


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/46/12 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 3rd  
Australian Division

October 1917



AWM4-1/46/12PART2



**URGENT.**

**THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.**

**SECRET.**

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd October, 1917.

S.G.386/204.

**"YPRES BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 14.**

**1. INSTRUCTIONS  
CONTAINED IN  
IN CIRCULARS TO  
BE OPERATIVE  
UNLESS REVISED.**

To avoid the issue of Operation Orders of great length immediately before Operations commence, instructions have been issued by means of Circulars. Each memorandum thus issued will be treated as if it formed part of the Operation Orders, unless subsequently cancelled or revised.

**2. DATE OF  
OFFENSIVE.**

On a date to be known as Code Day "S", vide this office letter O.G.2 of the 29-9-17, and at a time to be notified later, the Offensive will be resumed.

**3. FRONTAGE OF  
ATTACK.**

The Corps front of attack will extend from YPRES-ROULERS Railway (D.21.d.2.1) to Second Army Boundary near AVALATIK FARM (D.8.a.2.6).

**4. CORPS OBJECTIVE.**

The Corps Objective will be approximately from D.23.a.8.8 to D.3.c.50.75, and will include DASH CROSSING, TYNE COTTAGE, BERLIN WOOD and KNONPRINZ FARM.

**5. ISSUE OF BARRAGE  
MAP.**

The Official Barrage Map will shortly be published and will be issued to Brigades, etc., as soon as received from higher authority.

**6. DIVISIONAL FRONT  
& ALLOTMENT OF  
TASKS TO BRIGADES.**

The Divisional Frontage and Area to be captured will be as described in "Y.B." G.S.O. No.10

**7. ENEMY TROOPS TO  
BE ATTACKED.**

The Area opposite the Divisional Frontage is at present held by the 4th Bavarian Division, who were opposite us at IESSINES, or 20th Max Prussian Div. Accurate information not at present to hand.

**8. FLANK TROOPS.**

The 7th Brigade, 2nd Australian Division, will be attacking on our right, and the 4th Brigade, New Zealand Division on our left.

**9. BATTLE H.Q.  
OF ADJOINING  
FORMATIONS.**

The Battle Headquarters of adjoining Formations are as follows:-  
2nd Aust. Division at YPRES RAMPARTS.  
7th Aust. Inf. Bde. at D.26.c.1.3.  
N.Z. Division at CANAL BANK I.1.b.6.8.  
4th N.Z. Brigade at BANK FARM (O.24.b.4.6).

**10. DIVISIONAL  
BATTLE H.Q.**

Battle Headquarters of our own Brigades will be as follows:-  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde. At the Railway D.26.c.1.3, known as the HUT.  
10th Aust. Inf. Bde. at BORRY FARM, D.25.b.6.9., where two Battalions dugouts will be converted into Brigade Headquarters.  
11th Aust. Inf. Bde. At a Headquarters to be constructed near D.26.a.2.5.

**11. STRONG POINTS  
TO BE CONSOLIDATED.  
DATED.**

Strong Points to be consolidated by P. T. O.



special Engineer personnel for use by Infantry and Machine Guns will be fixed upon and communicated to those concerned. Special attention in this respect will be paid to the area around the point known as "K" in D.23.a. In addition two or three strong points to support our line on each Brigade front should be constructed.

Two lines, firing line and support line, will be dug. The Firing Line along the final objective; the Support Line in the vicinity of the line Q.L.D. the position of which has already been communicated to Brigades.

These lines will be as regular in trace as possible in order to be suitable as jumping off positions for a further advance.

#### 12. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LINE.

If the front line is broken at any point Troops in the Support Line, less nucleus garrisons, must be prepared to go forward and re-establish the situation.

Troops further back must similarly be prepared to replace those in the Support Line who have gone forward.

#### 13. MACHINE GUN BARRAGE.

Details of Machine Gun Barrage will be prepared by D.M.G.O. and issued to those concerned.

Places will be selected by him for the forward movement of Machine Guns during the progress of the battle. The 10th and 11th M.G. Coys., less 8 guns and 8 of each Coy. will remain with their respective Bdes.

#### 14. A.A. ACTION.

The Lewis Guns of the 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn., have been allotted to the two attacking Brigades to engage hostile aeroplanes.

#### 15. MAINTENANCE OF TOUCH.

Touch will be maintained with Formations on our Flanks throughout the whole advance. Small parties will be detailed to move with adjoining formations.

Those parties moving with the New Zealand Division will establish touch at each of the short halts, at the long halt, and on reaching the final objective.

It has been arranged with the Second Australian Division that similar parties will establish touch on the far side of THAMES WOOD and our Right Boundary near Point "P" (22.b.20.18). Again at Point "K" (23.a.40.65) and again on the final objective.

Touch will also be maintained between Brigades. The Right of the 11th Brigade, which starts on the YPRES-BOULERS Railway, will be the Directing Flank. If Gaps occur they must be filled by Troops moving up from behind.

Compass Bearings will be taken and Officers specially detailed with one or two men to keep direction.

The approximate compass bearing of the Sun at Sunrise will be noted on a day prior to ZERO and communicated to the troops in order to assist in maintaining direction.

#### 16. APPROACH MARCH.

Instructions for moving into the Area East of YPRES, and for the Approach March, have already been issued.

Rear Battalions must be on the move at ZERO hour. Owing to the possibility of fog, and other delays, a rate of advance faster than three-quarters of a mile to a mile an hour cannot be reckoned on.

Troops must be in assembly positions by one hour prior to ZERO.

Discretion should be given to Battalion Commanders as to localities at which halts will be made, in order that shelled areas may be avoided. Constant observation and careful reconnaissance will be necessary.

If troops are caught by a hostile barrage it is best to move them forward.

P.T. O.



If gaps occur Flanks are not to be refused but Troops from behind will be pushed up to fill the gaps. Every Commander is responsible for the provision of his Flanks irrespective of the fact that there are other Units on his Right and Left.

**17. RUNNERS.**

Signal communications are not likely to be good as during the MESSINES Battle. An ample supply of Runners must therefore be made available.

**18. WITHDRAWAL OF ENEMY'S GUNS.**

Advantage to be taken of the period during which the enemy's guns will probably be moving back.

During this period the maximum amount of digging should be done, and the maximum amount of Stores brought forward.

The Positions of the enemy's guns will be notified by those concerned by Divisional Headquarters.

**19. PACK TRANSPORT.**

The fullest use must be made of Pack Transport. In recent Offensives it has been worked by night right up to the front line, thus reducing wastage in man-power.

**20. O.Ps.**

In addition to observation from the front line, special Observation Posts should be established to look for the development of possible counter-attacks by the enemy.

**21. WIRE.**

Recent reports point to the fact that great value has been obtained by wiring our newly captured positions.

**22. ENGINEER & PIONEER TASKS.**

The tasks allotted to Engineers and Pioneers on ZERO day will be issued by the C.R.E.

**23. PIONEER & ENGINEER WORK PRIOR TO ZERO.**

The Pioneers are engaged on, and have been made made responsible for, the preparation of Approach Tracks. The Engineers, amongst other work will prepare dugouts for Brigade and Battalion Headquarters.

**24. SPECIAL MOPPING-UP PARTIES.**

It has been ascertained from Officers who held the old British line in the Area now to be captured, that the Railway leading up to point "K" constituted a good line of approach and afforded good facilities for dug-outs in its Cuttings. The 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. should therefore allot special Mopping-up Parties for this Railway.

Additional information is available that in the old days the road running North-West and South-East through DASH CROSSING gave good protection for the construction of dug-outs.

**25. CONTACT 'PLANES.**

Contact 'planes will fly at plus 100 minutes, and plus 220 minutes. Forward Troops will be ready to light Flares at these times, on the aeroplanes calling for them, in the usual way, viz., a series of A's on the KLAXON HORN, or firing of White VERY light.

In addition Flares will be lit at any other time when our 'planes call for them.

A special 'plane will fly on "T" morning at a time not yet decided. The hour of flying will depend

P. T. O.



on whether the morning is, or is not, misty. Exact time cannot be stated, but Flares will be lit upon being called for.

All contact work with Troops of the Division, will be carried out by the 21st Squadron, R.F.C.

Contact aircraft will be distinguished by one Black Streamer on each of the lower planes.

Machines of the 21st Squadron will carry the following distinctive markings:-

On Fuselage, working from the Observer's seat towards the rudder -

- (a) British markings.
- (b) A large "A" in white.
- (c) A Dumbell painted in White.

These markings will be on both sides of the Fuselage.

Only one Contact plane will work on the Corps Front at one time.

Flares, No. 3 RED, will be used. These flares are plainly visible, and it is not necessary to light them in groups of 3 as was the case with the Green flares during the MESSINES Battle. They are more easily distinguished if lit at the bottom of a trench or shell hole.

Only advanced troops will light flares. Commanders on the spot will decide what proportion of flares are lit on each occasion.

Contact aeroplanes have been fitted with Wireless, and there will be a Wireless Receiving Station at the Headquarters of the Reserve Brigade (D.26.c.1.3).

In addition to the Code Messages laid down on page 71 of S.S.135, the following Code will be used:-

"Enemy collecting at -----". Succession of Q's.

"Enemy advancing from -----". Succession of R's.

"More than a Battalion". LN.

"Less than a Battalion". SN.

Messages will be preceded by Squadron Call F.P., thus -

"Enemy collecting at B.6.a., more than a Battalion" would read

FFTPQQQB6aLN.

The G.O.C. Reserve Brigade will be responsible in the first instance for passing on all such messages to the two Attacking Brigades of his Division, and to his Divisional Headquarters.

26.S.O.S. Special instructions have been issued with  
SIGNAL. regard to the S.O.S. Signal

27.LIAISON. Details with regard to Liaison Officers will be as follows:-

One Senior R.A. Officer, and one Intelligence Officer, R.A., will be attached to each Infantry Brigade on "S" day.

In addition to the above two F.O.Os. per Artillery Group, of which there will be three, will go forward with the Infantry. Of those six F.O.Os., three will establish O.Fs. forward. The other three will be attached to the "D" Battalions, two to the "D" Battalion of the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde, one to the "D" Battalion of the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Thus there will be three Artillery Liaison

P. T. O.



Officers with the Battalions carrying the final objective, and two of these will be with the Battalion on the high ground on our Right.

A Divisional Staff Officer will visit Corps Headquarters and Infantry Brigade Headquarters when required, for the interchange of information.

An Officer detailed by the Heavy Artillery will be at Divisional Headquarters.

Officers have been detailed for Liaison work with each of the Flank Divisions.

Brigade Commanders will make arrangements for the interchange of Liaison personnel within their Brigades, and with the Brigades on their Flanks. They will also arrange for adequate Liaison between Battalions.

## 28. DUMPS.

The positions of Dumps, and the amount of ammunition, etc., to be made available at those Dumps will be notified to those concerned by "Q".

## 29. SYNCHRONISATION OF WATCHES.

Watches will be synchronised daily by an Officer from Divisional Headquarters visiting the following:-

9th, 10th and 11th Aust. Inf. Brigades.  
3rd Aust. Pioneer Battalion.

The following will arrange to obtain official time daily at Divisional Headquarters:-

C. R. A., C. R. B., Div. Sig. Co., D.M.G. Co.

The exact times at which the Officer from Divisional Headquarters will reach the various Headquarters when going round with the watch cannot be definitely stated, hence those concerned will arrange for the official watches to be available at their respective Headquarters.

## 30. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Details with regard to Signal Communications will be prepared by the O.C. Divisional Signal Coy., and issued to those concerned. In this will be included the positions of forward cable heads.

## 31. DESTINATION PATCHES.

Destination Patches of Battalions are as follows:-

"A" Battalion 10th Bde. (37th) No destination Patch.

"A" Battalion 11th Bde. (43rd) No destination patch.

"B" Bn. 10th Bde. (38th) White Patch.

"B" Bn. 11th Bde. (42nd) White Patch.

"C" Bn. 10th Bde. (39th) Blue Patch.

"C" Bn. 11th Bde. (44th Bn) Blue Patch.

"D" Bn. 10th Bde. (40th) Red Patch.

"D" Bn. 11th Bde. (41st) Red Patch.

## 32. MARKING OF JUMPING OFF TRENCH & ASSEMBLY POSITIONS.

Assembly Positions and Jumping Off Line will be clearly marked.

## 33. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

Details with regard to Prisoners of War, Straggler Posts, and other administrative matters will be dealt with separately.

P. T. O.



## Appendix No. 1 (6)

34. REPORTS. Divisional Headquarters will be at the RAMPARTS immediately South of the MENIN GATE (I.8.d.1.6).

Brigades will arrange for reports at stated periods during the progress of the fighting, in addition to special reports.

This will ensure negative information being received, and will serve to remind those concerned that reports are necessary.

ACKNOWLEDGE

T.C.

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

G. O. C.

"G" Staff.

A. Q. Staff.

C. R. A.

C. R. E.

3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th -do-

11th -do-

3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.

D. M. G. O.

A. D. M. S.

A. P. H.

3rd Aust. Div. Train.

D. I. C.

D. B. C.

D. C. O.

21st Squadron, R.F.C.

II ANZAC "G"

2nd Australian Division.

New Zealand Division

Lt-Col. DAVIS (Liaison Off. att.N.Z.Div).

Capt. MOYES (Liaison Off. att.2nd Aust.Div)

War Diary.

File.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. October, 1917.

"YPRES BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO.15.DIRECTION OF ADVANCE.

1. The magnetic bearing of the sun, for an hour or so after sunrise is, approximately, 110 degrees.
2. The magnetic bearing of the inter-brigade boundary or centre line of our advance is 73 degrees.
3. Therefore, after sunrise, the sun will bear 37 degrees south of our general line of advance; - in other words, our advance must be directed towards a point on the horizon which is about 37 degrees North of the sun. -
4. The angle "37 degrees" is subtended at the eye by 11 inches at full arm's length.
5. Thus, if a piece of wood 11 inches long be held, horizontally at full arm's length, with its right hand extremity coinciding with the sun, then its left hand extremity will give the mean direction of our advance.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*G. H. J. J. J.*

Lieut.-Colonel.  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

C. R. A. 8.  
C. R. E.  
3rd. Aust. Divnl. Signal Coy.  
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
D. M. G. O.

23rd. A.M.G. Coy.  
2nd. ANZAC 'G' (for information).  
New Zealand Divn. ( -do- ).  
2nd. Austln. Divn. (for informn).  
Lt.Col. F. VIS. (Liaison Officer  
attached New Zealand Divn).  
Captain MOYLES (Liaison Officer  
attached 2nd. Austln. Divn.)  
War Diary 3.  
File.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
Enl. October, 1917.

C. R. A.  
C. R. B.  
3rd. Aust. Divnl. Signal Coy.  
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
War Diary 3.  
File 1.

"YERRE BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 16.

Dated 30/9/17

The following copy of letter addressed to Enl. ANZAC Corps, 9th., 10th. and 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde is forwarded for your information and has been registered as Y.B.C.S.C. No. 16.

"The following selections for Brigade Headquarters have been made :-

- No. 1. At the Railway D.25.c.1.3, known as the HUT.
- No. 2. At a Headquarters to be constructed near D.25.a.7.5.
- No. 3. BERRY FARM, D.25.b.6.9, where two Battalion dugouts will be converted into Brigade Headquarters.

Headquarters to be occupied as follows :-

- No. 1. By the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
- No. 2. By the 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
- No. 3. By the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

BERRY FARM already has a cable bury to it, and arrangements are being made to bury a line from the test point S.E., North of 11th. Brigade Headquarters to join up with the 9th and 10th Brigade Headquarters. This will necessitate a bury of about 1,000 yards but will join up the 3 Brigades of this Division with each other, with Divisional Headquarters, and with the Enl. Australian Divisional system at the HUT.

The advantages are obvious and steps will be taken to secure sufficient Battalion Headquarters in lieu of those to be used as Brigade Headquarters."

*C. H. - Jan*  
Lieut.-Colonel.  
General Staff.



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Appendix 1 (M)

46

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

S.G.386/214.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd October, 1917.

"YPRES BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO.17.

1. Copies of Artillery Barrage Map herewith. Sufficient are enclosed to issue down to Companies.  
The Barrage Map is only forwarded to those directly affected thereby.
2. There will be five Barrages - "A", "B", "C", "D", "E".  
"A" Nearest to the Infantry.  
"E" Furthest off.  
Each of these barrages will be 200 yards apart.  
"A" Barrage will consist of 18pdrs.  
"B" Of 4.5" and 18-pdrs.  
"C" Machine Guns.  
"D" 6" Hows.  
"E" 8", 9.2" and 60-pdrs.  
The 18-pdr. Barrage "A" is the one affecting the Infantry. It will open for three minutes on a line 150 yards in advance of the Infantry Tape Line (position of Assembly already notified).
3. The 9th Aust. Infantry Brigade will ensure by previous active patrolling, and action of Stokes Mortars, that no enemy is established within this 150 yards of NO MAN'S LAND.
4. Barrage will dwell on the line plus 29 plus 41, and on the line plus 154 plus 166 to assist leap-frogging.
5. The Protective Barrage for the RED LINE, vide attached Barrage Plan, will lift at plus 130 minutes.  
The Protective Barrage for the BLUE LINE will be placed at a distance of 200 yards in advance of the BLUE LINE.  
The Barrage will advance by lifts of 100 yards throughout it's whole length.
6. For the "C" Barrage there will be the closest co-operation between the D.M.G.O. and the Brigade Major R.A.
7. The action of the Protective Barrage, which is shown in para.13 below, must be thoroughly understood by the Troops on the BLUE LINE so that they will not push out too far during the pauses in the "A" Barrage, or follow the other Barrages when they search forward.

P. T. O.



## Appendix A: 1 (R)

8. As a Signal to the Infantry that halting places of the Barrage have been reached Smoke Shell will be fired by the 18-pdrs.
9. Posts will be established inside the Protective Barrage approximately 100 yards in advance of the BLUE LINE.
10. The Barrage Map only shows the lifts of Barrage "A".
11. Special attention will be paid by Barrages "D" and "E" to Dug-Outs, Strong Points, etc.
12. During the Protective Barrage for the RED LINE guns other than those of Barrage "A" will search forward, but the 18-pdrs. in Barrage "A" will remain stationary.
13. After the whole Protective Barrage for the BLUE LINE has been formed, viz., from 182 to 206, the following procedure will be adopted:-  
 Barrage "A" will remain stationary 200 yards in front of the BLUE LINE, and guns will continue to fire as under -  

Plus 206 to plus 221	at 2 rounds per gun per minute.
" 221 " "	236 " 1 round " " "
" 236 " "	266 guns will cease firing.
" 266 " "	281 guns will resume at 1 round per gun per minute.
" 281 " "	386 there will be another break and no guns will be firing on the Protective Barrage Line.
" 386 " "	401 fire will be resumed at one round per gun per minute.

 Plus 401 guns will Cease Fire.
14. It is during the above periods of cessation of fire that Infantry must be careful not to go forward even if Counter-Attacked.
15. During the Protective Barrage on the BLUE LINE; as outlined above, Barrages "B", "D" and "E" will search forward. The fire of these Barrages, viz., "B", "D" and "E" will finally cease at plus 464, but there will be intermediate periods of cessation prior to this time.
16. During the periods of cessation of fire of the Divisional Artillery, as shown above, the guns may be used as required by Divisions, but will at once reopen on their Protective Line, that is 200 yards beyond the BLUE LINE, if the S.O.S. Signal is sent up.
17. After plus 401 when "A" Barrage finally stops, Batteries will be used as required, but will be ready to re-open on the Protective for the BLUE LINE on observing the S.O.S. Signal.  
 Barrage
18. In order to prevent the enemy's Machine Guns on the high ground about DARING CROSSING, DASH CROSSING, interfering with our advancing Infantry, a smoke barrage will be opened by the Artillery along the Railway starting at ZERO

P. T. O.



-3-

hour in Square 22.c. It will gradually roll up from the South-West in order not to interfere with the Infantry Advance.

18. The forward movement of the Infantry will be covered by a total of 9 Field Artillery Brigades, divided into three Groups. These are additional to any Heavy Artillery employed.

19. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*G. H. Jackson*

T.O.

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

G. O. C.	.
"G" Staff.	.
A.Q. Staff.	D. I. O.
C. R. A.	D. B. O.
C. R. E.	.
3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	21st Squadron, R.F.C.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.	II ANZAC "G".
10th -do-	2nd Australian Division.
11th -do-	Lt-Col. DAVIS (Liaison Off. att. N.Z. Div.).
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	Capt. MOYES (Liaison Off. att. 2nd Aust. Div.)
D. M. G. O.	✓ War Diary.
23rd A.M.G. Coy.	File.
A. D. M. S.	New Zealand Division.







THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONSECRET

S.C.288/232.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. October, 1917."YERRES BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 18  
-----

The following programme of Artillery activity on "S" and "T" days is published for information.

On the evening of "S" day,

9.45 p.m. to 10.0 p.m. no firing by Artillery, except in case of enemy attack.

10.0 p.m. to 10.6 p.m. standing barrage in depth from 200 yards beyond S.O.S. line to 1000 yards beyond S.O.S. line.

10.6 p.m. to 10.11 p.m. - silent period.

10.11 p.m. to 10.17 p.m. - standing barrage in depth from 1200 yards beyond S.O.S. line to 2000 yards beyond S.O.S. line.

The order of the separate barrages, from West to East, is "A", "B", "D", "E".

Barrage "A" will be put down 200 yards beyond S.O.S. line in first barrage and 1200 yards beyond S.O.S. line in second barrage.

On "T" day at 5.15 a.m. a barrage in depth will be put down in the normal way, viz., West to East "A" "B" "D" "E". Barrage "A" will be on S.O.S. line and distances between barrages will be 150 yards. The pace of the barrage will be 100 yards in 3 minutes. Barrages will creep straight forward and each will make one lift back before ceasing fire. Barrage "A" will lift back on to a line 200 yards East of the S.O.S. line - the other barrages commencing. Barrage "A" an 18-pdr. Barrage "B" will lift back at ZERO plus 20 and will cease fire at ZERO plus 33. The remaining barrages will lift back at ZERO plus 48 and will cease fire at ZERO plus 51.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

P.W.P.

*Jas A Lambden Capt*  
for Lieut.-Colonel  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION

G.O.C.  
"G" STAFF  
AG. STAFF  
C.R.A.  
C.R.E.  
3rd Aust. Div. *Sig. Coy*  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th -do-  
11th -do-  
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
D. M. G. O.  
D. B. O.  
*Diary*

D.I.O.  
D.B.O.  
21st Squadron, R.F.C.  
II ANZAC "G"  
2nd Aust. Div.  
Lt-Col. DAVIS (Liaison Off. att. H.Z. Div.)  
Capt. MOYES (Liaison Off. att. 2nd Aust. Div.)

*2nd Army Coy.*  
*My Div.*



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
S.G. 386/233.  
Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. October 1917.

"YERREB BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO 19.

The following arrangements with reference to Reliefs subsequent to "S" day are circulated for information and action by those concerned.

1. In order that the next stage of the operations after capture of the BEUL line on "S" day may be undertaken without delay, reliefs of troops will be carried out as early as possible. Reserve Divisions, i.e., in our case the 66th BRITISH Division, will be prepared to take over the front with their Reserve Brigades on "T.U" night. A scheme of reliefs is being prepared by Corps.
2. On relief of Divisions, technical units (R.B. and Pioneers) will not accompany their Divisions, but will be at the disposal of the Chief Engineer, 2nd ANZAC.
3. Machine Gun Coys. on relief of Divisions will not accompany their Divisions but will be concentrated into a Corps Pool under Corps orders. The Corps Pool will be available with the object of expediting the replacement of materiel, assisting ammunition supply and facilitating the formation of Corps barrages. It will be arranged so as to reduce the wear and tear on M.G. Coys. by unnecessary movements.
4. Divisions and Brigades, on going into action again, will be re-joined by their own M.G. units, in accordance with their tactical requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*For. Lieut.-Colonel*  
*General Staff.*

RFP.

DISTRIBUTION

G. O. C.  
"G" Staff  
A. Q. Staff  
C. R. A.  
C. R. E.  
3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th -do-  
11th -do-  
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
D. H. G. O.  
... D. H. S.  
A. P. M.

3rd Aust. Div. Train  
D. I. O.  
D. B. O.  
D. G. O.  
21st Squadron, R.F.C.  
II ANZAC "G"  
2nd Australian Division  
New Zealand Division  
Lt-Col. DAVIS (Liaison Off. att. N.Z. Div).  
Capt. MOYNS (Liaison Off. att. 2nd Aust. Div)  
War Diary  
File  
23rd H.G. Coy.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. October, 1917.

C. R. E.  
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

"YPRES BATTLE" GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 20.

At a Meeting this afternoon, where the following were present, viz:-

G. O. C.  
C. R. E.  
O. C., 40th. Battalion.  
O. C., 41st. Battalion.  
O. C., 11th. Field Coy. and  
O. C., 9th. Field Coy.,

it was ruled by the Divisional Commander that the Engineers should construct three strong points in the Right Brigade Sector for Vickers guns on the top of the BROODSKINDE and of the PASSCHENDAELE Ridge, and one at the railway crossing in D.17.c.

The G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will arrange with his associated Field Coy. for strong points, as he may think necessary along his front.

It was, also, decided by the Divisional Commander that a Coy. of Pioneers should be allotted by the C.R.E. for cutting communication trenches through the high ground in the vicinity of the BLUE LINE when captured, and that the remainder of the Pioneers would push tracks forward to the newly captured BLUE LINE.

The Divisional Commander ruled that wire should be taken forward to assist in the consolidation of the 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade on the high ground.

As already indicated, 'C' Battalions and 'D' Battalions will dig support and firing lines. 'A' and 'B' Battalions will not be required to dig organised lines in the low ground provided the Battalions, which pass through, are successful.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. H. Johnston*  
Lieut.-Colonel  
General Staff.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

P.O. 386/244.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd October, 1917.VERY URGENT.

Appendix 1(v)

G. B. A.  
D. M. G. O.  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th -do-  
11th -do-

"Y. B." G. B. C. No. 21.

S.O.S. Calls sent up by the Infantry between ZERO hour and ZERO minus 10 minutes will not be answered by Divisional Artillery, in order that there may be no chance of the Infantry being confused with regard to ZERO time and the real opening of the Barrage.

Counter-Batteries will, however, be available right up to and after ZERO.

The maximum amount of Artillery Ammunition possible will be got up during the present period of dry weather.

Brigades along the whole Army Front have decided to send over two Battalions at ZERO hour and the other two after an interval. The Divisional Commander has therefore decided to conform - thus, Brigade Commanders will arrange that "A" and "B" Battalions will go over at ZERO, and "C" and "D" at a suitable interval of time to reach their respective tanks.

"C" and "D" Battalions will have, therefore, to take advantage of gaps or thinning in the Barrage, and to be careful not to suffer casualties from our Machine Gun Barrage as they go forward, seeing that they may be starting from close in front of the guns. enemy's

The D.M.G.O. will visit 10th and 11th Aust. Infantry Brigades to-morrow in order to ensure safety arrangements in this respect.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

T.C.

*C. H. Fair*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

S.G.386/270.

S E C R E T.Divisional Headquarters,  
3rd October, 1917.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th        -do-  
11th        -do-

"Y. B." G.S.C.NO.22.

Message-form Maps have been sent out to each

Brigade -

500	-	9th Bde.
600	-	10th Bde.
600	-	11th Bde.

These numbers are considerably over the numbers requested by Brigades, but the Maps have been issued on a scale to permit of issue of several to Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants.

They will be useful not only for sending back messages (if necessary) during the Advance, but also for reporting exact locations (as nearly as possible) or final objective line.

No information concerning our own lines will be carried on these Maps forward of Battalion Headquarters.

T.C.

*W. L. L. L. L.*  
Captain:  
for Lieut-Colonel.-G.S.



Appendix 1 (x)

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

No. S.G. 386/279.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,  
3rd October, 1917.

C. R. A.  
C. R. E.  
3rd Aust. Div. Signal Coy.  
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th -do-  
11th -do-  
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.  
A. D. M. S.  
D. M. G. O.

"Y.B." G.S.O. NO. 23.

At Divisional Commander's Conference this morning it was decided that Brigade Commanders of the 10th and 11th Aust. Inf. Bdes. would pass Battalions across NO MAN'S LAND at, or after, ZERO according to the best tactical methods suitable to each of them.

That all Troops of the 10th and 11th Aust. Inf. Bdes. at ZERO hour would be beyond the Safety Line for VICKERS Guns, which line runs parallel to the tape line through point mid-way between Squares D.20. Central and 26. Central.

Brigade Commanders were warned that 2nd Aust. Division intend to use short bursts on Strombos Horn as an S.O.S. Signal in the event of mist being so bad as to prevent ordinary S.O.S. Signals being seen. All Troops must be warned of this in order not to assume that a Gas Attack is being made.

It was decided that the 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. would place two Light Trench Mortars with Teams, and an ample supply of Ammunition, at the disposal of the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. for employment about ZERO hour against a target at point D.21.d.18.60.

The 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. will forthwith take steps with regard to emplacements for these Mortars.

There is another Machine Gun recently reported at D.21.d.55.33 which is very inconspicuous, but will probably be caught by our 18-pdr. barrage.

It was ruled that Divisional Headquarters would warn Battalions of the 10th and 11th Aust. Inf. Bdes. with regard to ZERO date and hour, in addition to the warning they must receive from their Brigades. This was simply in order to save delay and give Battalions a little extra time in which to think of what was before them.

*G. H. Jackson*

Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.

T.C.



Appendix 1 (2)

SECRET.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
3rd. October, 1917.



YPERES BATTLE GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 25.

The following is TIME TABLE of Operations for 4-10-1917.--  
Operation.

<u>Time.</u> <u>a.m.</u>	
6.0	ZERO. - Artillery Barrage starts.
6.5	M. G. Barrage starts.
6.11	Capture of HILL 40 complete.
6.29 ) to ) 6.41 )	First halt and leapfrog.
6.53	Capture of SPRINGFIELD.
7.11 ) 7.23 )	RED Line reached on left. RED Line reached on right.
7.23 ) to ) 8.10 )	Long halt of Barrage.
8.26	Capture of BEECHAM and DARING CROSSING.
8.34 ) 8.46 )	Third halt and leapfrog.
9.2	BLUE Line reached on right.
9.26	BLUE Line reached on left.
9.56	"A" Barrage ceases temporarily.
10.26 ) to ) 10.41 )	"A" Barrage resumes and then ceases temporarily.
12.26 ) to ) 12.41 )	"A" Barrage resumes and ceases finally.
<u>p.m.</u> 1.44	"B", "D" and "E" barrages cease finally.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

DISTRIBUTION.

G.O.C.	9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	D.M.G.O.
"G" Staff.	10th. do.	21st. Squadron, R.F.C.
C.R.A.	11th. do.	2nd. ANZAC "G" (For inf).
C.R.E.	3rd. Aust. Pion. Bn.	N. Z. Division.
Div. Sig. Coy.	A.D.M.S.	2nd. Aust. Div.
Lieut-Col. Davis. (att. N.Z. Div).		Captain Moyes. (att 2nd. Aust. Div).
"A.Q" Staff.	War Diary.	D.B.O.
	File.	23rd A.M.G. Coy.

for Lieut-Colonel. -  
General Staff.  
*Geo. F. Wright*  
*Mayo*



Appendix (a) 1 (aa)

SECRET.



A.H.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,  
2nd. October, 1917.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.

ACTION OF MACHINE GUNS.

1. RESOURCES. The number of guns available will be 64 provided from the following units :-

9th. M. G. Coy.	16.
10th. M. G. Coy.	16.
11th. M. G. Coy.	16.
23rd. M. G. Coy.	16.
Total.	64.

II. ORGANISATION AND DISTRIBUTION.

The Machine Guns will form two 'Barrages', one of 24 guns and one of 32 guns: and 8 guns will be allotted to each of the 10th and 11th Brigades, for the purpose of consolidation. The first barrage will be composed of 16 guns of the 23rd. M. G. Coy. plus 8 of the 10th. M. G. Coy; and the second barrage will be composed of 16 guns of the 9th. M. G. Coy. plus the 8 of the 10th. M. G. Coy. and 8 of the 23rd. M. G. Coy, which were formerly on the first barrage. These guns will have to bound forward at a time to be notified later. When the first barrage finishes, 8 guns of the 23rd. M. G. Coy. will become a reserve to be held in the hands of the D.M.G.O.

Eight guns of the 10th. M. G. Coy. will be placed at the disposal of the 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade for purposes of consolidation, and eight guns of the 11th. M. G. Coy. will be placed at the disposal of the 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade for purposes of consolidation; the balance of the guns of the 11th. M. G. Coy. remaining in reserve.

The disposition of the guns of each barrage is shown on tracings A and B. The exact position of each gun must be selected by the Company Commander concerned.

The guns will be grouped into 4-8 gun batteries, and will be lettered consecutively.

III. FUNCTIONS. The function of any battery or group of guns must not be altered without reference to Divisional Headquarters.

- (1) The minimum safety clearance over our own troops must be maintained.
- (2) Movement during the whole operation must be reduced to the absolute minimum.

(1).



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IV. DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

The D.M.G.O. will be responsible for :-

- I. Co-ordination and supervision of the machine gun barrages.
- II. Liaison between batteries within the Division; liaison between Divisions on our Right and Left, also with Corps Machine Gun Officer.
- III. The place where the D.M.G.O. will be stationed will be notified later.

The Senior Officer with each Group of barrage guns will command that group.

He will be responsible for :-

- I. Control and direction of the Batteries of his Group.
- II. Liaison between Brigade Headquarters and D.M.G.O.
- III. All matters of command and administration within his Group.
- IV. He will not leave his Headquarters without the permission of the D.M.G.O.  
In case of such absence a Senior M. G. Officer must take his place.

V. He will refer all matters requiring co-ordination with, or affecting, the Batteries outside his control to the D.M.G.O.

Battery Commanders will be selected by Group Commanders in consultation with Company Commanders.

They will be responsible for :-

1. Elevation and Direction of fire from guns of their Batteries.
2. Fire efficiency of their Batteries (i.e. keeping the whole area allotted to their batteries under effective fire).
3. Rates of fire and expenditure of S.A.A.
4. Timing of lifts.
5. Safety clearances.
6. Supply of oil and water.



(3).

2/10/1917.

7. In the event of having to move to new position subsequent rapid opening of fire. Opening of fire to be immediately reported to Group Commanders.
8. Compilation and personal checking of indirect overhead fire sheet. (See Appendix III and page 88 Infantry Machine Gun Training 1917.)

#### V. RECORDS.

Indirect Fire Sheet will be checked by the Battery and Group Commander personally in each case.

All matters of interest to the Machine Gun Corps should be jotted down in a notebook as soon as possible after occurring.

#### VI. ACTION.

Fire will be opened at ZERO plus 5 minutes and fire rapid until ZERO plus 7 minutes when all guns will lift 100 yards. Rates of fire will then be reduced to 75 rounds per minute, and lifts carried out as per Sketch Plan "A" until ZERO plus 71 when the guns to form the second barrage will move forward to their new positions. The remaining guns will continue to fire until ZERO plus 130 minutes when No. I Barrage will cease.

At ZERO plus 130 minutes, No. II Barrage will commence and lift as shown in Sketch Plan B until the first S.O.S. line is reached, when a standing barrage will be put down. The Standing barrage will continue from ZERO plus 190 minutes until ZERO plus 318 minutes. Rests for cleaning, oiling, etc., must be arranged.

On the S.O.S. call all guns will immediately open fire on their S.O.S. lines, and fire rapid for 10 minutes and then 50 rounds per gun per minute for 20 minutes.

After 30 minutes firing as above, the guns will cease fire unless a further S.O.S. signal be sent up.

#### VII. S.A.A.

Ten thousand rounds per gun must be maintained at Battery positions.

Two thousand rounds per gun in belts must always be available with each gun: belts must be refilled as fired and not allowed to remain empty.

#### VIII. COMMUNICATION.

Group Commanders must keep in touch with Divisional Headquarters through Brigade Headquarters. In addition, a system of runners must be maintained.

All guns must be in position by daylight, 3rd. instant.

All infantry must be informed that the Machine Gun Barrage does not open until ZERO plus 5 minutes. At that, it moves 400 yards in front of the Infantry.

*Arthur Wright*  
Lient.-Colonel.  
General Staff.

#### DISTRIBUTION.

##### G.O.C.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
C. M. G. O.

##### "G" Staff.

9th. M. G. Coy.  
10th. M. G. Coy.  
11th. M. G. Coy.  
23rd. M. G. Coy.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

S.G.386/285.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,  
3rd October, 1917.

MACHINE GUN ACTION. FINAL INSTRUCTIONS.

To be read in conjunction with S.G.386/215 dated 2-10-17.

1. COMMUNICATION. It is notified for the information of Group Commanders that the Cable Head is situated North of BOSTIN FARM D.20.d.70.40.  
The importance of maintaining a sufficient system of Runners must be borne in mind.
2. SITUATION OF D.M.G.O. The D.M.G.O. will be situated at Divisional Headquarters. Close touch must be kept '1' by Group Commanders by wire from nearest Brigade Headquarters.
3. REPORTS. Reports will be sent to D.M.G.O. every hour. Special Reports as occasion demands.
4. SYNCHRONISATION OF WATCHES. After watches have been synchronised with D.M.G.O. to-day they must again be synchronised at least once before ZERO.
5. SKETCH PLANS. Amended Sketch Plan "B" is issued to all concerned herewith.
6. HARASSING FIRE. When the Final Objective has been reached guns of No.2 Barrage will employ harassing and searching fire for two hours with 50% of guns.  
  
Special attention will be paid to the Railway Cutting North of 17.Central by the guns of "A" and "B" Batteries.  
During this period all guns must be prepared to jump back to their S.O.S. line in the event of the S.O.S. being called for.
7. ACTION OF 2ND AUST. DIV. All Ranks must be warned that the 2nd Aust. Division on our Right intend to use short bursts on Strombos Horn as an S.O.S. Signal in the event of mist being so bad as to prevent ordinary S.O.S. Signals being seen. All troops must be warned of this in order not to assume that a Gas Attack is being made.

T.C.

DISTRIBUTION.

G.O.C.	9th A.M.G.Coy.
"G" Staff.	10th -do-
9th Aust.Inf.Bde.	11th -do-
10th -do-	23rd -do-
11th -do-	C.M.G.O. (for information).

*J.M. Cro. Major*  
Lieut-Colonel.  
General Staff.



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.THIRD PHASE - YPRES BATTLE - COMMENCING 4/10/1917.  
-----NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS.

Reference Maps: 1/40,000, Sheet 28  
 1/20,000, Sheet 28 N.W.  
 1/10,000, Sheet 28 N.E.1  
 1/10,000, Special Sheet, GRAVENSTAFEL.  
 -----

1. DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF DIVISION.

On the 28th September, units of the Division were located as follows :-

Artillery	...	Reserve Area with H.Q. at RENINGHELST.
Engineers	...	Field Coys. with Brigade Groups
Pioneers	...	YPRES South
9th. A. I. Bde	..	WINNEZEELE
10th -do-	...	WINNEZEELE
11th -do	...	BRANDHOEK No. 3.
Field Ambulances		With Brigades.

2. TAKING OVER OF LINE & ASSEMBLING OF UNITS IN  
DIVISIONAL AREA.

The Division was ordered to take over from the Third Division by 10.0 a.m. on the 1st October, under arrangements to be made by the Divisions concerned. The portion of the line South of ROULERS Railway was then to pass over to the Second Australian Division.

The task of taking over and adjusting the front line was allotted to the 9th A. I. Brigade.

The 10th A. I. Brigade was to go into reserve in YPRES South area and VLAMERTINGHE No. 3 area.

The 9th A.M.G.Coy and the 23rd A.M.G.Coy were allotted to the 9th Brigade and were to be disposed by the D.M.G.O. after consultation with the G.O.C., 9th. Brigade.

The Brigade Group moved up by bus and took over the line on the night of 29th/30th September and 30th Sept/1st October.

The 9th Field Coy. moving up on the 30th September, remained in the YPRES South area.

The portion of the line South of the Railway was handed over to the Second Australian Division on the 1st. October.

On the same date, Headquarters of this Division took over and established itself at the Ramparts, YPRES; command of the sector passing over to the G.O.C., at 10.0 a.m.



- 2 -

On the 1st October, the 10th Brigade moved by bus to YPRES South and VLAERTINGHE No. 3 area (H.9,10,15 and 16).

Field Ambulances. Field Ambulances moved into the line and took over on the 29th and 30th September.

Artillery. Divisional Artillery moved in and took over from the New Zealand Divisional Artillery on the 30th Sept.,

### 3. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.

#### Headquarters of Units.

Divisional Headquarters      Advanced - Ramparts, YPRES.  
Rear - BRANDHOEK No.2 area,  
H.7.c.9.5

Headquarters of Brigades were arranged as follows:-

9th Aust. Inf. Bde	...	Railway, D.26.c.1.3
10th    -do-	...	BORNY FARM, D.25.b.6.9
11th    -do-	...	D.26.a.7.5. (KINK CORNER).

Communications. By the night of the 2nd October, Divisional Headquarters were connected with Brigades by buried cable. Communication forward of Brigades consisted of ground lines, visual, pigeons and power buzzers.

#### Supplies.

Ammunition - 18-pdrs & 4.5 Hows. This was drawn from the dump at I.5.a.30.70 and carried by pack mule to gun positions.

S.A.A., Grenades, etc., Dumps were established as follows: - Rear Divisional Dump at H.7.d.7.0 - Advanced dump at POTIJZE, I.4.c.2.8.

R.E., Material Main dump at I.7.b.2.6.

Water. Water filling points were taken over in YPRES, I.8.b.1.9, and CAMBRIDGE ROAD, I.5.c.5.9. A Divisional Water Patrol Officer was appointed to supervise all the water arrangements for men and animals in the Divisional area.

Rations. In addition to the rations carried on men, one day's ration was held in the wagon lines. A dump of specially prepared barrage rations was held in YPRES at I.8.a.4.8.

#### Medical.

Regimental Aid Posts	..	D.25.b.7.8; D.26.b.2.2
Relay Posts	..	FROST HOUSE, D.25.a.6.1
		BAVARIA HOUSE, C.30.c.6.5.
Advanced Dressing Stations		POTIJZE, I.4.a.8.2
		Prison, YPRES, I.7.b.2.1.
Divisional Walking Wounded Collecting Post	..	MILL COT, I.5.a.1.7.

#### Routes of evacuation.

Stretcher Cases. Stretcher cases were to be evacuated from Regimental Aid Posts through Relay Posts to FROST HOUSE and BAVARIA HOUSE: here they were to be placed on Ford Motor ambulances or horsed ambulances and conveyed to advanced dressing station, POTIJZE, thence by M.A.C. transport to CORPS main dressing station.



- 3 -

Walking Cases. Walking cases were to be directed to MILL COT Walking Wounded Collecting Post, I.5.a.1.7: from here they were to be entrained and taken by DECAUVILLE Railway to CORPS Walking Wounded Collecting Station at The MILL, VLAERTINGHE, H.8.a.9.9. If trains were not available, they were to be sent by bus to VLAERTINGHE.

In the event of the A.D.S. POTIJZE, being destroyed, cases were to be sent to Advanced Dressing Station, YPRES.

Straggler Posts.

First Line	..	I.5.a.2.7, North end of CAMBRIDGE ROAD. I.11.b.3.6, Railway, CAMBRIDGE ROAD.
Second Line,	..	I.7.a.6.3, Bridge 9; I.7.c.4.7, Bridge 10
YPRES		I.13.a.7.3, " 13; I.8.b.1.1, MENIN ROAD I.8.b.1.8, THOUROUT; I.8.a.4.8, NORTH GATE.
Straggler Collecting Station.		I.7.b.2.1, Prison, YPRES.

Prisoners of War. Collecting stations were established at MILL COT and RAILWAY WOOD, from which places prisoners were transferred to Divisional Cage at Prison, YPRES: at this place the prisoners were examined for purposes of identification.

Details Camps. Transport Lines and Details Camps of Brigades were established as follows :-

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde	..	C.12.d.4.2
10th -do-	..	H.16.central
11th -do-	..	H.8.d.1.8

4. ORGANISATION OF UNITS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.

Brigades were organised with the following approximate fighting strength -

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde	..	89 Off:	2430	O/Ranks
10th -do-	..	79 "	2100	"
11th -do-	..	95 "	2280	"

Trench Mortar Batteries were left at the disposal of the Brigade Commanders.

Sixtyfour machine guns were available. Eight guns were allotted to each of the 10th and 11th Brigades for purposes of consolidation - the remainder being left in the hands of the D.M.G.O. for barrage work.

Engineers. One hundred men from the Infantry were attached to each Field Coy.

A.A.M.C. A total of 60 Infantrymen were attached to the A.A.M.C. as extra stretcher bearers.

5. OCCUPATION OF BATTLE POSITIONS.

On the 2nd October, "A" and "B" Battalions of the 10th. Brigade moved through YPRES to bivouac in the area I.4.c., and on the afternoon of the 3rd. were joined by the remainder of the Brigade.



- 4 -

The 11th Brigade moved by train from BRANDHORN No. 3 area to the Asylum, West of YPRES, and from there through YPRES to the area I.9.a. and c. - "A" and "B" Battalions moving on the 2nd. and "C" and "D" on the 3rd. <sup>Marched.</sup>

On the morning of the 3rd., the Field Ambulances had taken up battle positions.

Field Coys. and the Pioneer Battalion remained in YPRES and YPRES South area.

#### 6. REVIEW OF SITUATION AT 6.0 p.m. ON 3rd OCTOBER.

Both Brigades, by moving earlier through YPRES, had secured a clear passage for the approach march.

Two tracks for the 11th Brigade and one for the 10th. had been prepared and marked by the Pioneers from their Assembly areas up to the Tape line.

The Tape line had been laid out from D.21.d.20.10 to road intersection at D.20.b.80.95. A careful reconnaissance of the area and the tracks up to the Tape line had been carried out by a large number of Officers and N.C.Os. of both attacking Brigades.

All arrangements were now complete, and Brigades were ready to move.

#### 7. INFORMATION.

Enemy Shell Fire. Observation during the few previous days had shown that the enemy was in the habit of shelling the ZONNEBEKE, which was practically impassable, except where it was bridged; it was thought that he might put down a barrage in this vicinity at the commencement of the operations.

System of holding the line. The enemy appeared to be holding a series of strong points (mainly "pill-boxes" containing machine guns), with a shell-hole crater defence between. The strongest of these seemed to be WINDMILL CABARET with JACOBS COTTAGES, 21.a.central, ALMA, SPRINGFIELD, BORDEAUX FARM, BEECHAM, HAMBURG and DAB TRENCH.

On account of their ~~proximity~~ proximity to our front line, the buildings near the station at D.21.d.55.45 had not been dealt with by "Heavies".

In addition, it was considered probable that the enemy had made use of the embankments and cuttings on the railway in order to build emplacements.

Good protection for the construction of dugouts was open to the enemy on the road running N.W. and S.E. through DASH CROSSING.

Terrain. The ground about D.15.d. was very wet & heavy. This was also the case in D.22.b. The remainder of the ground to be covered, though badly cut up, was not considered a difficult obstacle.

Wire. It was not anticipated that wire in any great quantity would be met with, except, possibly, immediately West of DAB TRENCH.



- 5 -

8. DIVISIONAL TASK.

The Division was to capture the area up to the BLUE Line, D.10.d.30.00; D.16.b.60.70; D.17.a.00.18; D.17.a.15.00; D.17.c.70.00; D.22.a.68.78, - which was to be consolidated with a view to a further advance.

The flanks of our advance were :- on the right D.21.d.00.00 D.22.c.70.95, cross-roads D.23.a.40.65 - and on the left - D.21.a.00.80; D.15.b.80.00; D.16.b.00.80.

The railway line was made inclusive to this Division.

Flank Divisions. The Second Australian Division was operating on our right flank, and the New Zealand Division on our left.

9. PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

It was decided to carry out the attack with the 11th. Brigade on the right, and the 10th Brigade on the left; the 9th Brigade being in reserve. A line, from D.21.a.56.00 through point D.17.c.20.93 on the final objective, was made the dividing line between Brigades.

Two lines were to be consolidated, viz., the BLUE Line and a Support Line through D.16.a.65.55, D.16.b.00.25, D.16.b.32.00, D.17.c.00.45, D.17.d.50.00 and D.23.a.58.72.

Latitude with regard to the exact siting of these lines was allowed in order that the best field of fire might be obtained, but at the same time regularity of trace was required in order that a good jumping-off position for a further advance might be obtained.

Strong points were to be constructed by parties of the Engineers for use by Infantry and Machine Guns. On the Right Brigade sector it was arranged that these strong points should be constructed on the top of the BROODSEINDE edge of the PASSCHENDANLS RIDGE, and one at the Railway Crossing in D.17.c. The G.O.C. 10th Brigade was to arrange for strong points, as necessary, in the Left Brigade sector.

One Company of the Pioneer Battalion was detailed to dig communication trenches from the BLUE Line to the rear of the RIDGE.

If the front line were broken at any point, the troops in the support line were to be prepared to move forward and re-establish the line. Troops further back were to be prepared to replace those from the support line who had gone forward.

It was arranged that two Battalions only of each Brigade should move at ZERO, the remaining two taking advantage of any slackening of the enemy barrage to move as ordered by the Brigadier concerned. Care was to be taken that they were up in time to leap-frog through at the long halt of the barrage.

Barrages. Five barrages, 200 yards apart, were arranged:-

"A" Barrage	...	18-pdrs
"B" "	...	4.5 Hows. and 18-pdrs.
"C" "	...	Machine Guns
"D" "	...	6" Hows.
"E" "	...	8", 9.2" and 60-pdrs.



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Maintenance of Touch. Touch was to be maintained with formations on our flanks throughout the whole advance - small parties were to be detailed to move with the adjoining formations. These parties moving with the New Zealand division were to establish touch at each halt and on reaching the final objective.

It was arranged with the Second Australian Division that similar parties should establish touch on the eastern side of THAMES WOOD and at 22.b.20.16, 23.a.40.65, and on the final objective.

Arrangements for touch between Brigades was to be made by the Brigades concerned.

Maintenance of direction. Compass bearings were to be taken and Officers specially detailed, with one or two men to keep direction. The approximate compass bearings of the sun at sunrise was to be noted on a day prior to ZERO and communicated to the troops, in order to assist in maintaining direction.

S.O.S. S.O.S. Signal was to be inoperative between ZERO hour and ZERO minus 10 minutes. Counter-battery, however, was to be available up to and after ZERO.

Machine Guns. Machine guns in the hands of the D.M.C.O. were formed into two barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun batteries, each pair of batteries commanded by senior officer.

These guns were organised as follows :-

First Barrage	...	10th A.M.C.Coy.	8 guns
		23rd do	16 guns
Second Barrage	...	9th A.M.C.Coy.	16 guns
		10th do	8 "
		23rd do	8 "

The guns were to be placed in positions as follows :-

First Barrage - About D.26.a.72.90  
D.20.c.30.45  
D.20.c.20.80

Second Barrage - D.21.d.20.90  
D.21.b.10.10  
D.21.a.25.35  
D.21.a.00.57

Engineers. Engineers were to be used on the construction of strong points previously mentioned, the construction and maintenance of tracks and the improvement of roads.

Pioneers. Two Coys. of Pioneers were allotted to the C.R.A. for the construction and maintenance of Artillery roads. The remainder worked under the orders of the C.R.E.

Liaison. One Senior R.A. Officer, and one Intelligence Officer, R.A., were attached to each Infantry Brigade on "S" day.

In addition to the above, two F.O.Os. per Artillery Group, of which there were three, were to go forward with the Infantry. Of these six F.O.Os., three were to establish O.Ps. forward. The other three were attached to the "D" Battalions - two to the "D" Battalion of the 11th Brigade and one to the "D" Battalion of the 10th Brigade.



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Thus there were to be three Artillery Liaison officers with the Battalions capturing the final objective, and two of these were to be with the Battalion on the high ground on our right.

A Divisional Staff officer was to visit CORPS Headquarters and Infantry Brigade Headquarters, when required, for the interchange of information.

An Officer detailed by the Heavy Artillery was to be at Divisional Headquarters. Officers were also detailed for Liaison work with each of the Flank Divisions.

Arrangements for the interchange of Liaison personnel within the Brigades, and with the Brigades on their flanks, was left in the hands of the Brigadiers.

#### 10. OPERATIONS.

Synchronisation of Watches. Watches were synchronised twice daily with CORPS and with Brigades by an officer from Divisional Headquarters, who took his watch round to Headquarters of units. The watches of Battalions taking part in the attack were also synchronised by a Staff officer from Divisional Headquarters just prior to their moving off on the approach march.

Approach March and Assembly. In accordance with instructions issued, Brigadiers made their own arrangements for the approach march.

Right Brigade (11th.) The First Battalion of the 11th Brigade moved off on the approach march at about 9.0 pm. The tracks were well marked and little trouble was experienced from shelling. The dangerous area about the ZONNEBEKE was crossed without incident.

Left Brigade (10th.) The first Battalion of this Brigade moved off from the Assembly area at about 9.45 p.m. A greater number of casualties by shell fire were suffered by this Brigade than was the case with the Right Brigade. After crossing the ZONNEBEKE, Battalions deployed into Assembly positions - rear battalions moving further forward than was first intended in order to be clear of the ZONNEBEKE area.

Both Brigades had reported all Battalions in position at 4.0 a.m. on the 4th.

Enemy action prior to ZERO. At about 5.30 a.m. <sup>the enemy</sup> put down a barrage which fell on the rear battalions. These were moved forward, with the result that heavy casualties were averted.

#### 11. THE ATTACK

Right Brigade. At ZERO the Brigade moved off in good order. The barrage was very strong and apparently very effective, for though large numbers of the enemy were met with, especially along the railway line about THAMES WOOD, they surrendered freely.

No break was made in the advance right up to the BLUE Line, which was captured on time, and touch with the Brigade on the right ensured.



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This was largely due to the support lent to the advancing troops by those in the rear rapidly filling up gaps, and in one case by one support company, finding that the line ahead of it was dropping back from the barrage on account of the difficulties of the ground, pushing through and taking over its task.

Left Brigade. This Brigade also reported the barrage to be very strong and effective. Large numbers of the enemy were met with, but little opposition was offered, except by machine guns from ABRAHAM'S HEIGHTS and from the vicinity of the BLUE Line. By hard fighting these positions were captured. A break due to the machine gun fire was quickly filled up by troops in rear.

Large numbers of prisoners were taken in this area, mainly from "pill-boxes".

The leading battalion captured the BLUE Line to time and carried on with consolidation.

Counter-attacks. The enemy counter-attacked our right flank, and again at 6.30 p.m. On both occasions these attempts on the part of the enemy to regain lost ground were completely broken up by our Artillery fire.

Later on, an attempt against our right flank was also broken up. Throughout the night the enemy made several smaller unsuccessful attacks against our front.

Strong points were successfully established, as arranged, in rear of each Brigade front, and the work of digging communication trenches was proceeding satisfactorily.

#### Casualties.

	<u>Off:</u>	<u>O/Ranks</u>
<u>Assaulting Brigades</u>		
10th A. I. Bde	24	830
11th do	31	610
<u>Reserve Brigade.</u>		
9th. A. I. Bde	6	220

Prisoners. The total prisoners that passed through our Cages were 24 Officers and 1014 Other ranks. These belonged to the 77th and 79th Regts. of the 20th Division; the 5th Gren. Guards Regt. and 5th Foot Guards Regt. of the 4th Guards Division, and the 212th R.I.R. of 45th Division.

Material. We captured 2 Grenadierworker, 4 Trench Mortars and 70 Machine Guns.

#### 12. GENERAL.

Following are some of the outstanding features of the operation :-

(1) Statements from prisoners showed that the 212th R.I.R. were assembled for attack, but were forestalled by our offensive. This would account largely for the number of prisoners taken.



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(2) The success of the operation was largely due to careful and systematic preparation, together with the excellent leadership and initiative displayed by officers and N.C.Os. in all units.

(3). Our barrage was very effective, and the fact that it did great execution is borne out by the statements of officers taking part in the attack as to the large number of enemy dead lying in the captured territory.

(4) The enemy's Artillery, during the latter part of the day, was reported to be very weak and erratic.

(5). Visibility was poor, so the aeroplanes were able to render little service.

(6). The closing up of Battalions after crossing the SONNEBEKE undoubtedly saved many casualties.

(7). The prompt manner in which gaps in the line were consistently filled up by rear troops reflects credit on all taking part in the offensive.

(Sgd) S. H. JACKSON,

Divisional Headquarters,  
3rd. November, 1917.

Captain,  
for Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff

PWP.



37th BATTALION.

4-10-1917.

On Tuesday, 2nd instant, the Battalion moved from its billeting area at WINNIZKELE in motor lorries to a bivouaging area 1 mile East of YPRES, where the men made small shelters for themselves. During the night rain fell, which did not succeed in damping the spirits of the men.

During the 3rd. Coy. Commanders, Platoon Commanders and N.C.Os. took the opportunity of reconnoitring the route which had been selected for the approach march to the Assembly trenches. This route was duck-boarded only about a mile, the remainder being marked by tape, which wound serpent-like around shell holes and across muddy ground right up to the Assembly trench, which also was marked by tape.

At 9.45 p.m. on the 3rd, the approach march was begun. The Battalion moved in single file and adopted a steady, slow pace throughout. This undoubtedly was the chief factor in the success of the approach march.

At 1.0 a.m. the leading platoon had reached the Assembly trench, and by 1.20 the Battalion was formed up in position ready for the attack at dawn. Strict silence was a predominant characteristic on the approach march, and it was thoroughly maintained in the assembly.

At 5.30 a.m. the calm of the night was suddenly broke by a barrage put down by the enemy across the assembly lines. It appeared that the attack had been discovered, but it was really his preliminary barrage previous to an attack which he contemplated making on our ~~positions~~ positions at 6.15 a.m.

6.0 a.m. being our ZERO hour, the Battalion was on top of his assembled troops before they ~~recognised~~ recognised what had happened. Our barrage was excellent and the Battalion was in touch with it until the objective was reached.

Strong resistance was met with from JUDAH HOUSE, which was eventually overcome by its being rushed and the machine gun crew being captured. The leading Coys. were also held up for a few minutes by machine gun fire from the direction of ABRAHAM HEIGHTS. Opposition from other directions was successfully engaged with the bayonet, in which the men placed all their confidence. The objective was reached at 6.21 a.m. and consolidation was begun immediately. About 120 casualties were suffered during the advance, the remaining casualties being suffered during the work of consolidation.

Summarising the attack by the Battalion, - we have a depth of enemy country penetrated to the extent of 500 yards by a breadth of about 500 yards. In that area were counted some 350 dead Boches.

Captures - Prisoners	..	420
Machine guns		20

Our Casualties -	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	-	7	-	7
Other ranks	47	151	4	202



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Trench Mortars and 70 Machine Guns.

Our casualties were -

11th Brigade (Right Assaulting Bde.)	Off. 31.	O.R. 610.
10th " (Left " " )	24.	830.
9th " (Support Brigade)	6.	220.

The enemy troops opposite us were the 77th and 79th Regiments of the 20th Division, and the 5th Gren. Gard. Regiment and 5 Foot Gds. Regiment of the 4th Guards Division. The 212th R.I.R. of the 45th Division were attacking through these troops when our attack opened.

On the whole hostile artillery fire throughout the day was weak and erratic, although final objective was heavily shelled.

*Hamilton Capt*



9th. October, 1917.

36TH. BATTALION.

The approach march commenced from YERRES EAST Divouac area at 10.15 p.m. on the 3rd. Oct. and the Battalions were in position at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of the 4th. Battalion Headquarters was established at MITCHELL'S FARM. Heavy shelling was encountered during approach but only two casualties were sustained. There was a fair amount of congestion at the assembly point but the assembly was done very well.

At 5.30 a.m. the enemy barrage came down but the shells fell behind and to the right and the battalion suffered no casualties.

At ZERO hour the battalion moved forward and got across NO MAN'S LAND as quickly as possible. The 36th. Bn. became slightly mixed with the 37th. Bn in this advance but did not become disorganised.

After going through the 37th. Bn., strong opposition from Pill boxes in vicinity of SPRINGFIELD and BORDEAUX was encountered. These were rushed and in most cases garrison easily surrendered. One man fought to the last with bombs and was shot.

The RED LINE was reached on barrage time and the Battalion halted and made themselves comfortable by digging into shell holes. Lewis guns posts were put out temporarily and Battalion Headquarters was shifted forward to JUDAH House at 9 a.m. A good deal of intermittent shelling took place on RED LINE during the day and the Battalion suffered some casualties from it.

In rushing the BORDEAUX system of pill boxes, a Sergeant single-handed rushed a machine gun, killed the crew and captured the gun.

Communication during the battle was kept up by lamps and telephone. The lamp did splendid work.

Lewis guns were used extensively to down machine gun fire from Pill boxes and the men made good use of their rifles.

No rifle grenades were used and only a few hand grenades. Hand grenades were used for taking Pill boxes and clearing shell holes.

Casualties were 2 Officers and 150 other ranks.

The Battalion claims about 100 prisoners 7 machine guns and 2 granatenwerfer.



39th. BATTALION

The approach march was commenced from the ASYLUM at 6.30 p.m. 3rd. Oct. The Battalion marched to YPRES EAST and halted till 11.0 p.m. when the march was resumed. The Assembly point was reached at 3.0 a.m. 4th Oct. There was much shelling during the approach march and 1 officer and several other ranks were killed. The Battalion was bit crowded at the Assembly point, but on the assault commencing matters sorted themselves out.

At 5.30 a.m. an enemy barrage came down on the right, but the Battalion suffered no casualties, and at 6.0 a.m. it moved forward ~~back~~ behind the 38th.

At BEECHAM FARM opposition was met with from machine gun fire, but the hedge and house was rushed and the garrison killed. The huts in the centre also gave some trouble, but this was quickly overcome.

At 8.45 a.m. the Battalion reached the intermediate line and commenced to dig in. During consolidation 2 ~~stations~~ platoons were sent forward at request of 40th. Battalion to help with consolidation of the BLUE line, and in the evening two more platoons were sent up to help hold BLUE line.

During consolidation there was intermittent shelling on our line. Sniping from HAMBURG was bad till the BLUE line was captured, but after that no further sniping took place.

The line was dug in on bad ground which kept continually falling in, and it had to be resited, but eventually a good line was made, traversed and irregular, with Lewis Gun positions pushed forward.

During the day the shelling was not severe, but during the night constant S.O.S. signals on right and left caused Battalion to stand to all night. There was a scarcity of S.A.A. and wire, and the small quantity which came up on the night of the 4th. was sent forward to the 40th Battalion on the BLUE line.

Casualties were - 8 Officers and 269 Other ranks.

Captured - about 100 prisoners  
2 Machine guns  
1 Trench Mortar.

No Stokes Mortar Shell or Rifle Grenades were used and very few bombs - but large quantities of S.A.A. for both rifle and Lewis guns were used, and there was a shortage of S.A.A.



40TH BATTALION.

The Approach March went well till almost in position where there was not enough room, and the Battalion had to assemble in a Swamp. They were not able to deploy properly till they had moved forward some distance. This did not affect Advance March. They were in Assembly position at 3.50 a.m. Heavy shell fire occurred causing 15 casualties while assembling. Most of enemy barrage went behind our men.

The Battalion began to move at ZERO hour behind the 39th Battalion, and went through 39th Battalion at 8.12 a.m.

They met with good deal of resistance after that, particularly from Machine Gun fire. This fire came from left front in front of New Zealand Div. on high ground (ABRAHAM HEIGHTS) and also from actual BLUE LINE. There were about 10 machine guns firing. Fire was particularly heavy from these and heavy casualties both to Officers and men ensued.

The Right Company of first wave was nearly decimated and things were serious until Mopping-up Company and Reserve Company immediately pushed reinforcements into their place and they rushed the whole line of pill-boxes along the BLUE LINE.

Practically all the pill-boxes were taken by individual acts of gallantry. One Sergeant took one pill-box with two guns firing from it, and shot the Gunners.

One Officer captured 30 prisoners in a pill-box single-handed.

On reaching BLUE LINE Mopping-up Parties were sent forward between it and the Protective Barrage, and one Coy. Sgt-Major and 2 men captured a pill-box containing a Battalion Commander and 70 Other Ranks without firing a shot.

At 9.10 a.m. the BLUE LINE was taken and consolidation began. Covering parties were sent out; also Mopping-up parties towards the Protective Barrage.

At 7.20 p.m. enemy seen concentrating behind CEMETERY, 200 strong. This was dispersed with Lewis Gun and Rifle fire and Artillery barrage. 39th and 38th Battalions were ready to reinforce.

Shelling was not heavy on BLUE LINE during day. Our own barrage was short at times.

At 3.0 p.m. we had a good line dug, traversed, and Lewis Gun Posts and Snipers Posts, Strong Points and 2 Trench Mortar Positions; repaired enemy wire and had half of Sector wired that day.

Carrying was bad and no wire or ammunition was sent up till night of 4th. Situation was serious at times with regard to S.A.A.

There was another counter-attack on New Zealand front at 7 p.m. on the 5th, about a Brigade strong. S.O.S. sent up and attack dispersed by Artillery.

40th Battalion were in touch with New Zealanders and 11th Brigade all the time, and were in touch with Companies all time with lamp and telephones.

They found the lamp useful until it was broken and then used pocket torch back to Brigade F.S.

The only heavy shelling was at 7 p.m. on 5th, which developed into a very heavy barrage.



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Battalion was relieved by 7th Manchester Regt., 199th Brigade, at 9.30 p.m.

The enemy was moving back his guns from 9 a.m. till noon on 5th instant and then started to register.

Enemy aircraft was active on morning of 5th instant at daybreak, but none of ours were about.

Three enemy Machine Guns were effectively used against the enemy, there being an abundance of ammunition.

Casualties of 40th Battalion.

7 Officers.      260 Other Ranks.

Captures.

Prisoners. 300.  
M.Gs.      13.  
T.Ms.      3.  
1 Listening Set.  
1 Wireless Set, including Dynamo.  
2 7.7 cm. guns were seen to be abandoned  
in front of the line.



A.H.

41st. BATTALION.

1917.

Oct. 3rd.

At 7.30 a.m. in the morning, the Battalion moved out from Camp 30, POPERINGHE, and entrained at BRANDHOEK Siding at 12.5 p.m.

Battalion detrained at YPRES Asylum and bivouaced at area allotted to it beside the Cemetary, MENIN ROAD (J.19.a). At 11 p.m., after a hot meal served at 10 p.m., the approach march was commenced. The arrangements up to 26.B.3.0. were excellent; guides and taped tracks made the march a simple matter.

4th.

The Battalion under desultory shell fire remained halted for over an hour. It was then guided to BREMEN REDOUBT and as the position was thought unsatisfactory, the Battalion was again halted, until a reconnaissance across the ZONNEBEKE marsh was made. The march was completed under heavy whizzbang fire, and at 5 a.m. after suffering about 20 casualties, the Battalion was in position ready to move forward. The place of assembly was rather cramped, but there is no doubt that large casualties were avoided by moving forward from HILL known as BREMEN-RE-DOUBT (26.a.26.b.) At 5.30 a.m. German barrage came down on place of assembly but caused only slight losses. It was raining steadily. At 6 a.m. our barrage fell and at 6.3. a.m. the Battalion moved forward behind the 44th. Bn. Owing to darkness, Battalions were mixed, but there was no check in the advance. The first objective was taken to time, and the 43rd. Bn. consolidated. The 41st Battalion re-organized at this first halt, and it was found casualties were slight. The second objective was taken by 42nd. Bn. at 7.10 a.m. and during the long halt, the Battalion re-organized and rested. Casualties were still fairly light. Lieut. Clark was wounded. On passing through the 42nd. Bn. the men were well in hand. The 3rd. objective was reached at 8.25 a.m. On the left we experienced heavy casualties. Lieut. Rogers severely wounded. At 8.29 a.m. the Battalion in good order "leap-frogged" the 44th. Bn. and carried the final objective about 9.30 a.m. Casualties by then were about 200, all ranks. 'D' Coy. on the left consolidated by digging 2 double platoon posts, having placed out in front about 70 ~~new~~ feet 4 Lewis gun and sniper posts. Coy was in touch with 10th Brigade 'C' Coy - the centre Coy in touch with 'D' and 'A' Companies dug a continuous bay and traverse trench with Lewis gun and sniper posts in front at this point. 'A' Coy. - owing to 'C' Coy being too far to the left had ~~taken~~ about 300 feet frontage. Coy. Commander had three posts dug. The right one in touch with 26th Battalion - one in centre and one in touch with 'C' Coy. All posts connected by old German trench, which was consolidated in parts to form strong points. This line was protected by Lewis Gun and sniper posts. Splendid observation was secured on the right also field of fire. Outposts had to be withdrawn when S.O.S. came down; being too close to barrage.

'B' Coy. Having assisted other companies to consolidate, dug a trench for themselves behind the front line, slightly on the right of our sector. Local counter-attacks which took place during the whole of the day were easily repulsed by Lewis Gun and rifle fire. While repulsing an enemy local counter-attack with the bayonet Lt. Skewes was killed and Lt. Butler wounded.

At 3 p.m. a counter-attack on a large scale took place. The enemy was allowed to advance under Machine Gun and rifle fire



9/10/1917.

to within 300 feet of our position when our barrage came down and completely broke the attack. German losses must have been great. About 6.30 p.m. another large counter-attack on our right flank was dispersed by our artillery. 6 machine guns 2 trench mortars and 3 prismatic range finders were captured between the third and fourth objective besides many important documents maps etc.

5th. During the night many local counter-attacks were carried out in a half-hearted manner and were easily repulsed. During the day everything was quiet except for snipers and a machine gun firing from the right flank in front of the 26th. Battalion.

6th. By 3 a.m. we were relieved by 2nd/6th Manchester and ~~XXXX~~ marched back to bivouac at YPRES without suffering any casualties.

#### Casualties.

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>Other Ranks.</u>
Killed	4	32.
Wounded	5	201 .
Sick.		4.
Unaccounted for.		24.
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<u>Total.</u>	9.	261.
	<hr/>	<hr/>



### 42nd. BATTALION

At 10.0 p.m. night of the 2/3rd Oct. the approach march was commenced from the bivouac area, East of YPHES. Several light showers fell and the going was very difficult owing to the broken slippery ground. The enemy fired occasional shells along the routes and frequently put up Very lights from HILL 40 across the SOMMERSEN.

The Assembly position was marked by horizontal tapes and the Coy. boundaries by tapes running at right angles. The Assembly position was very broken and boggy, but by 3.0 a.m. on the morning of the 4th. all Coys. reported ready for the attack. We had 1 officer and wounded and two men killed during the approach march.

Battalion H.Q. was established in a dugout at D.27a.2.9.

### FORMATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

The whole Brigade formed up - 43rd in front, 42nd. 44th and 41st in rear. The front allotted was 500 yards from the railway, inclusive, along a line running N.W. The following formations were adopted. -

The Battalion attacked on a three Coy. frontage - each Coy. taking 200 yards - "D" Coy. on the right, "B" Coy. in the centre, "C" on the left and "A" Coy. in reserve. Each of the front Coys. had 1 platoon extended to follow the barrage; 2 platoons as Moppers-up, and 1 platoon in reserve. The reserve Coy. moved in Artillery formation.

The Barrage was to fall on a line 150 yards East of our Assembly line for 3 minutes, then advance 100 yards; lifts every six minutes. ZERO hour was fixed for 6.0 a.m.

### THE ATTACK.

In order to frustrate a possible enemy attack, our Artillery at 5.15 a.m. put down an S.O.S. Barrage which moved forward 300 yards and remained down until ZERO hour. In reply to this barrage the enemy put his barrage down along the SOMMERSEN-BREMER REDOUBT Line. Our rear troops sustained a fair number of casualties during this stage, to avoid which they moved forward up HILL 40 until the whole Brigade was crowded into a depth of a 100 yards.

At 6.0 a.m. our barrage fell like a wall of flame on the appointed line and the whole Brigade rose as one man and moved forward. An enemy machine gun kept firing for about 5 minutes from about D.21.a.6.4 and then stopped. The 42nd advanced behind the 43rd.

At ZERO plus 41 minutes, the 42nd Battalion leap-frogged through the 43rd and continued the attack. No resistance was met with and the fortified Orchard at D.22.a.7.3 and the ALMA gave no trouble. The enemy kept firing Very light signals as our troops advanced and his artillery kept shortening the range. He also heavily shelled THAMES WOOD. We sustained nearly all our casualties at this stage. The 10th. Brigade, on our left, lost direction and drew one left Coy. over to the left about 200 yards. This Coy. Commander immediately threw in his reserve platoon to fill up the front. The ground was very marshy on this flank, which rendered the going difficult and slow, and the left Coy. fell 250 yards behind the barrage. The Reserve Coy. Commander (Capt. C.A. Dunbar) acted promptly and threw his men into the gap. All went well and the left Coy. regained their position. Large numbers of the enemy occupied the dugouts East of THAMES WOOD



42nd. BATTALION - (Continued). (2)

along the railway line, but they did not fight and surrendered readily.

Our objective was reached on time, protective posts were at once pushed out and the work of consolidation began. The barrage halted 200 yards beyond the RED line for 47 minutes, and during this period a large number of prisoners came in. Altogether about 100 were captured by this Battalion all in this area.

The dugout at D.22.b.36 was an AID POST and the whole medical staff was captured. This dugout also contained a machine gun. Nine enemy machine guns were captured altogether, 4 of which were new but did not appear to have been fired from. The enemy had evidently been consolidating on the high ground in front of our RED line, as many half-finished positions were discovered.

The consolidation of the RED line was commenced on the following plan. Each Coy. put out two Lewis Gun posts, 100 yards in front; these posts were manned by the Lewis Gun teams and two snipers. Each Coy. also put down two platoon posts on its front, each post being about 30 yards long. Three platoons of the Reserve Coy (one to each front line Coy.) helped in this work for two hours by connecting up the posts. The 4th platoon of the Reserve Coy. dug in on a line 130 yards in rear of the RED line, and after two hours the other platoons of the Coy. came back and also dug in on this line.

The ground was very much wet and shell torn, which rendered the work very difficult; but in two hours the men were under cover. The work of the evacuation of the wounded was rendered very difficult by the long heavy carry and the enemy barrage kept down for 4 hours after ZERO.

At 9.0 a.m. on the morning of the 6th. the Battalion was relieved after 60 hours in the line.

Our casualties were - 4 Officers killed and 7 wounded  
Other ranks - 50 killed & 175 wounded,  
total 225



43rd BATTALION.

On 2nd October at 2.0 p.m. the Battalion left No. 31 Camp and entrained for YPRES, arriving there about 4.0 p.m. It marched to MENIN HILL and bivouaced until the night of the 3rd. During the spell there, men were rested as much as possible and the final articles of equipment were issued.

On 3rd Oct. at 9.0 p.m. the approach march was commenced along "F" track. The march continued at a steady pace until 10.30 p.m. when a halt was made for an hour near POTS DAM. On resuming at 11.30 the pace was slower, owing to enemy shell fire and the need of more caution. The assembly line was reached by the head of the column at 1.30 a.m. on 4th Oct. and the Battalion was all in position by 1.50 a.m. having suffered 1 casualty on the approach march.

From 1.30 a.m. to 5.30 a.m. enemy shells were occasionally falling in our lines.

At about 2.0 a.m. the Bde on our left notified our left Coy. of a possible enemy attack and Lewis Guns were then pushed forward into our first wave.

At 5.30 a.m. the enemy opened heavy shell fire on our forward area and this was still continuing at ZERO. Several casualties occurred during this bombardment.

At 6.0 a.m. our Artillery Barrage opened and the assaulting Coys. moved forward - the reserve Coy. following up closely on the right. Resistance was temporarily made by the enemy from HILL 40 on the right by M.G. fire and on the left by bombs. The M.G. caused some casualties but was quickly quitted by the rapid opening of fire from one of our Lewis Guns, and the enemy M.G. was quickly surrounded and put out of action. The bombing on the left was easily overcome and then strong point on the top of HILL 40 surrounded. Moppers-up did their work thoroughly, clearing this strong point and a line of trenches on the left, and the advancing line continued on up to the barrage. Very little further resistance was met with, as the enemy was only too willing to surrender. A number of prisoners were taken on the right from pill-boxes by the railway line, and by 6.30 a.m. our objective was reached. The battalion then lay in wait for the other Battalions to pass through, and when these had all moved forward, the three assaulting Coys. commenced consolidating their line. Strong protecting posts were pushed forward in front of the Battalion line and manned with Lewis Guns. When the right Coy. had dug in and consolidated, the portion of the reserve Coy. assisting it withdrew and joined up with the rest of its Coy. and dug in.

At 4.0 p.m. on 5th. the Battalion commenced withdrawing to the Western slope of FREZENBERG RIDGE, where it lay in shell holes until dusk and then moved back to the ASYLUM at YPRES. A hot meal was served about 9.0 p.m. and the men slept there for the night.

Our casualties were	-	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	
Officers	...	4	2	
Other ranks		33	101	
do	missing	1		
do	N.Y.D.E.	2		
Total casualties	...	...	...	143



43rd. BATTALION (Continued). (2)

## Estimated enemy losses -

Killed and wounded	...	...	800
Prisoners	...	...	400

## Trophies captured -

- 6 Machine guns
- 1 Telephone
- 1 Listening set.
- 2 Tripod Trench Periscopes.



44th BATTALION.

7-10-1917.

At 10.0 p.m. this Battalion moved off in single file from resting place near YPRES on approach march. We moved by "F" track to place of assembly on HILL 40 just across ZONNEBEKE Creek. We had one long halt of about  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour, in addition to several short halts. A few enemy shells fell near the track during the march, and two casualties were sustained.

We reported the Battalion moved up O.K. at place of assembly at 2.0 a.m. on 4th instant. The men rested in shell holes until ZERO hour. At 5.15 a.m. the enemy shelled the Assembly area with "Whizz-bangs", 4.2 and 5.9 Shapnel and H.E. About 34 casualties occurred between 5.15 a.m. and 6.0 a.m. ZERO hour.

At 6.0 a.m. our Attack Barrage came down on the enemy lines and everybody hopped off without hesitation. During the first 10 minutes or so, the three Battalions were rather mixed up - after this the men began to sort themselves out & followed their Platoon Officers in the general direction. During the 12 minutes halt in the barrage, Companys got into order and prisoners began to give themselves up. Up to this time our bayonets were frequently used.

During the next part of the attack, ALMA & ORCHARD were passed and left to the 42nd to mop up; then we began to cross the railway, our portion of which was mopped up by our "mopping-up" platoons. This yielded a fair number of prisoners - one concrete dugout on the right of the railway produced about 30 prisoners and some machine guns.

This was roughly the line of the 42nd. objective. Here we had a 47 minute halt in the barrage, in which to re-organise the Companys. Reorganisation was carried out so well that when the time came to go forward, every section and platoon was in its appointed place.

During the 47 minute halt our barrage searched forward. This was taken by our troops on the right and left as the move forward of the barrage and they followed it. Runners were sent over by O.S. "B" Coy. to remind them of what was happening with the barrage. The troops then began to dribble back in slow time and reorganise ready for the next advance. The barrage then came back and at the end of the 47 minutes, the barrage and troops began to move forward again.

We reached our objective, mopping up dugouts on the DARING CROSSING Road on the way, and began to dig in. The 41st. then went through us towards their objective.

During the day the S.O.S. signal was put up in front and on our flanks several times. Our S.O.S. barrage rapidly came down and prevented any counter-attack coming through. An Officer of the 41st Battalion sent a message through us to his Battalion H.Q. asking for reinforcements and ammunition. I sent up a platoon but it was sent back to me, saying they were not required. I sent up what ammunition I could spare for their Lewis Guns, as requested.

A Pioneer Officer and some Pioneers came up and proceeded to dig a C.T. from the railway line near DARING CROSSING, through our "B" Coy's sector towards the 41st Battalion. This was not quite completed by dark when they returned to their Battalion. By dark our trenches were almost completed; there was a continuous trench 5 feet deep the Battalion sector; in places



## 44th BATTALION (Continued). (2)

places overhead shelter had been put in, slits cut to shell holes in rear for Platoon Dumps and Latrines. These trenches were improved next day and a few small dugouts put in. The material for this purpose was taken from houses and dugouts broken up by our own shell fire.

On reaching our objective, 2 Lewis Gun posts were established per Coy. 70 yards in front of our line. ~~AK~~

At 8.15 a.m. on morning of 5th our Practice Barrage came down and searched forward. The retaliation to this came down well behind our line. At 10.0 a.m. four wounded Boches and 1 unwounded Boche, who had recovered from shock, were sent back under escort - 5 captured enemy machine guns were also sent back.

At 11.0 a.m. on the 5th. a Carrying Party brought up water. At 12 noon, hot stew and dry rations came to Coy. H.Q. These were distributed to the Battalion during the afternoon.

At 5.0 p.m. 4 guides per Coy. were sent down to guide the relieving Coys. to our trenches. At 1.15 a.m. on the 5th instant the relief arrived and took over. The relief was complete and our Coys. had moved out by 4.0 a.m.

Total casualties for the Battalion were - 31 killed, 148 wounded, 8 missing. Casualties during the march out - 1 killed, 2 wounded.

In my opinion the enemy did not know where our line was, because practically no enemy shells fell between DARING CROSSING Road and our L.G. posts.

After being relieved the men went to the ASYLUM at YPRES, where they had a hot meal and avrest before proceeding to this camp.

At 10.15 a.m. on 4th. a 7.7 shell landed in Battalion H.Q.'s dugout, wounding the C.O. and Adj. who were evacuated. I then took over command



11th TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY.

The Battery approached with the 43rd Battalion. At ZERO hour it took part in the preliminary bombardment, firing on enemy machine gun emplacements at CROSS ROADS D.21.d.5.4 and D.21.d.18.60. Guns were then moved forward in close support of the Infantry until the final objective was gained.

After preparations were made for the defensive, the Left Half Battery worked their guns right up to the Railway Cutting, where the enemy had assembled in the CEMETERY. On fire being brought to bear, they were soon driven out. During this movement a 7 C.M. Minnenwerfer was captured, situated well forward in the Railway Cutting on the North side.

At various times during the day, fire was brought to bear on ~~scattered~~ scattered enemy posts along the whole front. About 4.0 p.m. the enemy were again noticed to be assembling for a counter-attack, and dispersed. About 6.0 p.m. isolated groups were again steadily gathering on left to North of CEMETERY in an old cottage near hedge, but they quickly ran off when a few shells dropped amongst them.

During the night Mortars responded to S.O.S. signals but fire was ceased immediately the Artillery barrage came down.

At 10.0 a.m. on the 5th inst. it was reported by the Infantry that the enemy were moving forward on the Northern flank of the Brigade front. One gun was taken forward and it was found that the enemy were working up a trench from the North of CEMETERY towards TYNE COT. Traversing fire was put on the trench and ground searched in rear, and the ground cleared.

On the right the enemy were found to be massing for a counter-attack in the wood, which was brought under the fire of the 60-pdrs. Two Mortars were taken forward and fired on the enemy as they dispersed from the wood. Frequently during the day the enemy were seen to move forward from shell hole to shell hole - a few shells always made them alter their plan.

The gun teams of the Battery were specially organised and equipped for the operation. No mountings were carried. No. 1 carried the gun with sling - No. 2 carried Baseplate, cleaning rod and tool bag - the remaining numbers carried ammunition only. No tools were carried. The method of sling firing was found most practicable, as it made the loads much lighter, made the gun easier to carry and brought about greater rapidity in coming into action. It was the intention to send mountings up at ZERO plus 6, but Half Battery Commanders reported they did not require them for the work on hand.

The operation has shown that Stokes Mortars can be used under these conditions of warfare very effectively - the ammunition supply being the main difficulty. For advances without a barrage, pack mules would be necessary. The arrangement for the ammunition supply must be well in hand before the attack day. The No. 146 fuze is urgently needed, as a Mills' fuze is too slow.



A.H.

11th Australian Machine Gun Coy.

Report on Operations from 3rd to 6th October, 1917.

The Company was divided as under :-

A. 8 guns were under divisional control for barrage work.

B. 8 guns remained with 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.  
Report is therefore under two headings.

A. Guns under Divisional Control.

Lt. Wells in Command. 2 officers 3 R.C.O.'s and 32 men and 8 guns were available. These were in position at 7 p.m. on 3/10/17 and were held as a reserve to replace casualties in 9th. 10th. and 23rd. machine gun Companies. At 7.30 p.m. on 4th. Oct. 1 gun and team was sent to Left Barrage Group and 1 team to Right Barrage Group. At 11.30 p.m. on 4th Oct. 6 men were supplied to Captain Mackay (Right Group).

At 9.45 a.m. on 5th Oct. gun and team was sent to Left Group.

At 7.0 a.m. on 6th. the remaining guns and personnel were withdrawn from the line according to orders from D.M.G.O.

B. Guns with 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

1. Allotment. 6 guns were employed to go forward with assaulting troops. 2 guns were held in reserve at Coy. Headquarters (POTSDAM DUG-OUT).

2. Approach March. The reserve guns and personnel were in position at 8 p.m. on 3/10/17.

Two guns (under 2/Lt. Parks) followed 44th. Bn. and assembled on right of Reserve Company 44th. Battalion.

Assembly was reported correct at 3 a.m.

Four guns (Lieut. Freeman & 2/Lt. Harding) marched in rear of 41st Battalion.

At 600 or 800 yards from position of assembly the column was heavily shelled (mostly 77 mm)

To avoid unnecessary casualties, it was necessary for the men to scatter. At this point, Lieut. Freeman led one sub-section to position on right flank of Reserve Company, 41st Batta and 2/Lt. Harding 1 sub-section to position on left flank same unit. Assembly was complete at 5.20 a.m. Pack transport was used up swamp ground near railway. At this point it had to be abandoned, and guns, stores, etc. carried by the teams. No casualties occurred during this phase.

3. Movement from positions of assembly to Objectives :- Sub-sections were led forward from Assembly positions by their sub-section Commanders. 2/Lt Parks Sub-section took up a position on the right flank of the line established by the 44th Batta. Lieut. Freeman and 2/Lt. Harding followed 41st Batta. and established positions on Left and Right flanks respectively. Seven casualties occurred during the advance all from shell fire.

Positions of guns at this stage were - Two at D.23.a.60.75 Two at D.22.b.20.90 and two at D.17.c.30.90.

4. Action of guns. Two guns at D.23.a.60.75 (approx)

These guns were placed to protect flank of 41st Batta. and to cover gap which occurred between the Batta. and 26th Batta on the Right.

Guns opened fire almost immediately the 41st Battalion had reached their objective. Targets were numerous and favourable to Machine Gun fire, consisting for the greater part of parties of enemy from 10 to 15. — strong, emerging



-2-

9/10/1917.

from woods in square 23.b. and 24.a. This firing continued till dark. About 4 p.m. a large enemy party (strength about 3 companies) appeared about 2,000 yards N.E. of gun position. Fire was opened with two guns using combined sights and party scattered and disappeared. Several times enemy appeared to be preparing for counter-attack and the nearest parties were fired upon and disappeared.

An enemy machine gun was located near DILBY WOOD. It was carefully watched and fire opened when some enemy approached gun. Similar action was taken in regard to a suspected field gun emplacement.

**Bb** 2 guns at D.22.b.70.80. These guns were intended to protect flank of 44th. Battalion and took up that position for that purpose. After further objectives had been reached and consolidation commenced, these guns were moved to the position above referred to from where they carried out indirect fire on PASSCHENDAELE ROAD Woods in D.24.a. and D.18.a. and c. In addition, special targets were engaged to meet requirements of 41st Battalion.

The Officer in charge of these guns (Lt. Parks) was wounded shortly after getting his guns in position.

**c.** 2 guns at D.17.c.30.90. At this position, the field of fire was limited and on Infantry slightly withdrawing these guns were brought back and one placed in vicinity of DARING CROSSING and the other replaced a gun knocked out at D.22 b. 70.80.

The guns near DARING CROSSING searched PASSCHENDAELE ROAD frequently day and night and engaged with indirect fire various targets in the direction of PASSCHENDAELE.

**5. German Guns.** Four German Guns were used to search and sweep the valley in front of our new position. When visibility was good a post was established in front line and fire directed from observation obtained. About 25,000 rounds were fired from these guns.

**6. Supplies.** S.A.A., Water and Rations, Pack Transport was used and a company dump established at D.22.a.80.30. From here sufficient quantities of rations water and S.A.A. was available for all guns and teams.

**7. Relief.** These guns were relieved by 204th M.G. Coy on night of 5/6th October, relief being completed by 5 a.m.

**8. Casualties.** The total casualties for the period was :-

Officers.	Wounded	1.
Other Ranks	Killed	4.
	Wounded	3.
	Missing	2.
Attached.	Killed	1.
	Wounded.	4.
	Missing.	4.

**9. Engineer Party.** A party of 2 sappers and six (6) infantrymen was detailed to assist in consolidation. The construction of belt filling shelters was done by the party, with the result that a certain amount of protection was given to those filling belts, but most important was the fact that belts were kept dry and ammunition free from grit and mud. I would recommend that a similar party be detailed for future operations of the same kind.