


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/25/8 Part 3

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters,  
Australian and New Zealand Army  
Corps

November 1915



AWM4-1/25/8PART3



Appendix (35a)

Operations on Hill 60

Nov 1915

\*



Secret.

35a

131

A. & H. Army Corps

Appendix No. 35A

The Artillery of the Division under my command has been requested to give support to an operation for the capture of Hill 60 (94 J 458) to be carried out by the 54<sup>th</sup> Division at an early date.

I append a copy of the instructions issued by the 54<sup>th</sup> Div for the operation, together with artillery proposals which it is considered will give the necessary support.

The operation will entail considerable expenditure of ammunition, and I would like approval of this expenditure if the GOC Army Corps considers the operation warranted.

*A. Rodley*

Major General

Command of 11th A Division

2.10.15

Rec<sup>d</sup> 21002/10



B.M.

+ 129

ASSAULT ON HILL 60 (92 J 4/8)

Appendix No. 35A

Instructions for the Artillery  
by the G.R.A. No. 2. & A. Division.General Plan.

1. Copy of 54th Division's Secret No. G 1280 is attached, and is to be read in conjunction with these instructions.

A tracing of part of Map KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (1/10,000) is also attached to show the locality.

General Action of the Artillery.

2. The action of the artillery is divided into the following :-

- (a) The destruction of the wire entanglement in front of the first line of Turkish trenches (D-E).
- (b) A 20 minutes bombardment of C, beginning immediately the assault on A-B has been launched, and ending immediately before the assault on B-C begins.
- (c) A bombardment of trenches by which the enemy might bring up reserves. This is not to begin until the assault on A-B has been launched.
- (d) The neutralizing of hostile guns impeding our operations.
- (e) Action against Machine Guns on HILL 100 (92 P/U) and on the ridge between there and HILL 60.
- (f) Miscellaneous.

Detailed action of Artillery.

3. Taking the sub-paragraphs of paragraph (2) separately :-

3rd Battery  
4th Battery  
C 69  
D 69  
Left Sect. 17th Siege  
Battery  
6 in. Howitzer.

- (a) The destruction of the wire entanglement in front of the first line of Turkish trenches (D - E).

This task has been allotted to the batteries named in the margin, and detailed instructions were issued to all concerned on 27th September 1915 under the heading "Time Table - HILL 60".

By these instructions zones were allotted to each of the batteries, and the length of wire required to be demolished was more than covered. The time-table has since been temporarily suspended, owing partly to the fact that the wire soon became sufficiently destroyed in the opinion of the 54th Division, but, as the wire becomes rebuilt, the time-table will be brought into force again from time to time.

By this time-table, two combined bombardments at a rapid rate of fire were set down. The dates were allotted quite arbitrarily as the 3rd and 11th October, and it is intended to carry them out, if possible, though not necessarily on those dates. It is considered that these bombardments will lead the enemy



X 130

35a

into thinking that, if we intend to assault, we shall assault after a preliminary bombardment delivered immediately beforehand, of which these are rehearsals.

Sect. 4th Battery  
Left Sect. 17th  
Siege Battery.

(b) A 20 minutes' bombardment on C, beginning immediately the assault on A-B has been launched and ending immediately before the assault on B-C begins.

The signal for the commencement of this bombardment will be the explosion of the mines under the front line of Turkish trenches (D-E), and it will continue for 20 minutes exactly. Its object is to smash in the junction at C: to help to block the approaches to it from the east and south; and to assist the passage of the assaulting parties from B and ASH LANE.

The batteries named in the margin will undertake this task. Number of rounds -

Sect. 4th Battery - 100.

Left Sect. 17th Siege Battery - greatest possible.

(c) A bombardment of trenches by which the enemy might bring up reserves. This is not to begin until the assault on A-B has been launched.

There are four such trenches -

- P - X
- Q - R
- S - T
- V - Z

3rd Battery.

P - X. This trench, together with any others which may in the meantime have been constructed immediately in its rear, and by which the enemy could bring up reserves from his right without having to pass through Q-R, S-T or V-Z, will be engaged by the 3rd Battery. The zone is not quite as shown on the sketch, which does not carry the trenches far enough to the North to show it. Our infantry's left will rest on a point about 15 yards north of A, and X should be placed as near A as possible without endangering them. P should then be placed about 60 yards north of X as so placed, in order that the Battery shall not have too great a frontage. It must, within its zone, bring a fire to bear sufficiently intense to deny this approach to the enemy. The signal for opening fire will be the explosion of the mines under the lines of trenches D-E, and the normal rate of fire for the first hour will be battery fire 5 seconds, after which it should be possible to slacken it considerably.

50 instead of 15  
see 3d of op. order ||  
102

12 rounds minute  
= 720 rounds  
1 hour

D 69

3 Guns, 21st (Kohat)  
Mountain Battery at  
92 N 5/8.

Q - R. This covers the approach of the enemy from the North East, and is allotted to the batteries named in the margin. The signal for the commencement of the bombardment will be the



4 Guns 26th (Jacob's)  
Mountain Battery at  
9C W 2/3.

Sect. 4th Battery.

1 Gun, 1st Battery  
in tunnel 92 O.8.

C 69.

Sect. 1st Battery (d)  
2nd Battery  
5th Battery and 1 gun  
1st Battery.

B 69  
Right section 17th  
Siege Battery  
10th Heavy Battery  
(9th Corps)

explosion of the mines under the line of trenches D-E. A good rate of fire will be kept up for the first hour (about 700 rounds for the mountain guns and 180 rounds for D 69), after which it will probably be possible to slacken it considerably.

S - T. This covers the approach of the enemy from the East, and is allotted as per margin. The signal for the commencement of this bombardment will be, so far as concerns the Section, 4th Battery, the explosion of the mines under the line of trenches D - E. The amount of fire required within the first hour is 350 rounds from the Sect. 4th Battery, and every effort, consistent with accuracy, must be made to attain at least this rate. At the conclusion of the hour it should be possible to slacken it considerably.

The one gun 1st Battery is placed as a gun of opportunity. It will be able to enfilade and to get partially in reverse of the Northern end of S-T. It will unmask its tunnel on the explosion of the mines along the line of trenches D - e, but will not open fire unless and until it sees troops in its zone in sufficient numbers.

V - Z. This covers the approach of the enemy from the south-east. The bombardment is allotted to C 69. It will commence on the explosion of the mines, and for the first 20 minutes need not be at so great a rate as for the remaining 40 minutes of the first hour, as C will be being bombarded during that time. For the last 40 minutes of the first hour a rate of 180 shells per hour should be maintained, after which it may be possible to slacken it somewhat.

The neutralizing of hostile guns  
impeding  
~~our~~ our operations.

The batteries named in the margin will undertake this task.

An aeroplane is being asked for, and will be allotted to B 69.

The zones allotted are indicated by naming the batteries known to exist in each as follows :-

Sect. 1st Battery.  
93 R 1/4, 93 R 4/7.

2nd Battery.  
93 W 5, 93 W 9, 93 X 7.

5th Battery and 1 gun 1st Battery.  
81 A 1/5, 81 A 5, 81 A 7.

B 69.  
93 R 9, 93 W 5, 93 W 9.  
93 X 4, 93 X 5, 93 X 7.

Right Sect. 17th Siege Battery.  
93 L 1, 93 M 4.

10th Heavy Battery (9th Corps).

Guns on W HILLS and in that vicinity.

All the above batteries will remain in



x 137

observation of their guns until they open fire.

- (e) Action against machine guns on HILL 100 (92 P/U) and on the ridge between there and HILL 60.

No information can be given as to where these machine guns are.

2 Guns 26th (Jacob's) Mountain Battery, at 80 D. 9.  
 Left Section 17th Siege Battery (after bombarding C) Navy.

Hill 100 will be subjected to a steady bombardment by the guns named in the margin, beginning, except as regards left sect. 17th Siege Battery, on the explosion of the mines under the line of trenches D - E. The left Sect. 17th Siege Battery will switch to HILL 100 at the conclusion of the bombardment of C.

Section 4th Battery (after bombarding C) 9th Corps Artillery

The section of the 4th Battery allotted to the bombardment of C will, on the conclusion of that bombardment, subject the ridge between HILL 60 and HILL 100 (both exclusive) to a fire designed to keep down the enemy machine guns.

Such guns as the C.R.A. Right Flank Corps can allot will enfilade the same zone from the direction of CHOCOLATE HILL with the same object.

Godfrey's Battery. (f)

Miscellaneous.

The two 4 inch naval guns of this Battery will shell the Turkish trenches in 92 C and D at a steady rate, beginning on the explosion of the mines under the line of trenches D - E.

Registration.

4.

The following dates and hours are allotted for registration:

- 1st Brigade.
- 2nd Brigade.
- 34th Brigade.
- 69th Brigade.
- 7th Ind. M. A. Brigade.
- 9th Corps.
- Navy. 4" guns

Reports.

5.

The C.R.A. will be at 54th Div. Headquarters.

Issued as under :-

Copy No.

*Musickman*

Captain,  
for Brigade-Major,  
New Zealand Field Artillery



54TH DIVISION.

G. 1280.

PROPOSALS FOR THE ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF THE CREST OF HILL 60.

- 1. OBJECTIVE. The second line of Turkish trenches ( A - B - C ) to be the objective. Operations to reach this objective must be divided into four phases :-
  - (a) The destruction of the wire entanglement in front of the first line of Turkish trenches (D-E) to allow passage of assaulting troops.  
N.B. There is at present no wire in front of the trench (A-B).
  - (b) The destruction by mine explosions of the first line of trenches (D-E), and the clearing of these trenches by bombing and bayonet parties.
  - (c) The assault, capture and consolidation of the second line of trenches (A-B).
  - (d) The capture and consolidation of the remainder of the second line of trench from B-C.

2.(a) PASSAGE THROUGH THE WIRE MUST BE ENSURED BEFORE AN ASSAULT IS DELIVERED. Destruction of wire entanglement can only be adequately effected by artillery bombardment.

If this artillery bombardment immediately precedes the assault, the enemy will have warning of our intention, and the element of surprise will be eliminated.

It is therefore suggested that artillery fire should be brought to bear daily at irregular intervals, on the wire. This spasmodic bombardment will create gaps, and as the date fixed for the assault approaches, the daily bombardment can be intensified. If this goes on for some days, the suspicion of the enemy may be lulled, and on the date fixed, it may be possible to effect a surprise assault.

Even though it may appear that the wire is destroyed, parties must be told off in the assaulting columns with wire cutters to deal with any standing wire.

(b) Mine Explosions under the first line of trenches (D-E) to be fired at a given moment on the date selected for the assault. These explosions to be the first signal for the attack.

The explosions of the mines should practically obliterate large sections of the first line of trenches (D-E), but it is probable that the enemy will hold on to portions of the undamaged sections.

Bombing and bayonet parties must be told off to clear the first line of trenches. These parties will move forward with the 2nd line of the Battalion told off for the assault of the 2nd line of trenches (vide:- (c) below), but must drop into the 1st line as the assaulting Companies move across them.

(c) The assault of the second line trenches will be carried out immediately after the mine explosions. The assaulting companies to move forward in 3 lines crossing the first line of trenches (D-E) and dropping into the second line of trenches (A-B). The first 2 lines to be formed up for the assault previously to the mine explosions, in our fire trench (F-G) at a man a yard in each line. The first line to be clear of our wire before the signal is given for the second line to advance. The 3rd line to be drawn up in support trench (H-J) and to commence filing into fire trench (F-G) as soon as the mines explode. This line will move forward under orders of O.C. Battalion.

Simultaneously with the advance of the first line of the assaulting Companies, bombing and bayonet parties to be launched along the communication trenches leading towards the enemy's trenches from IVY LANE, MIDDLE LANE, and BEECH LANE.

Consolidating parties following close behind the bombing parties will place these communications in a state of defence both towards the north and south.

On reaching the second line of trenches (A-B) the assaulting Companies will bomb and bayonet the enemy, and will at once start putting the captured trench into a state of defence towards the East. Special parties will be told off to work along the trench



(B-C) leading south, to join up with the bombing party from ASH LANE (vide:- (d) below). A similar party will join up with the IVY LANE party.

One Battalion (about 400 men) should be sufficient to find the Companies assaulting the trench (A-B), the various bombing parties mentioned above, the bombing party mentioned in (c) below, and also for the party to clear the 1st line trench (vide:- "b"). This must be a fresh Battalion, and not the garrison of our fire trenches: it must be brought up into its position for the assault, only just before the hour timed for the mine explosions.

Detailed organization of the assaulting Companies to be most carefully arranged.

Half Company R.E. to be distributed amongst the assaulting troops.

(d) Capture of remainder of 2nd line trench (B-C).

Simultaneously with the mine explosions, an intense and concentrated bombardment to be opened by the Artillery on the junction of the Turkish trenches at "C". This bombardment to be kept up for 20 minutes.

Twenty minutes after mine explosion (i.e., allowing time for artillery bombardment), a strong bombing party to be launched from ASH LANE along sap to point "C". This bombing party to join up with party working down from "S", and to help to block the trenches leading S and E from "C".

3. The original garrison of HILL 60 must remain intact and must not be used for the assault. In order to give room for the assaulting companies (Para 2 (c) ) to be formed up in (F-G), the original garrison of this trench must be withdrawn into GRENADIERS ALLEY.

As soon as all three lines of the assaulting Companies have left the fire trench (F-G), the original garrison of the trench must immediately re-occupy their fire positions.

Sufficient dug-outs in the communication trenches (BURY STREET - BEDFORD ROW - COBBLERS ROW) must be constructed for the accommodation of the original supports etc., who now occupy these communication trenches. It is of the utmost importance that all communication trenches should be left entirely free for traffic.

4. To support the assaulting Battalion another Battalion (400 - 500 men) must be close at hand, ready to move forward as required to assist in consolidating and holding the captured trenches and communication trenches.

Dug-outs for three of the Companies of this Battalion must be constructed somewhere in BURY STREET and COBBLERS ROW: the 4th Company being placed in OLD GURKHA STREET. Half Company R.E. to be with this Battalion in support.

5. A fourth Battalion should be held ready at Brigade Headquarters as a Brigade Reserve.

6. Co-operation by troops on flanks and by artillery.

At the hour fixed for the mine explosion, a vigorous demonstration by the Infantry along the whole front of No. 4 Section will be carried out, and the 9th Corps will also be asked to assist in this.

In order further to distract the attention of the enemy from Hill 60, an Artillery bombardment of Hill 100 should be arranged to coincide with the assault on Hill 60.

Some batteries should also be told off to bring fire to bear on the Eastern Slopes of Hill 60, as soon as our assault is launched.

7. Assuming that the assault is successful, it is probable that the captured trenches will be subjected to intense artillery fire. Our artillery and that of 9th Corps must therefore be asked to engage the enemy artillery. It would possibly assist our artillery if aeroplanes were employed to locate hostile guns and 'spot' for our fire.

The assault on Hill 60 will be supported by fire from the

*no further  
particulars*



x 135

(3)

Appendix No. 35A.

Mountain Artillery placed in positions in the 161st Infantry Brigade line from which they can enfilade the Turkish trenches. 138

8. MEDICAL.

It is proposed to continue BEDFORD ROW from its junction with COBBLERS ROW to a sap which is already made and which runs roughly parallel to the latter ROW.

During the engagement, BEDFORD ROW and its continuation will be used exclusively for the evacuation of wounded from HILL 60. They will be taken to a dressing station which will be formed at dug-outs which exist on the main sap to HILL 60.

(Sgd) F.S. INGLEFIELD.

Major-General,

H.Q., 54th Division,

Commanding, 54th Division.



23/9/15.



# PLAN OF TRENCHES - HILL 60.

BRITISH TRENCHES ———  
GERMAN ———

— SCALE —




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


TRACING Part Map  
 KOJA CHEMEN TEPE  
 to show locality.



Handwritten signature and date:  
 Hussain...  
 30/7/5.





Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including a date "3/1/12" and some illegible text.



Secret.

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B.M. 350

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Copy No. 4 ..... 141

OPERATIONS ON HILL 60.

Instructions for the Artillery by C.R.A.

N.Z. & A. Division.

Otago Gully

Reference: Trench Map attached.

2nd November 1915.

GENERAL PLAN

(1) *made* The contents of secret B.M. 105 have been known to senior artillery officers. The copy, of 54th Division's Secret G 184.8 attached indicates sufficiently both the original intention and the present one. It is not anticipated that the operation will be carried out before the 8th November 1915.

GENERAL ACTION OF ARTILLERY.

(2) The action of the artillery is divided into the following:-  
(a) The destruction of the bombproofs between A and D with the object of destroying machine gun emplacements there.  
(b) A bombardment of points A, B, and C to prevent enemy sapping supports coming up.  
(c) A bombardment of the trenches by which the enemy might bring up reserves.  
(d) Action against machine guns on the HILL 100 spur.  
(e) The neutralising of hostile artillery.  
(f) Miscellaneous.

DETAILED ACTION OF ARTILLERY

(3) Taking the subparagraphs of paragraphs (2) separately:-

Left Section 17th Siege Battery

100

(a) The destruction of the bombproofs between A and D with the object of destroying machine gun emplacements there.  
Allotted as per margin. The B.C. will arrange to bombard them on each of several days, and that they are destroyed before the explosion of the mines along the trench D - E. If possible, no bombardment should take place on the day of and prior to, the explosion, as this would probably provoke retaliation and delay our infantry.

(b) A bombardment of points A, B, and C to prevent enemy supports coming up.  
To ~~prevent~~ commence on the explosion of the mines along the trench D - E. Rates of fire are given for the first 20 minutes only. After that the volume of fire required will depend on the situation, which cannot be predicted, and in the absence of further instructions the matter is left to the discretion of Battery Commanders.

I consider this a suitable plan for artillery cooperation for this operation, but it involves considerable expenditure of ammunition, but cannot be done satisfactorily with less.

C. B. O'Brien  
Maj. Gen. N. A. G. G. G.  
5/11/15

Seen sent to Army Staff  
Who thinks it is a  
plan. Successful  
C.R.A.



x 139

2.

Targets are allotted as follows:-

10th Heavy Battery

50

Point A. As per margin. Rate of fire 50 rounds in first 20 minutes.

C/69

60

Point B. As per margin. Rate of fire 60 rounds in first 20 minutes.

4th (Howitzer) Battery

Left Section 17th Siege Battery

60

Point C. As per margin. Rate of fire 60 rounds in first 20 minutes for 4th (Howitzer) Battery and greatest possible for Left Section 17th Siege Battery.

(e) A bombardment of the trenches by which the enemy might bring up reserves.

There are four such trenches namely:-

- P - X (including P. - X.)
- Q - R
- S - T
- V - X

Fire will commence on the explosion of of the mines along the trench D - E.

3rd Battery)  
4in Battery)

250

P - X (including P. - X.) Allotted as per margin. Rate of fire in first 20 minutes 200 rounds for 3rd Battery and 50 for 4in Battery.

D/69 )  
 4 guns 26th (Jacobs) )  
 Mountain Battery at )  
 92 W 2/3 )  
 3 guns 21st (Kohat) MB at 92 W 2/3 )  
 X 1 gun 1st Battery in )  
 tunnel at 92 O 9 )  
 Section 6th (Howitzer) )  
 Battery )

260

Q - R Allotted as per margin. Rate of fire for first 20 minutes:-

D/69	60
4 Mountain guns	200

60

S - T Allotted as per margin. Rate of fire for section 6th Battery 60 rounds in first 20 minutes.

The one gun 1st Battery is placed as a gun of opportunity. It will be able to enfilade and to get partially in reverse of S - T. It will unmask its tunnel on the explosion of the mines, but will not open fire unless and until it sees troops in sufficient numbers in its zone.

Section 6th (How) Battery

60

V - Z Allotted as per margin. Rate of fire 60 rounds in first 20 minutes.

2 guns 26th (Jacobs)  
Mountain Battery at 80

D 2

(d) Action against machine guns on the HILL 100 spur.

4th (Lowland) Battery

50

No information can be given as to where these machine guns are.

The Ridge from HILL 60 to HILL 100 (22 P/U) will be submitted to a steady bombardment by the guns named in the margin. The mountain guns will fire at HILL 100 itself. Rate 50 rounds in first 20 minutes.

40

The 4th (Lowland) Battery will engage the trenches on the spur named which were previously pointed out to Brigade Major R.A. Right Flank 9th Corps, from LALA BABA. Rate of fire 40 rounds in first 20 minutes.



X 140

3.

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143

Section 1st Battery  
2nd Battery  
5th Battery  
6in Howitzer  
B/69  
Right Section 17th Battery

Sege

(e) The neutralizing of hostile artillery.  
The Batteries named in the margin will undertake this task.

An aeroplane is being asked for to report guns what guns open fire.

The following is the allotment of targets  
1st Battery

81 A 1/5. 81 A 5. X 81 A 7.

2nd Battery

93 X 3. N 93 A 6/8. 93 H 9.

5th Battery

93 V 6/8. 93 V9/W7. 93 W 6. 93 W 5/7  
81 A 2/3.

6in Howitzer

93 Q 6. 93 R 1/4. 93 R 4. 93 R 4/7\*  
93 R 4/5. 93 R 4/8.

B/69

81 B 1. 93 X 5. 93 X 7. 93 W 9.  
93 R 9\*

Right section 17th Battery: 93G2 93L1 93M4.

Navy

(f) Miscellaneous.

The Navy will shell the gully of the ASMA DEBE ( 82 P and 83 Q ) as reserves are known to congregate there. Spotting will be from SUVLA. Fire will opened on the explosion of the mines.

REGISTRATION

(4)

The following dates and hours are allotted for registration ( except as against gun targets which will be arranged specially)

2nd Battery 4th November  
24th Brigade 5th November  
69th Brigade 6th November  
7th Ind. M.A. Brigade 7th November before 1530.  
9th Corps 7th November after 1530  
Navy At any time not later than 7th Nov.

REPORTS

(5)

The C.R.A. will be at 84th Divisional Headquarters.

Issued as under:-

Copy No 1	File	Copy No 6	2nd Brigade
2	War Diary	7	24th Brigade
3	War Diary	8	69th Brigade
4	B.G.R.A., ANZAC	9	7th I.M.A. Brigade
5	1st Brigade	10	C.R.A. Right Flank IX Corps.

*Russichman*

Captain R.N.Z.A.

Brigade Major R.A.

H.Z & A Division.



SECRET

*Guest*  
X 141

35a

144

To Headquarters,

A N Z A C.

-----

With reference to your Ga 432 of 25th ult., I forward herewith, copy No.6 of my Operation Order for the assault of Hill 60.

2. The date of the Assault depends on the completion of the mines. As soon as the date can be approximately fixed, you will be at once informed. It will probably be about a fortnight hence.

The hour timed for explosion of the mines will probably be about 1630.

3. Meanwhile, the works within Hill 60 (including the mines) are being pushed forward, and the Battalions concerned will carry out rehearsals of the tasks allotted.

4. I am in close consultation with the C.R.A., N.Z & A. Division regarding the Artillery co-operation.

H.Q.54th Division.

4 . 10 . 15

*J. L. Longpérier*

Major General.

Commanding 54th Division.



G1484

Secret

35a 145

X142

Copy No. 6

## 54th Divisional Operation Order

Ref. Map Attached

No. 2.

H.Q. 54th Div.

4-10-15.

1. An assault on the Turk trenches on the Crest of Hill 60 will be carried out by the 163rd Inf. Brigade and 2nd Field Coy. R.E. attached, on a date to be fixed hereafter.

**OBJECTIVE.** The capture and consolidation of the trench A - B - C.

2. The signal for the assault will be the explosion of five mines simultaneously, under the first line of Turk trenches ~~D - E~~ D - E. The C.R.E. will be responsible for all arrangements in connection with these mine explosions, and on the date fixed for the assault, an hour will be named at which the mines should be exploded. Owing however to technical difficulties in the way of ensuring punctuality in arranging for mine explosions, it is to be distinctly understood, not only by the troops detailed for the assault, but also by all other troops co-operating, both Artillery and Infantry, that the mine explosions must be awaited before the assault is launched, or before any action is taken to alarm the enemy, or apprise him of our intentions. It is anticipated that the trench D - E will be practically obliterated by the mine explosions.
3. The assault by the 163rd Inf. Brigade will be delivered as follows:
- (a) 1 Battalion } - To carry out the assault.  
& 1 Coy. R.E.)
  - 1 Battalion } - To support assaulting Battalion.  
& 1 Coy. R.E.)
  - 1 Battalion - To garrison our existing trenches on Hill 60.
  - 1 Battalion - In Brigade Reserve.

Separate instructions have been given to 163rd Inf. Brigade regarding the assembly of these Battalions.

- (b) 1st Phase - The capture of trench A - B.  
Immediately the mines have been exploded, the assaulting Battalion will move forward from trench F - G, across the trench D - E against the trench A - B, which will be captured by bomb and bayonet. Simultaneously with this assault, bombing and bayonet parties will be launched by this Battalion along the communication trenches leading from IVY LANE, MIDDLE LANE and BEECH LANE towards A, K, and B respectively. Special parties will be told off to deal with any Turks remaining in the demolished trench D - E ~~██████████~~.
- (c) 2nd Phase - The capture of trench B - C.  
Immediately the mines have been exploded, an intense and concentrated Artillery fire (vide: - para 4 (a) below) will be ~~opened~~ opened on the junction of the Turk trenches at "C", and will be kept up for exactly 20 minutes. Twenty minutes precisely after the mine explosions (i.e. allowing time for the Artillery bombardment of "C"), strong bombing parties will be launched:-  
(i) From the Battalion detailed to carry out the assault, to work from ASH LANE along the Sap to point "C".  
(ii) From the Companies which assaulted A - B, to work along the trench B - C towards "C".

(d)



x 143

(2)

1) Consolidation of captured trenches.

As soon as any portion of the trench A - B - C is captured, immediate steps will be taken to place it in a state of defence towards the East.

With this in view all trenches leading to the captured trench A - B - C from the North, East and South will be barricaded and held by small bodies of picked men about 50 paces from the point of junction, thus forming a covering party, behind which all other available men can work at the conversion of the main trench.

IVY LANE from F to A will be consolidated towards the North, and ASH LANE will be consolidated towards the South.

MIDDLE LANE and BEECH LANE will be improved as communication trenches.

4. The C.R.A., N.Z & A Division will arrange for Artillery co-operation as follows :-

(a) A 20 minutes bombardment of point "C" immediately following the mine explosions, to prepare the way for the assault along ASH LANE and along the trench B - C (vide:-para 3 (c) above).

(b) A bombardment of Turk trenches leading from the North, East and South towards A - B - C, to prevent the enemy from bringing up reserves. In arranging this, Battery Commanders will note the instructions (para 3 (d) above) to the Assaulting Battalion to push forward 50 paces along the communication trenches leading North, East and South from A - B - C.

(c) The neutralizing of any hostile guns directed against the 163rd Inf. Brigade.

(d) Action against Machine Guns at Hill 100 (92.P - U).

5. Immediately the mines have exploded, a vigorous demonstration will be made by the 161st, 162nd and Indian Brigades against the enemy trenches to their immediate front. This demonstration will be confined to fire action from our own trenches. Detailed instructions will be given to trench Commanders in order to ensure the distribution of fire, from the moment that the assault is launched by the 163rd Inf. Brigade, over those of the enemy trenches which are not attacked.

The Machine Guns of the 161st Inf. Brigade will be placed so as to bring enfilade fire to bear on the Southern and Eastern slopes of Hill 60, but the position of the assaulting troops of the 163rd Inf. Brigade must be carefully watched to avoid any risk to our own men.

6. It should be carefully explained to all troops, that surprise is an important factor in the success of these operations, and every endeavour must be made to conceal all preliminary arrangements and movements from the enemy.

7. An Advanced Dressing Station for the 163rd Inf. Brigade will be formed in the dug-outs in TIPPERARY ROAD, immediately N. of its junction with GAIBARRA ROAD.

All other Dressing Stations to remain in their existing Stations.

8. The 5th Bedford Regiment will be in Divisional Reserve.

9. Divisional H.Q. will remain as at present.

J.P.A. Costa  
Lieut. Colonel G  
54th Division





X144  
Issued at 1800

- Copy No. 1.161st Brigade  
2.162nd Brigade  
3.163rd Brigade  
4.C.R.E.  
5.C.R.A. N.Z & A. Div.  
6.ANZAC.  
7.A.D.M.S.  
8.Indian Brigade.  
9.War Diary  
10.Operation Order File.  
11.A.D.C. (for G.C.C.)





215


# PLAN OF TRENCHES ON HILLS 60

BRITISH TRENCHES  
TURKISH

SCALE



\* THERE APPEARS TO BE OVERHEAD COVER HERE.  
⊙ SHELTERS IN THE TRENCHES



Appendix No 35A.



\*746

35a

149

Secret

Gra 992

5 Nov. 1915

54<sup>th</sup> Division

I am to ask for a report as to the present stage of your operations on Hill 60 against enemy trenches D and E. The CRA NZIA Div has submitted his proposals for artillery support and has authority to begin the necessary registration series; but the Army Corps Command has not yet seen and approved the artillery programme. Will you please say on what date you anticipate being able to undertake the operation

8.5.11.15.

C.P. White



X-147

SECRET.

G.2048

Register No 515

150

35a

To :- Headquarters,

A & N.Z. Army Corps.

In reply to your Ga.992 of to-days date, I beg to report as follows :-

Mine shafts are now all well advanced and are at an average distance of about 15 feet from their objective.

Work on the underground trench to cut off the re-entrant between TURKEY TROT and IVY LANE is progressing. That portion of it which is essential to the operations should in the ordinary course be completed within ten days.

The saps from NORFOLK STREET are also progressing favourably, and in so far as they have any bearing on the operations are now practically ready.

Previous estimates both by Capt. ARNALL and by my C.R.E. have proved so erroneous, that it is impossible to state definitely when the above works will be sufficiently ready for the mines to be exploded. The C.R.E. however, states that he is confident that everything will be ready within 10 days.

I beg to enclose a copy (No.13) of Operation Order issued to-day and dealing with the proposed operations.

*Elda Costa VC*

*M* Brig-General,

Commanding 54th Division.

H.Q. 54th Division.

5 . 11 . 15

*Seen. Sent to account  
CWH/m*



54th Divisional Operation Order  
No. 3.

Ref. Plan of Hill 60

H.Q. 54th Div.

5-11-15.

1. Operations will be carried out against the Turk Trenches on Hill 60 on a date and at an hour to be fixed hereafter.

OBJECTIVE.

- (a) Destruction of the trench D - E.
- (b) Establishment of barricades and bombing posts on the line D - E with the object of preventing the re-occupation of this line by the enemy.
2. The destruction of the trench D - E will be effected by mine explosions.  
The C.R.E. will be responsible for all arrangements in connection with these explosions, and will have at his disposal, in addition to the necessary R.E. personnel, the mining party furnished by the Welch Horse.  
The accommodation of this mining party within the defences of Hill 60 will be arranged for by the 163rd Brigade.
3. Responsibility for the following measures to prevent the re-occupation of the line D - E will rest with the G.O.C. 163rd Bde.
- (a) Immediately the mines are exploded, strong bombing and consolidating parties will be launched up IVY LANE, MIDDLE LANE and BEECH LANE with the object of blocking communication trenches leading from A, K, B, and C.  
Barricades will be erected at suitable points, and bombing posts established on the line D - E to prevent the enemy from re-occupying that line.
- (b) IVY LANE, MIDDLE LANE and BEECH LANE will be consolidated as communication trenches from our present barricades up to the new posts occupied.
- (c) On the explosion of the mines, the tunnel trench across the re-entrant TURKEY TROT → IVY LANE will be "unlidded" and consolidated. This work will be carried out under R.E. supervision, and its immediate occupation, when ready, should be arranged by 163rd Brigade.
- (d) The original Garrison of Hill 60 will be kept intact. The parties necessary for the above operations will be detailed from a Battalion other than that occupying Hill 60.  
In addition, the G.O.C. 163rd Brigade will have at his disposal parties of Welch Horse and R.E.
4. ARTILLERY ACTION. The C.R.A. N.Z.A. Division will arrange for artillery co-operation as follows :-
- (a) A bombardment of points A, B and C to prevent enemy supports coming up.
- (b) A bombardment of the trenches by which hostile reserves might be brought up.
- (c) The neutralizing of hostile machine guns on the Hill 100 spur.



(d) Action against the enemy's artillery.

5. The 161st and Indian Brigades will co-operate with rifle and machine gun fire.  
Their object should be to keep down the fire of hostile machine guns and snipers which may be directed against our troops on Hill 60, and, together with the Artillery, to prevent the movement of enemy re-inforcements. Similar co-operation should be arranged by 163rd Brigade from NORFOLK STREET trenches.
6. It should be carefully explained to all troops, that surprise is an important factor in the success of these operations, and every endeavour must be made to conceal all preliminary arrangements and movements from the enemy.
7. An Advanced Dressing Station for the 163rd Inf. Brigade will be formed in the dug-outs in TIPPERARY ROAD immediately N. of its junction with CANBARRA ROAD.  
All other Dressing Stations will remain in their existing stations.
8. One regiment of Eastern Mounted Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve.
9. Divisional H.Q. will remain as at present.

*E. C. da Costa*

Lieut. Colonel G.S.

54th Division.

Issued at 1800.

- Copy No. 1 War Diary
- 2 Operation Order File.
  - 3 G.O.C.
  - 4 163rd Brigade.
  - 5 C.R.A. N.Z.A. Division.
  - 6 C.R.E.
  - 7 Welsh Horse
  - 8 A.D.M.S.
  - 9 161st Brigade.
  - 10 162nd Brigade.
  11. Indian Brigade
  - 12 Eastern Mounted Brigade.
  - 13 ANZAC.

*not yet issued*



X-153

35a  
153



MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

W

General Headquarters,

9th November, 1915.

My dear White,

Many thanks for sending me the papers about the 54th Division's proposals. I much doubt if they will be ready to carry out their operations by the 15th, as we know how much such matters are generally delayed, and I think that General Inglefield will be back before then, as I had a wire saying he expected to leave Alexandria on his return about the 7th.

○ About 1500 rounds at least (W)

In your note you evidently intended to state the number of rounds which you estimated the artillery would require, but forgot to do this at the last moment. In any case I can see it would be very great, and rather think that they have over-estimated their needs in this respect. These must undoubtedly be kept to the lowest possible figure, as we all know how short we are of ammunition, and, as far as I know at present, cannot count on the arrival of more at an early date. If the 54th take the place from practically underground, as they apparently intend to do by mining and bombing, there should not be required an enormous expenditure of ammunition, except for getting into the Turks well afterwards, when they are collecting to counter-attack.

Note 54 Div

One thing, which I think is necessary before the attack is made, is that the new line on the right of the Indian Brigade should be completed, as, if this is brought well forward, it should be able to give a lot of assistance. Thrown back as it was, it could of course do nothing, and it is only by continuing to shove it forward that one can decide/



X 154

35a

154



- 2 -

decide when it has got to the real point necessary, i.e., from where it can bring a direct fire to bear on the Turkish right of "Hill 60" position and their trenches trending away to their right flank. They may bring reinforcements from these, and in any case are likely to expose themselves just about there, so if the Indian trenches are well forward they will be a menace on that flank. The last time I was there I ordered them to bring them so forward, and I know they have been at it for the last week or so, but it is quite possible that they may not get sufficiently far to the front in the first instance.

I had a wire from the War Office last night saying that they had what they considered definite information that the Turks would shortly use gas on the peninsula. They may, or they may not, but in any case we have to do what we can to be prepared. Some experts from Home on the subject are here, and are being sent to the three areas to give all the advice they can. With the prevailing wind here from North to South, they seem to think Helles is the most likely area to be attacked. I understand that the present helmets we have are of little use against one new kind of gas the Germans have been using, and that we are to get another pattern. What I have been thinking about, however, in the gas connection, is with regard to the caves we have been making. When these are away back I imagine they will be all right, but if in a position like those recently made by the 2nd Light Horse Brigade - actually in the fire trenches, they may, if not very carefully arranged, become real deathtraps, as we know the gas is heavy, and might well sink down and fill these caves; so I think, therefore, all such caves should be provided with some heavy sacking

*Where are experts?  
They arrived  
10/7*

*or blankets*

doorways/



X-155

35a

155



doorways. I imagine if these were let down over the entrances to the caves, they would do a good deal to keep the gas out, and all the more so if water is near to damp them. If back entrances can be made, as I know the 2nd Brigade intended doing, everything would of course be all right. I understand that the sprayers are quite effective against all kinds of gas, so it is very necessary that they should be tested and kept always efficient in suitable places. Also, men who have been in France tell me that the lighting of fires or the throwing of bombs into the gas cloud disperses it almost at once, so the troops should be told all about such things.

*Memo issued  
AWG*

Russell's Top, Pope's and Quinn's all strike me as places where gas might be easily used, as the distance is so small, and the Turks are there slightly above us. On Russell's Top especially the danger would be great, and once gas got into all those tunnels, it might be very hard to get it out again, unless there are plenty of sprayers.

With reference to getting rid of everything unnecessary from our beaches, the 9th Corps are getting rid of some of their field ambulances, and I think this is a thing we might very well do also if Howse approves. I understand that a field ambulance is calculated to deal with a strength of 6,000 men, and that we have three per division. As our divisions are never likely, as far as we can see, to be up to such a strength anywhere in the near future, it seems to me that we might well get rid of one field ambulance per division. Will you discuss this with Howse and, if he agrees, make the necessary arrangements. If this

*Spoke Howse  
See Howse's  
Memo of 4/11*

is/



7.156

35a

156



- 4 -

is gone into now, it would save trouble when the 7th Brigade Field Ambulance moves across to its new position.

I am so sorry to hear that poor Hobbs has been seedy, and I am sending him a line, as I very much appreciate the good work he has always done. I do not think he need worry about the recognition of his artillery officers, for I sent in a large list of these to Sir Ian before he left, and I am hoping that they will be properly looked after in his final gazette.

I am indeed glad to know that you have heard MacLagan will be back shortly, and Johnston should of course replace Hobbs pending his transfer to the 2nd Division on the arrival of their artillery.

I shall be interested to hear what was in the notice, which the "Lone Pine" people apparently got in the captured Turkish tunnels. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade seem to be doing excellently in their small offensive shows, and please congratulate Ryrie and Wilson from me for all they have done.

I am just off to Mudros to meet Lord K., <sup>and</sup> Generals Monro and Maxwell. Hope to be back Thursday or Friday.

Yours ever,

W. B. Wood

Pa WOT 157M

a telegram just in announcing brave  
honours for our Corps etc. which I am delighted  
K.Ms. Johnston - Robertson, Christian -  
Herself Benn etc. - to the 7th Division  
are all well!!



(35a)

Spoke to Dalosta by telephone - told him what  
 Gen Bridwood had written & that art proposals  
 were extravagant. Told him to put whole  
 matter before Gen. Lypherts & 2nd place  
 matter before Gen. Hoodby & obtain a decision  
 Meantime day was not to be fixed

AW 13/4

pa with file  
 AW 15/4



X 150

35a  
158

Gra 90

54<sup>th</sup> Division

Secret

1. I am to acknowledge your Secret  
G 2048 of 5<sup>th</sup> inst and say that the  
Army Corps Commander would like  
to be informed when you consider that  
all your preparations are within (3)  
three days of completion.

2. I am also to say that General  
Browne considers that the new line on  
the right of the Indian Bde should be  
completed before the contemplated operation  
is undertaken.

J.S. 10. 11. 15.

C.P. B. White  
B.S.



SECRET

G. 2154

35a

159

44 Headquarters  
Asst. Army Corps.

1. Ref your G.O. 90 it is hoped that all my preparations will be complete by Monday 15<sup>th</sup> inst, but as the enemy is active against my mine heads it is quite possible that there may be delay.

2.

The new line on the right of the Indian Bde will not be completed for a fortnight. I agree that it is desirable that this line should have been completed before the contemplated operations are undertaken, but in view of the activity of the enemy against my mine heads. I submit that it is most inadvisable to delay action once the mines have reached their objectives.

The G.O.C Indian Brigade has put forward a scheme for raising the parapet of his existing trenches on the right so as to gain the necessary command. I propose, therefore, if the Corps Commander agrees, to carry out the operation as soon as ever the mines are ready.

H. W. Hodgson

Brig-General

Commanding 54<sup>th</sup> Division

H. Q. 54<sup>th</sup> Division

11. 11. 15



Secret  
G.O. 43.

45  
35a

13-11-15.

My dear General

Our arrangements on Hill 60  
are now well forward, & we have  
provisionally fixed 5.0 pm, Monday 15<sup>th</sup>  
as the date for our enterprise.

With regard to Gen Birdwood's  
expression of opinion that we should  
wait until the new Indian line ~~is~~ is  
completed, a portion of the new trench  
on the right has already been completed.  
All the work however has to be done  
by sapping, and it will certainly take



46

at least another fortnight to finish the whole line.

We have already had considerable difficulty in dodging the enemy's counter mines, and I fear that if we postpone our operations it may mean fresh trouble and indefinite delay.

If Gen Birdwood approves our proposal not to wait for the Indian line, it will certainly be a great relief to all those on Hill 60.

The C.R.A. says he has not yet received authority for the expenditure of ammunition. Can you arrange this?

Yrs sincerely  
Edo Costa





163 35a  
14/11/15

My dear White

HEADQUARTERS,  
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

I have just seen Gen. Myfield & arranged with him that he will blow up his mines to-morrow but will not attempt to make any attack or occupy any trench in advance of his present line. He wishes to blow up his mines as he thinks if he does not now that the Tanks will either blow him or at any rate stop him if he puts it off & he thinks that as things are, he will probably get a good bag of Tanks. When I

x. 157 Pa little file dealing with this operation

This letter was shown to BG RA.

AW 14/11



I saw him he did not  
know that he could not get  
artillery ammunition to the  
extent he wants & expected  
plenty of artillery fire after  
his blow. But Johnston tells  
me he has heard from Curhise  
from that the General will  
like the expenditure much cut  
down. Under the circumstances  
I will authorize the expenditure  
of ~~amount~~ slightly only  
exceeding the normal daily  
allowance.

Yours sincerely  
Arthur Godley



X157

163

35a

SECRET.

G.2218

To :-

Headquarters  
A & N. G. Army Corps.

1. Operation Order No.3 is cancelled.

As previously arranged in para.2 of above mentioned Operation Order, the mines will be exploded under the direction of the C.R.E at 1700 to-morrow, the 15th inst.

No further offensive action will be taken, but endeavour will be made from our trenches to take advantage of any favourable target.

The C.R.A. is requested to co-operate in this object.

2. Immediately after the mine explosions the tunnel trench across the re-entrant TURKEY TROOP - IVY LANE will be "unlidded" and consolidated under the direction of the C.R.E, who will have at his disposal the required working parties of Welch Horse.

The 163rd Inf. Brigade will occupy this trench as soon as possible.

3. Without taking any action that will involve the risk of serious casualties, the G.O.C. 163rd Inf. Brigade will take the opportunity of advancing the barricades in BEECH LANE and IVY LANE and for this purpose will have the assistance of working parties to be furnished by Welch Horse.

4. 161st, 163rd and Indian Brigades will arrange for their machine guns to take advantage of any favourable target caused by the mine explosion, and thereafter to prevent any attempt of the enemy to re-occupy the line.

H.Q. 54th Division.

14 . 11 : 15

Ed Da Costa

Lieut. Col.

General Staff, 54th Division.

Pa. with rest of file.  
CW 15/11



"C" Form (Duplicate).  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2123

No. of Message 193

Charges to Pay. £ s. d. <u>35a</u>		Office Stamp. A 15.XI.15. C	
Service Instructions.			
Handed in at <u>Y&amp;D Priority</u>		Office <u>1808</u> m. Received <u>1812</u> m.	
TO <u>Angac</u>			
Sender's Number <u>92236</u>	Day of Month <u>15</u>	In reply to Number	<u>AAA</u>

163 Bde reports aaa begins  
mine exploded at 1700 aaa  
Shock very great aaa Both  
our IVY LANE and BEECH  
LANE barricades partly destroyed aaa  
TURKEY TROT intact aaa Our  
new IVY LANE to MIDDLE  
LANE trench very slightly damaged  
aaa Result to enemy trench  
B-E understood to be quite  
satisfactory ends aaa

No.	<u>848</u>
DATE REC'D	<u>15/11/15</u>
ISSUED TO	<u>Ga</u>

FROM	<u>54 Division</u>	<u>1803</u>	and N. / A. C.
PLACE & TIME			

"C" Form (Duplicate).  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2123

No. of Message 204

Charges to Pay. £ s. d. <u>35a</u>		Office Stamp. A 15.XI.15. C	
Service Instructions.			
Handed in at <u>Y&amp;D</u>		Office <u>1846</u> m. Received <u>1857</u> m.	
TO <u>Angac</u>			
Sender's Number <u>G2239</u>	Day of Month <u>15</u>	In reply to Number	<u>AAA</u>

163 Bde reports at 1830  
begins aaa our old Barricades  
have been repaired aaa trenches  
are being cleared of rubbish  
aaa Unloading proceeding normally  
aaa Casualties now reported as  
killed 14 injured most very  
slightly aaa enemy signals reported  
between hill 60 and 10.  
hill ends aaa

No.	<u>853</u>
DATE REC'D	<u>15/11/15</u>
ISSUED TO	<u>Ga</u>
A. and N.Z. A. C.	

FROM	<u>54 Division</u>	<u>1843</u>
PLACE & TIME		

Appendix No. 35A  
164



x 163

"C" Form (Duplicate). Army Form C. 2123.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message 224

No 857

DATE REC'D 15/11/15 164 Geo  
ISSUED TO Matthews

Service Instructions. A. C.

Charges to Pay. £ s. d. Office Stamp.

Handed in at the Geo Office, at 2010 m. Received here at 2000 m.

TO Joe Angus

Sender's Number. <u>Gk 781</u>	Day of Month. <u>15</u>	In reply to Number. <u>AAA</u>
-----------------------------------	----------------------------	-----------------------------------

This evening turks opened aillery and rifle fire on front line of my right division who at the same time reported similar fire taking place on front of indian brigade as a Joe second int's divn believed turks were attacking your front but has now ascertained that the turkish fire was due to explosion of mines by 54 Divn as a he had received no previous notification of this enterprise as a My right subsection 158 inf bde wired at 1727 to indian bde for information as to what was going on but up to 1910 had received no answer as a Am sure you will agree that it is very necessary that neighbouring divns should keep each other informed in advance of any enterprise they may intend as a Just as we would each other of a serious operation as a should <sup>the</sup> enemy on such an occasion make a counter attack mutual support would thereby be assured as a Acknowledge

Joe 9th Corps 2005

W. 5375-423. 75,000 Pads-12/12-B. & F.-Form C. 2123/1.





1. Intro flori 54<sup>th</sup> Div  
 2. Report on sent post by  
of the circumstances  
at 16/11

G. O. C.

x 163



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words.	Charg	This message is on a/c of:	Reed. at	m.		
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.						Sent	Date		
Dumont					At	m.	Service.		
					To			From	35a
					By			By	

TO { 1st Corps

Sender's Number: 178, Day of Month: 15th, In reply to Number: 781, A A A

Army Corps Commander regrets extremely that you were not informed of action taken on Hill 60 A.A. He entirely agrees with you as to absolute necessity of neighbouring Divisions keeping each other informed in advance of all action likely to influence either front A.A. measures to this end have been taken

From: Aug 22, Place: 21 22, Time: 21 22

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) C.B.P. White

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

+ 161

Gu 183

15/11/15

35a

Dear La Coeta

Please see attached message from 9th Corps. I do not in the least excuse myself for not having told them of what was about to take place. I write & send the message to you, in order merely that we may make quite sure

- (1) that you are in touch with the 2nd Inf Div
- (2) the Indian Bde is in touch with the flank bde of the 2nd Inf Div.

Will you please assure me on these points? You will notice 1st Corps say they could not get any reply from the Indian Bde. In order to avoid anything similar in future will you always tell neighbouring Divs direct of any such job in contemplation and that will ensure their getting information from two sources - for I shall do likewise

Yours sincerely  
C.B.P. White

Appendix No. 35A 166



G. a. 47.

35a 50

16/11/15

My dear General.

Ref: your G. a. 183.

It is good of you to take the blame on your shoulders, but I must plead guilty to a most regrettable oversight in not letting the 2<sup>nd</sup> M<sup>td</sup> Div. know about our mine explosion yesterday.

There is of course no excuse for me, but the reason for the omission is probably due to the 'upset' caused by the abandonment of our original scheme.

Regarding your queries

- (1) We are in touch with 2<sup>nd</sup> M<sup>td</sup> Div. & exchange daily reports &

35a 51

+ 162

intelligence

(2) The Indian Bde is in touch with 153<sup>rd</sup> Bde on our immediate left.

I will go into the allegation of their neglect to reply to their enquiries yesterday.

Our orders to Brigades are that they must invariably inform adjacent Brigades of any contemplated enterprise, & this, as far as the Division is concerned, is our usual practice with the 2<sup>nd</sup> M<sup>td</sup> Div & N. Z & A Div with both of whom we are in constant touch.

In the overnight yesterday I must take the entire blame

Yours sincerely

pa CWJ  
16/11

G. D. Costa

Appendix No. 35A

167



+ 165

35a

19-11-15

My dear General.

Reference your G.A. 183

of 15<sup>th</sup> inst. I should like to clear  
the Indian Brigade of the charge of  
neglecting to reply to a message from  
158<sup>th</sup> Bn. I therefore ~~send~~ send you  
enclosed.

Yours sincerely

E. Da Costa

Seen  
Return Awt 9/11

91

35a

19. 11. 15

Dear Da Costa

Many thanks for the message  
from the Indian Bde, which I return  
herewith.

I felt sure that there had not  
been any unavoidable delay.

Yours

C. B. White

Appendix No. 35A

168



x 167

Daily Report. 7. Illa B<sup>de</sup>

No. 2 Post.  
16. x 1.15

H<sup>d</sup> Q<sup>M</sup> }  
21. Ill. B. } Nothing to report.

26. Ill. B. Sect. at 80. D.G (Capt. Herington)

1000 20T.S. at movement in comm. trench  
in 106 g.m. 8<sup>o</sup> Mag. 4700<sup>x</sup>.  
No actual casualties seen but Turks  
began to run fast danger point.

Remainder of Battery  
Nothing to report.

Information 1555 Hostile airplane passed flying  
roughly N-S.

1645 Burst bombardment of crest of CHOCOLATE HILL  
& firing line N.W. of HILL 60. Lasted till 1700.

Extract  
to 54 Div

The mine explosion on Hill 60 yesterday completely  
weakened the enemy's bombproofs, but has raised  
the top of the hill 6 or 8 ft. giving the Turks a  
better command than before, as they occupy the  
craters on the ridge

<u>Casualties</u>	21. Ill. B.	26. Ill. B.
	-	1 man & 1 pony wounded
<u>Rounds</u>	-	20

A. J. Ferguson  
Major  
Comd. Ill. B.



AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

No. Ga. 215

Army Corps Headquarters,

17th November, 1915.

From:- General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

To :- 54th Division.

MEMORANDUM.

The following is an extract from a report made  
by the O.C. 7th Indian Mtn Artillery Brigade:-

"The mine explosion on Hill 60 yesterday  
completely wrecked the enemy's bomb proofs;  
but has raised the top of the hill 6 or 8 feet  
giving the Turks a better command than before,  
as they occupy the craters on the ridge".

Will you kindly furnish a full report on the  
result of the explosion and indicate the present position.

*C. B. White*

Brig-General,  
General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.



35a

G.2293  
x 164  
L.S.

To Headquarters,  
A & N.Z. Army Corps.

With reference to your Ga 215 of the 17th inst, I beg to report as follows:-

On Thursday last at MUDROS Sir W.BIRDWOOD gave me to understand that the operations against Hill 60 should be postponed unless the Turks were so close to us with their mining that delay might lead to their blowing in ~~their~~ our galleries in which case it would be necessary for us to be before them and explode our mines.

On arrival on Sunday I found that on the right and on the left the Turks had countermined close to our galleries and at any minute they might break them down. Our mines were all laid and tamped except one which would be finished by Monday morning. I therefore saw General GODLEY and talked the situation over with him and I saw him again next morning.

We came to the conclusion that we should meet General BIRDWOOD'S wishes best by exploding the mines and straightening out the line without committing the troops to a fight which might result in appreciable losses if parties were pushed forward to the Turkish position.

The mine exploded with much violence. This explosion has resulted in a great upheaval of earth which has left the ground lying between our respective trenches, especially on the left, in a confused set of mounds and hollows.

The explosion caused the trench D - E to be completely obliterated. Much debris fell in TURKEY TROT and adjoining trenches; this resulted in one man being killed and about a dozen injured, all except two of the injuries being trivial.

The barricades in IVY LANE and BEECH LANE were advanced during the night by some 10 - 15 yards and 5 yards respectively to conform to the new alignment.

Immediately after the explosion work was started on the "unlidding" of the trench across the TURKEY TROT re-entrant. It was advanced sufficiently to enable it to be partly manned that night, and is now able to ~~be~~ be manned throughout its entire length, although more work on it is still required.

The ASH LANE → BEECH LANE trench is similarly situated. The front of the former trench has been wired by us, and more wiring will be carried out to-night.

The enemy attempted to re-occupy their line during the night of 15th/16th and exposed themselves freely in so doing. By now they have built up new parapets with sandbags on right and left of their line. These are clearly visible from our trenches.

During the night of 17th/18th they put out wire in front of the parapet between BEECH and MIDDLE LANES.

An attempt to advance the barricade along IVY LANE, made by us on the night of the 16th/17th, failed, chiefly owing to hostile machine gun fire.

Attempts are now being made to form bombing posts by breaking out to the surface through three of our mine shafts. This will necessarily take time but, when through, these posts should be within bombing distance of the enemy line.

It is reported that sounds of underground picking have been heard close to our new advanced barricade at the end of BEECH LANE. Steps are being taken to deal with this by undermining.

To summarize the results of the explosion, it may be said that the advantage gained by us is limited to the destruction, it is believed, of a good many Turks and to the straightening out of our line, while the enemy owing to the raising and general disturbance of the ground along the line D - E have gained extra command.

H.Q. 54th Division  
18 . 11 . 15

*T. J. England*

Major General  
Commanding 54th Division.

Pa CWI  
25/11  
No 982  
DATE REC'D 24/11/15  
A. and N. Z. A. C.



Ga 257

20th Nov 1915 (35a)

SECRET

Dear Dalosta

I promised you my views  
in writing on the Hill 60 situation.

After leaving you this morning I had  
a careful look at the position from a  
point further South.

The whole question is one of action or inaction.  
If we remain content with what we have  
done then we leave the Turk free to take action.  
His action will naturally be to establish  
himself behind the hillocks made by the  
Explosion. If he does this he gains an  
advantage of position. We will be at  
a corresponding disadvantage — and

4/70  
mining, the only resource left to us, will  
be restricted to deep level workings which  
are painfully slow.

I do not wish to urge my views on you  
General nor to pose as an expert in these  
difficult dealings but I cannot think it  
right that we should refrain from an  
effort to establish ourselves right behind  
the hillocks. Those heights should be ours.  
The point then is how to get about it. Here  
the responsibility mine this is what I  
should do

(1) Remembering that every day's delay helps

the Turk

(a) Push forward surface tunnels  
at best speed to 3 selected points

Appendix No. 35A

172



3.

These points are fairly well defined as outstanding eruptions.

(ii) Organize small bombing parties opposite the 3 objectives + instantaneously bomb the Turk out from behind them should he be there.

(iii) Organize carefully "barricading parties" who will quietly pass up & place sandbags to make ~~a~~ barricades at the three selected points.

(iv) Organize a working party to run the surface tunnels fair in behind each barricade.

Whether the bombing parties should issue from the surface tunnels and creep forward when

4

eruptions, or whether they should go out from the trench into the open, or whether they should act from a T head at the end of the surface tunnel is a question for local decision. Personally I should "eject" them from a "Salley port" made towards the end of the Sap. — and in small numbers. The barricade builders should be sent out in the same way and the filled bags should be passed from man to man forward to a small party who will place them in position. I prefer night for the job.

As I said a moment ago these are my

171



5  
ideas only. I have not had an opportunity of putting them before my General. It will be for your General to decide if any action is to be taken & if so if the lines I suggest are suitable. I believe the proposals to be practicable but have no desire to assert them — it may be that your General and you can devise something more suitable.

Yours sincerely

C. B. White

The date upon which you could take action will be determined by the time in which you can complete the surface tunnels. They will form the Comm- with the posts and are essential to success.



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Charges to Pay.

Office Stamp

£ s. d.

35a

A 20 XI 15 C  
LLEBARRAS

Service Instructions.

Handed in at Y&D Primary Office 1525 m. Received 1528 m.

TO

anyone

Sender's Number

Day of Month

In reply to Number

AAA

92320

20

Enemy exploded mine about 1445  
 in vicinity of BEECH LANE  
 barrage hill 60 ago our  
 barricades are intact but full  
 extent of damage if any  
 not yet reported also no  
 hostile attack was launched  
 ago further report will follow  
 when details are ascertained

Nr. 30

DATE REC

20/11/15

ISSUED TO

Gw

A and N. Z. A. C.

FROM

PLACE & TIME

57+

Dw

1524

Appendix No 35A

175



Service Instructions.	Charges to Pay. £ s. d.	Office Stamp. A 20.XI.15. C TELEGRAPHY

Handed in at Yes Cronky Office 1915 m. Received 1929 m.

TO Anzac

Sender's Number 92330 Day of Month 20 In reply to Number AAA

Enemy mine explosion has resulted in new barricade at end of BEECH LANE being demolished and BEECH LANE and new BEECH LANE ASH LANE trench filled with debris but latter will be cleared and occupied tonight and BEECH LANE is being dug out and barricade will be renewed tonight and TURKEY TROT and BOMBAY AVENUE intact and enemy made no attempt to assault and there is no new crater where he can effect lodgment and known casualties 5 killed & wounded and some miners may still be in our mine shafts but if so hopeful of rescuing them and explosion destroyed ~~comple~~

FROM \_\_\_\_\_  
 PLACE & TIME \_\_\_\_\_

Service Instructions.	Charges to Pay. £ s. d.	Office Stamp. A 20.XI.15. C TELEGRAPHY

Handed in at Yes Office \_\_\_\_\_ m. Received \_\_\_\_\_ m.

TO Anzac (2)

Sender's Number \_\_\_\_\_ Day of Month \_\_\_\_\_ In reply to Number AAA

completely hostile wire in vicinity  
 aaa NZA and 2nd Div  
 Divs informed

No. 38  
 DATE REC'D 20/11/15  
 ISSUED TO Ga  
 A. S. J. N. Z. A. O.

FROM 54 Div 1915  
 PLACE & TIME \_\_\_\_\_

X173  
 Appendix No. 35A  
 176



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.							Date
			Sent				
			At	m.	Service.		
			To				From
			By	(Signature of "Franking Officer.")			By

TO {

GHQ	8 <sup>th</sup> Corps	9 <sup>th</sup> Corps	French HQ
-----	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 90 258	20		

less	enemy	artillery	fire	during
the	day	but	increased	reple
fire	aaa	at	1445	enemy
Exploded	a	mine	on	Hill to
which	demolished	one	of	our
new	barricades	and	filled	up
two	tranches	with	debris	aaa
No	attempt	was	made	by
enemy	to	assault	aaa	our
Casualties	as	far	as	known
5	Killed	8	wounded	aaa
Strong	off	show	bridge	but
work	at	base	uninterrupted	
aaa	Addressed	GHQ	repeated	all
Corps				

From	A. N. 245		
Place			
Time	2030		

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z) R. B. [Signature]

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix No. 35A.

177



"C" Form (Duplicate). Army Form C. 2123.  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.** No. of Message 350 82

Service Instructions. <i>Priority</i>	Charges to Pay. £ s. d.	Office Stamp.
		<i>A 24.X.15. C</i>
Handed in at <i>YPR</i> Office <i>1052</i> m. Received <i>1104</i> m.		

TO *Anzac*

Sender's Number *92380* Day of Month *24* In reply to Number *AAA*

Enemy working has been heard just east of north of BEECH LANE barricade at two points distant approximately 20 and 40 feet from it. At the former point working is below DUS at the latter at about same level. AAA soundings were heard at intervals throughout yesterday afternoon and night. Report of listening period at 1330 can be relied on subsequent reports confirm but are made by experienced officers. AAA necessary steps being taken. Enemy picking also heard from our

FROM  
 PLACE & TIME

"C" Form (Duplicate). Army Form C. 2123.  
**MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.** No. of Message 350 82

Service Instructions.	Charges to Pay. £ s. d.	Office Stamp.
		<i>A 24.X.15. C</i>
Handed in at <i>YPR</i> Office <i>1052</i> m. Received <i>1104</i> m.		

TO *Anzac (2)*

Sender's Number Day of Month In reply to Number *AAA*

<i>old mine shaft near</i>	<i>9201</i>
<i>has been started</i>	<i>been</i>

Nr. *164*  
 DATE REC. *24/11/15*  
 ISSUED TO *[Signature]*  
 A. & N. Z. A. C.

FROM *54 Divn*  
 PLACE & TIME *1050*

Appendix No. 35A

x.176