

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/29/20 Part 5

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters, 1st  
ANZAC Corps

September 1917



AWM4-1/29/20PART5

## WAR DIARY.

## APPENDIX (g)

## MAPS.

INFORMATION MAPS.

No. 1	Second Army Outline Trench Map.
2	HOOGE Tinted Contour Map.
3	First ANZAC Forward Area Map - 30.9.1917.
4	Corps Area Map.
5	Map of 47th. Divisional Front.
6	Map of Enemy's Dispositions - 1.9.1917.
7	Map of Enemy's Dispositions - 16.9.1917.
8	(Hostile Tactical Map - 16.9.1917.
9	(Hostile Counter-attack Map (Second Phase) 23.9.1917.
10	Tracks used by Enemy. - 17.9.17.
11	Information Map. - 23/9/1917. (J.27 to J.10)
12	Information Map. (J.2 to J.16.)

BARRAGE MAPS

13	✓ Army Barrage Map - First Phase - September.
14	✓ Army Barrage Map - Second Phase - September.

CORPS SITUATION MAPS


15	Corps Situation Map - 20.9.17.
16	Corps Situation Map - 26.9.17.
17	Corps Situation Map - 27.9.17.

CONTACT PATROL MAPS

18	20.9.17.
19	20.9.17.
20	26.9.17.
21	26.9.17.

1:40000

PARTS OF SHEETS 20 & 28



SECOND ARMY  
OUTLINE TRENCH MAP


Scale 1:40000  
Yards 1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 YARDS

1:10,000


Battery Positions  
(Possible strong points) *Probably Timber or Camouflage*  
*Probably Concrete*

# HOOGE

EDITION 3



5th FIELD SURVEY CO. (1416)



GERMAN TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION RECEIVED UP TO 13-8-17.

- Machine Gun *d*
- Trench Mortar *o*
- Ammunition Dump *△*
- Supply Dump *△*
- Listening Post *•L*
- Observation Post *•*
- Buried Cable *—*


BELGIUM AND PART OF FRANCE

30<sup>th</sup> Sept 19

ED

1:40,000

19	20	21
27	28	29
36	36	37




SECRET NO. 32

Copy N° 53


Sub Division of 1<sup>st</sup> Anzac Corps Area  
SECOND ARMY AREA.

SECRET

Part of Sheet 5<sup>A</sup> (Belgium).

G.S.O.S. 5118.

Scale 100,000 or 1 inch to 1.58 Miles



1 Centimetre to 1 Kilometre

1. THIS MAP IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHEWING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CORPS AREA INTO SUB-AREAS BOUNDARIES OF CORPS AREA ARE NOT TO BE TAKEN AS AUTHORITY
2. AREAS 12 AND 13 WEST OF LINE XY ARE ARMY AREAS

Ordnance Survey April, 1917



47<sup>th</sup> (LONDON)  
 DIV<sup>y</sup> FRONT. 7.9.17.

MAGNETIC  
 Grid North

*Brigade Boundary*

*One battery*

*One battery*


*FROM A TO B*



REFERENCE: LIGHT SIGNAL  $\square$  DUMPS  $\triangle$  HUTS, BILLET.  $\circ$  DE-BUSSING POINT  $\diamond$  HEADQUARTERS (REGIMENTAL)  $\square$  ARTILLERY  $\dots$   
 TELEPHONE  $\square$  DUGOUT  $\text{---}$  LAGER ETC  $\circ$  LIGHT RAILWAYS  $\text{---}$  DUMPS (AMMUNITION)  $\triangle$  SUPPLY  $\triangle$   
 1:20,000 Coy.  $\square$  PLATOON  $\triangle$  BN. AREA  $\square$  D. 14 L. 31.

EDITION I. (Without contours)

**DISTRIBUTION of ENEMY FORCES**  
 opposite 1<sup>st</sup> ANZAC CORPS FRONT.  
 1.9.17.



Information supplied by  
 1<sup>st</sup> ANZAC CORPS to  
 TOPO. SEC. 1<sup>st</sup> ANZAC.

TRENCHES CORRECTED FROM INFORMATION  
 RECEIVED UP TO 3.7.17.



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## THE ENEMY'S TACTICAL METHODS EAST OF YPRES.

The accompanying "Hostile Tactical Map" shows the general method which appears to have been adopted by the enemy for defending the Gheluvelt—Zonnebeke Ridge. The sources of information from which it has been prepared are mainly prisoners statements, captured documents, photographs and the actual experience gained by our own troops in the severe fighting in this locality during the month of August. Reference has also been had to the enemy's typical methods of defence in depth and his principles of counter-attack which are now well known. \*  
Map 3

As to the experience gained by our troops in the recent fighting in this locality (by the Army on our left) the analysis of the enemy's actual movement and their sequence under those conditions in which he made his various counter-attacks shows that his scheme of defence was centred on that part of the ridge between Dumbarton Lakes and the North side of Polygon Wood and that he put his dependence upon his ability to heavily counter-attack there within a few hours after our objective had been gained.

Analysis shows further that it did not much matter—within say a thousand yards limit—where our front line had reached, these plans and their execution were much the same and were thus typical for this area and probably so perfected in their arrangements as to be always ready to be carried out under changing conditions. Then too his general characteristics are such that he will doubtless continue to use a well tried plan which has not been lacking in a measure of success.

It is therefore to be expected that the enemy, being committed to these plans of defence for this area, will put them into effect again in the same way as he did in August and that he will continue to fight desperately to retain this high ground as being essential to the safety of his various lines to the South.

The enemy's arrangements for defence in depth, his preparations and the promptness with which his larger counter-attacks were carried out, make it appear that he is applying to this battle the principles of his counter-attack policy to the fullest extent as outlined in those general orders on the subject issued by the Fourth German Army and the Ypres and Wytschaete Groups subsequent to the Battle of Messines: (Translation of these have already been issued with Second Army Intelligence Summary, August 31st: G.H.Q., Ia 38878). The following are extracts from such orders issued by the Ypres Group, June 13th.

"The following comprehensive orders for the action of Counter-Attack Troops are issued in view of present conditions:—

"The experience of all recent fighting has shown that immediate and rapid counter-attack carried out by reserve battalions, which have been kept concentrated in close proximity and are provided with field artillery held in readiness to move (counter-attack artillery), leads to the immediate recapture of the whole position.

"In such cases, it has been possible for the counter-attack artillery to gallop up in the open, and direct a very heavy fire on the English who had penetrated at certain points.

"Preparations for counter-attacks to be carried out within the divisional sector must be made by the division in that sector.

"The basis of the preparations should be that, at the approach of a hostile attack all reserves will be placed at the complete disposal of the divisional commander, the resting battalions of the division will, at the same time, be brought into and in front of the 3rd line position, and the counter-attack regiments will be brought closer up.

"If one division only is attacked, it can rely on the Group placing at its disposal for immediate counter-attack about three additional battalions and two or three batteries of field artillery.

"The employment of Second Line Fighting Divisions is to be prepared in the same way. The following general principles apply to their employment:—

"They will, at first, be billeted in the rear billeting areas. From there they will be brought forward into forward bivouacking areas, where they will bivouack in concentrated groups of infantry regiments with artillery. Billets must not be expected, as units must be kept together and villages and camps will, at this period of the attack, be for the most part under fire.

"On the approach of a hostile attack, troops will be brought forward from the forward bivouacking areas to their assembly positions for the attack, and will there be held in readiness. Attention must be paid to protection against aerial observation.

"The troops will be best disposed in infantry regimental groups. They must deploy at an early moment, so that when they receive orders, or a hostile attack takes place, the counter-attack can begin without any loss of time.

"Single batteries will be allotted to infantry regimental groups for tasks to be carried out in direct co-operation with the infantry (anti-tank defence and the engagement of machine guns). These artillery units should remain with their teams hooked in.

"The remaining batteries will remain in a position of readiness, which should face according to the requirements of the situation, their teams within easy reach.

"The schemes for the employment of the second line fighting divisions, must, above all, be based on the consideration that the counter-attack will have to be carried out between the 2nd and 3rd line positions and beyond the 2nd line position, with the object of at once retaking any of our guns which have been lost and eventually recapturing the whole position. The positions of readiness for batteries will be chosen correspondingly far forward, as also their observation posts and battery positions, which must be reconnoitred and fixed."

In view of the foregoing, the accompanying map may be studied with special reference to the area in question and the enemy's intentions can be readily seen.

The position of Divisional Reserves varies with the tactical situation and the nature of the ground. Whereas ordinarily in normal periods these may be 5,000 to 7,000 yards in rear they appear to be brought up to about half that distance when an attack by us seems imminent or when we have already attacked. In any case when, for greater security, there are three regiments of a division in line, all their battalions are pushed up closer to the front and consequently handier for meeting attack, but at the same time offer a better target for our artillery.

It is interesting to note in this connection that after the loss of his front line positions on July 31st and the consequent dispersion of the divisions holding those positions the enemy adopted the plan of keeping only two regiments in line and holding the third intact as an immediate counter-attack reserve. This regiment appears to have generally been in position about 5,000 to 7,000 yards in rear and to have been ready for immediate local counter-attack. Now, however, having resumed the three-regiment disposition again on this front he has lost the advantage of this strong compact local striking force.

The nature of the ground between the Menin Road and Polygon Wood is such that these reserve positions are up close under the crest of the ridge and their approaches are also well under cover. Such reserves being in temporary position are located in whatever cover can be secured, such as trenches, dug-outs, huts, or even farm billets; in some cases, as has been recently reported by prisoners, tents are used set out in the open at night but removed in day-time.

These forward positions (marked "S. V." on the map) being taken into use when "special vigilance" is in force, it is evident that the time element is important and the enemy may be expected to move from them without delay. He consequently will deploy direct from the positions themselves. Such deployment from the four "S. V." positions shown would be at about the normal distance from any objective he may have.

There are, in this case, several reserve divisions called "Counter-attack Divisions" at the disposal of the Group (Corps), and these may be sent to any divisional sector or may be split up amongst several. If a large counter-attack is made with, say, a division strength, the concentration would take some time (e.g., at Zonnebeke on August 16th), as it would have to come up from well in the rear, and considerable notice as to its time and place ought to be secured from R.F.C. and other sources. It is significant, however, that most of the enemy's counter-attacks were made with one or two battalions only, and the cause of this can be readily seen from the distribution of the reserve positions close up and convenient to the battle line or from his practice at the time of holding the third regiment intact in local reserve.

What the enemy will do just prior to an attack by us—if he suspects it—or after our attack is launched, can be surmised from the general position of his reserves which are close up. If he has not already pushed his "S.V." Battalions up from their normal positions he will do so without delay; if he has already done so he will bring up portions of his counter-attack Divisions to the normal positions which lie behind the threatened sector, and will, if he contemplates a large counter-attack, bring up the remainder of the Counter-Attack Division by various means, by say, both busses and railway and concentrate prior to attack. All of these movements to and from these known areas will afford targets for our Artillery and R.F.C. In general the small counter-attacks seem to have been launched within two or three hours after our zero, while in the larger attack seven to ten hours were required.

That the enemy will counter-attack within a few hours after zero is certain and it is equally certain that he will mainly employ the same methods as he did in August. As to where these may take place, a study of his action on the former occasions, having reference to the nature of the ground, makes it reasonable to expect that counter-attacks may be made:—(1) Astride or South of Tower Hamlets, (2) on the North of Menin Road, (3) on the North side of Polygon Wood, or (4) toward the Hanebeke, about Anzac, as before.

*Second Army Intelligence,  
September 16th, 1917.*


C. H. MITCHELL, Lieut.-Col., G.S.,  
for Major-General, General Staff, Second Army.

SECOND ARMY FRONT

Parts of Sheets 28 and 36.

7.

SECRET.



**DIVISIONS IN LINE**

**2nd GD. RES. DIVISION** - Came into sector N. of Ypres - Roulers Railway on Sept. 12th/13th from reserve near Ghent. Its second appearance on Ypres battle front, being previously withdrawn on Aug. 10th after heavy losses.

**121st DIVISION (Prussian)** - Came into Zonnebeke sector on Aug. 19th. Previously in line W. of Cambrai. Relief of this division may be expected shortly.

**BAVARIAN ERSATZ DIVISION** - Relieved 32nd Div. in Veidhoek sector on Aug. 25th. Came north from the Woivre area.

**9th RES. DIVISION (Prussian and Polish)** - Came into Klein Zillebeke sector on Aug. 20th. Had already been withdrawn from Ypres battle on Aug. 14th.

**207th DIVISION (Prussian)** - Came into Ypres - Comines Canal sector on Aug. 2nd.

**24th DIVISION (Saxon)** - Came into Houthem sector on Aug. 7th. This division has not been much fighting this year and is fresh.

**16th DIVISION (Prussian)** - Has held Warneton sector since June 24th.

**5th BAVARIAN DIVISION** - Probably relieved 16th Bav. Div. about Sept. 8th in Deulemont sector. Withdrawn from Ypres battle on Aug. 19th since resting.

Divisional Boundary  
 Regimental Boundary  
 Regimental Headquarters  
 Company in Position

**DIVISIONS IN RESERVE AFFECTING ARMY FRONT.**

**A. Fresh Divisions.**

- 234th DIVISION - Reported in reserve in Roulers area. Previously in St. Quentin sector. One of the new divisions, not of high fighting value, but quite fresh.
- 16th BAVARIAN DIVISION - Previously in Deulemont sector, and probably relieved there about Aug. 27th. Has seen little fighting, and may be considered fresh.
- 10th ERSATZ DIVISION (Prussian) - Reported in reserve in Bruges area. Previously in Woivre area, has not seen much fighting this year.
- 236th DIVISION - May be in reserve in Belgium, requires confirmation. One of the new divisions, not of great fighting value, but is quite fresh.
- 23rd RES. DIVISION (Saxon) - Last reported in reserve in Bruges area.
- 3rd Res. Division (Prussian) - Reported in reserve near Binche.

**B. Exhausted Divisions - may still be in the battle area.**

- 32nd DIVISION - Withdrawn on Sept. 4th from Inverness - Glencorse Woods sector.
- 34th DIVISION - Withdrawn on Aug. 25th from Inverness Copse - Glencorse Wood. Had very heavy losses.
- 12th RES. DIVISION - Withdrawn from St. Julien sector on Aug. 25th.
- 26th DIVISION - Withdrawn on Sept. 4th from Langemarck sector. Reported resting in Antwerp. Very considerable losses.
- 27th DIVISION - Withdrawn from sector N. of Ypres - Roulers Railway on Sept. 12th. Reported to have had heavy losses.
- 204th DIVISION - Withdrawn from E. of St. Julien on Sept. 10th, with very considerable losses.

\* These divisions are probably the most likely to be used for counter-attack and reinforcement in the sectors between Zandvoorde and Zonnebeke.

2nd F.S.C. 24962007. 1917-30-011. 1097 17 9/17.


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YARDS 1000 2000 3000 4000


EDITION 2a

ZANDVOORDE

German Trenches corrected to 10-9-17. Part of Sheet 28.



CONFIDENTIAL



### HOSTILE COUNTER-ATTACK MAP (SECOND PHASE)

September 23rd, 1917.

Showing Enemy's Probable Assembly Positions and Counter-Attacks East of Ypres.

#### REFERENCE.

- ● ● ● Divisional Boundaries
- Routes to Assembly Positions, etc.
- Routes of Approach Deployment and Attack
- S.V. "Special Vigilance" Position.

Scale 1:20,000 Yds - 1000 750 500 250 0 1000 2000 3000 Yds

Metres  
 0-50  
 50-100  
 100-150  
 150-200  
 Over 200

1:10 000 Map shewing **PRINCIPAL S.4 TRACKS** used by **ENEMY** EDITION 1.  
 and all Locations shewing signs of Occupation by 17.9.17.

10  
1



**REFERENCE**  
 Tracks { Apparently Transport  
           { Infantry only  
 Areas occupied

E. N. TOPO. SECTION

5th FIELD SURVEY COY. R.E. (1453) 19.9.17.      YARDS 500 400 300 200 100 0      Scale. 1:10,000.      500 1,000 YARDS

APPENDIX  
205

# D. 27. to J. 10. Scale 1:5,000

Concrete Dugouts Observation Posts *Information obtained from Air Reconnaissance, Ground observations, Prisoners & Captured Documents, & not verified by latest Air Photographs shewn in Green*


Trenches in good condition Headquarters Old Battery Positions

Machine Guns Strong Points

Occupied Shell Holes Posts Enemy

Marshy ground shewn is passable for Infantry in places without serious difficulty

Trenches Corrected to 23.9.17



# J.2. to J.16. Scale 1:5,000.


Scale  
YARDS 100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

Information supplied by Air Reconnaissance, Ground Observers, Prisoners & Captured Documents shown in Green; Marshy Ground shown is passable for Infantry in places without serious difficulty.

Concrete Dugouts  
Trenches - Good Repair  
Machine Guns  
Trench Mortars

Occupied Shell Holes

Observation Posts  
Headquarters  
Old Battery Positions  
Strong Points  
Posts



Corps Topographical Section, 917.

Printed by No 2 Advanced Section, A.P. & S.S. 18-9-17.



# WESTHOEK

GERMAN TRENCHES CORRECTED TO 1-9-17.

Part of Sheet 28.

EDITION A

# SECRET.


## ARMY BARRAGE MAP

September, 1917.

### CONVERSION TABLE.

MINUTES	HOURS.
64 mins.	1 hour 4 mins.
72	12
80	20
88	28
96	36
104	44
112	52
120	2 hours 0 mins.
128	8
136	16
253	4 hours 13 mins
261	21
269	29
277	37
285	45
293	53
301	Hours 1 min
305	5
309	9

**CORPS BOUNDARY**  **DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY** 



F.S.G. 1043-9-17 1075.16-9-17.

Scale 1:10,000

Minor corrections  
dotted line

# BECELAERE

German Trenches corrected to 21-9-17.

Part of Sheet 28.

EDITION I. A

## SECRET.


### ARMY BARRAGE MAP (SECOND PHASE)

September, 1917.

#### CONVERSION TABLE

MINUTES	HOURS	MINUTES
100	1 hour	40 mins.
108	1	48
118	30	58
124		4
132	2	12

CORPS BOUNDARY ————  
 DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY ●●●●●●



4th AUS. DIV.

5th AUS. DIV.

Battery Positions (possible strong points) Organised Shell Holes  
 Probably Timber or Camouflage  
 Probably Concrete

Scale 1:10,000  
 Yards 500 400 300 200 100 500 1000 1500 2000


F.S. 05 1122 21 22 1140.23-9-17.

WESTHOEK

GERMAN TRENCHES CORRECTED TO 1917 Part of Sheet 28

# E.A. SITUATION MAP

from INFORMATION received up to 9.30 p.m. 20.9.17  
APPROX. BRITISH FRONT LINE  
Machine Guns, Important Bridges, Headquarters, New Concrete D.O.



F.S.C. 1007.30877 1013.3.9.17

Scale 1:10,000



Minor corrections Work not now visible in Air Photographs shown thus. Dugouts supposed to be Concrete. Tape Section

BECELAERE

German Trenches corrected to 21-9-17.

Part of Sheet 28.

EDITION 1.A

# E.A. SITUATION MAP

from information received up to 7 p.m. 26.9.17.




F.S. CO. 1225. 21. 9. 17. 115. 22. 9. 17.

Battery Positions (possible strong points) Organised Shell Holes  
Probably Timber or Camouflage  
Probably Concrete

Scale 1:10,000  
Yards 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Yards

*File*



F.S. 07 1125 21-9-17 113 12 917

Battery Positions  
 (possible strong points)  
 Organised Shell Holes


Probably Timber or Camouflage  
 Probably Concrete

*Dropped in contact plane at 2000 ft*

*Hd Qrs*

*June*

*20-9-17*




- = Flares
- = Battalion HQ
- = Brigade HQ
- ▲ = Tank in Action
- △ = Tank out of Action

1:10 000

S.4.

EDITION 1

*Dropped by  
Contact Plane  
at Iburg  
Held on  
20-9-19*




5th FIELD SURVEY COY. RE. (1453) 19.9.17.

Scale. 1:10,000. YARDS 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 1,000 YARDS

APPENDIX 1  
214  
19

BECELAERE

Dropped from  
Darry Wood  
Contact Airplane  
at Darry Wood  
H. H. H. H.  
26-9-19



APPROXIMATE  
BRITISH  
FRONT


- = FLARES
- ⊙ = BATTN HQ
- ⊞ = BRIGADE HQ
- ▲ = TANK IN ACTION
- △ = " OUT OF ACTION

APPENDIX



g1 Dropped from  
contact as planned  
at I Angas  
Harden  
26-9-17

Red 1145 AM  
26/9




- = FLARES
- ⊙ = BRITISH HQ
- ⊠ = BRIGADE HQ
- ▲ = TANK IN ACTION
- △ = " OUT OF ACTION

APPENDIX  
216

# HOSTILE SHELLING

For 24 hours ending 6 pm 23/9/17

Scale 1:20000



E.A. Topo. Sec. 24.9.17

Operations

Ga PWS return pt

GT

Gb

Gc


# HOSTILE SHELLING

For 24 hours ending 6pm

*what date?*

24/9/17

Scale 1:20000



OTHER AREAS SHELLLED.

H24 by 15 cm. Gun, Zuidhoek.

operations

Ga **RMO**

Gi T **AS**

Gi b **J**

Gi c **mine**

Gi a

O/c Topo. Sect -

What date please? →


RMO

Heavy  Medium  Light 

HOSTILE SHELLING

For 24 hours ending 6 pm 25/9/17


Scale 1:20,000.



OTHER AREAS SHELLED.

Ypres by 10.5 cm. Gun, Gas shell Molenhoek, & by 15 cm. Gun from Zonnebeke Warrington Road, Gas shell Zwaavehoek.

OTHER AREAS CHECKED



*Operations.*

- La BM
- LT CA
- LT J.
- La mine.
- La


86  
193

HEAVY  
MEDIUM  
LIGHT

# HOSTILE SHELLING

For 24 hours ending 6pm 28.9.17

Scale 1:20,000.



Other Areas Shelled


H24a & I13b by H.V. Gun Molenhoek  
 H18b & I13a by 10.5 Gun Gheluveld



# HOSTILE SHELLING

For 24 hours ending 6 pm. 29.9.17

Scale 1:20,000.





# HOSTILE SHELLING


For 24 Hrs. ending 6 p.m.

Scale 1:20,000

1917  
27







Ga  
 Gb  
 Gc  
 Gd


AmR

REVISED EDITION, 30th SEPT., 1917.

COMPRISING INFORMATION FROM FURTHER CAPTURED ENEMY MAPS.

# BECELAERE

Part of Sheet 28.



EDITION I.

**REPRODUCTION  
OF  
CAPTURED GERMAN MAP,**

Showing Trenches, Wire, Concrete Construction  
and Billets.

DATED September 7th, 1917.


CAPTURED September 21st, 1917.

**NOTE.**—All information from the Map is shown in Red. The wire which is shown around the edges of woods and hedges is impossible to identify on photographs, and is, therefore, not on our maps.

- Trenches.
- Trenches traced but no longer used.
- xxxxx Wire.
- u Dug-outs.
- Machine-gun dug-outs.
- Woods cut down.
- Where super-imposed on buildings probably means Galleries etc., strengthened with concrete.
- Where clustered around fields, woods and farms, probably denotes houses etc. where single probably concrete structures.
- Locations of Headquarters according to maps and may still be used.

Scale: 1:10,000  
Yards 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Ga Amp  
Gb  
Gc <sup>line</sup>  
Wardham



14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20

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