

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit**  
**war diaries, 1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/42/7 Part 5

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters  
1st Australian Division

Appendix, proposed Divisional  
operation, pp 206-244

August 1915



Cover  
4 217

Some notes on proposed operations of  
Pt Aust Div



? Pen Walker's handwriting ?

This slip was attached  
to page 204.





11

also Opposite - the center of opposition the ruling  
and in opposition of ~~held~~ Plateau 400 (~~except the western edge~~)

and therefore Trenches ~~opinion~~ are within 100' of ours ~~the Eastern side~~ on its Western edge.

(See para 1)

$\frac{4}{5}$  definite decline -







for offensive movement.  
 & exclusive of  
 Garrison released  
 in trenches &  
 General Reserve

also  
 exclusive of 971 which is  
 distributed separately as  
 Da Estimated requirements  
 for Bala 700 - . . . 1  
 batt<sup>n</sup>.  
 for Bala 700 - . . . 1  
 Garrison of their trench 1 batt<sup>n</sup>.  
 Plateau 400 - 2 Brigades.  
 Gato Tpe - 1 "

Trench Garrison .  
 Queen's Fort - 2 batt<sup>n</sup>.  
 Walker's Ridge } 2 batt<sup>n</sup> 1 Brigade.  
 Queen's Port }  
 1<sup>st</sup> Gen Division Trenches - 1 "

Total - Brigades



Gate Type chief owing to bare  
~~slight~~ ~~crest~~ top  
 Surface does not appear to afford

at ~~part~~ ~~end~~ of ~~Salisbury~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~much~~ ~~exposed~~  
 and ~~hence~~ ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~much~~ ~~exposed~~  
 Salubrious means for defence ~~the~~  
 It is of course unknown what ~~part~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~  
 it offers how its interior in the  
 shape of ~~loopholes~~ etc towards South West.

The possible length of June the line  
 would have been held definitely &  
 prior to the assumption of a general  
 offensive appears to be an important  
 factor for consideration -



APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION AT ANZAC - 9th JULY, 1915.

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1. - The object of landing a force at ANZAC was to cut the Turkish communications with the southern portion of the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA. The full achievement of this object was frustrated by the strength of the Turkish resistance. Nevertheless the A. & N.Z. Army Corps occupied what is always a source of strength - a flank position. Large Turkish forces have thus been contained in order to mask the movement of enemy forces to the south.

A flank position is only of value, however, if the holder has the power of striking - in other words if he has the power of manoeuvre and retains the initiative. In its present circumstances the A. & N.Z. Army Corps has not the power of manoeuvre. To obtain it the enemy confronting the Corps must be defeated or driven back so far that the communications of the main force are exposed.

This, therefore, must be the immediate object of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

2. - (i) The enemy strength confronting us probably fluctuates. Estimates vary from 12,000 to 30,000. It may, perhaps, be set down safely as not less than 20,000. But that number forms the garrison and the reserves of well constructed works distant from our position variously 20 to 250 yards. The works comprise several lines but are not to any great extent protected by barbed wire; they are in many cases provided with overhead cover.

(ii) The intervening terrain is difficult in several places; notably between us and MORTAR RIDGE, across THE CHESSBOARD, by reason of its maze of trenches, and towards BABY 700, to gain which a narrow col is the only practicable avenue.



(iii) An attack upon entrenched positions, even when the intervening distance is short, must necessarily be costly; and it requires for its successful execution an extravagant preliminary artillery bombardment. Where possible, therefore, entrenched positions should be turned. Unfortunately the Army Corps is somewhat hemmed in on both flanks; and its position has the further disadvantage of lacking sufficient depth for the employment of large forces. The position only with difficulty gives cover for an additional force of about one division.

Exit from the southern flank is possible but the obvious exposure of the flank and rear of a force so employed make consideration of the possibility needless.

On the northern flank the same risk of exposure does not exist and there is greater room for manoeuvre - but the country is rugged and broken; in some places it is nearly impracticable. An attack from this flank, however, strikes the key of the enemy's position and this outweighs all other considerations.

The ideal method of attacking this high ground would be to move from the direction of the words INAM CHAI against HILL 971. A reconnaissance from the sea, however, shows the approaches to be broken and rugged, and POINT 971 to be separated, or partly separated, from the remainder of the ridge by precipitous escarpment. This fact leaves available two alternatives :-

(A) a move via the FARM HOUSE slopes; or

(B) a wide movement via BIYUK ANAFARTA.

The latter implies larger forces than could be concentrated at ANZAC and moved in the required direction. The former would demand much less force, for the available frontage is limited to some 1600 or 1700 yards.

It is therefore for consideration whether the force which could be moved by this route, viz:- allowing 5 men per



yard, or 2 brigades, is sufficient for the task? In all probability it is when the following factors are considered :-

- (a) That the objective is not seriously entrenched.
- (b) That the Turks in moving to oppose the attack must be greatly exposed to artillery fire.
- (c) That the objections to an attack on the enemy's entrenchments are so minimised in consequence of the flanking movement as to allow of such an operation being undertaken concurrently.

This flank or semi-flank movement must of necessity be preceded by the attack and capture of the enemy's right flank positions in the direction of what is known as BAUCHOPES HILL. Such an operation might be undertaken by a brigade which, in the initial stages, would act as the advanced guard of the flank attack and subsequently as the left flank guard to that attack.

(iv) It is now possible to arrive at some estimate of the forces required for this operation. As has been said two brigades would be required for the flank attack and one for flank protection. The attack on the enemy's entrenched position would involve :-

at LONE PINE	..	..	..	1 brigade
and probably another brigade to protect the southern flank during the operation				1 brigade
at JOHNSON'S JOLLY	..		say 2 battalions	
at MORTAR RIDGE	..	..	..	1 brigade
BABY 700	..	..	..	1 brigade

while to hold our present trenches two brigades would be required. In brigades this brings the total up to nine brigades plus two battalions. We have available :-

Australian Division	..	..	3 brigades
N.Z. & A. Division	..	..	2 brigades
3 L.H. Brigades, say, equivalent of	..		1 brigade
and			

1 New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade,

or a total of six brigades and one mounted rifles brigade.



(v) An extra division and an additional brigade are therefore required for what cannot be considered as more than the first step towards the accomplishment of our object.

This partial success would, however, make the way clear for the landing of additional forces at ANZAC - and by pushing the brigade protecting the northern flank still further to the north other forces could be landed as far north as SUVLA BAY.

3. - The plan recommended, therefore, is briefly :-

- (i) a limited turning movement to the north east by a division protected on the north by one of its brigades;
- (ii) a concurrent attack on the enemy in our front by four brigades .

The desirability of simplifying the operations to the utmost is evident and these attacks should be made at the same time, preferably at dawn.

- (iii) The retention of our present trenches with two brigades.

To confirm or complete any success achieved, all other forces available should be landed subsequently at ANZAC or further to the north. They should therefore be held ready for this purpose.

4. - This appreciation does not go into essential details affecting the execution of the plan, which may for convenience be summarized as :-

- (i) The arrangements for forming up units to attack the enemy's present entrenchments; the selection of directions of attack and places for debouching.
- (ii) The placing of guns and the provision of sufficient artillery ammunition to meet all probabilities which can be foreseen.
- (iii) The establishment of communications.
- (iv) Arrangements for providing covered approaches to the new ground gained.
- (v) The administrative arrangements for supplying the troops with ammunition, food, and water.
- (vi) The provision of adequate arrangements for clearing sick and wounded which will probably involve bringing up tent subdivisions of field ambulances.



5.

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- B. ( (i) The arrangements for landing additional forces.  
( (ii) The selection of forming-up places and places of deployment for the flank attack.  
( (iii) Effective artillery support for the flank attack which involves the placing of guns beforehand and the registration of zones; naval gun support.  
( (iv) The administrative arrangements for supplying the flank attack with ammunition, food and water.  
( (v) The provision of proper communications during the attack.  
( (vi) The making of roads, &c., to the new ground which will probably need the employment of civil labour.  
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CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE FORWARD MOVE OF THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN  
DIVISION.

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In drawing up this appreciation, it is understood that, in addition to the New Zealand Division aiming at BABY 700 and beyond, another force will operate still further north against, or with the object of turning, 971, which dominates the whole of the country to its south.

1. - Exclusive of artillery whose movements will be particularly circumscribed and abnormal, and are therefore dealt with separately, the fighting units in this division are :-

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Brigades;  
2nd Light Horse Brigade;  
4th Light Horse Regiment.



2. - According to verbal instructions from the Army Corps commander, one brigade will join the N.Z. & A. Division in the push for BABY 700.

Another brigade is to extend to, and include, KABA TEPE, thus leaving one infantry brigade, the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and 4th Light Horse Regiment to :-

- (a) operate against LONESOME PINE, JOHNSON'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH; and
- (b) hold the keys of our present trenches, cover guns, &c.

3. - The number of rifles available would be approximately :-

Infantry Brigade, say ..	..	2,700
2nd Light Horse Brigade ..	..	1,470
4th Light Horse Regiment ..	..	490
TOTAL ..	..	<u>4,660</u>

The length of trenches at present held is :-

1st Infantry Brigade ..	..	950
3rd Infantry Brigade ..	..	975
TOTAL ..	..	<u>1,925</u>

say 2,000 yards. The length of the hostile position which includes LONESOME



6237  
which includes LONESOME PINE, JOHNSON'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, is approximately 1,500 yards.

4. - When operating <sup>forward</sup> to our front it is of course not intended that our present trenches should be held in the same strength as now or even continuously.

But there are certain portions which must be occupied as points d'appui, some of which will, in the event of success, become important points on our lines of communication.



5. - Enumerating them from the left

these are :-

- |          |  |               |
|----------|--|---------------|
| (i)      | the continuation southwards of<br>the head of MONASH VALLEY from<br>the right of COURTNEY'S POST<br>up to and inclusive of<br>CLAYTON'S TRENCH - a length of | 325 yd        |
| (ii)     | the head of SHRAPNEL VALLEY<br>between THOMPSON'S POST and<br>some 100 yards southwards<br>along 4th Battalion trenches<br>(both inclusive) - a length of    | 150 yd        |
| (iii)    | from the left of the 3rd<br>Battalion gully sap up to<br>and inclusive of the<br>"PIMPLE" - a length of  | 250 yd        |
| (iv)     | from head of the "PIMPLE"<br>to CORNFIELD SAP inclusive -<br>a length of   | 225 yd        |
| TOTAL .. |  | <u>950 yd</u> |

If these portions of our existing trenches are held adequately when the forward move takes place, we secure our rear against contingencies.

Allowing a man per yard as the minimum garrison, it will be seen that we require, say, 1,000 rifles in the aggregate to hold these positions.

This deducted from what will be available viz:- 4,660 rifles, leaves for active operations 3,660 rifles.

These might be made up of one complete infantry brigade and two light horse regiments.



6739

This leaves one regiment from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade and the 4th Light Horse Regiment available to occupy the keys of the trenches mentioned above, plus certain machine gun sections which would have to be temporarily withdrawn from the attacking force until the latter had taken the trenches.

But it is estimated that it will take a brigade of at least 2,500 rifles, supported by artillery, to take and hold LONESOME PINE, which is the most important objective.

It is the key to the right of our present position, as BABY 700 is the key of the New Zealand position. It commands all the southern spurs emanating from it and once securely in our possession would materially help to turn JOHNSON'S JOLLY. It must be attacked from the "PIMPLE" and south to ensure success. It is commanded by BABY 700, and beyond again by 971.

It has to be decided whether actually the attack should be coincident with the forward movement against BABY 700 or when the attack on the latter is progressing. In the latter case



8240  
it would, of course, be necessary to heavily demonstrate against LONESOME PINE from the very commencement of the operations against BABY 700, until the moment arrived to push forward.

To reduce the distance between our trenches and the forward hostile trenches on LONESOME PINE underground saps are being pushed forward from the "PIMPLE" and its neighbourhood. It is intended eventually to join these up into a new fire trench in close proximity to the forward hostile trench. This it is proposed to do at the last minute. The open space over which the actual assault will have to be carried out from the neighbourhood of the "PIMPLE" will, it is hoped, not exceed some thirty to forty yards. That portion of the assault from the south of the "PIMPLE" will have further to travel but will be less exposed to 971 and JOHNSON'S JOLLY. Adequate artillery support will have to be rendered (this is dealt with under "Artillery"). It will most likely be a two or three days operation.

The other two important position to operate against, and which must be eventually occupied, are :-

- (i) JOHNSON'S JOLLY;
- (ii) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH



6.241  
Their respective frontages are :-

JOHNSON'S JOLLY	..	yards
GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH		yards

To carry and hold JOHNSON'S JOLLY, inclusive of the gully between it and LONESOME PINE, will, it is estimated, require a brigade of equal strength to that operating against LONESOME PINE, i.e. :- 2,500 rifles. Similarly it will probably be an operation extending over several days.

The task should be undertaken concurrently with the attack against LONESOME PINE, the capture of which should facilitate the operation against JOHNSON'S JOLLY, which, however, like LONESOME PINE, is dominated by 971.

GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH. Until BABY 700 has been made good, it is to be considered whether an actual attack should be made against GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH though a vigorous demonstration against it would be necessary. Our occupation of BABY 700 would render "THE CHESS BOARD" more or less untenable by the Turks. Their position in GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH would at the same time be weakened and it might then be taken though until JOHNSON'S JOLLY is in our hands



6 24/1A

the latter can always enfilade us in the GERM  
OFFICERS TRENCH. In any case it is estimated  
1,000 rifles would be required for the operations

Our figures in paragraph 5 show that  
for all the three operations referred to we shall  
have available 3,660 rifles; our estimates show  
requirements of 6,000 rifles.

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Note

~~Secret~~ on proposed attack by 1<sup>st</sup> Aust. Div<sup>n</sup>

## 1. - The advantages claimed for attacking LONE

PINE prior to making an attack elsewhere is that it

will draw off reserves. Admitting this for the moment

then it must be admitted that, following it to a logical

conclusion, the troops allotted to the attack will

therefore run considerable risk of failing to retain

the ground gained. If they are "outed" before the

movement elsewhere is well advanced little is gained

and much is lost.

## 2. - (i) But can it be fairly asserted that a

movement such as this will cause the enemy to throw in

more than local reserves? And will not local reserves

be "contained" in any case?

## (ii) What it will do will be to expose

attacking troops to a continuous and concentrated bom-

bardment by the enemy's artillery. This will in itself

make it difficult for the attacking troops to consolidate

trenches gained. Our artillery will therefore have to

reply and they will thus use up ammunition, the want of

which next day may be disastrous.

I hope it will draw off all  
reserves near enough to get up to  
971 quickly & contain any  
general reserve - also it may  
lead to reserves near at Anafan to  
being moved round to Kojadee to  
repel an attack from our right  
front.

If an Australian Bde can once  
establish itself in the ready  
made excellent trenches - some  
of which are only 100 yds off  
our own - then allow itself  
to be "outed" I shall be so  
surprised as to think  
it might return from  
Anzac - but I feel  
sure it will not allow  
itself to be outed.

See above

Not necessarily in any  
way. The Turks might  
well risk holding a strong  
work without reserves who might be  
sent up to hold 971.

To meet which all our  
artillery will be available: if simultaneous attacks were made only a small proportion would be so.  
The troops we live with at  
once be in trenches, as I  
know the attack will be  
made with the idea of coming  
the closer ground in a few  
seconds & then getting into  
trenches. Enemies  
show no disposition to bombard all  
night & did not do so even  
the night of our landing.

unless we have ample  
ammunition no attack  
can be contemplated.



2.

650  
 Now what we can see of these

branches it seems most unlikely that enfilade or oblique fire can be brought to bear with much effect - at least we find that to be the case where we apparently have enfilade - and enfilade -

Branches on the right are

to be expected in plenty and these we must make up our minds to entirely defeat the Turks. But if the Turks are undisturbed by action elsewhere - the object will have been accomplished - i.e. we shall have got 971 undisturbed. This I fear is altogether too sanguine.

(iii) LONE PINE and JOHNSON'S JOLLY will

throughout the night be subjected to such enfilade and oblique fire as will, if undisturbed by action elsewhere, make the strengthening of ground gained very difficult.

(iv) The enemy will have been given

No. 101 on 971

previous warning of determined attack. He probably knows, as we know, that the retention of the plateau ~~which~~ is unlikely while the high ground is in his hands, and he will thus anticipate further attack. - Yes

I do not agree. He might well suppose our main object is to join hands with the force near Achi Baba. I do not wish to extend unnecessarily to the North.

but probably in the same high ground - the Jolly Jolly life perhaps.

(v) If the operation, as an isolated one,

failed, it may and probably will imperil the completeness of the other projected operations. It will certainly tend to disorganize them.

It was for this very reason that it would not in any way imperil the main operation that I am anxious to carry this out. In case of complete failure all that

could happen would be that the attacking force would fall back on to its original position. The forces detailed to attack Lone Pine & 971 are so entirely separate that I fail to see how any failure on the part of the pine could in any way disorganize the latter - the counter move fighting which would in any case take place and Lone Pine must help the attack. I feel convinced that if Lone Pine is attacked with determination as I know it will be - that there will be no failure. - U.F. 2121



NOTES ON THE ATTACK OF LONE PINE.

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A. LONE PINE.

1. - This paper deals mainly with problems concerning the attack of LONE PINE. The topographical relation of LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY is such, however, that, strictly speaking, both should, in the event of attack, be dealt with simultaneously. Reasons forbidding this, however, are :-

(i) insufficiency of numbers;

(ii) the fact that the operations in this area are being undertaken to hold the enemy in this locality.

2. - We can only conjecture the enemy's strength in the LONE PINE position. Excluding communication trenches, and as far as the trace of his trenches can be determined, he has space for about 1,000 rifles. The length of front from P.2 to S.3 is about 300 yards but with double tiers of fire at least 600 rifles could be brought into action. Cover in rear and adjacent affords cover for unlimited supports and reserves.



2.

Our total available strength is :-

1st Infantry Brigade	..	..	2930
2nd Infantry Brigade	..	..	2679
3rd Infantry Brigade	..	..	3587
2nd L. H. Brigade	..	..	1750
			<u>10946</u>

This may be increased by reinforcements.

With this number we have to hold a front of some 2,400 yards and may have to undertake other operations. To hold the front of 2400 yards in the manner indicated hereafter at least some 7,000 men will be required, thus leaving some 4,000 men free for the operation against LONE PINE. Out of this a reserve will have to be provided. The 1st Infantry Brigade will therefore have to undertake the operation against LONE PINE with a strength of some 3,000 men and a battalion of the 3rd Brigade will be held in reserve. This of course, bearing in mind probable casualties, is a minimum requirement.

3. - The nature of the ground separating our and the enemy's trenches is not altogether favourable. To the north between our tunnel B.24 and enemy trench P.2, the distance to be traversed is about 70 yards and the ground



3.

is mostly rising slightly. The drawback to movement between our tunnels B.24 and B.8 to the enemy's trenches is that, while defiladed from fire from the southern faces of LONE PINE, it is enfiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to a serious extent. A movement straight against the enemy from the vicinity of our tunnel B.5 passes along the crest and is exposed on both flanks; it is, however, the shortest route (about 50 yards). Movement from between B.5 and B.3 is defiladed from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY but slightly exposed from PINE RIDGE and SNIPERS RIDGE. From between B.4 and B.5 movement will be over a distance of 125 yards and passes through a dip with a steep climb towards the enemy.

The frontage upon which the attack must be delivered, however, extends from P.2 to about the letters S1 - a total of some 200 yards.

4. - The available area for our deployment, therefore, extends from B.24 to a point about 10 yards north of B.3. Within this line we have our forward recesses capable of accommodating some 230 men. The



6260  
present firing line can accommodate two lines of 204 and 290 men respectively. These three lines would be able to advance almost simultaneously, and they would give a total of some 700 men. It is improbable that the forward recesses could be filled a second time owing to the difficulty of moving through tunnels and the need for getting to work at once on these tunnels to convert them into communications. Subsequent lines will, therefore, have to move from the present firing line and will have to be told off in lines and formed up ready in communication trenches, which should be clearly marked. This is unfortunate as it will mean congestion in a position which is sure to be vigorously shelled. The provision of overhead cover on communication trenches will diminish casualties.

5. - The objective of our attack should be not the first or second line of enemy trenches but the fourth trench back and the heart of the work. Each battalion should be given a definite line of trenches to aim at and be told that when once occupied the tendency should be to open out to the flanks. Enemy lines P2, O10, O11 or P3,



5.

and P.4 should be converted into works facing north to give flank protection, and they should be joined up with the craters about B.22 and tunnel B.24 to flank OWENS GULLEY and the ground to the north. The more craters we can make on the line B.24, B.26, the better. On the south we should endeavour to convert R.3 R.7 into flank protection.

6. - Bomb parties, obstacle parties, and working parties will need to be told off; bomb parties should go with each of the first three lines, and obstacle and working parties should follow - they should include engineer parties.

Bomb parties will have to be provided with means of carrying bombs and be given a supply of lighting sticks.

Parties will also have to be held ready to begin work promptly on our tunnels and running them into the enemy's forward trenches. B.5 will be the main communication trench. The exits to GUN ROAD from B.4, B.9, and B.5 should be improved and properly marked.



6.

7. - The provision of means of communication with captured works will for some time present some difficulty. The periscope signal apparatus will have to be used for some time but as early as possible telephone wires should be laid in tunnels.

B. HOLDING REMAINDER OF LINE.

The most effective and economical means of holding the remainder of the line will be the selection of points d'appui and the assembly of strength at them - the intervening spaces being held lightly where men are available. The points d'appui, beginning from the south, are suggested thus :-

CHATHAM POST

RYRIE POST

TASMANIA POST,

SILT SPUR,

TURKEY KNOLL (which should be linked up to B3)  
and posts to be established at B.3

THE PIMPLE (near B.5)

the B.24 post

the GULLY POST

MOORE'S POST



7.

The CRATER POST  
THE TAMBOUR  
SCOTT'S POST  
STEELE'S POST  
COURTNEY'S POST.

This should so reduce numbers required to hold the present line that the 3rd Infantry Brigade will be able to hold a battalion in reserve and be prepared for operations against PINE RIDGE if they became necessary. The 2nd Infantry Brigade similarly should have available some 500 men for any attack on GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH which may be required, and, in addition, sufficient men to resist counterattack from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY or GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

C. FURTHER OPERATIONS.

It is impossible to predict what further operations may be required of the division. We are bound however to contemplate :-



8.

- (i) the seizure of GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH;
- (ii) the seizure of PINE RIDGE;
- (iii) an advance to the eastern slopes of LONE PINE plateau;
- (iv) the occupation of the JOLLY.

The first only need be of our own volition - the remainder may be forced upon us.

It is necessary, therefore, to determine the most advantageous time for operations against GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH. In the absence of knowledge of the wider plans upon which the action of the division is dependent the fixing of time is difficult. The object of the attack on LONE PINE is to draw troops down to that locality. In the event of pressure by counterattack we could therefore use an attack on GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH to relieve us at any time necessary during the night. This, however, has the disadvantage of indicating our tendency to extend our attack to the left. By midnight, however, this tendency may in any case become evident. And there is every advantage in doing the operation at night : the work is subjected to cross fire from the north and from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY in the south. All things considered it would appear that midnight was a suitable time.



Extent of Johnstone's  
Jolly Position.

1. Frontage Frontage of enemy's trenches  
350 yds. approx.
2. Depth To rear of first rise = 200 yds  
approx.  
Thence to main valley = 300 yds  
Approx Total = 500 yds.
3. General (i) It is impossible to get a complete view of this feature  
(ii) The attached sketch is compiled from the captured Turkish map and from the results of close personal reconnaissance.  
(iii) The two 'swells' of which the feature is composed amount practically to a small plateau descending sharply to the east to a

swatercourse. The slope on this side appears to be convex

- (iv) The works constructed on the feature appear to extend in depth over both swells
- (v) The feature is higher than the ground held by the enemy immediately to the north (GERMAN OFFICER'S Trench) and slightly higher than LONESOME PINE.

4. Tactical (i) GERMAN OFFICER'S Trench could give very little assistance in defending the JOLLY.  
(ii) LONESOME PINE could give a good deal of help  
(iii) The eastern 'swell' appears to form a point d'appui for the forward position and for LONESOME PINE and trenches now connect up.  
(iv) Possession of the JOLLY would make LONESOME PINE untenable by the enemy & would probably cause the evacuation of GERMAN




# OFFICER'S TRENCH.

5 Garrison 400 yards of trenches require to be held. Under present conditions, a garrison of two battalions would be required

- 6) Plans. (1) JOHNSTONES JOLLY  
attached App 12" to 1 mile  
(2) Locality sketch  
approx 3" to 1 mile

W. Blamey Major

7/6/15





8407

SKETCH 2



ROUGH LOCALITY SKETCH

3" = 1 MILE

CAB

Appendix No.

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2 Extent of  
LONESOME PINE POSITION

- 1 General Description This position runs diagonally to our present front for 600 yards. It then continues along another spur running a little west of south for nearly 400 yds. It has a convex slope towards the East.
- 2 Depth From front to rear the depth may be taken as about 600 yards. Owing to the formation of the ground the defended depth is about 300 yards to 400 yds.
- 3 Support It is supported from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY which

- appears to command it.
- 4 Field of Fire It has a good field of fire generally but, this is somewhat broken up by nullahs, particularly on the southern side.
  5. Tactical (i) The northern & southern ~~parts~~ parts are incapable of mutual fire support owing to the nature of the ground.  
(ii) The northern part and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY are so closely connected for defence that it would seem that an attempt should be made to capture both at the same time.  
(iii) Owing to the sharpness & convexity of the eastern



629  
slope it would be  
- necessary to go forward  
a considerable distance  
if it were decided to hold  
the place.

6. Garrison. ~~It~~ III above leads to a  
greatly extended line  
of from 1000 to 1200 yards.  
The garrison required would  
be from 3 to 4 battalions.

7. Personal. I have not seen over  
this ground for some days  
& would like to revise  
this note after a thorough  
reconnaissance made  
definitely for the purpose.

8/6/15

W. Blamey Major



## SKETCH

SHOWING JOHNSTONES TOLLY  
& LONESOME PINE POSITIONJohnstone's  
Tolly

Lonesome Pine

Scale App 12" = 1 Mile

NOTE. VI 40' Appr.

- i Positions of Enemy Troops are only approximate
- ii Eastern Slope of LONESOME T. appears to be convex.
- iii Blue chain dotted line represent line we must be prepared to hold.

8/6/15 La Blomay Major



NOTES ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION OF INCLUDING KABA TEPE  
AND INTERVENING RIDGES IN OUR DEFENSIVE LINE.

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Object.

1. - The object would be three-fold :-

- (i) the removal of a flank menace;
- (ii) the provision of an exit for future forward movement;
- (iii) to create a diversion on this flank.

Factors affecting  
attainment of  
object.

2. - (i) To hold KABA TEPE the intervening ground must be held. This comprises a low ridge (A) running off the right of our position at an angle of about 60 degrees and extending for some 900 yards. Beyond this it is joined by a col to a twin ridge (B) some 600 yards further on, the southern slopes of which practically fall into the creek. The creek has steep banks but would afford good cover for attacking the low wooded ridge which protects the entrance to KABA TEPE.



2.

*(would bring against)*

(ii) The number of troops which the enemy A.

and B. if captured is probably small - although it is difficult to say what the two valleys east of the ridges hold. The ridges to the east would certainly bring fire to bear on A. and B.; and gun fire both from those ridges and south of KABA TEPE would have to be guarded against.

If troops were brought by the enemy against A. and B. either by the valleys or across the ridges to the east, a good target would be presented to the right of our present main line.

In KABA TEPE itself there are certainly troops but the numbers are unknown. It is improbable, however, that they are in any strength but likely that they have a number of machine guns.

(iii) The new line may be put down roughly at 2,200 yards. The strength required to hold it is therefore not less than a brigade whose strength is not less than 3,000 men. The great drawback to the position is that it has no depth and in consequence the disposition of supports and reserves, and the service of maintenance,



will be difficult.

(iv) The position will undoubtedly form another  
*and acute* salient in our line.

(v) To take the line two operations will be  
necessary :-

- (a) the occupation of the ridges A. and B.;
- (b) the occupation of KABA TEPE.

To take the ridges A. and B. it will be necessary to make a flank movement along the beach and narrow strip of intervening ground. Covering fire from the right of our present ridge will probably simplify this. Once taken the ridge will be enfiladed from KABA TEPE and by gun fire from further south. The effect of this could be minimised by "T" heading the trenches on TWIN POINTS and traversing elsewhere.

From the cover of TWIN POINTS the force to attack KABA TEPE would have to deploy. To get there it would be necessary to move along the beach and this



4.

would be exposed to the view of KABA TEPE if done in daylight.

(vi) General points :-

The effect of the operation on others must be considered. The utilization of an extra brigade in a defensive line means a brigade less for offensive operations.

A certain amount of ships' gun fire will always be necessary to maintain the brigade.

The new line can easily be fired at by guns from KILID BAHR. Later on the whole attention of those guns will be taken up with the southern force, and the question arises in consequence if the operation should not be delayed.

The new line would undoubtedly form a good jumping off place for the capture of the ridge culminating in point 971. It is a question, therefore, whether it should not be an immediate preliminary to any contemplated operation against 971. Its value for *forward* a turning movement from this flank is, however, reduced



5.

by the lack of depth in the position.

It would almost appear that the assault of LONESOME PINE and the occupation of the ridge running south of it and overlooking the valley should be made a concurrent operation to make our gain appreciable.