


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/42/8 Part 9

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 1st  
Australian Division

September 1915



AWM4-1/42/8PART9



4. 9. 15.

Appendix No. 2

NOTE ON THE "LONG PINE" POSITION.

General. 1. The total perimeter of the position, including the front line and the rear line, is about 750 yards, and the garrison required is about 770 men.

The best garrison would be a battalion less details left in rest camp. The Bn. Cooks and a night reserve of 100 men may be kept in BROWNS DIP.

The position has hitherto been divided into three sections, in each of which the firing recesses are numbered from the right. Each of these usually is manned by 6 men and 1 N.C.O., of whom two men are always on duty, one observing and the other sniping at loopholes, enemy if visible within effective range, or enemy's sandbags.

WEAK POINTS OF THE POSITION:-

(i) The S.E. Angle has an old enemy trench within 20 yards which is sometimes occupied by the enemy's miners and bombers. Upon this point machine gun and artillery fire can be brought to bear from our main position to the S.W. by previous arrangement. Vigorous bombing has hitherto driven the enemy from his trench.

(ii) SAP B on the extreme East of the position is a salient and was originally an enemy communication trench. We have erected barricades in it and use it as a bombing hole. Should the enemy ever get into it it would be necessary to bomb them out by a vigorous bomb attack.

(iii) "The Circus" on the extreme North is a salient relying for protection on fire from the Northern front and from the old firing line 150 yards West.

The MACHINE GUN POSITIONS and arcs of fire are shown on the Map. Four M.Gs. in LONG PINE used at night; 7 M.Gs. in Old firing line capable of supporting fire which is given at night if a blue light is shown from LONG PINE.

REAR OF POSITION. The Western or rear face of the position is watched at night by sentry posts and pickets in B4 and B8 Saps.

MINING AND ENGINEERING. - On the South and East points a number of small galleries have been driven towards the enemy, which are used as a safeguard against mining by the enemy. These may be eventually driven up to or under his trenches and used by us for the capture of the trench after the enemy have been shelled and bombed out of it.

P.T.O.



SNIPING AND BOMBING - Sniping by day is best carried out by using periscope rifles, and if the enemy's snipers are not within 50 yards using telescopic or service rifles through loopholes. In every case at least one observer using a periscope should observe for the riflemen.

Enemy headcover within bombing distance should be consistently bombed with double (otrivniere bombs ("Hair-brush") Bombs or Trystol Bombs.

Enemy should be kept out of rear trenches by bombing all along them and throwing occasional bombs back at the parts previously bombed.

Any enemy bomb attack should be met by two bombs at least to every one he throws.

THE ENEMY. 2. The enemy's counter-attacks to try and re-take LONG PINE took the form of an advance of columns storming along their communication trenches and throwing bombs rapidly from the head of the column. They lost very heavily.

The enemy having been taken in by our throwing an "unlit" "hair-brush" bomb with an instantaneous fuse, which they lit in order to throw back and were blown up, tried the same ruse on us, but without success: they threw in two or three unlighted bombs which were found to have instantaneous fuses.

The enemy on the NORTH in JOHNSTONS JOLLY have sent bombers at night to the south edge of OWENS GULLY to bomb our NORTH front, but they have now given this up and use rifle and M.G. fire at night or sniping by day.

The enemy's artillery is probably aware that we use B5 and B8 communications; his principal targets in the position are:-

- (i) S.E. firing line from S.E. and N.E.
- (ii) Eastern firing line between S.E. angle and Sap A from S.E. and N.E.
- (iii) The highest point of earth heaps East of Rd. line of N91 Sec.
- (iv) Old Turkish firing line near East end of B5, from N.E.

His times of firing are generally 2 or 3 shots 6 am.; 12 to 30 shells 10-11 am.; 4-5 pm.; 6-7 pm.

3. The garrison is relieved every 48 hours, one section at a time at an interval of 1 hour or more in the forenoon. The times are changed and precautions taken to give no clue to the enemy that any movement is in progress.

The men's meals are cooked in BROWNS DIT and brought into the position. In case of emergency a Reserve of Biscuit and one quart of water per man are kept in the position.

All periscopes, periscopic rifles, and Special Sniping rifles, S.A.A., Stocks of bombs, tools and stores are handed over to relieving units.

Telescopic rifles are kept with units.

Brown's D.P.  
6.9.1915.

Wm Smyth Brig. General,  
Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade



STANDING ORDERS FOR "LONE PINE" POSITION.RATIONS.BOMBS &S.A.A.

1. Rations now stored in trenches are to be kept intact.
2. (i) Bomb Reserve (300 per Sec.) and S.A.A. to be kept up to strength on following basis:-

NO 1 Sec. - 220 men.  
NO 2 Sec. - 200 men.  
NO 3 Sec. - 350 men.

(ii) Large stocks of bombs must not be kept in advanced trenches or saps, but should be stored at immediate disposal of supports.

(iii) In cases where the size of the Sec. has to be reduced owing to shortage of rank and file, the O.C. of such Section must be prepared to hand over on requisition a certain quantity of these to O.C. of Section which has been increased.

(iv) Special care is to be taken in the storing of Lotbinière Bombs which should not be kept in store for longer than 3 days.

GREAT.COATS.SMOKINGPERISCOPES & PERISCOPE RIFLES.ARTILLERYFIRE.COMMUN-CATIONINTELLI-IGENCEPIQUETS.RELIEFS.

3. Equipment is on no account to be worn over greatcoats.

4. No Smoking is to be permitted near stores of bombs.

5. These will be handed over to relieving units.

6. On the enemy shelling LONE PINE all concerned will be prepared for our artillery to fire reprisal rounds on enemy's works in vicinity.

Exposed working parties should take cover, as H.E. shells are liable to throw debris into our own trenches.

7. Commanders of Sections are responsible that Sections join up with those next to them, and that they are in a constant state of readiness, and that casualties are evacuated without delay.

8. One Officer in each Sec. will be told off for intelligence duties. He will arrange that constant watch is kept on enemy visible from his Section, and that any special movement or new works are reported for information to Bde. Hd. Qrs. Important intelligence will be reported at once. A short daily report will be sent to Bde Hd Qrs at 1300. The Intelligence Officer will keep the Section Map up to date, and as far as possible plot the enemy's works in the vicinity.

9. Piquets mounted in B4 and B3 Sap after dark are responsible that no unauthorised person enters LONE PINE and that no enemy approaches the Sap without being fired upon.

10. Reliefs proceeding to or from LONE PINE will move in silence and avoid USING ARTILLERY ROAD where it is visible from GABA TEPE. Sniping must be continued while the reliefs are taking place.

BROWN'S DIP  
6.9.1915.

J. S. Anderson  
for Bde Major Genl. Bde. Captain



STATEMENT SHOWING STRENGTH OF 1st. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ASHORE AT  
 ANZAC WHEN LANDING COMPLETED AND STRENGTH ON 4th. SEPTEMBER 1915

U N I T	TOTAL Landed	PRESENT STRENGTH 4/9/15
Divsn. Headquarters	55	41
4th. L.H. Regt. (landed 26.5.15.)	438	342
<u>DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY</u>		
Headqrs	16	14
1st. F.A. Bde (at Helles)	--	--
2nd. F.A. Bde	345	333
3rd. F.A. Bde	363	384
<u>Divisional Engineers</u>		
Headqrs	10	4
1st. Fld. Coy	148	92
2nd. Fld. Coy.	157	113
3rd. Fld. Coy.	141	119
Div. Signal Coy.	64	100
<u>1st. INFANTRY BRIGADE - Headqrs</u>	38	30
1st. Battalion	1138	497
2nd. "	1102	215
3rd. "	1133	298
4th. "	1019	250
<u>2nd. INFANTRY BRIGADE</u>		
Headqrs	37	41
5th. Battalion	892	424
6th. "	764	404
7th. "	933	284
8th. "	937	659
<u>3rd. INFANTRY BRIGADE</u>		
Headqrs	33	41
9th. Battalion	1297	683
10th. "	1216	678
11th. "	1211	489
12th. "	1227	594
<u>DIVISIONAL TRAIN</u>	173	92
1st. Field Ambulance	118	153
2nd. Field Ambulance	146	103
3rd. Field Ambulance	183	110
<u>T O T A L S .....</u>	15334	7609
Officers	584	319 Officers
Others	14750	7290 Others

Major,  
 D.A.A. & Q.M.G.?  
 for G.O.C. 1st. Australian Division

26th. September 1915

This does not include 4,600 reinforcements, which landed at Anzac between 25th April & 4th. Sept. Thus we have now only some 3000 of the original men who landed, many of whom have been away wounded or sick & have since returned.



## MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

No. of Message

Prefix <i>SM</i>	Code	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Words.	At <i>1010</i> m.	At	m.	
<i>LHB</i>		From	To		<i>4</i> <i>9-</i>
		By <i>D</i>	By		

TO { *1st Aust Div*

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
<i>LHB 904</i>	<i>fourth</i>		

As enemy have made several considerable improvements along HARRIS RIDGE south of BIRD TRENCHES we would be glad if an officer may be sent on board destroyer tonight to point them out

Repeating  
V and  
by 800  
at 1730  
Pr

From	Place	Time
<i>seen</i>	<i>2nd LHBdc</i>	<i>1000</i>

## MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

No. of Message

Prefix <i>gm</i>	Code	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Words.	At <i>1436</i> m.	At	m.	
		From <i>LHB</i>	To		<i>4/9</i>
		By <i>CHO</i>	By		

TO { *1st Aust Div*

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
<i>LHB 906</i>	<i>4th</i>		

It is proposed to carry out the following rule at 0415 tomorrow morning aaa 5th L.H. to send a party of 30 along the beach 400 yds south of Beach Post and to open fire on Harris Ridge from Bird Trenches to Baldwin Pits as if covering an advance. aaa Garrison 6thathams Post and 101 machine gun to fire on same targets. aaa Destroyers at 0420 to shell along the ridge between the above

From	Place	Time
	<i>app</i>	





MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

Prefix	Code	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			At	m.	At	m.
			From		To	
			By		By	

TO				
----	--	--	--	--

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
-----------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

trenches aaa It is expected that this fire will force enemy over to eastern slope of Harris Ridge aaa No 31 gun 7<sup>th</sup> Batty to then fire 12 rounds at Bird trenches aaa the signal for destroyer to open fire would be a red rocket from Chatham's Post aaa The Beach party would withdraw at 0430 aaa Please inform me as early as possible if the above is approved as it is intended to send

From			
Place			



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

Prefix	Code	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			At	m.	At	m.
			From		To	
			By		By	

TO				
----	--	--	--	--

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
-----------------	--------------	--------------------	-----

an officer on board the destroyer this afternoon


From	2nd Lt. Horse		
Place	1420		

Appendix No. 4



## MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

† Message

Prefix _____	Code _____	m. _____	Words _____	Charge _____		Recd. at _____	m. _____
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Date _____	From _____
<u>Priority</u>			At _____	m. _____	Service.	By _____	
			To _____		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		
			By _____				

TO	<del>Prague</del>	2. L. 17 R.D.	
----	-------------------	---------------	--

* Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	•
9.635	fourth	LHB 906	AAA

[illegible]

From	firm	ans	div	
Place				
Time	1607			

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.


(Z)

*Censor.*

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix _____	Code _____	m.	Words _____	Charge _____	 <p><i>This message is on a/c of:</i></p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____ Service.</p> <p>_____</p> <p>(Signature of "Franking Officer.")</p>	No. of message _____
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent _____			Recd. at _____
_____			At _____ m.			Date _____
_____			To _____			From _____
_____			By _____		By _____	

TO	ANZAC.			

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	
* 4621.	20th		AAA

[illegible]

From	FIRST	AUST	DIV.	
Place				
Time	1100			

*The above may be forwarded as now corrected.*

(Z)

*Censor.*

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix No. 4

261



"A" Form.

Army Form C 2121.

# MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.				
Sent				
At				
To				
By				
Recd. at				
Date				
From				
By				



TO	second	LH	ode
----	--------	----	-----

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 624	fourth	LHB 904	

please	send	officer	to	report
to	ANZAC	at	1730	today

From	first Anzac	Div
Place		
Time	1150	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

(1530) Wt. W 9044-1194. 12/14. 40 Pads. S. B. Ltd.

"B" Form.

Army Form C 2122

# MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Received
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			
Words.			
At			
From			
By			
Sent			
At			
To			
By			



TO	Anzac	Div
----	-------	-----

Sender's Number	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 624	4	662	

Please	send	him	down
at	1730		

From	Anzac
Place	
Time	1125

Appendix No. 4

262



"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Recd. at	m.	
<p>Office of Origin and Service Instructions.</p> <p>Sent</p> <p>At</p> <p>To</p> <p>By</p>						Date		
						From		
						By		
						Signature of "Franking Officer"		



TO HNZAC

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* 9 641	1000th		

In anticipation of your concurrence and in order to save time the I have approved the following rule to take place at 0415 tomorrow morning a a a 7 AM Light House to send a party of thirty along the beach 100 yards south of BEACH POST and to fire on HARRIS RIDGE from BIRD TRENCHES & BAIKAT PITS as if covering an advance. Gunner CHATHAMS POST and No 10 machine gun to fire on same targets a a a Destroyer will be shell along ridge between the shore trenches a a a It is expected that this fire will force enemy over to eastern slope of HARRIS RIDGE a a a No 3<sup>gun</sup> Down M. Battery to then fire twelve rounds at BIRD TRENCHES a a a The signal for destroyer

From	
Place	
Time	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

"A" Form. Army Form C. 2121.  
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words	Charge	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.	Recd. at	m.	
<p>Office of Origin and Service Instructions.</p> <p>Sent</p> <p>At</p> <p>To</p> <p>By</p>						Date		
						From		
						By		
						Signature of "Franking Officer"		



TO

Sender's Number.	Day of Month	In reply to Number	AAA
* -2-			

to open fire would be a red rocket from CHATHAMS POST a a a the beach party would withdraw at 0430

From	
Place	
Time	1740

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

Appendix No. 4

263



"B" Form.

Army Form C 2122

## MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix <i>AC</i>	Code <i>CFS</i>	m.	Received	Sent	Office Stamp.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			At <i>1937</i> m.	At	
Words. <i>14</i>			From	To	
			By <i>R</i>	By	<i>4/9/-</i>

TO

*Anat Wion*

Sender's Number <i>GA 87</i>	Day of Month <i>4th</i>	In reply to Number <i>641</i>	<b>AAA</b>
---------------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------------	------------

*Suggestion approved and officer has left w gun direct*

*sent message via*

*about 10:00 am*

*Speak about 10:00 am*

*Tractor sign anchor wire*

*3 officers - 17th Bn*

*Low Pine*

*intercept in low Pine*

*2 platoons in support at*

*now*

*Keep 3.7 at S.E. of*

*1930*

*PA*

*Angac*

*Keep 3.7 at S.E. of*

*1930*

"A" Form.

Army Form C. 2121.

## MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message

Prefix	Code	m.	Words.	Charge.	This message is on a/c of:	Recd. at	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.					Sent	Date	
					At	From	
					To	By	
					By		

TO

*third first*

Sender's Number <i>GA 87</i>	Day of Month <i>4th</i>	In reply to Number <i>641</i>	<b>AAA</b>
---------------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------------	------------

<i>Secured</i>	<i>L H</i>	<i>6th</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>carrying</i>
<i>out</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>rise</i>	<i>at</i>	<i>0415</i>
<i>Tomorrow</i>	<i>near</i>	<i>HARRIS</i>	<i>RIDGE</i>	

From <i>first</i>	<i>anal</i>	<i>Div</i>
Place		
Time <i>1715</i>		
The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)		
Censor.	Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name	

Appendix No. 4

264



Appendix No. 5

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Army Corps Headquarters,  
Anzac Cove, 5th Sept. 1915.

From General Staff, A.&.N.Z.A.C.

To 1st Australian Division.

MEMORANDUM

Headquarters and two infantry brigades of the 2nd Australian Division have now arrived at Anzac.

2. On arrival G.O.C. 2nd Australian Division will take over command of Nos. III and IV Sections bounded as follows :-

From WIRE GULLY exclusive along the present line down WALKERS RIDGE to the sea at the old beach barrier.

Inner Administration boundarier -

Southern - BRIDGES ROAD (Exclusive) -SHRAPNEL VALLEY ROAD to the sea at BRIGHTON PIER (exclusive)

Northern- from TURKS Point-across HAPPY VALLEY to WALKERS RIDGE at 80.m.8-WALKERS RIDGE-Sea.

(The base area is excluded from this administration and responsibility. This area is under the Commandant Anzac Base, for administrative purposes. Its boundaries are:-

Commencing from the South at HELL SPIT the outer boundary runs along the watershed of MACLAGANS RIDGE the top edge of the cliffs West and North of PLUGGES PLATEAU and of the cliffs at the heads of RESERVE and MULE GULLIES as far as but excluding the col. in Sq. 80 M 9 on WALKERS RIDGE ROAD - thence round the South sides of the camping areas on the South of WALKERS RIDGE road to, and including, the ground on the North slopes of MULE GULLY at present occupied by the Indian Mule Transport Corps and 15th Casualty Clearing Station, thence to the sea.

Temporarily, to enable the troops of the 1st Australian Division to be relieved, 2nd Australian Division will take over for defence and administration the whole of the Section known as Southern No. II or such portion thereof as may be arranged between the two divisional commanders.

3. G.O.C. No. V Section will continue, temporarily, to include in his tactical and administrative command, the area Southward from the SAZLI BEIT DERE through No. 1 POST across exit from HAPPY VALLEY to WALKERS RIDGE, exclusive.

4. Four hundred men, with a complement of officers from each of the Infantry Brigades of the 2nd Australian Division will be detailed for beach duties under the Commandant Advanced Base Anzac,

Orders for the location, command and administration of these detachments are being issued separately.

(signed) A.SKEEN, Brig.-General,  
General Staff,  
A.&.N.Z.A.Corps.



9.414

Appendix 6

Redistribution, consequent to relief of part of 1st Division  
by 2nd Division.  
PROGRESS REPORT.

				Troops of 2nd Australian Division.		
				B 24 to		WIRE GULLY
						to
Sept. 6th	Went in during	morning.	LONE PINE	WIRE GULLY	COURTENAYS	
			23rd Bn. 200 under (% instr. (say 25	22nd Bn. 400 re- place 25%	24th Bn. 400 (replace 25 %	
				u n d e r i n s t r u c t i o n		
" 7th	"	"	23rd Bn. 200	22nd Bn. 400	24th Bn. 400	
" 8th	"	"	23rd Bn. 200 in relief 200 under in- struction.	400 in relief replace 50 % of 1st Div.	21st Bn. 400 under instruction.	
" 9th	"	"	23rd Bn. 300 in relief 100 instruction	22nd Bn. whole line on relief	21st Bn. 400 under instruction.	
" 10th	"	"	440 24th Bn. )3rd balance)4th 310    )7th	22nd Bn. Whole line on relief	Whole line on relief. 21st Bn.	
" 11th	"	"	440 24th 310 1st Div..	22nd Bn. Whole line on relief	21st Bn. Whole Line on relief.	
" 12th	"	"	Whole 23rd Bn. in relief.	Whole line 22nd Bn.	Whole line 21st Bn.	







9. 4. 16

00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000

Appendix No. 8



9.417.

Appendix 9 269

1st Australian Division.Troops leaving Anzac for LEMNOS.Embarkation State.

Unit	Officers	Other ranks	Total.
<u>1st Inf. Bde.</u>			
Bde. H.Qs. & Sig.Sec.	6	28	34
1st Battalion	13	484	497
2nd "	12	190	202
3rd "	6	205	211
4th "	9	261	270
Totals	46	1168	1214
<u>2nd Inf. Bde.</u>			
Bde. H.Qs. & Sig.Sec.	5	31	36
5th Battalion	21	383	404
6th "	16	383	399
7th "	13	270	283
8th "	22	588	610
Totals	77	1655	1732
1st Field Ambulance	3	111	114
2nd "	5	89	94
Grand Totals	131	3023	3154



## SUMMARY OF MOVEMENT OF UNITS OF 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION FROM ANZAC TO LEMNOS.

COMMENCING 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1915.  
-----

Date	Unit	Strength		To	Remarks.
		Officers	O.Ranks.		
Night 8/9	2nd Bn. (1st Bde)	12	172	Lemnos.	Total 470 - allowed 500
" 8/9	1st Bn. (part)	8	278		
" 9/10	balance 1st Bn.	4	155		Total 1405 - allowed 1500
	5th	20	385		
	6th	16	331		
	8th (part)	8	278		
	1st F.Amb.	3	111		
	2nd F.Amb.	5	89		
" 10/11	H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde.	4	15		Total 452 - allowed 3000
	2nd Bde. Sec. Div. Sig. Co.	1	23		
	8th Bn. (remainder)	12	325		
	6th Bn. (beach party)	1	42		
	Div. Train.		49		
" 11/12	Nil				
" 12/13	3rd Bn.	7	214	) Ready but only the following actually went owing to lack of transports.	all ranks. ( 1st Bde. H.Q. 20 ) ( 3rd Bn. 144 ) Total 314. ( 4th " 135 ) ( Div. Train 15 )
	4th "	9	250		
	7th "	13	279		
	Div. Sig. Co.	1	45		
	Div. Art.	8	140		
			all ranks.		
" 13/14	3rd Bn.		113	)	Total 417
	7th "		304		
" 14/15	2 <sup>nd</sup> Bn.		5	officers. others. 12. 289.	Total 301 all ranks - 5359. Engineers still to go - about 130
	4 <sup>th</sup> "	4	97		
	6 <sup>th</sup> "	1	6		
	8 <sup>th</sup> "	1	6		
	Div Art.	5	147		
	Div. Sig. Co.	1	28		



9.419

Appendix **HOA** 429

DIVISIONAL ORDERS No. 189 21.9.15

by  
Major-General H.B. Walker, D.S.O.  
Commanding 1st Australian Division

Divisional Headquarters,  
21st September, 1915.

A. ADMINISTRATION

952. During the absence of the Divisional Commander on Inspection duty at Mudros - commencing on Wednesday, the 22nd. instant :-

- (i) the 3rd Infantry Brigade will be administered as usual from Divisional Headquarters, but for tactical purposes will be under the command of Brigadier General G. de L. Ryrie, Commanding 2nd. Light Horse Brigade.
- (ii) the Brigades and the Divisional Units of the Division now at Anzac will come under the command of Major-General J. G. Legge, C.M.G., Commanding 2nd. Australian Division.

C.H. FOOTT, LIEUT. COLONEL,  
A.A. & Q.M.G.



9.420

APP 2 11

430

23 9 15

G.O.C.,  
1st Australian Division,

Hydraulic Sluicing

From 1907 to 1914, I have been a director of a considerable sluicing company working under conditions closely approximating those obtaining here - that is, lifting water from a river at a low level and raising it at a considerable altitude by centrifugal pumps in breaking down wash dirt. The water is raised 710 ft. and carried 7 1/2 miles to the point where it is used. The pumps vary from a 6" outlet to 12" - the power used is steam - producer, gas and oil.

Proposals submitted - The following comments are suggested :-

Capt. ABBOTT To raise water by six or seven short lifts from the sea to PLUGGE'S PLATEAU - by means of large centrifugal pumps each worked by an oil engine - diameter of pipe proposed 20" - power 55 Brake H.P.  
Thence flow to 400 plateau, say BROWNS DIP or LONE PINE, thence raised to final elevation and forced through a 20" centrifugal pump.

I. The proposition from an economically effective point of view is unsound, and offers the following objections :-

- i. Too many interdependent links to give any guarantee of regular working
- ii. Too many points offering targets for direct, searching or chance fire by enemy artillery.
- iii. Unnecessarily large installation.
- iv. Great initial cost
- v. Excessive weight of parts to be man-handled without observation from enemy, or in any case without facilities for lifting and moving.
- vi. It is open to question whether a 55 Brake H.P. oil engine can lift a column 20" x 60ft.
- vii. The power required to drive a centrifugal pump of the size proposed at sufficient speed as to cut away earth effectively at 30 to 50 yards from the nozzle would probably be fully 100 h.p.

Given



## Appendix No. //

Given the military value of the work capable of being performed warrants the installation of the system, I would suggest :-

- (a) The material to be cut away is most suitable for hydraulic sluicing - being easy to break down and quickly forming slurry.
- (b) The actual cubic contents of any section of trench required to be demolished is comparatively small.
- (c) A relatively moderate stream poured into the trench would render it untenable.
- (d) The actual period a pump would be in action at one any time would be brief, owing to the necessity of shifting the nozzle :

Therefore the utilisation of such an enormous plant is not advisable.

The points which appear to offer some doubt as to successful working are :-

- (a) Obtaining immunity of pumping stations and pipe line from enemy shell fire
- (b) Securing a sufficiently open embrasure to enable a nozzle of effective size to be worked under rifle or machine gun fire, given protection from artillery fire can be afforded. The embrasure would be about that required for the 3 pr. Hotchkiss guns - This at 30 to 50 yards from enemy trenches offers a good target.
- (c) Directing the nozzle by means of observers - the nozzle man can hardly observe
- (d) A nozzle would be about 4'6" long by 2'6" high, and if worked from behind a parapet, given an embrasure impracticable, would have to be elevated so much as to cause the trajectory of the water to miss very near trenches unless taken so far back as to lose power, or otherwise, if raised in the same manner as a machine gun, the exposure and liability of being put out of action by enemy gun is considerable.
- (e) Every foot the nozzle is raised above the force pump considerably decreases nozzle velocity.
- (f) During the winter, climatic conditions are likely to cause freezing and bursting of pipes.

The possibility of breaking down a sufficiently large section of trench to make an immediate assault possible is open to question :-



## Appendix No. //

It may be taken that 50 yards is an extreme effective cutting distance - the lateral range of a nozzle at this distance would be 30 yards. Under ordinary conditions with everything in the open, this would take two hours to completely demolish. Under existing conditions, if not effectively interfered with by enemy fire, it would occupy three hours.

It is submitted that a heavy deluge of water on the soil under consideration for three hours, plus the matter of slurry formed would make any advance over that front impracticable.

The utilization of hydraulic power in this connection offers, however, several great advantages, and though the details of the scheme as submitted by Captain Abbott appear open to criticism, the idea is worth consideration, and I venture without in any way lessening the value of Captain Abbott's proposition to suggest a variation on lines worked by me for some years, which, while not lessening the credit due to Captain Abbott's initiative, will give more practical results with less cost, labor, and exposure to enemy fire.

Over and above the foregoing points, there is one grave engineering difficulty in Captain Abbott's proposals. Plugge's Plateau is, according to our contoured maps, 65.6 ft. below the general line of the 400 plateau, and to my reckoning therefore 75 to 80 ft below LONE PINE. It is manifestly impracticable to raise water in a reservoir to the level of LONE PINE. The water entering a centrifugal pump used for nozzle purposes should be from a higher level than the pump so as to add to the efficiency of the revolving parts, as if the pump has to spend its energy on suction, its propulsion is greatly reduced. 18ft may be taken as the extreme limit of suction for these pumps. Further, if water is pumped round numbers of bends and elbows, the friction greatly reduces the nozzle velocity.

According to the ~~xxxxx~~ contour plan, the hill at the top of WALKERS RIDGE is 98'4" above LONE PINE.  
One



Appendix No. //

One good steam pump of sufficiently convenient size could throw a 11" stream of water in one lift to the top of WALKERS RIDGE ; from there a 9" pipe line could be easily taken along QUINNS, CLAYTONS, WIRE GULLY to LONE PINE, and the further SOUTH, the greater would be the fall. The total length of piping to LONE PINE would be about 2250 yards only.

This, after allowing for friction, would give at least a head of 60' at any point, and at some, fully 90'.

By using a centrifugal pump of about 8" capacity, a flow of water could be obtained which would cut away any parapets or sand bags within 40 to 50 yards from the nozzle and the volume of water entering the enemy trenches would be such that they would be unliveable in, and any tunnels made for saps or shelters be flooded.

These smaller plants would be much less cumbersome to handle, though of sufficient difficulty, as their weight even will be about 4 tons. The whole cost would be much less than under Captain Abbott's proposal, and the time of erection shorter, especially if wooden piping is mainly used, which is recommended.

The propositions put forward by Lieutenant  
*Moray* do not contain sufficient information or detail to express an opinion on, except that I have not yet been fortunate enough to come in contact with a plant of the power he suggests doing the work he anticipates.

*W. H. Murray*  
Major  
G.S. 1<sup>st</sup> Aust Div



9.474  
G.O.C.,  
1st Australian Division.

appendix 434  
Boring

In large Australian mines, most up-to-date prospecting is done by means of horizontal bores put out at right angles to the lode being worked, at any depth, or at any inclined angle desired.

These bores extend from two or three hundred feet to as much as 1500 feet in distance.

They are conducted on exactly the same system as boring from the surface is done for coal, oil or water, though usually, a sufficient core only being required to test the rock passed through, the horizontal or inclined bores are smaller in diameter than vertical ones.

This work is somewhat specialized, a few Companies owning necessary plants and maintaining certain trained men; consequently very few miners have actual personal knowledge of the work, and there is only one among the units from mining districts at ANZAC who has worked on them, and then only as a labourer.

Having contracted with these Companies to do a great deal of boring, I have some knowledge of the subject, and suggest that in the soft easy country here, this system can be most suitably employed in boring under enemy trenches.

The advantages appear to be :-

1. A bore can be put in at least three times as fast as a tunnel.
2. There is no heavy labor in fatigues.
3. The work is absolutely silent as far as the enemy is concerned.
4. It cannot be countermined.
5. The charge can be placed at any point well inside enemy trenches
6. An almost exact calculation can be made as to where the explosion will take place.

The



9.4.25

Appendix No. 12

The principal drawback is that the diameter of the bore would be limited - without practical knowledge of horizontal boring, I should say at :-

50 yards	-	6"	diameter
100 "	-	5"	"
150 "	-	4"	"
200 "	-	3"	"

The insertion of the charge should offer no difficulties, as the bore can be cased right throughout, and the tamping would be perfect, the firing being done by an electric firer.

During winter, if the ground becomes frozen at all, this work could progress excellently.

21 <sup>9</sup>/<sub>15</sub>

*Michael*  
Major.



9 476

Appendix ~~III~~ <sup>XII</sup> 436  
25.9.15

Notes respecting Turkish Trenches in front of 3rd Infantry  
Brigade

The suggestion that Turks are withdrawing from this front is not borne out by observation :-

1. LONE PINE. Two good firing lines with new sand bags have been completed and the inclusion of steel loop holes points to permanency.

It is suggested that the constant bombing from LONE Pine has caused the Turks to withdraw all men possible from trenches very close but recent mining of our sap and rather daring work of removing our sand bag barricade and shooting one of our officers points to close watch being maintained.

2. SNIPERS RIDGE It is plain this trench is neglected and weakly held during the day. The reason is probably our snipers have been very active, and they shooting extremely in 10th and 11th Regiments is ~~very~~ accurate, constantly knocking sand bags about and keeping Turks weak under cover.

3. WEIR RIDGE There are two lines of firing line trenches, the rear or eastern one is placed within bombing distance of the front one, while wire entanglements have been well fixed and front cleared. A considerable number of old sand bags have been replaced by new ones and both lines are joined up to the main firing lines facing LONE PINE. - Communication trenches across WANLISS GULLY to PINE RIDGE have been much improved.

Altogether the work has been far too well carried out and too much new and good material used to lead to the supposition either that these trenches are very weakly held or that any retirement is contemplated.

4. WANLISS GULLY A really good firing trench sandbagged and loopholed has been made across the head of this gully, enfilading the VALLEY OF DESPAIR and threatening



9.427

any advance or attack from LEANES TRENCH to PINE RIDGE.

Appendix No. 12A

5. PINE RIDGE There are two lines of trenches all recently improved and extended - new bags have largely replaced old ones and much heavy rough timber carried into them of late.

This work is also too good and well finished to suggest a "bluff", and leads to the opinion that it is properly garrisoned.

5. BOOMERANG TRENCHES & GUN RIDGE Quite a lot of work has been carried out lately and the number of men carrying rations - if calculated on the same scale as our own, viz, 2 men to 30 - would give the impression that at least one Battalion is being used in these trenches and that considerable reserves are in LEGGE VALLEY.

6. HARRIS RIDGE The construction of a new trench now proceeding behind BIRD TRENCH and the constant movement of relief and water parties do not point to much diminution in strength

26  $\frac{9}{15}$   
—

*W. H. L. D. M.*

Major

6303 1<sup>st</sup> Aus Div




## MAP OF THE SITUATION

1<sup>ST</sup> AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

2-9-15.

True Meridian



Scale 1:10000

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 YDS.

V. 1.20 metres = about 65 ft.



271

Appendix No. 13

Scale 1:10000


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Vertical scale 1:10000



MAP OF THE SITUATION  
1ST. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
5.9.15

True Meridian



*Handwritten signature and date:*  
5.9.15


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V. 1.20 metres = about 65 ft.



MAP OF THE SITUATION  
1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
272

272

Appendix No. 15



Scale 1:10000

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

V. 1.50 miles - about 2.5 H.

Handwritten signature and date "27-2"




# MAP OF THE SITUATION

1ST. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

8.9.15

True Meridian



*Handwritten signature and date:*  
5.7.15


Scale 1:10,000

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 YDS.

V.L. 20 metres = about 65 ft.



Appendix No. 13



Scale 1: 0.0001



MAP OF THE SITUATION

1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

11.9.15

True Meridian

5th Lowland Bty.  
4 5th How.  
NZLADIV HQ  
ANZAC HQ  
6th Bty 2  
Strachan 2  
IMA  
Caddy 2  
6th How  
Phillips 1  
Phillips 3  
Jopp 2  
8th Bty 1  
8th Bty 2  
Burgess 2  
47 Gun  
No 1 Section Nth  
10th Bn  
12th Bn  
Hughes 1  
No 15th N 1st Bn  
No 1 Section Sth  
6th How  
No 15th S  
HQ  
Hughes 3  
4th LH  
6th LH  
5th LH  
Tasmania Post & Lines Tr.


Scale 1:10,000  
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 YDS.  
V.I. 20 metres = about 65 ft.

John Williams  
6500 1st Aus Div



274

Appendix No. 13



Scale 1 : 10,000

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

V.I. 50 miles - about 82 ft.



True Meridian ↑



MAP OF THE SITUATION


1<sup>ST</sup> AUS. DIV.

14.9.15.

Scale 1:10000

Appendix No. 13





MAP OF THE SITUATION.


1st AUS. DIV.

17.9.15.

Scale 1:10000

Appendix No. 13  
*Michael M. May*  
G843  
276





MAP OF THE SITUATION

1ST. AUS. DIV.

20-9-15

Scale 1:10000

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

V.I. 20 metres = about 65 feet

Appendix No. 13

65th Aust. Div.  
20-9-15





MAP OF THE SITUATION

1<sup>ST</sup> AUS. DIV.


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Scale 1:10000

Appendix No 13

*Handwritten signature*  
439





# MAP OF THE SITUATION


1st Aus. Div.

26.9.15

Scale 1:10000

Appendix No. 13





# MAP OF THE SITUATION

1ST AUS. DIV.

29.9.15.

Scale 1:10,000

Appendix No. 13

441  
65



OPERATION MEMORANDUM No. 31  
by  
Major-General, H.B. Walker, D.S.O.,  
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Divisional Headquarters,  
4th September, 1915.

Machine Guns.

1. With reference to the latter part of Divisional Order No. 931, which lays down that unit commanders must make certain <sup>that</sup> machine guns "are not used when the situation does not demand their employment"; it is to be understood that this is not intended to restrict the use of machine guns when required by the tactical situation either for offence or defence.

Snipers.

2. In view of the information gathered from prisoners, that our snipers have from time to time succeeded in damaging enemy machine guns, the Divisional Commander wishes to emphasize the importance of encouraging selected good shots to keep up a constant fire on enemy machine gun emplacements, many of which have been located. Patient watching for opportunities to shoot with effect at emplacements and loopholes will be repaid.

Bombs.

3. (i) Arrangements will be made to secure a turn-over and periodical inspection of bombs, those whose fuzes show signs of getting slack or of deterioration being returned to the bomb magazine for refuzing.

(ii) More care is required in the handling and storage of bombs, especially powerful bombs like the Lotbiniere.

A supply of notices, copy attached, is being forwarded to units concerned. These will be posted in the trenches where bombs are stored.

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
D. G L A S F U R D, Major,  
for Colonel, General Staff,  
1st Australian Division.



1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

(ii) Special precautions will be observed for the safe storage of Lotbiniere Bombs in trenches. These are made of gun cotton and are highly dangerous.

- (a) Fuze and detonator will be withdrawn and stored separately from bomb. They can be replaced when required for use
- (b) The bombs will be stored in boxes surrounded with damp tow, and are to be kept damp by sprinkling water on the tow.



Issued with -  
Operation Memorandum N: 31



*Handwritten:* H.B. Walker

OPERATION MEMORANDUM No. 52

by  
Major General, H.B. Walker, D.S.O.,  
Commanding 1st Australian Division.

Divisional Headquarters,  
10th September, 1915.

Regimental  
Signallers.

1. (i) During the period of trench warfare, regimental signallers will be maintained at the following minimum strengths :-

Battalion headquarters - 1 serjeant, 1 corporal,  
10 privates.

Company headquarters - 1 lance corporal,  
3 privates.

It is not essential that men so employed should be visual signallers but they must be thoroughly acquainted with :-

- (a) The positions of all neighbouring headquarters.
- (b) The care and repair of telephone lines.
- (c) The position of all infantry telephone lines in the vicinity and a general knowledge of artillery lines.

(ii) Regimental signallers will carry all written messages; they will also be practiced in carrying verbal messages accurately.

(iii) Regimental signallers will not be used for fatigues, other than those in connexion with their own bivouac; but they will do equivalent work in patrolling telephone lines, carrying messages, practicing and other technical work. Their normal position will be at battalion or company headquarters; but in emergency they can be used in the firing line. The battalion signalling officer is generally responsible for the technical work of regimental signallers.

(iv) Casualties (including men sent away sick) which may occur among regimental signallers will be replaced at once by suitable men drawn from the ranks.

...

Bombs.

2. (i) There are now several varieties of bombs in stock, each of which has its special characteristics. The number of types is, it is understood, to be reduced, and only the most effective retained; but as a large stock exists, it is well to know the circumstances in which each type can be used most effectively.

(a) The Cane handle No. 2 and the Hales rifle grenade are percussion grenades. The defects of percussion grenades - the need for careful throwing, ample throwing room and a hard surface to strike on make them unsuited to trench warfare, and it is unlikely that many more of these will be issued.

(b) The cricket ball bombs are of inferior workmanship to the Turkish sample, burst into a few large pieces, and are the least effective of our fuze ignition grenades though useful in a narrow trench.



- (c) The double cylinder bomb is a far better weapon and has more wounding effect and is much feared by the enemy.
- (d) The Lotbiniere bomb - guncotton fixed on a "hair brush" backing, which has little effect on personnel or trenches but is particularly destructive in closed spaces or for breaking down head cover.

The undermentioned grenades are of a much superior type and power to the foregoing, which are mostly improved bombs.

- (e) The Pitcher and Mills have a scattering effect, from the many pieces into which the envelope is shattered. Both very powerful bombs and apparently safe to handle.
- (f) The time and friction No. 6 has an entirely different action. It gets its results from the highly localised destruction caused by the high explosive compound with which it is filled. Experiment shows that a bursting grenade will clear a circle of a yard diameter in bush, destroying roots to a depth of 6 inches; while leaves and twigs outside that circle are not even injured. In addition the explosion has a terrifying effect. This grenade is therefore obviously best suited for use in attacking up trenches - the thrower being immune from flying pieces.

...

3. At present there is a very large stock of double cylinders, a large stock of cricket balls, and a limited supply of the three better grenades.

In using these grenades, therefore, the double cylinder and cricket balls should be earmarked especially for use in the normal interchange of grenades between trenches.

The Lotbiniere bomb should be used whenever head-cover in enemy trenches has to be destroyed but not otherwise, as it is an expensive weapon and in every other use has its superior in one or the other of the smaller grenades.

The Pitcher, Mills and No. 6 grenades should not be used daily except for special purposes such as the repelling of real bomb attacks or for dealing with bomb parties who cannot be quieted by the local grenades - that is they should ~~be used~~ <sup>not</sup> for bombing trenches and areas as such so much as for dealing with trenches and areas in which the enemy is known to be in sufficient numbers to warrant the use of these more effective grenades.

In other words the Mills and Pitcher grenades should be used for -

- (a) Repelling attack.
- (b) Use by our bombing parties.
- (c) Attack on enemy trenches as part of an operation.

The Time and Friction No. 6 is specially indicated by its characteristics for clearing the enemy from trenches in which a lodgment has been made. It should as a rule be reserved for this purpose or for an attack on enemy trenches.

D. G L A S F U R D, Major,  
for Colonel, General Staff.