallons Petrol.

and large quantities of S.A.A., Rifles, Grenades, Shells, Equipment, Maps, Documents and other material not classified.

P.T.O.

13. CASUALTIES. - From August 8th to August 10th inclusive -

	Off.	O. Rs.		Off.	O. Rs.
4th A.I. Bde. Killed -	7	47	12th A.I. Bde. Killed -	2	24
Wounded -	14	862	Wounded -	8	102
Missing -	14		Missing -	13	
	21	325		10	219

	Off.	O. Rs.		Off.	O. Rs.
1st A.I. Bde. Killed -	-	-	4th H. G. Bn. Killed -	2	12
Wounded -	-	1	Wounded -	5	71
Missing -	-	-	Missing -	5	2
	-	1		-	85

	Off.	O. Rs.		Off.	O. Rs.
13th A.I. Bde. - Killed -	-	7	Artillery. Killed -	1	19
Wounded -	-	22	Wounded -	3	93
Missing -	-	-	Missing -	2	8
	-	29		-	114

	Off.	O. Rs.		Off.	O. Rs.
Engineers. Killed -	-	-	Pioneer Bn. Killed -	1	5
Wounded -	4	6	Wounded -	1	15
Missing -	-	-	Missing -	-	-
	4	6		-	20

GRAND TOTAL.

	Officers.	O. Rs.
Killed -	13	107
Wounded -	33	852
Missing -	-	31
	46	790

LESSONS.

14. GENERAL. Conferences beforehand at which all details are discussed are of the greatest assistance.

ARTILLERY. Value of Screen Calibration Ranges was proved as batteries were unable to register prior to this operation. The practice of attaching personnel of Topographical Section to Group Artillery H.Q. for resecting and fixing Batteries' positions is excellent and should be continued.

Earliest possible definition of Infantry and Artillery 'Start Line' should be made known if possible before Battery positions are selected.

The quick work and excellent results achieved from attaching a section of guns to each Infantry Battalion justifies this action being taken in similar operations. Four gun batteries are still available under their Commanders. The presence of an offensive Bde. of Artillery closely following the advancing Infantry and Tanks proved invaluable as they were able to deal with the unexpected position caused by the failure of the Division on our left.

/ The recent ...

164

APPENDIX 65

176

The recent mobile operations not only demonstrated that the decentralization of Artillery Groups to independent but co-ordinated Ede. control under the tactical command of their respective Commanders is essential in open warfare, but that such decentralization in no way prejudices the quick resumption and formation of "Group" organizations when the final objective has been captured and the artillery is required to act in a defensive role.

It is not advisable to restrict the action of Field Artillery supporting Divisions to their own sectors. This may be a precaution against accidents but in light of this experience on the R. SOME it is not justified and may lead to disastrous results.

The tendency of batteries to keep to tracks and roads was noticed. "Battery Column" formations moving freely over the field should be employed.

The attachment of a platoon of Pioneers to each offensive Artillery Ede. for preparing crossings in advance of the guns was of great assistance.

This attack proved that our units have not lost their mobility or capability of quick fire action on account of the influence of trench warfare.

Forward report centres must be pushed forward in conformity with the general advance and Unit Commanders should keep touch with this centre at all times. Specially trained mounted orderlies were of great value.

TANKS. It was amply demonstrated that during purely mobile fighting tanks are helpless against enemy field guns firing over open or semi-covered positions. The principle must be accepted that tanks should not attempt to continue to operate, except where covered by folds in the ground, or in cases of extreme urgency, until the opposing field guns are neutralised in some way, such as capture, artillery fire, and smoke screens. Smoke screens are essential even when advancing under an artillery barrage.

MACHINE GUNS. Direct overhead M.G. fire was used on several occasions with great effect, against enemy Infantry, Machine Guns and Field Guns.

If boldly and judiciously handled Machine Guns can, during such operations, be brought close behind their positions in action by means of their own horse transport, thus obviating fatigue to the personnel and ensuring the maximum of speed in bringing fire to bear. This is, of course, the normal method for open fighting. /A signal.

(14)

A signal should be arranged for tanks to fire to indicate that they are under hostile artillery fire. Should our batteries be unable to immediately locate and on gage hostile guns they should throw a smoke screen in front of the tank. Smoke shell might be issued to tanks for this purpose also.

It is doubtful whether any advantage is gained by a long halt during an operation such as the two hour halt that followed the capture of the GREEN line. During this delay several tanks were blown out by hostile artillery fire. A much shorter halt would have been sufficient to enable artillery to limber up and get forward.

Tanks again rendered invaluable assistance to the infantry and were most useful in engaging hostile machine gun nests. The Mk. V* Tanks which managed to reach the BLUE Line did great execution, but on the whole it is considered that this type of tank is too slow and cumbersome. The experiment of sending forward Vickers and Lewis Guns in them for exploitation purposes was not successful owing to the majority of them being either hit or stranded on account of engine troubles.

During a rapid advance supported by tanks and over open country where there are few obstacles, Stokes Mortars generally arrive too late to be of much use, but where the advance is necessarily slow over broken and entrenched country they can be employed to advantage; as also in defensive positions covering the objective after its capture, or to put down a smoke screen during a temporary hold up.

For successful co-operation between tanks and infantry it is necessary for the closest liaison to exist between the personnel of the two arms.

Again it was found advantageous in detailing the tasks to allot tanks definitely to infantry units for the operation and this had the happiest results.

In broken country cut up with wire, wide and broken trenches, etc., it is necessary to detail a party of infantry to each tank to act as ground scouts. These parties too proved most useful in pointing out immediate objectives such as machine gun nests, and in assisting the tank crews to a knowledge of the situation in the vicinity as the latter are largely "blind" in the smoke and dust and after a long run in the tanks.

The enemy now fires RED flares to indicate the position of tanks to their guns and machine guns. It might be advisable for us to carry similar ones to "draw" fire elsewhere when the enemy uses his.

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

SECRET.
Table 1.

App. I.

EVACUATION SCHEME FROM ZERO HOUR UP TO CAPTURE OF GREEN LINE.

R.A.P's.	Relay Post.	M.L. Posts	A. D. S.	M. D. S.	D.S.S.	Remarks.
P.21.A.9.2 P.16.C.1.9 P.16.A.1.3	P.14.C.9.5 P.9.A.3.4	P.13.D.1.5 P.8.E.2.3	0.13.A.5.7 9th Field Ambulance.	M.4.C.9.2 11th Field Ambulance.	Les Alencons 10th Field Ambulance 2 Tent Sub Divisions in reserve.	As soon as possible after zero hour a W.W. Dressing Station will be opened at the Hospice, FOUILLOY - 0.10.A.9.7 by the 13th Fld Ambulance, W.W. being evacuated by Busses direct to C.C.S.
P.10.C.3.1 P.5.D.0.4	P.4.A.4.5	P.3.C.2.6	13th Field Ambulance 3 X Tent Sub Divisions.	12th Field Ambulance 3 Tent Sub Divisions.		This W.W. Dressing Station will also become the A.D.S. for Stretcher Cases as soon as circumstances allow. The 4th Aust. Fld Amb. Tent Sub-Div. are at 0.10.E.7.9 ready to push forward and establish an A.D.S. in Hamel vicinity.

The O.C.9th Aust. Field Ambulance is responsible for evacuation back to M.D.S.
The R.A.P's will advance as soon as possible and Motor Ambulances push forward along VAIRE-HAMEL-CERISTY, HAMEL-WARFUSEE and FOUILLOY-WARFUSEE Roads.
3rd Divisional Stretcher Bearers will evacuate cases from Green Line back to A.D.S.
4th Australian Divisional Stretcher Bearers will advance with 4th Aust. Divn. Brigades but will not evacuate any casualties.
Evacuations from M.D.S. by 3rd M.A.C. Cars; Busses being used for Walking Wounded.
Gas and Blood Transfusion centre ST. ACHEUL.

(sp) Kenneth Smith,
Colonel,
A.D.M.S., 4th Australian Division.

5th August, 1918. 11.00 p.m.

APPENDIX

65

166

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Table 2.

Evacuation scheme after capture of Green Line, i.e. after commencement of attack by 4th Australian Division.

A. D. S.	M. D. S.	D. C. S.	Remarks.
Hospice FOUILLOY O. 10. A. 9. 7 13th F. Amb. Also Walking Wounded Dress- ing Station.	N. 4. C. 9. 2 12th F. Amb. and 11th F. Amb.	Les Alencons (1 tent sub-division). 10th F. Amb. 2 Tent Sub-divisions in reserve.	As soon as circumst- ances allow an A.D.S. will be established in the vicinity of HAMEL by the Tent Subdivisions of the 4th Aust. Field Amb- ulances site being selected by O.C., 4th Aust. Field Ambulance. When this A.D.S. is established the FOUILLOY A.D.S. becomes the M.D.S. (2 Tent Subdivisions 19th F. Amb. being brought forward to assist). N. 4. C. 9. 2 then becomes the D.C.S. The 3 Tent Subdivisions of 11th F. Amb. & 2 Tent Subdivisions of 12th F. Amb. coming into Reserve.

The O.C., 4th Aust. Field Amb. is now responsible for evacuation back to
M.D.S., 4th Aust. Divisional Stretcher bearer personnel being employed to
evacuate cases back to the GREEN line.

R.A.P's., Bearer Relays & M.L. Posts will be pushed as far forward as is
possible.

Gas Centre and Blood Transfusion Centre ... St. Achoul.

(Signed) Kenneth Smith,
Colonel,

A.D.M.S., 4th Australian Division.

5th August, 1918.
10 p.m.

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.App. III
Table 3.

Evacuation scheme after capture of RED Line.

A. D. S.	M.D.S. & W.W.D.S.	D. C. S.	In Reserve.
Hamel Vicinity 4th Field Ambulance	FOUILLOY O. 10. A. 9. 7 13th F. Amb. and 10th F. Amb.	N. 4. C. 9. 2 12th F. Amb. (1 Tent Sub- division).	2 Tent Subdivisions of 12th Aust. Field Ambulance. 3 Tent Subdivisions of 11th Aust. Field Ambulance. 3 Tent Subdivisions of 9th Aust. Field Ambulance.

4th Aust. Divisional stretcher bearers evacuate casualties from RED Line
to GREEN Line.

3rd Aust. Divisional stretcher bearers evacuate casualties from GREEN Line
to A.D.S.

Gas Centre and Blood Transfusion Centre ... St. Achoul.

(Signed) Kenneth Smith,
Colonel,


A.D.M.S. 4th Australian Division.

5th August, 1918.
11 p.m.


ADVALTES THRU DRESSING STATIONS OF 4TH DIVISION
DURING RECENT OFFENSIVE

8 th AUGUST			9 th AUGUST			10 th AUGUST			11 th AUGUST		
12 am	6 pm	9 pm	6 am	12 am	6 pm	9 pm	6 am	12 am	6 pm	9 pm	6 am

APPENDIX No. 4.



HARBONNIERES



176


MAP C

1:40,000

FRANCE

EDITION I (Revised)

SHEET 62D 170



4TH AUST. DIV.
DISPOSITIONS AS AT 10 PM 10.8.18
4TH BRIGADE AREA HACHURED BLUE
12TH REGT USA INF GREEN
13TH REGT USA INF PURPLE

Scale 1:40,000
Meters
Yards

170

176

