

AWM4


**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Miscellaneous (North Russia, Hobart, and groups
returning in 1919)

Item number: 34/9/1

Title: North Russian Campaign 1918-1919

July - August 1918



AWM4-34/9/1

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
ARCHANGEL	10.8.18		G.H.Q. established in ARCHANGEL, HQ. ELOPE being at ISAKA GORKA. Both railway & river expeditions held up; former versts from OBOSERSKAIA, latter at BEREZNITZKAIA. Armed boats went up DWINA to join River Force; also Captain of HMS NAIRANA in M.L. boat to reconnoitre if possible as far as KOTLAS. Colonel RINGUE, O.C. French Battalion, seriously wounded. Allied Embassies returned to Archangel.	Appendix 1 App. 2 + 3
	11.8.18		Another force, under Lt. Colonel HASELDEN, despatched - consisting of 100 French, 25 American Seamen, 35 Russians SBAL, 27 Poles. This force will go by river to SIISKOE & thence by road to RESETSKAIA in order to get behind the BOLSHEVIKS force at OBOSERSKAIA.	App. 1 + 2 App. 2
	12.8.18		Lt. Col. JOSSELYN sent up DWINA to replace Col. RINGUE. Two monitors arrived from home and departed again for KANDALAKSHA.	
	13.8.18		Captain of NAIRANA returned, and NAIRANA left for KANDALAKSHA. We have only one effective aeroplane, owing to "crashes", & most of material being sent stowed in bottom of WESTBORO' and especially - to	

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	14.8.18		<p>great deficiency of spare parts. News received that BRITISH reinforcements promised for August 15th will not arrive till August 23rd.</p> <p>Forces at present out will be designated in future as follows:—</p> <p>Lt. Col. GUARD's force on railway Force A</p> <p>" HASELDEN'S " river and road " B</p> <p>" JOSSELYN'S " river " C</p> <p>A and C are still held up — B is progressing.</p>	
	15.8.18		<p>Report from Force B that they are going ahead + expect a scrap tomorrow — + from C that they are going on up river.</p> <p>Aeroplane made a reconnaissance + bombed train in OBOSERSKAIA.</p> <p>Capt. ALTHAM, HMS ATTENTIVE, took over control of all craft on river.</p>	App 2
	16.8.18		<p>Force A report patrol of 1 officer + 20 men met enemy patrol of 1 officer + 88 sailors. Large number of enemy killed, including officer who was German. No casualties on our side. Force B report 250 men with armoured car, field + machine guns encountered near SELETSKOE.</p> <p>They were driven back with heavy losses — armoured car and 1 m.g.</p>	App. 2

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			being captured. SELETSKOE occupied. Our casualties, 1 officer (Captain GARSTIN) + 4 men killed, 1 man died of wounds, 1 officer + 6 men wounded. Reinforcements of 100 Russians S.B.A.L. with Lewis Guns + 2 Vickers Guns detachments sent up to FORCE B. Wireless communication established with Force A, + set sent up to FORCE C. Force C reports naval engagement. 2 gunboats were fired upon by concealed rifles + machine guns. They silenced fire + then retired down stream. They are now at BOROK 55 miles ^{South} South of SEMIONOVSKOE.	App. 2 App. 3 + 4
	17.8.18.		Force B reports Bolsheviks fled leaving ammunition (dum dum bullets in m.g. belts) + a large motor lorry. Bolsheviks.	
	18.8.18.		Reported that Force C at 4 a.m. at TROITSA captured enemy's position, 2 guns, 4 machine guns. Steamer reported sunk by one of our aeroplanes. Armoured train sent up to Force A consisting of engine fully armoured - 1 truck with 77 mm how. - 1 truck with 55 mm gun - 2 trucks with 1 French 75 mm gun in each. In addition 1 truck with 2 - 77 mm hows in it is being prepared.	App. 4

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	19.8.18		Force C reports a third battery captured on evening of 18 th August. Main body at SELETZKAIA. Reported from PETCHORA that BOLSHÉVICKS are giving trouble - 25 men sent by Commander CHAPLIN to deal with situation. Monitor 25 arrived + has started to lighten with a view to proceeding to DVINA. Major RIGGS (American Army) Captain LELONG (French Army) left for London en route to VERSAILLES. HMS SALVATOR departed for MURMANSK with ADMIRAL KEMP. Captain WILLS, HMS GLORY IV (ASKOLD) now SNO ARCHANGEL.	App. 4
	20.8.18		Small expedition went up river to PINEGA to do propaganda among peasants, get recruits, exchange flour tea etc for milk + butter.	
	21.8.18		Funeral of Capt. GARSTIN.	
	22.8.18		Aero planes report bridge over river YEMTSA on Force B's road destroyed. Arrived train with Force A carried out practice on enemy position.	App. 2

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	23.8.18		<p>Reported 500 Bolsheviks marching on ONEGA. Admiral requested to send Monitor to ONEGA. He agreed.</p> <p>Capt. HALES with 2 machine gun sections SBAL left for ONEGA about 4 p.m. 5 Russian Officers + 50 men - detailed by Commander CHAPLIN were also to have gone, but only the Officers appeared.</p> <p>Force C reports being attacked at POTYUGE POTYUGE by 150 men with field guns + gun boats. Monitor 25 is on her way up.</p>	App. 4
	24.8.18		<p>Force C still engaging enemy - about 20 vessels up stream from SELETZKAIA. They have therefore retreated a little.</p>	App. 4.
	25.8.18		<p>Section of 18 howitzers under Capt POORE with SBAL personnel proceeded up river to Force C. Force B, who have now changed route are marching on OBOSERSKAIA (instead of on PLESSETSKAIA as originally arranged) along SELETSKOE - OBOSERSKAIA road, are held up by broken bridge. City of Cairo carrying battalion of Royal Scots crossed the bar at 7 p.m. Operation order no 1 published.</p>	App. 2 "
	26.8.18		<p>2/10 Royal Scots disembarked, marched through town, reembarked on</p>	9

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			<p>bugs for BAKHARITSA. Force C report under gunfire all sides, so retired with all material to KONETZHORSKA. Monitor reached Force C 2.30 am.</p> <p>Force B report bridges now ready, advance will proceed. They are 30 verst from OBOSERSKAIA. 3 Companies of Royal Scots proceeded up river. Monitor reported in action - but enemy gunboats escaped under cover of 6" shore battery.</p> <p>D.H. 4 crashed. Some bombs dropped by plane practising near MODYUGSKI caused some panic - as no previous warning given.</p> <p>Capt HALES, ONEGA, reports the SBAL Section from SOROKA fired on its officers & that one had deserted. At request of Russian authorities, he had given leave for them to be sent back to SOROKA. Gen. MAYNARD informed by cable. Report from AMS NAIRANA that she is proceeding to ONEGA today. She was informed by wireless of position of force A & asked to keep planes in reserve in case Elope would like cooperation.</p>	<p>Apr 4.</p> <p>Apr. 2.</p>
	27.8.18			
	28.8.18			
	29.8.18			

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	30.8.18.		<p>Force B reported about 20 werts from OBOSERSKAYA. Later reported that Bolsheikos have come up road from PLESETSKAYA + occupied SELETZKOE - number unknown but 80 carts on road. Advance guard of 150 within 7 werts of FEDOROVSKAYA. Later reported by aeroplane which after reconnaissance from SIITSKOE landed at BAKHARITSA aerodrome in the dark that Force B has turned + is retiring on FEDOROVSKAYA, also that force of 60 Russians ^{under Capt SHIRITOV} SBAL 1 left at FEDOROVSKAYA had been driven back by enemy who is advancing on SIITSKOE ignoring Force B. All the above occurred during afternoon of 29th + night 29-30 August. ^{30 RFC personnel with 8 machine guns have set out on foot from SIITSKOE to reinforce SHIRITOV.} Morning 30th August, Platoon of Royal Scots + 35 RMLI, whole party under Capt SCOTT RS. proceeded up river to reinforce SIITSKOE. Force C have fallen back unsuccessfully to BEREZNITSKAYA as enemies were getting round their flank with cavalry + heavy guns. M. 25 was hit by big shell, several men being killed. She knocked out one big enemy gun. 700 R.S. should have arrived at Force C by now. Lt. Col. Clarke proceeded to Omega to take command of district.</p>	<p>App 2 " " " App. 1 App. 2 " App. 1 " App. 1 App. 3</p>

✓ 'E' 12/5/13/8
17th July 1941
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APPRECIATION BY GENERAL POOLE.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH FINLAND.

It is obvious that in our present position in the KOLA Peninsula the attitude of FINLAND towards us is a question of vital importance. As far as can be foreseen at present it even seems probable that in the near future FINLAND may definitely declare war on the Allies. The difference between a friendly or hostile FINLAND on our Western flank along the length of the MURMAN Railway is so enormous, that it is vital for us to endeavour in every possible way to bring about a good understanding with this country.

With the plan proposed by the various Allied legations at Stockholm, i.e., to state that we are prepared to hand over PETCHENGA to FINLAND at the end of the war, I am in absolute disagreement. To do so would at once absolutely destroy our influence in Russia not only in this district but amongst all patriotic Russians. Our statements here have been most explicit. That we are here to help Russia to maintain the integrity of her territory against German or other aggression. If, after this, we now say that after the war, FINLAND is to have a free hand to despoil Russia, then we are at once convicted of bad faith and all patriotic Russians will leave us. There is no doubt that to the educated Russian the question of any cession of Russian territory is a very serious matter. For example, last week I proposed to the Sovdep to send a company of Red Finns to reinforce the garrison at Petchenga. At once I was faced with most vehement opposition, which was entirely based on the grounds of the danger of allowing even a Red Finn, and as such bitterly opposed to the present Finnish Government, to enter into Petchenga for fear of a temptation to annex it for his country. But there are, I suggest, other methods which might be used to bring about a good understanding with FINLAND.

As far as my information goes, the feeling of the mass of the Finns is very anti-German, notwithstanding the fact that the pro-German minority, headed by Saio have snatched the power. Here we have one point to work on. Let us take advantage of their present discontent with their German Allies and foster it by every means, not only for present military advantages but also for post-war commercial advantages which might accrue. In this we can surely get much help from the Scandinavian countries, whose interests in blocking German domination are coincident with our own.

There are two immediate steps which should be taken if we decide on this line of action:-

- (1) Both England and America to recognise the independence of FINLAND.
- (2) To guarantee FINLAND, on certain conditions, a regular monthly supply of foodstuffs.

As regards (1), unless we are prepared for this it does not seem likely that we shall meet with much success in any negotiation.

As regards (2) the present food situation in FINLAND is deplorable. Germany has failed in her promise to feed FINLAND. This point shall be rubbed in by our propaganda departments. The supply could be made through Scandinavia at a monthly rate of say 10,000 tons. Our own agents should be allotted to FINLAND to superintend the issue and to guard against any food going to Germany. Thus we could establish

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official agents throughout the country who could form a framework for an effective anti-German propaganda.

The conditions to be attached to the issue of food should be:-

(1) Guarantees of non-cooperation of Finnish troops in any offensive movement beyond the pre-war Russo-Finnish border.

(2) Economic advantages for a term of years after the war.

(3) Steps to be taken ~~towa~~ towards gradual extinction of German influence.

We should at the same time make a declaration of our object in interfering at MURMAN and emphasise the fact that we have no desire to injure FINLAND or her interests.

I consider that, bearing in mind the economic and food situation in FINLAND, such policy affords a reasonable chance of success, and as at any rate well worth consideration of H.M. Government.

It is known that negotiations for supply of wheat corn were entered with FINLAND during last Autumn and failed, but in those days the Finn had the now broken promise of Germany to fall back upon and also the food situation was not nearly so bad as now. If this agreement were to come about it would very materially assist our operations by forcing Germans into anxiety as to those of his communications emanating from FINLAND's Soviet.

13/7/18.