

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/44/27 Part 4

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 2nd  
Australian Division

October 1917



AWM4-1/44/27PART4



63  
War Diary

App. XL

123

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

G.204.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Location of Units at 8 a.m. 13th October 1917.

DIV. H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	Rue de Carnot.
Div Artillery H.Q..	OUDEZEELE.	J.14.a. Sheet 27.
4th & 5th A.F.A.Bdes	IN LINE	Under 4th Aust Div.
2nd Aust D.A.C.	do	do
5th Aust Inf Bde H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	20 Rue Poperinghe.
17th Bn.	STEENVOORDE AREA	K.25.c.4.2.
18th Bn.	"	J.30.c.6.1.
19th Bn.	"	J.35.d.6.9.
20th Bn.	"	J.22.d.6.7.
5th A.M.G.Coy.	"	J.24.d.7.9.
5th A.L.T.M.Bty.	"	J.27.d.8.9.
6th Aust Inf Bde H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	68 Rue Poperinghe.
21st Bn.	STEENVOORDE AREA.	K.35.a.8.3.
22nd Bn.	"	K.15.d.8.1.
23rd Bn.	"	K.27.d.1.7.
24th Bn.	"	K.28.a.1.7.
6th A.M.G.Coy.	"	K.27.central.
6th A.L.T.M.Bty.	"	K.28.d.3.8.
7th Aust Inf Bde H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	6 Rue de Cassel.
25th Bn.	STEENVOORDE AREA	K.20.b.5.2.
26th Bn.	"	K.8.c.1.5.
27th Bn.	"	K.25.central.
28th Bn.	"	K.26.d.9.4.
7th A.M.G.Coy.	"	K.31.b.7.3.
7th A.L.T.M.Bty.	"	K.26.d.8.9.
O.R.E.	KRUISSTRAAT.	H.18.c.8.2. Sht 28.
5th A.Field Coy.	H.21.b.2.2.	"
6th do	I.14.b.3.8.	"
7th do	I.14.a.4.3.	"
2nd Aust Pioneer Bn.	SWAN CHATEAU.	I.19.c.3.7. "
A.D.M.S.	STEENVOORDE.	Rue Carnot.
5th A.Field Ambloc.	WARATAH CAMP.	G.15.c.2.9. Sht 28.
6th do	STEENVOORDE.	K.21.c.7.3.
7th do	RENINGHELST.	Sht 28.
Div Train H.Q..	G.19.b.7.7.	Sht 28
15th A.A.S.C.	P.5.b.1.5.	Sht 27
16th do	K.34.c.8.8.	"
17th do	K.32.c.5.0.	"
20th do	G.26.a.1.9.	Sht 28.
2nd Aust D.S.C.	L.33.c.2.5.	Sht 27.
Div Units.		
22nd Aust M.G.Coy.	P.4.d.70.95.	
D.M.G.O.	at D.H.Q.	
D.A.D.O.S.	STEENVOORDE	
D.A.D.V.S.	do	
Lob Vet Sect.	K.25.c.8.5.	
Paymaster.	STEENVOORDE.	

TO BE DESTROYED ON RECEIPT  
OF A LETTER FROM

*H. L. M. Tall Coy*  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.



War Diary

App. XL1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.  
SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

G.212.

Location of units at 8.0 a.m., 15th October, 1917.

DIV. H. Q.	STEENVOORDE.	Rue de Carnot.
Div. Artillery H. Q.	OUDEZEELE.	J.14.a: Sheet 27.
4th & 5th A.F.Bdes.	In Line.	Under 4th Aust. Div.
2nd Aust. D. A. C.	do.	do.
5th Aust. Inf.Bde.H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	20 GRANDE PLACE.
17th Battalion.	STEENVOORDE Area.	K.25.c.4.2.
18th do.	do.	J.30.c.6.1.
19th do.	do.	J.36.c.1.8.
20th do.	do.	J.22.d.6.7.
5th A.M.G. Coy.	do.	J.24.d.7.9.
5th A.L.T.M.Bty.	do.	J.27.d.8.6.
6th Aus. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	68 Rue Poperinghe.
21st Battalion.	STEENVOORDE Area.	K.35.c.8.3.
22nd do.	do.	H.15.d.5.6.
23rd do.	do.	K.35.a.6.2.
24th do.	do.	K.27.d.8.6.
6th A.M.G. Coy.	do.	K.28.a.0.0.
6th A.L.T.M.Bty.	do.	K.28.c.1.7.
7th Aus. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	STEENVOORDE.	6 Rue de Cassel.
25th Battalion.	do. area.	K.20.d.5.2.
26th do.	do.	K.14.c.9.2.
27th do.	do.	K.25.c.8.8.
28th do.	do.	K.27.a.4.9.
7th A.M.G. Coy.	do.	K.26.a.2.1.
7th A.L.T.M.Bty.	do.	K.26.d.8.9.
G.R.E.	KRUISSTRAAT.	H.18.c.8.2. Sheet 28.
5th A. Field Coy.	H.21.b.2.2.	"
6th do.	I.14.b.3.8.	"
7th do.	I.14.a.4.3.	"
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	SWAN CHATEAU	I.19.c.3.7. "
A.D.M.S.	STEENVOORDE.	Rue Carnot.
5th A.F. Ambulance.	WARATAH CAMP.	G.15.c.2.9. Sheet 28.
6th do.	STEENVOORDE.	K.21.c.7.3.
7th do.	RENINGHELST.	Sheet 28.
Div. Train H. Q.	G.19.b.7.7.	Sheet 28.
15th A.A.S.C.	P.5.b. 1.5.	Sheet 27.
16th do.	K.34.c.8.8.	"
17th do.	K.32.c.5.0.	"
20th do.	G.26.a.1.9.	Sheet 28.
2nd Aust. D.S.C.	L.33.c.2.5.	Sheet 27.
Div. Units.		
22nd Aus. M.G. Coy.	P.4.d.70.95.	
D.M.G.O.	at D.H.Q.	
D.A.D.O.S.	STEENVOORDE.	
D.A.D.V.S.	do.	
Mob. Vet. Sect.	J.14.a.5.9.	Sheet 27.
Paymaster.	STEENVOORDE.	

TO BE DESTROYED ON  
RECEIPT OF A LATER ISSUE.

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*J. L. M. Call Capt.*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET.

M. G. 32

REPORT on action of VICKERS  
Machine Guns during offensive operations, 4th to 5th Oct., 1917.

DISTRIBUTION  
and TASKS of  
GUNS.

1. Creeping Barrage. - - - 16 guns.  
S.O.S. and Creeping Barrage - 22 guns.  
Mobile Guns. - - - 32 guns.

CREEPING  
BARRAGE  
GROUP.

2. These guns "D" and "E" Batteries, were furnished by 5th A.M.G. Coy. under Capt. HAMILTON, fired to time table and task map issued by the Corps. On completion of Creeping task and after the capture of the BLUE Line, both batteries were moved forward to positions at D.22.c.8.8 and prepared to engage any targets between 30 degrees and 120 degrees Grid, by indirect fire; on evening of the 4th "D" battery relieved "K" on S.O.S. Line. On evening of 5th October "E" battery was withdrawn to rest for next operation.

S.O.S.  
BARRAGE  
GROUP.

3. This group consisted of "I" "J" and "K" batteries - 22nd Aust. M. G. Coy. and 6 guns of 5th Australian Division - under Capt. A. McLENNAN as Group Commander. They supplied the Creeping barrage from the BLUE Line forward as per task map, and then stood by for S.O.S. purposes.  
The time-table was maintained, and S.O.S. calls as under were promptly answered by barrages on the S.O.S. line.

4th Oct. - 10.40 a.m., 3.15 p.m., 7.5 p.m.  
5th Oct. - 10.5 p.m.

This line was maintained until 8 a.m. on morning of 8th October.

## MOBILE GUNS.

4. These guns, 6th and 7th A.M.G. Companies, were placed entirely at the disposal of their own brigades, except that 4 guns per brigade were ordered to be set apart for A. A. Defence.

4 guns from each brigade were placed in front line, remainder distributed in depth as usual.

## RESULTS.

5. Nothing new was disclosed in regard to results of the fire from the barrage guns. It is again suggested that special enquiries be made from Infantry Officers that prisoners be questioned, and that enquiries be made from Army Medical Officers, as to the wounds amongst the prisoners dealt with that are caused by machine gun or rifle fire. As there is an almost entire absence of rifle fire during the actual advance, this would furnish some guide as to the material effect of the barrage fire.

## APPENDICES.

6. Appendices attached:-

- (a) Casualties - Personnel.
- (b) Ammunition expended.
- (c) Material destroyed or damaged.

File

Herdish

Major, D.M.G.  
Second Australian Div



4th and 5th OCTOBER.

APPENDIX "A."CASUALTIES - PERSONNEL.

COMPT.	KILLED.		WOUNDED		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
5th.	-	6	3	23	-	-	3	29
6th.	-	2	2	16	-	-	2	20
7th.	-	3	3	25	-	-	3	28
22nd.	-	12	-	26	-	1	-	39
Totals.	-	23	8	92	-	1	8	116

APPENDIX "B."AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Creeping Barrage Group.	-	-	163,000.
S.O.S. Barrage Group.	-	-	490,000
Mobile Guns.	-	-	210,000
Totals.			663,000

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APPENDIX "C."MATERIAL DESTROYED AND LOST.

Coy.	Guns.		Tri-		Spare		Spare		Belt		Belt		Bar-		Glinom-	
			Pods.		parts		Parts		boxes.		Belts.		Mill.		rels.	sters.
					boxes.		Cases.						Mchns.			
5th.	4	3		3		3		54		120		-	6		2	
6th.	-	-		-		-		-		-		-	-		-	
7th.	2	-		-		-		16		16		-	-		-	
22nd.	4	7		2		3		50		50		-	-		5	
	10	10		5		6		120		186		-	6		7	



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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2ND  
AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
M.G. 33  
SECRET.

14/10/17

Report on action of Vickers Machine guns during  
offensive operations, 9th October, 1917.

DISTRIBUTION  
and TASKS.

1. Covering fire - 12 guns.
- S.O.S. line cover-  
ing Right flank 8 guns.
- Mobile Guns - 26.
- Div'l. Reserve - 18 = Total 64 Guns.

COVERING FIRE 2.  
& S.O.S.  
BATTERIES.

These guns carried out the tasks  
allotted to them by Corps and Divisional  
Instructions according to time-table.

The two batteries told off for covering  
fire on the BROOGEN - BROODHORN Ridge con-  
sisted of 6 guns each and were located at  
D.22.d.95.35 and D.22.d.75.85 respectively  
and suffered heavily from shell fire.

The S.O.S. battery at D.27.d.75.80 came  
off much lighter although it had been in the  
same position since the opening of the second  
series of operations.

On the evening of the 9th at 6 p.m. the  
3 batteries were instructed through their  
Group Commander to lay out S.O.S. line across  
the Divisional front in practically the same  
position as it would have been put had the  
final objective been reached. This putting  
of the line well out was necessary owing to  
the uncertainty then existing as to the  
exact position of our own most advanced  
posts and also of the troops on our left.

At 9 a.m. on morning of 10th the centre  
battery was withdrawn on the recommendation  
of the Group Commander, it having been reduced  
to two guns and 12 men and the remainder  
being very much shaken. One gun was taken  
to replace gun out of action in left battery.

The Right Brigade was informed by  
telephone of this withdrawal and requested to  
warn Mobile guns on their front to be extra  
watchful.

The two remaining batteries were withdrawn  
when line taken over by 4th Australian Division  
at 8 a.m. on 11th October.

## MOBILE GUNS.

3.

8 guns were allotted to each attacking  
Brigade. In the case of the Right Brigade  
4 guns went forward with the infantry and all  
were put out of action before any opportunity  
of firing occurred.

W. A. D. I.



- 2 -

Practically nothing of any value was done by these Mobile guns. The Company Commander considers that the guns would have done better in the face of the hostile Machine Gun fire and sniping, to have waited until dusk before going over to take part in the consolidation.

In the case of the left brigade, one section, (4 guns) was attached to each assaulting battalion. Two guns under Lieut. Gritten appear to have been cut off by the enemy according to the account of a wounded man of the section. The remainder appear to have had very little opportunity of inflicting any loss on the enemy although they were posted in positions to give immediate support if required, and remained in these positions until relieved by the 12th A. M. G. Company on the night 10th/11th October.

GENERAL REMARKS. 4. The condition of the ground cut up as it was with shell holes, combined with the bad weather, made the difficulties, which are always present with Machine Guns, much greater and the work much heavier than usual.

Under similar circumstances it would appear that better results would be attained at less cost if a smaller proportion of Vickers guns were allotted for front line objectives, the guns being retained mainly in suitable intermediate positions from which they can fire over the front line, or in case of front line being driven back permitting the intervening ground to be swept clear of advancing enemy.

APPENDICES  
ATTACHED.

5. (a). Casualties - Personnel.  
(b). Ammunition expended.  
(c). Material destroyed and lost.

*H. C. Smith* Major, D.M.G.O.,  
Second Australian Division.



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

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OPERATIONS 9th & 10th OCTOBER.APPENDIX "A."CASUALTIES - PERSONNEL.

COMPANY.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Offr.	O.R.	Offr.	O.R.	Offr.	O.R.	Offr.	O.R.
5th.	-	5	1	21	1	10	2	36
6th.	1	14	1	10	-	-	2	24
7th.	-	4	-	10	-	-	-	14
22nd.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1	23	2	41	1	10	4	74

APPENDIX "B."AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

S.O.S. and Creeping Barrage guns (20).	-	-	131,000
Mobile Guns. (16).	-	-	5,000
Total.	-	-	136,000

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APPENDIX "C."
MATERIAL DESTROYED AND LOST.  
 (Small articles not included).

Comp.	Guns.	Tri- pods.	S. P. boxes.	S. P. cases.	Belt boxes.	Bar- rels.	Glinch- sters.	Tele- phones.	Buzzer Unit.
5th.	5	5	11	11	48	48	10	1	1
6th.	7	6	-	-	90	90	-	-	-
7th.	7	-	-	8	70	70	-	-	-
22nd.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total.	19	11	11	17	208	208	10	4	1



SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

G.3/128.

Headquarters,  
15<sup>th</sup> October, 1917.

First ANZAC Corps.  
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Reference your 164/61, dated 22nd September; Report No. 4.

1. The attack was launched at 5.20 a.m. on the 9th October, with the 6th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the right and the 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the left. The right Brigade encountered strong opposition in DAISY WOOD and came under heavy machine gun fire from BUSY WOOD. This held up the Brigade for some considerable time, but DAISY WOOD was eventually cleared and the Right brigade was finally established on approximately on the RED Line except South-east of DAIRY WOOD.

The Left Brigade captured the RED Line without much opposition. During their advance to the BLUE Line they came under heavy enfilade and reverse fire. Parties of our troops reached the BLUE Line, but owing to this heavy fire and to being unsupported on either flank, they were forced to withdraw. The Left Brigade was finally established on approximately the RED Line.

Attached is map showing the dispositions of units after the attack.

2. ENEMY DISPOSITION.

On the 4th October the troops opposite us consisted of the 4th Guard Division (5th Guard Grenadiers, 5th Foot Guard and 93rd R.I.R.) and the 212th R.I.R. of the 45th Division.

After our attack on the 4th, these troops were relieved, and on the 9th October the troops opposite us consisted of the 233rd Division (449th, 450th and 448th I.R.), and the 8th JAEGER and 233rd R.I.R. of the 195th Division.

3. CASUALTIES.

The casualties suffered by the Division from 5 a.m. 9th to 10 a.m. 11th October, amounted to -

		<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O. Ranks.</u>	<u>Total.</u>
Killed.	-	21	184	205
Wounded.	-	32	519	551
Missing.	-	9	273	282
		<u>62</u>	<u>976</u>	<u>1038</u>

4. CAPTURES.

About 100 prisoners were captured, but it is difficult to get the exact number as practically all of them were sent to the cage of the Division on our left instead of to our own Corps cage, their cage being more conveniently situated on the routes leading back from the front line.

The material/

*War Diary.*



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The material reported captured is -


Machine Guns.	-	-	11.	
Machine Guns (Light).	-	-	5.	
Minenwerfer	-	-	1.	
15 cm. Howitzer.	-	-	1	(Lying near the railway in D.17.b).

Major-General,  
Commanding Second Australian Division.



Yards 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 1000 Yards

Scale 1:10,000



DUGOUTS or STRUCTURES  
Supposed to be Concrete

verified by Air Photographs

■ C

Old Gun Positions

)

Trenches in good repair

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Do damaged or apparently not used

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Do

Do

Not

Dugouts Not Concrete  
Machine Guns.

←

Headquarters.

□

Printed by H.Q. 2 Advanced Section, A.P. & S.S.

Trenches Corrected to 4-10-17.



MESSAGE FORM.

To:—

No.

1. I am at..... (Note:—Either give Map Reference or mark your position by a 'X' on the Map on back.
2. I have reached limits of my Objective.
3. My Platoon is at..... and is consolidating.  
Company
4. My Platoon is at..... and has consolidated.  
Company
5. Am held up by (a) M.G. at..... (Place where you are).  
(b) Wire
6. Enemy holding strong point .....
7. I am in touch with..... on Right  
Left. at.....
8. I am not in touch with..... on Right.  
Left.
9. Am shelled from. ....
10. Am in need of —
11. Counter Attack forming at .....
12. Hostile (a) Battery  
(b) Machine Gun } active at .....  
(c) Trench Mortar
13. Reinforcements wanted at .....
14. I estimate my present strength at ..... rifles.
15. Add any other useful information here:—

Name.....

Platoon.....

Company.....

Battalion.....

Time ..... m.

Date ..... 1917.

(A). Carry no maps or papers which may be of value to the Enemy.

(B). Give no information if captured, except the following, which you are bound to give:—

Name and Rank.

(C). Collect all captured maps and papers and send them in at once.



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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G3/129.

SECRET.Headquarters,  
16th October, 1917.PART V. OF REPORT ON  
OPERATIONS OF 4th OCTOBER: - LESSONS.  
=====1. (a). ASSEMBLY.

One mile an hour again found to be a suitable rate to allow for the movement of assaulting battalions along a duck-board track to a place of assembly.

A longer time would be required in wet weather, especially if duck-boards are in bad repair - gaps, broken.

On 4th October all battalions were in position in good time though rain fell during the night.

(b). DUCKBOARD TRACKS.

It is considered that one of the primary causes for success on October 4th was the fact that each assaulting brigade had a duckboard track leading up to close behind its place of assembly.

These tracks enabled the troops to reach their destinations without undue fatigue and without disorganisation.

The tracks were necessarily laid hurriedly, and merely consisted of duckboards laid on the ground without proper supports.

They served not only as a path on which to walk, but as a guide to lead the troops without fail to their destination.

Not to have duckboard tracks means - in wet weather - a severe handicap to troops about to assault.

Tracks for pack animals should also be made, not much wider than duckboards, but paved in bad places with short transverse fascines or trestle bridges. Pack animals must not be permitted to use Infantry duckboard tracks, and pack animal tracks should be at least 100 yards distant from Infantry tracks.

2. FORMING UP.

Must not be too dependent on taped lined, but ready to modify if circumstances demand it.

If sufficiently dark, or not too close to enemy, whole of assaulting troops can be moved forward to escape shelling on tail of formations.

If front troops cannot move forward before zero, then rear troops can sometimes close up, reducing distances.

P.T.O.



The important point however is to study enemy's methods ascertain where he normally places his barrages and avoid these spots as forming up places.

The 4th October fight was peculiar in that the enemy were preparing an attack at about the same time. Consequently his artillery fire was practically on our forming up area, especially in the case of the 6th Aust. Inf. Brigade on the right.

3. The advantages of deliberate methods in the present type of warfare.

This necessitates time to enable plans and orders to reach every officer, N.C.O. and man engaged.

In this case time was available and all ranks knew and did their work.

Thus, the troops formed up and attacked according to plan, the strong points ordered were made and garrisoned according to plan.

The communication trench was made by 2.30 p.m., according to plan, also the front line and support trenches.

The danger of course is that deliberate methods do not enable troops to take full advantage of openings given by mistakes or defeat of the enemy when sharp decided blows are essential.

In these circumstances however some risks can, and must, be run and troops must be asked to do what would not be demanded of them were the enemy unbroken.

The lesson however is to continue to train Officers tactically - to be quick to appreciate a situation, quick to make a simple plan, and quick to issue clear orders.

Reports from Battalion Commanders agree that on the 4th October the leading by Platoon and Section Commanders was all that could be desired; they were quick to act and ready to take over command of higher units when their seniors became casualties.

They also report that the spirit of the men is such that they feel their superiority to the Germans in battle and that, even when the artillery barrage is not satisfactory, they can beat relatively larger numbers of the enemy.

ARTILLERY.

4. (a). The reports of the assaulting troops show that the artillery barrage was not nearly so effective on 4th October as it had been on 20th September.

It was less regular, not so intense and on the left flank especially it appeared to the troops to open later with the result that it came down on and behind the left of our leading wave and caused casualties.

The best artillery barrage is a straight line parallel to the jumping off line, and both should be at right angles to the line of advance. Any other form of barrage adds to the difficulties of the Infantry.

The Infantry must draw in any advanced posts which lie in advance of a straight jumping off line so that the artillery barrage may be straight and parallel.

This means co-operation between the Infantry Commander and the Artillery Commander who is arranging the barrages.

(b). There were several cases of short shooting on 2nd and 3rd October.

The fact that these were genuine cases of short shooting and not enfilade fire by the enemy may be taken as proved from the fact that the fire was observed not only by

Junior Infantry



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Junior Infantry

Officers but by several senior Officers of the 22nd and 23rd battalions, and by Artillery Officers.

The fire came over ANZAC Spur and fell not only on our front line but on supporting troops about TOKIO.

The nature of the shells is described as 6" or perhaps 60 pounder. One officer thought they might be 4.5 Howitzer.

Repeated reports did not stop it entirely though the C.R.A. and O.C., 57th H.A.G. did all they could to do so.

On 3rd October between 4.15 and 6.30 p.m. the casualties due to short shooting were 3 killed, 1 Officer and 33 Other Ranks wounded, 1 Lewis Gun blown up. A section of trench had to be vacated.

Altogether, on 2nd and 3rd October, the casualties from this cause amounted to 65.

(c). Though the artillery barrage sufficed during the advance up the western slopes of BROODSEINDE Ridge both Infantry Brigades report that on arrival on the top and on the eastern slopes the barrage was not enough to make the German Machine Gun Detachments and riflemen keep under cover, and as a consequence their machine gun and rifle fire was then heavy, and was the cause of many casualties. The fire was returned both by Vickers and Lewis guns and snipers, and a suitable line was established well down the slope on the far side of the ridge.

(d). The long halt after the capture of the RED line was considered a disadvantage in this case, as it was not required to enable the troops for the BLUE line to close up, nor was it required, as events turned out, to permit of the village of ZONNEBEKE being mopped up, but it enabled the enemy to get away a number of men, minenwerfer and machine guns, which otherwise might have been overtaken.

With assaulting troops who are fresh and full of the spirit of attack, long halts are not necessary.

Where men are fatigued or have undergone long continued privation and hardship they will still be necessary, also where marshes or other bad ground has to be crossed, or where much mopping up has to be done.

(e). S.O.S. SIGNALS.

The system of having a time limit for artillery and machine gun barrages proved a success and must have saved large quantities of ammunition.

The limit fixed was 10 minutes on S.O.S. lines, then 5 minutes, - half the guns searching and half on S.O.S. lines, - then fire dies down unless another S.O.S. signal is fired.

5. USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS.

In the attack on the 4th October the bomb was little used except where the enemy was slow or reluctant to come out of his dug-outs. It is, however, necessary to take bombs, both rifle and hand, into such actions. One Brigadier considers two No. 23 rifle grenades per man best as these can be used both for rifle and hand grenade work.

The Lewis Gun proved its great value. The enemy was fired on from the hip during the advance and casualties inflicted.

P. T. O.



The bayonet was used effectively on many occasions. The rifle was used both deliberately and for "Rabbit Shooting" or snap-shooting on the move.

6. STOKES MORTARS. Were used on several occasions against enemy machine guns.

These guns had been ordered to advance about 150 yards behind the battalion which they were supporting in the right brigade.

On 4th October this did not prove a success as the carrying parties for the guns were caught in the enemy's artillery fire and many casualties caused so that, though the guns got through, there was very little ammunition.

7. MOBILE VICKERS GUNS.

These kept close to the battalions with which they were co-operating and practically escaped casualties during the assault. Several cases are reported where good targets were obtained after crossing the BROODSEINDE Ridge.

8. LOW FLYING ENEMY AEROPLANES.

Though special arrangements had been made for machine gun and Lewis gun fire against low flying enemy aeroplanes these proved a source of almost constant harm to the Infantry after the actual assault was over.

During the attack our aeroplanes were in evidence and kept off the hostile aeroplanes; later in the day and on the next day the enemy's aeroplanes appear to have predominated and to have fired on the Infantry in their trenches and shell holes and to have indicated their positions with accuracy to the German artillery.

They were heavily fired on by the machine guns but, except in one case where an enemy aeroplane was brought down, they were free to observe.

The remedy suggested is to issue tracer bullets to machine guns and Lewis guns specially detailed for this purpose.

Greater efforts must be made by Vickers and Lewis gun officers to aim their fire well in advance of the enemy aeroplane and in greater volume so that the aeroplane, by continuing on its course, will fly into the bullets.

9. COMMUNICATIONS.

Right Brigade forward party established the forward station at DE KNOET Farm at 7.30 a.m.

Wires from cable head (TOKIO) were laid by 9 a.m., but owing to shell fire could not be maintained to either of the forward battalions.

The power buzzer of the right brigade did not go up till about 8 a.m., it was damaged by shell fire and was not working till 2.30 p.m.

There seems to be no reason why it should not have gone forward earlier - with the brigade forward party.

The power buzzer with the left brigade was hit by a shell before it could be got into position.

More use might have been made of visual by Battalion Commanders.

P.T.O.

P.T.O.



- 5 -

10. MAPS.

A smaller issue of Artillery Barrage maps would suffice.

They are required to issue with Divisional Orders and with Brigade Orders.

Battalion Commanders consider that one or two copies per battalion are enough for they invariably call their Company Commanders together and go through the scheme with them.

The Company Commanders mark their own maps and explain to the Platoon Commanders, who do the same for their Section Commanders.

These officers do not want to load themselves with a large number of maps or parts of maps and are now taking to the use of the message form maps on one of which they mark all they want for the fight.

The barrage maps require to reach the battalions at latest by midday on the day before an attack; they are therefore required at Divisional Headquarters on the previous evening, or early morning of the day before the attack.

Mosaics and aeroplane photos are required to be with the companies on the morning of the day before an attack. Daylight is essential for their study.

*W. Bridges*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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G 3/130.

SECRET.Headquarters,  
16th October, 1917.PART V. OF REPORT ON  
OPERATIONS OF 9th OCTOBER: - LESSONS.  
=====

1. The conditions under which the attack was carried out explain the difference in the results obtained on 9th October compared with the results of 20th September and 4th October battles.

These were (a) bad weather causing not only discomfort such as wet and cold and inability to get sleep because both trenches and shell holes had water or wet mud in them but also excessive fatigue due to the difficulties of movement entailed in carrying, cable burying, etc.

(b) the fact that the men did not come fresh into the attack. They had been practically in the line for 9 days and had either taken part in the attack of the 4th October or had assisted by carrying, laying duckboard or burying cable. When not actually in the front line they had lived almost under front line conditions in trenches or shell holes under hostile artillery fire.

(c) less effective artillery barrage. This no doubt was due to the change in the weather which rendered impossible the movement forward of the artillery by brigades according to programme. Some guns were out of action being temporarily "bogged" and commands were broken up. The result is described by both Infantry Brigade Commanders as a "Thin Barrage" which did not prevent the enemy from maintaining fire on the attacking troops as they advanced.

2. The lessons which came to light in the action of 4th October apply generally to the action of 9th October with the following modifications:-

- (a) The time being short, and the available energy both as regards numbers and physical strength being less, the preparatory measures and arrangements were necessarily not so complete as on 20th September and 4th October.

In spite of this the 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade to who had been allotted the main portion of the attack carried through their attack both of the RED and BLUE Lines.

The 6th Aust. Inf. Brigade on their right flank were checked at DAISY WOOD during the morning, but eventually got through it and established posts on the greater part of their objective.

- (b) Though the artillery barrage was thin during the attack, it was effective on the S.O.S. line established after the attack and at 5.20 p.m. fell so intensely on an enemy attack coming forward in 5 lines that the attack never made headway.

P.T.O.



(c) Firing the Lewis gun from the hip and "Rabbit Shooting" with the rifle were much used especially in the woods.

(d) The use of Mobile Vickers guns with assaulting troops has proved to be successful when the whole operation has been successful. On this occasion the whole operation was not successful for, owing to lack of support from the ridge to the north, the 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade had to eventually fall back on the RED line, and then the casualties to machine gun crews and machine guns were severe. Five guns out of eight which went forward with the 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade were destroyed by shell fire and a similar number in the case of the 6th Aust. Inf. Brigade.

It is considered that in similar actions better value would be obtained if fewer Vickers guns were sent forward with the assaulting troops, others being retained in intermediate positions from which they could fire over the front line troops.

(e) Considerably more use was made of visual signalling on 9th and 10th October than during previous operations. This was chiefly due to necessity and suitable terrain.

The cable head was still at TOKIO and 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade H.Q. were near MOULIN FARM. Wires over land were almost always cut.

(f) S.A.A. There was no actual case of S.A.A. running out, but a post established at RHINE had to stop firing at the enemy for fear that their ammunition might run short.

A possible means of economising ammunition would be for any man who found enemy rifles and ammunition lying about in captured positions to use this first in preference to their own which would then form a reserve for future use.

*A. H. Bridges,*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.



63 War Diary  
Copy No. 25.....

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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App. XLV  
SECRET.

G.3/1/529.

\*\*\*\*

Headquarters,  
19th October, 1917.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS - RELIEFS.

1. The Second Australian Division will relieve the Fifth Australian Division in the line (Right Divisional Sector) about the 27th/28th instant.

The front for which this Division will be responsible will extend from J.5.b.30.15 to about D.23.central.

The First Australian Division will be next to the North of this Division.

The new boundary on the North will be notified later.

2. The front system will be held by one Brigade ("A" Brigade) which will extend back to the neighbourhood of GARTER POINT.

One Brigade ("B" Brigade) will be in support from WESTHORN Ridge (inclusive) to the LILLE ROAD (exclusive).

One Brigade ("C" Brigade) will be in Divisional Reserve in the OUDERDOM area (of this Brigade one Battalion may be quartered in the Support Brigade area to assist in work).

3. The 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. will be "A" Brigade.  
The 5th do. do. "B" Brigade.  
The 6th do. do. "C" Brigade.

4. The Division will probably be in the line for about three weeks as far as can be foreseen at present.

Its rôle will be primarily a defensive one, though it will be prepared to advance its left to conform with any forward movement of the troops further North.

5. The chief tasks will therefore be:-

(a) The preparation and maintenance of a good defensive system. This will include not only defensive works but plans for counter-attacks.

(b) The preparation and maintenance of good communications, duckboard tracks, roads, trams, etc.

(c) The improvement of Signal Communications, buried cable routes, visual signal stations, etc.

P.T.O.



- 2 -

(d) The improvement of accommodation for troops in the area both in front line and behind:- i.e.,

(i) dry places when men can rest, sleep, and change their socks.

(ii) positions for sentries.

(iii) positions for snipers and observers.

(iv) Headquarters for Companies, Battalions, Brig des, and accommodation for Signal personnel, R. A. P's. etc.

(v) Marking the above and erecting sign posts.

6. A Field Company of Engineers will be affiliated to the Brigade in the front system, and work in this system will be carried out under the orders of the Brigade Commander, who will submit his proposals for the approval of the Divisional Commander.

7. Pending the issue of a revised Defence scheme the policy laid down in the defence schemes taken over on relief will be carried on both as regards Infantry, Artillery, and Machine Gun tasks, and works programmes.

8. Administrative Instructions will be issued separately.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued at 2 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

*Atkinson*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Copy No.      To.

1. C.R.A.
2. C.R.E.
3. 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
4. 6th do.
5. 7th do.
6. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
7. 2nd Aus.Div.Sig.Coy.
8. 22nd Aus. M. G. Coy.
9. 2nd Aust. Div. Train.
10. 2nd Aus.Mob.Vet.Sec.
11. 2nd Aus.Div.Rfts.Camp.
12. A.Q.
13. A.
14. A.D.M.S.
15. D.M.G.O.
16. A.P.M.
17. D.A.D.V.S.
18. D.A.D.O.S.
19. D.B.O.
20. D.G.O.
21. Camp Commandant.
22. 1st Anzac "G".
23. 1st Aust. Div.
24. 5th Aust. Div.
- 25-7 War Diary,
- 28 File.
- 29-35 Spare.



EDITION 1, B


SECRET

S/15  
Copy No. 10

## BECELAERE

German Trenches corrected to 16-10-17.

Part of Sheet 28.





SECRET.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 150.

Copy No. 41

Headquarters,  
23rd October, 1917.Reference Map -  
Sheets 27 & 28 - 1/40,000.

1. The 2nd Australian Division will relieve the 5th Australian Division in the right sector of the Corps front between 26th and 28th October, 1917.
2. The relief and the necessary moves will be carried out in accordance with the attached March Table.
3. The front for which the 2nd Australian Division will be responsible has been notified to all concerned in Preliminary Instructions for Relief issued on 19th October with Addenda issued on 20th October.  
The 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. will take over the Divisional front and will be responsible for the defence of the front system including the defences on the eastern slopes of the BROODSEINDE Ridge, the ridge itself and westwards to the TOKIO Spur.  
The 5th Aust. Inf. Brigade will be in support, and will be quartered at HALFWAY HOUSE and SWAN area, but will be prepared to move forward and occupy WESTHOEK and ANZAC RIDGES in case of need.  
The 6th Aust. Inf. Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve in the DICKEBUSCH area.
4. Separate orders will be issued for the Artillery defence, and the relief of Engineer and Medical units.
5. The Machine Gun Companies will receive separate orders for the Machine Gun defence. The system will be that the Machine Gun Company of the Brigade in the line will be with their Brigade and will find -
  - (a) direct fire defence guns.
  - (b) anti-aircraft guns for the front system and
  - (c) Machine Gun Company Reserve.
 There will also be an S.O.S. group, posted under the order of the D.M.G.O., but in direct touch with the Commander of the Brigade in the line and under his orders for S.O.S. purposes.
6. Subject to the terms of this order the relief will be carried out by mutual arrangement between Brigade and other Commanders concerned.  
Command will pass on completion of the relief and will be reported by telegram to the 5th Australian Division as well as to the 2nd Australian Division.  
Troops on arrival in, or forward of, the DICKEBUSCH area will come under the command of the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division for tactical purposes.

P.T.O.

War Diary



- 2 -

7. Separate Administrative Orders will be issued by "Q" Branch.

8. The G.O.C., 2nd Australian Division, will take over command from the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, at 10 a.m. on 28th instant, at which hour D.H.Q. will close at STEENVOORDE and open at LILLE GATE, YPRES.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*Amages.*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 2 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

FOR INFORMATION.

Copy No.	To.	
1.	G.R.A.	21. 1st ANZAC. "G."
2.	C.R.E.	22. 1st ANZAC. "Q."
3.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.	23. 1st Australian Division.
4.	6th do.	24. 4th Australian Division.
5.	7th do.	25. 5th Australian Division.
6.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	26. 2 <sup>nd</sup> Division.
7.	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	27. 4th Squad. R.F.C.
8.	22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.	28. 57th H.A.G.
9.	2nd Aust. Div. Train.	29. Comdt. STEENVOORDE.
10.	2nd Aust. Mob. Vet. Sec.	30. " WIPPENHOEK.
11.	A.Q.	31. " RENINGHELST.
12.	A.	32. " OUDERDOM.
13.	A.D.M.S.	33. " Dickebusch.
14.	D.M.G.O.	34. " SWAN.
15.	A.P.M.	35. Town Major, STEENVOORDE.
16.	D.A.D.V.S.	36. " YPRES.
17.	D.A.D.O.S.	37. G.O.C.
18.	D.B.O.	38. 2nd Aus. Div. Rfts. Camp.
19.	D.G.O.	39-40. File.
20.	Camp Commandant.	41-43. War Diary.
		44-50. Spare.

P.T.O.



# MARCH TABLE

TO ACCOMPANY 2nd AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 150.

Date.	U N I T.	F R O M.	T O.	R O U T E.	R E M A R K S.
Oct. 26.	7th A.I.Bde. 22nd A.M.G.Co.	STEENVOORDE area.	SWAN area.		By train from ABEELE to YPRES. Thence by march route.
	5th A.I.Bdo.	do.	DICKEBUSCH area.	ABEELE - RENING- HELST - OUDERDOM.	BY BUS.
27.	6th A.I.Bde.	do.	OUDERDOM area.	RENINGHELST - OUDERDOM.	By march route. Move to be completed by 1 p.m.
	7th A.I.Bde.	SWAN area.	Line.	-	Relieves 15th A.I.Bde. during day 27th and on night 27/28 Oct.
28.	5th A.I.Bde.	DICKEBUSCH area.	SUPPORT BDE. Area.	-	Moves in when 15th A.I.Bde. has moved out.
	6th A.I.Bde.	OUDERDOM area.	DICKEBUSCH area.	-	Move to be completed by 12 noon.

Distances to be maintained between Units when moving by road West of YPRES.

800 yards between Battalions and other units.

400 yards between transport of units, horsed units, and other troops.

200 yards between Companies.

Machine Gun Companies will all move in the first instance to BELGIAN CHATEAU which will be M.G. H.Q.  
M.G. nucleus personnel will remain here instead of going to the Reinforcement Camp.

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Appendix No. XLVI

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App XLVII

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
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HEADQUARTERS,  
SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
(GENERAL STAFF.)  
S E C R E T.  
Copy No. 11  
G.8/92.

23/10/17

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM No. 41.  
=====

Anti-aircraft protection.

1. 1st ANZAC Corps G. S. Circular No. 93 is forwarded herewith. Reference Para 1. (i). The right forward Divisional area is subdivided into two portions -

- (a) The front system.
- (b) The Support Brigade area.

(a) The G.O.C., Brigade in the line, will submit his arrangements for anti-aircraft defence of the area from the front line back to and including the TOKIO SPUR.

(b) The G.O.C., Support Brigade, will submit a plan for the anti-aircraft defence of the area from and including ANZAC RIDGE back to and including SWAN area.

The anti-aircraft defence of artillery groups ordered in para. 1 (ii) of 1st ANZAC G. S. Circular No. 93 will be taken into consideration in framing this plan.

2. The detachments provided by the Corps for duty in J.3.c. and J.8.b. (i.e., 4 machine guns) will be attached to the Brigade in the line for administration and discipline, but will be under the command of the D.M.G.O., who will ascertain where the Artillery Group Commanders wish the guns to be placed.

3. The Lewis guns at present provided by the 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion for duty with the artillery will now be withdrawn, and the O.C., 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion, will detail 4 Lewis guns for the duty laid down in para.2 (i) of 1st ANZAC G. S. Circular No. 93.

O.C., 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion, will report when this duty has been taken up.

The D.M.G.O., will draw up written orders, as to their duties, reliefs, and system of administration, in consultation with the O.C., 2nd Australian Pioneer Battalion.

4. The G.O.C., Divisional Reserve Brigade, will submit his plan for anti-aircraft defences in the DICKEBUSCH area.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*A. M. M. Jones*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. To.

- |                         |                        |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. O.R.A.               | Copy No.               |
| 2. O.R.E.               | 7. 22nd Aus. M.G. Coy. |
| 3. 5th A.I. Bde.        | 8. D.M.G.O.            |
| 4. 6th do.              | 9-10. Filo.            |
| 5. 7th do.              | 11-13. War Diary.      |
| 6. 2nd Aus. Pioneer Bn. | 14-20. Spare.          |

*War Diary*



## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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Headquarters,  
24th October, 1917.

ADDENDUM TO GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR MEMO. No. 41.Anti-aircraft protection.

1. The first addendum to First ANZAC G. S. Circular no. 93 is issued herewith for information.
2. The detachment for the 2 guns allotted to Group H.2 in I.I.I.d. are attached to the Support Brigade for administration and discipline and, like the guns attached to the Brigade in the line, will come under the command of the D.M.G.O.
3. Accommodation will be allotted by the Brigade to which guns are attached.
4. The D. M. G. O. will report when all are in position.
5. Acknowledge.

*W. H. M. Jones*,  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	C.R.A.
2.	C.R.E.
3.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
4.	6th do.
5.	7th do.
6.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
7.	22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.
8.	D.M.G.O.
9.	O.C., 1st ANZAC Cyclist Bn.
10-11.	File.
12-14.	War Diary.
15-20.	Spare.

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*War Diary.*



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App XLIX

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AMENDMENT TO SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 150.  
\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET

Copy No.. 41

Headquarters,

25th October, 1917.

Reference Map -  
Sheets 27 and 28 - 1/40,000  
-----

The 7th M. G. Coy. will move to BELGIAN CHATEAU by bus on 25th instant and will take over in the line on 26th/27th instant.

The 22nd M. G. Coy. will move with the 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. and proceed to BELGIAN CHATEAU and will take over the S.O.S. barrage during 27th instant.

In March Table, opposite 26th instant - 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade - in "Remarks" column, expunge present entry and insert "BY BUS."

ACKNOWLEDGE.

*E. T. Bagley Capt*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

Issued at 11 a.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

Same as for 2nd Australian Division Order No. 150.

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*War Diary*



63 *ward diary*

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App I

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET.

Copy No. *16*....

G.1/782.

Headquarters,  
25th October, 1917.

map reference - DECELAERE Sheet 1/10,000.  
Sheet 28 N.W., 1/20,000.

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTIONS.

(To be read in conjunction with Divisional Order No. 150).  
-----

1. The 7th Aust. M. G. Company will relieve the 25th Aust. M. G. Company in the line on the night 26th/27th October. Relief to be complete by 10 p.m., 26th October. On completion of relief the 7th Aust. M. G. Company will come under the command of the G.O.C., 15th Aust. Inf. Brigade.
2. The 22nd Aust. M. G. Company will relieve the 8th Aust. M. G. Company (S.O.S. Group) on the 27th October. Relief to be complete by 3 p.m.
3. The O.C., 7th Aust. M. G. Company, will arrange to hand over to the 22nd Aust. M. G. Company 4 guns with spare parts before 9 a.m. on the 27th October. These guns will be used in the S.O.S. Group and will be supplied with personnel by the 22nd Aust. M. G. Company.
4. The Group Commander, S.O.S. Group, (O.C., 22nd Aust. M. G. Company) will maintain direct touch with the Commander of the Brigade in the line and will be under his orders for S.O.S. purposes.
5. Subject to the terms of these instructions the reliefs will be carried out by mutual arrangement between Company Commanders concerned.
6. Completion of both reliefs will be reported to Brigade in the line and 5th Australian Divisional Headquarters.
7. The 5th Aust. M. G. Company and the 8th Aust. M. G. Company will remain in reserve at CHATEAU BELGE.

P. T. O.



- 2 -

8. Officers of 22nd Aust. M. G. Company will reconnoitre the forward groups, and Officers of 5th Aust. M. G. Company the S.O.S. Group, with the object of a future relief.  
Reconnaissances will commence on or before the 29th October.

10. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*Amidges,*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No.	To.
1 - 2.	5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
3 - 4.	6th Aust. Inf. Bde.
5 - 6.	7th Aust. Inf. Bde.
7.	22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.

FOR INFORMATION.

8.	1st ANZAC Corps.
9.	1st Australian Division.
10.	5th Australian Division.
11.	21st Division.
12.	O.R.A.
13.	A.Q.
14.	D.B.G.
15.	File.
16-18.	War Diary.
19-21.	Spare.
22.	Area Comdt., CANAL area.
23.	" SWAN "



63

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App LI

151

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

\*\*\*\*

SECRET.

G.32/190.

Headquarters,  
26th October, 1917.

O.R.A.  
O.R.E.  
O.O., 2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.  
5th Aust. Inf. Bde.  
6th do.  
7th do.  
D.M.G.O.  
A.D.M.S.  
A.Q.

-----

Subject - DEFENSIVE MEASURES.

1. On taking over from the 5th Australian Division each Brigade, the O.R.A. and the O.R.E. should take over a copy of the existing Defence Schemes.

Section 3 of this Scheme contains the system of organisation for defence which has been laid down by the Corps.

Briefly this organisation is:-

A FRONT LINE SYSTEM which comprises -

Tactical Wire.  
Front Line Posts.  
Support posts and Machine Guns.  
Regimental Reserve Line (wired) on TOKIO SPUR.

A BRIGADE RESERVE LINE.

Line to be marked out and wired on ANZAC SPUR.

A DIVISIONAL RESERVE LINE.

Line to be wired on WESTHOEK RIDGE

2. The main line of defence of the Division on our right (at present 21st Division) is on the line REUTEL - JAI BARN - J.5.central.

The main line of defence of the 1st Australian Division on our left has not yet been finally determined.

3. The responsibility for the work specified in para. 1 is allotted as follows:-

(a). The Brigade in front line is responsible for all works in the "Front Line System," subject to Div'l Commander's approval.

(b) The O.R.E. is responsible, in consultation with the General Staff of the Division, for marking out and wiring the "Brigade" and "Divisional Reserve Lines."

4. It will be observed that the Corps instructions contemplate the connecting up of the front line posts and the construction of communication trenches to the front line of defence.

War Diary



Plans for commencing this work should now be made and submitted to Divisional Headquarters by the G.O.C., 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade.

5. To carry out the work to be done in the front line system the G.O.C., has, to assist him, a Field Company and the troops garrisoning the Posts.

Work will be continued on the plans taken over from the 5th Australian Division.

Any alterations to these plans will first be submitted for the approval of the Divisional Commander.

6. The G.O.C., 7th Aust. Inf. Brigade, will prepare and submit by the last D.R. on 1st November, a map (1/10,000) of the front line system showing:-

(i) Existing trenches, works of defence, and wire entanglements in -

- (a) the front line and front line Posts.
- (b) the Support Posts and M.G. positions
- (c) The Regimental Reserve Line.

(ii) Positions of H.Q., Brigade and Battalions, and Companies in front line, also M. G. Companies and L.T.M. Batteries.

(iii) Communications - duck-board tracks, and Mule tracks.

(iv) Position of dumps.

(v) Position of R. A. P's. Relay Posts, in the front line system.

(vi) Dugout accommodation in the front line system.

Much of this information will be taken over on relief but it is necessary that it should be checked and verified and any new work added.

7 Subsequently on Thursday of each week by the last D.R. a tracing or sketch will be submitted by the Brigade in the line showing all new work under any of the headings given in para. 5 above, and a statement of the disposition of troops to defensive localities.

8. The C.R.E. will prepare and submit by last D.R. on Thursday 1st November a master map (1/10,000) of the Divisional sector showing the information specified in the headings given in para. 5 above, to cover all the Divisional sector exclusive of the front line system, i.e., inclusive of the Brigade and Divisional Reserve Lines and all behind them. He will also show all roads and tramways in the Divisional sector whether in the front line system or not.

9. Subsequently on Thursday of each week a tracing will be submitted by the C.R.E. showing all new work in the area for which he is responsible also roads and tramways in the front line system.

P.T.O.

It will be observed that the Corps instructions emphasize the connecting up of the front line posts and the connection of communication trenches to the front line of defence.



- 3 -

10. The O.G., Divisional Signal Company, will, each Thursday submit a tracing showing any additions to cable routes. The first sketch will be submitted on 1st November.

11. The information received under paras. 6 to 10 will then be embodied in a combined map at D.H.Q. for submission to Corps.

It is essential that maps or tracings be sent in punctually.

The conventional signs issued from this office on 25th April, 1917, (G.H.Q. Ic/6712/21) will be used so that maps may be uniform.

12. The A.D.M.<sup>S</sup> and A.Q. Branch will notify "G" Branch of any alterations in Medical arrangements and dumps so that the map may be corrected at once.

*A. H. Bridges,*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.



No. 13.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 27th to 6 a.m. 28th October 1917.

NOTE. Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Heavy bursts of fire were opened according to programme on enemy tracks and known centres of activity between 8.45 p.m. and 8.51.p.m., and between 9.10.p.m. and 9.16.p.m.

Our artillery co-operated in an Army barrage at 8.50.a.m. (28th inst)

Throughout the 24 hours the usual harassing fire was maintained on enemy tracks, roads and activity centres.

Patrols. At 11 p.m. a patrol consisting of 1 officer and 3 other ranks left our line at D.29.b.25.25, and moved out to FLINTE FM (D.29.b.58.23), and thence southwards to the N.W. corner of CELTIC WOOD (D.29.d.7.6), returning to our lines at D.29.d.30.35. at 12.40.a.m. Nothing was seen of the enemy.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

Was fairly quiet throughout the 24 hours, except for the period from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m., when battery positions in J.8.b. and c were heavily shelled.

Between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. 77.mm mustard gas shells were fired into the valley between WESTHOEK and ANZAC Ridges. At the same time the two Ridges were shelled by 15 cm and 10.5.cm from the direction of WATERDAMHOEK and MOORSLEDE.

Gun flashes were observed during the afternoon as follows-

From.	Time.	Bearing	Remarks.
O.P. at J.8.b.61.85.	12.45.p.m.	91°	15 cm How.
O.P. at J.8.c.75.93.	1.0. p.m.	93°	Bty 15 cm How.
O.P. at J.8.c.75.93.	3.15.p.m.	90°-95°	{ 1 sec 15 cm How 1 Bty 10.5. do 1 gun 10.5.cm

ENEMY DEFENCES.

A hostile machine gun has been reported active firing from CEMETERY WOOD (J.6.a.8.5.)

ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Enemy aircraft were active during the day, and the earlier part of the night flying over our forward area and over YPRES.

At 10.a.m. a large formation of E.A.flew over our lines at an altitude of about 5,000 feet towards YPRES, but were driven back by our A.A. and H.G. fire.

MISCELLANEOUS.

At 2 a.m. a large fire was observed in the direction of DROOGENBROODHOEK.

Throughout the night enemy searchlights were active.

Flares. During the night the enemy fired a number of flares from several points along a line about 800 yards east of our front line. These flares were fired, not out over No Man's Land, but in northerly and southerly direction.

*G. 000*  
*G. 111*  
*Iga RB*  
*D10 RBW*  
*Dungo*



App LIII  
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G.316.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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Location of Units at 8 p.m. 28th October, 1917.

<u>Div. H.Q.</u>	Advanced.	- YPRES. LILLE GATE.	- I.14.b.1.5.
	Rear	- WALKER CAMP	- H.27.b.7.7.
<u>Div. Artillery H.Q.</u>		- YPRES. LILLE GATE.	- I.14.b.1.5.
4th A.F.A. Bde.		- H.19.a.70.05.	In line under 1st A. Div.
5th do.		- J.1.d.35.30.	do. do.
2nd A.D.A.C.		- G.18.c.60.80.	do. do.
14th A.F.A.Bde.		- I.17.c.4.8.	LINE.
13th do.		- H.28.a.7.8.	LINE.
6th A.D.A.C.		- I.19.b.3.6.	
<u>5th A.I.Bde. H.Q.</u>		- HALFWAY HOUSE.	(I.17.c.4.7). Support Bde.
<u>6th A.I.Bde. H.Q.</u>		- WALKER CAMP.	H.27.b.7.7. Reserve Brigade. DICKEBUSCH AREA.
<u>7th A.I.Bde. H.Q.</u>		- J.1.d.6.4.	LINE.
<u>C.R.E.</u>		- LILLE GATE. YPRES.	I.14.b.1.5.
5th Fieldn Coy.		- I.14.b.3.7.	
6th Field Coy.		- I.14.b.3.8.	
7th Field Coy.		- I.14.a.4.3.	
2nd Aus. Pioneer Bn.		- SWAN CHATEAU.	I.19.c.3.7.
<u>A.D.M.S.</u>		- LILLE GATE, YPRES.	I.14.b.1.5.
5th Field Amb.		- 2nd A.D. Rest Station, WARATAH CAMP.	- G.15.c.2.9.
6th Field Amb.		- School House, RENINGHELST,	G.34.b.1.1.
7th Field Amb.		- A.D.S. -	I.9.c.9.6.
<u>Div. Train H.Q.</u>		- <del>XXXXXX</del> G.19.b.7.7.	
<u>Div. Units.</u>			
22nd A.M.G. Coy.		- H.18.c.4.4.	
D.M.G.O.		- At D.H.Q. Adc.	
D.A.D.O.S.		- BUSSEBOOM	- G.16.c.5.0.
D.A.D.V.S.		- Rear H.Q.	WALKER CAMP.
Paymaster		- Rear H.Q.	do.

(Signed) C. G. N. MILES, Lieut-Colonel,  
 General Staff,  
 Second Australian Division.

2nd Aust. D. H. Q.,  
 X



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War Diary

VJ

App LIV

156

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

G. 335.

Location of Units at 8 a.m. 29th October 1917.

<u>Divisional H.Q.</u>	-	YPRES.	LILLE GATE.	I.14.b.1.5.
<u>Artillery H.Q. (5th Aust Div)</u>	-	YPRES.	do	do
"B" Group H.Q.	-	I.17.c.4.8.	(13th and 14th A.F.A.Bdes.)	
5th A.D.A.C.	-	I.19.b.3.6.		
C.R.A. 2nd Aust Div.	-	BAILLEUL.		
4th A.F.A.Bde.	-	H.19.a.70.05.	In Line under 1st Aust Div.	
5th do	-	J.1.d.35.30.	do	do
2nd Aust D.A.C.	-	G.18.c.60.80.	do	do
<u>5th Aust Inf Bde.H.Q.</u>	-	HALFWAY HOUSE.	I.17.c.3.8.	SUPPORT BDE.
17th Bn.	-	H.24.b.5.6.		
18th Bn.	-	I.15.a.8.5.		
19th Bn.	-	H.24.c.4.4.		
20th Bn.	-	HALFWAY HOUSE.	I.17.c.3.8.	
5th A.M.G.Coy.	-	CHATEAU BELGE.	H.23.b.5.7.	
5th A.L.T.M.Bty.	-	H.24.c.4.4.		
<u>6th Aust Inf Bde.H.Q.</u>	-	WALKER CAMP.	H.27.b.7.7.	RESERVE BDE.
21st Bn.	-	H.23.b.5.9.		
22nd Bn.	-	H.26.b.6.7.		
23rd Bn.	-	H.33.a.5.1.		
24th Bn.	-	H.20.c.9.1.		
6th A.M.G.Coy.	-	CHATEAU BELGE.	H.23.b.5.7.	
6th A.L.T.M.Bty.	-	H.26.b.6.7.		
<u>7th Aust Inf Bde.H.Q.</u>	-	J.1.d.6.4.	IN LINE.	
25th Bn.	-	J.3.a.5.5.	Support Left.	
26th Bn.	-	D.29.a.35.40.	LINE. Left. (2 Coys Line	
27th Bn.	-	J.9.a.30.65.	Support Right (2 " Support.	
28th Bn.	-	J.4.b.88.60.	{ LINE. Right.	
7th A.M.G.Coy.	-	J.4.b.85.60.	{ 2 Coys Line. 2 Coys Support	
7th A.L.T.M.Bty.	-	J.3.a.5.5.		
<u>C.R.E.</u>	-	YPRES.	LILLE GATE.	I.14. . a.35.30.
5th A.Field Coy.	-	I.14.b.5.7.	YPRES.	
6th do.	-	I.14.b.3.8.	do	
7th do.	-	I.14.a.4.3.	do	
2nd A.Pioneer Bn.	-	SWAN CHATEAU.	-	I.19.c.3.7.
<u>A.D.M.S.</u>	-	YPRES.	LILLE GATE.	I.14.b.1.5.
5th A.Field Ambce.	-	WARATAH CAMP.	G.15.c.2.9.	Div Rest Station.
6th do.	-	RENINGHAMST.	G.34.b.1.1.	School House.
7th do.	-	I.9.c.9.6.	Adv Dressing Stn.	
<u>Div Train H.Q.</u>	-	G.19.b.7.7.		
15th A.A.S.C.	-	G.20.a.5.7.		
16th do.	-	do		
17th do.	-	G.19.b.7.7.		
20th do.	-	G.26.a.1.9.		
2nd Aust D.S.C.	-	L.33.c.2.5.	Sheet 27.	
<u>Div Units.</u>	-			
22nd Aust M.G.Coy.	-	Adv.	J.3.d.45.10.	
	-	Rear.	H.23.d.7.7.	
D.M.G.O.	-	YPRES.	At D.H.Q.	
D.A.D.O.S.	-	WALKER CAMP.	H.27.b.7.7.	
D.A.D.V.S.	-	do	do	
Paymaster.	-	do	do	

P.T.O.



-2-

Salvage Coy.	-	H.22.a.5.9.
Mob Vet Sect.	-	G.24.c.0.5.
Div Bomb Officer.	-	H.23.d.2.2.
Div Gas Officer.)		
Div Gas School	-	BUSSEBOOM. G.22.a.1.5.
Div Rainft Camp.	-	CAESTRE.
Div Musketry Officer.	-	CAESTRE.

*Ch. H. H. H. H. H.*  
 Lieut Colonel.  
 General Staff.  
 2nd Australian Division.

TO BE DESTROYED ON RECEIPT OF A LATER ISSUE.



*War Diary*

*App LV*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No 14.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 28th to 6 a.m. 29th October 1917.

NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Our artillery, according to programme, put down two bursts of fire in depth 1,000 yards east of S.O.S. line, and co-operated in an Army barrage at 5.15 a.m. this morning.

Intermittent searching and sweeping fire was maintained on tracks, communications, and centres of known hostile activity on the Divisional front.

A suspected enemy M.G. post at D.24.c.9.9. and 9.1., were shelled.  
(D.24.b.8.4. and enemy posts at)

Patrols.  
(a). A patrol of 1 officer and 8 other ranks went out from our lines at 9.30 p.m. at point D.29.d.25.25, working in direction of D.30.central. On reaching point D.30.c.25.80 approx. an enemy sniper opened fire from direction of D.30.central. A number of white flares were fired from eastern edge of CELTIC WOOD, and a machine gun opened up from approx D.30.c.50.65, without causing casualties. The ground in this neighbourhood is badly churned up and the shell holes full of water, the condition getting worse on moving east.

(b) A patrol of 1 officer and 8 o/ranks moved out from J.5.b.30.75 working towards JUSTICE WOOD. The WOOD was not penetrated, but no movement was observed in the vicinity.

(c) A party of 1 officer and 12 o/ranks left our lines in the vicinity of FLINT COPSE at 10 p.m. and returned at 2 a.m. Broken trenches were passed about 20 yards north of FLINT COPSE in a very boggy condition, and showed no sign of recent occupation. No wire was seen in the vicinity. Continuing approx East through ANVIL WOOD and then to the road at D.30.a.8.8. still no signs of wire or occupation were seen, and the party was prevented from reconnoitring further owing to our artillery activity. The boggy nature of the country in the valley would make it almost impossible to keep troops there.

(d) Another patrol of 1 officer and 12 o/ranks left D.29.a.9.3. and patrolled D.30.a. to All pill boxes in this vicinity were entered and found to be unoccupied. The party then reconnoitred TABLE WOOD and found same unoccupied. Searching as far as D.24.c.8.7. our artillery prevented further progress.

(e) A standing patrol of 1 N.C.O., 6 men, and a Lewis gun was established at approx D.24.c.central at 11 p.m. and returned at 4.15 a.m. A machine gun was in action well behind TABLE WOOD and flares were fired from this locality.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

WESTHOEK and ANZAC RIDGES and VALLEY between intermittently shelled by 5.9's and 4.2" Hows. from direction of POTTERIJEBURG and WATERDAMHOEK, and roads and tracks in the forward area searched intermittently by 5.9" Hows. from direction WATERDAMHOEK. Between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m., I.17. was heavily shelled by 5.9" Hows. from direction 100-120° from I.17.central. Some high bursts of shrapnel were also put over that area.

Between 1.45 and 5 p.m. J.8.c. was shelled by 5.9" How. from 37° 50' T.B. from J.8.c.7.9.

Between 10.40 p.m. and 1.30 a.m. WESTHOEK RIDGE and valley in J.8.a. and b received intense bombardment of 4.2" Hows (Gas shells, mustard.) Otherwise only intermittent light shelling during the period.



HOSTILE ARTILLERY ( Continued )

FROM.	TIME.	TRUE BEARING.	REMARKS.
-------	-------	---------------	----------

D.29.a.35.30.	11.30 a.m.	83°	
D.29.c.60.53.	3.0 p.m.	80°	15 cm. gun.
D.29.c.60.58.	5.20 p.m.	52°	10.5 cm.
J.4.b.88.60.	Intervals	48°	15 cm. How.Battery.
	during day.		

At 3.30 a.m. 8 enemy planes were active flying over our front line system. They were engaged by Machine Gun fire from the ground and flew back over their own lines on the approach of several of our scouts.

At 10.45 a.m. 10 enemy planes flew at a low altitude over area I.17. This area was later on heavily shelled.

No movement was observed in enemy's lines on account of the haze which made observation difficult.

FLARES. During the night the enemy sent up a large number of single red flares. These were usually followed by a few rounds of H.E. on our front line system.

Enemy balloons were observed as follows:-

<u>FROM.</u>	<u>TIME.</u>	<u>TRUE BEARING.</u>
D.29.a.35.30..	5.30.a.m.	92°
do	6.30.a.m.	92°. 114°. 44°. 66°. 63°.
do	3.40.a.m.	47°.

At 9.25.p.m. a large energy dump was set on fire in MOORSLEDE. During the night fires were seen in K.1. and E.19.

*J. L. M. Tall* Capt  
Lieut Colonel.  
General Staff.  
2nd Australian Division.

ANNEXE follows.



-3-

ANNEXE.To 2nd Australian Division Intelligence Summary No 14.NOTES ON AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS.

4.B.435. D.24.c. The small line of posts running from the S.E. corner of TABLE WOOD to the BROODSEINDE-MOORSLEDE Road still appear to be occupied. Also a line running from D.24.c.98.68 to D.24.d.42.00

4.B.447. E.14.a.c.d. 15.c. A fairly good piece of trench can be seen running from E.14.d.50.46. to E.14.d.66.25.


4.B.436. E.21.c.d. 26.b. 27 a and b. A new trench appears to be in construction from E.27.c.20.67. towards 45.40. It appears very ragged and is really formed by linking up certain shell holes. A small piece can also be seen at 43.62. Some movement has taken place round these shell holes which have previously been used by troops bivouacing.

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## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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Map Ref. - BECELLARRE Sheet 1/10,000.  
Sheet 28 N.W., 1/20,000.

Headquarters,  
29th October, 1917.

MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTIONS - RELIEFS.

1. The 5th Aust. M. G. Company will relieve the 22nd Aust. M.G.Coy. on S.O.S. Barrage duty on the afternoon of 30th October, relief to be complete by 5 p.m.
2. The 22nd A.M.G.Coy. will relieve the 7th A.M.G.Coy. in the line on the night 30th/31st October; relief to commence as soon as dark enough to conceal movement.
3. The 4 guns, etc. of the 7th Coy. at present in use with 22nd Coy. will be taken over and manned by the 5th Coy.
4. On completion of reliefs the 7th A. M.G.Coy. will return to their rear Coy. H.Q. and remain in Reserve.
5. Subject to the terms of these instructions the reliefs will be carried out by mutual arrangement between Company Commanders concerned.
6. Completion of reliefs will be reported by Commanders of 5th and 22nd Coys. to H.Q. of Brigade in line and to Div. H.Q.
7. Officers of the 5th A.M.G.Coy. will reconnoitre the forward Groups, and Officers of the 6th A.M.G.Coy. the S.O.S.Group, with a view to future reliefs, before the 3rd November, when the next relief will probably take place.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued at 1 p.m.  
DISTRIBUTION.

*Ambridge*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	5th Aust. Inf. Brigade.
2.	6th do.
3.	7th do.
4.	5th A.M.G. Coy.
5.	6th A.M.G. Coy.
6.	7th A.M.G. Coy.
7.	22nd A.M.G. Coy.

FOR INFORMATION.

8.	1st ANZAC.	13.	D.B.O.
9.	1st Australian Division.	14.	Area Comdt. CANAL Area.
10.	21st Division.	15.	" SWAN "
11.	C.R.A., 5th Aust. Div.	16.	File.
12.	A.Q.	17-19.	War Diary.
		20-22.	Spare.


War Diary



App. LVII

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

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Headquarters,  
30th October, 1917.

## GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM No. 42.

Subject - ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE.

1. Attention is directed to G. S. Circular No. 38 of 10th September, 1917, paras. 1 and 2.
2. Commanders of detached units, such as Pioneers or working parties, or units not in the Divisional area, will forward the report asked for to the Area Commandant, and a copy to Divisional Headquarters.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

*G. H. Williams*  
Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	C.R.A.
2.	C.R.E.
3.	5th Aust. Inf. Ede.
4.	6th do.
5.	7th do.
6.	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
7.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
8.	2nd Aust. M. G. Coy.
9.	A.D.M.S.
10.	2nd Aust. Mob. Vet. Sect.
11.	2nd Aust. Div. Train.
12.	A.Q.
13.	D.M.G.O.
14.	Camp Commandant.
15 - 17.	War Diary.
18 - 19.	File.



SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.  
\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
GENERAL STAFF  
Copy No. 14  
G.S./101

Headquarters,  
30th October, 1917.

CORRIGENDA TO GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR MEMO. No. 41.

Anti-aircraft Defence.

1. Reference to Second Australian Division Circular Memo. No. 41, para 2, the detachments mentioned will be attached for administration and discipline to 5th Australian Divisional Artillery, and NOT to the Infantry Brigade in the line.
2. Reference to "Addendum" to above memo. para. 2, the detachments mentioned will be attached to 30th Siege Battery for administration and discipline, and NOT to the Support Brigade.
3. AOKNOWLEDGE.

*W. H. H. H. H.*  
for Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>
1.	C.R.A.
2.	C.R.E.
3.	5th Aust. Inf. Brigade.
4.	6th do.
5.	7th do.
6.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
7.	22nd Aust. M. G. Coy.
8.	D.M.G.O.
9.	O.C., 1st ANZAC Cyclist Bn.
10.	57th H. A. Grcup.
11.	30th Siege Battery.
12 -13.	File.
14 -16.	War Diary.
17 -22.	Spare.

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No. 15.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

From 6 a.m. 29th to 6 a.m. 30th October 1917.

NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.

OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Harassing fire was maintained upon enemy communications and occupied localities, particular attention being paid during the day to reported enemy posts, and during the night to the MOORSLEDE - BROODSEINDE and the KEIBERG - DAME HOUSE roads.

Minor bombardments were carried out on posts D.50.c.3.8, D.24.c.8.3, and D.24.c.15.60.

At 5.50 a.m. this morning the Creeping barrage commenced in conjunction with Army operations.

(a) Patrols. A party of one Officer and 20 Other Ranks with Lewis Gun left our lines at 10 p.m. from J.5.b.30.75 and proceeded along road to Junction at D.30.c.05.30, where it split into two sections, and thoroughly searched CELTIC WOOD. No enemy were encountered or hostile movement observed until parties emerged from the N. E. corner of the wood, when a machinegun opened fire from about D.30.c.60.80. Flares were fired from about D.30.c.60.90. Pill boxes and huts in the wood were examined and found to be badly smashed and uninhabitable. The ground in the valley running through D.29.b. and D.30.c. is slightly boggy but not impassable. Patrol then moved east along the road as far as D.30.c.7.4, then turned south and moved into JUSTICE WOOD. Enemy were found in strength along eastern edge of wood notably from D.30.d.14.10 to J.6.b.25.90.

Main road to KEIBERG is in good condition, and the ground passable. Pill boxes were discovered in good condition as follows:-

1 at D.29.d.7.4.

3 at D.30.c.8.7.

(b). Another patrol of 1 Officer and 22 Other Ranks, with Lewis gun started from D.29.a.9.8. at 9.30 p.m. and moved east and N.E. until CHINA WOOD was reached. This was searched and nothing discovered, but a quantity of trip wire. The ground was very wet but passable.

The party then moved towards ANVIL WOOD, and on approaching this they were fired on by M.G. from approximately D.50.a.10.8. Flares bursting into two reds were fired from this place which brought a light artillery barrage down between our line and CHINA WOOD. Flares were fired for some time and the M.G. continued firing.

A M.G. and flares then opened up from near TABLET WOOD. Owing to M.G. activity and the extremely bright night it was considered inadvisable to go further, so after engaging the enemy with Lewis Gun and rifles the party withdrew.

The ground North of CHINA WOOD is rapidly drying up and is passable for troops.

(c). A party of one Officer and 9 Other Ranks moved from D.29.b.25.05 at 10 p.m. and moved in a N.E. direction for 500 yards, then south towards CELTIC WOOD and S.W. corner of D.29.b. No enemy were encountered, and nothing of interest observed. The ground passed over was extremely swampy, and a large area is impassable.

P.T.O.



(d). One Officer and 20 men and a Lewis Gun left our left flank to examine BUSY WOOD and TABLE WOOD and to establish a standing patrol at D.24.d.2.7.

Moved along the DROOGENBROODHOEK road until the edge of TABLE WOOD was reached, M. G's. then opened fire from approx. D.24.c.75.60 - D.24.a.5.1. - D.24.c.6.9.

Golden flares bursting into two reds were fired from these places which brought an artillery barrage on the line - BUSY WOOD - along MILITARY ROAD - and back towards CHINA WOOD.

Three of the enemy were observed moving in vicinity of M.G. at D.24.c.75.60, and disappeared as soon as our patrol was discovered.

The standing patrol was eventually posted at D.24.c.2.6. and withdrew at 4 a.m. Roads passed are in good condition. condition.

#### HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

This was quiet during the day. From 11-30 a.m. to 1-30pm. an 8" How. and two 5.9 Hows. were firing on J.8., J.1., J.2., and D.26, the 8" How. being on T.B. 1250 from J.8.c.75.93. At 3 p.m. J.8.a. was lightly shelled by 5.9 How. on T.B. 920 from J.8.a.4.4. At 1.25 p.m. a 5.9 How. opened on J.8.c. on T.B. 1250 from J.8.c.7.9, and this continued intermittently during the afternoon.

WESTHOEK and ANZAC RIDGES were intermittently shelled during the afternoon, and some scattered fire from 4.2 and 5.9 Hows. searched the tracks in the forward area occasionally during the day.

During the night WESTHOEK RIDGE and east valley lightly shelled by 5.9 Hows. from direction of WATERDAMHOEK.

Between 6 p.m. and 5 a.m. the battery positions in J.8.b. and c. and J.3.c. were heavily shelled by 4.2 Hows. with gas (garlic) from the direction of POTTERIJEBRUG.

YPRES received a few 4.2 M. V. shells from the south-east during the morning.

J.17.c. and I.17.d. were shelled intermittently throughout the day.

Gun flares were observed on T.Bs. 31° 97° 99° and 108° from O.P. at J.4.b.88.60 during the day.

Flares of 10.5 cm. or 15 cm. How. Battery observed on T.B. 98° from D.29.c.5.6.

At 1.45 p.m. Infantry observers reported a 15 cm. battery firing from E.16.c.7.7. Artillery observers informed.

At 2.15 p.m. gun was observed firing from approx. K.4.c.0.2. At 3.30 p.m. a gun was observed firing from E.15.c.5.5.

#### ENEMY ATTITUDE.

Throughout the 24 hours hostile artillery and machine guns were decidedly less active than usual, as were also his snipers.

#### ENEMY DEFENCES.

Enemy M. G's. located at:-

D.30.c.6.8 - D.30.a.9.8 - D.24.c.75.60 -

D.24.c.6.9 - D.24.a.5.1.

Flares were also fired from all these points.

Enemy located in strength along eastern edge of JUSTICE WOOD, particularly from D.30.d.14.10 to J.6.b.25.90.

An O.P. is suspected in tree at E.19.c.8.5.

#### MOVEMENT IN ENEMY LINES.

3 men were observed at D.24.c.75.60 by one of our patrols. They disappeared before fire could be brought to bear on them.

Throughout the day parties each about 6 men strong were seen constantly moving from K.2.b.1.3 to buildings at E.28.c.1.4.

At 2.30 p.m. 3 mounted men rode from K.2.b.1.6. to E.28.c.1.4.



- 3 -

AERIAL ACTIVITY.

Both our own and enemy aircraft were very active throughout the day. Enemy planes constantly flew over our forward area at a low altitude dropping light bombs and opening M.G. fire on our troops. These were all actively engaged by our A.A. guns and Machine guns.

At 2.30 p.m. 10 enemy planes flew over our lines as far back as YPRES and dropped bombs in the vicinity of ZILLEBEKE and in I.14.c. and smoke signals when over I.17.

About 6 p.m. 24 enemy planes crossed our lines flying westwards.

Balloons. 2 enemy balloons were observed at 7.10 a.m. on T.B.107° and 117° from O.P. at D.29.a.3.2.

At 1.20 p.m. an enemy balloon ascended on a T.B. of 91° from O.P. at D.29.a.3.2. This balloon was pulled down at 1.40 p.m.

MISCELLANEOUS.

At 1.30 p.m. a train was seen moving along line from DADIZEELE to KANTERHOEF.

At 2.35 p.m. a large dump at approx. E.21.b.9.1. was observed to be on fire.

A large Red Cross Flag can be seen flying from a building in the centre of WATERDAMHOLK (approx. E.21.d.95.00).

*L. J. L. M. Ball Coy*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

No 16.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.From 6 a.m. 30th to 6 a.m. 31st October 1917.NOTE. - Not to be taken into the front line trenches.OPERATIONS.

Artillery. Our artillery actively carried on harassing fire upon enemy centres of activity, and continued with a series of minor bombardments.

At 11.15.a.m. a Zone Call was received and responded to for a hostile battery at E.20.d.70.35. The result is unknown owing to poor visibility.

At 12.35.p.m. a hostile working party between E.20.c.00.54. and E.19.b.30.80. were engaged, and dispersed by our fire.

During the afternoon a reported Sniper Post at D.30.central was engaged, and bombardments of reported hostile strong points at D.24.d.42.00 to D.24.d.0.7., D.30.d.45.60. to D.30.d.45.90., and D.30.b.51.29 to D.30.b.51.21 were carried out.

A machine<sup>gun</sup> position at D.30.c.50.65, also received bursts of fire at irregular intervals.

At 5.15.a.m. this morning, an Army barrage was fired according to programme.

Patrols.

(a). A patrol of 1 officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point J.5.b.30.75, proceeded eastward and established a post at J.6.a.30.75. Flares were fired from D.30.central and D.30.d.25.30. No hostile movement was observed. The ground was very wet and slippery and in some places boggy. Post was withdrawn at 5 a.m.

(b) A patrol of 1 officer and 9 o/ranks left our line at 10 p.m. from point D.29.d.3.4. Patrol worked through CELTIC WOOD to point D.30.c.45.70. Flares were fired from approx.D.30.c.60.90, and also from a post about 100 yards to N. Patrol then moved south to point on road at D.30.c.40.30, where a post was established. No machine<sup>gun</sup> or rifle fire was heard at all. A further examination of pill boxes in CELTIC WOOD obviously shows that they have been purposely destroyed to render them uninhabitable. No enemy movement was observed, and post was withdrawn at 2.45.a.m.

At intervals during the night CELTIC WOOD was searched with 77 cm and 4.2" shrapnel, each salvo being followed by a pair of RED flares fired from D.30.central.

(c) A patrol of 1 officer and 20 o/ranks, with a Lewis gun, left our line at D.29.a.9.8. at 9.30.p.m. CHINA WOOD was searched and no trace of enemy found. Patrol then moved eastward and were not fired on by machine gun from D.30.a.9.8. as was the case the night previous. Two men were seen near this point moving northward. M.Gs were fired from ANVIL WOOD about D.30.a.8.8. Patrol remained for 1½ hours near point D.30.a.9.8., but no further enemy movement was observed. They returned to our lines about 2.30.a.m.

(d) A patrol of 1 officer and 16 o/ranks, with a Lewis gun, left our line at 9.30.p.m. at point D.25.d.3.5. They proceeded to cross roads at D.24.d.2.7. When about 300 yards from our line enemy shelled patrol with 77 cm, and a M.G. firing from D.24.c.75.60. held them up. Two M.Gs also opened fire from direction of TABLE WOOD. The enemy's attitude proved that patrol's movements could be seen, as each time they moved the M.Gs opened fire. Patrol withdrew to D.25.d.3.5, and searched the ground in the vicinity. A post was established at D.25.d.6.5. which withdrew at 4.30.a.m., and reported no enemy movement seen.

P.T.O.



HOSTILE ARTILLERY.

This was fairly quiet during the period. ANZAC and WESTHOEK RIDGES and the VALLEY between occasionally shelled lightly by 5.9" and 4.2" Hows from direction between MOORSLEDE and POTTERLIEBRUG, chiefly from the WATERDAMHOEK Group.

About midday the forward slopes of BROOSSEINDT RIDGE were searched with 77 mm and 10.5 cm shrapnel, with occasional bursts of 15 c.m. H.E. from direction of MULLENHOEK.

During the afternoon, tracks in the forward area, particularly the corduroy road through J.3.a. and b, and J.3.c., received intermittent attention from the same Group, and occasionally from a 5.9" How at TERHAND. A 5.9" H.V. gun fired into J.2. between 2 and 5 p.m. I.17.d. was shelled at intervals by 5.9" Hows from the south-east.

During the night only desultory shelling of ridges and tracks in the forward area. Between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. enemy fired over 300 gas shells into area J.4.b. and J.5.a.

AERIAL ACTIVITY.

There was a marked decrease in enemy aerial activity during the day. At 5 a.m. 5 E.A. flew over squares J.7.a. and c. Later on this area was heavily shelled with 21 cm H.E. from a S.E. direction.

At 5.30 a.m. 2 E.A. flew along our front line and dropped a number of WHITE flares. They were actively engaged by our machine and Lewis guns.

At 7.20 a.m. one of our 'planes crashed in D.27.b.

MOVEMENT IN ENEMY'S LINES.

About 8 a.m. enemy troops were observed apparently massing at E.13.b.8.6. They were engaged by our artillery and dispersed.

At 9.25 a.m. 4 men appeared at E.19.d.8.4., and walked south along a track, disappearing at E.25.b.8.1.

At 10.5 a.m. 3 mounted men were observed at E.16.a.5.5, moving into MOORSLEDE. This road is camouflaged in places, but not very effectively.

At 11.19 a.m. a man appeared running away to the S.E. from building at E.28.c.8.9. Our artillery were shelling this building at the time.

At 12 noon 4 men left the buildings at K.4.a.30.65, and walked down track towards front line as far as K.3.b.35.85, then on to K.3.a.85.45, where they crossed a creek, disappearing at K.3.a.7.4.

At 12.5 p.m. 2 men left building at K.5.a.0.1., and disappeared at K.4.b.3.7.

At 1.50 p.m. 3 men were observed to enter dugout at E.19.d.85.40. They appeared anxious to avoid observation as they were practically crawling for about the last 50 yards.

ENEMY DEFENCES.

Suspected O.P. at E.19.c.8.5. consists of a platform fixed in a tree.

M.G.s were reported active during the night from J.6.b., D.30.a.8.8., D.24.c.75.60., TABLE WOOD.

Flares were fired during the night from D.30.central., D.30.d.25.30., D.30.c.6.9., D.24.c.6.1., D.30.a.8.8.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Red Cross flags can be seen at E.19.b.35.86., E.21.d.75.70., E.9.d.8.5. (approx), and flying from a tree at E.22.d.6.3.

Hostile gun flashes were observed on T.Bs of 86° and 71° from O.P. at D.29.a.35.30., and T.Bs of 83° and 94° from O.P. at J.5.b.25.80.

At 7.25 a.m. a loud explosion occurred in the direction of PASCHENDALE.

Lt Col  
 General Staff  
 2nd Aust Division



App LX

## SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 151.

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SECRET.

Copy No. ...

Headquarters,  
31st October, 1917.

Reference Maps - Sheet 28. 1/40,000  
 BECELAERE, 1/10,000.  
 HOOGE, - 1/10,000.

1. Reliefs will be carried out on 2nd November and night 2nd/3rd. in accordance with attached table.

2. Troops on the march will maintain distances as follows West of the YPRES - COMINES CANAL:-

800 yards between Battalions and other units.

400 yards between transport of units, horsed units and other troops.

200 yards between Companies.

East of the CANAL movement may only take place by small columns not larger than a Platoon, and where the tactical situation, state of light and presence of hostile aircraft render it necessary, by sections.

3. Subject to the terms of this order the reliefs will be carried out by mutual arrangements between Brigade Commanders concerned.

Command will pass on completion of relief and will be reported by telegram to D.H.Q.

4. The 7th Aust. Inf. Bde. will detail one battalion to take over, on the 4th November, the work at present being carried out by the 21st Battalion.

On being relieved the former battalion will move straight to the camp now occupied by the 21st Battalion, H.23.b.5.9, the 21st battalion moving on the 2nd November to the 19th Battalion camp.

5. Acknowledge BY WIRE.

Issued at 9 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION.

*Ambridge*

Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,  
Second Australian Division.

P. T. O.

*Mac Dair*



- 2 -

DISTRIBUTION.

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>To.</u>	
1.	5th A.I. Bde.	
2.	6th do.	
3.	7th do.	
4.	C.R.A. "B" Group.....	
5.	C.R.E.	
6.	2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	
7.	2nd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	
8.	22nd A. M. G. Coy.	
9.	2nd Aust. Div. Train.	
10.	S.S.O., 2nd Aust. Div.	FOR
11.	2nd Aust. Mch. Vet. Sect.	
12.	2nd Aust. Div. Rfts. Camp.	INFORMATION.
13.	G.O.C.	
14.	A.Q.	
15.	A.D.M.S.	
16.	A.P.M.	
17.	D.M.G.O.	
18.	D.A.D.V.S.	
19.	D.A.D.O.S.	
20.	D.B.O.	
21.	D.G.O.	
22.	First ANZAC "G."	
23.	do. "Q."	
24.	1st Aust. Division.	
25.	4th do.	
26.	5th do.	
27.	21st Division.	FOR
28.	4th Squad. R.F.C.	
29.	57th H.A.G.	INFORMATION.
30.	Area Comdt. SWAN AREA	
31.	" DICKEBUSCH area.	
32.	Town Major, YPRES.....	
33.	File.	
35.	War Diary.	
38 - 45.	Spare.	

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Colonel  
General Staff  
Australian Division

P.T.O.



# RELIEF TABLE

to accompany Second Australian Division Order No. 151.

Date.	Unit.	From.	To.	In relief of	Relieved unit moves to	Remarks.
Nov. 2.	6th A.I.Bde. (less M.G.Coy.)	DICKEBUSCH area. (Reserve).	SWAN area. (Support).	5th A.I.Bde. (less M.G.Coy.)	LINE.	Relief to be carried out as battalions of 5th A.I.Bde. move out of SWAN area.
2/3rd.	5th A.I.Bde. (less M. G. Coy)	SWAN area. (Support).	LINE.	7th A.I.Bde. (less M.G.Coy.)	DICKEBUSCH area. (Reserve).	Relief of Support Battalions to be carried out during afternoon in daylight.  Relief of Line Battal- ions to be carried out as early as possible after dusk.