

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/29/21 Part 5

Title: General Staff, Headquarters, 1st
ANZAC Corps

October 1917



AWM4-1/29/21PART5

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 942

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
183	1/10	-	a.m. 6.32	4th. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	I.G.725	Heavy shelling on right Bn. at dawn. 4.30a.m. enemy reported advancing in two lines. Barrage put down by our artillery at 4.30a.m. and again at 5a.m.
184	"	-	7.10	5th. Aus.Div.	"	I.G.26/ 1062.	About 5a.m. enemy shelling on our front increased. In reply to S.O.S. our artillery commenced firing.
185	"	-	7.25	5th. Aus.Div.	"	G.16/1064	Command of Sector passed to 21st and 7th. Divisions at 6a.m.
186	"	a.m. 10	10.10	1st. Aus.Div.	"	G.66	Command of new Right Div. Sector passed to 1st.Aus.Div. at 10a.m.
187	"	10.40	10.56	2nd. Aus.Div. Phone	"	G.975	Enemy made several attacks on X Corps about 5a.m. between north of POLYGONE WOOD and MENIN ROAD. All attacks apparently driven off.
188	"	-	11.15	1st. Aus.Div.	"		Right of 1st. Div. in action during enemy attack this morning.

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For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

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9(a)

OPERATIONS.

32
Secret.

Seq. No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
189	OCT, 1st	p.m. 7 25	p.m. 7.55	1st Aust. Div.	I ANZAC	G.687	S.O.S. reported on extreme right of Div. front as expected at 7.10 p.m. Barrage down promptly.
190	2nd	a.m. 6. 0	a.m. 6.51	do.	"	G.702	At about 9 a.m. 1st Oct. about 80 of enemy apparently forming up for attack, were barraged by our artillery which opened in response to S.O.S. No attack developed.
191	"	(11.10 {	11.48) p.m.) 7.28)	X Corps	G.199 I ANZAC	(G.199 (GR.204	As result enemy counterattacks between 5.30 a.m. and 8.40 a.m. on 1st October, line now located as follows :- J.15.d.5.5, d.6.8, d.68.90, J.16.a.20.25, a.55.50 (with post at J.16.a.65.65) J.16.a.55.92, J.10.c.5.0, c.6.2, c.6.5, c.85.60, d.10.75, b.15.00, b.2.1, b.2.2.

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For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 40

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
192	4/10	5.42 ^{a.m.}	5.48 ^{a.m.}	2nd. Aust.Div.	I Anzac	G.a.210	Both Brigades report troops ready formed up.
193	"	6.10	6.21	1st Aus.Div.	"	G.989	Infantry Bdes. reported in positions of assembly 5.30a.m. Considerable hostile shelling on front line 5.45a.m.
194	"	6.58	7.16	2nd Aus.Div. Phone	"	G.a.213	Attack progressing well. Retaliation light.
195	"	-	7.15	2nd. Aus.Div.	"		30 prisoners came in at Zero.
196	"	7.20	7.35	1st Aus.Div.	"	G.1	Success signal for first objective reported from both Brigade fronts. 40 prisoners.
197	"	7.38	7.40	1st Aus.Div. Phone	"	G.2	Right Bde. reports Red Line taken; both flanks in touch.
198	"	-	7.54	2nd Army Centre	"		21st Division on Red Line.
198(a)	"	7.50	8.3	2nd. Aus.Div	"	G.a.216	Both Bdes. reported on Red Line. Prisoners 120.
199	"	7.55	8.6	1st. Aus.Div.	"	G.5	Left Bde. report 7.42 a.m. enemy reinforcements moving South from BROODSEINDE dispersed by artillery.
200	"	8.12	-	I Anzac Phone	2nd Army &c.	G.18	Both Divisions on Red Line.
201	"	-	8.15	2nd. Army Centre.	I Anzac		X Corps apparently on Red Line. Casualties slight.
202	"	8.35	8.43	2nd Aus.Div.	"	G.a.219	Captures Right Brigade - 4 M.gs. 150 prisoners.
203	"	8.50	-	Phone 2nd Army Centre.	"		3rd. Aus.Div. on Red Line. Left Brigade 5th British Divn. 400 prisoners.

W. Cunningham Capt
For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

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OPERATIONS.

Secret. 88

Seq No.	Date. 1917	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
204	4/10	8.35	8.56	2nd. Anzac.	I ANZAC	G.23	ALMA (D.22.a) and KOREK (D.9.c) ours.
205	"	8.55	9.15	1st. Aust.Div.	"	G.6	^{One} First success signal (final objective) reported on Right Bde. front 8.45a.m.
206	"	9.0	9.22	2nd. Aust.Div.	"	G.a.220	Left Bde. reports captured 3 officers 132 other ranks and 3 m.g.s. Enemy shelling Red Line also heavy ^{for} MUHLE SPUR.
207	"	9.15	9.22	1st. Aust.Div.	"	G.7	Left Bde. reports success signal final objective gone up along Bde. front.
208	"	8.55	9.26	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.a.28.	3rd.Aust.Div. 8.25a.m. reports Red Line captured.
209	"	9.20	9.35	1st. Aust.Div.	"	G.7	Reported heavy barrage on our assembly area 5.30a.m.; attacking troops moved forward slightly to avoid barrage. Casualties during advance slight: enemy casualties heavy.
210	"	9.15	9.37	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.a.32	N.Z.Div. report Red Line captured. In touch both flanks.
211	"	9.30	9.44	2nd. Aust.Div.	"	G.a.221	Right Bde. 9.13a.m. reports our troops seen at BROODSEINDE CROSS ROADS. Enemy shelling crest of objective ridge.
212	"	9.50	10.1	1st. Aust.Div.	"	G.10	Left Bn. Left Bde. report strong opposition met on road 29 A and C; pushing on. Success signal final objective reported on whole divisional front.
213	"	10.12	10.22	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.43	BEECHAM (D.16.a) ours.
214	"	9.35	10.5	X Corps.	"	G.G. 213	All objectives 5th Div. reported captured. 21st.Div. objective believed taken. Right Bn. 7th. Div. on objective.
215	"	9.58	10.14	1st. Aust.Div.	"	G.12.	Captured ground being heavily shelled.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX 6
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Unclassified Cap

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For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 127

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
220	4/10	a.m. 10.20	a.m. 11.14	2nd. Aust. Div.	I ANZAC	G.a.223	Right Bn. Right Bde. reports 8.25a.m. established on ridge. Captures 1 field gun 4 m.gs. Casualties 24th.Bn. slight. Left Bde. reports 202 prisoners.
221	"	10.33	11.20	2nd. Aust. Div.	"	G.a.224	Left Bde. on Blue Line. One E.A. shot down by L.g. fire. 2 or 3 camouflage guns reported at D.23.b.0.5. M.g. and rifle fire from ridge D.18.b. - D.13.c.
222	"	11.0	11.25	1st. Aust. Div.	"	G.15.	Contact plane reports flares at J.5.b.7.1. - b.3.1. - b.25.20 - b.25.39 - a.3.6. - J.29.d.50.60 - A.85.80 - J.23.c.50.95 - a.4.0. Also flares on line D.29.c.3.7. to 22.b.8.1. (approx). Flash lamp in Zonnebeke Gasometer signalled "O.K." 10.15a.m. At 10.20a.m. rifle fire from CELTIC WOOD. At 10.25a.m. flare at D.17.c.9.8. Heavy m.g. fire from DAISY WOOD.
223	"	11.10	11.29	1st. Aust. Div.	"	G.16.	Right Bde. consolidating on final objective.
224	"	11.20	11.36	1st. Aust. Div.	"	G.16.	Left Bn. Left Bde. on final objective.
225	"	11.30	11.44	2nd. Aust. Div.	"	G.a.230	Left Bn. right Bde. reports 8.50a.m. on Blue Line, flanks obscure. Casualties light. Right Bn. Right Bde. reports 9.50a.m. consolidated Blue Line. Officer casualties heavy.
226	"	11.50	11.53	2nd. Aust. Div.	"	G.a.223	6th and 7th Aust. Inf. Bdes. each reinforced by one Bn. from Reserve Bde.
227	"	11.20	12.5	X Corps	"		7th Div. report first objective gained. 91st. Bde. reported on final objective.
228	"	11.45	12.15	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.64	Contact plane reports flares at D.17.c.15.15 - D.16.d.8.6 - D.45.80 - b.25.30 - b.10.50 - a.88. - D.10.c.7.1 - c.3.2 - d.99.95 - b.10.15 - b.05.30 - D.3.c.65.20 - c.2.6 - D2.d.72.45. KRON PRINZ FARM (D.3.c.) ours. Prisoners from TYNE COTTAGE (D.17.a.)

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX

15.5

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

127

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
229	4/10	p.m. 12.10	p.m. 12.22	1st. Aust.Div.	I ANZAC	G.17.	Right Bn. Right Bde. in touch with troops of 7th. Div. on Blue Line.
230	"	12.5	12.40	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.73	3rd. Aust.Div. reports Blue Line captured.
231	"	12.55	1.5	2nd. Aust.Div.	"	G.a.237	Strong point completed D.22.d.7.2.

Clémentine
For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX 8 156

Capt

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 151

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
232	4/10	p.m. 1.10	p.m. 1.27	1st Aus. Div.	I ANZAC	G. 21	Consolidation of Blue Line progressing favourably. Enemy shelling very heavy. Casualties severe.
233	"	1.15	1.41	II ANZAC	"	G. 80	Blue Line captured throughout. Estimated prisoners 700
234	"	1.30	1.56	II Army	"	G.176	Situation 1.15 p.m.- Blue Line Objective completely ours with exception 800 yards between JUDGE COPSE (J.11.d.8.9) and IN DER STER CABARET (J.5.d.9.4) where fighting continues.
235	"	2.5	2.13	2nd Aus. Div.	"	G.a.239	On whole of Blue Line except opposite DAISY WOOD where line is withdrawn about 100 yards. All flanks in touch. Consolidation proceeding satisfactorily. Strong points completed D.22.d.7.2. and b.9.3.
236	"	2.40	3.5	2nd. Anzac. Phone	"	G.99	3rd.Aust.Div. report 2.35p.m. counter-attack in three waves from CEMETRY D.17.a. dispersed.
237	"	-	3.30	2nd Army Centre.	"	L.28	X Corps reported on final objective. 2nd Anzac reports capture 17 officers 1655 other ranks.
238	"	3.20	3.38	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	G.a.242	Enemy reported collecting to East of ANVIL WOOD - (D.30.a.6.8.). Field and heavy artillery engaged. Enemy's shelling decreased. Communication trenches on Right Brigade front now through crest.
239	"	-	3.47	2nd. Army Centre.	"	L.29	S.O.S. X Corps front.
(240)	"						
241	"	6.45	-	I ANZAC	2nd Army &c	G149.	960 German dead counted on ground captured by Right Div. Prisoners admitted to Corps Cage up to present 20 Officers 535 other ranks. Total material captured 6 F.guns, 18m.gs. 3 t.ms.
240	"	5.	5.42	2nd Army	I ANZAC	G.188	Situation 4.30p.m. all objectives for day taken except BERRY COTTS (J.27.a.4.5.) and LEWIS HOUSE (J.21.d.2.4.). Two counter-attacks on 2nd Anzac front repulsed. Over 2,000 prisoners already reported.

Uncutler Capt

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX 3

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OPERATIONS.

Secret. 206

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
241	4/10	p.m. 10.47	p.m. 10.58	1st Aust.Div.	I ANZAC	G.38	S.O.S. along whole front 10p.m. All quiet 10.20p.m.
242	5/10	a.m. 11.25	a.m. 11.53	2nd. Anzac Phone	"	G.205.	Aeroplane reports 8a.m. line :- D.17.c.7.6., G.44.70, a.75.30, D16.b.94.73, c.32.30, c.67.60, D.9.b.86.20, D.3.d.55.05, d.2.3.
243	"	-	5.40	G.O.C. 2nd. Aus.Div. Phone	"	P.17	Post established D.23.d.5.4.
244	"	-	5.51	G.O.C. 2nd. Aus.Div.	"	P.18	Post established D.29.b.15.95 and D.23.d.4.3. Our troops walking freely in D.23.d. Reason to believe enemy retired to DROOGEN - BROOKHOEK RIDGE. Preparing to push out patrols.
245	"	5.45	6.12	1st Aust.Div.	"	G.64	Post established Western edge FLINTE COPSE.
246	"	7.49	7.46	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	G.a.272	S.O.S. along front 7p.m., repeated 7.18 and 7.22p.m.
247	"	8.8.	8.50	1st. Aus.Div.	"	G.66	Situation reported quiet 7.50p.m.
248	"	7.25	8.24	X Corps	"	G.r.245	Line now runs :- J.22.a.5.8.- J.16.c.7.2., c.7.4., c.7.7., a.8.0., a.9.4., a.7.7., J.10.c.9.2., J.11.c.5.2., c.6.4., c.7.8., b.5.3., b.5.5., J.12.a.15.60., a.15.90., J.5.d.8.5., b.2.2. Block house J.16.a.6.7. captured.

Chas. M. Smith Cap.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

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Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch	Receipt				
249	9/10	a.m. -	a.m. 5.5.	1st. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	IG 8.	Quiet night, till 2.30a.m. when some heavy shelling commenced on forward area.
250	"	-	5.40	Phone. G.S.O.1 2nd.A.Div.	"	R.12.	66th Div. report that at 3a.m. only two Bns. of their ^(Right) Bde. had come up. Two Bns. of their Reserve Bde. were therefore put at disposal of Right Bde. Commander.
251	"	5.30	5.36	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.295	Situation quiet all night. At 3a.m. a slight shelling on forward area commenced.
252	"	6.6	6.12	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.297	Right Bde. reports all Bns. on tape line to time.
253	"	6.16	6.21	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.298	Right Bde. reports enemy's reply to our barrage moderate.
254	"	8.5	8.16	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.303	Left Bde. report RED Line captured and BLUE Line Bn. going well. Enemy shelling and m.g. fire not heavy. Apparently few casualties.
255	"	-	8.40	Phone. Army Centre.	"	K.22	Whole of Fifth Army on RED Line and going well. 49th. Div. (2nd Anzac) on RED Line.
256	"	8.50	9.6	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.305	197th. Bde. (Right Bde. 2nd Anzac) report first objective taken; slight casualties. In touch Australian troops on right.
257	"	9.30	-	I ANZAC	2nd. Aus.Div.	G.21	Contact plane located flares at D.23.d.0.7.-d.1.9.-b.0.2.-a.7.4.-a.8.6., -b.0.9.-D.17.d.4.4.- D.18.a.1.5.
258	"	9.40	9.56	2nd.	I ANZAC	Ga.306	Right Bde. on RED Line except opposite DAISY WOOD, which is still occupied by the enemy. Support Bn. sent to DAIRY Wood and is attacking DAISY Wood from N. and N.E.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX 159

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
259	9/10	-	a.m. a.m. 10.0	Phone Army Centre.	I ANZAC	K.23.	66th Div. taken all objectives. Many prisoners. 2nd Anzac on BLUE Line in many places.
260	"	-	10.10	Phone Army Centre	"	K.24	1st Anzac H.A. report DAISY WOOD surrounded by our troops. Mopping up in progress.
261	"	-	10.15	Phone Army Centre	"	K.25	Aeroplanes report 2nd Anzac on whole of BLUE Line except at junction of the two Divs. where position is obscure owing to haze.
262	"	-	10.40	Phone B.G.G.S. 2nd Anzac.	"	R.13.	66th Div. officially on BLUE Line also 49th Div. who are assisting Div. on their left just West of ADLER FARM.
263	"	-	Desph. 11.0	(2nd Army I ANZAC (2nd Anzac (Corps.		G.33	2nd Aus.Div. appear to be on BLUE Line except for opposition in DAISY WOOD which is now being mopped up.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

160

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 52

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
264	9/10	a.m. 11.0	a.m. 11.12	1st. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	G.167.	In conjunction with attack at 6.20a.m. 3rd.Aust.Inf.Bde. raided CELTIC WOOD. Wood cleared almost to Eastern edge, where enemy was found in strength. Heavy casualties inflicted. Our casualties approximately 30, enemy's considerably greater.
265	"	-	p.m. 12.25	Phone. Army Centre.	"	K.28	Four Companies and 10 wagons observed going North on road at E.19.d.5.7. at 12.15p.m. H.A. notified.
266	"	p.m. 12.20	12.55	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	Ga.313	Situation appears to be 22nd Bn. on RED Line South of MORSLEDE ROAD. Posts established at D.23.d.7.9 and 4.6.. Some of our troops on Western Edge of DAISY WOOD. 21st and 24th Bns. digging in between DAISY and DAIRY WOODS and on South East edge of DAIRY WOOD. 23rd Bn. post at D.24.a.3.9. in touch 5th Bde at RHINE and distributed back to North edge DAIRY WOOD. 5th Bde. left - in touch 197th Bde. at D.17.b.9.5.
267	"	1.5	1.22	X Corps	"	G.p.940	7th Div. posts established J.6.c.5.3. - c.5.7. to J.5.b.4.0.35. giving good observation of valley.
268	"	1.40	1.52	2nd Aus.Div.	"	Ga.325	Right Bde. Right Bn. successfully repulsed local counter-attack at 11a.m. Estimated 30 casualties inflicted on enemy.

W. McCulloch Capt. 161

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

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Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch	Receipt				
269	9/10	3.30	3.45	2nd. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	Ga316	5th Bde. report one E.A. brought down in flames at D.26.d. and one British plane crashed in J.2.d.
270	"	3.0	3.50	X Corps	"	IG 139	Observer reports flares at 12.15p.m. in trench from J.11.b.65.10 to d.65.60 also at J.11.c.95.40. Our Infantry at J.12.a.15.65 - J.11.c.8.3. to b.30.55. In trench from J.11.c.65.40 to 6.0. and at J.16.d.0.6.45. Our troops holding line J.22.a.9.9 to 21.d.8.9.
271	"	4.0	4.33	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.580.	Contact patrol reports flares at D.4.d.2.1. and d.9.0. Line of our troops D.4.b.2.2. to d.5.6. Posts in shell holes V.28.c.2.2. and c.4.1. Post at D.5.c.30.15. One post Eastern outskirts HARLAND COPSE D.11.b. Line of our men in trench just West of VIENNA COTTAGE.
272	"	6.20		I ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.65	2nd Div. line 5p.m. D.23.d.43.36 - b.32.00 - b.32.55 - b.58.88 - D.17.d. 52.00 - d.75.15 - D.18.c.10.45 - D.17.b.3.3. Advanced post at D.24.a. 13.85. Posts also located at D.23.b.4.3. D.17.b.37.07 and b.55.90
273	"	5.40	5.48	2nd. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	Ga322	S.O.S. Left Bde. front 5.20p.m. also 2nd Anzac front.
274	"	6.47	6.58	2nd Aus.Div.	"	Ga323	Everything apparently O.K. at 6.18p.m.; artillery stopped firing.
275	"	6.25	7.5	2nd. Army	"	G.504	Situation 6p.m. X Corps objectives gained except POLDERHOEK CHATEAU J.16.d. and JUDGE COTT J.12.a. REUTEL VILLAGE ours. Two posts established North of JOINERS REST at J.6.c.5.4. and 5.8.
276	"	6.50	7.18	2nd Army.	"	G.506	5th Army situation 3.5p.m. Line Northward from POELCAPELLE BREWERY as follows :- HELLES HOUSE (V.14.c.6.4.) to REQUETTE FARM (V.14.c.4.8.) thence gap to LANDING FARM (V.13.b.4.7.1.) thence to SENEGAL FARM (V.7.c.9. to TAUBE FARM (V.7.a.6.0) to RAILWAY at (V.7.a.6.9.) thence along final objective. Gap between REQUETTE FARM and LANDING FARM is being closed. Estimated prisoners to date 500.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.


APPENDIX
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G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 388

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch	Receipt				
277	9/10	p.m. 6.45	p.m. 7.19	2nd. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	G.172	Right Bde. line :- Strong posts D.23.d.3.2. - d.20.35 thence connected shell holes D.23.d.2.7. to 2.9. Four posts in N.E. portion DAISY WOOD also one at D.23.b.05.50. Trench from D.23.b.1.4 to 3.6. Post at D.23.b.1.8. then a gap to about D.17.d.9.1. thence line of posts to just N.W. RHINE. Left Bde :- Over-lapping Right Bde. in DAISY WOOD thence to D.17.d.2.0. to 6.1. to 4.3. to RAILWAY at D.17.b.30.25. (in touch here 2nd Anzac) Isolated M.G. post believed at D.17.d.95.30. Enemy believed still in E. portion DAISY WOOD.


 For B.G.G.S.
 First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

4(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 408

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch	Receipt				
278	9/10	p.m. 10.30	p.m. 10.35	X Corps	I ANZAC	G.R.278	Line now runs J.12.a.3.8. - CROSS ROADS - a.25.10 - J.11.d.60.65 - North to CEMETRY to J.11.d.25.20 - REUTEL - J.17.a.5.9. along line held last night to REUTELBEEK - J.16.b.7.4. - J.16.c.95.20 - c.90.70. - J.22.a.4.8.- a.7.7. From J.22.a.4.8. line runs as previously to MENIN ROAD.
279	10/10	a.m. 5.42	a.m. 5.52	2nd. Aus.Div.	"	G.a.325	Two advanced posts vicinity D.23.d.4.2. adandoned early in night, most of the garrison having become casualties.
280	"	6.30	-	I ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.381	Quiet night except for intermittent shelling on support areas Right Div.
281	"	8.55	9.25	2nd. Anzac.	I-ANZAC	G.636	Right-Div.-line-now-runs-from-about-D.17.b.0.2.-to-D.10.b.0.4.
282	"	-	9.50	Phone Army Centre.	"	K.29.	2nd Anzac front line runs approximately on RED LINE with some posts in advance.
283	"	10.10	-	I ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.394	Aeroplane reconnaissance this morning places our line approximately as follows :- D.23.d.45.25 - D.23.d.30.35 - D.23.b.25.25 - D.23.b.3.6.- D.17.d.60.15 - D.17.d.85.55 - D.18.c.0.9 - D.17.b.4.3.
284	"	10.2	10.39	5th. Aust.Div.	I ANZAC	G.12.	G.O.C. 5th. Aus.Div. taken over command right sector 10a.m.
285	"	9.50	10.42	2nd Anzac	"	G.636	Right Div. reports line running from D.17.b.0.2. to D.10.b.0.4. Contact patrol reports flares at 6.45 a.m. at D.4.d.15.00. D.10.b.3.5. and D.11.d.45.20. There is a trench at D.11.d.45.20.
286	"	-	10.15	2nd. Army Report Centre.	"		Situation 5th Army 8.3p.m. 9th inst. XIV Corps right has been driven back. Contact aeroplane shows line running V.13.d.7.1 - 3.6. - CONTRONIS FARM - V.13.a.8.7. - V.7.c.9.0. - V.7.c.3.3. - V.7.c.3.7. - V.7.a.2.6. - V.1.c.1.0. - ANGLE POINT - 5 CHEMINS. XVIII Corps line runs from D.3.b.5.1. where in touch with II Anzac thence along 1st Objective excluding OXFORD HOUSES to BEEK HOUSES - V.20.c.3.7, V.20.a.0.5 - 200 yards S.W. of road junction V.20.a.0.8. Point of junction between XIV & XVIII Corps not certain. Result of attack on OXFORD HOUSES S.W. not known: Estimated prisoners 600.

APPENDIX

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 93

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
287	12/10	a.m. 6.20	a.m. -	I ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.67	Morning Report. Enemy artillery active during night, increasing at times to barrage fire on front and support lines. Shelling quietened down 4a.m.
288	"	-	6.59	4th Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	Ga563	ZONNEBEKE area heavily shelled. All lines forward of Bde. H.Q. cut.
289	"	-	7.5.	do.	"	Ga564	RED LINE Bn. reported all troops in position on tape and cheerful.
290	"	7.15	7.27	2nd. Anzac Phone.	"	G 792	Assembly both attacking divisions reported complete one hour before Zero.
291	"	-	7.30	Army Centre	"	K.31	Enemy barrage one quarter hour late on 2nd Anzac front.
292	"	7.35	7.50	4th Aus.Div.	"	Ga565	45th Bn. reported 5.40a.m. attack going well. 47th and 48th Bns. observed on top of ridge. C.T. commenced. Shelling heavy in rear.
293	"	7.50	8.0	4th Aus.Div. Phone	"	Ga566	F.O.O. reports 6a.m. RED LINE reached.
294	"	-	8.0	Army Centre.	"	K.34	Left Bde. N.Z. Div. on RED LINE and in touch 9th Div.
295	"	7.50	8.10	2nd Anzac	"	G 800	Right Div. advanced & reported proceeding steadily 6a.m. 100 prisoners coming in. Heavy M.G. fire at Zero.
296	"	-	8.18	4th Aus.Div.	"	Ga567	F.O.O. reports 7.18a.m. O.K. Consolidating RED LINE.
297	Red	9.25 (Phone)		2nd. Army Centre.	"	K.35	2 1/2 enemy Bns. Inf. observed vicinity MOORSLEDE, being engaged by artillery. One of our planes successfully engaged with M.G. fire several teams of horses, also group of mounted men behind enemy lines.
298	"	9.30	9.45	2nd Anzac	"	G 811	3rd Aus.Div. 9.2a.m. report Bn. of Left Bde. for BLUE LINE objective passed from over RED LINE at 8.10a.m. All then going well.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

165

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret.^{112.}

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
299	12/10	a.m. 10.20	a.m. 10.31	2nd. Anzac.	I ANZAC	G.816	3rd Aus.Div. 9.32a.m. reports advance of both Brigades from RED LINE to BLUE LINE successfully launched.
300	"	-	10.50	Phone Army Centre	"	L.41.	Aeroplane reports 4 Bns. enemy infantry on MENIN-GHELUWE ROAD at 10.20a.m. also considerable number of troops from MOORSLEDE moving WEST.
301	"	p.m. 12.5	p.m. 12.31	2nd. Army.	"	G.861	2nd Anzac situation 11.30a.m. N.Z. Div. left in touch with 18th Corps at VARLET FARM (V.27.d.9.1.) N.Zealanders hung up at WOLF COPSE and lower slopes BELLEVUE, and will resume attack at 2 or 3p.m. under barrage. 3rd Aus.Div. have put in reserve Bn. to fill gap between SNIPE HALL and CREST FARM towards FRIESLAND. Australians seen at CREST FARM and also at 12 Central. 3rd. Aust.Div. reported to have a line almost as good as BLUE Line and will secure CREST FARM and 12 Central.
302	"	-	12.49	4th Aus.Div.	"	G.53.	RED LINE Bn. 10.40a.m. reports all RED LINE except ASSURIA taken. Digging in 9th Bde. not yet in line, but coming up. Encountering much sniping. At 8.50a.m. BLUE LINE Bn. slightly in advance of RED LINE. Heavy shelling over whole area. Considerable E.A. activity. Ground very boggy and impassable in places. Estimated casualties RED LINE Bn. 7 Officers and 140 other ranks.
303	"	12.30	12.46	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.843	N.Z. Div. will make BLUE LINE final objective.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E


166

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 124

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
304	12/10	p.m. 1.30	p.m. (Phone)	Army Centre.	I ANZAC	L.46	Aeroplane reports about 1.15p.m. DADIZEELE and MOORSLEDE full of transport and troops entering from East and moving out West by all possible routes.
305	"	1.45	(Phone)	Army Centre.	"	L.45	5th Army front 9a.m. North to South:- V.1.a.0.4. - A.4.0. - d.0.5. - V.7.a.5.0. - V.13.b.1.8. - V.14.c.1.9. - BREWERY FARM - V.20. Central - V.26.b.3.5. - V.27.b.4.5. - thence to RED LINE.
306	"	2.10	2.23	4th Aus.Div.	"	G.a.379	48th ^{Bn.} (12th Bde) 8.50a.m. reports 9th Bde. held up on our ^{right} line preventing our advance beyond RED LINE.
307	"	-	2.55	4th Aus.Div.	"	G.54.	O.C. Right Bn. 9th Bde. states he is in touch with our BLUE LINE Bn. on BLUE LINE, and that our Bn. has established post at E.7.c.5.3. O.C. has been instructed to withdraw post. Consolidation is to be carried out in conjunction with 9th Bde.
308	"	2.40	2.58	2nd Army.	"	G.668	Situation 2.50p.m. - N.Z. Div. on line WOLF FME - Western slopes BELLVUE SPUR in D.4.c. and D.10.b. 3rd. Aus.Div. in touch N.Z. Div. in D.11.a., thence approximately on RED LINE. 4th Aus.Div. on RED LINE except ASSYRIA. Bellvue Spur being bombarded by our artillery.



For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX-E67

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

502

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
308	12/10	p.m. 4.30	p.m. 5.13	2nd. Anzac.	I ANZAC	G.863	Contact patrol reports line 3p.m. as follows - West to VIENNA COTTAGE D.12.c in trench parallel to road up to D.12.c.20.65 thence shell holes to D.11.a.0.0. - D.10.b.5.0 along road to junction D.10.b.3.9 - D.4.d.5.1 thence shell holes and disconnected trenches to WOLF FARM D.4.c. thence shell holes in CEMETERY D.3.b.95.35 thence West VARLET FARM D.17.d.9.1.
309	"	XXXX	5.50	4th. Aus.Div.	"	Ga581	Whole of RED LINE except at ASSYRIA being consolidated. Hostile artillery very active on RED LINE, whole front line and on BROODSIENDE RIDGE. Enemy reported massing squares 180, 24, 130, 19A. Artillery fire brought to bear; no infantry action reported. Approximate captures 1 Officer 100 other ranks, 3 M.G.'s.
310	"	-	5.52	4th. Aus.Div.	"	Ga581	12th Bde. report S.O.S. on 2nd Anzac front 5.15p.m.
311	"	6.40	6.57	4th. Aus.Div.	"	G.58	Report at 3.40p.m. from front line states 47th and 48th Bns. hold RED LINE approximately with 3rd Aus.Div. about 100 yards to rear of left flank. Later report states owing to troops on left having fallen back further, 12th Aus.Inf.Bde. has had to retire to original line.

W. W. W. W. W.
Capt.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX 2 168

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
312	13/10	a.m. -	a.m. 11.3	4th Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	G.62	12th Bde report established on old line in touch with flanking units.
313	"	9.0	9.29	2nd. Anzac.	"	G.920	Contact plane 7a.m. reports line - D.18.a.8.7 - road junction - D.12.c.2.7. - D.11.a.0.0. - D.10.b.50.00 - along road to road junction - D.10.b.3.9. - D.4.d.35.22 - Southern edge WOLF COPSE - WOLF FARM - CEMETERY - D.4.a.
314	"	-	Phone. 11.40	Army Centre.	"	K.38.	Fifth Army front runs as follows :- XVIII Corps - WALLON MOLEN - BARKS Hos. - V.27.b. central - OXFORD Hos - V.28.b. central - BEEK Ho. - V.28.b.10.95. - V.20.c.3.7. - V.20.a.2.0. - V.14.c.1.6. - post at FRACAS FM - V.20.d.7.5. XIV Corps = V.19.b.6.7. - V.14.a.2.8. - V.8.c.0.0. - V.7.d.3.7. - V.7.a.6.2. - V.11.c.0.5. - V.6.d.0.8. - V.5.d.2.5. - Other locations unconfirmed :- V.14.c.6.7. - V.14.c.0.3. - V.14.c.2.5 - REQUETTE FARM - V.14.c.5.9. - MEMBLING FARM - V.8.c. central - GRAVEL FARM - V.7.b.9.05 - V.7.a.9.1. - V.7.a.6.2.
315	"	11.55 (Recd)		2nd. Anzac.	"	G.932	Prisoners to 11a.m. 13th inst. 16 Officers 364 other ranks. About 120 prisoners also admitted to C.C.S.

Uniceithink
Cap

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

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G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 366

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
218	13/10	-	P.M. 5.30	PHONE. B.G.S. 1. 3rd. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	R.20.	3rd Aust.Div. definite co-ordinates North of RAILWAY are :- D.17.b.3.3 - D.11.c.8.1 - D.11.c.1.1 - D.10.d.5.7 - and thence along old line.

W. Cunningham. Capt.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E
170

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 47

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
317	16/10	a.m. 5.30	a.m. 5.45	4th. Aust.Div.	I ANZAC	IG 749	Patrols on afternoon of 15th inst. reached D.23.d.4.3. - D.24.c.15.60. Four of enemy observed at D.24.c.00.35.
318	"	11.10	11.45	4th Aust.Div.	"	IG 752	Patrol at 10.40p.m. proceeded :- D.23.d.2.5, 9.8, c.5.9, thro. TABLE WOOD, D.24.d.2.9, 4.6. Rifle and M.G. fire heard from E.19.c.5.7. 7.30p.m. patrol proceeded :- D.23.b.2.2, D.24.a.2.7, 3.7, 8.2, b.2.5. At 4.45a.m. patrol proceeded :- D.23.b.5.8, 9.3, D.24.a.5.3. BUSY WOOD un-occupied. 4th patrol gained touch with enemy in strength at ASSYRIA.
319	"	6.0	6.30	5th. Aust.Div.	"	IG 26/110	Patrol proceeded thro. FLINTE COPSE and FLINTE FM, to D.30.a.3.7. Flares sent up West of ANVIL WOOD. Another patrol advanced to D.30.a to East of ANVIL WOOD thence South 200 yds, returning thro. FLINTE COPSE. Flares fired from West edge ANVIL WOOD.
320	"	-	7.40	Phone. 5th. Aust.Div.	"	L.47	Our patrols fired on from N. corner JUSTICE WOOD and from E. end CELTIC WOOD. Enemy line runs parallel to and about 200 yds W. of road N. and S. thro. D.30. and J.6.
321	17/10	a.m. 10.20	-	I ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.476.	4th Aust.Div. report patrols worked to :- ZWERG COTTAGE un-occupied; touch gained with enemy entrenched about E.13.c.0.5. 150 yds. E. CHINA WOOD located post D.24.c.8.2. S.E. corner TABLE WOOD located post D.24.c.9.7.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX

G(a)

OPERATIONS.

Secret. 370

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch	Receipt				
322	Oct. 26	a.m. 9.20	a.m. 9.30	1st Aus. Div.	1st ANZAC	G.366	O.C. attacking troops 8.10a.m. reports objective taken. Position being consolidated.
323	"	11.15	11.42	2nd Army	"	G.414	Situation 9.30a.m. 3rd Canadian Division left on RED dotted line V.28.d.2.4 - not in touch 63rd Div. Centre on BELLEVUE Spur. Right forced back to original line. 4th. Canadian Div. gained objectives. 1st Aust. Div. captured DECLINE Copse. 3rd Canadian Div. moving up to maintain centre at BELLEVUE Spur. Opposition from CREST FARM and pill-box D.5.c.0.5. 5th Div. attack on POLDERHOEK WOOD and Chateau appears successful. Right Bde. 7th Div. held up BERRY COTS and LEWIS HOUSE.
324	"	9.52	-	1st ANZAC	Canadian Corps	G.841	Contact plane reports flares at D.12.a.8.5. and c.6.0. - c.8.6 and d.1.7.
325	"	11.47		1st ANZAC	2nd Army &c.	G.852	Our troops consolidating DECLINE Copse. In touch Canadians. Apparently few enemy holding on about Eastern edge Copse.
326	"	p.m. 1.20	p.m. 1.46	2nd Army.	1st ANZAC	G.426	5th Div. (X Corps) hold POLDERHOEK WOOD and Chateau. 7th Div. were counter-attacked near GHIELUVELT and are back on original line with left flank advanced along railway in J.22.c and a.
327	"	5.15	5.23	1st Aus. Div.	"	G.384	Objective consolidated. 4 M.G's. and 70 prisoners taken.
328	"	5.10	5.46	2nd	"	G.432	Situation 2.40p.m. 4th Canadian Division in touch 1st Aust. Div. at DECLINE Copse thence line runs D.11.d.0.0. along road to D.12.c.3.7. - D.19.c.80.75 - D.12 Central - D.12.a.5.1 - Southern edge DECK WOOD - D.11.b.90.05 - D.11. Central. Posts about D.12.c.8.1 and D.12.c.4.5. Line of posts D.4.d.8.5. - D.4.d.4.7. and D.4.b.5.0 - a.6.8. Canadian troops in touch 63rd Div. SOURCE TRENCH V.28.g.5.4.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

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OPERATIONS.

Secret.

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
329	Oct. 26	p.m. 5.30	p.m. 5.51	Canadian I ANZAC Corps.	"	G.44	175 prisoners captures.
330	"	7.25	7.40	1st Aust.Div.	"	G.S.392	Reports indicate out-post in DECLINE COPSE was withdrawn in conformity with movement of troops on left. Bde. has been instructed to restore situation.
331	"	7.15	8.4	2nd Army	"	G.437	Situation 6p.m. Canadian line runs V.28.c.5.4. - D.4.b.5.0 - D.4.d.8.4.- thence DAD TRENCH and LAANKENK to RAVENBEEK VALLEY - D.11. Central - D.12. Central - D.12.c.5.5. - DECLINE COPSE - D.18.a.5.6. Posts pushed out towards TIBER and TIBER COPSE.

For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E

173

OPERATIONS.

Secret.

Seq No.	Date.	Time of		From	To	Sender's number	TEXT
		Despatch.	Receipt				
	Oct. 30	a.m.	a.m.				
332		6.20	6.27	1st. Aus.Div.	I ANZAC	G.460	Post established DECOY WOOD 2.40 a.m.
333	"	8.40 (Phone)		Canadian Corps	"	R.29.	4th Canadian Division report enemy massing EDDY HEIGHTS. R.13.
334	"	8.40 (Phone)		I ANZAC	B.G.H.A.		Informed re R.29.
335	"	11.42	11.50	Canadian Corps	I ANZAC	G.174	Contact patrol 10a.m. reports flares - D.12.c.8.7. - b.0.2 - a 65.75 - D.5.d.90.85 - b.60.25 - b.15.60 - a.4.4.
336	"	p.m. 3.0	p.m. 3.18	2nd Army	"	G.684	Canadian Corps have captured MEETCHELE and CREST FARM. Three counter-attacks delivered from between PASSCHENDAELE and HILL 52 repuls ed.
337	"	6.30	6.54	Canadian Corps	"	G.161	Right Div. consolidating line DECLINE COPSE - RAILWAY CUTTING - D.18.a.9.9 - TIBER - D.12.a.9.8. - East of CREST FARM - D.5.d.8.3.. 3rd Canadian Div. right Ede. consolidating general line GRAF - MEETCHEELE- (D.5.Central) FURST FARM. Left Ede. has been ordered to consolidate line V.29.c.3.3. - VAPOR FARM - SOURCE FARM to get in touch with 63rd Division in SOURCE TRENCH.

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For B.G.G.S.
First ANZAC Corps.

APPENDIX E
174

ORIGINAL

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

PERIOD - 6P.M. 27TH. SEPTEMBER TO 6P.M. 4TH OCTOBER.

1) ARTILLERY ACTIVITY :-

(a) BRITISH :- Harassing fire was carried out according to programme prior to our attack on the 4th. September. Centres of enemy activity have been constantly searched and subjected to destructive bombardments.

(b) ENEMY :- On the 29th. September there was a noticeable increase in the activity of enemy counter-batteries in the nature of area shoots. On the 30th. September there were indications of the retirement of the KEIBERG Group, which has since been confirmed. On 1st October our batteries were again heavily shelled, fire being directed on several occasions by enemy aeroplanes.

Localities on which enemy shelling has been chiefly active during the period are :- TOKIO, ANZAC, WESTHORN, and BELLEWAARDE Ridges and GLENCORSE Wood.

2) INFANTRY ACTION :-

At 5.45a.m. on 28th September about 200 of the enemy in attempting to approach our line in the vicinity of JETTY Wood were severely cut up by our artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire. The survivors (3 officers 67 O.R.) surrendered to our troops during the morning.

At 6.50a.m. on 29th September the right company of the 5th Australian Division and the left Brigade of the X Corps were attacked simultaneously ~~attacked~~ by the enemy. The first wave of the attacking troops was successfully driven off with loss, and our artillery prevented further attacks.

At 6a.m. on 1st October the command of right Divisional Sector passed from G.O.C. 5th Australian Division to the G.O.C. 21st and 7th Divisions, and at 10a.m. the command of the present right Divisional Sector passed from the G.O.C. 4th Australian Division to the G.O.C. 1st Australian Division.

The present left Divisional Sector was taken over by the 2nd Australian Division from the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions at 10a.m. on 1st October.

At about 9a.m. on 1st October about 80 of the enemy apparently assembling for the attack were engaged by our artillery, which opened in response to an S.O.S. signal. No attack developed.

At 6a.m. on 4th October the third phase of the present operations was commenced. First ANZAC Corps with the 1st Australian Division on the right and 2nd Australian Division on the left, attacked the enemy on a front of 2,000 yards, viz:- from POLYGONE Wood (exclusive) to ZONNEBEKE (inclusive).

The whole of the final objective was gained and consolidated with the exception of the Western edge of DAISY Wood, where our line is withdrawn 100 yards.

In certain localities the enemy offered resistance, and some hand to hand fighting ensued. The enemy's losses have been very heavy, 960 dead being counted on the ground captured by the Right Division alone.

Total -

War Diary.

(2)

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
(Continued)

Total captures reported :-

Prisoners (including wounded)	-	900.
Field guns	7	
Machine-guns	58	
Trench mortars.....	6	
Flammenwerfer	2	
besides other material.		

(3) CASUALTIES :-

Estimated :-

	Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division	87	1,512.
2nd " "	43	1,110.
4th " "	22	925.
5th " "	23	304.
<u>TOTAL :-</u>	175	3,851.

Note :-

(i) Actual casualties for period 20.9.17 to 27.9.17 (inclusive) :-

	Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division	110	2,636.
2nd " "	94	2,309.
4th " "	49	835.
5th " "	107	3,256.
<u>TOTAL :-</u>	360	9,036.

(ii) This amends previous summary.

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Am R. W. C.
for

5.10.1917.

Lieutenant-General,
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

FIRST ANZAC CORPS.

(2)

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

Period 6p.m. 4/10/17 to 6p.m. 11/10/17.

1. - ARTILLERY :-

(a) BRITISH :- Our artillery carried out bombardment barrages daily in preparation for our attack on the 9th inst. At the request of Infantry Commanders special shoots have been carried out, including the dispersal of enemy troops in CELTIC WOOD on several occasions, bombardment of located hostile M.G.'s., and barrages to cover minor operations undertaken by the 1st. Aust. Div.

(b) ENEMY :- On the 5th and 6th insts. enemy shelling was below normal. On the afternoon of the 8th inst. hostile artillery became very active. Six new hostile battery positions were located, mostly in the vicinity of WATERDAMHOEK.

During the afternoon of the 9th instant hostile counter batteries were active against our heavy batteries. Enemy shelling has been chiefly directed against the BROODSEINDE RIDGE and the ZONNEBEKE VALLEY. There has been little shelling on our back areas.

The enemy has, as a rule, vigorously replied to our prearranged bombardments, but his fire has not been well directed.

On several occasions his light signals have been answered by heavy barrages.

2. - INFANTRY ACTION :-

On 5th inst. posts were successfully established by 1st Aust. Div. on the Western edge of FLINT COPSE and by 2nd Aust. Div. at D.29.b.15.95 and D.23.d.4.3.

At mid-night on the night 6/7th insts. CELTIC WOOD was raided by two parties of 1 officer and 30 other ranks from each the 11th and 12th Aust. Inf. Bns. The raid was completely successful, a number of the enemy being killed and 10 prisoners and one M.G. captured. During the morning of the 7th inst. 5 of the enemy, who had been sent out to re-establish the raided post, surrendered to our troops.

At 5.20a.m. on the 9th inst. the 2nd Aust. Div. in conjunction with the Corps on our left attacked the enemy between DAISY WOOD and the YPRES-ROULERS RAILWAY (both inclusive). The attack was carried out by the 6th. Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right and the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the left. Strong opposition was met by the right Bde. at DAISY WOOD, and this, combined with heavy M.G. fire from BUSY WOOD, held this Bde. up for some considerable time. DAISY WOOD was finally cleared and the right Bde. established approximately on the RED LINE, excepting the South-eastern portion of DAIRY WOOD.

The left Bde. succeeded in capturing the RED LINE without meeting with serious opposition. The BLUE LINE was reached by elements of our troops, but being unsupported on either flank, they suffered heavily from enfilading and reverse fire, and were compelled to withdraw to the RED LINE. A position was finally established approximately along the RED LINE.

Simultaneously -

(2)

INFANTRY ACTION (Continued)

Simultaneously with the attack at 5.20a.m. on the 9th instant, a party of 5 officers and 100 other ranks from the 10th Aust. Inf. Bn. carried out a raid on CELTIC COPSE in D.22.d. Considerable opposition was experienced and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The raiding party steadily moved forward and finally succeeded in clearing the whole of the COPSE.

Although our casualties were heavy (40 all ranks), considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy. It is estimated that 40 of the enemy were killed and 30 wounded. Great difficulty was experienced in withdrawing from the COPSE owing to enemy M.G. fire which necessitated a number of our men remaining out till dusk.

Command of the Right Divisional Sector passed from 1st Aust. Div. to the 5th Aust. Div. at 10a.m. on the 10th inst., and the command of the Left Divisional Sector from the 2nd Aust. Div. to the 4th Aust. Div. at 10a.m. on the 11th inst.

3. CASUALTIES :- Actual casualties for period so far reported :-

	Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division	108	2588.
2nd Australian Division	156	1934.***
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TOTAL	264	4522
	-----	-----

*** 6th and 7th Bde. G.R. casualties for 9th inst. not yet reported.

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Am. R. Smith

Lieutenant-General.
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

13.10.17.

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

Period - 6p.m. 11th October to 6p.m. 18th Oct. 1917.

FIRST ANZAC CORPS.

1. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY :-

(a) BRITISH :- Our artillery has maintained intermittent harassing fire throughout the week. All enemy tracks, communications and known centres of activity have been continually shelled. Several hostile parties have been engaged with good results. Enemy strong points have been successfully bombarded by howitzers.

(b) ENEMY :- Enemy artillery has been very active during the period. Definite shoots have been carried out under aeroplane observation. Our battery positions have come in for a good deal of shelling. Area shoots have been employed on HANEBEKE VALLEY, and on ZONNEBEKE and its vicinity. Localities of chief activity have been BROODSEINDE, ANZAC and WESTHOEK RIDGES and the intervening valleys. YPRES has received attention in back area shoots.

During the past few days there has been a noticeable increase in the activity of 7.7cm. calibre guns.

Gas shells were extensively used on the nights 14/15th and 15/16th October.

2. INFANTRY ACTION :-

At 5.25a.m. on the 18th inst. the 12th. Australian Infantry Brigade, operating on the left of the 4th Australian Division, attacked the enemy in co-operation with 2nd Anzac Corps on our left.

The object of the attack was to provide protection to the right flank of the 2nd Anzac Corps by gaining ground in a North-easterly direction immediately South of the YPRES-ROULERS railway, and securing a position astride the DROOGENBHOODHOEK Spur. The frontage of the attack was approximately 650 yards.

On securing the first objective a series of connected posts were to be constructed from RHINE to ASSYRIA, and on securing the second objective these posts were to be continued to the railway at E.7.c.2.2.

The 47th and 48th Battalions were detailed to capture the RED and BLUE Lines respectively.

Assembly was carried out successfully and our troops moved forward to time under the covering barrage.

The first objective with the exception of a portion near ASSYRIA was reached at the specified time; consolidation was then commenced by 47th Battalion while the 48th Battalion passed through and waited for the barrage to lift towards the 2nd objective.

Touch was gained with the troops of 2nd Anzac Corps at a point on the railway about 150 yards in the rear of our first objective.

At this period considerable trouble was experienced from ASSYRIA HOUSE, which, with the aid of 2 Stokes Mortars, was stormed. Our troops were also subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and fire from snipers in the vicinity of VIENNA COTTAGE and the higher ground about 12 Central.

Owing -

War Diary

Owing to the decision of the troops on our left not to continue the advance on account of their diminished numbers, the C.O. 48th Battalion decided to remain and consolidate his present position. During this period the enemy maintained an intense bombardment on our captured area and on our original front line, heavy casualties resulting.

At approximately 4.6p.m. one Battalion of the enemy advanced in massed formation against the right flank of our position. Our artillery dealt with the situation satisfactorily, and shortly after 5p.m. the 47th Battalion advised having repulsed the remnants of this force.

At this juncture, the enemy comprising of at least a Brigade developed an attack from the direction of PASSCHENDAELE which struck the railway at about DECLINE COPSE. Owing to this and a further withdrawal on the part of the Brigade on our left, it was decided to withdraw to our original line. Two Vickers guns successfully covered our retirement, one of which, together with its crew, was unfortunately sacrificed, while the other, after its ammunition was expended, was destroyed and abandoned, a jamb having prevented the removal of the gun from the tripod.

The enemy still continued to shell BROODSEINDE RIDGE till 7p.m., after which the fire slackened, and by 9p.m. the situation was quiet.

On the night of the 14/15th^{Oct.} was suspected that the enemy was effecting a local with-drawal from the valley running North-west of OOSTOEK.

Daylight patrols were sent out on the 15th inst. and located the enemy approximately on a line parallel to and 200 yards to the West of the road running North and South through J.6 and D.30. Advance posts were located at D.30.a.2.9 - D.29.c.9.7 - E.13.c.5.0 and at ASSYRIA.

One of our patrols attacked a "pill-box" on the Eastern edge of CELTIC WOOD. Of the 10 occupants, 5 were captured, 3 killed and 2 wounded. The two latter, however, succeeded in effecting their escape after being pursued by our troops.

On the night 17/18th instant casualties were inflicted on a hostile patrol at D.24.c.9.7.

3. CASUALTIES :-

Casualties for the period are as follows :-

	Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division (Artillery)	11	137
2nd Australian Division (Artillery)	7	65
4th Australian Division	61	1710
5th Australian Division	29	713
TOTAL	108	2,625.

Am Ross *to be*
for

19.10.1917.

Lieutenant-General.
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

FIRST ANZAC CORPS.

PERIOD 6P.M. 18th OCTOBER TO 25th OCTOBER 1917.

ARTILLERY ACTION :-

(a) BRITISH:- Programmes of harrassing fire have been executed and bombardments carried out under direct observation. Roads, tracks and centres of activity have been subjected to intermittent bursts of fire.

At 10a.m. on 24th October, command of the Left Divisional Sector passed from the 4th Australian Division to the 1st Australian Division.

(b) ENEMY :- Hostile shelling has come mainly from the WATERDAMHOEK and DADIZEELE Groups, although at the beginning of the period the MOORSLEDE and TERNAND Groups were considerably active.

On the night 18th/19th October concentrated area shoots were carried out on our forward areas.

There was a noticeable increase in hostile counter-battery work on the 20th and 21st October.

Enemy retaliation to our practice barrages has not been heavy.

INFANTRY ACTION :-

(a) BRITISH :- Infantry action for the period under review has been confined to active patrolling along the whole of the Corps front.

CELTIC WOOD, CHINA WOOD, TABLE WOOD, BUSY WOOD and ASSYRIA were found to be unoccupied.

DECLINE COPSE was held in strength by the enemy, who were on two occasions observed to be consolidating their position.

On the night 21st/22nd October, a post was established at D.17.b.75.40.

(b) ENEMY :- Enemy has shown an attitude of passive defence. His patrols have been inactive.

CASUALTIES :-

Casualties for the period are as

follows :-

	Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division (Artillery)	13	182.
2nd Australian Division (Artillery)	2	77.
4th Australian Division	23	677.
5th Australian Division	17	487.
TOTAL	55	1,423.

W. McCutcheon
for Lieutenant-General.
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

War Diary

WEEKLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

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FIRST ANZAC CORPS.

PERIOD ENDING 6P.M. 1ST. NOVEMBER 1917.

ARTILLERY ACTION :-

(a) BRITISH :- Our artillery has operated according to programme, and has given assistance to the Canadian Corps during their major operations on the 26th and 30th October.

At 8.57p.m. on 30th October our artillery effectively engaged an enemy concentration in rear of the BROOGENBROODHOEK Spur which had been reported by the Canadian Corps.

No infantry action developed from this assembly.

(b) ENEMY :- Hostile artillery has been normally active during the period.

The chief activity has been shown by the WATERDAMHOEK and DADIZELLE Groups, although heavy shelling on the nights 26th/27th and 30th/31st October, came from the South East.

On the 30th October little shelling was reported on the Corps front.

There has been no change in the general grouping of the enemy's artillery, and it is probable that there has been a slight decrease in the number of hostile batteries.

The enemy's reply to our practice barrages has been weak.

Gas shelling on our forward areas and battery positions has been considerably above normal.

INFANTRY ACTION :-

(a) BRITISH :- In co-operation with the attack of the Canadian Corps at 4.50a.m. on the 26th. October,

one company of the 6th Australian Battalion attacked and captured DECLINE COPSE, thus ensuring the protection of the Canadian right flank.

At 10a.m. a post from D.18.a.56.60 to 56.50 had been consolidated.

70 prisoners and 4 M.G.'s. were taken in this operation.

Later during the day the garrison of this post was withdrawn in conformity with the movements of the Canadian troops on our left.

On the night 29th/30th October a post was established in DECOY WOOD in order to protect the right of Canadian Corps in its attack on the morning of the 30th. October.

The area to our front has been actively patrolled each night. JUSTICE WOOD, CELTIC WOOD, ANVIL WOOD, CHINA WOOD, BUSY WOOD, ZWERG COTTES., BIRMA COPSE and RHINE COPSE were all visited and found to be unoccupied.

Attempts to approach ASSYRIA were unsuccessful owing to the vigilance of enemy M.G. fire from the vicinity of the objective and from the railway East of DECLINE COPSE.

On the night 30th/Oct/1st Nov., however, a patrol succeeded in approaching to within 100 yards from the direction of DECLINE COPSE without drawing enemy fire.

Supporting points appear to be located at DAME HOUSE and DE MISPELAERE CABARET, and aerial reports verify this.

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War Diary

INFANTRY ACTION (Continued)

Except for a small number of strongly held posts in E.19 and E.25.b. located by aerial reconnaissance, there is no definite line of resistance visible West of the KEIBERG Ridge.

Access to the enemy outpost is obtained only by a number of roads in good condition, otherwise the ground in rear appears to be almost impassable.

Posts at the following points have ~~actually~~ been located by our patrols :- J.6.b.25.85 - D.30.d.15.10 - DAME HOUSE - D.30.central - D.30.a.97.87 - D.30.a.85.40 - D.24.c.60.65 - TABLE WOOD. It has been definitely established that each of these posts contains machine guns. Command of the right Divnl. sector passed from 5th Aus.Div. to 2nd Aus.Div. 10am, 28th Oct.

(b) ENEMY :- The enemy has shown no offensive attitude during the period under review.

No encounters have taken place with hostile patrols but on several occasions our patrols have come under machine gun fire and on one occasion under light 7.7 cm. gun fire. The enemy is apparently content to allow our patrols to move about in the western portions of Squares D.24.c., D.30.a., D.30.c. and J.6.a. but seen anxious to prevent any movement on our part further eastwards.

CASUALTIES :-

Casualties for the period are as follows :-

		Officers	Other Ranks.
1st Australian Division	...	14	427
2nd Australian Division	...	10	401
4th Australian Division	...	4	29
5th Australian Division	...	12	292

	TOTAL	40	1,149

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Lieutenant-General.
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

The Enemy's Probable Intentions for Counter-Attack East of Ypres

(Third Phase).

General.

The accompanying "Hostile Counter-Attack Map" is prepared to indicate the Enemy's Probable Assembly Places and Counter-Attacks in the forthcoming Third Phase of the Operations East of Ypres. The sources of information from which it has been prepared have been mainly prisoners' statements, captured maps and the experience we have gained of the enemy's counter-attack and defensive methods in the recent operations. Reference has been had as well to the changes of his artillery grouping and the recent photographs of the areas in which he is accustomed to billet and assemble his troops.

In the Memo., similar to this, "The Enemy's Tactical Methods East of Ypres," which was issued on September 16th, prior to the First Phase of these Operations, attention was drawn to the enemy's well known methods of counter-attack, which he had developed after the Battle of Messines, which he had employed in the fighting East of Ypres in August and which were described therein in quotations from his Orders. These methods he has consistently carried out in the First and Second Phases of the September Operations in this locality as was expected, and, though varying according to the ground, they were so in accordance with his known policy that we were able to take full advantage and anticipate his tactics.

The Enemy's Appreciation.

The enemy's appreciation of the present situation doubtless turns largely on his experiences and the result of his tactics during the September fighting; two main considerations are probably prominent in it:—

1. His tactics for Counter-Attack have failed.
2. He confidently expects our offensive will continue at (a) Menin Road, and (b) Broodseinde Ridge.

The former needs no comment except that he doubtless now sees the necessity for a change in his defensive tactics.

The latter will enable him to make plans for counter measures well in advance of our resumption of the advance.

The Enemy's Preparatory Measures.

That the enemy is changing his tactics is now evident. He has already engaged in a counter offensive independent of our last advance after we have become established on our new line. This has taken the form of deliberate well-organized attacks on our new line about Menin Road and between it and Polygon Wood; two yesterday and three this morning. These have followed our last advance after an interval of three days in which he has perfected his preparations after the confusion of his former failures. He will doubtless make another similar attempt in the same place or somewhere on the battle line within the next two days.

With the change of tactics and the belief that the course of our offensive is toward obvious objectives, he has already effected numerous changes in dispositions and arrangements for defence on a more comprehensive basis independent of his counter offensive yesterday and to-day. These are disclosed in the following:—

1. The relief of at least one Division on the battle front, the *second* time since our last advance on the 26th (236th Div.), and the possible relief of the Division next on the Southern flank of the battle front (207th Div.).
2. Reliefs of near by Divisions off the battle front probably getting them into reserve behind, such as:—
4th Guard Reserve Div. from Lens, and possibly 5th Bavarian Div. opposite Armentieres.
3. The re-arrangement of his artillery grouping, forming four main groups, viz: Tenbrielen (one large group of long range guns) firing mostly North-West towards Tower Hamlets Ridge; Kruiseecke (two groups) firing towards Menin Road and Polygon Wood; Becelaere (two groups) and Keiberg (one group) firing towards Polygon Wood and Broodseinde Ridge; Passchendaele (and possibly Goudberg) groups firing towards Gravenstafel Ridge.
4. Increased aerial activity both in front line reconnaissance, artillery aeroplanes using wireless and bombing of our camps and rear areas. His artillery machines seem now to have recovered from their confusion of the 26th September, 1917 (evidenced by his disorganization of wireless).
5. Moving of wireless stations rearwards behind Becelaere and Moorslede.
6. Removal of his portable hutments wholesale from areas around Kruiseecke, Terhand and Becelaere and their re-appearance in areas behind the line Dadizeele—Moorslede in more concentrated areas already much in use.

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The Enemy's Intentions.

The enemy's probable intentions can be fairly well deduced from the foregoing and may be summed up as follows :—

While still likely retaining his local reserves of battalions in close support (in special vigilance positions) and using them for local counter-attacks in from 3 to 4 hours after zero, he will probably discard his policy of counter-attacking with larger forces in from 5 to 10 hours after zero as has been his custom. He has doubtless found that the confusion and losses caused by our alert and prompt barrages on well defined routes of approach along with the confusion created so soon after our attack and transmitted to his attacking troops from those already up at the front, are out of proportion to the advantage gained by prompt counter-attack.

The likelihood is therefore that he will wait until our advance with limited objectives, which he now has learned to expect, has become established and consolidated and that he will, after deliberate preparation by his artillery, launch a large well organized attack or series of attacks at a time long enough after zero to ascertain our new positions, and to enable adequate dispositions and arrangements to be completed.

To do this would require at least 10 or 12 hours and even then it is a question whether at this season he would put in such an attack with failing light. It is more than likely that he would defer the attack until daybreak employing the night in getting up and assembling his assault troops and putting on the heavy preparatory bombardment of our line in addition to his customary barrages and bombardments of our rear areas and communications.

Should he carry out this policy his assault troops (the Counter-Attack Divisions) would be billeted well in the rear where there is ample accommodation in areas well organized for supply and transport and the various regiments and battalions would go forward from these straight to the places of deployment which would be about coincident with the assembly places of the reserve battalions (earlier in the day or zero day).

Counter-Attacks.

There are two main localities in which the enemy is likely to counter-attack :—

- (a) Astride the Menin Road and on Tower Hamlets Ridge.
- (b) Astride or South of the Roulers Railway on the Broodseinde Ridge.

Reference to the accompanying Counter-Attack map will indicate the probable places of concentration or forward assembly of troops for these attacks, their probable route of approach and the places of deployment. These are worked out with reference to the ground and the customary routes (off the main roads), ascertained from prisoners and confirmed by photographs. The enemy's action on former occasions as observed by aerial and ground reconnaissance has also been studied.

That the enemy attaches great importance to the Menin Road positions seems apparent from his continued resistance to our advance along it in all the fighting of August and September. The operations here in 1914 and his long occupation have emphasised in his mind the importance of observation from the Gheluvelt Ridge. He will, consequently, doubtless continue to make every effort to prevent our getting forward to these positions where his Gheluvelt and Zandvoorde Switch Lines and the Kruiseecke Defences may be turned. Comparison of the enemy's methods of approach and assembly for counter-attack here on September 20th and 26th show a fixed scheme which he will probably still follow, assembling about Kruiseecke and Zandvoorde after approaching from Menin by the Menin Road and Wervicq. Approach and assembly in these localities should again be quickly discovered by the R.F.C. (aeroplane and balloon) and by ground observers as on previous occasions.

The approaches for counter-attack on Broodseinde Ridge are well covered east of the Keiberg Spur, which lies midway between it and Waterdamhoek. It is behind this that the enemy's assembly for deployment is sure to occur—as it is also the position of assembly of reserve battalions for local counter-attacks. Such assembly is difficult of observation except by aeroplane, but advance over the ridge and down into the valley toward the Broodseinde Ridge ought to be readily discovered with reasonable visibility.

The same remarks apply to the positions for assembly and deployment, and of advance for attack on Gravenstafel Ridge from Passchendaele, and, though probably less likely to be attempted than the Broodseinde Ridge, may possibly be done in conjunction with it.

It must be kept in mind that the enemy may have three, and possibly four, divisions available to put in as Counter-Attack Divisions if he considers this the critical period in our offensive to employ them. If four, there will probably be two from each of the Ypres and Wytschaete Groups, of which the boundary lies on the line Polygon Wood—Waterdamhoek. He will doubtless employ the Divisional Artillery of all of these in any case.

Second Army Intelligence,

October 1st, 1917.

C. H. MITCHELL, Lieut.-Col., G.S.,

for Major-General, G.S., Second Army.

DUPLICATE

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD 27th SEPTEMBER, 1917, TO 4th OCTOBER, 1917.

On the 27th September successful minor operations took place to complete the capture of those portions of the final objectives that had not been reached on the 26th September.

The 15th Australian Brigade took Joist Farm (South-East of Polygon Wood) and gave valuable assistance to the 33rd Division on their right, who, in spite of determined opposition and heavy shelling, succeeded in completing their advance before the evening.

The 28th and 29th September passed relatively quietly. An interesting incident occurred on the 28th on the front of the 5th Australian Division, East of Polygon Wood, which well showed the demoralising effect of our tactics. A hostile party of some 200 of the 19th Reserve Division came into the line on the night of the 27th-28th. They were caught by our nightly artillery harassing fire, and then lost their way. Daylight found them wandering about close to the Australians, who opened on them with rifle and machine gun fire. They suffered many casualties, and three Officers and 67 other ranks surrendered in batches during the course of the morning.

By the evening of the 29th, the enemy had largely recovered from the confusion and disorganisation caused by our operations of the 26th September. His immediate counter-attack Division (236th Division), which had been thrown in on the 26th-27th September, had failed and had been withdrawn again in accordance with his known plan of operations.

Sufficient time had elapsed to permit of the organisation of further local operations, and on the early mornings of the 30th September and 1st October, a series of counter-attacks developed. These were aimed against our front between the Menin Road and Polygon Wood, and were carried out by the 19th Reserve Division, which was holding this section of the front.

On the 30th September the enemy was reported concentrating East of Polygon Wood and movement was seen in Cameron Covert. Our artillery put down two heavy barrages and no infantry action followed. On both sides of the Menin Road, however, at least two attacks were launched with Flammenwerfer and considerable artillery support. Except for the temporary loss of a post just South of the Menin Road, both these attacks collapsed under our fire.

On the morning of the 1st October a series of powerful attacks developed between the Menin Road and the North of Polygon Wood. Our posts at Joist Farm and Cameron Copse were driven in and heavy fighting ensued. The enemy employed nearly all his guns on intensive bombardments of the forward area throughout the day, our battery areas being relatively immune.

Except as already stated, all the enemy's attacks were repulsed and his losses from our artillery and machine gun fire would appear to have been great.

The night of 2nd-3rd October passed quietly except that the enemy put down an extremely heavy barrage 500 yards behind our lines between Polygon Wood and the Menin Road.

The 2nd October passed quietly; the enemy's artillery was considerably less active. At daylight on the 3rd, however, further hostile counter-attacks developed. The front threatened was from the South of Polygon Wood to the South of the Menin Road. Our S.O.S. barrage may have broken up a portion of the attack as the only advance actually made was on each side of the Menin Road. Here, covered by the mist, elements of the enemy's infantry reached our lines and temporarily surrounded a post held by the Rifle Brigade. All our posts, however, remained intact, and on the greater portion of the front the attack broke down before reaching our lines.

The long spell of fine weather broke on the evening of the 3rd October, when a heavy gale, accompanied by light rain showers, broke in from the South-West. There was some intermittent hostile shell fire during the night of 3rd-4th, but on the whole the assembling of our troops was not seriously interfered with.

At 6 a.m., 4th October, the attack was launched on a frontage of about 9,700 yards, extending from Bitter Wood, South of the Tower Hamlets Spur, to North of Gravenstafel, where the front of the attack was prolonged by the Army on our left by a further 4,300 yards to the Ypres-Thourout Railway.

The first objective for the attack was the *Red Line*, viz.:—

Hampshire Farm—Berry Cottages—Northern portion of Gheluvelt Wood—Polderhoek Chateau—Reutel Village—Romulus Wood—Thames Farm—Van Mieben—Albatross Farm.

The IX. Corps attacked on the right with troops of the following Regiments:—Middlesex, Somersets, Lincolns, R. Fusiliers, K.R.R.C. and Rifle Brigade, all of 37th Division. The greater part of the objective was gained under the barrage, but we failed to take Berry Cottages and Lewis House.

The X. Corps attacked on the right centre with troops of the following Regiments:—

R.W. Kent	} 5th Division.
K.O.S.B.	
Devons	
D.C.L.I.	
K.O.Y.L.I.	} 21st Division.
Queen's	
S. Staff's	} 7th Division.
Devons	

Despite some hostile shelling of the forward area, the troops reached their assembly positions up to time. Considerable opposition was met with about Polderhoek Chateau and West of Reutel, but the objective was gained throughout the whole line, and the troops detailed for the assault on the further objective were able to reach their jumping off positions up to time.

The I. Anzac Corps attacked in the left centre with troops of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions. The enemy were met with in considerable strength, elements of three Divisions being found formed up ready for an attack on our line which our assault anticipated only by 10 minutes. Very severe casualties were inflicted on the enemy by our barrage and with the bayonet, and the enemy's opposition was quickly overcome. By 8.12 a.m. the whole of the Red Line was reported to be in our hands.

The II. Anzac Corps attacked on the left with the 3rd Australian Division on the right and the New Zealand Division on the left. The New Zealand Division was intermittently shelled throughout the night causing some casualties. The support line of the 3rd Australian Division was also intermittently shelled and at 5.30 a.m. the enemy opened a barrage on our front line. Nevertheless our assault was launched punctually to time and by 9.14. a.m. both Divisions had reported the capture of the whole of the Red Line, and many German prisoners were already being sent back.

At 8.10 a.m., after a halt of from one to two hours on the Red Line, the assault was launched on the Blue Line, viz. :—

Reutel—Judge Copse—Joiners Rest—Noordemhoek—Celtic Farm, West edge of Daisy Wood—Tyne Cottage—Berlin Wood—Kronprinz Farm.

The X. Corps on the Right employed troops of the following Regiments :—

E. Yorks.	} 21st Division.
Northumberland Fusrs.	
Lincolns	
Manchesters	
Queens	} 7th Division.
Gordons	
Borders	

The I. Anzac Corps attacked in the Centre, and the II. Anzac Corps attacked on the Left with Australian and New Zealand troops.

The enemy offered a stubborn resistance, but by 12.20 p.m. the I. Anzac Corps reported the capture of the whole of their final objective and the II. Anzac Corps reported similarly at 1.15 p.m. The 7th Division, X Corps, reached practically the whole of their final objective and probably the 21st Division also, but the situation of the right brigade of this Division in Reutel was at all times somewhat obscure.

During the day the enemy delivered no less than 10 counter-attacks.

Five counter-attacks were made against the right brigade of the 5th Division between the Menin Road and Polderhoek Chateau and two attacks against the left brigade of the 21st Division on the Judge Copse Spur North of Reutel. These attacks appear to have been successfully repulsed. A further attack, however, succeeded in dislodging us from Judge Copse, Reutel, and Polderhoek Chateau, and at the end of the day our line ran along the western and northern edges of Polderhoek Chateau Wood, the eastern edge of Cameron Covert, on the western outskirts of Reutel, through J 11 central to the Broodseinde—Becelaere Road at point J 6 c 1.0.

Further North, a concentration of the enemy's infantry in D 30 a during the afternoon was dispersed by our artillery.

At 2.35 p.m. the enemy made a determined attack in three waves from the direction of the Cemetery in D 17 a, North of Ypres—Roulers Railway, but this attack was broken up by our artillery, rifle and machine gun fire. A second attack was similarly dealt with, and a concentration in D 4 b and D 5 a, West of Passchendaele, about noon was broken up by our artillery before any counter-attack from this direction could materialize. Several S.O.S. signals were sent up at various points of the front at 7 p.m. and during the night of 4th–5th October, but the enemy made no further attacks and the consolidation of our line proceeded satisfactorily.

On the greater part of our front the enemy offered a stubborn resistance and the large proportion of bayonet wounds among the German prisoners testifies to the severity of the hand to hand conflict which took place on many parts of the front, and in which our troops again proved their superiority. In places, however, the Germans surrendered freely, an Australian Officer capturing 31 prisoners single-handed from one blockhouse, and the garrison of another blockhouse surrendered with three machine guns as soon as our attack was launched.

The enemy Order of Battle on the Second Army front of attack from North to South was as follows —

10th Ersatz Division, 20th Division, 4th Guard Division, one Regiment of 45th Reserve Division, one or more Battalions of 16th Division, 19th Reserve Division, 8th Division.

As a result of recent operations it is estimated that seven Battalions of each of the 4th Guard and 19th Reserve Divisions; six Battalions each of the 10th Ersatz and 20th Divisions; five Battalions of the 45th Reserve Division; four Battalions of the 8th Division and three Battalions of the 16th Division have all suffered so heavily as to be of little further fighting value. The thickening up of the line by the bringing in of Battalions and Regiments of other Divisions, the confusion of units and the lack of cohesion in the counter-attacks proves how completely our former attacks have disorganized the enemy and with what haste he has been compelled to throw in his reinforcements. The enemy situation has not been improved by the severe losses which he incurred on 4th October.

In spite of very unfavourable weather on the day of attack, our aeroplanes succeeded in carrying out several contact patrols and flash reconnaissances and in attacking enemy troops and transport with machine gun fire. One enemy aircraft was brought down by Lewis gun fire on the I. Anzac Corps front.

Seven field guns, several trench mortars and a large number of machine guns have been captured.

The total number of prisoners who passed through Corps Cages and Casualty Clearing Stations from 6 p.m., 3rd October, to 6 p.m., 6th October was 114 officers and 4,044 other ranks.

W. ROBERTSON, Lieut.-Col.,

6th October, 1917.

General Staff, Second Army.

No. 3

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECRET.

SECOND ARMY.

FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS,

26th Sept. and 4th Oct., 1917.

Tactical.

1. The increased use of the rifle has been a feature of the recent fighting.

So far as it has been possible to obtain an estimate, Battalions which had the most fighting used about 70 rounds per rifle and 25 magazines per Lewis Gun. In one Brigade Sector where 580 German dead were buried, it was noticed that most of them had been killed by rifle or Machine Gun fire.

2. Stokes Mortars pushed forward with the attack were found of value on at least two occasions when strong points had to be captured. On the two occasions referred to, bursts were obtained just outside the door of the dug-out and the inmates then surrendered. Direct hits on the dug-out itself had no effect.

3. The principle of allotting one Battalion in a Brigade to one objective and making this Unit responsible for clearing its own area and consolidating in depth was found to work well, as there was not the same risk of confusion arising as there is when more than one have to attack the same objective. Provided the width of front allotted to a Brigade is not too great, this plan appears to be most satisfactory.

Equipment.

1. Smoke Rifle Grenades were not extensively used. There is no doubt that they may be very useful, but it is essential that a certain number should be available for training men in their use while they are out of the line.

2. Very little use was found for Mills' Grenades except to bomb an occasional "pill box." One bomb per man would appear sufficient in the present form of fighting.

3. Hales rifle grenades were found very useful, especially where the enemy used machine gun fire from the roof of a dug-out or "pill box."

4. It is generally agreed that the new S.O.S. rifle grenade is the best thing of its kind that has been issued.

5. In some units as many as 220 rounds S.A.A. per man were carried in the attack. It is calculated that an extra 50 rounds per rifle are required and should be sent up early on the night of the Attack Day to forward dumps.

In addition, about 300 rounds per Stokes Mortar are required in forward dumps.

Communications.

1. Visual was largely used and the Lucas Lamp was very successful.

2. Lines were difficult to maintain, and the expenditure of cable was considerable.

3. Runner Routes were marked by flags at 100 yards interval but it was found that this distance was too great and the flags were knocked down. White tape was also used and found of great assistance. A combination of white tape and flags is suggested.

4. Relay posts were not always satisfactory owing to their being manned by men of different units. It might be preferable to make each unit responsible for manning relay posts in its own area and getting back all messages from the front through them.

5. Pigeons were very largely used and generally successful. The pigeon message map was found to be a considerable help.

Artillery.

1. One Brigade only, found the barrage rather too slow. It is sometimes difficult for the Infantry to know where the barrage is when the shrapnel is bursting high and there are few, if any, ground bursts.

2. The smoke barrage, to mark the objective, was most useful. It should be made slightly thicker and it is suggested that it might be possible to employ coloured smoke for the purpose.

Approach March.

In some formations where unexpected obstacles were met, there was a danger of troops not reaching their Assembly Positions in time. An average rate of even $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour is only possible if the going is good. Wherever possible, duckboards should be covered with wire netting. Slippery duckboards are a hindrance more than a help.

Assembly Positions.

Where tapes are used to mark assembly positions, some mark should be put on the tapes to distinguish between the various lines, e.g. :—

- 1st Line—Attach small pieces of wood.
- 2nd Line—Attach wire rings.
- 3rd Line—Knots in the tape, etc., etc.

C. H. HARINGTON, *Major-General,**General Staff, Second Army.*

12th October, 1917.

1st ANZAC No: G.130/174.

SECRET.

2nd Army,

G.796

14th October, 1917.

~~Reference~~ Second Army printed Notes on Operations,
No. 3, 26th September to 4th October : -

Artillery.

The sentence: "It is sometimes difficult for the
Infantry to know where the barrage is when the shrapnel is
bursting high and there are few, if any, ground bursts",
should be deleted.

This was a comment by one Brigade only and is in
no way universal.

(Sgd.) C.H. HARRINGTON,
M.G.G.S., Second Army.

SECOND ARMY—SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

During Period 5th October to 12th October, 1917.

The Battle of Broodseinde on 4th October appears to have inflicted such heavy losses on the enemy and to have so disorganised his artillery that the succeeding days passed uneventfully.

The 5th October passed comparatively quietly. The enemy shelled our front line and support area about Reutel, but our artillery twice caught the enemy massing apparently for a counter-attack and no infantry action followed. Our front line on the Broodseinde Ridge was heavily shelled at dusk, the fire coming from both flanks. Gas cylinders were projected into the enemy's trenches about Frelinghien.

On the night 5th-6th October a hostile raid against one of our posts South of Hollebeke was repulsed by Lewis gun and rifle fire and by bombs.

At 3 p.m. on the 6th October the enemy opened a heavy barrage on the area West of Clapham Junction, Torr Top and Mount Sorrel and about Larch Wood, apparently in the hope of catching our artillery on the move to more forward positions. Elsewhere the enemy's artillery activity was below normal.

Amongst many valuable documents and maps captured during the Battle of Broodseinde there fell into our hands a Brigade Order of the 5th Guards Infantry Brigade, showing that the enemy realised that the policy of counter-attack which they had practiced throughout the whole of the operations at Ypres this year have been not only fruitless but costly. It was now proposed to hold the front line in much greater strength, not less than half the regiment being in the front line. From subsequent events it was found that this order came from the Higher Command and was already being put into effect.

As a result of our operations on the 4th October the prisoners who passed through Corps cages and C.C.S. between 6 p.m., 3rd October, and 6 p.m., 6th October, totalled 117 Officers and 4,035 Other Ranks.

On the night 6th-7th October, Australian troops raided the enemy's position opposite Celtic Wood, 1,200 yards South-East of Broodseinde, and captured 12 prisoners and a machine gun. About 20 Germans were killed, many were wounded and the remainder ran away.

At 5 a.m., 7th October, the enemy bombarded our line in Cameron Covert, South-West of Reutel, and was seen advancing to the attack. His assault, however, was broken up by artillery, machine gun and rifle fire, and failed to reach our lines.

During the day hostile artillery shelled our positions about Broodseinde, and directed bursts of fire on the Westhoek, Sanctuary Wood and Hill 60 areas. S.O.S. was sent up on the greater part of our battle front in reply to a heavy enemy barrage. Hostile infantry advanced in strength. At 5.30 p.m. the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the greater part of our battle front and advanced to the attack in some strength against our positions about Reutel. The enemy were beaten off by our artillery and rifle fire, leaving two prisoners in our hands. No infantry attack was made against the remainder of our front, and, except for considerable hostile artillery activity, the night of the 7th-8th October passed uneventfully.

On the 8th October the enemy confined his attention to a bombardment of our battle front and of the ground about Frezenburg, Hooze and Clapham Junction. At 4 p.m. the enemy barraged our front and support lines from North of the Ypres-Roulers Railway to South of Broodseinde. At the same time his aeroplanes appeared in large numbers and our airmen reported that the Menin-Gheluwe Road was crowded with troops and transport. This was dealt with by our artillery, and our counter batteries opened fire. The situation then quietened down and the enemy made no attempt to attack.

The assembling of our troops during the night 8th-9th October was attended with considerable difficulty. The ground was very heavy owing to heavy rain having fallen intermittently since the afternoon of the 4th October, and the night up till 11 p.m. was exceptionally dark. No interference, however, was encountered from hostile artillery fire, and at 5.20 a.m. on the 9th October our attack was successfully launched.

The X. Corps undertook a subsidiary operation on the right to improve the line we had gained on the 4th instant. Troops from the following regiments took part in the initial assault:—

Cheshires	} 5th Division
Warwicks	
Warwicks	} 7th Division.
H.A.C.	

The I. Anzac Corps formed the right flank of the main attack and employed troops of the 2nd Australian Division.

The II. Anzac Corps were the left flank Corps of the Second Army; troops of Fifth Army attacking on their left. The II. Anzac Corps employed troops from the following regiments in the initial assault:—

Lancs. Fusiliers	} 66th Division
Manchesters	
E. Lancs.	
York & Lancs.	} 49th Division.
K.O.Y.L.I.	
W. Yorks	

APPENDIX G

The attack by the 5th Division, X. Corps, on Polderhoek Chateau met with considerable opposition. Hostile machine guns came into operation, and but little progress was made. The 7th Division, however, on the left, attained practically all their objectives, capturing the remainder of Reutel and getting a footing in Judge Copse. The line was held in spite of considerable machine gun fire from the South and East, and has been consolidated.

Between the subsidiary and the main attack, the 1st Australian Division, unwilling not to take part in the battle and taking advantage of the barrage, raided Celtic Wood (North-East of Molenaarelsthoek) and advancing over 500 yards almost reached the eastern outskirts of the wood. Here the enemy were found holding a trench in strength, and fierce hand to hand fighting took place. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy at small cost to ourselves.

The 2nd Australian Division met with considerable opposition in Daisy Wood, North-East of Broodseinde, but swept round it and eventually mopped it up. At the end of the day our line ran East of Daisy Wood, Dairy Wood and Neuwemolen to the level crossing at D 17 b 4.3.

The II. Anzac Corps with the 66th and 49th Divisions met with considerable machine gun fire from isolated positions, and at one time were reported to have reached their final objectives. It is not yet clear whether the flares seen by our Contact aeroplanes were lit by the enemy in order to mislead, or whether small parties of our men actually reached this line but were too isolated and weak in numbers to be able to retain the positions they had won. Both Divisions however succeeded in capturing and holding a large number of fortified farms and buildings and in establishing a line along the whole front 500 yards East of the line from which they had started. At the end of the day our line ran from the level crossing at D 17 b 4.3, through Keerselaarhoek and Marsh Bottom to the western edge of the Cemetery in D 3 b.

With the exception of one local counter-attack which was easily repulsed, the enemy made no attempt to dislodge us from the positions we had won, and the consolidation of our new line proceeded satisfactorily. We captured four Officers and 310 other ranks in these operations.

On October 10th the enemy shelled the Broodseinde Ridge heavily, and also barraged the area about Hooge.

During the night 10th-11th we completed the relief of the troops who took part in the assault of the 9th October, the 14th and 23rd Divisions relieving the 5th and 7th Divisions on the front of the X. Corps, the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions relieving the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions on the front of the I. Anzac Corps, and the 3rd Australian and the New Zealand Divisions relieving the 66th and 49th Divisions on the front of the II. Anzac Corps.

The enemy's artillery shelled the front areas of our two northern Corps somewhat heavily at intervals during the night 11th-12th October, using a large number of gas shells on the area astride the Ypres-Roulers Railway and on Westhoek Ridge. This, together with the muddy ground and a very wet, dark night, made the assembling of our troops a matter of considerable difficulty. All our troops, however, reached their jumping off positions up to time, and at 5.25 a.m., 12th October, the I. and II. Anzac Corps, consisting entirely of Australian and New Zealand troops advanced to the assault. Hostile machine guns immediately opened heavy fire, and it was found that new apron wire had been erected round several of the enemy's strong points and "pill boxes." Our troops progressed satisfactorily up several of the spurs, but a strong point about Bellevue succeeded in checking our advance at this spot. The valleys proved impassable after the heavy rain owing to the mud, which also delayed and tired out our troops in their further progress on the higher slopes. Eventually our advance was brought to a standstill, and a line was consolidated slightly in advance of that from which the attack started.

During the 48 hours ending 6 p.m., 13th October, 25 Officers and 514 other ranks of the enemy passed through our Corps Cages and Casualty Clearing Stations as prisoners of war.

W. ROBERTSON, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
General Staff, Second Army.

13th October, 1917.

SECRET.

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECOND ARMY.**Further Notes on Training and Preparation
for Offensive Operations.**

In continuation of "Notes on Training for Offensive Operations" issued by Second Army, the Army Commander directs that special attention be given to the following points:—

Disposition in Depth both for Attack and Defence.

It must be explained to all ranks why depth of formation is essential and what it means and what it involves.

In the task before us we shall encounter opposition in depth from the enemy, from defensive positions in shell-holes, strong points, etc., and from counter-attacks gradually increasing in strength as we advance, and to deal with these our plan is to have sufficient men and allow ample time to clear each area included in our advances, and successive bodies of fresh troops as supports and reserves well forward to meet the counter-attacks.

To be able to carry out this plan successfully, every commander of supporting troops must know the position and situation of the troops which he is supporting and must utilise every means at his disposal to do this.

It must be explained to all front line troops that supporting troops are behind them and getting gradually nearer, so as to assist them at once to destroy any enemy counter-attacks if necessary, and not only officers but N.C.O's. and private soldiers must be kept informed of the situation.

So long as formations are kept intelligently in depth and men realise the superior power which their rifles and machine guns give them against enemy counter-attacks, they are in a position to inflict far-reaching destruction on the enemy.

They should understand that there is no danger if there are "gaps" in the line or if troops on their flanks are temporarily checked. The supporting troops will quickly remedy this provided every unit, however small, clings tenaciously to every point they have gained until their arrival.

Although troops following a barrage have to move slowly they must be trained to act quickly when occasion arises.

Troops for the initial stage, *i.e.*, the capture of the First Objective, should be lightly equipped, and careful training and practice is necessary to ensure that all attacking troops get started inside the enemy barrage.

Similarly when enemy "strong points" are encountered, these must be dealt with at once and without hesitation. Delay may be fatal.

"Consolidation" should always be in depth.

10th September, 1917.

C. H. HARINGTON, Major-General,
General Staff, Second Army.

No. 4.

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

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SECOND ARMY.

Further Notes on Operations.

The changes in the enemy's defensive tactics, viz., a concentration of machine guns and a stronger system of defence generally in the forward areas, necessitate some modifications in our methods of attack :—

(i.) There must be a more systematic artillery bombardment of the forward areas than there has been hitherto.

(ii.) The protective barrages, after the objectives have been reached, must not be stationary, but must sweep forward and return to take on the infantry at the appointed time.

(iii.) Machine guns must be specially placed to deal with defended localities in co-operation with the artillery.

(iv.) It will probably not be necessary to increase the strength of the first waves of the assaulting troops, but there must be a large proportion of moppers, carefully organized and distributed, and supports and reserves must be well closed up.

(v.) The condition of the ground of itself limits the depth of the objective.

15th October, 1917.

C. H. HARINGTON, Major-General,
General Staff, Second Army.

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APPENDIX G
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No. 5.

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

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Second Army.

FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS.

1. Pace of Barrage.

Where the going is heavy, as has been the case of late, a rate of 100^x in 8 minutes has been found about correct.

2. Use of Grenades, etc.

Hand and rifle grenades have on the whole taken a minor place in the operations, but whenever resistance on the part of the enemy was determined they were immediately required. Rifle grenades have been especially useful where a flank becomes exposed, in clearing snipers from shell holes, etc.

Another instance is quoted of where they were used to prevent the enemy from digging in near the line on which our troops were consolidating.

The value of the No. 27 Grenade has been further proved for masking the advance of troops on a strong point.

3. Supplies of S.A.A., Grenades, etc.

(a) Instances of a shortage of S.A.A. occurred, but this was sometimes due to uneven distribution, and a suggestion is made that coloured or marked sandbags containing 250 rounds each should be used.

(b) The value of keeping forward dumps of S.A.A. and grenades away from other dumps was amply demonstrated. Large dumps or ones which were constantly used were eventually spotted and shelled, and the ammunition, etc., lost.

4. Machine Guns.

Further stress is laid on the necessity of providing some cover for belt filling.

Over heavy ground, in order to lighten the carrying, ammunition boxes were opened and the contents carried forward in bandoliers.

5. Snipers.

Evidence shows that more use might be made of snipers with telescopic sights. Many opportunities presented themselves and might have been taken advantage of by men well placed on commanding ground, in positions which can be selected beforehand.

6. Communications.

The positions of all H.Q. must be fixed as early as possible in order to permit of the best arrangements for communication being made, and once fixed they should not be moved without very good reason.

In all cases where the positions of the stations admit of it, communication should be opened at least on the day previous to the attack, if not sooner.

During recent operations runners were found to be practically the only means of communication in front of Advanced Brigade H.Q.

The clear marking of all H.Q. and routes for runners still require more attention.

7. Roads and Tracks.

Permanent maintenance parties are required for duck board tracks in forward areas. Unless they are in good repair they seriously hamper movement in the dark.

Very careful arrangements, supervised by Officers and N.C.Os. capable of enforcing their orders, are required for traffic control.

Boarded tracks and roads should have a riband on the outer edge to prevent men and vehicles slipping off into the deep mud.

Mule tracks must be separate from foot tracks. Duck boards are frequently damaged by the passage of pack animals alongside them.

8. Date of Assembly.

In cases where the approach to the assembly position is liable to become excessively difficult in the event of bad weather, it would seem advisable to reduce the number of troops to be moved up on the last night to the lowest number possible by taking over the trenches on the previous night and closing up the remainder of the assaulting Brigades into whatever cover is available.

20th October, 1917.

C. H. HARINGTON, Major-General,
General Staff, Second Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Enemy's Probable Intentions for Defence & Counter-attack Between Gheluvelt and Passchendaele.

General.

The accompanying "Hostile Counter-Attack Map" has been prepared to indicate the Enemy's Probable Reserve Positions and Counter-Attacks during forthcoming operations which form the Sixth and subsequent phases of the offensive now in progress East of Ypres.

The map has been prepared mainly from a study of the Enemy's policy of defence as disclosed by documents and sketches captured in recent operations, more especially since 1st October, at which time he made radical changes in his methods. This information has been augmented by prisoners' statements and actual knowledge (by aerial and ground reconnaissance) of his movements during our operations of the 9th and 12th instant, as well as by detailed study of aeroplane photographs and of the changes in the grouping of the enemy's artillery.

During our operations of September the enemy's policy of defence was well established as being that of holding the front line system thinly and counter-attacking with local reserves a few hours after zero following with more powerful counter-attacks from 6 to 10 hours after zero by forces brought up from rear positions of concentration (see Memo. "The Enemy's Tactical Methods East of Ypres," September, 16th).

About 1st October, however, the radical changes in the defence policy adopted by the enemy—subsequently disclosed by captured documents—consisted mainly in crowding troops into his front line system and endeavouring to stop our attack at the outset and to counter-attack with powerful forces at a later stage should deep penetration occur. This new policy adopted before our attack on Broodseinde Ridge on the 4th instant, resulted on that occasion in very great losses to him in both casualties and prisoners, and in the subsequent attacks of the 9th and 12th the same thing occurred but in a lesser degree.

The New Defence Policy.

It is to be expected that the enemy will still adhere to this new policy, and in fact all his action during the past fortnight indicates his development of it along lines which now appear well defined.

That he has chosen to crowd his front line system full of troops and machine guns and to oppose our advance as far forward as possible at the outset undoubtedly imposes on his forward troops quite as great a responsibility for local counter-attack as they had under the former policy when he held his front line thinly. Not only are the rear Battalions of the front line regiments to be pushed closer up previous to our attack, but they are told that they must counter-attack more quickly, before we are organized for defence. They are further told that they must "clearly understand that in the fight for its position" they "can only very seldom count on the support of the counter-attack divisions."

Thus, the enemy's evident intention is to hold us up entirely within "the forward battle line by the rapid fire of machine guns, rifles and trench mortars" while we are attacking and bringing up our succeeding waves, and to do this he will throw in all his support and reserve battalions without delay automatically from their positions of readiness in the hope of catching our attack while it "is still on the move."

The effect of this policy is admittedly to draw in all the support and reserve battalions of the front line divisions immediately we attack and commit them unreservedly in an effort to stop our advance near the front line.

Assuming that his support battalions are about 1,200 yards behind the line, and that—as appears common throughout the new scheme—the reserve battalions are 2,500 to 3,500 yards, it is reasonable to expect that, given a fair start, the rearward battalions might get up to a line, say, at about 1,500 yards on which to meet our advance after it has passed through the support battalions which are presumed to have been engaged at, say, 700 or 800 yards. While these dispositions and the action of the enemy's troops are, of course, dependent on the tactical value of the ground, it may, in most cases, be assumed that after, say, a mile has been gained by our advance all of the enemy's immediate reserves have been drawn in, and no more are apparently available without making use of what he formerly called the Counter-Attack Division.

It is true that the enemy recognises the danger of this possible zone temporarily depleted of troops, and has provided for it to some extent by having "in addition further reserves . . . in rear of these which, however, must not be engaged . . . unless the enemy . . . penetrates deeply into our positions," and that these reserves will be taken from the Counter-Attack Divisions. The use of these subsidiary reserves (Regimental Groups) must depend on the enemy's appreciation of (1) the location of our limited objective, and (2) the rate of our advance. On the former will depend the decision as to whether he will require to employ these reserves at all during our advance, and on the latter, the time at which he would set them in motion. As both of these are dependent on early information, and as it is likely that the foremost of the subsidiary reserves would be at least 5,000 to 6,000 yards back, it is reasonable to expect that they may not succeed in interfering with our consolidation on the objective, and any hesitancy on the enemy's part as to whether it is a sufficiently deep penetration to warrant throwing fresh troops in will delay their counter-attack to our advantage.

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The Enemy's Intentions.

The enemy's appreciation of the present situation doubtless depends much upon the weather and the state of the ground, and it may be that he does not yet realise how much influence these factors had upon our operations of the 9th and 12th when he presumably had his new defence policy better organised than on the 4th.

On the two recent occasions he had only his local reserves engaged, and the fighting was restricted solely to the front defensive zone of the Division holding the line. The enemy has as yet had no experience in pushing up his regimental groups from his counter-attack divisions and employing them under the new defence policy, but from his experiences in the former operations he knows how difficult it is to advance these troops from their assembly positions in rear in the face of our artillery fire after they have been located by our aerial reconnaissance (see his own reports and divisional orders recently published in the Army Intelligence Summary). Generally speaking, then, the movement and employment of these subsidiary reserves—Regimental Groups in the rear—will, for purposes of counter-attack, be much the same as previously, except in point of time and in the use of their covering artillery. They will doubtless have to advance in the same manner, and will be even more confined to roads or routes known to be passable at this season, and consequently all the more easily discovered.

Probable Counter-Attacks.

The two features of the employment of these main counter-attacking groups which stand out prominently are:—

1. The enemy will not employ them until assured that essential positions are jeopardized by "deep penetration," and if so they will be employed late in the day, say eight or ten hours after zero or next morning.

2. Counter-attacks of this deliberate nature on the afternoon of zero day or later will be supported by a proportion of heavy artillery which will not have been used earlier in the day and which will be moved to temporary positions for the purpose of specially covering the point selected for counter-attack.

On account of the difficulty of determining the positions of our limited objectives sufficiently quickly the enemy will doubtless be at a loss to know whether to put his rear reserves into motion. If he is content to leave the defence solely to the division holding the line he may not use these reserves at all, which is the course he pursued before. On the other hand, there is the possibility that, in at least two places, viz., at Menin Road about Gheluvelt, and at Roulers Railway on Passchendaele Ridge, where the situation is and has always been acute, the enemy may decide to counter-attack heavily as soon as the existing equilibrium is disturbed. As we have had no indications for some time as to the enemy's probable action should we attempt to advance at these two points, and as his rearward positions opposite are still somewhat conjectural owing to the state of the ground, the probability of prompt counter-attacks should be anticipated.

Of the other points where counter-attacks are probable the Meetcheele Spur about Goudberg (North of Passchendaele), seems likely, and the Becelaere area possible if the enemy still adheres to the views as to the importance of this locality which he held three weeks ago when he counter-attacked here so fiercely.

In all these four cases the approaches for both reserve battalions and regimental groups appear reasonably possible so far as the ground and its state are concerned. Approaches and assembly and deployment positions are now much restricted and will be even more so if the weather should become unfavourable again in the interval.

It is to be expected that the enemy will make much more use of his artillery to support counter-attacks, and if he did not fully employ his heavy artillery on the 9th and 12th it must be expected that after a fortnight of rearrangement he will have worked out and organized a more comprehensive scheme to secure the co-operation which was lacking on previous occasions. On the other hand, if ground conditions become worse, it is likely that he will not be able to employ and concentrate more of his reserve heavy artillery than that in the sector attacked. While there are no definite indications it is obvious that he has lately re-organized his wireless control of artillery fire to a greater extent than in previous intervals between the battles, and if registrations are a criterion more fire may be expected upon selected areas of assembly and approach.

With reference to the disposition of counter-attack groups which have been worked out on the map, five divisions are indicated though it does not follow that all may be present. It will be noticed that there is a distinct concentration about Moorslede; this has appeared likely not only from prisoners' statements but from analysis of captured documents and of the enemy's policy as applied to the present tactical situation about the Passchendaele Ridge.

The foregoing notes are put forward to assist Commanders and Staffs in the study of the enemy's methods and for the purpose of bringing to attention the features of the enemy's policy and forecasting what he may possibly do.

Second Army Intelligence,

24th October, 1917.

C. H. MITCHELL, Lieut.-Col., G.S.,

for Major-General, G.S., Second Army.

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECRET.

SECOND ARMY

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, during the period 12th October to 25th October, and on 26th October, 1917.

After the operations of the 12th October had ceased there was no further change in the situation until the morning of the 26th. Close touch has been maintained with the enemy everywhere except on part of the front of the I. Anzac Corps, where the Germans have evacuated some low-lying ground South of the Ypres—Roulers Railway.

Patrols have located the enemy on a line through Decline Wood and the western slopes of the Keiberg Ridge. Thence probably through E 19 c to Anvil Wood in D 30 a.

Every effort has been made to organise the captured battle ground for further offensive operations.

The Canadian Corps relieved the II. Anzac Corps in the line opposite Passchendaele.

Roads and railways were pushed forward to the utmost. Guns were moved up and dumps formed in the forward area.

Our artillery endeavoured to keep down the enemy's fire by intense counter-battery work. The enemy's communications were harassed by day and by night. His defensive works were subjected to destructive shoots, and his shell-hole system was swept by preparatory barrages.

During the period under consideration the enemy has adopted a very aggressive artillery policy. His guns were not disorganised by our attack on the 12th to the same extent as they had been by previous attacks, with the result that the artillery battle was more quickly resumed.

Every effort has been made to destroy our batteries and prevent our guns being moved forward. The enemy's area shooting reached a maximum on the 16th and was general along the whole battle front, but was particularly heavy East and South-East of Zillebeke.

This taken in conjunction with the barraging of our forward areas in the battle zone, on the mornings of the 17th and 18th, indicates that the enemy was expecting to be attacked on one of the latter dates.

Since the 18th instant, the enemy has continued to shell our battery areas and harass our communications.

On the occasion of the combined attack by the First French Army and the Fifth Army on our left, on the 22nd instant, the enemy appears to have thought an attack was also developing against Gheluvelt. This was probably due to our extending the Fifth Army barrage, and to the fact that a small party of our men attempted to raid a "pill-box" near the Menin Road under cover of this barrage. As a result the X. Corps area was very heavily shelled throughout the 22nd instant.

In spite of adverse weather conditions the R.F.C. carried out much artillery co-operation, photography and reconnaissance work.

The enemy's aircraft has been unusually active especially in the forward area, both dropping bombs and making reconnaissance and artillery flights, and occasionally firing on our troops.

In addition to the 25 officers and 514 other ranks reported captured up to 6 p.m. 13th October, 92 other ranks have passed through Corps Cages or Casualty Clearing Stations up to 6 p.m., 24th October. The greater number of these have come in as small parties of men who had lost their way, in many cases more or less intentionally.

OPERATIONS ON THE 26th OCTOBER.

Our troops having been successfully assembled without serious interference by the enemy an attack was launched at 5.40 a.m. on the fronts of the X. and Canadian Corps.

On the X. Corps front, the 5th Division attacked the Polderhoek Wood and Chateau and made connection with the 7th Division, who attacked the village of Gheluvelt. The 5th Division, with troops of the Warwickshire and Royal West Kent Regiments, succeeding in capturing the Polderhoek Wood and Chateau, the enemy's garrison of the latter being found to be about 200 men.

The Right Brigade of the 7th Division, consisting of troops of the Queen's, South Staffs. and Manchester Regiments, was checked at the start by strong points about Lewis House, J 21 d, and Berry Cotts, J 27 a. This enabled the enemy to bring enfilade machine gun and rifle fire to bear on the troops of the Left Brigade of the 7th Division as they advanced along the Menin Road on Gheluvelt village.

In spite of this, and the very great difficulty of movement owing to the muddy state of the ground, a mixed force of Borderers, Manchesters and Gordons succeeded in penetrating into Gheluvelt village.

There they were violently counter-attacked, and as their rifles and Lewis guns were, by that time, choked with mud they were forced to retire to their original line. The enemy followed them as far as the line of the tramway cutting in J 22 a and b.

During the above operations the enemy maintained heavy machine gun fire on our front of attack, and inter-communication of any kind was rendered most difficult.

At about 5 p.m. the enemy launched a powerful counter-attack against our new positions on the Polderhoek Spur. After heavy fighting our troops were driven from the Polderhoek Wood and finally evacuated Polderhoek Chateau and retired to our original front line.

The Canadian Corps attacked with one Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division on the Right, and two Brigades of the 3rd Canadian Division on the Left. A Brigade of the 1st Australian Division of I. Anzac Corps supported their flank on the Ypres—Roulers Railway, and the 63rd Division continued the attack on their Left.

The 4th Canadian Division obtained all their objectives, and, pushing on, established posts 100 yards South-West of Deck Wood, D 11 b 8.3, whence heavy machine gun fire was reported.

The 1st Australian Division captured Decline Wood, so securing the Right flank of the attack.

The 3rd Canadian Division launched their attack successfully, but the Right Brigade was held up by machine gun fire from the "pill-boxes" on the road across the top of the Bellevue Spur. This Brigade was therefore obliged to fall back to its original line.

Meanwhile, the Left Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division reached its first objective, but was unable to advance further as both flanks were unsupported.

At 3 p.m. the right of the 4th Canadian Division was in touch with the Australians at Decline Copse, whence the line ran to D 11 d 9.0—along the Passchendaele—Broodseinde Road to D 12 c 3.7—with posts about D 12 c 80.75; thence across the road at D 12 a 5.1—South end of Deck Wood at D 11 b 90.05—D 11 central.

Posts were out in front of this line at D 12 c 3.1 and D 12 c 4.5, and the left flank of the Division had been thrown back in accordance with the situation on the 3rd Canadian Division front.

The line of the 3rd Canadian Division consisted of posts from D 4 d 8.5 to D 4 d 4.7. A line was being consolidated from D 4 b 5.0 and D 4 a 5.8. The left of the Division rested on Source Trench V 28 c 5.4, where touch was gained with the 63rd Division.

By 6 p.m., after recalling the barrage and again attacking with fresh troops, the 3rd Canadian Division had captured the line Lamkeek—Dad trench and the commanding "pill-boxes" on top of the Bellevue Spur.

The position of their left Brigade remained as before.

Two counter-attacks were delivered by the enemy, one against the right Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division at 4 p.m., and a heavy one against the 4th Canadian Division at 4.40 p.m. Both were driven off with loss.

During the course of the night 26th–27th October the Canadians further improved their position by establishing a forward line in the "pill-boxes" along the road from D 4 b 6.2 to the cross roads at D 5 c 1.6.

The weather conditions and the state of the ground had a very great influence on the day's operations.

Two features, apart from exhaustion and the difficulties of movement, seem outstanding;—

- (i.) The mud, in a semi-liquid state and splashed up by shell bursts, got into everything, and was especially troublesome for rifles and machine guns.
- (ii.) The very soft nature of the ground apparently affected the detonation of percussion shells to such an extent that prisoners have on several occasions remarked on the harmlessness of the bursts, or the failure to detonate.

In spite of rain and bad visibility our aeroplanes did useful patrol work, located flashes, sent down zone calls, and fired on ground targets from low altitudes.

Enemy aircraft were below normal. In nine combats one E.A. was shot down, three were driven down out of control, and one of our machines failed to return. One of our machines was also hit by a shell and brought down in our lines.

Up till 6 p.m. on the 27th prisoners passed through Corps Cages and Casualty Clearing Stations numbered 19 Officers and 467 other ranks.

W. ROBERTSON, Lieut.-Colonel,

27th October, 1917.

General Staff, Second Army.

No. 6.

Not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

SECRET.

SECOND ARMY.
FURTHER NOTES ON OPERATIONS.

1. Assembly.—A faster rate of march than one mile per hour cannot be relied on, when moving to assembly positions, under the present wet conditions.

2. Machine Guns.—It is interesting to compare the experiences of two Divisions with Vickers guns sent forward with the assaulting troops.

In one Division ten out of sixteen guns sent forward were put out of action, while in another eight out of ten reached their objectives and were invaluable. It would seem that perhaps the first Division sent too many guns forward, and heavy enemy Artillery fire caused the casualties.

3. Lewis Guns.—The enemy's change of tactics in putting more men into the forward positions has brought out again the value of using the Lewis gun firing from the hip while advancing.

It should not, however, be made a rule, which may lead to unnecessary expenditure of ammunition, but used with discretion as targets offer themselves.

4. Communications.—Great difficulty was found in maintaining the wires in front of cable head.

Visual was always useful especially as the ground on which we are now operating lends itself to its use.

Pigeons were again invaluable. It is worthy of note that in bad weather the pigeons took anything from two to twelve hours to reach their destination, whereas for a slightly longer distance in good weather 35 minutes was the average.

Every effort should be made to bury the Power Buzzer earths. Where this was done they were found to be most valuable.

5. Low Flying Enemy Aeroplanes.—Considerable inconvenience was experienced by the Infantry from low flying enemy aeroplanes on the days subsequent to attack day.

The remedy suggested is a larger issue of tracer bullet ammunition to Vickers and Lewis guns detailed to deal with these low flying planes, and more training in anti-aircraft work.

It is interesting to note that on one of the days referred to above, in one sector of the line alone, eleven out of twelve of our low flying aeroplanes returned considerably damaged by enemy rifle and machine gun fire. We should be able to do the same and more.

6. Dumps and Supplies.—Brigade dumps should be as far forward as possible, but must be in a position which pack animals can reach in daylight.

Instances of shortage of S.A.A. continue to appear, but it is thought that in many cases more use might be made of German rifles and S.A.A., and so save our own.

One hundred and seventy rounds per man are not enough for one day's fighting, and now with the increased use of the rifle, ammunition and water are the two most important things for carriers to take up after an attack.

7. Grenades.—One Division found that accurate shooting up to 65yds. could be made with the No. 24 Rifle Grenade by putting the sights up to 2,000 yards and aiming direct at the object.

8. Training.—The following are some of the points to which it is desired to draw attention when training for future operations:—

Consolidation.—On reaching the objective the men should first of all be disposed in suitable shell hole fire positions to meet a counter-attack.

The men should then at once clean their rifles and Lewis guns to ensure that they are fit for use, and that rapid fire can be opened if necessary.

This is absolutely essential under the present weather conditions, but much of the cleaning can be avoided if muzzle protectors and breech covers are used and properly adjusted.

Only after this has been done should the consolidation proper be undertaken.

Use of Rifle, Lewis Guns, Machine Guns.—The improvement in the use of the rifle has been most marked, but the number of S.O.S. calls sent up point to the fact that still more training is necessary until the men have sufficient confidence in their rifles, machine and Lewis guns to deal with any counter-attack without the help of artillery.

It is worthy of note that during the night following the Canadian Corps attack on 26th October, no S.O.S. call was sent up at all.

Expenditure of Ammunition.—Every endeavour should be made to utilize German rifles and ammunition in order to minimize the expenditure of our own and so save carrying.

Compass.—Reference was made in previous comments to the value of the prismatic compass in keeping direction where darkness or mist make the recognition of landmarks impossible.

Recent operations have emphasized the necessity for training all Officers in the use of compasses.

9. General.—Experience still shows the vital necessity of instilling into all Officers and N.C.Os. the knowledge that provided depth of formation is employed in operations, whether offensive or defensive, they have nothing to fear from "gaps" occurring. Their own weapons are ample security against any such "gaps." Any retirement from ground gained for the above reason is unjustifiable.

Every effort should be made to ensure the presence of a senior officer at hand when important tactical points are gained who should at once take charge of the operations on the spot.

Second Army Headquarters,
27th October, 1917.

F. S. Co.—1394—2500—33-10-17

C. H. HARINGTON, Major-General,
General Staff, Second Army.

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121
(in pads of 100).

No. of Message.....

Prefix.....	Code.....m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of: Service.	Recd. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Sent			Date.....
		At.....m.			From.....
		To.....			By.....
		By.....		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	

TO { 4th and 5th Aust. Divs.

Sender's Number. * G. 961	Day of Month. 1/10	In reply to Number.	AAA
------------------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	-----

I wish to record and to convey to all ranks my appreciation of the work recently done by the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions AAA By their gallantry and steadfastness they have made greater the great tradition established by the Australian Imperial Force.

AAA Added 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.

From General BIRDWOOD.

Place

Time

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.

(Z)

Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name

* This line should be erased if not required.

100,000 Pads. W. 12093. M1217. M.C. & Co., Ltd. 1/17. (E. 764). Forms C/2121/11.

(B 8188) Wt. w. 7496—M857 250,000 Pads. 1/17 H & S (E489.) Forms/C.2123/3.

"A" Form				Army Form C. 2121. (In pads of 100.)			
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.				No. of Message.....			
Prefix.....		Code..... m		Words.....	Charge.....		
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.				<i>This message is on a/c of:</i> <i>Service.</i> (Signature of "Franking Officer.")			
						Sent	
						At..... m.	
						To.....	
				Reed. at..... m			
				Date.....			
				From.....			
				By.....			
TO { 5th Corps.							
Sender's Number.....		Day or Month.....		In reply to Number.....			
* 136		5/10		A A A			
Many thanks for your kind message AAA We look forward to further successes in which we hope to be near our old friends the 5th Corps.							
From.....		I ANZAC					
Place.....		0950					
Time.....							
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.				(Z) [Signature]			
Censor.....				Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.....			
* This line should be erased if not required. (3198.) Wt. W 1295./M 1294. 375,000 Pads. 1/17. H. W. & V., Ltd. (E. 818.)							

Army Form C. 2121.
 (In pads of 100.)

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message.....

Prefix.....	Code.....	m	Words.	Charge.		
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent At.....m. To..... By.....		This message is on a/c of : Service.	Recd. at m. Date..... From..... By.....

TO {

1st Aust. Div.: 2nd Aust. Div.: B.G.H.A.

Sender's Number.
 * **G 137**

Day or Month.
5/10

In reply to Number.
AAA

Again I congratulate you and all ranks most heartily AAA The work of both divisions and the artillery has been beyond praise AAA Added. 1st and 2nd Aust. Divs. and B.G.H.A.

War Diary

From **GENERAL BIRDWOOD**
 Place
 Time **0920**

(Z) **WILLIAM L. ...**

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.
 Censor.

Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

* This line should be erased if not required.
 (3198.) Wt. W 12952/M1294. 375,000 Pads. 1/17. H. W. & V., Ltd. (E. 818.)

1st & 2nd 3 6
4th Sq RSC
~~Yochat~~
B. G. Ha



Dear Sir W. Buntome ⁶

Please accept
congratulations and
wishes from 2nd
Division and all
corps engaged in
success achieved
6-5-41.

Yours sincerely
General Plumer

2nd. Gen. Plumer
M. Gen. Plumer
A. G. Plumer

1
APPENDIX. H

APPENDIX

HEADQUARTERS

1 205

ANZAC

G. 156/38

5

First ANZAC Corps.

9th October, 1917.

2nd Australian Division.

The following letter has been received by the
corps commander from General PLUMER, and is forwarded for
your information and necessary action:

"Please accept congratulations and convey thanks
to 2nd Division, and all troops engaged, on success
achieved to-day."

Am Rose

Brigadier-General,
General Staff,
First ANZAC Corps.

Copy to -

1st Australian Division.
4th Squadron, R.F.C.
B.G., H.A.

War Diary

HEADQUARTERS

I ANZAC.

G. 126/40

No. Date.

First ANZAC Corps,

24th October, 1917.

O.C., 1st Canadian Tunnelling Coy.

I desire to tender to the officers, n.c.o's. and men of the 1st Canadian Tunnelling Coy. my appreciation of the assistance provided by them in effecting the important and essential work of road construction in this Corps Area.

The help furnished by the 1st Canadian Tunnelling Coy. has been invaluable and the cheerful and wholehearted manner in which the duty was undertaken were most praiseworthy. The Coy. have earned the gratitude of the whole Corps and I am forwarding copy of this letter to the Controller of Mines, Second Army, in order that the good work done may be recorded.

(Sgd) W R Kidwood

Lieutenant-General,
Commanding First ANZAC Corps.

Ga AOR
A Q Tal

G

(Copy to Controller of Mines
Second Army.).

? War Diary

G.
First ANZAC Corps,

26th October, 1917.

No 126/44
Date

8

1st Australian Division.

I am directed by the Corps Commander to convey to you, the Brigadier-General commanding 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, and the officers and men concerned his appreciation of the excellent and successful operation carried out this morning.

Despite the most trying difficulties the 1st Australian Division has again showed how completely they are to be relied upon to carry out successfully whatever is ordered.

CM
Brigadier-General,
General Staff,
First ANZAC Corps.

*Ga Amb
AQ Ral
War Diary*

- 2 -

AMMUNITION.

7. Group Commanders will see that the following ammunition is with each battery in addition to the amount to be used in creeping barrage which will be at the rate of 3000 rounds per gun per hour.
- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Creeping barrage M. guns | reserve of 2000 rounds per gun. |
| S.O.S. barrage M. guns | " " " " |
| Switch M. guns | " " " " |

CASUALTIES.

8. Casualties to guns and material will be made good from divisional dumps to be formed by D.M.G.O's and notified to all concerned.

GROUP COMMANDERS
AND D.M.G.O's.

9. Positions for as laid down in M.G. Instructions No. 2 Series No. 2.

RELIEF.

10. The personnel of all guns will stand by until relieved; times for relief will be notified later.

SPARE PARTS.

11. The first aid cases only to be taken to gun positions, all other spare parts to be left with Group Commanders or at divisional dump.

Distribution -

Copy No. 1	D.M.G.O. 1/Aust Div
2	D.M.G.O. 2/Aust Div
3	D.M.G.O. 4/Aust Div
4	D.M.G.O. 5/Aust Div
5	G.O.C.R.A.
6	B.G.H.A.
7	A.D.Signals
8-10	C.M.G.O.
11-20	G.S.
21	War Diary
22	Filo

L75Hore
Lieut-Colonel.
C.M.G.O.
First ANZAC Corps.

1
SECRET.



210
APPENDIX 3

18
Copy No.....

1st ANZAC Corps.
Headquarters.
5th October, 1917.
2

M. G. INSTRUCTIONS No. 3.

SERIES No. 3.

1. M. Guns and personnel of the 4th and 5th Australian Division will be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity to M. Gun Corps Camp BELGIAN CHATEAU where they will come under the control of their respective Divisions.
2. The six barrage M. Guns belonging to 2nd Australian Division now employed as special target M. Guns will be withdrawn to the above Camp on 6th October after 8.30 a.m. when they will come under the control of the 2nd Australian Division.
3. The remaining S.O.S. Barrage M. Guns of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions will not be withdrawn for the present but their personnel will be relieved as far as possible by their respective D. M. G. O's.
4. D. M. G. O's 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions will ensure that the whole of the present S.O.S. line is covered.

L. S. Hore

Lt-Colonel.
C. M. G. O.
1st ANZAC Corps.

Distribution :-

Copy No. 1 D. M. G. O., 1st Aust. Division. No. 5-7 C.M.G.O.
2. D. M. G. O., 2nd Aust. Division. No. 8 to 17 G.S.
3 D. M. G. O., 4th Aust. Division. No. 19 War Diary.
4 D. M. G. O., 5th Aust. Division. No. 18 File.

1
SECRET.



APPENDIX
211

Copy No. 20

1st ANZAC Corps.
Headquarters.
5th October, 1917.

M. G. INSTRUCTIONS No. 1.

Series No. IV.

(3)

1. The role of M. Guns for the 4th Operation is -

- (i) To keep down hostile fire from the KEIBERG SPUR
- (ii) To repel enemy counter-attacks from the East.

2. These two objects can be obtained by both direct and indirect fire.

3. The M. G's of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions being required to act solely with their Divisions, the number of M.Guns which can be supplied from the Companies at present forming the barrage groups is limited.

4. More work will therefore fall on the mobile machine guns and the general scheme for M.G. tasks must be framed according .

5. The following distribution of M.Guns for the 4th operation will be made.

Left Division. 1 group of 6 M.Guns to be emplaced in the vicinity of M D to fire on target M.D and to be timed in relation to Infantry advance. These will be drawn from the present mobile M. Guns.

1 group of 6 M.Guns to be emplaced in the vicinity of MG . to fire on target MG as above will be drawn from the present mobile M. Guns.

Right Division. 1 group of 6 M.Guns to be emplaced in the vicinity of MB to fire on target MB. These will be drawn from the present mobile M.Guns.

1 group of 6 M.Guns to be emplaced in the vicinity of MA to fire on target MA. These will be drawn from the present mobile M.Guns.

6. The above groups need not be in the exact positions indicated, but in their places in the line, so long as

(1) they can fire safely on the target given

(2) their fire is coordinated by the D.M.G.O. to ensure the whole Spur being covered with fire and that any timing necessary is correctly done.

7. The remaining mobile guns should cover all approaches from the East and search the Southern portion of the Spur especially the valley in E. 19. b.

2.

3

6 from 1st Aust. Division emplaced in ALBANIA WOODS to cover an S.O.S. line opposite right flank of 1st Australian Division.

Lt-Colonel.
C. M. G. O.
1st ANZAC Corps .

Copy No. 1 D. M. G. O., 1st Aust. Division.
2. D. M. G. O., 2nd Aust. Division.
3. D. M. G. O., 4th Aust. Division.
4. D. M. G. O., 5th Aust. Division.
5. G. O. C., R. A., 1st ANZAC.
6. B. G., H. A., 1st ANZAC.
7. C. M. G. O., 1st ANZAC.
8. " " "
9. " " "
10 to 19. G. S., 1st ANZAC.
20. War Diary.
21. File.


TASK MAP
TO ACCOMPANY
M.G. INSTRUCTIONS No 1
SERIES No 4

ZONNEBEKE

EDITION 7 A

TRENCHES CORRECTED TO 8-9-17.

28 N.E. I.



On several maps all bearings should be given with reference to the nearest grid line, which are parallel to the East and West edges of the sheet. Bearings should always be reckoned clockwise from 0° to 360°.

Grid bearings are less than compass bearings, the difference being called the deviation of the compass. To find out this deviation is, take a compass bearing in a distant point, and measure on the map the grid bearing to that point. The difference between the two bearings is the deviation of that compass from grid North. To obtain the grid bearing of any point this deviation must be subtracted from the compass bearing (adding 360° if the latter is necessary).

On this sheet the mean deviation of a compass is 12° 23', but the exact deviation of each compass should be noted as described above, and this should be reported on each locality.


To fix the position of a point within a square the divided system is used, as described on the 100,000 and 250,000 maps, whereby the square sides are considered to be divided into ten parts. (4 on one side and 6 on the other) and to measurement, two sides of each 100 yard square on these maps are divided into ten by small ticks. A simple extension of this system indicates the position of a point approximately. By a simple extension it may be used to fix a point more accurately, by considering the sides as divided into 100 parts, and using four figures.

The following rules must be observed:

- (1) Use the figure 0, but never 10 or 100.
- (2) Use the figure two or four figures, never one or three.
- (3) When using two figures, describe a point by the square intersection.

Examples—
 Two figures—Point A is 08.
 Point B is 20.
 Point C is 12.

Four figures—Point C is 0122.



Where numbers appear on the map they are co-ordinates on the above system, and have been inserted to facilitate reference to important localities, such as junctions, etc.

They should never be quoted without the full map reference.

Abbaye, Abbé	Abbey.
Abbrévier, Abbr.	Watering-place.
Abri de dommaier	Customs-shelter.
Acier	Steel.
Aiguilles	Needles (Pl.)
Allée	Alley, Narrow
Alcove - ne, Am.	Old.
Aqueduc	Aqueduct.
Arbre	Tree.
" éventail	" fan-shaped.
" déclaré	" bare.
" forcé	" forced.
" isolé	" isolated.
" penché	" leaning.
Arbre	Small tree.
Architrave, Arch.	Arch.
Armée	State quarry.
Asile	Asylum.
" des aliénés	Lunatic asylum.
" de charité	Asylum.
" des pauvres	
" de refuge	
Auberge, Aub.	Inn.
Auc	Alder-tree.
Bac	Ferry.
" à traîlle	Bathing.
Baignoire	Bath.
Place aux baines	Bathing-place.
Baïes	Bay, Beacon.
Banc	Room.
Banque de sable	Sand-bank.
" vase	Mud-bank.
Baraque	Hut.
Barrière	Barrier.
Barrage	Dam.
Bateau	Gate, Bait.
(Machine à) Bascule	Wough-bridge.
Bâtiment	Building.
" d'échouage	Tidal dock.

Bassin de radoub	Dry dock
Bateau plate	Light-skip
Blanchisserie	Laundry
B M (ou mullière)	Mill stone
B ^o (borne)	
Kilométrique	
Boulonnerie	Bolt Factory
Boule de boules	Buoy
Bouée	Buoys
Bouillotte, B ^o	Brickfield
Brigatier, B ^{ri}	Breakwater
Brises-lames	Breakers
Bureau	Customhouse
B ^o de douane	Butt, Mound
Butte	
Calane	Hut
Calais, Cal ^o	Island
Calvaire, Cal ^o	Kilometre
Calvaire marin	Calvary
Canal	
Canal d'irrigation	Drainage canal
Fa ^o de canotiche	Irrigation canal
" " " "	Canal
" " de gravier	Gravel-pit
Casernes	Barracks
Champ	Harbour
" " manoeuvres	Drill-ground
" " tir	Rifle range
Chantier	Building yard
	Ship yard
	Dock yard
Chantier de construction	Skip-way
Chapelle, Ch ^o	Chapel
Chaudière	Boiler
Châtea ^o d'eau	Water tower
Chausée	Causesway
Chemin de fer	Railway
Cheminée, Ch ^o	Chimney
Chêne	Oak tree
Cimetière, Cim ^o	Cem. treasury
Clocher	Belfry
Cloche	Bell factory
Colombier	Dove-cot

Coron	Workmen's dwellings.
Cour des marchands	Goods yard.
Couvant	Convent.
Crafter	Slag heap.
	Crust.
Dame	Isner dock.
Décolé-e	Destroyed.
Détruit-e, e, Détr ^e	
Déversoir	Ditch.
Digue	Digue, causeway.
Distillerie, Dist ^e	Distillery.
Douane	Custom-house.
Entrepôt de douane	Customs warehouse.
Entrepôts de douane	Dynastie
Dynamitère, Dynam ^e	Dynamite magazine.
Dynamitère	Dynamite factory.
Ecluse	Sluice, Lock.
Eclusette, Ecl ^{te}	Sluice.
Ecole	School.
Eglise	Church.
Emballerie	Keelhaul works.
Emplacement	Location, place.
Estaminet, Estam ^t	Inn.
Etang	Pond.
Fabrique, Fab ^e	Factory.
Fab ^e de produits	
	Chemical works.
Fab ^e de faïence	Pottery.
Faisencerie	Farm.
Faisence chimique	
Filature, Fil ^e	Spinning mill.
Fonderie, Fond ^e	Foundry.
Fountain, Fond ^e	Springs, fountain.
Forêt	Forest.
Forme de rebouch	Try dock.
Forme	Form.
Rosse	Min. Pit.
Fosse	Moss, Ditch.
Fossé	Gully.
à chaux	Lime-kin.

Four à coke	Coke oven.
Gasterie	Glove Factory.
Gary	Station.
Garnier	Warren.
Garnier	Garrison.
Gassner	Gasmeter.
Glaçerie	Mirror Factory.
Plât de glaces	Ice factory.
Grue	Crane.
Gud	Factory.
Hautrie	Store-box, Tower.
" à signaux	Signal-box, Tower.
Halte	Halt.
Hauger	Shed, Hangar.
Hôpital	Hospital.
Hôtel de Ville	Town hall.
Houillère	Colliery.
Huilerie	Oil factory.
Imprimerie, Impre ^s	Printing works.
Jéte	Pier.
Laminerie	Rolling mills.
Laiterie de marée	High water mark.
Laisse	Low "
" de basse marée	Low "
Maison Forestière	Forester's house.
" de p ^{re}	"
Mait-house	Malt-house.
Marbrerie	Marble works.
Marais	Marsh.
Marais salant	Salt marsh.
Marché	Market.
Marteau	Hammer.
Meule	Mill.
Minier	Mine.
Mouture	Mongatory.
Moulin, M ^l	Mill.
" à vapeur	Steam mill.
Nage	Swim.
" à crinelle	Loop-holed wad.

Nacelle	Ferry.
Orme	Elm.
Organisme	Organism.
Ornières	Or-rut-beds.
Ouvrage	Fort.
Ouvrage hydrauliques	Water works.
Papeterie	Paper-mill.
Parc	Park, yard.
" aérostatique	Aviation ground.
" à charbon	Coal yard.
" à pétrole	Petrol store.
Passage à niveau P.N.	Level-crossing.
" à vapeur	Steam bridge.
Peuplier	Nursery-garden.
Peuplier	Poplar-tree.
Pier	Pier-house.
Pilier, Pilr	Post.
Plaine d'exercice	Drill ground.
Plaque	Plate.
Ponceau	Culvert.
Pont	Bridge.
" levier	Swing bridge.
" de garie- " à côté	Coast-guard station.
Porte	Post.
" à feu	Pottery.
Poterie	Pottery.
Poudrière, Pond*	Powder magazine.
" à poudre	Water supply.
Prix d'achat	Pit-head.
Puits	Shaft, Well.
" à tirage	Shaft.
" d'aérage	Ventilating shaft.
" ventilateur	Ventilating.
" de sondage	Boring.
Quai	Quay, Platform.
" au charbon	Little platform.
" des marchandises	Goods platform.
" des diées	
Raccordement	Junction.
Raffinerie	Refinery.
" de sucre	Sugar refinery.
Râperie	Sugar root factory.

Remblais	Embankment.
Rémise ^{de} machines	Engine-shed.
Reservoir	Reservoir.
Route cavalière	Bridle road.
Rubannerie	Ribbon Factory.
Ruine	Ruin.
En ruine	Ruined.
Sablon	Sand.
Sablons, Sahlon, Sahlon ^{re}	Sand-pit.
Sapin	Fir tree.
Saule	Willow tree.
Sauvage	Sav. work.
Scierie, Scie ^e	Saw-mill.
Soufflage	Boring.
Souffleur	Spinning.
Sucrerie, Sucre ^e	Sugar factory.
Tannerie	Tannery.
Tir à la cible	Rifle range.
Tissage	Weaving mill.
Tôle	Rolling mill.
Tombau	Tombl.
Tour	Tower.
Tourterie	Pest-box, Pest-b.
Tourrelle	Small tower.
Tuilerie	Tile works.
Usine à gaz	Gas works.
" électrique	Electric works.
" chimique	Chemical works.
" métallurgique	Metal works.
" à agglomérés	Bricks factory.
Verrerie, Verre	Glass works.
Viaduc	Viaduct.
Vivier	Fish Pond.
Vies de chargement	
" déchargement	
" évitement	
" formation	Siding.
" manoeuvre	
Zinguerie	Zinc works.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS:

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SECRET.

1st ANZAC CORPS

8th October, 1917.

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTIONS. No 2SERIES No 4

1. Subject to the tasks being carried out in accordance with Task map accompanying M.G. Instructions No 1 Series No 4, the barrage machine Gun Companies of 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions will be under the control of their respective Divisions.

Lieutenant-Colonel

C.M.G.O.

1st Anzac Corps.

Distribution

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