

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit
war diaries, 1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/42/7 Part 7

Title: General Staff, Headquarters
1st Australian Division

Appendices, including Lone Pine
orders and report, pp 298-357

August 1915

S 341
SECRET.



GS 32
Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
2nd August, 1915.

Officer Commanding
1st Infantry Brigade.

1. - The enclosed notes on the distribution of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the whole of No.2 Section and including COURTNEY'S POST are forwarded for your consideration.

2. - The General Officer Commanding will be glad to have early any remarks you may have to make on the notes.

3. - Kindly return the notes after perusal.

WJ.
Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

S E C R E T.

Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
2nd August, 1915.

Officer Commanding
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C.B. White

Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

1st Austr. Division.

The proposals appear to me to be complete and adequate and I concur in them. It is presumed that the 2nd Brigade will block up the sally ports until required. *Wm Smyth*
Colonel

Candy Lt Inf. Bgd.

Lt Inf Bgd H.Q. 15 hrs. 3d Aug 1915

Filed. 1915

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Appendix No.

300

CONFIDENTIAL.

18th Inf Bde & to return please

NOTES
on the
DISTRIBUTION OF THE 2nd INFANTRY BRIGADE
PRIOR TO IMPENDING OPERATIONS.

1st August, 1915.

1. - The distribution of the 2nd
Brigade on its new front must aim at :-

- (a) adequately holding the points
d'appui;
- (b) maintaining the trenches connecting
the points d'appui by a series of
sentry groups in posts most
judiciously selected;
- (c) holding in hand a force of 300
rifles to operate against GERMAN
OFFICERS TRENCH;
- (d) creating as strong a reserve as
possible so as to have a force to
operate against JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY
when such an operation is either
demanded by circumstances or
appears advisable.

2. - The line to be occupied is best
considered in two sections :-

1st section - from left of COURTNEY'S
POST to right of WIRE
GULLY, both inclusive.

2nd section - from left of TAMBOUR to
right of 1st Bde. present
front, both inclusive.

2.

3. - In 1st section the lengths of front
are :-

COURTNEY'S POST 168 yards
to right of WIRE GULLY 500 "
Total <u>668 yards</u>

This section contains the two points d'appui
of :-

(a) COURTNEY'S right and 2nd Brigade (Steel's Pt
left;

(b) from SCOTT'S POST to south side of
WIRE GULLY, both inclusive.

4. - The garrison for the whole must
be estimated on the basis of one man per yard.
This estimate to include points d'appui
garrisons, but exclusive of reserves, to
include working parties, or force set aside
for GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH. Thus it is
necessary to determine the garrisons required
for each of the two points d'appui and to
distribute the remaining force, allotted to
carefully selected sentry posts between the
two points d'appui.

5. - The garrisons of points d'appui must be estimated at two men per yard; this leaves one man per two yards of remainder of trench. There will thus be short intervals of unoccupied trench between sentry posts.

6. - The requirements for this first section, therefore, will be :-

(a) defensive line	..	<u>yards</u>	<u>rifles</u>
		668	say 670

(b) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH 300

Total, say ..	<u>1,000 rifles</u>
---------------	---------------------

7. - In the 2nd section, the length of front is 700 yards.

This section includes six points d'appui as below :-

THE PIMPLE
B.24 POST ϕ
GULLY POST ϕ
MOORE'S POST ϕ
THE CRATER POST ϕ
THE TAMBOUR POST.

Note. The 3rd Inf. Bde. should establish a point d'appui at the B.3 Tunnel Post.

4.

Those points d'appui marked with a ϕ have important parados which afford a second tier of fire (if required, night use only). Their garrisons must be considered as extra to the calculation of one man per yard. Their lengths are not correctly known; an approximate estimate of 25% of the whole length of trench is therefore allowed.

8. - The requirements, therefore, for this section will be :-

defensive line	700 rifles
parados, 25% of above ..	165 "
Total ..	<u>865</u> "

9. - We thus arrive at an estimate of the total requirements of the defensive line (plus GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH force but exclusive of reserves) of 1865 rifles - say three battalions.

10. - According to present states the effective strength of the 2nd Infantry Brigade is 2679. There should therefore be

5.

surplus to defensive line requirements 814
rifles - say 800.

This number, however, includes those
details who cannot be accounted as being
ordinarily available, i.e., signallers, cooks,
batmen, quartermasters' storemen, pioneers,
and listeners in tunnels. Reckoning these
to amount to 50 per battalion there should be
available as a general reserve (on above
figures) 600 rifles.

The 2nd Brigade commander will bear
these figures in view and allot as reserve
that battalion whose strength most nearly
approximates^{to} them, the other battalions being
distributed accordingly on as wide a front as
is compatible with the policy indicated above,
and numbers.

11. - The reserve battalion will have to
provide outside working parties and fatigue
parties which, however, will be reduced to an
absolute minimum until the impending operations
are concluded.

12. - The location of this reserve battalion will require careful consideration. It will not be advisable or possible to keep it in one place but it must be so posted as to be able :-

(a) most readily to reinforce threatened points;

(b) to concentrate for an offensive movement.

The northern section need not be considered as the 300 rifles for GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, whether held in readiness or despatched on their mission, will provide the necessary force.

Similarly, THE PIMPLE is provided for ~~the~~ by the offensive action of the 1st Brigade.

The reserve battalion should therefore be distributed in rear of that portion of the trench which lies between WIRE GULLY and OWENS GULLY. The need of half a battalion in WIRE GULLY is indicated. The other two companies might be distributed behind the CRATER POST and in the open trenches behind the 1st Battalion.

3rd Bn is right.
please see "2nd Bde Orders"
(memo by Brigadier to
GSO I and GSO)

→ ? 3rd

8 350

13. - Once the new line has been taken over by the 2nd Brigade it is obvious that the points d'appui or sentry posts cannot be depleted by a single man and that there could be no sending out to places in rear to draw rations or fetch water. Posts must therefore be rationed and provided with water for twenty-four hours, and cooking arrangements for each post or group of posts must be carefully considered.

14. - No. ¹ Field Company Engineers. As the services of the ^{2nd} ~~1st~~ Field Company will be entirely absorbed by the 1st Brigade, the ^{1st} ~~2nd~~ Field Company must be carefully distributed where its services appear to be most likely required, such as the tunnels nearest to GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH and most of the "C" tunnels. The O.C. ^{1st} ~~2nd~~ Field Company should lay in a store of sandbags, timber, iron, &c., for repairs.

15. - The question of mines and how and when to deal with them is an important question

and must be considered separately from all domestic matters by the divisional C.R.E.

16. - Special orders regarding ammunition supply will be issued.

17. - A certain number of reinforcements for the division are expected, though details are not known. It is believed that some 400 rifles per brigade may be expected. Their arrival will facilitate fatigues, &c., and will naturally strengthen the reserve by additional units from other companies - but will not alter the numbers allotted to the "defensive line".

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S E C R E T.




SS. 32
Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
2nd August, 1915

Officer Commanding
2nd Infantry Brigade.

1. - The enclosed notes on the distribution of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the whole of No.2 Section and including COURTNEY'S POST are forwarded for your consideration.

2. - The General Officer Commanding will be glad to have early any remarks you may have to make on the notes.


Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.



1st Australian Division

Remarks

on Notes re the distribution of 2nd Infly
Brigade (No G.S. 32)

(1) Sections of line to be occupied are
called "First Section" and "Second Section"
as in notes.

First Section. Courtney's Post, shown
in notes as 168 yds has been ascertained
to be approx. 115 yds.

Remainder of Section to right of WIRE
GULLY shown in notes as 500 yds, if
taken to terminate at SCOTTS pt. (for
troops cannot be placed further to
the right) is approx only 400 yds.

Total length of First Section
therefore = 515 yds

Second Section, from left of
Tambour to right of 1st Bde = 700 yds

Total length of line to
be occupied = 1215 yds

(2) Number of Rifles at present
available

Notes show 2679, but ~~number~~ = 2679
number actually available is as follows.

5th Batt.	490	
6th "	478	
7th "	450	
8th "	780	2198

with 461

1st Australian Division

2(3) Proposed distribution pending arrival of Reinforcements

✓ First Section to be occupied with 515 rifles of 8th Batt = 1 rifle per yard.

Second Section - 8th Batt. to occupy ^{of Section} left with 235 rifles. - remainder of Section to be occupied with whole of 5th Batt 490 rifles = 725 rifles ~~is~~ i.e. 25 more ^{rifles} than one per yard.

Notes set out 865 rifles for this Section, which should read 875; there is an error of 10 in the computation of the ²⁵10% for parados - see para 8 of Notes.

✓ Taking the 175 for parados the balance of 550 will provide one rifle for each $1\frac{3}{4}$ yards.

(4) Capture of German Officers Trench ^{5th Batt.}

Proposed that 6th Batt. carry this out, with 300 rifles, the number set out in Notes.

Consider it essential that Snipers Trench should be taken simultaneously with Ger. Off. Trench, and destroyed. This is not provided

1st Australian Division

3.

for in Notes. Propose allot 100 rifles
6th Batt for this, if operation approved
This leaves 78 rifles of 6th remaining
to augment Reserve. (see para 5)
below.

(5) Brigade Reserve

7th Batt: 450 rifles
6th " 78 "

Total 528

or 72 less than suggested by
Notes.

(6) Of course troops for trenches &
for reserves would be strengthened
by any reinforcements which may
arrive.

59 (7) On the night prior to the operations
I am informed by 1st Bde, that
this Brigade will rest in trenches
in rear of their ^{present} firing line. This
removes any danger during
that night owing to firing line
being thin, and 2nd Bde Reserve can
be used to support 1st Sec, during night.

(8) Machine Guns

I am informed by 1st Bde
that the 7 Machine guns which

4

it is intended to take forward to Lonesome
 Pine will be left in position during
 the night prior to operations. When
 these go, there will be remaining
 7 guns of 1st Bde, which number will
 be augmented by two guns from
 this Brigade. There are two other
 guns on the left of the Section but
 these have the specific mission
 of sweeping ground in front of
 German Officers Trench, and ~~but~~
 cannot assist in the defence of the present
 1st Bde line. J. K. Forsyth, Col.

O/C. 2^d Inf. Bde

for This is all clear. The only point in doubt
 is as to whether the 1st Inf Bde W^d not like
 to withdraw his 7 in. guns in going Sth.

WJ 4/8

pa with sp 32
 WJ
 4/8

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OPERATION ORDER No. 8

by
Brigadier-General H.B. WALKER, D.S.O.,
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Divisional Headquarters,
2nd August, 1915.

Reference : Map of Area occupied by A. & M.E. Army Corps, 1/10,000.

1. - The following changes in distribution will be made in accordance with Army Corps Order No. 15 of 2nd August, on the dates shown below :-

Unit	Present location	Intended location	Time
Aust. Div. H.Q.	Anzac Gully	present 1st Inf. Bde. H.Q.	a.m. 5th August.
2nd Inf. Bde.	No. 2 Section North (MACLAURINE HILL)	(i) To take over COURTHY'S (ii) To take over No. 2 Section South. (iii) Reserve units to BRAUNDS HILL, in rear of CHATER POST, and open recesses in rear of 3rd Bn.	by evening 5th August do. evening 5th August.
3rd Inf. Bde.	No. 1 Section North.	To extend left to include B.3 TUNNEL POST.	evening 5th August.

2. - Newly prepared areas will be cleared for new arrivals by the times given below :-

VICTORIA GULLY	10 p.m. night 4th/5th August
GULLY WEST of MCCAY'S HILL	10 p.m. night 3rd/4th August
WHITE GULLY	10 p.m. night 3rd/4th August
near BRIDGES ROAD	10 p.m. night 5th/6th August

3. - This order will only be communicated to those officers whose duty requires them to be aware of the information contained in it.

C. E. B. WHITE Colonel.
General Staff.

Copy No.	By	To	At
1	Divisional Signal Co.	1st Inf. Bde.	
2	"	2nd "	
3	"	3rd "	
4	"	2nd L.H. Bde.	2200
5	"	Div. Art.	
6	"	Div. Engrs.	
7		Some	am 3/8
8		Am	pm 3/8
9			
10			

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.



Army Corps Headquarters,

2nd August, 1915.

From:- Brigadier-General,
General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps.

To :- Australian Division.
New Zealand and Australian Division.
13th Division.
29th Brigade, 10th Division.
29th Indian Brigade.

Memorandum.

In order to avoid the possibly fatal delay which may ensue in the event of casualties among leaders of Battalions and higher formations, General Officers Commanding Divisions, and in the case of the 29th Brigade, 10th Division, and 29th Indian Brigade, the Commanders of those formations, will arrange to select successors to themselves in the event of their becoming casualties, and will inform their staff officers confidentially of their selections. Similarly, they will arrange ~~that~~ ^{that} their Battalion commanders ~~to~~ do the same as regards themselves.

2. It is to be clearly understood that these selections are not necessarily to be based on seniority, but that the most suitable men to take over in emergency are so selected.

Askeu Brig-General,
General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

*Memo issued
(Secret) 3rd Aug
1915 4/15*

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S E C R E T.



G5.38
No.....

Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
3rd August, 1915.

Brigade Commanders.

1. - In order to avoid what may be serious delay in the event of casualties among battalion and higher commanders, selections to succeed will be made beforehand and names will be communicated confidentially to respective staffs.

2. - The selection will be based on suitability and be made regardless of seniority.

3. - The General Officer Commanding suggests the following designate brigade commanders :-

1st Infantry Brigade	..	Lieut.-Colonel A.J. Bennett, D.S.O.,
2nd Infantry Brigade	..	Lieut.-Colonel C.H. Brand, D.S.O.
3rd Infantry Brigade	..	Lieut.-Colonel J.L. Johnston.

CB B White

Colonel.
General Staff.
1st Australian Division.

8 359



Ad Qrs.
Aus. Div.

I Concur in O/C designate
for 2nd Infy Bde - Bt Col CH. BRAND
and recommend as under
designate O/C's for Batts. of
Brigade.

5th Batt.	Major C. Stewart
6th "	Capt. CW. Daly
7th "	Capt. H T Fayh LAYH
8th "	Major G. Coulter.

With regard to 7th Batt. Capt.
Layh is the only available
Officer with the Batt. He
~~has only been a Capt. since date~~
has only been a Capt. since date
of departure from MENA.
All other officers except
the C.O. are Lieutenants.

pa
b/s

5/8/15

J. K. Forsyth Col
O/C 2nd I. Bde

K.C. 596

17 Aug: 1915

Reference G.S. 38 df- 3 August 1915
para 3-

I regret I am unable to endorse the selection of Lieut Colonel J. L. JOHNSTON as designate brigade commander - I am quite certain that this officer's temperament unfits him for a superior command, at times - I have other reasons I suspect but of which I have no tangible or absolute proof at present.

2. The best officer in the Brigade Commanding a Bn is Lt Col E. H. SMITH Commanding 12 Bn & next Lt. Col. J. C. ROBERTSON Commandg 9 Bn.

3. In the event of my becoming a casualty I would suggest that if available Lt. Col. SMITH be designate Brigade Commander & be made a Temporary Colonel.

4/8/15

Lt Smith MacLagan Brig Gen
Commandg 3rd Inf. Bde.

SECRET

43

4/8/15

319.

"A" Form.

Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	<div>This message is on a/c of 44 4.8.15 Service. (Signature of "Franking Officer.")</div>	Recd. at
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date
			At			From
			To			By
			By			

TO { Third Inf Bde

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 45.44	Fourth	KC596	

The Div Comd Concurs

From	Place	Time
Asst Dir		2100

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

* This line should be erased if not required.

(632) —McC. & Co. Ltd., London.— W 11400/2045. 100,000 2/15. Forms C 2121/10.

4.8.15

S E C R E T.

Copy No.

OPERATION ORDER No. 9

by
 Brigadier-General H.B. WALKER, D.S.O.,
 Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Divisional Headquarters,
 4th August, 1915.

Reference : Map of GALLIPOLI PENINSULA 1/20,000
 Trench Diagram No. II.

Information.

1. - As a prelude to major operations elsewhere, the outline of which has been communicated confidentially to brigade commanders, the 1st Australian Division is to take action on its present front with the object of preventing the enemy moving reserves to other areas.

Intention.

2. - The 1st Australian Division and attached troops will :-
 (i) hold the present entrenched line from CHATHAM'S to COURTNEY'S POST (inclusive);
 (ii) attack and capture the works known as :-
 (a) LONE PINE, and
 (b) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

Distribution.

3.

A ARRANGEMENTS FOR HOLDING EXISTING LINE.

A (i) To hold the line referred to, troops will be disposed as follows :-

2nd L.H. Bde. - On its present front, including advanced posts.

3rd Inf. Bde. - The posts and line now held by this brigade up to and inclusive of B.3 TUNNEL POST.

2nd Inf. Bde. - From B.3 TUNNEL POST exclusive up to and including COURTNEY'S POST.

B.24 TUNNEL and the crater near B.22 will be held by the 2nd Inf. Bde. after the troops of the 1st Inf. Bde. have moved to the attack, to protect the northern flank.

Troops will be distributed on this line holding such points d'appui as offer special advantages :-

- (a) to support the 1st Infantry Brigade;
- (b) to thin the firing line elsewhere.

These points d'appui will be prepared at once under the directions of the O.C. Divisional Engineers.

Brigade commanders will submit tables showing the distribution of troops in detail to these points.

The new positions will be taken up by the evening of the 5th August.

4.8/12

2.

(ii) The 3rd Infantry Brigade will arrange to have one battalion as divisional reserve towards the northern flank of its section. The exact position for the battalion will be selected by the Brigadier-General Commanding 3rd Infantry Brigade, and reported to Divisional Headquarters.

(iii) The 2nd Infantry Brigade will arrange to have one battalion in reserve, distributed between BRAUND'S HILL, in rear of THE CRATER POST, and in the recesses in rear of 3rd Battalion's present lines.

B**ATTACK ON LONE PINE.**

B (1) For the attack on LONE PINE troops will be allotted as follows :-

1st Infantry Brigade
2nd Field Coy., Engrs.

(ii) The immediate objective of the attack will be the enemy trenches marked S2, R3, Q7, Q4, P13, P6, P4, P3, P1. The enemy communication trenches R3 R7 will also be seized and formed into flank protection from the south; similarly the trenches P1, P3, P4 will be converted to protect the northern flank (Trench Diagram II.).

(iii) The frontage allotted to the 1st Infantry Brigade for deployment lies between the vicinity of TUNNEL B.3 to TUNNEL B.24. All fire, support, and communication trenches in rear of this alignment will be at the disposal of the 1st Infantry Brigade. The O.C. Divisional Engineers will improve the support and communication trenches and, where possible, provide them with overhead cover.

The O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade will, during the process of deployment, remain in the southern end of GUN LANE and in the communication trench immediately north of it the troops destined to occupy the PIMPLE POST.

(iv) The divisional artillery, under the orders of the divisional commander, will co-operate in the attack as follows :-

(a) During the 4th, 5th, and 6th instants, there will be preliminary bombardments of LONE PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH by batteries as follows :-

D Battery, 69th Brigade R.F.A.

B " " " " (1 sec.)

4th Battery Lowland Brigade R.F.A.

New Zealand 4.5-inch Howitzers (1 section)

1st Battery New Zealand Field Artillery

4th Battery Australian Field Artillery

5th Battery Australian Field Artillery

A Battery, 69th Brigade, R.F.A.

Times will be arranged and communicated to brigade commanders concerned by Brigadier-General Commanding Divisional Artillery.

48.15

3.

(b) Beginning at 1700 and lasting until 1730 on the 6th instant, there will be an intensive bombardment by batteries as follows :-

D Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. - JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY

B Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. - LONESOME PINE

(1 section)

4th Bty. Lowland Bde., - GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH and S.E. slopes
R.F.A.

N.Z. 4.5 inch Howtzs. - Trenches in front of JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and LONE PINE.
(1 section)

1st Bty. N.Z.F.A. - Entanglements in front of above trenches.

6th Bty. A.F.A. - C.1 - C.6 (b)

A Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. - "A".11 trenches.

4th Bty. A.F.A. - A.3, A.7, and A.11.

(c) During and subsequent to the delivery of the assault the initial functions of batteries will be as follows:-

(1) The 7th and 8th Batteries and mobile section will be prepared further to support the infantry assault by bringing fire to bear on LONE PINE TRENCHES. As soon as our infantry approach the enemy's trenches the howitzer batteries allotted to JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and LONE PINE with the exception of the section, "B" Bty., 69th Bde., will switch a steady fire on to :-

(A) Southern slopes of JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY;

(B) Communication trench to LONE PINE and eastern glacis;

(C) Eastern end of OWEN'S GULCH;

(D) LEGGE VALLEY.

No.1 Bty. N.Z.F.A. will assist as far as possible.

The undermentioned batteries will maintain a steady fire on to the following objectives :-

6th and 8th Bts. A.F.A. - CHESSBOARD

No.2 Bty. N.Z.F.A. - Trenches opposite QUINN'S.

7th and 8th Bts. A.F.A. - LONE PINE RIDGE.

(2) The undermentioned batteries will be prepared to engage hostile guns as follows :-

G. Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. - SCRUBBY KNOLL Bty.
6-inch Howtz., N.Z.Div. }

A. Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. }
5th and 8th Bts. A.F.A. } - Guns at G.

C. Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. }
5th Lowland Bty. } - MORTAR RIDGE
N.Z. 4.5-inch Howtz. }

A. Bty. 69th Bde. R.F.A. }
4th Lowland Bty. } - SAND PIT.

No.2 6-inch How. }
4th Lowland Bty. } - GUN RIDGE.

7th Bty. A.F.A. }
9th Bty. A.F.A. }
4.7-inch gun } - OLIVE GROVE and
No.1 6-inch How. } WINEGLASS.
5th Lowland Bty. }

1 Sec. 26th Mtn. Bty. - Such targets as can
(TRENCHARD) be best engaged,
using their own discretion. After dark

4815

4.

star shell will be fired over :-

OWEN'S GULLY - eastern end;
JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY;
WIPE GULLY.

All changes necessary will be effected on the orders of the Brigadier-General Commanding Div. Art.

- (d) During the night star shell will be fired at intervals by the section of the 21st Mountain Battery.
- (e) Every effort will be made by attacking troops to display red and yellow flags to indicate their position to artillery observers.
- Red bunting has been issued to the Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade. From this small red flags will be made and shown in captured trenches; it has been observed that the Turks thus mark the position of their firing lines.

(v) The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade will assist the attack by fire. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade and 3rd Infantry Brigade will endeavour to neutralize the enemy's fire from PINE and SNIPERS RIDGES; and the 2nd Infantry Brigade will cover the advance of the 1st Infantry Brigade by keeping down fire from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and LONE PINE and preventing the movement of enemy reinforcements via OWEN'S GULLY and the eastern glacis of LONE PINE.

(vi) The O.C. Divisional Engineers will prepare mines for explosion in suitable tunnels between C.31 and C.33 with the object of screening and disturbing fire from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY. He will have arrangements in train for firing mines in tunnels adjacent to B.26 and B.22.

(vii) Trench mortars will be distributed as follows :-

- (a) at the disposal of the O.C. 3rd Infantry Bde.:-
- 1 3.7-inch near TASMANIA POST;
- (b) at the disposal of O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade :-
- 1 Garland in line now held by 2nd Bn. - objectives : LONE PINE AND JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY;
 - 2 Garlands) near MOORE'S POST on parade - objectives
 - 1 Japanese) LONE PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH;
 - 1 Garland north of MOORE'S in the line now held by 4th Bn. - objectives : LONE PINE, JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH;
 - 1 Japanese, SCOTT'S POINT - objectives : JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH;
 - 1 3.7-inch, JACK JOHNSON'S GAVITY - objectives : GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH and trenches opposite COURTNEY'S.

(viii) The attack will take place at 1730 on the 6th August, the signal being three short whistle blasts, the first sounding promptly at 1730. All watches will be synchronized at 1600 on 6th August.

48.15

5.

C. ATTACK ON GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH AND SNIPERS TRENCH.

(i) For the attack on GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH and the destruction of SNIPERS TRENCH the O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade will detail a force of approximately 400 men.

(ii) The objective of the attack will be the enemy trenches marked M8, M9, M1, and M4; the first two will be cleared and the last two held (Trench Diagram No. II).

(iii) The frontage upon which the force will deploy will be allotted by the O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade.

(iv) The attack will take place at midnight on night 6th/7th August, the signal being made by flare or rocket as determined by the O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade.

(v) The O.C. Divisional Engineers will arrange for the two mines under GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH to be fired before the attack begins.

4. -ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

(i) Attention is drawn to Army Corps Organization Orders for the troops in Anzac issued herewith.

(ii) With reference to paragraph 1 of the Organization orders :- Jackets will be worn;

(a) 150 rounds of ammunition per man will be held in brigade reserve by the 1st Infantry Brigade; portion of this will in advance be placed in recesses off TUNNEL B.5.

(b) At least two sandbags per man will be carried by attacking troops.

(c) The distinguishing armlets and shoulder patch will be worn by all ranks whether of units detailed for special operations or holding present trenches. Armlets and patches will not be affixed until the day of the 6th instant.

(d) The storage of surplus equipment (see paragraph 3 of Organization Orders) will be made under brigade and divisional unit arrangements.

(e) Troops detailed to hold present trenches will be rationed for 24 hours and all waterbottles will be filled on the afternoon of the 6th instant.

(f) From the 4th instant inclusive, rations will be drawn from the four days reserve now in unit charge.

(iii) (a) In each battalion or detachment of attacking troops bombing parties of four non-commissioned officers and 24 men will be organized and held available for distribution to companies. A bombing party should consist of :-

6.

1 man with rifle and bayonet ready for use
 1 bomb thrower
 1 carrier with basket of bombs
 Non-commissioned officer
 second thrower
 second carrier
 spare man.

(b) A similar organization will be adopted in the battalions holding the present line.

(c) Prior to the 6th instant brigades will be equipped with bombs as follows :-

1st Infantry Brigade	..	1200
2nd Infantry Brigade	..	1200
3rd Infantry Brigade	..	800
2nd L. H. Brigade	..	800

Men should be told to remove the bombs from dead and wounded wherever possible.

(iv) In the organization of troops for attacks on LONE PINE and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, engineer parties, working parties, and obstacle parties will be included under brigade arrangements. The necessary tools and stores will be collected beforehand and placed in a brigade depot. They should provide reserve as well as expense stores.

These parties will be separately told off :-

- (a) to convert enemy trenches;
- (b) to construct obstacles in enemy communication trenches;
- (c) to complete communications to LONE PINE via TUNNELS B5, B8, B6.

(v) The main communications with the captured works will be through TUNNELS B5, B8, and B6, which will be prepared by the engineer details allotted to the 1st Infantry Brigade and such additional working parties as may be told off by the Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade. The O.C. Divisional Engineers will forthwith improve the exits from these tunnels to the GUN LANE and have them clearly marked.

(vi) Complete medical arrangements have been made by the A.D.M.S.; the following details are published for information :-

(a) No.2 Field Ambulance will operate over No.II Section North and that portion of No.II Section South which is north of 1st Infantry Brigade Headquarters. Two advanced dressing stations will be formed in BRIDGES ROAD.

(b) No.3 Field Ambulance will operate over that portion of No.II Section South which is south of the 1st Infantry Brigade Headquarters. One advanced dressing station will be established in BROWNS DIP and one in VICTORIA GULLY.

(c) No.1 Field Ambulance will operate over No.I Section. Two advanced dressing stations will be established in this section.

4.8.15

7.

(d) Three divisional collecting stations have been selected :-

(1) On the northern slope of McCAY'S HILL where No.3 Field Ambulance is bivouacked;

(2) On the lower western slope of McCAY'S HILL facing the sea, where No.2 Field Ambulance is bivouacked;

(3) In VICTORIA GULLY at DAWKINS' POINT where No.1 Field Ambulance is bivouacked.

All wounded able to walk should immediately proceed to the nearest divisional collecting station, as they are places of comparative safety.

5 - Divisional Headquarters will on the morning of the 5th instant move to the present position of Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade. On that date the communications of the 1st Infantry Brigade will be arranged to meet the preliminary arrangements for attack.

C. B. B. WHITE Colonel.
General Staff.

Copy No.	To	By	At
1 - 5	Divisional Headquarters	Hand	
6 - 10	Divisional Artillery	D. S. Coy.	
11	Divisional Engineers	"	
12	Divisional Signal Coy.	Hand	
13	1st Infantry Brigade	D. S. Coy.	
14	2nd Infantry Brigade	"	
15	3rd Infantry Brigade	"	
16	2nd L.H. Brigade	"	
17	Divisional Train	"	
18	A.D.M.S.	Hand	
19	Anzac (for informn.)	D. S. Coy.	
20	N.Z. Div. (for informn.)	"	
21-24	1st Bde. for Bns.		
25-28	3rd Bde "		
29-32	2nd Bde "		
33-36	2nd L.H. Bde for regts		
37	Gen. Godley		

ORGANIZATION ORDERS FOR THE TROOPS IN AIZAG.

The following orders are published, so that troops may make provision now for the various steps required.

DRESS AND EQUIPMENT.

1. The dress for operations will be:-

F.S. EQUIPMENT less great coats, ~~coats~~ and packs. Respirators will be carried.

AMMUNITION - 200 rounds per man carried on person.
Machine guns - 3500 rounds per gun in bolt boxes.

No regimental or brigade reserve will accompany the troops, but will be sent forward later as required from the reserves which have been formed.

Trained bomb throwers will be included in each company.

These men will carry only 50 rounds of ammunition but will each be provided with an additional haversack to carry 8 bombs.

SANDBAGS. At least one per man.

TOOLS. The light entrenching tool will be carried, and in addition picks and shovels in the proportion of one pick and one shovel to each 8 men - carried on person. (One pick and one shovel per 4 men not employed in an attacking column).

Wire cutters will be carried. Other articles of equipment at the discretion of Commanders in charge of special operations.

ALL RED AND YELLOW SEMAPHORE FLAGS - signalling or special issue in possession of units are to be taken. One each per Officer and N.C.O. up to the number in possession, after deducting signalling requirements.

These Red and Yellow flags are to be waved rapidly when it is desired to show the position of our troops to the Navy, our own artillery, or to our infantry.

WATER BOTTLES - filled, and to be very sparingly used.

IRON RATIONS. Meat and biscuits or equivalent: one day.
Groceries 2 days.

Indian ranks. Ghee or sugar in place of groceries.

All ranks will wear white armbands 6" wide fixed on each arm above the elbow - and a white patch about 8" square fixed on the back of the right shoulder or between the shoulder blades. This will be worn in addition to any distinguishing marks selected by Commanders of Columns.

No animals will be available for carriage of any equipment. Cable and other technical equipment usually carried in carts or wagons is to be carried on barrows or by hand.

NIGHT OPERATIONS.

2. The pass word for night operations will be published in Operation Orders.

Any one not answering with the countersign at once: and anyone without the distinguishing armbands and patch ordered in Para 1 will be treated as an enemy.

The following refers to night operations involving a night march previous to assault:-

i. Rifles are not to be loaded. Magazines will not be charged before moving off, and are only to be charged by the direct order of an officer.

ii. Bayonets will be fixed.

iii. All movement is to be as silent as possible: Guides and leaders of columns are reminded that a pace of more than a mile an hour cannot be attained in broken country with a column of more than 500 men.

4.8.15

- 2 -

iv. No talking is to be permitted from the hour of falling in till daylight; necessary orders are to be passed in low tones.

v. No smoking or lights are to be permitted from the hour of falling in, till daylight.

vi. No messenger is to be sent from front to rear at a faster pace than the column is moving, as men moving rapidly back are apt to cause panic. Unless therefore the matter is urgent the messenger should be dropped to await the arrival of the person the message is meant for.

Similarly no evacuation of wounded to the rear during darkness is to take place till the columns have passed by. No man not a stretcher bearer is to fall out on the excuse of assisting wounded to the rear unless his services have been demanded by a medical officer.

vii. In the event of the enemy's fire being opened while troops are moving on the objective, troops are to move on, advanced parties or special groups being detailed for attacking enemy piquets or snipers with the bayonet if these are close to the line of march.

If the fire is effective, as from machine gun fire trained on a point, troops will take cover while stops are organized to deal with it.

When, however, the objective is close, troops will press on to its capture at all costs, remembering that several other columns are aiming at the same objective and that the attack of one aids all.

viii. Electric torches, used only by officers and by the order of the senior commander on the spot, will be useful to flash backwards and show position of front lines from time to time to those in rear. (These are only for use once touch with the enemy has been gained and the advance of the troops can no longer be concealed).

ix. When considering the distribution of troops in their commands, leaders are warned that soon rather than late enemy piquets will be met with. Each column should therefore be headed by a party ready to deal with out any hesitation with an enemy party when met with using the bayonet and following up quickly on the heels of the enemy if he withdraws up the direction of the march.

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

3. In accordance with Para 1, packs, coats, and other articles of equipment have to be left behind. This applies to all units, as whether employed actively or passively to begin with, all may be required to assume the offensive at short notice.

These articles will be collected before falling in and left in charge of a party of

1 officer per brigade

1 senior N.C.O. per battalion

2 men per company

and a similar proportion for other units.

This equipment with all surplus kit, will be left:-

In the case of new arrivals - in the area allotted to the units, under brigade arrangements

In the case of Anzac units - as may be selected under Divisional arrangements.

DISPOSAL OF SICK.

4. Casualties occurring in the brigade area between dark of the night on which movement commences and the march of troops will be dealt with under arrangements which are being made for all troops by Australian Division in their area, and New Zealand & Aust. Division in theirs. None but urgent cases will be evacuated until daylight.

WATER.

5. The afternoon before operations commence an extra supply of water will be provided for troops detailed for operations beyond the Anzac position. Water bottles are to be filled from this. As much as possible of any balance from this extra issue should be consumed before starting.

48.15

- 3 -

CARE OF
SUPPLIES.

6. All ranks are to be warned to be sparing in their use of water, food, and ammunition. In some cases there is no possibility of water being sent up to the troops for at least 18 hours after their movement commences, nor of food being available for 48 hours. Any food or water thrown away cannot therefore be replaced.

As regards ammunition, every effort will be made to bring up reserves immediately in the rear of troops, but none the less wild firing is to be checked at once and no firing permitted except on paying targets - or by picked shots specially detailed to deal with individual enemy.

REST.

All ranks are also to be warned that the first night of the operations will be sleepless and the next probably sleepless also.

They should therefore during the night and day pre-paring the operation rest rather than move about unnecessarily.

ENTRENCING.

8. All new arrivals are reminded that no labour expended on digging is wasted and that when they occupy a position they are to dig, not till they have completed a little breastwork, but till a deep recessed fire trench has been made. Then they are to continue till support and communication trenches are complete and give full protection against shrapnel and small arm fire. And as the only tools available will be those carried by the men, these are on no account to be thrown away because of their weight or inconvenience.

DIFFERENT MARKS
OF AMMUNITION.

9. The troops employed are armed with rifles firing two Marks of ammunition, Mark VI and Mark VII.

The maxim built for the Mark VI cannot take Mark VII ammunition - and this is being legislated for as far as possible by employing guns now at Anzac in places where only Mark VI ammunition is used by the troops.

Mark VII ammunition can be used in any Mark of .303 rifle but is likely to jam in loading, and a different sighting is necessary. Briefly - L.E. short rifle or the long rifle using Mark VII ammunition fires high up to 400 yards and after that low. A rifle sighted for Mark VII ammunition and using Mark VI ammunition fires low for the first 400 yards and after that high.

It is therefore desirable to avoid mixing up the two Marks and to help in this, boxes of Mark VII ammunition are clearly marked, and have in addition two "V" shaped nicks on the ends of the lids of all boxes, so that the boxes can be distinguished by feel as well as by sight.

An additional safeguard is that all Mark VII ammunition is packed in bandoliers for convenience in distribution, and not in packets.

"B" Form.

Army Form O 2122

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

* This line should be erased if not required.

4373

“A” Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.
Army Form C. 2121.

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of		46	48/15	Service.	(Signature of “Franking Officer.”)	By
Office of origin and Service Instructions.	At		To	By	Sent		Date		From	By	

TO		7407		Lt		Rde	
----	--	------	--	----	--	-----	--

Sender's Number.	45.46	Day of Month	Fourth	In reply to Number	Ka695	AAA
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R3	has	intentional	but you
may	you	with	change it
to	RS.		

From	Dunt	
Place		
Time	2130	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.
(Z)
Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.
* This line should be erased if not required.
(632) — M.C. & Co. Ltd., London. — W 11400/2043. 100,000 2/15. Forms C 2121/10.

4.8.15

Ga 117

ANZAC COVE

5. 8. 15

Australian Division

I have to acknowledge receipt of
Copy No 19 of your Operation Order No 9 of 4th August.

The only point on which the Army
Corps Commander is not quite clear is in
C ii viz "trenches marked M 8, M 9, M 1, & M 4,
the first two will be cleared and the last
two held" - as ~~the trenches~~ on the
trench diagram Trench M 9 appears
necessary to the holding of the last two.

Adkeu Brig Genl. J.S.

A.N.Z.A.C.

"A" FORM.

Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message _____

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____		Recd. at _____ m.	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions. <div style="font-size: 2em; opacity: 0.5; position: absolute; top: 50%; left: 50%; transform: translate(-50%, -50%);">Hand</div>						Sent _____ At _____ m. To _____ By _____	Date _____ From _____ By _____
TO { AUGAC							

Sender's Number. * AS 51	Day of Month. 6th	In reply to Number Jan 17	AAA
--	---	---	--

M8 and M9 are SMIPERS TRENCH

It is separated from G.O

TRENCH and completely looked into

by the Jolly

From AUGAC		
Place		
Time 0900		CP 29 CP 11 Hms

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

Censor.

(Z)

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

* This line should be erased if not required.

726(1), Wt. 11400-2045, 50,000, 2-18, B. M. & S. Ltd

Times & Messages. Attack on LONESOME PINE.

1. Appreciation submitted G.O.C. Army Corps. App. 1.
2. Orders Operation 2.
3. Artillery Dispositions 3.

Time. Preliminary bombardment 4th 5th 6th.

16.30. An intense bombardment by all guns opened and continued until 17.30.

This bombardment was successful as regards killing or wounding personnel in LONESOME PINE, about one half of the Turkish troops actually in the front trenches at its commencement being killed or wounded. But the result of the shooting in destroying overhead cover in front trenches was so small as to be of only slight assistance to the Infantry attack most of the shell were either just short or too far over.

One gun an 18 pr placed in an exposed position on Artillery Road brought direct fire at point blank range with great effect every shot being well

placed and the gun was served well by the detachment under Lt GATLIFFE. An 18 pr placed in a similar position to bring fire to bear on JOHNSTON'S TOLLY was very slow being delayed nearly half an hour and finally Lt RICHARDSON was induced to alter or remove some sand bags to enable it to be fired. The Howitzer Fire on JOHNSTON'S TOLLY was not impressive many shell burst short or near our trenches and others appear to have been misdirected as to effect by the columns of smoke. The effect on the ~~Right~~ or SOUTHERN portion of the first FIRING LINE appeared afterwards to be fair but the NORTHERN half of the trench seems quite intact.

A very heavy bombardment on the known enemy gun positions was maintained, the rate of fire from the 8" Battery especially being good. But the Howitzer shooting was not sustained, perceptible lulls occurring giving the impression that men were tiring.

Barbed wire destroyed

The result of this expenditure of ammunition was practically nil as the enemy guns were not silenced but the 75 mm. and 6" How. maintained a very vigorous bombardment on our trenches at about Bq during the whole of our Infantry attack. It is probable that Lieut GATLIFFES gun did immense service.

The main feature of the enemy artillery was the well sustained fire from a small number of guns. The method adopted was not destructive - no fire was brought directly on the area over which the Infantry crossed except for a very slight sweep, the guns braving on the parapet of our Firing Trench, the two factors being

1. Fear of enfilading their own trenches
2. Difficulty with a concealed gun in engaging a moving target over a very limited space.

Had the gun placed by the 2nd F.A Bde to fire

on JOHNSTONS SALLY been as relatively effective as the one placed to command LONE PINE the losses from Machine gun fire would have probably been less.

17.06 Brigade 1st Ist Bde reported all Batt^{ns} in position and ready.

17.30 The attack ^{began} commenced, and though reported by prisoners as unexpected by enemy in trenches the enemy artillery was very quickly on to the parapet over which our Inftry advanced, fire from TURKS HUMP, SANDPIT, and "C" and the unlocated guns in rear of SCRUBBY KNOLL being heavy. There appeared to be the keenest wish to get forward, the men taking the space between the trenches, much of it almost clear of scrub with great gallantry. The sang froid and steadiness of the reserves in our trenches was remarkable. not the least excitement or nervousness being apparent.

On reaching the Enemy Firing Line a serious check took place owing to the solidly built overhead cover giving very little entry into the trench, the attacking party in a great measure had to take cover by laying down under the sand bags forming the parapet while a small number comparatively were able to enter the trench.

- 17.42 Report received that large bodies of enemy were retiring out LONESOME PINE.
- 17.43 Report received that 3rd & 4th Bns were well into centre of position.
- 18.04 Report that 2nd Bn men were hitting Parados of enemy position. 1 Coy in reserve occupying dip of Hill.
- 18.10 1st Report. 3rd Bn reached South end of trench. Reserves from 4th Bn now pushing forward and well in trench. Bayonets visible 30 yards in.

18.10 cd 2nd Bn over enemy parados about centre of its frontage

At this time the enemy artillery fire was very severe on the zone between trenches the scrub being fired in several places. but telephone communication was re-established and ^{reserves} troops moved up to Sap Bq.

18.19. Message recd? JOHNSTON JOLLY. Fire shot 2 to Left. Enemy massing with fixed bayonets.

The fire from our artillery was lacking in intensity and not well directed on Jolly where numbers of men could be observed in communication trench having seen OWENS GULLY. O.C. Machine Gun detachment was notified and brought heavy fire to bear, but it was evidently a good How^o target though impossible for 18p. Q.F.

18.24 Message recd? Whole of 1st Bn sent in in reply to request from LONCPINE

There was no cessation of enemy artillery fire. 8th Battery AFA was firing at a very finely sustained rate mainly at C Target which was the one apparently best controlled. Guns behind SCRUBBY KNOLL were very active from covered positions.

1835 Report received attack appears successful. It was apparent that a good footing had been obtained, reserves moved forward fresh and water and am^o carriers commenced to cross the open zone, the enemy artillery being concentrated mainly on our firing line trench.

It was reported that our bomb were not working well.

1840 Reported. Owens Gully Enemy massing.

1847 PINE RIDGE reinforced from GUN RIDGE 600 Turks.

There was some doubt as to the extent of enemy massing in OWENS GULLY. Probably two Turkish troops were moved from JOHNSTON'S SALLY across OWENS GULLY to LONE PINE but the whole of the reserve troops belonging to Sally section were brought up and moved through OWENS GULLY.

PINE RIDGE reinforcement was interesting and disclosed strength on TURK left and anxiety to defend that section.

1855 Report received "all reserves except 120 reinforcements 1st Bⁿ forward. Firing Subsidized ex Machine Gun

1857 Message "All 1st Bⁿ reinforcements sent. and 3rd 13th to send one 13th to GUN LANE.

By this time the trench was won and congratulations received from Gen. GODLEY

19.02. Enemy was pressing in Right (May
McKay) and reinforcements asked for.
1906 Artillery requested to concentrate on
South Slopes LONE PINE. (24)
a counter attack from JOHNSTONS SLOPE
was reported and a number of reports
sent in mainly by Cpl DOBBIN that
enemy was massing in OWENS GULLY
but finally after a series of Star Shell
had been fired it was reported that
the statements were not confirmed.

19.20 } Messages respecting delay in
19.40 } arrival of Bn from 3rd Bde asked
to sent to GUNLANE.

19.20 } Reported enemy fire on parapets
20.45 } PIMPLE very severe.

19.30 } Reports "Our guns firing on our lines."
20.45 } "Our howitzer dropped shell in our trenches"

20.59 Reports Everything about safe

20.35 General Walker sent messages of
Congratulation.

22.00 Reports "all safe"

at this time the wounded and
prisoners were gradually brought through
By Sap. The prisoners were 119 in all
and sent to Aus. Div. Campment at
ANZAC. 2 Machine Guns reported
captured & used - (02.52)

7th Aug

01.56

Lt Col McNAUGHTON reported all going well.

Appendix No. 1. 338
4.8.15.

Appendix 7⁸/₁₅

TIMES & MESSAGES HOLDING LONE PINE TRENCHES.

At 03.00 ANZAC was advised that attack on LONE PINE had accomplished everything attempted.

The effort now was to consolidate gains and secure further ground.

During the night 119 prisoners had been secured and some intelligent N.C.O's interrogated, the information gained which was confirmed by comparison with that obtained the previous day from prisoners from LEANES showing that the Turkish forces before the Division were considerable and that at least three batt^{ns} of the 47 Rgt were allotted to the LONE PINE area - with probably three B^{ns} of the 13th Rgt available as a reserve.

To reach the LONE PINE communication was established through B 5 & B 9 saps which were not completed until early morning. meantime reinforcements, ammunition, water, bombs & flares had to pass up one narrow tunnel and across open ground

and wounded and prisoners return, causing much congestion. The 2nd Field Co Engineers under Maj. MARTYN having working parties going from the crater.

No serious counter attacks were made by the TURKS though frequent reports of enemy massing in OWEN'S GULLY were received.

The whole of the 1st I. B^{de} was taken into the PINE & 2nd B^{de} from 3rd I B^{de} being brought up to act as support.

7⁸/₁₅

At 07.45 Everything was reported very quiet & there were plenty of men in the trenches but continued indications of enemy counter attacks were observed and 3rd I B^{de} endeavored to keep the enemy pinned to his trenches by intermittent bursts of rapid fire.

A 5th How B^{de} of the 69th B^{de} firing on JOHNSTON'S GULLY fired several shells short which

landed in the firing trenches occupied by the 5th B^{ty} causing a number of serious casualties.

At 11.30 It was reported that 4 M.G.s had been captured and enemy were bombing severely, our supply of bombs was intermittent and during the whole of the operations of ~~defence~~ holding & consolidating the captured trenches the question of a sufficient supply of bombs was ~~a~~ cause of anxiety. On the other hand the Turkish supply appeared inexhaustible -

12.25 It was now possible to ascertain the position of the trenches which were found to be most awkwardly situated, being enfiladed in every direction by the other Turkish trenches and possessing no field of fire for our use.

The total number of M.G.s had now increased

to seven, with many thousands of rounds of ammⁿ and a large number of Rifles. From 13.00 to 14.00 enemy preparations for a serious attack were observed. 2 Coy of 1st B^{ty} which had been withdrawn to the PIMPLE were sent to the PINE, and artillery ordered to shell LEGGE VALLEY. At 13.55 regular streams of enemy were observed coming up a communication trench and at 14.30 a severe attack supported by artillery fire was sustained. The attack was almost entirely a bomb one and at 14.56 both flanks were so severely pressed that more artillery support was asked for. The attack continued until 15.50 when the situation was reported easier, but there was no cessation, at 16.53 there was noticeable diminution in intensity of fire and the LEFT attack appeared to have failed. The ships fire during this

period proved valuable.

At 17.25 The enemy showed renewed energy. JOHNSTON'S TOLL was fully manned and apparently in addition to the supporting B^{ns} of the 47th Rgt. the Turks had brought up the whole of the 13th Regt hitherto in reserve and from OWENS GULLY and LEGGE VALLEY the attack was continued.

All troops available for 1st IB^{de} were now being used and one Coy of the 12th B^{de} absorbing all the reserves of the 3rd IB^{de} was sent to the PIMPLE. The CONNAUGHT ROR B^{de} being also obtained, one Coy of which went to the PIMPLE the B^{de} going to 3rd IB^{de} as reserve.

After a slackening in the ^{effort} of the attack the TURKS who losses must have been very severe they again renewed their bombing

of LONE PINE at 19.00 and by 20.00 the question of supply of bombs from ANZAC was requiring attention.

8 ⁸/₁₅

During the whole night almost continual bombing took place and at 05.00 the enemy were still continuously attacking against LONESOME PINE.

In spite of severe losses and extraordinarily difficult conditions the trenches had been held almost in their entirety but two dead ends one 30 yds the other 10 yds had been vacated. From 05.50 to 06.50 the fight was constant and in addition to his efforts on the PINE the 3rd IB^{de} was being shelled, LEANE'S Trench bombed and 2nd IB^{de} engaged by guns from MORTAR RIDGE.

At 08.32 Further TURKISH troops collected in LEGGE VALLEY and fiercely attacked the 4th B^{de} temporarily taking one trench but being

6107

Appendix No. 1
341

1815.

thrown out. Genl WALKER congratulating
Lt Col McNAUGHTON - at 09.15 the 7th Bn
was sent to relieve units in LONE PINE
and bombing had much diminished -
(note. About this time a visit to the trenches
presented a magnificent exhibition of
stamina & courage. The losses had been
severe, all the dead from previous days'
fighting were unmoved and conditions
generally appalling but nowhere could the
slightest sign of weakness be observed. Men
were dead tired and physically sick often
with the trench but showed the most dogged
determination while there was a complete
absence of flinching).

A partial lull took place but at 10.25
more enemy troops moved up & it was
reported the H.2 artillery did excellent work.

Communications with the PIMPLE were

now good and every effort made
to clear up the trenches, the Co of Con.
NAUGHT Rgt removing and burying dead.

Bombing continued but situation was
in hand and at 19.15 3rd Bn attacked
a portion of trench held by enemy carrying
it by 20.00 and linking up with 4th
Bn and at 23.00 the situation was
much easier the enemy being fairly
quiet.

9th 15. At 04.15 the Turks efforts were continued.
a heavy rifle fire from JOHNSTON'S LOCH was
brought in LONE PINE and bombs thrown but
situation felt to be easy, artillery fire was
sustained at 04.45 and a few Turks
entered the S end. and at 06.10 more
men were urgently needed the 7th & 12th
Bns being used, the former on the right
flank holding the enemy well though

suffering heavy casualties.

At 06.39 the 4th Bⁿ reported the situation favorable and considered we had gained the upper hand over the enemy in bomb throwing and from this time on ascending was practically assured. at 06.42 it was reported the Turks were losing heavily and the assault appeared to have failed, at 07.03 the enemy appeared demoralized but our men's spirits were very good. at 07.37 the 1st Bⁿ was sent with the PINE to reinforce with a view of counter-attacking the Turks whose heavy losses had evidently demoralized them.

At 08.45 The 5th Bⁿ sent two Coys to LONE PINE to relieve troops and the 3rd Bⁿ was taken out relieved by the 1st Bⁿ.

At 09.40 small parties of Turks were observed retreating from LONE PINE.

11.28 The enemy still persisted to some extent and portion of the 1st Bⁿ under Capt SASSE surrounded & killed a party of 20 who attacked the SW angle - and at 11.56 the situation was reported somewhat quieter but all bombs used and more required - the Turks still endeavored and at 12.25 were close to SW front trench and bomb supply being short but at 12.35 bombs were received and 7th Bⁿ reported to be holding its own though suffering heavy casualties.

This attack diminished and at 16.19 the 1st Bⁿ captured 40 yds of communication trench leading to OWENS VALLEY Capt Sasse & SHOUT with 8 men killing 8 Turks.

At 16.55 A Squadron of Light Horse from 2nd LH Bⁿ was sent to LONE PINE to reinforce and at 18.05 the enemy ceased killing the position.

From this the attacks were irregular and during the night 9/10th and the 10th the work of fortification was carried on, though frequent ^{very} bursts of artillery fire were directed at the PINE.

The PENNAUGHT Rgt was relieved and sent to ANZAC. 12th Bde returned to 3rd Bde and only one officer and 40 men of 2nd Bde reinforcements sent to the PINE.

Practically the combat attacks were a continuous series from 06.00 7th to 00.00 9th/10th or 72 hours or from the time of the attack at 17.30 on the 6th 78 hours.

At least ^{Turkish} 6000 troops must have been used for the defence & combat attacks and their losses were

undoubtedly very severe.

For many hours they exhibited courage and determination much above the average of their fighting but it can be fairly said that the exhibition of fine calm moral ~~and~~ physical bravery shown by the troops taking part in this enterprise was unsurpassable and the clockwork regularity in which reinforcements were given and reliefs afforded no doubt inspired them with the utmost confidence that they were being capably handled.

7⁸/₁₁

LONE PINE

- 03.06 ANZAC advised attack on LONE PINE completed.
- 05.47 Reserve 13th 3rd B^{de} (12th) nearly all absorbed garrisoning LONE PINE.
- 06.20 3rd B^{de} asked if 12th B^{de} could be withdrawn but GOC thought inadvisable.
- 07.45 Everything reported very quiet, ~~in trenches~~ plenty of men in trenches - 4th B^{de} on LEFT consolidating position.
- 08.27 3rd Ist B^{de} reported "Endeavouring keep enemy pinned to trenches by intermittent bursts of rapid fire."
- 08.33 1st B^{de} reported firing discontinued at LONE PINE. No shell fire since 07.00. 12th B^{de} withdrawn to PIMPLE. 1st B^{de} reorganized.
- 09.43 Our 5" shells reported falling in our trenches - 25 casualties including 9 killed.
- 11.30 09.34 4 Enemy M.G.s reported captured.
- 11.58 Bombs wanted urgently by 1st B^{de}

7⁸/₁₁

General

- 03.45 Reported that cable landed at HEBRUNESSI. and only a little shelling in front of landing at SUVLA.
- 05.55 Enemy Aeroplane observed.
- 05.20 6 How & 75^{mm} heavily shelled N. N^o 2 Sec. Heavy action reported in front of QUINN'S.
- 05.45 Reinforcements 1st & 2nd Infy B^{de} reported as landed and being sent up.
- 06.10 1st Ist B^{de} asked if action should be taken in regard to QUINN'S.
- 06.13 Front trenches solely observed fully manned and artillery ordered to bring guns to bear.
- 06.35 Reported attack by QUINN'S repulsed. POPE'S attack held up on DEAD MAN'S RIDGE.
- 07.30 5th How shell falling in our trenches.
- 10.30 Enquiry if our troops in CHESS BD. No N.Z. position reported.
- 11.30 Turkish troops observed on TURKS HUMP.

Appendix No
1815.
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Estimate.

31st July LEANE'S TR. over 300

14 Aug Bombardment " 400

5. " " 600

6. LEANES POST 400.

6 } LONE PINE.
7 }
8 } 2 Co in attack 600
9 }
10 } 5000 men called
say 2000 2600

Bombardements
Q.O. French
Schmuckin Jolly 600

4.900

Appendix.

L.P.

12. 25- Report from 1st IBth respecting field of
fire & setting of benches.

12. 40 Trucks reported moving before LONE PINE

12 42 Total number of MG captured sum
many thousands Bds Amⁿ & large Mⁿ Rifles

12. 45 1500 Enemy reported moving East.

13 19 1st B^{de} reported there was every indication
of an attack on LONE PINE. 2 C^o 1st B^{de}
ordered as reinforcements.

13. 30 Artillery arrangements made 6.5 shell
LEGGY VALLEY & NZ assistance asked -

13 55 1st B^{co} reported enemy coming up communication trench in regular streams.

14 01 No counter attack reported.

14 30 2nd 13th attacked on Right with bombs

14 32 " " " " " 9 artillery

14 56 Both flanks Low Point Severely pressed. Artillery
Support asked for.

15. 50 Situation reported easier.

Appendix No. 1

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L.P.

- 16.53 Report that Bombing & firing still continues but not so intense. Left attack appears to have failed. Ships fire valuable.
- 17.03 One B^{de} from 29 B^{de} placed at disposal of Division.
- 17.15 JOHNSTONS LOWY apparently full of TURKS.
- 17.25 Enemy attacking LONEPINE from LEGGEE VALLEY and OWENS GULLY. 1st B^{de} Have no reserve & ask for one B^{de} at PIMPLE.
- 17.50 3rd I B^{de} sent 1 Co 12 B^{de} to 1st B^{de} absorbing all reserves.
- 18.00 BENNAUGHT REGS sent for. 1 Co PIMPLE remains reserve 3rd I B^{de}.
- 19.00 Further counter attack against LONEPINE.
- 20.00 Again bombs required.

18th

German Officers Trench

- 00.45. OC 2nd I B^{de} reported that communication with 6th B^{de} was broken but OC 8th B^{de} reports attack delayed cause not known, men ready in tunnels.
- 01.00. G.O.C. ordered 6th B^{de} to move at once.
- 01.16 Reported. Attack on G.O. Trench delayed owing to blocked tunnels from shot & not impossible. Blocking due to enemy gun fire. 2nd B^{de} to reorganize and attack promptly.
- 02.20 Orders sent for one party of 100 men to be followed by a second and if required a third party to take G.O. trench.
- 03.00 Lt Col BENNETT ordered to attack in compliance with instructions.
- 04.10 Report from 2nd B^{de} Attack on GERMAN OFFICERS Trench failed again.
- 04.23 Instructions sent 2nd I B^{de} to reorganize another attack promptly.
- 04.50 9.559 cancelled. Withdraw 6th B^{de} and

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7.8.15.

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reorganize and steady it. Make arrangements to launch another attack but do not do so until ordered.

08.25 Orders sent for 6th B^{de} to continue reorganization

09.24 Report received from 2nd I B^{de} that all arrangements complete as regards reinforcements. 5th B^{de} & 7th B^{de} would do for German officers trench but 6th not strong enough to relieve them. Recommend 7th for G.O. trench task.

11.32 2nd I B^{de} asked for reports respecting G.O. Trench.

~~H.38~~ G.O.C. ~~Ans. D.M.~~

4.8.15.

Appendix No 1. 348

Headquarters, 1st Australian Division,
14th August, 1915.

DESPATCH No. 15.

From - General Officer Commanding
1st Australian Division.

To - Lieutenant-General Commanding
A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

Sir,

1. - I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried out against the enemy works known as LONE PINE and GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH on the 6th August, in obedience to Army Corps Order No. 16 of the 3rd August, and instructions for the General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Division, dated 4th August :-

A. THE ASSAULT ON LONE PINE.

(1) The enemy's work on LONE PINE consisted of a strong point d'appui on the south-western end of the 400 PLATEAU and confronted at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards the salient in the line of our trenches known as THE PIMPLE. The work was a strong one connected by numerous communication trenches with another point d'appui known as JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to the north, with LEGGE VALLEY on the east, and with SNIPERS and PINE RIDGES on the south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards. The intervening ground composed the narrow summit and the slopes of a convex feature. The slope to the south formed the head of a small nullah and was thinly covered with brushwood; that to the north had an

8.383

inappreciable slope northwards. The approach to the position was exposed to enfilade fire from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY to the north and SNIPERS RIDGE to the south.

A portion of the enemy's work was protected by rough wire entanglements; and it was known that at least a proportion of trenches were provided with overhead cover.

(ii) The policy of our operations for some time past had been to advance our trenches as close as possible towards the enemy by tunnelling. In consequence of this we had in front of LONE PINE an underground fire trench 20 yards nearer to the enemy. ^{marked x x} This trench was, prior to the assault, carefully prepared to facilitate the exit of a maximum number of men. A number of mines were also exploded in advance of this line in order to increase available cover.

(iii) I attach a copy of my operation order for the attack from which it will be seen that during the 4th, 5th and 6th instants both LONE PINE and JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY were subjected to a deliberate artillery bombardment, and that an intensive bombardment was effected from 4.30 to 5.30 p.m. on the 6th instant.

(iv) The assault was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions, each of whom held one company in reserve. The 1st Battalion formed the brigade reserve. In anticipation of further requirements I had arranged that the garrison of the remainder of the line held by this division should be so distributed to points d'appui that a battalion of each the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades should be available in reserve.

(v) The assault began punctually at 5.30 p.m., the brigade arrangements for timing and making the signal to advance being good and practical. Two lines

practically issued simultaneously and they were closely followed by a third. The dash and élan of the troops was beyond all praise and the determination to reach the enemy's trenches made the men invincible. Upon reaching the enemy's trenches a slight check and consequent bunching occurred. This was due to the existence of barbed wire entanglement and the presence of stout overhead cover. The delay occasioned some loss.

The advance was opposed by rifle and machine gun fire; that from the machine guns increasing in intensity and accuracy. The enemy's guns opened promptly on our trenches and the intervening ground. Our casualties were considerable.

At 5.47 the 3rd and 4th Battalions were well into the enemy's position; and at 6.5 p.m. the reserves of the 2nd Battalion had advanced over the enemy's parades and by driving out, killing and capturing had occupied trenches as far south as R.5 (see Trench Diagram No.II attached). The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions followed, and at 6.20 p.m., in response to messages from the captured position, the brigade reserve (the 1st Battalion) was launched to consolidate the success gained. Reinforcements of this battalion to the number of 120, withheld at this time, were by 7 p.m. also absorbed, and a battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade was brought up to our trenches opposite the captured work.

During the assault our artillery continued to fire on JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY, and lengthening its range covered the ground behind the captured work.

(vi) At 7.5 p.m. the enemy began a determined and violent counter-attack from the north and south. The tide of its progress swayed backwards and forwards. Here and there the persistence of bomb attacks forced

4-385-
our men to give up portion of trenches but in most cases these were retaken, a fact which redounds to the credit of the officers upon whose initiative the action was taken, and the gallantry of the men. The counter-attack lasted for a considerable time and must have occasioned the enemy appreciable loss.

(vii) Meanwhile, as previously arranged, communication with the captured work was rapidly established by means of open saps from the ends of tunnels^{B5 B8} which, by previous preparation, had been well advanced for the purpose. By 7.40 p.m. covered communication had been established with the captured work.

(viii) The task of consolidating ourselves in the new work proceeded steadily; progress, however, was greatly hindered by continual bombing, by shell fire, and by the difficulties of removing wounded and dead.

At 1.30 a.m. on the 7th renewed counter-attacks were made by the Turks, who advanced up communication trenches preceded by showers of bombs. These counter-attacks continued for a considerable time and our work was in consequence greatly hampered. A large number of prisoners had been taken and these added to the congestion.

The casualties incurred during the beating off of these counter-attacks, which lasted continuously until about 8.40 a.m., were heavy and in consequence it became necessary to absorb part of the 12th Battalion - the reserve of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

(ix) At 1.23 p.m. on the 7th indications of further counter-attack became apparent. Shortly afterwards the Turks began another determined counter-attack which lasted until 5 p.m.. This was resumed at midnight - was intense at first and went on intermittently for some hours.

8.386

At an early period of this counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish portion of a trench. Later on upon the prompt initiative of the commanding officer it was gallantly retaken and a number of the enemy were killed.

During the day of the 8th we took advantage of every cessation in the enemy's bombing to improve our position. The 2nd Battalion which, in its exposed position, had suffered heavy losses and had lost its commanding officer, was withdrawn and replaced by the 7th Battalion - the reserve of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

(x) At 5 a.m. on the 9th August the enemy made a violent counter-attack from the east and south-east after a feint or fire attack from the north which was not pressed home. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of this attack and repelled the enemy with bomb and rifle fire. By 7.45 a.m. it was evident that the attack had failed and the Turks had lost heavily. There being signs that the enemy were demoralized, Colonel SMYTH assembled the 1st Battalion with the object of counter-attacking but a favourable opportunity did not occur. At this time the enemy's guns were causing much inconvenience.

(xi) Bombing and sniping continued in less volume throughout this day and night, and lasted until the 12th August, when it became evident that we had gained the ascendancy in rifle fire and could always repel a bomb attack if we could keep up a bomb supply of double that of the enemy's.

2. - GENERAL REMARKS.

From the foregoing narrative it will be seen that a strong and extensive enemy work was captured

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and held, despite practically six days continual counter-attack, by an infantry brigade whose strength at the outset was but 2800 rifles with the support of two other weak battalions. The success of the initial action was due mainly to the gallantry and dash of both officers and men. While I do not think the enemy were actually surprised it is certain that he was not at the time anticipating immediate attack and in some measure to this cause our success must be ascribed.

I venture to think that the result achieved justifies my reference to the action of this brigade as a feat of arms which for gallantry and steadfastness has rarely been excelled. It establishes beyond doubt the fighting qualities of the Australian soldier and will ever form a glorious page in the history of the Commonwealth Military Forces.

The fighting was most sanguinary and there abound in the trenches silent testimony of bitter struggles and grim determination. It is unfortunately not possible to chronicle the many deeds of gallantry and heroism. I wish, however, to place on record my appreciation of the soldierly qualities displayed by the several commanding officers, among whom for initiative and whole-hearted devotion to duty I cannot single out any one.

The assistance given by the artillery was continual and effective - the gunners sparing no effort likely to help their comrades.

The losses on both sides were heavy : more than 1,000 bodies have been removed from the trenches. The enemy probably suffered more than we did. I must express regret that the action cost us the lives of so many good officers, among them two battalion commanders of great promise - Lieutenant-Colonels E.S.BROWN and

C 354
R. SCOBIE.

In an attachment to this despatch I submit the names of officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are deserving of recognition.

I commend to your notice the careful preparation made by Colonel N.M. SMYTH, V.C., and his confident and determined conduct of the operation of the 1st Infantry Brigade. (The attachment above referred to, containing the names of officers, non commissioned officers, and men, will be forwarded later, when fully completed.)

B. THE ATTACK ON GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

(1) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH comprises an irregularly shaped series of small trenches on MAC LAURIN'S HILL (Square 80 X.3) and opposes our trenches on the summit of that feature. To the south it has a small offshoot known as SNIPERS TRENCH from whence there is communication both to MORTAR RIDGE in rear and to JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY.

The face of the trench actually confronting ours does not in length exceed 50 yards^{N. N3}, and there is a well-defined gap between the visible southern end and SNIPERS RIDGE. Overhead cover existed over nearly the whole length of the trench.

(ii) The intervening surface is devoid of obstacle other than the craters of mines fired by us, and the ground slopes gradually from our to the enemy's trenches over an intervening distance varying from 30 to 50 yards.

(iii) As in the case of the attack on LONE PINE we had forward recesses prepared ready for the exit of attacking troops.

We had the additional advantage of having three mines laid out under the enemy's trench.

838A

(iv) GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH was subjected during the 4th, 5th and 6th instants to artillery bombardments similar to that delivered on LONE PINE. There was no intensive bombardment immediately prior to the assault.

(v) 300 men of the 6th Battalion were told off for the assault, which was timed for 12 midnight, 6th/7th August. A further 100 men from the same battalion were detailed to attack SNIPERS TRENCH.

A mine was exploded at 11.5 p.m., another at 11.28 p.m., and the third at 11.40 p.m.. The object of this plan was to give the enemy time to refill his trenches after the first two explosions and to make him wary of doing so after the third.

During these explosions the assaulting party was held ready; the men were not placed in position in the forward recesses until after the final explosion. Unfortunately some delay occurred in placing men in the recesses due to the blocking of some of the tunnels leading to the forward line.

The attack was eventually made at about 12.45 a.m.. It was apparently anticipated by the enemy and heavy maxim and rifle fire opened on the men the moment they emerged; enfilade maxim fire from JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and THE CHESSBOARD was particularly effective. A number of men were shot before they could get out of the recesses. This broke the cohesion of the line and although a certain number of men reached the enemy's parapets the losses suffered at the very outset, and the difficulty in the dark recesses of sending out other lines affected the spirit of the men and the attack failed.



(vi) Orders were thereupon issued for a reorganization of the arrangements and for a second attempt to be made. This was done and another attack was launched about 4 a.m.. This I regret to say also failed; the failure must be ascribed to the fact that the enemy were awaiting attack and had all preparations made.

(vii) A verbal report of the circumstances was made to the Lieutenant-General Commanding, who, upon consideration, deemed further effort inadvisable, although preparations for a third attempt were in hand.

3. - GENERAL REMARKS.

After the brilliant action of the 1st Infantry Brigade during the afternoon hopes certainly ran high that the 2nd Infantry Brigade would by the action of one of its battalions consummate the success and add to its already established renown. It is therefore with great regret that I have to report the failure of two efforts. While there were probably minor contributing causes, the main reason for the failure lay in the fact that the attempt did not come as a surprise and that the enemy had made preparations which only attack on a large scale could have successfully overcome.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Brigadier-General.
Commanding 1st Australian Division.