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AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Army Corps Headquarters,

September, 1915.

From:- General Officer Commanding,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

To :- General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith an account of the operations of my Army Corps and troops attached to it, between 6th and 10th August.

2. Preliminary Arrangements. Tactical. The main feature of the action of the Anzac forces was to be an attack on the Chunuk Bair Hill at night. Every effort was therefore made to concentrate the enemy's attention on the Southern flank of the Anzac position. The occupation of Harris Ridge, Holly Spur, and Tasmania Post, begun gradually and completed by see my report of 9th August vigorous offensive operations/were under taken with this view. Action on the Northern flank was restricted to such limited reconnaissance as could be carried out by small patrols at night, and everything was done to foster the impression that after the loss of Old No. 3 Post we had abandoned the idea of activity on this flank, no attempt ever being made to improve approaches along the beach as I should otherwise have liked to do.

Meanwhile advantage was taken of the presence of the destroyer patrol to send out small parties of officers to view the Western slopes of the Sari Bair Hill from the sea, and the thanks are due to the Navy for the help given us in this respect.

A great obstacle to attacking the Chunuk Bair Ridge was

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the occupation by the Turks of the Old No. 3 Post, and Table Top Hill, overlooking the approaches up the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep-sided flat topped hill, close on 400 feet above sea level, and approached by a few steep scrub covered strips and difficult ravines on its precipitous sides, all commanded by enemy trenches. The top was entrenched. It is connected with the feature known as Rhododendron Spur by a communication trench, and the capture of the hill, though presenting great difficulties, was essential before a further advance up the Chailak Dere or onto Rhododendron Spur could be made.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually to our No. 2 and No. 5 Outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on 30th May it had been converted into a strong redoubt, with two lines of fire trench, protected by heavy wire entanglements on its South face - the only really accessible one - with strong overhead cover, several outworks commanding the approaches, and with communication trenches along the slopes overlooking both the Sazli Beit Dere and the Chailak Dere.

Old No. 3 Post thus formed a powerful work whose capture was essential before an advance on Table Top was possible.

In order to increase the chances of surprise, a nightly programme was arranged with the aid of the destroyer patrol, which consisted of turning a searchlight onto Old No. 3 Outpost, shelling the trenches for a few minutes, ceasing fire but leaving the searchlight on, and then shelling hard for a few minutes longer before switching both light and fire onto Table Top. The object of this was to accustom the Turks to a nightly programme and to make them form the habit of taking cover till the searchlight ceased, and as will be seen, the carrying out of this programme on the night of the attack contributed

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materially to its success.

Administrative. The accommodation of the reinforcements which the General Commanding placed at my disposal demanded a great deal of preliminary arrangements in preparation of bivouacs on the slopes of the few available gullies, in making of interior communications, and, to prevent undue movement within the position giving away the fact of arrival of reinforcements, storing of water and supplies to last the new units till the time came for them to move out.

In addition, the shortage of mule transport and the impossibility of watering additional animals if landed, made it necessary to store beforehand supplies (for 7 days), water, and ammunition up to Divisional Ammunition Column ^{requirements} close up to units destined to stay in or operate from the trenches, while a similar arrangement was made of stocking water and ammunition in Mule Gully and No. 2 Post sufficient to meet the requirements of the Columns attacking Chunuk Bair.

At the same time, the additional requirements laid down in your Table "A" were landed.

As nearly all ^{of} this work was done by hand, and practically all by night, the uncomplaining exertion of the troops in these arduous preliminary arrangements is no less to their credit than their efforts in the actual fighting which followed.

3. On the nights of the 4th, 5th, and 6th August the reinforcing troops landed and were disposed as required, without apparently being detected by the enemy.

At the same time the concentration for battle was carried out, involving a number of moves which are detailed in Table "B" accompanying Army Corps Order No. 15 already forwarded to you.

With the arrival of these reinforcements the forces at my disposal totalled :-

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
The 13th Division, less all its artillery except the
69th Brigade R.F.A.
The 29th Brigade, 10th Division.

The 29th (Indian) Brigade.
The 4th (Lowland) Brigade R.F.A.

or approximately, 37,000 rifles and 72 guns.

Naval support was provided as follows:-

Right flank. H.M.S. Bacchante, Humber, Havelock, M.29.
Left flank. H.M.S. Endymion, M.33.
Destroyers. H.M.S. Colne and Chelmer.

4. The primary task allotted to the Army Corps was the capture of the Sari Bair Ridge, and the dispositions made to effect this were as follows:-

(a) Holding the Anzac position, and to be employed in assaulting Lone Pine, Chessboard, and Baby 700 -
Australian Division.

1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades.
2 battalions, 40th Brigade (8th Cheshires and
5th Royal Welch Fusiliers)

(b) To move via the Outposts, and the Chailak and Aghyl Beres to assault the Chumuk Bair Ridge -

N.Z. & A Division, less 1st and 3rd Light Horse
Brigades.

13th Division, less 5 battalions.

29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

I.M.A. Brigade, less 4 guns in Anzac position.

(c) In reserve -

38th Brigade, less 1 battalion.

29th Brigade.

Orders for these operations have already been sent to you.

5. The preliminary steps included a slow bombardment of the works to be assaulted - the Lone Pine, Johnston's Jolly, Chessboard, Baby 700, and Nek groups of trenches being bombarded throughout 4th, 5th, and 6th August.

Mines were prepared, communications cleared, and all necessary steps for assaulting the various objectives were completed.

6. The action commenced at 4.30 p.m. by a continuous and heavy bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent works, H.M.S. Bacchante assisting by searching the valleys to the North East and East of Plateau 400, and the monitors by shelling the enemy's batteries South of Gaba Tepe. At 5.30 p.m. the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade, which had been detailed to attack, assaulted the Lone Pine works.

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A full account of the operation is given in the Report by G.O.C. Australian Division, which I attach.

I am sure the General Commanding will endorse, as I do, the opinion of the Divisional Commander that the action of the 1st Australian Brigade was a feat of arms which for gallantry and steadfastness has rarely been excelled.

I would also bring to the notice of the General Commanding the remarks of the Divisional Commander on the Commander of the Brigade, to whose full arrangements and determined execution of the task the success of this difficult operation is largely due.

At the same time I am confident that the care and forethought bestowed on the problem by Major-General Walker, both when commanding the 1st Brigade and later on when in command of the Division helped more than anything else to bring about the marked success which attended the assault on Lone Pine.

The intention of the attack on Lone Pine was to draw the enemy's attention and possibly his reserves to our right flank in accordance with the policy I had been following since June. It is not known to what extent it succeeded in this but there is no doubt that the enemy's attention was diverted from the main point of attack and that none of the enemy in the vicinity of Lone Pine and the rest of our front were moved to meet our attack on Sari Bair.

This, the main operation, commenced at 9 p.m. on 6th August. The force, which was under the command of Major-General Sir Alex. J. Godley, K.C.M.G., C.B., was organized in columns, as in attached appendix "A", the objectives of which were:-

Right Covering Force to seize the enemy's positions from the Sazli Beit Dere to the Aghyl Dere as far East as Table

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Top and thus open the three ravines for the passage of the Assaulting Column.

Left Covering Force to seize the Damakjelik Bair and thereby assist the landing on "C" beach, and cover the move up the Aghyl Dere of the Left Assaulting Column.

Right Assaulting Column to push onto the Ghunuk Bair as far North as the narrow watershed of the Rur Dere.

Left Assaulting Column to move up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the Right Assaulting Column as far as Hill 305.

Troops were on the move towards their objective from immediately after dark. This difficult task of controlling the columns going out along the beach, which involved the move of over 15,000 men along a communication trench 5' wide and a road along the beach, to several destinations, was handled by the Staff of the N.Z. & A Division with marked success.

At 9 p.m. H.M.S. "Colne" opened fire, using her light, on Old No.3 Post for 10 minutes, and then ceased firing until 9.20 p.m. when heavy fire was reopened for another ten minutes - following the nightly programme mentioned in Para 2.

Under cover of this fire, and in the deep shade outside the searchlight's beam, part of the right covering force moved forward and crawled through the scrub to within a few yards of the Old No.3 Post. At 9.30 p.m. the searchlight was switched off: this was the signal for the attack, which was made swiftly and silently, and this portion of the enemy's position was in our possession before 11 p.m.

As soon as the assault on Old No.3 Post was launched the attack on Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere began. Walden Point, the furthest point, was seized about 10 p.m. and a machine gun taken - and the whole hill, a difficult mass of ridge and ravine, entrenched everywhere, was occupied by 1.10

a.m.

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The attack up the Chailak Dere was held up by a strong barbed wire erection in front of and flanked by a deep trench across the river bed, and here the Otago Mounted Rifles lost heavily. The barbed wire was removed with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of N.Z Engineers supported by Maoris in time to admit the entrance of the Right Assaulting Column.

The attack on Table Top was put in at the same time assisted by a heavy bombardment for 30 minutes from H.M.S. "Colne" and our howitzers. The artillery preparation and the dash of the troops attacking it placed it in our hands about midnight and with this the task of the Right Covering Force was completed and the troops began as best as they could to reorganize and consolidate the many mountainous and very intricate positions gained. All the attacks ~~made~~ made by the Covering Force were by bayonet and bomb only.

The Maori Contingent, which formed part of the Right Covering Force, was sent to Bauchop Hill in support of the Mounted Rifles and acquitted itself well.

Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles, and much equipment, ammunition, and stores.

This difficult operation, on the success of which depended the possibility of any further advance was entrusted to Brig-General Russell who, with the commanders under him, (N.Z. Mounted Rifle Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the N.Z. Field Troop and the Maori Contingent) had studied the problem with care and carried it through with a determination and vigour which cannot be praised too highly.

Meanwhile the Right Assaulting Column had been pressing on and by midnight the bulk of them had entered the Sazli Belt Dere and the Chailak Dere and at 1.30 fighting for the trenches on ^{lower} the/part of Rhododendron Spur was in progress, while the Chailak

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Dere Column was advancing steadily up that gully, meeting enemy entrenched towards the head of the valley.

The Left Covering Force, marching via the beach to No. 3 Post, moved North when the attack on Bauchop Hill had somewhat developed. Its progress was hampered at the Ghailak Dere which was crossed by a sunken road in which were troops belonging to the Right Covering Force. Some temporary mixture of units and loss of formations resulted, which was soon righted. After clearing the Ghailak Dere, the force marched without interruption to the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, though exposed to a certain amount of fire from the spurs of Bauchop Hill which had not then been captured, and attacked Damakjolik Bair.

Several Turk trenches were rushed by the South Wales Borderers. The hill was occupied by 1.30 a.m. 7th August, and touch was gained with the troops posted by the Left Assaulting Column to piquet the hills in the direction of Koja Chemon Tepe.

The success of this operation, which ensured the safeguarding of our left rear, was necessary to the success of the move of the main column, and the troops engaged carried out their task excellently.

The Left Assaulting Column began to move over the Ghailak Dere at 12.30 a.m. 7th August, and following close on the Covering Force entered the Aghyl Dere. Opposition was soon met with, and this, continued with the difficult nature of the country, made the advance extremely slow. The surprise on this side, however, was very complete - two Turkish officers being captured in sleeping attire, and arms, accoutrements, and ammunition; were found in every direction.

The operation was now in full swing but the advance was much delayed by the difficult nature of the country and the disorganization consequent on the fighting, bush, steep climbs, and the necessity of constantly having to get into single file

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so that dawn broke before the objectives were reached.

The Right Assaulting Column, making use of two lines of advance - i.e. the Sazli Beit Dere and the Chailak Dere, had commenced its advance up these gullies at 12.30 a.m. 7th August.

That portion (one battalion) which went by the Sazli Beit Dere met with little opposition, but its advance was slow owing to the extremely intricate nature of the country, which caused the column to lengthen out considerably. Shortly before dawn the Officer Commanding, Lieut-Colonel J.C. Hughes D.S.O., commanding the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, found himself at the foot of Rhododendron Ridge, and at once led his battalion on to its lower slopes where he joined up with the rest of the column.

The greater part of the Right Assaulting Column moved up the Chailak Dere, the Otago Battalion leading, and soon met with opposition which necessitated the deployment of the leading troops. Owing to the confined and broken nature of the country, this took time and the advance of the column was slow though steady.

After taking part in the attacks on Bauchop Hill (where a machine gun was captured), Table Top (250 prisoners captured), and the ridges in the vicinity of Little Table Top, the force reached Rhododendron Spur, where it connected up with the Canterbury Battalion at about 5.45 a.m. 7th August, and the whole force moved up the spur and ridge and entrenched when the opposition met with checked further progress.

At this point the Left Assaulting Column connected with it by means of the 10th Gurkhas.

Here the troops were exposed to enfilade fire from Battleship Hill and a trench along the ridge North East of Chumuk Bair.

At 9.30 a.m. a further attack was made on Chumuk Bair; but without success, owing to the increasing opposition offered by

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the enemy, and the fatigue of the men.

The Left Assaulting Column after moving some distance up the Aghyl Dere separated. The 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade (Brig-General Monash) moved up the spurs North of the Aghyl Dere, North Fork, its objective being Kojja Chemen Tepe. The country was exceedingly difficult and intricate, and in the face of considerable opposition, slow progress was made. The 29th (Indian) Brigade advanced up the Aghyl Dere (South Fork) and the spurs to the North of it, its objective being Hill "Q".

At dawn, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere: the 29th (Indian) Brigade on the ridge West of the Farm, and along the spurs to the North East. Brig-General Cox then ordered Brig-General Monash to collect his Brigade, leaving half a battalion on the line of the Asma Dere, and to assault Kojja Chemen Tepe, giving him the 14th Sikhs from the 29th (Indian) Brigade. Two battalions of the reserve were placed at General Cox's disposal to enable him to consolidate a position on the main ridge.

Increasing opposition on the part of the enemy and fatigue of the troops, however, prevented this assault being made.

Orders were sent to No. III and No. IV Sections of the line of defence at Quinn's and Pope's Posts and Russell's Top to deliver their assaults as arranged at 4.30 a.m. to draw off opposition to a further advance. These assaults, which failed, are described later.

It was now 7 a.m.

About this time the Left Assaulting Column had progressed as follows:-

On the right the 5th and 6th Gurkhas had approached the ridge at 81 A 8 and on their left the 14th Sikhs were connecting with the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the Southern watershed of the Asma Dere. The 4th Australian Brigade was

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ordered to leave half a battalion to hold the spur - the rest, with the 14th Sikhs to assault 305 - two battalions of the reserve being added to the force to help in securing 81 A 2.

By now the enemy opposition had hardened, and reserves could be seen moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. More artillery support was asked for and given but by 9 a.m. it was certain that the attack on Chunuk Bair was checked and that the advance on 305 could not hope to progress, so arrangements were made to hold the Asma Dere watershed and attack 81 A 2, supported by a fresh effort against Chunuk Bair. This was done at 9.30 a.m., and meanwhile our guns continued to inflict loss on the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs while all the Eastern slopes of Chunuk Bair were heavily shelled. It was however found impossible to make much more ground owing to the opposition of the enemy and the increasing exhaustion of the troops.

Throughout the day the troops held on to all the ground they had gained and tried to reorganize for an assault during the night.

Three battalions of the General Reserve (59th Brigade) were sent up at 11 a.m. to be ready for use when needed.

At the same time the drain on Lone Pine necessitated a battalion of the reserve being sent to the Australian Division behind Lone Pine, and a second battalion was placed further up Monash Gully in case the Turks should attempt counter attacks on Nos. III and IV Sections of the main Anzac position.

The situation on the left at 3.30 p.m. August 7th was as follows:-

Brig-General Johnston's Column on Rhododendron Spur and Ridge.

The 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade on the line of the Asma Dere.

The Right Covering Force in occupation of Table Top, Old

No. 3 Post, and Bauchop Hill. General Russell had been ordered to hold this line with two Regiments of Mounted Rifles, and to assemble 2 Regiments and the Maori Contingent ready to move as required.

The Left Covering Force (Brig-General Travers) in occupation of the Damakjelik Bair.

Forces detailed for operations from Nos. III and IV Sections of the Anzac position in occupation of their original lines. All had suffered heavily, and the men were tired.

Towards evening arrangements were completed for a dawn assault on 8th preceded by a heavy bombardment from 3.30 to 4.15 a.m.

This ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair Ridge. Though not actually attaining its full objective, the troops engaged had performed a feat which is without parallel - a night march and assault by several columns in intricate, entrenched, mountainous and unrecconnoitred country, which was carried through almost without check in face of considerable opposition, and was at last brought up by daylight and an increasing fire from an enemy in a commanding position. The arrangements made by Major-General Godley, and the spirit and determination of his troops and those of the 15th Division, are the chief factors which led to these results.

I have already referred to Brig-General Russell, while Brig-General Johnston who carried on so well the task which Russell began, Brig-General Cox who handled his column with skill and resource, Brig-General Travers who carried through alone the capture of the Damakjelik Bair are all entitled to a large share of the credit which must be given to all the commanders and troops for this most hazardous and arduous operation.

The assistance given by H.M.S. "Colne" and "Chelmer", who have been identified with the defence of the left flank since early in the operations, has already been referred to.

The intricate nightly programme, adhered to accurately for many days and continued into the first phases of the attack, materially assisted in the assault on Old No. 3 Post, and the full support given to the attack on Table Top and the Rhododendron Spur trenches, and the fire on the Battleship Hill trenches and communications which accompanied and followed the bombarding of Table Top, did much to help the troops in their difficult task.

Our thanks are due the Navy all through, but the help of the "COLNE" and "CHELMER" will always be most gratefully remembered.

The subsidiary operations, the assault on German Officers Trench, the attack on the Nek and Baby 700 trenches, and the supporting attacks on the trenches in front of Quinn's and Pope's, were not successful.

The assaults on German Officer's Trench are described in the report of G.O.C. 1st Australian Division pp 7-9.

It was hoped that this operation would assist the assaults on the Chessboard and Baby 700 trenches, but in view of the strength in which those works proved to be held, it is doubtful whether the full effect expected would have been produced. I agree with the remarks of the Divisional Commander and am certain that the troops did their utmost and did not fail to maintain the high reputation the 2nd Australian Brigade has built up for itself.

Meanwhile the troops in Quinn's Post, Pope's Hill, and Russell's Top were preparing to assault at 4.30.

A heavy artillery bombardment had been carried out from 9.25 to 10 p.m. on the 6th, and a slow fire was directed on the trenches in front of Russell's Top throughout the night. At 4 a.m. this fire became intensive, the destroyers and H.M.S. "Endymion" joining in till 4.30 when fire in the trenches in front of Russell's Top was stopped and directed further East.

The ground in front of our trenches was however exposed

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to converging machine gun fire which had not been silenced - being in positions in trenches in rear and on the flanks. The assault from Quinn's was checked at once - the first assaulting line being completely wiped out by three machine guns. The assault from Pope's succeeded in reaching the third line of enemy trenches, of which about 100 yards was held for two hours, but eventually strong counter attacks compelled the troops to retire, as they could not be adequately supported.

Both attacks met with enemy manning trenches very strongly, and these remained strongly manned all that day and next night, and the enemy have shown great nervousness here ever since, so that the loss of life was not without result.

The assault from Russell's Top met with no more success and being a larger effort the losses were more serious. At 4.30 a.m. the 8th Light Horse attacked in three lines. These were instantly subjected to a heavy machine gun fire which the previous bombardment had seemingly not affected at all. Four machine guns at least played on the narrow strip 60 yards across, which was quite open, and practically wiped out the first two lines at once. A few men got into the Turkish trenches but were unable to hold their own - while an attempt to work up Monash Gully, the success of which depended on the success of the assault on the Nek, also failed. Casualties are estimated at 60 killed and 160 wounded and missing, almost all from the 8th Light Horse.

The arrangements made by Brig-General Hughes left nothing to chance. The troops assaulted with the utmost determination and bravery, this in itself contributing largely to the high losses suffered. And here also, though unsuccessful, the action of this section assisted the main operation largely by drawing away from Battleship Hill numbers of the enemy who might otherwise have been available to move against the main advance at a critical phase of these operations.

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The position of the troops during the night of the 7th and 8th were as follows:-

On the right the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade held its own front and extended a little further North than usual. The 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade continued the line of our trenches up to and beyond Lone Pine. The captured work was held by the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade reinforced by a battalion of the 3rd Brigade and supported by the 5th Battalion Connaught Rangers. The Lone Pine works were subjected to continual counter attacks and bomb attacks up the still disputed communication trenches. Further North the 2nd Australian Brigade continued the line up to and including Courtney's Post; Quinn's Post and Pope's Hill were held by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade with two Companies 8th Cheshire Regiment, who kept the enemy fully employed all night; and on Russell's Top the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade with the remainder of the 8th Battalion Cheshire Regiment also kept up continual demonstrations against the enemy who were thick in the trenches on Baby 700.

The troops in the new area occupied on the left were holding an outer line through 80 I 5 to K 2, thence from the farm 80 f 8., Northwards to 92 U 4., O 9., and thence West to the sea along the Damakjelik Bair, including the knoll in 92 O 9. An inner line was also held.

There is no need to follow the Lone Pine operations further - the captured position was held onto with the same determination which marked the attack, and the enemy's efforts to recapture it have now decreased.

I trust however that the excellent work done by the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade in the capture of this position may not be overshadowed by the larger operations carried out to the North by the New Zealand and Australian Division. Had the former operation been carried out alone, it would probably

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have formed the subject of special reports, as the results obtained were not only important, but gave a great opportunity for the display of magnificent soldierly qualities on the part of the Australian troops.

Every detail in connection with the assault of the position had been most thoroughly worked out by the Brigade and Divisional Staffs concerned. Tunnels leading right up to the enemy's work to be immediately converted into communication trenches, mines, special bomb throwing parties, etc., had all been arranged for with the most satisfactory results.

The second the bombardment was completed, the Brigade went across the enemy's front without any hesitation, in spite of the heavy rifle fire, machine gun and shrapnel fire, and dashed into and seized the enemy's trenches, going right through the Turkish works with hand to hand fights every yard throughout the whole labyrinth of complicated and connected works which had to be occupied.

To show the nature of the fighting, I may mention that in one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found, all dead, who had evidently fought it out man to man to the last.

Such importance did the Turks evidently place on the possession of the position, that for three days and nights a constant series of counter attacks were kept up, at the end of which a thousand corpses - Turkish and our own - were dragged out actually from the trenches, irrespective of the number of Turkish dead lying outside, and of the still greater number who were killed by our guns and machine guns when they were coming up in mass along the reverse slopes of their position.

On the rest of the line in No. III and IV Sections the operations assumed their normal aspect - bomb attacks, mining and countermining, and continual harrying of the enemy, keeping in front of us a force at least equal to the numbers he formerly employed on this front.

7. 175.
To follow the attack on the Chunuk Bair Ridge:-

During the afternoon of the 7th August, reconnaissances were made with a view to a further attack on the Sari Bair position and orders were issued for an advance in 3 columns - details of which are given in Appendix "B".

The attack, which was preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment from 3.30 to 4.15 a.m., commenced at 4.15 a.m. 8th August.

On the right, Brig-General Johnston's Column, headed by the Wellington Infantry Battalion, and supported by the 7th Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers and the Maori Contingent, the whole gallantly led by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Malone, Wellington Infantry Battalion, who I regret to say, was killed during the course of the action, made a determined attack, and succeeded in gaining the South Western slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair.

In the centre, the 39th Infantry Brigade and the Indian Brigade, advancing from the positions they occupied overnight, moved along the Gullies leading up to the Sari Bair Ridge - Right moving South of the Farm on Chunuk Bair - remainder up the spurs to the North East of the Farm on the Nek and on Hill "Q". Little progress was made owing to the severity of the enemy's rifle fire, but some ground was gained on the spurs to the North East of the Farm.

On the left, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade advanced from its position on the Asma Dere against the lower slopes of the Abdel Rahman Bair with the intention of wheeling to its right, and attacking Koja Chemen Tepe up the spur. Considerable opposition was immediately met with from well placed Turkish machine guns, and infantry in position. In spite of every effort, no material progress was made, and on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the 4th (Aust-

ralian) Infantry Brigade, which was then virtually surrounded was withdrawn after losses amounting to over 1000, to its previous line on the Asma Dere; and in this position withstood, for many hours, determined attacks by the enemy on whom heavy losses were inflicted.

The situation at 12 noon was as follows:-

General Johnston's Column in occupation of the South Western slopes of Chumuk Bair.

The 39th Infantry Brigade and the 39th (Indian) Infantry Brigade in occupation of the Farm and the spurs to the North East.

4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the Asma Dere.

40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 battalions) on the Damak-jelik Bair.

Fighting in progress all along the line.

It was decided to break off the action till nightfall, preparatory to another attack on the main ridge using the footing gained on Chumuk Bair as a pivot.

During this fighting the Lone Pine position was heavily attacked but the occupants with the aid of our field guns repulsed the masses coming up against them, inflicting heavy losses.

The fighting slackened off in the afternoon and the troops were busy entrenching the positions held and getting up food. Further reconnaissances were made of the lines of approach to the enemy's positions, and orders were issued for a further advance in three columns to attack the line Chumuk Bair - Hill "Q" under cover of the foothold gained by Brig-General Johnston's Column on the morning of the 8th.

In the evening the troops under Major-General Godley were distributed roughly as follows:-

On Rhododendron Ridge and Chumuk Bair the N.Z. Infantry Brigade, with 2 Regiments of N.Z.M.R. and the Maoris; next and to the left was Brig-General Cox, and then Brig-General Monash with the 4th Australian Brigade. Behind the New Zealanders

was the 38th Brigade in reserve, and in the rear of Brig-General Monash, 2 battalions of the 40th Brigade. The N.Z.M.R. Brigade still held the inner line, and the 29th Brigade, less 2 battalions, had been sent up from the General Reserve and was further in rear in reserve. Brig-General Travers with 2 battalions 40th Brigade, still held the Damakjelik Bair.

Assaulting Columns as detailed in Appendix "C" were organized and prepared for the attack of the 9th August.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 9th August, a heavy bombardment commenced of the Chunuk Bair Ridge and Hill Q by the Naval guns, all N.Z. & A guns on the left flank, and all Australian guns possible from right flank, from whence the enemy advance was enfiladed: this was continued with increasing intensity till 5.15 a.m. at which time the fire was directed on to the flanks of the position being attacked, and on to its reverse slopes.

In the meantime, No. 3 Column (General Baldwin's) less Loyal North Lancashire Regiment who had been sent up earlier) had assembled at 8 p.m. 8th August in the Chailak Dere, and moved up towards General Johnston's Headquarters.

General Baldwin's plan, of which I entirely approved, was to form up his battalions immediately behind the trenches occupied by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and from there to launch his attack in successive lines, keeping as much as possible on the high ground. With this object, arrangements were made for the narrow track to be kept clear of all obstructions, such as wounded coming down, rations going up etc, and guides were provided for his column. But in spite of all these precautions, he was so much delayed and hampered by the extreme difficulty of the scrub-covered country to be traversed, the steepness of the ascent, and the heavy fire which met him immediately he neared the summit, that his column was unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of

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the Farm - Chumuk Bair till 5.15 a.m., though a few advanced parties managed to reach the top.

Meanwhile the 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Brigade gallantly led by Major C.J.L. Allanson, 6th Gurkha Rifles, advanced up the slopes of the Sari Bair, and succeeded in crowing the heights on the Nek between Chumuk Bair and Hill "Q". Not only did this battalion reach the crest, but it began to move down the far side firing on the retreating and enemy. It was, however, not supported closely/at this juncture a few very heavy shells falling among the troops, they were thrown into confusion, and a strong Turkish counter attack developing at the same time they were compelled to withdraw to the lower slopes of Sari Bair.

Two companies of the East Lancashire Regiment, the leading battalion of General Baldwin's Column, and the Hampshire Regiment, who gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chumuk Bair, now attacked: The Turks were by this time lining the crest in great strength, and they were unable to make any headway. General Baldwin was eventually compelled to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the Farm. Regrettable though the necessity for this withdrawal appeared at the time, later events make me doubt whether in the face of enfilading machine gun fire from Kaja Chemen Tepe and of shell fire from the Ismail Oglu Tepe Hills - this lodgment could have been made permanent.

The New Zealand troops, in spite of repeated attacks by the enemy maintained their ground and at the end of the day though much worn out and extremely exhausted still held a footing on the crest of Chumuk Bair.

During the evening the last battalion of the General Reserve was sent up to the left, being replaced by a readjustment of the garrisons of No. III and IV Sections.

Reports came in that the enemy were wearing white arm bands in imitation of our badges - but as ours had been

removed the night before in anticipation of such a ruse, the result was not happy for them.

Requests for help by gun fire were received from the 11th Division, which we were unable to give, our guns being immobile and out of range of the target proposed.

No change in the situation occurred throughout the day though fighting continued on the left flank and towards evening heavy attacks developed there. By the evening the line held ran along Rhododendron Ridge up to the crest of Chunuk Bair where about 200 yards were occupied and entrenched and held by some 800 men. From there it ran down to the Farm and almost due North to the Asma Dere Southern watershed down which it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu.

On the right the Australian Division was still holding its line. Lone Pine was being subjected to continuous bomb attacks and to several counter attacks which were all beaten off with loss, but caused a constant drain of casualties, the 1st Brigade whose strength was 2,900 on afternoon 8th, being now reduced to 1000. The trenches in front of the Anzac position were still strongly held and the attention of the enemy there was held in every possible way.

Casualties up to 8 p.m. of the 9th reached a total of approximately 8,500. The troops were all ^{still} in good spirits, in spite of shortage of water and constant fighting.

10th August.

During the night 9th/10th August 1915, the New Zealand troops in occupation of Chunuk Bair were relieved. They had been fighting for three days and three nights with no sleep and with little food and water, and their relief was imperative if necessary.

The position they held under such difficulties was handed over to two battalions of the 13th Division, the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment: the 10th Hampshire Regiment connecting them with the troops

about the Farm.

At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a determined attack from the line Chumuk Bair - Hill "Q" against our positions. This attack was particularly directed against the two battalions holding the top of Chumuk Bair itself. These two battalions, ^{were} attacked by a force which from later information appears to have consisted of a Division plus a Regiment. Though subjected to heavy shell fire they held their own gallantly for some time, but were at length overpowered, and forced out of the trenches.

The onrush of the Turks was, however, stopped by our supporting troops, by excellent shelling from the warships, and by the highly effective fire of the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, and 39th Brigade R.F.A., which first caught successive lines of Turkish Infantry as they topped the crest of the ridge, and then rained shell on them as they assembled in the various gullies.

Meanwhile enemy reinforcements continued to move up the Battleship Hill slopes under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, while more kept on coming down the Western slopes of the Chumuk Bair Ridge all along the line held by us. Here they were exposed to concentrated fire from our own and the ships guns, while 10 machine guns of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade played upon them while in solid masses and at close range for half an hour without ceasing inflicting enormous losses - in fact only very few of this attacking force ever got back again over the slopes of Chumuk Bair.

In the meantime, a heavy attack was being made against our positions at the Farm and on the spurs to the North East, and some portions of our line here were compelled to give ground. The ground so lost was, however, recovered after fierce fighting by bodies of troops under command of Brig-Generals Gayley, Baldwin, and Cooper who, with their

Commanding Officers, set an example of personal courage beyond all praise.

During these operations, I regret to say that Brig-General A.H. Baldwin, 33th Infantry Brigade, was killed, and Brig-General R.J. Cooper severely wounded. Lieut-Colonel M.H. Rynn commanding 9th Worcestershire Regiment, was also killed, and Lieut-Colonels H.G. Lovings, Commanding 8th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and J. Carden, Commanding 5th Wiltshire Regt, are, I regret to say missing.

In view of the probability of further determined attacks on our positions, I sent up my last reserve battalions the 5th Connaught Rangers and the 8th Welsh Fusiliers, from the Army Corps Reserve. These battalions were sent up the Aghyl Dere. By 10 a.m. the main attack of the Turks had expended itself, and those that remained on our side of the ridge began to trickle back over the ridge suffering annihilation as they did so: and by the end of the day, there was scarcely a Turk left on the slopes of the ridge facing us.

During the morning, a determined attack was made on our Northern positions along the Asma Dere and on the Danakjelik Bair, held respectively by the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, under Brig-General Monash, and the 4th South Wales Borderers. This attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

A second attack was delivered against the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade at 3 p.m. and was also repulsed. I regret to say that Lieut-Colonel F.M. Gillespie, Commanding 4th South Wales Borderers, was killed in action while commanding his battalion in this portion of our line.

In the evening General Cox, finding the line of the Farm, and spurs to the North East unsuitable to hold, withdrew slightly to the line knoll 80 D 5., 80 D 2., 92 Y 3., and thence to the Asma Dere.

Nothing of further importance occurred during the day,

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and during the night reorganization proceeded and the position was consolidated. A small party rushed a Turkish trench in front of Rhododendron Ridge but this was retaken before the hold could be made good. There was constant fighting all day and though no marked attacks or counter attacks took place the day's casualties amounted to a little over a thousand, bringing the casualties up to date to about 12,000 in all, including a very large proportion of officers who can ill be spared.

Our line was thrown forward to connect with the right of the 9th Corps, inner lines completed, and preparations made for a fresh attack.

This closed the second phase of the attack on Sari Bair. Major-General Godley brings to notice the names of several officers.

I quote his report verbatim -

"Throughout the period under report, I received the greatest possible assistance from Major-General F.C. Shaw, C.B., Commanding 13th Division and his Staff, General Shawe's coolness and judgement throughout, and his services in command of a section of the attack during its latter stages were of the utmost value to me personally and to the operations generally.

I wish to bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander the valuable services rendered by Brig-Generals H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., Commanding 29th (Indian) Brigade, F.E. Johnston (North Staffordshire Regiment), Commanding 40th Infantry Brigade, and A.H. Russell, Commanding N.Z.M.R. Brigade, who commanded the assaulting and covering columns.

The difficulty and responsibility of the conduct of these operations, necessitating, as they did, a night march night attacks, and much movement by night, in an exceptionally broken and rugged country, proved these Officers to

Have qualities of leadership of a high order.

Brig-Generals W. de S. Cayley, 39th Infantry Brigade, H.G. Chauvel, C.M.G., Commanding 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, F.G. Hughes, Commanding 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, and J. Monash, V.D., Commanding 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, are also deserving of great credit for the manner in which they handled their commands and carried out the operations entrusted to them.

I would further bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander, for his favourable consideration, the excellent work done throughout the operations by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Braithwaite, D.S.O., Royal Welsh Fusiliers, General Staff Officer 1st Grade; Lieut-Colonel J.J. Esson, 5th (Wellington) Regiment (New Zealand), Assistant Quartermaster General; Colonel H. Manders, Army Medical Service, Assistant Director Medical Services (killed in action); Lieut-Colonel G.W. Johnston, R.A., Commanding the Artillery, and Lieut-Colonel G.R. Pridham, R.E., Commanding the Engineers, all of the New Zealand and Australian Division, upon whom fell the responsibility for the control in their various branches, of the arrangements for the considerable force which I have the honour to command".

I would add to this the name of Major-General Godley, who had under him at one time forces amounting to a strength of two Divisions which he commanded admirably resulting in the success of the operations on the left flank - for though we were not able to remain on the Chunuk Bair Ridge, yet I think the results obtained and the very large number of Turks accounted for, may well be claimed as a success.

General Godley goes on to say -

"I cannot close this report without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during

the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units have been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the new Armies have only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them have not previously been under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks - from the Old Country Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army".

In this appreciation I most cordially concur.

Lieut-General,
Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

APPENDIX "A"

Composition of the Columns detailed for operations
on the Left Flank.

RIGHT COVERING FORCE - Objective (Table Top. (80 C 9)
(Old No. 3 Post. (80 B 9)
(Bauchop's Hill. (92 X 7 & 8)

<u>Troops</u>	N.Z.M.R. Bde.	}	Brig-General A.H. Russell.
	Otago M.R. Regt.		
	N.Z. Field Troop.		
	Maori Contingent.		

RIGHT ASSAULTING COLUMN - Objective. The line point 181 - CHUNUK BAIR -
head of KUR DERE.

<u>Troops</u>	N.Z. Inf. Bde.	}	Brig-General F.E. Johnston
	Indian Mountain Batty,		
	less a section.		
	Coy N.Z. Engineers.		

LEFT COVERING FORCE - Objective. DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

<u>Troops</u>	Hdqs 40th Bde.	}	Brig-General J.H. Travers
	1/2 72nd Field Co.		
	4th S. Wales Borderers.		
	5th Wiltshire Regt.		

LEFT ASSAULTING COLUMN - Objective. Line KOJA CHIMEN TEPE -
head of KUR DERE.

<u>Troops</u>	29th Indian Inf. Bde.	}	Brig-General H.V. Cox.
	4th Aust. Inf. Bde.		
	Indian Mountain Batty,		
	less 1 section.		
	Coy N.Z. Engineers.		

DIVISIONAL RESERVES.

At CHAILAK DERE -	6th South Lancs. Regt.	}	Lieut-Col. Bald.
	6th Welsh Regt (Pioneers)		

At AGHYL DERE -	39th Inf. Bde.	}	Brig-General W.S. Cayley.
	1/2 72nd Field Co.		

APPENDIX "B"

Composition of Columns attacking Sari Bair
on 8th August, 1915.

RIGHT COLUMN : Brig-General F.E. Johnston.

Troops 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.
No. 1 Company N.Z. Engineers.
N.Z. Infantry Brigade.
2 Battalions, 13th Division. (8th Welsh Pioneers,
Maori Contingent. 7th Gloucester Regt)

Objective. The line Point 161 (80 K 5+ 6) - CHUNUK BAIR -
Point 81 A 4.

CENTRE AND LEFT COLUMNS : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
No. 2 Company N.Z. Engineers.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion) and with
6th South Lances. Regiment attached.
29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Objective. The line 81 A 4 - Hill Q (81 A 2) - Point 305.

The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (less
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment) to remain in
occupation of BIG TABLE TOP - OLD NO. 3 POST -
BAUCHOP HILL.

The 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions)
to remain in occupation of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

APPENDIX "C"

Composition of Columns attacking Sari Bair
on 9th August, 1915.

NO.1 COLUMN : Brigadier-General F.E. Johnston.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.
Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment.
No.1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
2 Battalions, 13th Division (8th Welsh Pioneers and
7th Gloucestershire Regiment).

Objective : To hold and consolidate the ground gained on the
8th August, and in co-operation with other Columns
to gain the whole of the CHUNUK BAIR, extending
to the South East.

NO.2 COLUMN : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
No.2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion but with
6th South Lancs. Regiment attached).
Indian Infantry Brigade.

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q" (81 A 2.) The
advance to commence from present positions.

NO.3 COLUMN : Brig-General A.H. Baldwin, Commdg 38th(Infantry)Bde.

Troops : 6th East Lancashire Regiment.
6th Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment.
10th Hampshire Regiment.
6th Royal Irish Rifles.
5th Wiltshire Regiment.

POSITION OF ASSEMBLY : The CHAILAK DERE : Head of Column at 80 D 9.

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q": the Column to move
East of the Farm. This Column was to be the
main attack, and the other Columns were ordered
to co-operate with it.



Headquarters, 1st Australian
Division.

14th August, 1915.

Despatch No. 15.

From:- General Officer Commanding,
1st Australian Division.

To :- Lieut-General Commanding,
A & N.Z. Army Corps.

Sir,

1. - I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried out against the enemy works known as Lone Pine and German Officers Trench on the 6th August, in obedience to Army Corps Order No. 16 of the 3rd August, and instructions for the General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Division, dated 4th August:-

A. THE ASSAULT ON LONE PINE.

(i) The enemy's work on LONE PINE consisted of a strong point d'appui on the south western end of the 400 PLATEAU and confronted at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards the salient in the line of our trenches known as the PIMPLE. The work was a strong one connected by numerous communication trenches with another point d'appui known as JOHNSTON'S JOLLY to the north, with LEGGE VALLEY on the east, and with SNIPERS and PINE RIDGES on the south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards. The intervening ground composed the narrow summit and the slopes of a convex feature. The slope to the south formed the head of a small nullah and was thinly covered with brushwood; that to the north had an



inappreciable slope northwards. The approach to the position was exposed to enfilade fire from JOHNSTON'S JOLLY to the north and SNIPERS RIDGE to the south.

A portion of the enemy's work was protected by rough wire entanglements; and it was known that at ~~in~~ least a proportion of trenches were provided with overhead cover.

(ii) The policy of our operations for some time past had been to advance our trenches as close as possible towards the enemy by tunnelling. In consequence of this we had in front of LONE PINE an underground fire trench 20 yards nearer to the enemy. ^{marked +++ on diagram II} This trench was, prior to the assault, carefully prepared to facilitate the exit of a maximum number of men. A number of mines were also exploded in advance of this line in order to increase available cover.

(iii) I attach a copy of my operations order for the attack from which it will be seen that during the 4th, 5th and 6th instants both LONE PINE and JOHNSTON'S JOLLY were subjected to a deliberate artillery bombardment, and that an intensive bombardment was effected from 4.30 to 5.30 p.m. on the 6th instant.

(iv) The assault was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions, each of whom held one company in reserve. The 1st Battalion formed the brigade reserve. In anticipation of further requirements I had arranged that the garrison of the remainder of the line held by this division should be so distributed to points d'appui that a battalion of each the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades should be available in reserve.

(v) The assault began punctually at 5.30 p.m., the brigade arrangements for timing and making the signal to advance being good and practical. Two lines



practically issued simultaneously and they were closely followed by a third. The dash and elan of the troops was beyond all praise and the determination to reach the enemy's trenches made the men invincible. Upon reaching the enemy's trenches a slight check and consequent bunching occurred. This was due to the existence of barbed wire entanglement and the presence of stout overhead cover. The delay occasioned some loss.

The advance was opposed by rifle and machine gun fire; that from the machine guns increasing in intensity and accuracy. The enemy's guns opened promptly on our trenches and the intervening ground. Our casualties were considerable.

At 5.47 the 3rd and 4th Battalions were well into the enemy's position; and at 6.5 p.m. the reserves of the 2nd Battalion had advanced over the enemy's parapets and by driving out, killing and capturing had occupied trenches as far south as R. 5 (see Trench Diagram No. II attached). The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions followed, and at 6.20 p.m., in response to messages from the captured position, the brigade reserve (the 1st Battalion) was launched to consolidate the success gained. Reinforcements of this battalion to the number of 120, withheld at this time, were by 7 p.m. also absorbed, and a battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade was brought up to our trenches opposite the captured work.

During the assault our artillery continued to fire on JOHNSTON'S JOLLY, and lengthening its range covered the ground behind the captured work.

(vi) At 7.5 p.m. the enemy began a determined and violent counter-attack from the north and south. The tide of its progress swayed backwards and forwards. Here and there the persistence of bomb attacks forced



our men to give up portions of trenches but in most cases these were retaken, a fact which redounds to the credit of the officers upon whose initiative the action was taken, and the gallantry of the men. The counter-attack lasted for a considerable time and must have occasioned the enemy appreciable loss.

(vii) Meanwhile, as previously arranged, communication with the captured work was rapidly established by means of open saps from the ends of tunnels ^{51.38} which, by previous preparation, had been well advanced for the purpose. By 7.40 p.m. covered communication had been established with the captured work.

(viii) The task of consolidating ourselves in the new work proceeded steadily; progress, however, was greatly hindered by continual bombing, by shell fire, and by the difficulties of removing wounded and dead.

At 1.30 a.m. on the 7th renewed counter-attacks were made by the Turks, who advanced up communication trenches preceded by showers of bombs. These counter attacks continued for a considerable time and our work was in consequence greatly hampered. A large number of prisoners had been taken and these added to the congestion.

The casualties incurred during the beating off of these counter-attacks, which lasted continuously until about 8.40 a.m. were heavy and in consequence it became necessary to absorb part of the 12th Battalion - the reserve of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

(ix) At 1.23 p.m. on the 7th, indications of further counter-attack became apparent. Shortly afterwards the Turks began another determined counter-attack which lasted until 5 p.m. This was resumed at midnight - was intense at first and went on intermittently for



some hours.

At an early period of this counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish portion of a trench. Later on upon the prompt initiative of the commanding officer it was gallantly retaken and a number of the enemy were killed.

During the day of the 8th we took advantage of every cessation in the enemy's bombing to improve our position. The 2nd Battalion which in its exposed position, had suffered heavy losses and had lost its commanding officer, was withdrawn and replaced by the 7th battalion - the reserve of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

(x) At 5 a.m. on the 9th August the enemy made a violent counter-attack from the east and south east after a feint of fire attack from the north which was not pressed home. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of this attack and repelled the enemy with bomb and rifle fire. By 7.45 a.m. it was evident that the attack had failed and the Turks had lost heavily. There being signs that the enemy were demoralized, Colonel SMYTH assembled the 1st battalion with the object of counter attacking but a favourable opportunity did not occur. At this time the enemy's guns were causing much inconvenience.

(xi) Bombing and sniping continued in less volume throughout this day and night, and lasted until the 12th August, when it became evident that we had gained the ascendancy in rifle fire and could always repel a bomb attack if we could keep up a bomb supply of double that of the enemy's.

2. - GENERAL REMARKS.



From the foregoing narrative it will be seen that a strong and extensive enemy work was captured and held, despite practically six days continual counter-attack, by an infantry brigade whose strength at the outset was but 2800 rifles with the support of two other weak battalions. The success of the initial action was mainly due to the gallantry and dash of both officers and men. While I do not think the enemy were actually surprised it is certain that he was not at the time anticipating immediate attack and in some measure to this cause our success must be ascribed.

I venture to think that the result achieved justifies my reference to the action of this brigade as a feat of arms which for gallantry and steadfastness has rarely been excelled. It establishes beyond doubt the fighting qualities of the Australian soldier and will ever form a glorious page in the history of the Commonwealth Military Forces.

The fighting was most sanguinary and there abound in the trenches silent testimony of bitter struggles and grim determination. It is unfortunately not possible to chronicle the many deeds of gallantry and heroism. I wish, however, to place on record my appreciation of the soldierly qualities displayed by the several commanding officers, among whom for initiative and whole-hearted devotion to duty I cannot single out anyone.

The assistance given by the Artillery was continual and effective - the gunners sparing no effort likely to help their comrades.

The losses on both sides were heavy: more than 1000 bodies have been removed from the trenches. The enemy probably suffered more than we did. I must express regret that the action cost us the lives of so many good officers, among them 2 battalion commanders of great promise - Lieutenant - Colonels E.S. BROWN and R. SCOBIE.



In an attachment to this despatch I submit the names of officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are deserving of recognition.

I commend to your notice the careful preparation made by Colonel N.M. SMYTH, V.C., and his confident and determined conduct of the operation of the 1st Infantry Brigade. The attachment above referred to, containing the names of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, will be forwarded later, when fully completed.

B. THE ATTACK ON GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

(i) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH comprises an irregularly shaped series of small trenches on MACLAURIN'S HILL (Square 80 X 3) and opposes our trenches on the summit of that feature. To the south it has a small offshoot known as SNIPERS TRENCH from whence there is communication both to MORTAR RIDGE in rear and to JOHNSTON'S JOLLY.

The face of the trench actually confronting ours does not in length exceed 50 yards, ^{M1 M3} and there is a well defined gap between the visible southern end and SNIPERS RIDGE. Overhead cover existed over nearly the whole length of the trench.

(ii) The intervening surface is devoid of obstacle other than the craters of mines fired by us, and the ground slopes gradually from our to the enemy's trenches over an intervening distance varying from 30 to 50 yards.

(iii) As in the case of the attack on LONE PINE we had forward recesses prepared ready for the exit of attacking troops.

We had the additional advantage of having three mines laid out under the enemy's trench.



(iv) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH was subjected during the 4th, 5th and 6th instants to artillery bombardment similar to that delivered on LONE PINE. There was no intensive bombardment immediately prior to the assault.

(v) 300 men of the 6th battalion were told off for the assault, which was timed for 12 midnight, 6th/7th August. A further 100 men from the same battalion were detailed to attack SNIPERS TRENCH.

A mine was exploded at 11.5 p.m., another at 11.28 p.m., and the third at 11.40 p.m. The object of this plan was to give the enemy time to refill his trenches after the first two explosions and to make him wary of doing so after the third.

During these explosions the assaulting party was held ready; the men were not placed in position in the forward recesses until after the final explosion. Unfortunately some delay occurred in placing men in the recesses due to the blocking of some of the tunnels leading to the forward line.

The attack was eventually made at about 12.45 a.m. It was apparently anticipated by the enemy and heavy maxim and rifle fire opened on the men the moment they emerged; enfilade maxim fire from JOHNSTON'S JOLLY and the CHESSBOARD was particularly effective. A number of men were shot before they could get out of the recesses. This broke the cohesion of the line and although a certain number of men reached the enemy's parapets the losses suffered at the very outset, and the difficulty in the dark recesses of sending out other lines affected the spirit of the men and the attack failed.



(vi) Orders were thereupon issued for a reorganization of the arrangements and for a second attempt to be made. This was done and another attack was launched about 4 a.m. This I regret to say also failed; the failure must be ascribed to the fact that the enemy were awaiting attack and had all preparations made.

(vii) A verbal report of the circumstances was made to the Lieut-General Commanding, who, upon consideration, deemed further effort inadvisable, although preparations for a third attempt were in hand.

3. - GENERAL REMARKS.

After the brilliant action of the 1st Infantry Brigade during the afternoon hopes certainly ran high that the 2nd Infantry Brigade would by the action of one of its battalions consummate the success and add to its already established renown. It is therefore with great regret that I have to report the failure of two efforts. While there were probably minor contributing causes, the main reason for the failure lay in the fact that the attempt did not come as a surprise and that the enemy had made preparations which only attack on a large scale could have successfully overcome.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) H.B. Walker,
Brigadier-General,
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

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Appendix No. 41

NO.3 OPERATION ORDER.
by
Colonel N.M. SMYTH, V.C.
Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigade Headquarters,
BROWN'S DIP, 5/8/1915.

Reference : (i) Map of GALLIPOLI (KOJA DERE) 1/20,000.
(ii) Plan of communications.
(iii) Plan of enemy trenches, LONE PINE.
(iv) TRENCH DIAGRAM No.2.

Information. 1. + One (1) copy each of Divisional Operation Order No.9 and Organization Orders for the troops in ANZAC has been issued to Battalion Commanders.

Intention. 2. - The 1st Infantry Brigade will assault the Lonesome Pine position at 1730 tomorrow.
Units on both flanks are to co-operate by a ~~vigorous~~ vigorous demonstration.

Artillery. 3. - Immediately preceding the assault there is to be an intensive artillery bombardment from 1700 to 1730.

Deployment. 4. - (i) Battalions will move to their allotted positions, shown in Appendix 1, as follows:-
2nd Bn. - to be clear of Brown's Dip by 1430.
1st Bn. - to be in position in Brown's Dip by 1500.
3rd Bn. - moving by the main rear communication trench from their present headquarters, will pass ARTILLERY ROAD at 1500.
4th Bn. - will follow immediately in rear of the 3rd Bn.
All units will be deployed by 1700.
(ii) During the deployment of the garrisons of 2nd Inf. Bde are to be withdrawn into the Southern end of GUN LANE and the communication trench North of the PIMPLE.

Assault. 5. - On the signal being given at 1730 three companies each of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions will assault from both firing lines simultaneously over and into the enemy's trenches.

Frontages:-

2nd Bn- - R.3 to junction of R.1 and R.6.
3rd Bn. - From junction R.1 - R.6 to junction P.3 - P.7.
4th Bn. - Enemy's trenches south of OWENS GULLY from junction P.3 - P.7 to junction P.1 - P.2.

(ii) The remaining company of each of these battalions will be held in regimental reserve.

(iii) Troops will not cheer until the position is gained.

(iv) The forward position gained will be marked by red and yellow flags carried by companies in the assaulting columns

Brigade reserve. 6. - The 1st Battalion will be in Brigade reserve in the dugouts near Brigade Headquarters in BROWN'S DIP.

Limits of advance. 7. - The limits of advance will be as follows:-
Right flank - R.5 to Q.7.
Centre - Q.7, Q.4, P.13, P.8.
Left flank - Prolongation of the line Q.4 - P.8 to where it would meet O.10, P.2.

Assault Signal. 8. - The signal for the assault will be three short whistle blasts sounded by the brigade major in the entrance of B.5 Tunnel at 1730.

Officers commanding battalions will post an officer at the entrance of each tunnel and a N.C.O. at the junction of each tunnel with the new firing line to repeat this signal.

These officers and N.C.O.'s will compare watches with the brigade major at 1200 and 1630 tomorrow.

Machine guns. 9. - Machine guns will be carried forward with each assaulting column, 3,500 rounds being taken for each gun.

Working parties. 10. (i) A working party at least 100 strong carrying picks and shovels will move forward with the third assaulting company of each battalion.

(ii) The following will be placed at the disposal of the O.C. 2nd Field Co. forthwith for opening up communications from PIMPLE:-

1st Battalion -	1 officer	83 other ranks.
2nd Battalion -	1 " "	33 " "

Engineers. 11. - (i) The O.C. 2nd Field Co. will detail the following:-

(a) 1 N.C.O. and 5 other ranks to each battalion to move forward with the assaulting column. These parties will carry out demolitions and assist battalion working parties in defence works. They will report to C.O.'s at their battalion headquarters at 1300 tomorrow.

(b) 1 officer and 15 other ranks to move forward in the assault with the 3rd Battalion for the purpose of opening up communications. This party will report to the O.C. 3rd Battalion at the PIMPLE at 1600.

(ii) Special instructions have been issued to O.C. 2nd Field Co. to explode certain mines and to connect tunnels B.5 B.8 and B.6 with the position gained by means of open saps.

Ladders. 12. - Eight portable ladders will be carried by each battalion in the assault.

Signalling. 13. - Battalions will take Periscope Morse discs for signalling; also telephone wires.

Equipment, ammunition, supplies. 14. - (i) 200 rounds of ammunition, one days rations, a full waterbottle and 2 sand bags will be carried by each man.

(ii) Bomb throwers ~~will~~ only carry 50 rounds of ammunition in addition to their explosives.

(iii) No packs, entrenching tool carriers, or bayonet scabbards will be worn by the assaulting columns of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions.

The entrenching tool will be placed at the back of the waist belt.

(iv) Respirators will be carried by all ranks.

Dressing stations. 15. - An advanced dressing station will be established in BROWN'S DIP and a divisional collecting station on the northern slope of MCCAY'S HILL.

All wounded able to walk will proceed to the divisional collecting station direct.

7.199

Appendix No. 41

Reports.

16. - Reports to brigade headquarters at BROWN'S DIP.

(Sgd) D.M. KING Major.
Brigade Major,
1st Infantry Brigade.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>At.</u>
1 - 3	Brigade Hdqrs	-	1915.
4	1st Aust. Division.	D.M.	
5	2nd Inf. Bde.	"	
6	3rd Inf. Bde.	"	
7	2nd Field Co.	"	
8	1st Battalion.	Orderly	
9	2nd Battalion.	"	
10	3rd Battalion.	"	
11	4th Battalion.	"	

Unit.	Frontage.	Routes to positions.	Remarks.
2nd Battalion. Estimated capacity	(1) In new firing line - B.3 to B.28. Recesses Nos. 55 - 84. (2) In present firing line - entrance B.3 to entrance B.5 exclusive. New firing line - 120 men. Present firing line - banquettes 66 men fire trench 98 men Remainder in communication trenches.	Two communication trenches from BROWN'S DIP south of 1st Inf. Bde Hd.-Qrs., also tunnels B.3 and B.4.	Between 1700 and 1730 as many men as possible will be placed in the present firing line. Commanding officer after inspection will be near entrance to B.4 tunnel.
3rd Battalion. Estimated capacity	(1) In new firing line - B.28 to B.9 Recesses Nos. 26 - 54. (2) In present firing line - entrance B.5 to B.9 inclusive. New firing line - 182 men. Present firing line-banquette 54 men fire trench 76 men Remainder in communication trenches.	GUN LANE from 2nd Bn. Hd.-Qrs. to PIMPLE and communication trench at the turn which leads to B.9 tunnel; also tunnels B.5, B.8, and B.9.	Between 1700 and 1730 as many men as possible will be placed in the present firing line. Commanding Officer after inspection will be near entrance to B.8 tunnel.
4th Battalion Estimated capacity	(1) In new firing line - B.9 to entrance B.24. Recesses Nos. 1 to 25. (2) In present firing line - entrance B.9 (exclusive) to entrance B.24. New firing line - 116 men. Present firing line-banquette 84 men fire trench 116 men Remainder in communication trenches.	From ARTILLERY ROAD through communication trench to B.24, also from BROWN'S DIP through communication trench to B.6. (GUN LANE is not to be used.)	Between 1700 and 1730 as many men as possible will be placed in the present firing line. Commanding officer after inspection will be near entrance to B.9 tunnel.
1st Battalion	In dugouts west of 1st Infantry Brigade Hd.-Qrs.	As directed.	Commanding officer will remain near 1st Inf. Bde. Hd.-Qrs. after 1700.

(Sgd) D. M. KING Major.
Brigade Major 1st Infantry Brigade.

7201

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ENGINEERS.

Reference : Operation Order No. 3 dated 5/8/1915.

1. - Following mines will be exploded by you at 1400 tomorrow, the 6th instant. Charges will be laid tonight. If possible avoid weakening new firing line by heavy charges :-

B. 37
B. 26
B. 22
B. 27

2. - At 1730 tomorrow, the 6th instant, as soon as the assault is delivered, the following tunnels in addition to those mined (paragraph 1) will be driven forward as open saps :-

B. 36 (to join B. 27)
B. 39
B. 5
B. 21
B. 8

3. - Speed is all important hence men should be worked in short shifts.

4. - Keep tunnels clear of all stores, supplies, &c., until the junction is complete.

5. - Notify Brigade Headquarters as soon as you have established communications.

6. - The ammunition magazines will be filled under directions of a staff officer tomorrow morning.

(Sgd) D. M. K I N G , Major,
Brigade Major 1st Inf. Bde.

BROWN'S DIP, 5th August 1915.

By orderly at 2200.

Officers Commanding
2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions.

With reference to No. 3 Operation Order, dated
5/8/1915 :-

1. - The red flags sent to you are intended to deceive the Turks and therefore should be conspicuously displayed on their nearest trenches.
2. - The red and yellow flags are to show our own artillery the extent of the position gained. As far as possible they should be concealed from the Turks.
3. - The following machine guns will be carried forward with the assaulting column, vide paragraph 9 :-
 - 2nd Battalion - 2 guns.
 - 3rd Battalion - 2 guns
 - 4th Battalion - 3 guns
4. - The iron ration will not be taken. Two biscuits should be sufficient.
5. - Bombing parties will be organized in accordance with paragraph 4 (iii)(a) on page 5 of Divisional Operation Order No. 9.
6. - The intensive bombardment will commence at 1630 and will terminate at 1730.
7. - Only four (4) portable ladders are now available for your battalion. These may be drawn at Brigade Headquarters at any time.
8. - When you have made your final arrangements forward the actual number of rifles assaulting with each company and give numbers left behind. Officers will be shown separately by companies.
9. - The engineer party of one n.c.o. and five other ranks accompanying you must destroy with explosives such overhead cover as may be found to be a hinderance in the defence.

(Sgd) D. M. K I N G , Major.

Brigade Major 1st Inf. Bde.

6/8/1915.

1045 by orderly.

Report on the Operations against the SARI BAIR Position6th - 10th August 1915.G. 351.

- of the -

Force under the Command of Major-General Sir A.J. Godley K.C.M.G., C.B.
Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Reference Map :No. 2 Post, ANZAC,
GALLIPOLI.Gallipoli 1:20,000 Sheet KOJA DERE.

August 16th 1915.

TO :

The Brigadier-General, General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows on the Operations
of the Force under my command, between the 6th and 10th
August 1915.

1. For some time, operations on an extended scale against
the enemy in front of the Anzac Position had been decided
upon by the Army Corps Commander, of which an attack on the
SARI BAIR position was entrusted to me.

The troops placed at my disposal for this Operation
consisted of :-

New Zealand and Australian Division.

13th Division - less Divisional Artillery (not yet
landed)

and
Certain Battalions (3) at
first allotted to Army Corps
Reserve: but subsequently sent
up to join the 13th Division.

29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, less 1 Section
21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

2.
PREPARATORY
MEASURES

For some time past careful reconnaissance of the
country over which the operations were to take place had
been made by General Officers Commanding and Staffs,
Commanding, and other Senior Officers, and by specially
selected junior Officers and non-commissioned Officers of
the New Zealand and Australian Division. These reconnaiss-
ances were conducted from the Outposts at 80 B. 4 and 7, and
from destroyers between SUVLA BAY and ANZAC COVE, while as

2.
(Cont.)

an additional measure, 2 Officers and a party of selected troopers of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were sent to the Isle of Imbros to gain experience in night reconnaissance and the leading of troops by night.

During the period 3 - 6 August, the portions of my Force detailed for the attack on the SARI BAIR Ridge were assembled in bivouacs in the ANZAC Position and the necessary reliefs of Posts made in Sections. These bivouacs had been previously prepared so that the concentration might not be detected by the Turkish Artillery Observers, or from the air : and, in order to facilitate the movement of the Troops on to their respective objectives, communications were made or improved - notably a road along the Beach from ANZAC COVE to No. 3 Post : a road connecting REST GULLY (Square 80 R.7) with RESERVE GULLY (Square 80 R.4), and the widening of the communication trench between the Northern Spit of ANZAC COVE (ARI BURNU) and No. 3 Post : this being made to take Infantry in file, or loaded mules.

In order to avoid delays, clashing of the various Columns, or blocking of roads and communication trenches, elaborate arrangements were made to provide guides to lead Columns, and Military Police to direct and control traffic at road junctions and along communication trenches.

It is much to the credit of the Staff, and others entrusted with these important duties that the arrangements made worked smoothly and without any hitch, and that Units reached their rendezvous well up to time.

To assist the actual leading of the Left Covering Force, the Assaulting Columns and the Reserve, Officers and men selected from the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were appointed as guides. These Officers and men had previously been given frequent opportunities of reconnoitring the ground to be traversed, and of examining it from

various points of view. Detailed reconnaissance of the actual routes to be traversed had, however, not been found feasible owing to the activity and alertness of the enemy.

3. As the result of reconnaissance reports of the North Western slopes of the SARI BAIR Ridge, and of the various lines of advance on the enemy's position, the following conditions, based on the Orders of the Army Corps Commander, were arrived at :-

- (a) That the principal primary objective was the portion of the summit of the Range lying between CHUNUK BAIR (Square 80 K. 3) and KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (Square 93 W. 9), both inclusive.
- (b) That the attack should be delivered by night : the actual assault on the summit being timed to take place well before daybreak.
- (c) That, in order to bring a sufficient force into line for the assault, as many routes as were available should be utilized in the advance.
- (d) That the advance of the Assaulting Columns must be facilitated by the capture beforehand of certain commanding positions immediately to the North East and North of Outposts Nos. 1 (Sq. 80 H. 8 & 9), No. 2 (Sq. 80 B. 7) and No. 3 (Sq. 80 B. 4).
- (e) That in order to contain the enemy before Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of the Anzac Position, and to maintain this portion of our line, it was necessary to hold these two Sections with a sufficient Force : this Force to assist the main operations against the SARI BAIR Ridge by offensive action at dawn against the Turkish position in front of these Sections.

I therefore divided the Force at my disposal as follows :-

(4)

3.
(Cont.)

Right and Left Covering Force.

Right and Left Assaulting Column.

Reserve, also sub-divided into two Columns.

Garrisons of Posts in Nos. 3 and 4 Sections.

The composition of these Forces was as follows :-

Right Covering Force.Commander : Brig-General A.H. Russell, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.Troops : New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.

Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment.

Field Troop, New Zealand Engineers.

The Maori Contingent.

Left Covering Force.Commander : Brig-General J.H. Travers, 40th Infantry Brigade.Troops : The 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions). $\frac{1}{2}$ Field Company R.E., 13th Division.Right Assaulting Column.Commander : Brig-General F.E. Johnston, New Zealand Infantry Brigade.Troops : New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

26th (Jacob's) Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).

No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.

Left Assaulting ColumnCommander : Brig-General H.V. Cox C.B., C.S.I., 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.Troops : 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.

21st (Kohat) Indian Mountain Battery
(less one Section).

No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.

(5)

3.
(Cont.)

Reserve.

Commander : Major-General F.C. Shaw C.B., G.O.C. 13th Division.

Troops : The 13th Division

LESS

2 Infantry Brigades - except 1 Battalion.

Divisional Artillery.

2 Field Companies, Royal Engineers.

Garrisons of Sections of the ANZAC PositionNO. 3 SECTION

Officer Commanding : Brig-General H.G. Chauvel C.M.G.,
1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Troops : 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Half Battalion, 13th Division.

2 Sections Field Ambulance.

NO. 4 SECTION

Officer Commanding : Brig-General F.G. Hughes,
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Troops : 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

1 Section 26th (Jacob's) Mountain Battery.

2 Battalions (less half Battalion) 13th Division.

2 Sections Field Ambulance.

Divisional Artillery.

Divisional Artillery, N.Z. & A. Division, stood fast in the positions already occupied.

on the night 6th/7th August

4.
ORDERS
-to-
TROOPS

On the 5th August 1915, Orders for the Operations were issued to the Troops under my command. These were based on the orders of the Army Corps Commander, and on the conclusions referred to in para 3.

- (a) Right Covering Force - to assault and occupy BIG TABLE TOP (Sq. 80 C. 9), OLD NO. 3 POST (Sq. 80 B. 9), BAUCHOP HILL

(6)

4. (a)
(Cont.)

(Sq. 92 X. 7 & 8) with a view to covering the march of the Assaulting Columns in its initial stages up the SAZLI BEIT DERE, CHAILAK DERE and AGHYL DERE : these being the three routes selected for the advance.

- (b) Left Covering Force - to assault and occupy the DAMAKJELIK BAIR (Sq. 92 M.N.) with a view to assisting the march of the left Assaulting Column (vide d) up the AGHYL DERE, and to assist the landing of the 9th Corps which took place between SUVLA BAY and the mouth of the ASMAK DERE (Sq. 91.0)

The action of these covering forces to be prepared by the fire of guns of H.M. Ships, which were to commence firing at 8 p.m. on the 6th August on various targets. The assault of the Right Covering Force was to commence at 9. 30 p.m. The Left Covering Force was to pass No. 3 Post (Sq. 80. B. 4) at 9. 30 p.m., and was ordered to occupy the southern slopes of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR by 10. 30 p.m.

- (c) Right Assaulting Column - Objective - the line Point 161 (80 K. 6) - CHUNUK BAIR - Head of KUR DERE (81 A. 4) : with a view to making a further advance on to the line SCRUBBY KNOLL (Sq. 80 Z.) - CHUNUK BAIR, in co-operation with offensive operations from Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of Defence (vide f). Line of advance - the SAZLI BEIT DERE and the CHAILAK DERE : leading Troops to enter these Gullies at 10. 30 p.m.

- (d) Left Assaulting Column - Objective - KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (inclusive). This Column was directed up the AGHYL DERE, and was ordered to protect the left flank of the Force after clearing the Left Covering Force (para b).

- (e) Reserves were disposed in two Columns - Right and Left : Heads of Columns to be at the mouth of the CHAILAK DERE and AGHYL DERE respectively by 1 a.m. 7th August.

4. (f) The General Officers Commanding Nos. 3 and 4 Sections were ordered to engage the enemy by fire and bomb attack as soon as the attack of the Right Covering Force (para a) commenced. No. 4 Section was to assault at 4.30 a.m. 7th August with a view to seizing certain trenches on the NEK (80 N. 8), BABY 700 (80 N. 8 & 9) and the CHESSBOARD (80. S. 3). No. 3 Section was to assist No. 4 Section by fire and bomb action, and by the assault and capture of certain trenches opposite QUINN'S POST (80 S.7).

The final objective of these Troops was the line QUINN'S POST - SCRUBBY KNOLL (80 2. 2) in conjunction with the advance to the latter spot referred to in para 3 c.

5.
COURSE OF THE
OPERATIONS.

The operations of the Forces at ANZAC COVE commenced at 5. 30 p.m., the 1st Australian Division successfully attacking the LONE PINE (Square 68 B.2.3.5.6) position.

Between dark and 9. 30 p.m. in accordance with a pre-arranged programme, the Navy shelled the NEK (80 N.8) and OLD NO. 3 POST : bringing searchlights to bear at intervals. The time and sequence of firing the ships' guns had been practised nightly for some weeks, and the enemy was quite accustomed to it.

Covering (a)
Forces.

RIGHT COVERING FORCE (para 4.a):At 9.0 p.m. that portion of General Russell's force detailed to attack OLD NO. 3 POST crept forward from under cover of the Outposts. At 9. 30 p.m. the searchlight, which had been directed as usual on Old No. 3 Post, was switched off: this was the signal for the attack which was made swiftly and silently, and this portion of the enemy's position was soon in our possession.

At the same time, 9. 30 p.m., the forces detailed to attack BIG TABLE TOP and the BAUCHOP HILL series of Ridges advanced up the SAZLI BEIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE

5. (a) and across the latter Gully. Opposition was soon met with,
(Cont.) and a wire entanglement placed across the CHAILAK DERE delayed the Troops advancing by this route for some time. It was, however, eventually removed.

In the meantime, excellent progress was made against the seaward spurs of the BAUCHOP HILL position, and under cover of these operations, the Left Covering Force made its way North for the attack on the DAMAKJELIK BAIR. OLD NO. 3 POST was captured by 10.50 p.m. 6th August, and BAUCHOP HILL by 1.10 a.m. 7th August, the gallant Commander of the Otago Mounted Rifles, Lieut. Colonel A. Bauchop, C.M.G. being, I regret to say, mortally wounded while in the act of leading his men to the assault.

The attack on BIG TABLE TOP was prepared by a heavy bombardment of this position by 4.5", 5" and 6" Howitzers and by Ships' guns. The fire and searchlight were directed on to the hill till 10 p.m. at which hour the assault was timed. The hill was captured at 11.50 p.m.

The Maori Contingent, which formed part of the Right Covering Force, was sent to BAUCHOP HILL in support of the Mounted Rifles, and acquitted itself well. All the attacks made by this Force were by bayonet and bomb only. Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles, and much equipment, ammunition and stores.

(b) The LEFT COVERING FORCE (para 4. b), marching via the Beach Road to No. 3 Post, moved North when the attack on BAUCHOP HILL (para 5. a.) had somewhat developed. Its progress was hampered by the CHAILAK DERE which was crossed by a sunken road in which were Troops belonging to the Right Covering Force. Some temporary intermixture of Units and loss of Formations resulted, which was soon righted. After clearing the CHAILAK DERE, the force marched without interruption to the mouth of the AGHYL DERE, though exposed to a certain amount of fire from the Spurs of BAUCHOP HILL which had not then been captured, and attacked DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

Several Turk trenches were rushed by the South Wales Borderers. The Hill was occupied by 1.30 a.m. 7th August,

(9)

5.(b) and touch was gained with the Troops posted by the Left
(Cont.) Assaulting Column (para 5.e.) to picket the hills in the
direction of KOJA CHEMEN TEPE.

Situation (c) The SITUATION at midnight 6th/7th August was as follows :-
Right Covering Force in possession of OLD NO. 3 POST and BIG
TABLE TOP : fighting still proceeding on BAUCHOP HILL,
(which was finally cleared at 1. 10 a.m. 7th August), ^{and} LITTLE
TABLE TOP, ~~and the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.~~
Left Covering Force in occupation of the Southern slopes of
the DAMAKJELIK BAIR : fighting still in progress.
Right Assaulting Column moving up SAZLI BEIT DERE : and
CHAILAK DERE (Square 80 A. 3).
Left Assaulting Column approaching AGHYL DERE.
Reserves still in bivouac.

Assaulting
Columns. (d) The RIGHT ASSAULTING COLUMN (vide para 4. c.), making use of
two lines of Advance i.e. the SAZLI BEIT DERE and the
CHAILAK DERE, commenced its advance up these Gullies at ~~that~~
~~position~~ 12. 30 a.m. 7th August.

That portion (One Battalion) which went by the SAZLI BEIT
DERE met with little opposition, but its advance was slow
owing to the extremely intricate nature of the country,
which caused the Column to lengthen out considerably.
Shortly before dawn, the Officer Commanding, Lieut.Colonel
J.G. Hughes D.S.O., commanding the Canterbury Infantry
Battalion, found himself at the foot of RHODODENDRON RIDGE,
and at once led his Battalion on to its lower slopes where
he joined up with the rest of the Column.

The greater part of the Right Assaulting Column moved up
the CHAILAK DERE, the Otago Battalion leading, and soon met
with opposition which necessitated the deployment of the
leading troops. Owing to the confined and broken nature
of the country, this took time and the advance of the
Column was slow though steady.

After taking part in the attacks on BAUCHOP HILL (where a

(10)

5. (d)
(Cont.)

Machine Gun was captured), TABLE TOP (250 prisoners captured), and the Ridges in the vicinity of LITTLE TABLE TOP (Square 80. D. 1), the force reached RHODODENDRON SPUR, where it connected up with the Canterbury Battalion at about 5. 45 a.m. 7th August, and the whole Force moved up the SPUR and RIDGE and entrenched on the line Ridge 80 D. 5 & 9 - 80 J. 3 - 80 K. 1. ^{round the head of the valley}

Left Assaulting Column connected with it At this point the ~~Column was joined by 6 Companies both~~ by means of the 10th Gurkhas. ~~Gurkhas who had lost their way.~~

Here it was exposed to enfilade fire from BATTLESHIP HILL (Square 80. O. 2 & 3) and a trench along the Ridge North East of CHUNUK BAIR.

At 9. 30 a.m. a further attack was made on CHUNUK BAIR; but without success, owing to the increasing opposition offered by the enemy, and the fatigue of the men.

- (e) The LEFT ASSAULTING COLUMN (vide para 4. d) began to move over the CHAILAK DERE FORD at 12.30 a.m. 7th August, and followed the Left Covering Force to the AGHYL DERE, up which Valley it turned. Opposition was soon met with and this, combined with the difficult nature of the country, made the advance extremely slow.

The 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade (Brig-General J. MONASH) moved up the spurs North of the AGHYL DERE, North Fork (Square 92 Y. 1), its objective being KOJA CHEMEN TEPE. The country was exceedingly difficult and intricate, and in the face of considerable opposition, but slow progress was made. The 29th (Indian) Brigade advanced up the AGHYL DERE (South Fork) and the spurs to the North of it, its objective being HILL Q (Square 81 A.2).

At dawn, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade was on the line of the ASMAK DERE (Square 92 ^PU - 93 Q. 7) : the 29th (Indian) Brigade on a Ridge West of the FARM (80 F. 8) and along the Spurs to the North East.

5. (e)
(Cont.)

Brig-General Cox then ordered Brig-General Monash to collect his Brigade, leaving half a Battalion on the line of the ASMAK DERE, and to assault KOJA CHEMEN TEPE, giving him the 14th Sikhs from the 29th (Indian) Brigade.

Two Battalions of the Reserve were placed at General Cox's disposal to enable him to consolidate a position on the Main Ridge.

Increasing opposition on the part of the enemy and the fatigue of the Troops, however, prevented this assault from being made.

(f) The Forces detailed to hold No. 3 Section ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ (less COURTNEY'S POST) and No. 4 Section (vide para 4. f) did all in their power to hold the enemy to his defences, and draw his fire, during the night 6th/7th August.

This was done by means of fire action and bombing, which kept the enemy on the qui vive all through the night and drew a heavy volume of fire from him.

From 4. ~~30~~ a.m. 7th August, an exceptionally heavy bombardment of the Turkish trenches in front of RUSSELL'S TOP, POPE'S HILL and QUINN'S POST took place, all available guns, assisted by guns of H.M. Ships being engaged from 4. ~~20~~ to 4.30 a.m.; heavy rifle and machine gun fire was also directed ^{to} on/the same objective. At exactly 4. 30 a.m. an assault by the 8th Light Horse Regiment was delivered from the trenches of RUSSELL'S TOP against the enemy trenches on and dominating the NEK (Sq. 80 N. 8).

This was met by a terrific rifle and machine gun fire, and although some of the men reached the enemy's trenches, they were unable to maintain their position there and were withdrawn. Simultaneously with this attack, two

assaults were delivered from the Posts in No. 3 Section. From QUINN'S POST the 2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment assaulted the "I" trenches in spite of many difficulties, and in the face of a heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

(12)

5. (f)
Cont.

The leading line suffered severely, and the Officer Commanding exercised what was probably a wise discretion in discontinuing the assault.

From POPE'S POST the 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment, moving out round the flanks of the Post, delivered an assault and succeeded in reaching the third line of enemy trenches.

About 100 yards of these were held for two hours, but eventually strong counter-attacks compelled the troops to retire, as they could not be adequately supported. Severe loss was undoubtedly inflicted on the enemy by these assaults, and they fulfilled their object of engaging the enemy's attention and preventing him from detaching Troops to other portions of the line. Our losses, which were heavy, included, I regret to say, Lieut. Colonel A. Miell 9th Australian Light Horse, and Lieut. Colonel A. H. White 8th Australian Light Horse who were killed while leading their men to the Assault.

Situation (g)

The SITUATION at 3. 30 p.m. August 7th was as follows :-
Brig-General Johnston's Column on RHODODENDRON SPUR and RIDGE.

The 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade on the FARM RIDGE, and along the Spurs to the North East.

The 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the line of the ASMA DERE.

The Right Covering Force in occupation of BIG TABLE TOP, OLD NO. 3 POST, and BAUCHOP HILL. General Russell had been ordered to hold this line with 2 Regiments of Mounted Rifles, and to assemble 2 Regiments and the Maori Contingent ready to move as required.

The Left Covering Force (Brig-General Travers) in occupation of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

Forces detailed for operations from Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of the Anzac Position in occupation of their original lines. All had suffered heavily, and the men were tired.

I therefore decided to halt on these positions and wait till nightfall before attempting to gain a footing on the Main Ridge (SARI BAIR).

The fighting had been severe throughout the day, and the Turks showed little disposition to retire completely from the low ground between the SARI BAIR Ridge & the sea.

SECOND ASSAULT ON THE SARI BAIR POSITION.

6. During the afternoon of the 7th August, reconnaissances were made with a view to a further attack on the SARI BAIR Position, and orders were issued for an advance in three Columns as under :-

(a) RIGHT COLUMN : Brig-General F.E. Johnston.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.
No. 1 Company N.Z. Engineers.
N.Z. Infantry Brigade. (8th Welsh Pioneers
2 Battalions, 13th Division 7th Gloucester-
Maori Contingent. shire Regiment.)

Objective : The line Point 161 (80 K. 5. 6) - CHUNUK
BAIR - Point 81 A. 4.

(b) CENTRE and LEFT COLUMNS : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion) and
with 6th South Lincs. Regiment attached.
29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Objective : The line 81 A. 4 - HILL Q (81 A. 2) - Point
305.

Lower line

- (c) The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (less Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment) to remain in occupation of BIG TABLE TOP - OLD NO. 3 POST - BAUCHOP HILL.
The 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions) to remain in occupation of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

7. The attack, which was preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, commenced at 4. 15 a.m. 8th August.

- (a) On the RIGHT, General Johnston's Column, headed by the Wellington Infantry Battalion, and supported by the 7th Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers and the Maori Contingent, the whole gallantly led by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Malone, Wellington Infantry Battalion, who I regret to say, was killed during the course of the action, made a determined attack, and succeeded in gaining the South Western slopes of the main knoll of CHUNUK BAIR.

7. (b) In the CENTRE, the 39th Infantry Brigade and the Indian Brigade, advancing from the positions they occupied overnight, moved along the Gullies leading up to the SARI BAIR Ridge - Right moving South of the FARM (80 F. 8) on CHUNUK BAIR - remainder up the Spurs to the North East of the FARM on the NEK (81 A. 4) and on HILL Q (81 A. 2).
 xxxx Little progress was made owing to the severity of the enemy's rifle and Machine Gun fire, but some ground was gained on the Spurs to the North East of the FARM.
- (c) On the LEFT, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade advanced from its position on the ASMA DERE (92 P. U.) against the lower slopes of the ABDEL RAHMAN BAIR (93 L.) with the intention of wheeling to its right, and attacking KOJA CHEMEN TEPE up the Spur. Considerable opposition was immediately met with from well-placed Turkish Machine guns, and Infantry in position. In spite of every effort, no material progress was made, and on the approach of heavy Columns of the enemy, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, which was then virtually surrounded, was withdrawn to its previous line on the ASMA DERE ; and in this position withstood, for many hours, determined attacks by the enemy.
- (d) The SITUATION at 12 noon was as follows :-
 General Johnston's Column in occupation of the South Western slopes of CHUNUK BAIR.
 The 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade in occupation of the FARM (80 F. 8) and the Spurs to the North East.
 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the ASMA DERE.
 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions) on the DAMAK-JELIK BAIR.
 Fighting in progress all along the line.
- It was* I then decided to break off the action till night-fall, preparatory to another attack on the Main Ridge, using the footing gained on CHUNUK BAIR as a pivot.

THIRD ASSAULT ON THE SARI BAIR RIDGE.

8. (a) During the afternoon of the 8th August, further reconnaissances of lines of approach to the enemy's positions were made, and orders were issued for a further advance in three Columns, and to attack the line CHUNUK BAIR - HILL Q under cover of the foothold gained by General Johnston's Column on the morning of the 8th August.

Distribution
- of -
Troops.

The Assaulting Columns were as follows, two Battalions of the 29th (British) Infantry Brigade (the 10th Hampshire Regiment and the 6th Royal Irish Rifles) having joined the Force from Army Corps Reserve, under command of their Brigadier, Brig-General R.J. Cooper :-

NO. 1 COLUMN : Brigadier-General F.E. Johnston.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.
Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment.
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
2 Battalions, 13th Division (8th Welsh Pioneers
and 7th Gloucestershire Regiment).

Objective : To hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 8th August, and in co-operation with other Columns, to gain the whole of the CHUNUK BAIR, extending to the South East.

NO. 2 COLUMN : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion but
with 6th South Lancs. Regiment attached).
Indian Infantry Brigade.

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q" (81 A. 2).
The advance to commence from present positions.

NO. 3 COLUMN : Brig-General A.H. Baldwin, Commanding 38th (Infantry) Brigade.

Troops : 6th East Lancashire Regiment.
6th Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment.
10th Hampshire Regiment.
6th Royal Irish Rifles.
5th Wiltshire Regiment.

8. (a) Position of Assembly : the CHAILAK DERE : Head of Column at 80 D. 9.

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q": the Column to move East of the FARM. This Column was to be the main attack, and the other Columns were ordered to co-operate with it.

Course
of the
Operations

- (b) At 4. 30 a.m. on the 9th August, a heavy bombardment of the CHUNUK BAIR Ridge and HILL "Q" by the Naval guns and all those under my control, commenced : this was continued with increasing intensity till 5.15 a.m. at which time the fire was directed on to the flanks of the position being attacked, and on to its reverse slopes. (less Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment who had been sent up earlier) In the meantime, No. 3 Column (General Baldwin's) had assembled at 8 p.m. ^{8th August} in the CHAILAK DERE, and moved up towards General Johnston's Headquarters.

General Baldwin's plan, of which I entirely approved, was to form up his Battalions immediately behind the trenches occupied by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and from there to launch his attack in successive lines, keeping as much as possible on the high ground. With this object, arrangements were made for the narrow track to be kept clear of all obstructions, such as wounded coming down, rations going up etc, and guides were provided for his Column. But in spite of all these precautions, he was so much delayed and hampered by the extreme difficulty of the scrub-covered country to be traversed, the steepness of the ascent, and the heavy fire which met him immediately he neared the summit, that his Column was unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the FARM - CHUNUK BAIR till 5. 15 a.m.

Meanwhile the ~~xxxxxxx~~ 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Brigade gallantly led by Lieut-Colonel C.J.L. Allanson, 6th Gurkha Rifles, advanced up the slopes of SARI BAIR, and succeeded

8. (b)
(Cont.)

in crowning the heights on the Nek between CHUNUK BAIR and HILL "Q". From this vantage point, they looked down upon the DARDANELLES, and saw Turkish motor-cars and other Transport coming and going along the main roads to the Eastward. Unfortunately, no fresh Troops were sufficiently near to confirm this success, and a strong counter-attack delivered by the Turks, combined with heavy shelling, compelled them to withdraw to the lower slopes of SARI BAIR.

Two Companies of the East Lancashire Regiment, the leading Battalion of General Baldwin's Column, and the Hampshire Regiment, who gained ~~gained~~ the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on CHUNUK BAIR, now attacked : The Turks were by this time lining the crest in great strength, and they were unable to make any headway. General Baldwin was eventually compelled to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the FARM. I regret to say that Colonel A.R. Cole-Hamilton, 6th East Lancashire Regiment, was killed at the head of his Battalion.

The New Zealand Troops, in spite of repeated attacks by the enemy, maintained their ground ~~under orders of Brigadier General Sir J. Johnston~~, and at the end of the day still held a footing - a rather precarious one it is true - on the crest of CHUNUK BAIR.

During the evening, the 6th Leinster Regiment joined the Force from Army Corps Reserve, and was placed under the Orders of Brig-General Johnston.

That night the general line held by us in this locality ran up the RHODODENDRON RIDGE to the forward trenches on CHUNUK BAIR, thence in a north-westerly direction through the FARM, and from there northwards to the ASMA DERE.

(18)

OPERATIONS ON THE ~~XXXXXX~~ 10th AUGUST 1915.

9. (a) During the night 9th/10th August 1915, the New Zealand Troops in occupation of CHUNUK BAIR were relieved. They had been fighting for three days and three nights with no sleep and with little food and water, and their relief was imperatively necessary.
- The position they had held under such difficulties was handed over to two Battalions of British Infantry - the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment : the 10th Hampshire Regiment connecting them ~~---~~ with the Troops about the FARM. ~~---~~
- (b) At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a determined attack from the line CHUNUK BAIR - HILL "Q" against our positions. This attack was particularly directed against the two Battalions (vide 9 a.) holding the top of CHUNUK BAIR itself. These two Battalions, attacked by a force estimated at about a Division, and subjected to heavy shell fire ~~xxxxxx~~ held their own gallantly for some time, ^{but were} at length overpowered, and forced out of the trenches.
- The onrush of the Turks was, however, stopped by our supporting Troops, by excellent shelling from the Wardips, and by the highly effective fire of the New Zealand and Australian Field Artillery, the Mountain Artillery Brigade, and 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery, which first caught successive lines of Turkish Infantry as they topped the crest of the Ridge, and then rained shell on them as they assembled in the various gullies. X
- In the meantime, a heavy attack was being made against our positions at the FARM and on the Spurs to the North East, and some portions of our line here were compelled to temporarily give ground. The ground so lost was,

(19)

9. (b)
(Cont.)

however, recovered after fierce fighting by bodies of Troops under command of Brigadier-Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper who, with their Commanding Officers, set an example of personal courage and leadership beyond all praise.

During these operations, I regret to say that Brigadier-General A.H. Baldwin, 38th Infantry Brigade, was killed, and Brigadier-General R.J. Cooper severely wounded.

Lieut-Colonel M.H. Nunn, commanding the 9th Worcestershire Regiment, was also killed, and Lieut-Colonels H.G. Levinge, Commanding 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and J. Carden, Commanding the 5th Wiltshire Regiment, are, I regret to say, missing.

In view of the probability of further determined attacks on our positions, the Army Corps Commander sent up the 5th Connaught Rangers from Army Corps Reserve, thus completing the 29th Infantry Brigade (Brig-General R.J. Cooper): This Battalion was sent up the AGHYL DERE. By 10 a.m. the main attack of the Turks had expended itself, and those that remained on our side of the Ridge began to stream back over the Ridge suffering heavy casualties as they did so: and by the end of the day, there was scarcely a Turk left on the Slopes of the Ridge facing us.

During the morning, a determined attack was made on our Northern Positions along the ASMA DERE and on the DAMAK-JELIK BAIR, held respectively by the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General J. Monash, and the 4th South Wales Borderers. This attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

A second attack was delivered against the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade at 3 p.m. and was also repulsed.

I regret to say that Lieut-Colonel F.M. Gillespie, Commanding the 4th South Wales Borderers, was killed in action while commanding his Battalion in this portion of our line.

9. (b)

~~Bridge at Koonung~~

(Cont.) In the evening General Cox, finding the line of the FARM, and Spurs to the North East unsuitable, withdrew slightly to the line Knoll 80 D. 5 - 6 - 80 D. 2 - 92 Z. 7, and thence to the ASMA DERE.

(c) As a result of the last four days' fighting, it was found necessary to re-organize the line held by the Force Attacking SARI BAIR, and orders were issued accordingly. The line held was divided into four Sections numbered

3 - 6 as follows :- (Nos. 1 and 2 Sections were held by the 1st Australian Division).

NO. 3 SECTION : Brigadier-General H.G. Chauvel C.M.G.

Troops : 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.
2 Companies, 8th Cheshire Regiment.

NO. 4 SECTION : Brigadier-General F.G. Hughes.

Troops : 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
8th Cheshire Regiment (less 2 Companies).

NO. 5 SECTION : Major-General F.C. Shaw, C.B.

Outer Line : Brigadier-General J.H. Travers.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect.)
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
8th Welsh Pioneers, Divisional Troops,
13th Division.
6th Leinster Regiment (29th Infantry
Brigade).
6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (38th
Infantry Brigade):
7th Gloucester Regiment (39th Infantry
Brigade).
8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (40th Infantry
Brigade).
5th Wiltshire Regiment (40th Infantry
Brigade).
New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

Inner Line : Brigadier-General A.H. Russell.

Troops. : New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.
Maori Contingent.

NO. 6 SECTION : Brigadier-General H.V. Cox C.B., C.S.I.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect)
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
10th Hampshire Regiment (29th Infantry
Brigade).
6th Royal Irish Rifles (29th Infantry
Brigade).

Troops in
No. 6 Section
(Cont.)

6th Royal Lancaster Regiment (38th Infantry Brigade).
4th South Wales Borderers (40th Infantry Brigade).
29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.

and the following Battalions under the command of Brigadier-General W. de S. Cayley;

5th Connaught Rangers (29th Infantry Brigade)
6th East Lancashire Regiment (38th Infantry Brigade).
6th South Lancashire Regiment (38th Infantry Brigade).
9th Worcestershire Regiment (39th Infantry Brigade).
9th Warwickshire Regiment (39th Infantry Brigade).
7th North Staffordshire Regiment (39th Infantry Brigade).

The frontages of the Sections referred to above ~~have been~~ were allotted as follows :-

NO. 3 SECTION : COURTNEY'S POST (exclusive) - QUINN'S POST (80 S. 7) - POPE'S HILL (80 S. 4) - RUSSELL'S TOP (80 N. 7) (exclusive).

NO. 4 SECTION : RUSSELL'S TOP (80 N. 7) - WALKER'S RIDGE (80 M. 8 - 4) (inclusive) to the sea.

NO. 5 SECTION : WALKER'S RIDGE (Exclusive) - No. 1 OUTPOST (80 H. 8) - DESTROYER HILL (80 I. 1) - RHODODENDRON SPUR (80 K. 1) - Knoll on Spur 80 D. 5 (exclusive).

NO. 6 SECTION : Knoll on Spur 80 D. 5 (inclusive) - Knoll 92 Y. 9 - Knoll 92 U. 9 - 92 U. 2-3 - DAMAKJELIK BAIR - KAZLAR CHAIR (exclusive) (92 A. 7), where it joins with the right of the 9th Corps.

was ordered to be

This general line ~~was consolidated~~ being consolidated with a view to a further advance, and Units, which had of necessity become considerably intermingled in the course of the severe and continuous fighting in such broken and difficult country ~~to be as far as possible~~ to be as far as possible, reorganized into their Brigades and higher Formations.

10.
Artillery

The Artillery of the Force, and the guns of the 1st Australian Division, at all times gave efficient support to the attacking Troops, and not only rendered material assistance to the Infantry in repelling the Turkish counter-attacks; but were, I am satisfied, responsible for the infliction of severe loss on the enemy.

11.
Engineers

The Engineer Field Companies did much valuable work in improving communications up the narrow and tortuous gullies which were our only means of access to the Troops in the fighting line. The water supply, which was a matter of serious difficulty, was thereby much facilitated. The specially good work done by these Companies in connection with work on trenches by night proved the men belonging to them to be possessed of courage and determination beyond the ordinary.

The Signal Companies efficiently kept up communication between my Headquarters and the various Columns, and the bravery and devotion to duty of the linesmen, who went out to repair faults in the dark, over difficult and intricate country, and often under heavy fire, is beyond praise.

12.
Supply
and
Transport

The Supply and Transport arrangements of the Force worked smoothly and well, in the face of great difficulties of terrain and a shortage of easily obtainable water. The Troops were kept supplied with ample food and ammunition, and everything possible was done to supply water in sufficient quantities.

The personnel of the Indian Mule Cart Train rendered yeoman service in keeping the Troops supplied frequently under heavy fire.

13.
Medical

Manders killed

The Medical Arrangements were subjected to a considerable strain owing to the heavy casualties, and the difficulty of transporting the wounded down the narrow gullies which formed our sole means of communication with the fighting Troops. The Medical Officers and Stretcher bearers were indefatigable in their efforts, and did all in their power to cope with the rush of wounded.

14.
Casualties

The Casualties, I regret to say, were severe, amounting to 375 Officers and 10,158 Other Ranks, Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

15.

" Throughout the period under report, I received the greatest possible assistance from Major-General F.C. Shaw C.B., Commanding 13th Division, and his Staff. General Shaw's coolness and judgment throughout, and his services in command of a section of the attack during its latter stages, were of the utmost value to me personally, and to the operations generally.

I wish to bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-Generals H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., Commanding 29th (Indian) Brigade, F.E. Johnston (North Staffordshire Regiment), Commanding New Zealand Infantry Brigade, J.H. Travers, Commanding 40th Infantry Brigade, and A.H. Russell, Commanding New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, who commanded the assaulting and covering columns.

The difficulty and responsibility of the conduct of these operations, necessitating, as they did, a night march, night attacks, and much movement by night, in an exceptionally broken and rugged country, proved these Officers to have qualities of leadership of a high order.

Brigadier-Generals W. de S. Cayley, 39th Infantry Brigade, H.G. Chauvel C.M.G. Commanding 1st Australian

15. (Cont.)

LightHorse Brigade, F.G. Hughes, Commanding 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, and J. Monash V.D., Commanding 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, are also deserving of great credit for the manner in which they handled their commands and carried out the operations entrusted to them.

I would further bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander, for his favourable consideration, the excellent work done throughout the operations by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Braithwaite, D.S.O., Royal Welch Fusiliers, General Staff Officer 1st Grade; Lieut-Colonel J.J. Esson, 5th (Wellington) Regiment (New Zealand), Assistant Quartermaster-General; Colonel N. Manders, Army Medical Service, Assistant Director of Medical Services (killed in action); Lieut-Colonel G.N. Johnston, R.A. Commanding the Artillery, and Lieut-Colonel G.R. Pridham, R.E., Commanding the Engineers, all of the New Zealand and Australian Division, upon whom fell the responsibility for the control, in their various branches, of the arrangements for the considerable force which I have the honour to command.

I propose to submit later a further list of names of Officers whose services were of such a nature as to merit special mention.

For the valuable and substantial help and co-operation rendered by the guns and searchlights of the Royal Navy to the operations of my Force, I cannot adequately express my thanks. At no time of day or night did they fail to respond immediately to any request for help which I made, and on the mornings of the 9th and 10th, their fire was in a large degree responsible for such success as we have achieved.

15.
(Cont.)

This Force is specially indebted to the following of

H.M. Ships :

H.M.S. BACCHANTE - Captain the Hon. A.D.H. Boyle M.V.O.

H.M.S. ENDYMION - Captain A.V. Vyvyan..

H.M.S. COLNE - Commander C. Seymour.

H.M.S. CHELMER - Commander H.T. England.

I cannot close this report without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian Units have been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies have only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them have not previously been under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks - from the Old Country, Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Alex Godley

Major-General.

Commanding New Zealand & Australian
Division.