

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/44/27 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 2nd  
Australian Division

October 1917



AWM4-1/44/27PART2



63

War Diary

APP IX

No. 6

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 2nd to 6 a.m. 3rd October 1917.

NOTE : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Practice artillery barrages were laid down at 6 a.m. (22nd) and at 5 p.m.

Throughout the day the enemy forward area was kept under a steady fire. Roads, tracks, and known centres of activity were subjected to bursts of fire at intervals.

At 10.30 p.m. our Stokes mortars fired 20 rounds on to enemy strong post at D.28.a.6.4; the result could not be observed.

ENEMY SHELLING.

J.7.b, and BELLEWAARDE RIDGE were heavily shelled between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. with 10 cm, and 15 cm. J.1.c, and J.7.a. were also heavily shelled throughout the day.

At 6 a.m. WESTHOEK VALLEY was shelled for an hour with 7.7 cm shrapnel.

In reply to our practice barrages the enemy opened a light fire on our front line and support system with 7.7 cm 10.5 cm and 15 cm.

The only area that was at all heavily barraged was the spur running from MUHLE to ST JOSEPH'S INSTITUTE. The fire came from a S.E. direction and continued throughout the period our own barrage was down.

As has been noticed previously, the enemy within 10 minutes of our barrage opening searched POLYBONE WOOD with heavy fire as if expecting an attack to develop along the high ground we hold there.

Generally on this Div. front the enemy reply to our barrages is tardy and not heavy.

During the night enemy harassing fire on our forward area east of WESTHOEK RIDGE was above normal.

SANS SOUCI was heavily shelled with 10.5 cm H.E. and shrapnel from 7.50 p.m. to 5 p.m.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Two M.Gs have been located in concrete dugout at D.21.d. 45.45, and one in pill-box at D.21.d.65.25.

A machine gun emplacement or an O.P. is suspected at D.29.a.15.70.

New earth work is visible at D.29.a.1.9.

A hostile M.G. firing from D.28.a.4.4. during the night was silenced by our Lewis gun fire.

The only wire visible is that in front of DOCILE TRENCH. It is too much blown about to form a serious obstacle to infantry.

ENEMY ATTITUDE.

Hostile M.G. and sniping activity has been reduced to a minimum during the last two days.

The CHATEAU and road area in D.27.b. were subjected to slight bursts of M.G. fire throughout the day from D.28.b.6.6.

HOSTILE AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Enemy planes have been very active, flying at a low altitude over our front and support line systems.

At 8.15 a.m. an enemy plane flew over our front line right Brigade sector and dropped two WHITE flares. Nothing followed.

P.T.O.



## Appendix No. IX

-2-

At 9.15.a.m. 3 enemy 'planes flew over our Right Bde support lines and one of them dropped 3 WHITE flares. Nothing followed.

ENEMY SIGNALS.

When our practice barrages opened up yesterday the enemy sent up flares bursting into two REDS and two GREENS. These were answered by a light barrage on our front and support line areas.

ORANGE sprays are frequently sent up during the night without any apparent results.

A flare bursting into 2 REDS and 2 GREENS is usually followed by artillery fire on our forward area.

During the day the enemy several times fired short into his own lines N and E of ZONNEBEKE LAKE. YELLOW clusters were immediately sent up from the areas shelled.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Hostile balloons were observed from O.P. at J.l.d.6.2. as follows :-

6 a.m.	On T.B.	720°	
8.30 a.m.	do	420°	Descended at 9.35 a.m.
5.50 p.m.	do	220°	Stayed up only for 5 minutes.

Condition of ground. (9.30 a.m. 3rd) The ground is still sticky as a result of rain last night, but is drying well.

*Lt Col J. L. M. Call*  
 Lieut Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 2nd Australian Division.



EDITION 1.A

BECELAERE

German Trenches corrected to 21-9-17.


Part of Sheet 28.

**ARTILLERY.**  
 C Group  
 10<sup>th</sup> & 11<sup>th</sup> A.F.A. Bdes  
 RAILWAY WOOD BUDGOTS  
 I. II. B. G. 2.  
 D. Group  
 4<sup>th</sup> & 5<sup>th</sup> A.F.A. Bdes.  
 I. II. C. I. 9.

7<sup>th</sup> BDE. H.Q.  
 26<sup>th</sup> Bn.  
 6<sup>th</sup> BDE. H.Q.  
 28<sup>th</sup> Bn. WESTHOEK RIDGE

23<sup>rd</sup> Bn. WESTHOEK RIDGE

5<sup>th</sup> A.I. BDE. RESERVE  
 H.Q. I. II b. 52.  
 19<sup>th</sup> Bn. RAILWAY WOOD  
 18<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> & 20<sup>th</sup> Bns. GORDON AREA.



E.A.Y. 3/10/17


Battery Positions (possible strong points) Organized Shell Holes  
 Probably Timber or Camouflage Probably Concrete  
 Scale 1:10,000  
 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Yards



App. X

ORDER OF BATTLE.  
LEFT DIVISION - FIRST ANZAC CORPS.

Second Australian Division.  
Major-General N. M. SMYTH, V.C., C.B.





SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.  
-----From 6 a.m. 3rd to 6 a.m. 4th October 1917.NOTE. : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Our artillery. Practice barrages were put down at 7.15 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. The usual harassing fire was maintained on enemy posts, tracks and roads, throughout the 24 hours.

Enemy artillery. Enemy artillery was active all day shelling our front and support lines. ANZAC (J.3.a) and J.7. were heavily shelled at intervals with 15 cm.

At 1.37 p.m., in retaliation to our 1.30 p.m. barrage, enemy placed a heavy barrage on our front line, supports, and tracks leading to front line. Shells were 10.5 cm and 15 cm. Shelling ceased at 2 p.m.

During the night road in J.13. was intermittently shelled

ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Below normal, apparently due to poor visibility.

MOVEMENT IN ENEMY LINES.

At 6.15 p.m. 3 men were seen about 50 yards west of DE KNOBT FK. They disappeared into a shell hole before fire could be brought to bear on them.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Balloons were observed up on true bearings of 46° and 87° from O.P. at J.3.a.3.5.

*J. J. L. M. Ball Capt.*  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.



APP. XIII

Disposition of Units 6 a.m. 4.10.17 shown by red lettering  
Disposition of Units 6 p.m. 4.10.17 shown by black lettering  
Do. S.O.S. & Barrage M.Gs. remained unchanged.

○ → 1 Machine Gun (Vickers)  
⊙ 1 Stokes Mortar

SECRET.


EDITION I.A

BECELAERE

German Trenches corrected to 21-9-17.

Part of Sheet 26.

ARTILLERY.  
"C" Group  
10<sup>th</sup> & 11<sup>th</sup> A.F.A. Bdes.  
Railway Wood Dugouts  
I. 11 b. 6.2  
"D" Group.  
4<sup>th</sup> & 5<sup>th</sup> A.F.A. Bdes.  
I. 12 c. 1.9  
7<sup>th</sup> BDE. H.Q.  
27<sup>th</sup> Bn.  
6<sup>th</sup> BDE. H.Q.  
28<sup>th</sup> Bn. Westhoek Ridge  
23<sup>rd</sup> Bn. Westhoek Ridge  
5<sup>th</sup> A.I. Bde. RESERVE.  
H.Q. I. 11 b. 5.2  
19<sup>th</sup> Bn. Railway Wood  
18<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> & 20<sup>th</sup> Bns. Gordon Area.  
20<sup>th</sup> Bn. Railway Wood  
17<sup>th</sup> Bn. Westhoek



At 5.45 a.m. enemy put down barrage for his attack which was planned for 6 a.m. This was a very deep barrage, much deeper than any before experienced.

The 7th Sde. battalions had to come through this barrage and suffered severe casualties.

Owing to its being a very dark night, the moon being obscured, the J.O.C. 6th A.I. Sde. ordered the 22nd, 21st and 24th Battalions to push forward from their jumping off line so that only the rear platoons of the A.I.S. line battalions were behind the road. This proved a most fortunate order as most of the troops escaped the enemy barrage, the only ones who were caught being the rear platoons.

Ed. J. Beck 1917

Battery Positions  
Possibly strong points  
Organised Shell Holes

Probably Timber or Camouflage  
Probably Concrete

Scale 1:10,000  
0 100 200 300 400 500 1000 1500 2000 Yards

Printed by H92 Advanced Section, A.P. & S.S.



SECRET.

Copy No. 24

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No 144.

5th October 1917.

Reference Maps: BECELAERE Sheet 1/10,000. }  
23 NW 1/20,000. }

1. The 5th Aust. Infantry Brigade will relieve the 6th and 7th Aust. Infantry Brigades to-night (5/6th Oct.) in the front line which was captured yesterday.

2. The disposition of troops will be as follows:-

5th A.I.Bde.

New front line ..... 2 Battalions.  
From Blue (inclusive)  
back to Red Line... 2 Battalions.

6th A.I.Bde. & 7th A.I.Bde.

From Red Line (exclusive) back to Jumping off line (inclusive) 1 Battalion each.  
From Jumping Off Line (exclusive) back to present Brigade Adv. Headquarters..... 1 Battalion each.  
From Bde. Adv. Headquarters to Railway Wood (inclusive).... 1 Battalion each.  
In Gordon Area..... 1 Battalion each.

KIT & KAT, RED LODGE and BELLEWAARDE FARM are in 6th A.I. Brigade area.

THE CHAPEL, THE RECTORY, and LAKE FARM are in 7th A.I. Bde. area.

Each Brigade may keep half a battalion in RAILWAY WOOD trenches.

3. HEADQUARTERS are allotted as follows:-

5th A.I.Bde. Advanced at D.26.0.1.3  
Rear..... I.12.0.3.5.  
6th A.I.Bde. Advanced at SANS SOUCI  
Rear..... I.12.0.3.5.  
7th A.I.Bde. at RAILWAY WOOD.

4. MACHINE GUNS. The 5th and 22nd Aust. Machine Gun Companies will remain under the D.I.G.O. for S.O.S. and switch purposes, finding their own reliefs.

The G.O's.C. 6th and 7th A.I.Bdes. will each detail two sections (8 guns) to come under the orders of the G.O.C. 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. as mobile guns.

5. The relief will be completed by 5 a.m. on 6th October. Command will pass on completion of relief and will be reported to D.H.Q.

6./

*Wai Diany*



## Appendix No. XIII

-27

6. Dumps of ammunition, bombs, and other stores also strombos horns will be handed over on relief.
7. Brigade Commanders will be responsible for the provision of working parties to maintain and improve communication trenches and tracks in their areas.

The 5th A.I.Bde. will improve and open up the communication trenches through the BROODSEINDE ridge.

The 6th and 7th A.I.Bdes. will maintain the duckwalks behind the Red Line.

The C.R.E. will provide the engineer assistance and supervision for the above.

The Pioneer Battalion will continue work on roads and tracks as already ordered.

8. The G.O.C. 5th A.I.Bde. will, on the morning of 6th October, report his dispositions in detail, showing how touch is effected on each flank and, as far as he can, the dispositions of the enemy nearest to his line.

9. Advanced Division Headquarters remain at YPRES RAM-PARTS.

10. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*C. H. Bridges*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff, 2nd Aust. Division.

Issued at 8 a.m.

## DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No

1	O.R.A.	16	1st Anzac "G"
2	O.R.L.	17	1st Anzac "Q"
3	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.	18	1st Aust. Division.
4	6th Aust. Inf. Bde.	19	3rd Aust. Division.
5	7th Aust. Inf. Bde.	20	4th Aust. Division.
6	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	21	5th Aust. Division.
7	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Co.	22	2nd Aust. Div. Train.
8	22nd Aust. M.G. Coy.	23	2nd Aust. Mob. Vet. Sectn.
9	A.Q.	24	2nd Aust. Div. Rfts. Camp
10	A.D.M.S.	25	4th Sd. R.F.C.
11	D.M.G.O.	26	Detach. 13th A.L.H.
12	A.P.M.	27	57th H.A.G.
13	D.B.O.	28	G.O.C.
14	D.G.O.	29	D.A.D.O.S.
15	Camp Commandant.	30	D.A.J.V.S.
		31	Area Comdt. CANAL AREA.
		32-33	File.
		34-36	War Diary.
		37-46	Spares.

\*\*\*\*\*



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No 8.

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 4th to 6 a.m. 5th October 1917.

NOTE. : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

In conjunction with the divisions on either flank we attacked the enemy position at 6 a.m. (4th). This Division attacked on a two-brigade front and gained all objectives, except just in front of DAISY WOOD where our line for about 250 yards runs about 150 yards west of the original final objective line.

Our troops formed up without incident, but at 5.15 a.m. enemy artillery became very active shelling vicinity of front line, TOKIO, ANZAC and SANS SOUCI. This shelling caused some casualties amongst our troops assembled for the assault.

At 6 a.m. our barrage came down and our troops moved forward following it closely and suffering very few casualties from enemy fire. Our first objective was taken on time and a number of prisoners captured. By 10 a.m. our second objective line was in our hands and was being consolidated.

Prisoners of War.

Prisoners were secured from the following Regiments : -

5th Foot Guards.	-	4th Guards Div.
5th Grenadier Guards-	-	"
Guard F.A.R. No.6.	-	"
212 R.I.R.	-	45th Res.Div.
29th. I.R.	-	16th Div.
M.G.Abtelung.No.15.	-	"
51st Scharpshutzen.Abt.	-	"
1st and 2nd M.G.Coys.	-	4th Guard Div.
9th Bav.I.R.	-	"
		<u>Total.</u> 14 officers. 314. o.rs

Officer prisoners include the Battalion Commanders of the 1st and 3rd Bns, 5th Guard Gren.Regt, and the Adjutant 1st Bn Guard Gren Regt.

Trophies.

The following trophies were captured. : -

26 Machine Guns.	
<del>2 anti-tank guns</del> (7.7.cm)	
<del>1 Field gun</del> (7.7.cm)	
5 6" Trench Mortars.	
1 Telephone set.	

ENEMY OPERATIONS.

Practically no resistance was offered by the enemy during our advance to the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE, but as soon as our troops appeared on the sky-line they came under heavy artillery and M.G. fire which caused them many casualties and considerably hampered the work of consolidation.

So far the enemy has not launched any counter-attacks on our newly won positions.

P.T.O.



ENEMY OPERATIONS (Contd)

At 3.45.p.m. however observers reported massing of troops near CHINA WOOD (D.24.c) and in DAIRY WOOD (D.23.b). Both these concentrations were effectively dispersed by our artillery fire.

ENEMY SHELLING.

Hostile shelling, which commenced at 5.15.a.m., continued intermittently throughout the day, being mainly confined to the area between our old support line and our newly won front line.

The crest of BROODSEINDE RIDGE in particular has been heavily shelled at intervals throughout the 24 hours.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Our Right Bde reports that the enemy front line appears to be about 250 yards in front of our line in some sort of continuous trench

Hostile M.Gs have been extremely active along our whole front, and especially from DAISY WOOD (D.23.central)

Enemy snipers have also been very active. One has been located at D.29.b.6.8.

PRISONERS' STATEMENTS.

From the statements of prisoners it appears that the 4th Guard Div. had relieved the 236th Div in the line on the night 27/28th.

On the night 3rd/4th the 212th R.I.R. were bussed up from BEYTHEM under orders to attack our position from POLYGOE WOOD to ANZAC. They were to pass through the 4th Guard Div. and attack at 6 a.m. 4th Oct. They were quite unaware of our impending attack which threw them into great confusion and completely upset their plans.

All Regiments of the 4th Guard Div, and the 212th R.I.R. suffered exceedingly heavy casualties, the greater part of the 212th R.I.R. being either killed, wounded, or captured.

*J. J. L. M. Call Capt.*  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.



SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 145.  
\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET. 35

Copy No.....

Headquarters,  
5th October, 1917.

References to BROODSEINDE and PASSCHENDAELE Sheets 1/10,000.

1. The boundary between the Second Australian Division and the Division next to the North will be adjusted as follows:-

From the present Northern boundary at D.22.a.5.0. along the PRES - ROULERS railway towards ROULERS. The railway line is inclusive to the Second Australian Division.

2. The Second Australian Division will accordingly on the night 6th/7th October extend its frontage to take over that portion of the line held by the Right Division of II ANZAC Corps between the present Northern boundary and the railway line (the new boundary).

3. The 3rd Australian Division will be relieved by the 66th Division on the night 5th/6th October.

4. The 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade will take over that portion of the Divisional frontage referred to in Para. 2 above, from the Right Brigade of the 66th Division on the night 6th/7th October.

The necessary reconnaissances will be carried out forthwith.

5. The relief will be carried out by mutual arrangement between G.O.C., 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. and the G.O.C., 199th Brigade, 66th Division, which will then be holding this portion of the front.

Command will pass on completion of the relief and will be reported both to the 2nd Australian Division and 66th Division.

6. The inter brigade boundary between 5th and 7th Aust. Inf. Brigades will be SANS SOUCI (inclusive to Right Brigade) - St. JOSEPH'S INST. (inclusive to Left Brigade) - along ZONNEBEKE - BROODSEINDE road to road junction at D.22.d.6.5. (common to both) - thence a direct line to the road junction at D.23.a.40.65 - thence through the north western corner of DAIRY WOOD to road junction at E.13.c.15.95.

7. The headquarters of the 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade will be at D.26.c.1.3. (with the 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade H.Q.), this headquarters together with the railway line being now definitely inclusive to this Division.

8. A tracing showing the front line now held on the sector to be taken over has been forwarded direct to G.O.C., 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade. Any corrections to this will be

P. T. O.

*Headquarters*



forwarded to D. H. Q. as soon as possible after relief is completed.

9. . . . . ACKNOWLEDGE.

*Amudges*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 6.0 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION:

- | <u>Copy No.</u> | <u>To.</u>                     |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| 1.              | C.R.A.                         |
| 2.              | C.R.E.                         |
| 3.              | 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.            |
| 4.              | 6th do.                        |
| 5.              | 7th do.                        |
| 6.              | 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.          |
| 7.              | O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy. |
| 8.              | 22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.          |
| 9.              | A.Q.                           |
| 10.             | A.D.M.S.                       |
| 11.             | D.M.G.O.                       |
| 12.             | A.P.M.                         |
| 13.             | D.B.O.                         |
| 14.             | D.G.O.                         |
| 15.             | 2nd Aust. Div. Train.          |
| 16.             | 1st ANZAC "G"                  |
| 17.             | 1st ANZAC "Q"                  |
| 18.             | 1st Australian Division.       |
| 19.             | 4th Australian Division.       |
| 20.             | 5th Australian Division.       |
| 21.             | 66th Division.                 |
| 22.             | 199th Inf. Brigade.            |
| 23.             | 2nd Aust. Mobile Vet. Sect.    |
| 24.             | 2nd Aust. Div. Rfts. Camp.     |
| 25.             | 4th Squad. R.F.O.              |
| 26.             | Detach. 13th A.L.H.            |
| 27.             | 57th H.A.G.                    |
| 28.             | Area Comdt., CANAL Area.       |
| 29.             | G.O.C.                         |
| 30.             | D.A.D.O.S.                     |
| 31.             | D.A.D.V.S.                     |
| 32.             | Camp Comdt.                    |
| 33.             | 34. File.                      |
| 35 - 37.        | War Diary.                     |
| 38 - 45.        | Spare.                         |

For information.

P. T. O.



63

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
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App XVI 59  
SECRET.  
Copy No .....  
G.1/748.

Headquarters,  
5th October, 1917.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS No. 1.

Series No. 3 .

References to BECELAERE and PASSCHENDAELE sheets 1/10,000.  
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1. The 1st ANZAC Corps in conjunction with the Corps and Army to the north will advance on a date and hour to be notified.

The attached map shows in blue the probable extent of the advance on the front of the 2nd Australian Division and neighbouring Divisions.

The boundaries to North and South are shown in black.

2. The necessary preliminary arrangements are as follows:

The 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade will take over the portion of the front south of the YPRES - ROULERS railway which is now held by the Division on our left. This will be done on night 6th/7th October.

On the night 7th/8th October the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. will take over the present Divisional front from the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. and the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. will the same night take over the front held by the 7th Aust. Inf. Bde.

The 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. is allotted the task of advancing to the new line in D.18.c and b, the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. on its right will advance at the same time to the line in D.24.c. and a.

The 7th A.I.Bde. will be in Divisional Reserve.

3. This operation will probably take place on "X" day.

4. The 6th A.I.Bde. will provide a cable burying party of a battalion made up to a minimum of 500 men to bury the cable from TOKIO to MOULIN FARM. The party to be ready for work by midday on 6th October.

Detailed instructions for rendezvous, time, tools required, etc., will be given by the O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.

5. Acknowledge.

*A. M. Dyes*

Lieut-Colonel, 58  
General Staff, 58  
Second Australian Division, 58

Issued at 6.0 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION. Over leaf.

*War Diary*



DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
* 1.	C.R.A.
* 2.	C.R.E.
* 3.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
* 4.	6th Aust. Inf. Bde.
* 5.	7th Aust. Inf. Bde.
6.	1st ANZAC Corps.
7.	1st Australian Division.
8.	66th Division.
9.	57th H.A.G.
10.	O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
11.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
12.	A.D.H.S.
13.	A.Q.
14.	D.M.G.O.
15.	"O" Squad. 13th A.L.H.
16.	File.
17-19.	War Diary.
20-30.	Spare.

The necessary arrangements for the distribution of the above mentioned documents are as follows:

The 5th, 6th and 7th Australian Infantry Divisions will take over the portion of the front line of the 1st Australian Division which is held by the 5th, 6th and 7th Australian Infantry Divisions respectively. The 5th Australian Infantry Division will take over the front line from the 5th Australian Infantry Division and the 6th Australian Infantry Division will take over the front line from the 6th Australian Infantry Division. The 7th Australian Infantry Division will take over the front line from the 7th Australian Infantry Division. The 1st Australian Division will take over the front line from the 1st Australian Division. The 66th Division will take over the front line from the 66th Division. The 57th H.A.G. will take over the front line from the 57th H.A.G. The O.C., 2nd Australian Division Signal Coy. will take over the front line from the O.C., 2nd Australian Division Signal Coy. The 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion will take over the front line from the 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion. The A.D.H.S. will take over the front line from the A.D.H.S. The A.Q. will take over the front line from the A.Q. The D.M.G.O. will take over the front line from the D.M.G.O. The "O" Squad. 13th Australian Light Horse will take over the front line from the "O" Squad. 13th Australian Light Horse. The File will take over the front line from the File. The War Diary will take over the front line from the War Diary. The Spare will take over the front line from the Spare.

This operation will probably take place on "X" day.

The 6th A.L.H. will provide a cable carrying party of a battalion made up to a minimum of 100 men to bury the cable from 0810 to 0815 hours. The party to be ready for work by midnight on 6th October.

Detailed instructions for construction, time, tools, equipment, etc., will be given by the O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.

Major-General,  
General Staff,  
1st Australian Division.


Issued at 8.0 pm.  
Distribution.



EDITION I. A.

# POLYGON WOOD

German Trenches corrected to 4-9-17. Part of Sheet 28.



## SECRET

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 To accompany 2nd Australian Divisional  
 Preliminary Instructions No. 1. (Series No. 3)  
 dated 5th Oct. 1917

F.S.G. 1003 27-87 1028 2-17

Scale 1:20,000




Secret

6am 6-10-17

MESSAGE MAP.

App. XVII

Trenches corrected to 28-9-17



Trenches  
 Lewis Guns  
 Vickers Guns  
 Trench Mortar

good repair  
 damaged or apparently not used  
 Guns  
 40 Headquarters

Old Gun Positions.  
 Trenches in good repair  
 Da. damaged or apparently not used.

DUGOUTS or STRUCTURES.  
 Supposed to be CONCRETE.  
 Da. DUGOUTS not CONCRETE.  
 Machine Guns  
 verified by Air Photographs.  
 Not Da. Headquarters



MESSAGE FORM

To:—

No.

- (Note:—Either give Map Reference or mark your position by a 'X' on the Map on back.)
- I am at.....
  - I have reached limits of my Objective.
  - My Platoon Company is at.....and is consolidating.
  - My Platoon Company is at.....and has consolidated.
  - Am held up by (a) M.G. at.....(Place where you are).  
(b) Wire
  - Enemy holding strong point .....
  - I am in touch with.....on Right Left. at.....
  - I am not in touch with.....on Right Left.
  - Am shelled from.....
  - Am in need of—

- Counter Attack forming at .....
- Hostile (a) Battery  
(b) Machine Gun  
(c) Trench Mortar } active at .....
- Reinforcements wanted at .....
- I estimate my present strength at ..... rifles.
- Add any other useful information here:—

Time ..... m.  
Date ..... 1917.

Name.....  
Platoon.....  
Company.....  
Battalion.....

- Carry no maps or papers which may be of value to the Enemy.
- Give no information if captured, except the following, which you are bound to give:—  
Name and Rank.
- Collect all captured maps and papers and send them in at once.

MESSAGE FORM

No.

(Note:—Either give Map Reference or mark your position by a 'X' on the Map on back.)

- my Objective.
- .....and is consolidating.
- .....and has consolidated.
- at.....(Place where you are).
- point .....
- .....on Right Left. at.....
- .....on Right Left.

in active at .....

tar } at .....

strength at ..... rifles.

information here:—

Name.....  
Platoon.....  
Company.....  
Battalion.....

papers which may be of value to the Enemy.  
tion if captured, except the following, which  
ad to give:—  
Rank.  
ed maps and papers and send them in at once.



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War Diary

App XVIII

S E C R E T .  
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G.102.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
-----

Location of Units at 8 a.m. 6th October 1917.

The following changes are notified since last report (G.74 )

<u>5th Aust Inf Bde. H.Q.</u>		Adv.	D.26.c.1.3.	LINE.
		Rear.	I.12.c.3.5.	
17th Bn.	-	D.22.c.8.4.	Support.	Left Sector.
18th Bn.	-	D.29.a.2.7.	LINE.	Right Sector.
19th Bn.	-	D.22.d.1.4.	LINE.	Left Sector.
20th Bn.	-	D.22.b.6.6.	Support.	Right Sector.
5th A.L.T.M.Bty.		LINE.		

<u>6th Aust Inf Bde.H.Q.</u>		Adv.	SANS SOUCI.	J.2.a.3.6.
		Rear.	"Y" WOOD DUGOUTS.	I.12.c.3.5.
21st Bn.	-	EIT and KAT	J.1.d.3.7.	
22nd Bn.	-	HAFEBEEK		
23rd Bn.	-	ANZAC.	J.3.a.2.4.	
24th Bn.	-	GORDON AREA		

<u>7th Aust Inf Bde.H.Q.</u>			RAILWAY WOOD.	I.11.b.5.2.
1 Bn.	-		Old Jumping Off Line.	
1 Bn.	-		Advanced Bde H.Q. Line.	
1 Bn.	-		RAILWAY WOOD.	I.11.
1 Bn.	-		GORDON AREA.	

*J. J. L. M. Call* Capt  
 Lieut Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 2nd Australian Division.



War Diary App XIV

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No. 9.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 5th to 6 a.m. 6th October 1917.

NOTE : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Infantry operations were confined to strengthening and improving our new positions.

At 2.30.p.m. and at 3.45.p.m. our Stokes mortars successfully bombarded an enemy strong post at D.29.b.9.2.

Our artillery maintained the usual harassing fire on known enemy strong points, roads, tracks, and centres of activity.

At 6.53.a.m./6.56.p.m., S.O.S. barrages were put down in response to signals from the front line. No hostile infantry counter-attacks developed.

ENEMY SHELLING.

Throughout the day hostile shelling was very light, consisting mainly of very high bursting shrapnel on BROODSEINDE RIDGE, and 15 cm H.E. in ZONNEBEKE and D.28.b.

At 7.5.p.m. the enemy placed a heavy barrage on our front line, and 10 minutes later the western slopes of BROODSEINDE RIDGE in squares D.22.d. and D.28.b. were heavily shelled. By 7.30.p.m. enemy fire had practically ceased.

This is the first occasion on which our new front line has been shelled to any appreciable extent by the enemy. Most of the fire came from north-easterly and south-easterly directions.

In reply to our practice barrages at 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. the crest of BROODSEINDE RIDGE was heavily shelled throughout the period our own barrage was down.

PATROLS.

A patrol located a party of enemy about 12 strong at D.23.d.3.5. Lewis gun fire was opened and enemy dispersed.

An enemy Strong post was located at D.23.d.4.2.

Patrols report that DAISY WOOD is strongly held by the enemy - apparently by detached strong posts.

FLARES.

Throughout the night most of the enemy flares appeared to come from a line approximately 300 yards from our own front line.

About 11 p.m. enemy fired WHITE flares from D.23.d.4.2. which were answered by a series of DOUBLE GREEN flares which were repeated along the whole Divisional front.

TRENCH MORTARS.

A hostile mortar-position not yet located-is reported to be firing pineapple bombs on to our communication trench at D.23.c.3.9.

P.T.O.







## 1a. Appendix to 2nd A.Div I.S.No.9.

EXTRACTS FROM 2ND ARMY and 1ST ANZAC CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.

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1st ANZAC Corps Summary, 5:10:17.

Prisoners of War. A total of 34 Officers and 853 Other Ranks have been captured in the operations which commenced yesterday morning.

Trophies. The following trophies have been secured by the Corps in the last two days:-

Machine Guns	-	70.	
Trench Mortars	-	11	(5 - 6" in emplacement at D.22.d.05.35).
Field Guns.	-	6	(Two 7.7 cm. at D.29.a.1 5.75 in excellent condition in emplacements with ammunition).
Flammenwerfer	-	2	
Bomb Machines	-	2.	
Telephone Set	-	1.	

2nd ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Features of Yesterday's Operations. The principal feature of the operations was the enemy's assembly for attack in front of POLYGOON WOOD just at the time we made our own. That he suffered extraordinary losses by our assaulting troops and barrages is now well known, and the effect of this on the moral of the enemy's troops in this locality is evidenced in many ways.

The manner in which the enemy threw in his various units promiscuously on all parts of the battle front is especially significant. This has usually been his habit in operations of this nature, but the mixture and lack of cohesion, along with the consequent confusion, have been much more marked than on previous occasions and tend to indicate a more pronounced deterioration in organization as well as in moral.

The action of his artillery throughout the day has also been unusual in that it was not only feeble but very scattered in its efforts. The lack of regular barrages or organized destructive fire was noticeable, in fact he seemed to be prepared with no well defined scheme of artillery defence. His recent withdrawal of guns to positions further back has, as was expected, caused considerable disorganization, and he does not appear to have got them properly into operation in their new groupings before the attack as their action, especially on the northern front, has been spasmodic and lacking definite objectives.

As to the enemy's forces, it appears that of the six divisions opposite this Army front which have had very heavy fighting and severe losses, the equivalent of at least three divisions may be considered to have suffered so badly as to be counted out. As he had put practically two divisions in each of the three sectors and had a large proportion of their battalions up to the front when our attack occurred, a large and varied assortment of prisoners was obtained. These almost without exception speak of the terrific effects of our bombardment both before and after zero and display a marked decrease in moral.

In general, yesterday's battle is a definite, distinct defeat which the enemy will not easily explain and which will doubtless have very far-reaching effects at this critical period of the war and season.

P. T. O.



1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Examination of prisoners of the 5th Gren. Regt., 4th Guard Div. Views on the attack. Prisoners ascribe the success of our attack chiefly to the fact that their own artillery, when putting down a barrage preparatory to their own attack, fired short, inflicting heavy casualties on their own men. No notice was taken of signals and this demoralized the men even more than our subsequent barrage.

The general opinion expressed was that no attack was expected for the next two or three days, whereas all preparations had been made for a counter-attack on the line lost on September 26th.

This is borne out by prisoners of other regiments captured.

2nd ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, 4:10:17.

Prisoners' statements. An analysis of the statements of, and conversations with, prisoners taken on the 26th and 27th September shows that the following are the prevailing opinions among the rank and file of the enemy:-

1. The prisoners had thought that climatic conditions would prevent anything in the way of serious operations after the end of August, and that the state of the ground would prevent the movement of artillery in particular.
2. So far as the prisoners knew, the intention was to hold up the British advance west of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE and occupy the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE line for the winter.
3. This plan was upset by the rapidity of the British advance; it was impossible to continue working on the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE line, owing to our shelling.
4. There are at present no organised lines of defence in rear.
5. The rank and file of the German Army have little confidence in their ability to hold the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE in face of a serious attack.
6. Work on back areas is being concentrated on road systems in rear of MOORSLEDE.
7. The WERCKEN - HOOGLEDE Line is intended as a "holding-up" position only, and not as a permanent line of defence.
8. There is a general opinion that, if driven from the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, a line of defence for the winter will be constructed east of ROULERS. They have heard of a canal or river as a likely one. (GENT-BRUGES? Derivation de la Lys?).
9. Considerable distrust of the moral of the rank and file is evident.

The above opinions only reflect the opinions of the junior ranks, and must be accepted with reserve.

P. T. O.

P. T. O.



SECOND ARMY, 4:10:17. (Continued).

Order of Battle. Prisoners could give no information. They stated that there is a great deal of confusion amongst battalions, regiments and divisions, and that troops are pushed in anywhere where they are needed irrespective of sectors, and one regiment may be reinforced or supported by troops of a regiment not belonging to the same division.

2ND ARMY SUMMARY, 4:10:17.

Information from Captured German Map. A captured German map of the IPRES Group area, dated 21st September, 1917, shows the following projected lines of defence:-

1. A line called the FLANDERN III STELLUNG, running north and south crossing the HOOGLEDE - WESTROOSEBEKE road about one mile south-west of HOOGLEDE and passing east of OOSTNIEUWKERKE through VIERKAVENHOEK and just east of LEDEGHEM. Photographs already show a tracing of the northern part of this line, which has been named the "ROULERS Line." An "Artillerie Schutz Stellung" is projected about a mile in rear of this line running roughly parallel with it.
2. A line called the "MOORSLEDE RIEGEL" runs from the DADIZELLE Line to the new ROULERS Line (FLANDERN III STELLUNG) leaving the former south of MOORSLEDE and joining the latter just south of LEDEGHEM.
3. A line called the "BECELAERE RIEGEL" leaves the STADEN - ZONNEBEKE Line south-east of ZONNEBEKE and joins the PASSCHENDAELE - TERHAND Line at TERHAND.

The other projected lines correspond to the description given in G.H.Q. Summary of the 24th September.

The trench traced just east of BECELAERE is an artillery Schutz Stellung.

The DADIZELLE Line is also called an Artillerie Schutz Stellung.

The PASSCHENDAELE - TERHAND Line is named "FLANDERN II STELLUNG."

The map shows a considerable amount of wire, more especially around WESTROOSEBEKE etc., which is not discernable from photographs but which is probably actually erected.

Maps will be issued in due course with all information derived from this map contained thereon.

1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Names of places. The following names have been approved:-

- Ref. Sheet 28. Depression running N.W. through J.3.b. and D.27.c. - BRANDS GULLY.
- For spur running east through D.27.d. and D.28.c. and S.E. through J.4.b. - GLASGOW SPUR.

I.P.O.



- 4a -

TRANSLATION of captured German document - Orders for intended counter-attack on our position at 6 a.m., 4:10:17.

29:9:17.

4th Guard Infantry Division.

Ia. No. 2586.

S E C R E T.P L A N S.

For the execution of an attack, the objective of which is the S.W. edge of ZONNEBEKE, the ridge S.E. of ZONNEBEKE, and the Western edge of MOLENAARELSTHOEX.

I. The objective is noted on accompanying sketch. The height 715 is necessarily included, also the ridge stretching thence south-eastwards.

Following advantages will thus be gained:-

1. The enemy's direct observation of our position vi South of ZONNEBEKE is prevented.
2. He loses the possibility of cover for massing troops for an attack.
3. We gain forward interval from the, ~~to~~ us, important observation posts on the BROODSEINDE - IN de STER Ridge.
4. We regain a large portion of ZONNEBEKE.
5. We get observation on the country west of ZONNEBEKE.
6. Our infantry positions will be improved, so that the front line will no longer be in the marshy ground, but on the presumably dry ridge.
7. The supports for the front line can be placed on the eastern slope of the ridge and close up to the front line.
8. There is a probability of capturing material and prisoners, thus strengthening the moral of our troops, and weakening that of the English.

II. ATTACK TROOPS.

(a) Infantry: The frontage of the attack is about 1,600 metres. Four battalions are considered necessary for this. The number of necessary assault troops of the Assault Battalion will be stated, as soon as it can be ascertained how many old concrete dug-cuts still remain within the objective. For the capture of the Western portion of ZONNEBEKE, four assault sections would undoubtedly be required.

P.T.O.



- 5a -

(b) The quantity of requisite artillery and ammunition is set out in the accompanying scheme of the Divisional Artillery Commander. The Division concurs with these suggestions.

(c) Minenwerfers. It would be necessary to employ one M. W. Coy. on each flank of the attack, each with 8 medium T. M's and 8 light T.M's of the Infantry Regiments. 100 rounds of ammunition per T.M. would be necessary.

To expedite the delivery of this ammunition to the T.M's, several columns of pack animals should be attached.

### III. DIRECTION OF ATTACK.

The attack must be led by strong flanks, particularly from ZONNEBEKE and MOLENAARELSSTHOEK. The success of the attack depends largely on the reconnaissance of our present own and enemy's front lines by airmen.

### IV. TIME OF ATTACK.

On the day following the attack (raid?) of the "Gabain" group against POLYGONE WOOD. Assault 6 a.m.

V. As far as can be judged by the map, it seems desirable to regain possession of the heights, 500 metres West of ZONNEBEKE; this, however, depends upon results of a reconnaissance on the spot in the 20th Divisional sector, and on the result of the proposed operation.

### YPRES GROUP.

(Sgd.) V. Alt-Stutterheim.

\*\*\*\*\*

the moral of the English.

the attack is about considered necessary.

the Western portion would undoubtedly

which is, however,

0.1.0.



- 6 a -

1st ANZAC Corps SUMMARY, 5:10:17.PRISONERS STATEMENTS. 5th Gren. Regt. 4th Guard Division.

Composition of Companies: There appear to have been no Landsturm or Landwehr in the Regiment, all the latter having been picked out and sent back to be utilised as frontier guards, etc., Nearly the whole trench strength was comprised of 1917 class and a very small proportion of 1918 class. The returned wounded and reservists were mostly retained for transport duties.

Equipment of Enemy Troops. A cursory examination of enemy dead in our left Divisional sector reveals that the enemy's troops were exceptionally well equipped with brand new gear. Each man carried a patent cooker, some of which had the seals still unbroken. Water-bottles were filled with coffee and every man carried articles essential to storm troops. The majority of the troops were of a good stamp, their ages varying from 23 to 30 years.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.Information from Artillery prisoners.

1. Army Field-artillery reserves are now used in a similar manner to our Army Field Artillery Brigades.
2. Detached field guns are placed in the crater area and fire on infantry only.
3. Owing to frequent movement of batteries, a large number are now firing practically from the open, it being almost impossible to compete with construction of concrete emplacements.
4. Forward communication for F.O.O's to field batteries has been very difficult and in some cases impossible; hence much of the apparent disorganisation of enemy fire.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

New German "Minenwerfer" Shell: The examination of captured charges for a medium Minenwerfer has disclosed the introduction of the following:-

- (a) A 1917 pattern shell (Model 1917).
- (b) An increase in the weight of the charges Nos. 2 - 6 and a new full charge called No. 7 of 1920A pattern grammes (the original full charge, No. 6, weighed 154 grammes).

This points to an increase in range and to the possible introduction of a new pattern of medium Minenwerfer. Prisoners should be examined with reference to the above.

New Gas Shell. A 15 cm. gas shell of the usual 1912 n/A pattern has been found to contain Phenyl carbylamine chloride, which is probably made from the action of chlorine on phenyl mustard oil. The vapour resulting from this liquid has an irritating, unpleasant smell of mustard oil, and is a moderately powerful lachrymator. It is entirely different from "Yellow Cross" gas, which is, however, generally known as "mustard gas."

P.T.O.



- 7a -

FIRST ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17,

Prisoners' statements. Gas Shells are fired from the T.M. They are distinguished by 2 yellow bands round the shell.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Results of Bomb raids. A prisoner states that, on the night of the 20th or 21st September, our aeroplanes dropped bombs in the neighbourhood of LICHTERVELDE and hit an ammunition train. On the following day, the prisoner saw that the whole train had been demolished and the lines broken.

FIRST ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY, 5:10:17.

Miscellaneous. The Germans have the following form which they require prisoners to fill in:-

1. Write your name here.
2. Write the number of your Battalion here.
3. Write the number of your Division here.

All ranks are warned that the enemy cannot compel questions 2 and 3 to be answered.

SECOND ARMY SUMMARY, 5:10:17.The Calling up of 1919 and 1920 Classes.

1919 CLASS. The class as a whole was mustered throughout Germany in March and April and was called up during May and June.

In Baden and Alsace (XIV. and XV. Corps Districts), a certain number of recruits of this class were mustered in January, and called up in January and February, 1917.

1920 CLASS. Boys of the 1920 class have been mustered and called up for auxiliary service (HILFSDIENST) in certain Corps Districts. The 1920 class appears not to have yet commenced its military training.

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
2nd Aust. Div. H.Q.  
6th October, 1917.

\*\*\*\*

P.T.O.



(D) Mitte.



Objective ——— Direction of Attack ←







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 War Diary

XXX  
 App XXI  
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No. 10.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

-----  
 From 6 a.m. 6th to 6 a.m. 7th October 1917.

NOTE. : - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Artillery.

Harassing bursts of fire were carried out on tracks, wood woods, and ground between CHINA WOOD and FLINTE COPSE.

Patrols. Our patrols were active along the Divisional front during the night.

One which left our lines at D.29.b.0.9. encountered a party of 12 Germans about D.29.b.25.99. Fire was opened and hostile party scattered. It is not known if casualties were inflicted or not.

Another patrol left our trenches at D.29.b.16. and worked up to D.23.d.4.0. They report a hostile M.G. active at about D.23.d.2.2., and 4 others at about D.24.c.0.2.

Prisoners. Under cover of our practice barrage at 6.15 a.m. (7th) an enemy post in D.23.d. was rushed and 1 N.C.O. and 12 o.ranks captured and brought back to our lines. Prisoners belong to the 448th and 450th I.R. (233rd Div).

ENEMY SHELLING.

Square D.28. was shelled intermittently throughout the day, as was also the road running N and S along the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE. Most of the shells were 15 cm and 10.5 cm H.E., with a small proportion of 7.7 cm shrapnel.

Movement on the crest of the ridge almost invariably drew 7.7 cm fire from the direction of BROOGENBROODHOEK. ZONNEBEKE Church and THAMES WOOD were shelled at intervals during the day with 15 cm H.E.

In our back area squares J.7.a. and b., H.12.b. and d., were shelled at intervals with 7.7 cm and 10.5 cm, and 15 cm.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Machine Guns. Hostile machine guns are active firing from CHINA WOOD (D.24.c.)

4 M.Gs about 15 yards apart fired on one of our patrols from about D.24.c.0.2.

Another M.G. was located at D.23.d.2.2.

M.G. at D.23.d.35.35. (prisoners statements)

Listening Posts. Were located at D.23.d.13 and D.23.d. 7.5.

New Work. Men were seen digging in E.19.b. and d.

Strong Post. Suspected at E.13.c.30.43.43.43.43.

Wire. No wire is visible on our front from ground observation, but it is probable that many of the small clumps of bushes and woods on our front are wired.

Guns. A battery of four guns has been located at E.20.c

7.3. Another battery of four guns was observed firing on a T.B. of 98° from O.P. at D.28.c.15.20.

P.T.O.



MOVEMENT IN ENEMY'S LINES.

A great deal of movement has been observed in and around a clump of bushes on the crest of the ridge at about E.13.c.3.4.

Machine guns have been reported firing from about this point.

In front of our Left Bde there are numerous clumps of bushes many of which appear to conceal enemy posts.

Between 7 and 9 a.m. several parties of about 20 men each in small groups moved from cross roads D.24.d.25.75, to D.30.b.3.9.

At 11 a.m. a party of 30 men near a pill-box at D.23.d.10.75 were fired on by our Lewis guns, and three casualties inflicted; party disappeared. A few minutes later about 10 of them re-appeared carrying a Red Cross flag. Our Lewis guns fired on them, and they again disappeared.

At 1 p.m. 10 men were seen moving from EFFECT COPSE (D.24.d.9.1.) towards D.24.central.

During the day small parties of from 3 to 4 were moving to and fro at E.13.c.2.7., and E.19.d.2.9.

At 3.30 p.m. several men were observed at E.19.a.8.7.

At 4 p.m. 3 horse wagons were seen towards MOORSLEDE on road at E.9.central. *(moving)*

Snipers. Enemy snipers and M.Gs were active throughout the night firing on the crest of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE.

Flares. The enemy fired a number of RED and GREEN flares at 12 midnight. Nothing followed. Throughout the remainder of the night DOUBLE YELLOW flares were sent up.

AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Enemy 'Planes were fairly active during the day.

Between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. 8 'planes patrolled our front and support lines.

Between 5.10. and 6.25.p.m. several flights of about 6 planes each, flew up and down our front and support lines, and dropped several WHITE flares.

In each case our M.Gs opened fire without any noticeable results.

At 3 a.m. an enemy 'Plane dropped bombs in D.28.b.

MISCELLANEOUS.

There is a large sandy pit at D.23.d.05.10.

*J. J. M. Call Capt.*  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.

Examination of Prisoners - Appendix - attached.

P.T.O.



APPENDIX.

-3-

No. 10.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS OF (448th  
Div) captured in D.23.d. at 6.15. a.m. 7th Oct. during our  
practice barrage.

Prisoners stated that their Division was relieved by the 36th Div. in ST QUENTIN Sector, and left there on the 1st Oct. They were trained up to ROULERS where they spent the 2nd inst. On the 3rd inst, they were bussed to MOORSLEDE, and marched up into reserve in E.14.b. on night 4/5th.

448th I.R. went into the line in front of DAISY WOOD, night 5/6th, relieving the 5th FOOT GUARDS and elements of the 211th RIR. They have all four companies in the line with the 1st Bn in close support, and 1 Bn in reserve in E.14.b.

450th I.R., 3rd Bn, 12th Coy, came into the line at 10.30.p.m. night 6/7th, relieving the 5th BAV.I.R.

Order of Battle N.to S.

450th I.R. 448th I.R.

The 449th I.R. is in reserve, but will, according to prisoners, relieve the 448th I.R. in the line tonight.

450th I.R. 12th Coy, is commanded by Lieut HEINSCH, and has a trench strength of about 75 men.

The front line consists of a series of shell holes held by infantry with 3 Light M.Gs per Coy sector.

Prisoners state that they had no intention of counter-attacking us, but were told by their officers that we were now digging in, and they must do likewise. Some prisoners stated that no further attacks by us were expected, while others stated that they were expecting further attacks by us.

Prisoners stated that 2 days ago they saw some men of the 211th R.I.R. (45 Res Div) in MOORSLEDE. They also saw one battalion of the 94th I.R. in E.13., and were told that the 82nd RIR. were near. This seems to indicate that the 22nd Res Div will be coming into the line just north of our sector.

They further stated that MOORSLEDE is full of troops, and the MOORSLEDE - DROOGENBROODHOEK Road is always crowded with troops at night.



1a.

Appendix to 2nd Aust Div Int Summary No. 10.

EXTRACTS FROM 2nd ARMY and 1st ANZAC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.

1st ANZAC CORPS SUMMARY 6-10-17

Prisoners of War.

The total number of prisoners captured since 6 a.m., 4th October is 34 officers and 1,057 other ranks.

Miscellaneous.

The following are extracts from captured enemy documents.

Additional order for the attack of October 3rd.

Units will advance with fixed bayonets and will attack with loud shouting of "Hurra".

Experience has proved that the English have never been able to withstand an attack of that sort.

Special attention is drawn to the fact that the English always respect the Red Cross.

A stretcher-bearer will therefore walk ahead of stretcher-bearer parties, and will steadily wave a large Red Cross flag.

2nd ARMY SUMMARY. 6-10-17.

Enemy's Rear Lines.

Prisoners report that the wire of the PASSCHENDAELE TERHAND Line in 28 E 200 is quite good, standing about 4-5 ft high and being about 20 yards deep.

Information from Captured Documents.

Transfer of Cavalry to Infantry. Extract from letter dated 9/9/17: - "Anton Zeller, the proud Ulan, has had to put away his uniform and go to the Machine Guns at LANDAU. That's a bit of a come down". All the Uhlans have been transferred to the Infantry or Machine Guns.

Rewards. - Regiment unknown - "N.C.Os. and men who take a prisoner will be promoted for bravery and can start tomorrow for 14 days leave. In addition I refer to the rewards already published."

Losses. - 20th Division.

A prisoner (Platoon Commander) of the 12th Coy, 77th I.R. (20th Div) states that his Coy had been reduced from a trench strength of 110-120 to 24 during the 6 days preceding our attack. These casualties were entirely due to our artillery bombardment and included several men buried and suffering from shell shock who were sent back by the company commander. Prisoner states that this reduction in the strength was not abnormal in the Coys holding the front line. He further states that casualties in the STADEN-ZONNEBEKE Line were apparently greater. The Bn Commander of the IIIrd Bn in the front line preferred not to be relieved on the 3rd inst as he considered the front line safer than the support position.

The 20th Div seems to have had an exceptionally high percentage of casualties, both in killed and in prisoners; and to have been practically wiped out with the exception of those elements which escaped from the STADEN-ZONNEBEKE Line, though these probably suffered heavy losses from our barrage in escaping.

(Continued)



2a.

1st ANZAC SUMMARY 6-10-17.

TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

Extracts from orders of 5th Guard Inf. Bde., 29th Sept 1917

Tomorrow, according to prisoners' statements, there will be a battle of first importance.

Regiments are to make preparations for complete readiness for battle, and for the protection of ways of communication.

At the Commanders' conference today, mention was made on all sides of the fact that the counter-attacks of reserve and storm Divisions usually come too late in cases of a hostile attack with a limited objective, and that the losses caused in this way are out of proportion to the success gained. In many cases the counter-attack hardly reached the front line then held; heavy casualties were suffered and the whole thing was a failure, as our enemy contented himself with the objective already gained.

His gain in ground was secured by his numberless machine guns, which he immediately built in, by his protective waves following close behind the attackers, who dug themselves under the latter's protection. He was enabled by this means to beat off our counter-attack.

It has therefore proved itself necessary to strengthen the front line in order to make possible the repulse of the enemy's troops, and command of the occupied shell hole line, here a matter for its own garrison.

Our garrison must therefore, as far as possible, avoid being scattered at the time of an infantry attack, so that the exact line of our forward position may remain unbeknown to the enemy, and his fire may lift from the shell holes lying in front of our line, or, in the case of a narrow interval between the trenches, while the enemy is making preparation for an attack, he may be rushed with bayonets and bombs, which a thinly held post line is not in a position to carry out.

In all sectors, the dispositions are to be made in such a way, that 6 companies occupy the front line and just behind the front line, while the other half of the Regiment is distributed further back in the open outside the principal zone of fire.

A strongly held front line demands the establishment of numerous '08 M.Gs. Two M.G. Companies of the Regiment must be distributed in the front line and the area immediately behind it, while the 3rd M.G. Company takes up the line of the emergency garrison and the area occupied by the rear 6 companies.

The new fighting tactics of the enemy, wherein he sets a very limited objective to his attacks, compels us to change our policy, which has been to defend any extensive breaks of our line with subsequent operations.

Regiments will test their organisation with this end in view, and will report how circumstances permit this policy to be carried out. Report as to action taken to be sent in at once.

Brigade orders of today's date regarding the explicit principles for defence are to be altered in accordance with these orders.

\*\*\*\*\*

(Continued)



- 3a -

## SECOND ARMY SUMMARY - 6:10:17.

\*\*\*\*\*

THE GENERAL SITUATION.

The enemy's actions yesterday and to-day lead still further to the conclusion that he has been very seriously demoralised by our attack of the 4th. The large number of prisoners taken by this Army from an area representing the front of three Divisions and the casualties known to have been inflicted on him as evidenced by the killed and wounded found within our own lines are, in themselves, sufficiently serious; but, in addition, there is a mixture of regiments and the accompanying fact of our taking prisoners from nearly every company of the Divisions represented.

Other signs of the enemy's disorganisation are:-

1. The re-arrangement of his guns and their re-establishment further back or to the flanks of former positions.
2. The movement of his wireless stations.
3. The inevitable reliefs of some of the shattered divisions now known to be proceeding.

Probably the best signs of the enemy's demoralisation lie in the fact that he has as yet attempted no serious counter-attack with large forces. It is true that various small local counter-attacks were made by some of his battalions in the afternoon and evening of zero day, but only one of these (about REUTEL) even reached any serious proportions. In this respect he is notwithstanding the operation which he himself initiated south of ZONNEBEKE simultaneous with our attack - not following the counter-attack policy which he had evidently laid down for himself in the event of our further advance.

The extent to which he attempted his large attack has now been disclosed by captured documents. It appears that a large attack involving several divisions had been planned for the morning of the 3rd instant on a very wide front with objectives extending from the South side of POLYgone WOOD to ZONNEBEKE (2 miles) arranged in two sectors. The failure, however, of their furious efforts to drive in our line about CAMERON COVERT on the 30th September and 1st October necessitated not only abandoning the southern sector of the main attack but its postponement 24 hours to daybreak of the 4th, when it met with such a disaster.

It is therefore evident that not only were the effects of our attack so great, but that the enemy had become so committed to his own plan of attack in front of BROODSEINDE Ridge that he was unable to convert the situation into anything but a defensive action, not only for hours but for days after.

The train movement yesterday and to-day has been abnormal on those lines tributary to this front, but this is to be expected under the circumstances, as doubtless reliefs and evacuation of wounded is proceeding with all haste. It is however, difficult to conceive what confusion may probably exist in sorting out his units near the front, mixed as they were, and in properly supplying and moving them.

P. T. O.



The past 24 hours there have been several signs that have indicated uncertainty on the part of the enemy as to organising his line of defence, especially between BECELAERE and the ROULERS Railway. His machine-gun and rifle fire is erratic and his artillery continues to change rearward and to the flanks in a manner which seems to indicate some new defensive policy in connection with the KEIBERG Ridge; his Wireless stations too have been significantly silent in this locality and some have moved back. It is possible that he is getting his guns into a favourable position on the flanks to infilade and bombard the BROODSEINDE Ridge while at the same time to anticipate the possibility of our further advance here. It is to be expected that he will make a counter-attack of large proportions somewhere in this locality, but how soon and with what troops it would be difficult at present to conjecture. It is also to be expected that he will continue to attack in the vicinity of BECELAERE.

The abnormal train movements which continue this afternoon and which now seem to be more than would be warranted by ordinary reliefs and evacuation of wounded, would appear to indicate the arrival of fresh reserves in considerable numbers. On this account it would be reasonable to expect that the counter-attacks indicated above might be put in within the next 48 hours.

As to his garrisons and his reserve divisions, there is not much that is definite at present, except that the Divisions which have had the worst losses are being relieved. So far as is known, no new reserves have as yet got close up to the battle front, but it is most likely that several divisions are now either up or en route from the South, and more - like the 19th Reserve and the 20th - may still be expected from the Russian front.

\*\*\*\*\*

2nd Aust. D. H. Q.

7th October, 1917.

P. T. O.



XXX

App. XXII

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET.

Copy No. 10

AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
(GENERAL STAFF.)

G/753.

Headquarters,  
7th October, 1917.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS No. 2.

Series No. 3.

Reference to BECELAERE and PASSCHENDAELE Sheets 1/10,000.

Reference Preliminary Instructions No. 1, Series No. 3 -  
Cancel Para 1 and objective shown on attached map. \*

SITUATION. 1. (a) On the 4th October the Second and Fifth Armies advanced their line. -  
The front line of 1st ANZAC Corps now runs approximately as shown on attached map.

(b). On "X" Day the Second and Fifth Armies will continue their advance in co-operation. -  
The Second Army operation is to be effected by the 1st and 2nd ANZAC Corps.  
On the 1st ANZAC Corps front the operation will be carried out by the 2nd Australian Division..

(c) The objective of the 2nd ANZAC Corps is a N.W. and S.E. line facing PASSCHENDAELE.

OPERATIONS. 2. (a) The next step in the operations of the 2nd Australian Division will be the capture and consolidation of the line -

D.24.a.3.8 - D.18.e.3.0 - D.18.c.4.4 - D.18.c.8.8 -  
D.18.a.9.0. - D.18.b.05.40 - to railway (inclusive)  
at D.18.b.0.8 shown in BLUE on attached map.

(b). The operation will be effected in two stages -

i. The advance to the RED LINE -

D.23.d.1.1 - D.23.d.4.5 - D.23.b.6.0 -  
D.24.a.0.3 - D.24.a.3.8 - D.18.b.2.0 -  
D.18.b.0.3 - D.17.d.6.8 - to the railway  
inclusive at D.17.d.45.35.

ii. The advance to the BLUE LINE.

D.24.a.3.8 - D.18.c.4.4 - D.18.a.9.0 -  
D.18.b.0.8 (Railway inclusive).

BOUNDARIES. 3. The attached map shows the Divisional and inter-brigade boundaries.

forward.

P.T.O.

*War Diary*



TROOPS.

4. On the 2nd Australian Division front the attack will be carried out by the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right and the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the left.

The 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. will be in divisional reserve.

The 66th Division (2nd ANZAC Corps) will attack on the left of the 2nd Australian Division.

The 197th Inf. Brigade will be the right brigade of the 66th Division.

ARTILLERY.

5. (a) The 2nd Australian Division will be covered by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisional Artilleries, 1st and 4th (C.1 and C Groups) covering the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde., 2nd (D Group) covering the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

(b) The barrage which will be placed over the whole Corps front will be put down for four minutes on the opening barrage line - It will then move forward to the RED LINE at the rate of 100 yards in six minutes.

The RED protective barrage which will be placed 200 yards in advance of the RED LINE will lift at zero plus 100 minutes. It will then move forward at the uniform rate of 100 yards in six minutes to the BLUE LINE.

MACHINE GUNS.

6. Each attacking brigade will have half its own machine gun company as mobile guns.

The Reserve Brigade will have 10 guns of its company at its own disposal.

The 22nd Aust. M. G. Coy. and the remainder of the 5th, 6th and 7th Machine Gun Companies will be employed under the D.M.G.O. in accordance with special machine gun instructions to be issued.

COMMUNICATIONS.

7. In the forthcoming operations success signals will be fired by assaulting troops. The capture of the various objectives must be reported by the ordinary signal service means, - lamp, pigeon, power buzzer, telephone or runner.

Signal instructions will be drawn up by the O.C., 2nd Aust. Division Signal Coy. and issued to all concerned.

The buried cable is being continued from TOKIO (present cable head) to MOULIN FARM.

8. Administrative and Medical instructions will be issued separately.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND MEDICAL INSTRUCTIONS.

9. A precis of all available information as regards the country in front and enemy dispositions will be circulated later.

PLANS.

10. The G.O's.C., 5th and 6th Aust. Inf. Bdes., will submit brief plans of operations showing the allocation of units to objectives, positions at zero, and hour at which each of the battalions in rear move forward.

P. T. O.



11. SYNCHRONISATION OF WATCHES.

Paris time will be sent out twice daily to the 5th, 6th and 7th Aust. Inf. Bdes.

P.O.W. STRAGGLER POSTS.

12. The same instructions apply as were given in para. 22 Preliminary Instructions No. 1, Series No. 2, dated 29th September, except that the Intelligence personnel for the D.I.C. will be detailed from the 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. instead of the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

LIAISON.

13. The C.R.A. will arrange for Liaison with the Artillery of Divisions on the flanks.  
The 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. will send a liaison Officer to the 197th Infantry Brigade and to the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
The 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. will send a liaison officer to the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
Adjoining battalions in the attack must have liaison with each other.  
Capt. ROYDHOUSE is detailed as liaison officer from the 2nd Australian Division to the 66th Division.

POINTS OF JUNCTION.

14. Points of junction between brigades will be arranged mutually between Brigadiers concerned and notified to this office.

HEADQUARTERS.

15. Headquarters will be as follows:-  
2nd Aust. Div. Adv. H.Q. - YPRES RAMPARTS.  
66th Division do. - MENIN GATE, YPRES.  
5th Aust. I.Bde. do. - D.26.c.1.3.  
6th do. do. - SANS SOUCI, J. 2.3.6.  
7th do. do. - D.26.c.1.3.  
197th Inf. Bde. do. - (To be notified)

PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS.

16. Attention is drawn to the following Preliminary instructions which apply equally to this stage of the operations. -  
Preliminary Instructions No. 1, Series No. 2, of 29th September, paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 (and addendum thereto dated 1st October).  
Preliminary Instructions No. 2, Series No. 2, of 30th September, paragraphs 30 and 31.

FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.

17. The 5th and 6th Aust. Inf. Brigades must be prepared to remain in the line for 48 hours after the attack. They may be relieved earlier, but this will depend on subsequent operations.

18. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*G. H. H. H. H.*  
for Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 1 p.m.

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* 3.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
* 4.	6th do.
* 5.	7th do.
6.	1st ANZAC Corps.
7.	1st Australian Division.
8.	66th Division.
9.	57th H. A. G.
10.	O.C., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
11.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
* 12.	A.D.M.S.
13.	A.Q.
14.	D.M.G.O.
15.	File.
16-18.	War Diary.
19-29.	Spare.

\* MAP ATTACHED.

\*\*\*\*\*

Series No. 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 (October).  
Series No. 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 (October).

Brigades must be relieved for 48 hours after this date, but this may be done earlier, if necessary.


General Staff,  
Australian Division.



# POLYGON WOOD

German Trenches corrected to 4-9-17. Part of Sheet 28.

EDITION I.A



**SECRET**

Copy No 8

FRONT LINE

2ND AUSTR DIVISION

LEFT BDE

RIGHT BDE

CORPS

BOUNDARY

BOUNDARY

BOUNDARY

BOUNDARY

APPROXIMATE

BRITISH

F.S. (6) 1003 27-81

Scale 1:20,000



SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET.

Copy No. 19

Headquarters,  
7th October, 1917.

OPERATIONS.

\*\*\*

Map Ref. - ZONNEBEKE Sheet 1/10,000.

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 - Series No. 3.

(To be read in conjunction with Corps M. G. Instructions, Series No. iv, Divisional Orders, Instructions and Memoranda).

GUNS AVAILABLE.

- 1. The number of guns available on the Divisional front will be 64, i.e.,  
5th; 6th; 7th; 22nd Aust. M. G. Coys.

DISTRIBUTION OF GUNS AND TASKS.

- 2. Reference Task Map No. 1 issued herewith:-

COY.	DISTRIBUTION OF GUNS.					TOTAL.
	Target M.C. (Covering fire)	Target M.D. (covering fire)	Target K.B. (S.O.S.)	Brigade Mobile Guns.	DIV'L RESERVE Guns in Camp.	
5th.	-	-	-	8	8	16.
6th.	6	-	-	8	2	16.
7th.	-	6	-	10	-	16.
22nd.	-	-	8	-	8	16.
TOTAL.	6	6	8	26	18	64

DIVISIONAL RESERVE GUNS.

- 3. (Guns for targets MA & MB are provided by 1st A.Div.)  
The Reserve Guns in camp will be maintained in a constant state of readiness to reinforce or relieve guns in the line.

MOBILE GUNS.

- 4. Definite tasks should be given each gun or pair of guns and the approximate position for each team to make for should be clearly laid down in their orders.  
These guns should be able by direct fire to prevent any enemy advance from an Easterly direction and a sharp look out kept over the low ground towards E.19. Central.  
At least one sub-section (2 guns) should be maintained as a local reserve to replace personnel and material that may become casualties.

COMPANY AND OTHER COMMANDERS.

- 5. Company Commanders of 6th and 7th Companies will at once detail the necessary officers to command the guns for covering fire, supplied by their respective Companies, and will supervise the reconnaissance and other necessary preparations for their own guns; in other respects they will be at the disposal of Brigade Commanders. Names of Battery Commanders selected to be notified to D.M.G.O. Capt. A. McLENNAN will act as Group Commander for the S.O.S. and Covering Fire guns.

P.T.O.

*Mac Denny*



63

S.O.S. AND COVERING FIRE GUNS. POSITIONS, COVER, AMMUNITION, WATER, ETC.

- 3. Positions for guns as shown on map are approximate only and may be varied as long as the task set can be carried out with safety to our own troops. Company Commanders will ensure that :- "Positions are selected and suitable cover constructed." 1,500 rounds S.A.A. per gun are provided at each position. 2 petrol tins full of drinking water for each gun team. Sufficient water, oil and cleaning material for guns. Necessary calculations made, Fire organisation orders and Barrage Charts prepared and checked. D.M.G.O. to be notified of positions selected as soon as possible.

TIME-TABLE.

- 7. Time-table will be issued as soon as known.

ZERO DAY AND HOUR.

- 8. Attack will probably be on 9th instant. Zero hour will be notified later.

POSITION OF GROUP COMDR.

- 9. D.27.c.85.15.

REPORTS.

- 10. To D.M.G.O. at advanced Divisional H.Q. YPRES RAMPARTS.

- 11. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*G. H. H. Col.*  
 Lieut-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.

Issued at 1 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

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- 3-4 6th do.
- 5-6 7th do.
- 7 22nd Aust. M.G. Coy.

- 8. 1st ANZAC Corps.
- 9. C.M.G.O. 1st ANZAC Corps.
- 10. D.M.G.O., 1st Aust. Division.
- 11. D.M.G.O., 2nd Aust. Division.
- 12. D.M.G.O., 4th Aust. Division.
- 13. D.M.G.O., 5th Aust. Division.
- 14. D.M.G.O., 66th Division.
- 15. C. R. A.
- 16. A. Q.
- 17. D. B. O.
- 18. File.
- 19-21. War Diary.
- 22-31. Spare.

Map to - 6th A.M.G.Co.  
 7th -do-  
 22nd -do-

P.1.0.




TASK MAP  
referred to in  
M.C. Instructions No 1  
Series No 3.

Appendix No. X 277  
89

# BECELAERE


German Trenches corrected to 21-9-17.

Part of Sheet 28.



F.8.07 1122 21 242 655 12 917

Battery Positions (solid black dots)  
 (dashed lines) Probably Timber or Camouflaged  
 (solid lines) Probably Concrete  
 Organised Shell Holes (circles with dots)





Task map  
Corps  
M/G Justus  
No 1 (3)