


AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/46/16 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 3rd
Australian Division

February 1918



AWM4-1/46/16PART2

S E C R E T.

Divisional Headquarters,
31st. January. 1918.

LOCATION OF UNITS AS AT 6.0 A.M. 1/2/1918.

Map Reference 1/40,000.
Sheets 27, 28, 36 & 36 A.

Divisional Headquarters.	RAVENSBERG. S.17. central.
Divsnl. Signal Coy.	" "
Divsnl. Engineer. H.Q.	" "
A. D. M. S.	" "
A. P. M.	F.13.central.
D. M. G. O.	RAVENSBERG. S.17. central.
D. B. O.	T.8.d.40.30.
Divsnl. Paymaster.	RAVENSBERG. S.17. central.
D. G. O.	" "
D.A.D.V.S.	118 Rue de la Gare, BAILLEUL.
D.A.D.O.S.	B.1.d.10.80.
9th. Brigade. H.Q.	T.20.c.40.40.
33rd. Bn.	T.26.b.90.50.
34th. Bn.	B.4.a.80.40.
35th. Bn.	T.26.b.40.50.
36th. Bn.	T.26.c.60.10.
9th. A.M.G.Coy.	T.20.d.20.90.
9th. A.L.T.M.Battery.	T.20.c.40.20.
10th. Brigade. H.Q.	Rue du Sac Romarin. B.4.c.40.90.
37th. Bn.	U.15.c.90.50.
38th. Bn.	U.9.b.80.40.
39th. Bn.	U.19.b.40.80.
40th. Bn.	T.18.d.70.40.
10th. A.M.G.Coy.	B.14.a.20.90.
10th. A.L.T.M.Battery.	U.19.b.40.60.
11th. Brigade. H.Q.	B.10.a.60.70.
41st. Bn.	C.3.c.80.50.
42nd. Bn.	B.10.a.75.85.
43rd. Bn.	B.10.d.70.80.
44th. Bn.	U.27.b.80.20.
11th. A.M.G.Coy.	B.9.b.60.20.
11th. A.L.T.M.Battery.	B.9.b.60.20.
23rd. A.M.G.Coy.	B.8.c.10.85.
3rd. Pioneer Bn. H.Q.	RUE CHATEAU. NIEPPE.
"A" Coy.	The CHATEAU, NIEPPE.
"B" Coy.	Place de l'Eglise, NIEPPE.
"C" Coy.	The Chatcau, NIEPPE.
"D" Coy.	61 Rue de la Gare, NIEPPE.
9th. Field Coy.	B.1.d.60.50.
10th. Field Coy.	T.16.a.90.90.
11th. Field Coy.	B.4.a.50.20.
9th. Field Ambulance.	T.19.b.40.50.
10th. Field Ambulance.	B.8.b.20.50.
11th. Field Ambulance.	B.16.c.80.80.
3rd. Aust. Div. Arty. H.Q.	50 Rue de Lille, BAILLEUL.
7th. Aust. F.A.Bde. H.Q.	B.11.d.15.48.
8th. Aust. F.A.Bde. H.Q.	T.21.d.20.10.
3rd. Aust. D.A.C. H.Q.	S.30.c.30.70.
3rd. Aust. Divsnl. Train. H.Q.	118 Rue de la Gare, BAILLEUL.
867th. Coy.	B.8.a.00.40.
868th. Coy.	B.9.c.
869th. Coy.	B.9.c.
870th. Coy.	A.5.d.80.50.
3rd. Aust.Div.Mob.Vet.Section.	B.8.d.50.70.
3rd. Aust.Div.Salvage Coy.	B.7.d.80.40.

NOTE - Amendments to be immediately notified to Divisional Headquarters.

Appendix 3

Copy APPENDIX. 30

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters.
5th. February, 1918.



C.R.A.
C.R.E.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
11th. -do-
War Diary (3).
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

1. - The attached copy of report on LA BASSEVILLE, which has been approved by the Divisional Commander, is forwarded for information, and is not to be taken beyond Brigade Headquarters.

2. - Consequent upon the above, the G.O.C., 10th. A. I. Brigade will :-

- (i) Arrange for a definite plan of works to be prepared as early as possible and forwarded to Divisional Headquarters for approval.
- (ii) Arrange for personnel to proceed with improvement forthwith, under Engineer supervision.
- (iii) Prepare a Defence Scheme for the locality, including plans for reinforcing, or counter-attacking if lost.

3. - The G.O.C., 11th. A.I. Brigade will arrange necessary details for reconstruction of his garrison strength and dispositions, so that sufficient troops are on (or enabled to move rapidly to) the left flank of his Brigade Sector to co-operate with the 10th. A.I. Brigade in any eventuality.

4. - The G.O's.C., 10th. and 11th. A.I. Brigades will arrange mutually to construct the undermentioned wire belts :-

- (a). From about U.23. central, TROIS TILLEUL FARM to ULTIMO AVENUE in vicinity of FLATTERED FARM.
- (b). Railway embankment at U.23.a.7.3. through U.16.d.5.0. to ULTIMO CRATER.

5. - ACKNOWLEDGE.

[Signature]
Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

TWP.

SECRET

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,
5th February, 1918.

APPRECIATION OF SITUATION.LA BASSEVILLE-WARNERTON.Enemy situation.

The enemy have, by clinging to the ruined village of WARNERTON, been able to make a strongly defended locality which, while it protects the flank of their position N. of the River DOUVE, has the following disadvantages :-

- (a) It is enclosed by the Rivers DOUVE and LYE in a narrow triangle, with an apex towards the rear. (East)
- (b) Their front line is roughly 1000 yards, as opposed to our opposing line of 1500. This (though extremely suitable for defence) is a great disadvantage in attack, as to assemble sufficient troops for the assault -
 - (i) The assembly must be dense;
 - (ii) Deployment (or extension) must take place at the same time as the advance, namely, under barrage fire.
- (c) The East ~~side~~ edge of the "HILL 63" Spur in U.11 and U.17 commands their forming up places for any daylight assault, or preparation of jumping off trenches, etc.,
- (d) No local assistance (in an assault) other than by fire can be rendered by adjoining units, as on the north the DOUVE (though not a serious obstacle), runs diagonally across the front, while on the south, the LYE flows southward in U.17.d., and ~~flows~~ across the front of the attack.
- (e) Reinforcements must either come through the apex of the triangle or across the river, laterally by bridges, etc., nearer to the ~~enemy~~ ^{us}.

Advantages.

For defence, the advantages are obvious, as the attackers have to converge, and even though driven from forward lines, fewer defenders are required to hang on to succeeding lines, and the attack must, for the reasons in (d) above, be localised between the rivers, therefore making artillery defence simpler.

Our situation.Disadvantages.

- (a) Our wider front should enable us to bring greater rifle fire to bear on the attacks (if our trenches were continuous and manned) but, unfortunately, though situated on rising ground, front lines of the right and left battalions are separated by the morass in 11.D. and 17.A. and 17.B. and elsewhere consist only of posts in various stages of repair.
- (b) LA BASSEVILLE on the right consists of a ruined village on a slight eminence, with good command and concealment, and cellar accommodation for a garrison, but as the cellars in the majority of cases have but one outlet, (and that facing the Boche), the exodus of the garrison in time to repel an attack is doubtful.

5/2/1918.

- (c). In rear of LA BASSEVILLE to the South, there is no occupied support trench, (ULTIMO DRIVE might be used), nearer than UMPIRE DRIVE, 1000 yards away.

To use UMPIRE DRIVE, the troops therein would have to fire to the rear (i.e., over the parapets), and could be enfiladed by machine guns, etc., from WIGART FARM, and then could only fire on the flank on an enemy advancing. (after they had captured LA BASSEVILLE), south-west to FLORENTIN.

- (d). On the left battalion sector, the front trench is in better condition, but is entirely detached (except for doubtful communication at its E. end) from the support line, while its right flank is in the air at about 11.4.5.5.

The support line in rear is well placed, but is in almost useless condition in parts, comes in even now for a considerable amount of enemy attention, and will certainly be engaged with annihilating fire in the event of enemy attack.

- (e). LA BASSEVILLE is reached by one communication trench near the southern limit of the brigade boundary.

- (f). The possession of LA BASSEVILLE by the enemy would give complete dominance over the area contained in 16.D., 17.C., 17.D., and would enable him to extend his front to 3000 yards by junction with troops occupying the FORT ROUGE SALIENT, who would only be opposed by a single firing line from U.29.a.2.0 to U.23.d.0.8, which would end in the salient formed by the junction with UMPIRE DRIVE.

While LA BASSEVILLE is held by us, the FORT ROUGE SALIENT is useless for occupation by the enemy, though even now, owing to his pontoon bridges, etc., he cannot be completely prevented from patrolling same.

- (g). The increased width of front, from the DOUVE to the CUSTOM HOUSE at U.29.b., would enable the river to be bridged, covered by troops, and enable an attack on this broad front to be attempted across squares U.16. and U.22. and perhaps U.29.a. and b., when nothing but wire would be encountered till held up by CRATER, ELDER HOUSE, and FALK VILLA Posts.

If this were successful, the right brigade position in 8.3., 4., 9., 10., would be practically untenable unless counter-attack could be driven in from the flank and be at once successful.

- (h). LA BASSEVILLE, as at present, is not certain of repelling even a determined raid on a large scale.

- (i). If occupied only locally by the enemy, local counter-attack by us would be very difficult -

(a) from the West, because of the Morass;

(b)(1) from the South-west or South, because of no suitable works in the vicinity to emerge from;

(c)(11) because of the command, South and West;

(d)(11) because of the fire which would be received from the East bank of the River.

8/2/1918.

ADVANTAGES.

- (a). The site of LA BASSEVILLE is high enough for suitable drained works to be constructed and maintained.
- (b). It can be supported by fire from the left battalion front and support lines, (while they remain).
- (c). Shelters exist for local supports to front line.
- (d). The River LYS localises attack to the N.E. or N.
- (e). The railway embankment offers firm ground for the construction of suitable second communication trench, (i.e., to left flank).
- (f). Construction of short lengths of fire trench can be concealed by the ruined buildings.
- (g). While LA BASSEVILLE remains in our hands, the PORT ROUGE SALIENT is of no use to the enemy.
- (h). If the locality holds out for even a short period, enemy reinforcements, or withdrawal, should be made very costly by our artillery and machine guns.

REDUCTIONS.

LA BASSEVILLE is the key of the centre of the divisional forward zone.

It is not in a suitable state of defence.

Therefore, improvement of defences are urgent, and should consist of :-

- (i). (a). More wire in front;
 - (b). Running west from junction of front trench and railway to UMBVEN SUPPORT, and
 - (c). also through forward portions of the village.
- (ii). suitable short lengths of fire trench for support garrisons in the village.
- (iii). Emergency exits from the cellars.
- (iv). Another communication trench from the west to the left flank.
- (v). Short communication trenches from posts in village to front line.
- (vi). Front line to be made continuous.
- (vii). A definite Defence Scheme, drawn up for the locality, detailing action in case of attack; also plan for reinforcing or counter-attack by the support company.
- (viii). The command of the locality only to be given to an officer of known energy, determination and personality.

The work is of immediate importance while the long nights and morning mists enable parties to work for longer times, and while the weather and ground conditions make attack on anything like a large scale somewhat unlikely.

- 4 -

This can hardly be depended on for more than a few weeks more.

No amount of harassing the enemy by day with fire, and by night with patrols, will compensate for time lost in above defence preparations.

[Signature] L. Col
E. S.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,
 5th. February, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 72.

Reference Maps: Sheet 28. 1/40,000.

BAS WARNETON (Part Sheet 28, 1/10,000).

WARNETON (Part Sheet 28, 1/10,000, Ed. 2.B.).

-----000-----

1. On "Z" Day, at an hour to be arranged, the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will raid the enemy's trenches between the following points :-

U.18.a.28.55.

U.18.a.70.85.

U.12.c.50.25.

U.12.c.10.15.

At the same time, diversions will be made to the North of the above sectors; the Division on our left has also been asked to arrange similar action.

"Z" Day and selected hour will be notified later to all concerned.

2. The objects of the raid are as follows :-
 - (i) To capture or kill as many enemy as possible.
 - (ii) To damage or destroy material and defences.
 - (iii) To obtain identifications, documents and other information.
3. The C. R. A. will make the necessary artillery arrangements for wire-cutting, bombardment, - both Divisional and Heavy, - counter-battery, etc., with G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. and B.G., H.A. He will also allot all tasks to 9.45" and 6" Mortars.
4. "Q" of Division will arrange for necessary issues of special clothing, equipment, weapons, etc.
5. L.T.M. Batteries of the Division are placed at the disposal of G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde., and will work under supervision of O.C., 10th. A.L.T.M. Battery. Lieut. A. S. VARLEY, 9th. A.L.T.M. Battery, will supervise the manufacture and employment of any special bombs, smoke, etc.
6. The 9th. A.M.G. Coy. will be placed at disposal of 10th. Brigade for employment by arrangement with the D.M.G.O.
7. O. C., Divisional Signal Coy., will arrange for power buzzer and necessary trained personnel being made available.

(1).

P.T.O.

(2).

5 /2/1918.

8. Medical arrangements will be made by G.O.C., 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. with 11th. Field Ambulance.
9. Lieut. J. J. HERBERTSON (attached 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.) will assist in the interrogation of prisoners taken.
10. The A.P.M. 3rd. Australian Division, will arrange for necessary escorts to be available at 10th. Brigade Collecting Cage at Advanced Brigade Headquarters.

11. ACKNOWLEDGE.

[Signature]
Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1.	A.D.C. for G.O.C.	
2.	"G" Staff.	
3.	"A.Q." Staff.	
4.	C. R. A.	
5.	C. R. E.	
6.	3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.	
7.	9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	
8.	10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	
9.	11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	
10.	3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	
11.	A. D. M. S.	
12.	D. M. G. O.	
13.	23rd. A. M. G. Coy.	
14.	A. P. M.	
15-16	AUSTRALIAN CORPS.	} for information.
17.	57th. Division.	
18 & 21	5th. Aust. Division.	
19.	Military Board, C.M.F.)	
20-22.	War Diary.	
23.	File.	
24-27.	Spars.	

War Diary Appendix 4a

A.H.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

COPY NO. 21...

S E C R E T.

Divisional Headquarters,
8th. February, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 73.

Reference Maps: Sheet 28. 1/40,000.
BAS WARNETON. (Part Sheet 28. 1/10,000).
WARNETON. (part Sheet 28. 1/10,000, Ed. 2.B.).
-----000-----

1. This order will be read in conjunction with Third Australian Divisional Order No. 72.
2. S.O.S. will be inoperative on the Left Brigade Front from ZERO minus 30 minutes to ZERO plus 60 minutes.
3. "Z" Day will be 10th. February, 1918.
4. ZERO Hour will be notified later.
5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Cyfron.

Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

- | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| Copy No. 1. | A.D.C. for G.O.C. | |
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| 5. | C. R. E. | |
| 6. | 3rd. Aust. Divsnl. Signal Coy. | |
| 7. | 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. | |
| 8. | 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. | |
| 9. | 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. | |
| 10. | 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn. | |
| 11. | A. D. M. S. | |
| 12. | D. M. G. O. | |
| 13. | 23rd. A. M. G. Coy. | |
| 14. | A. P. M. | |
| 15-16. | Australian Corps. | } for information. |
| 17. | 57th. Division. | |
| 18-19. | 5th. Aust. Division. | |
| 20. | Military Board. C.M.F. | |
| 21-23. | War Diary. | |
| 24. | File. | |
| 25-28. | Spars. | |

A.H.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.Divisional Headquarters,
11th. February, 1918.Headquarters,
Australian Corps.MINOR OFFENSIVE - NIGHT, FEBRUARY 10th/11th, 1918.

1. I beg to forward hereunder a more detailed report of raid carried out by this Division during last night. -

2. PLAN.

(a). The programme was planned to commence one day before ZERO Day by a systematic cutting of the enemy wire before his Front and Second lines, - not only over the frontage to be attacked, but over an extension of same towards the North. - The Left Flank Division concurrently carried out wire cutting at various points on its front. - All wire cutting was carried out by 4.5 howitzers with 106 fuzes assisted by 6" Trench Mortars, and attention was distracted from the actual wire cutting by a simultaneous organised bombardment by the whole of the Divisional Artillery of selected enemy works and approaches. -

(b). The Artillery action during the actual raid was as follows:- The Divisional Artillery carried out an advancing barrage which came to rest 100 yards beyond the furthest point of penetration, and was maintained there until the close of the operation. - The reinforcing Army Brigade kept under fire the enemy's front line to the Northward of the point of attack, and also provided a Northern flank barrage which was chiefly in enfilade. - The Artillery of the Left Flank Division carried out diversion bombardments within a Zone 1,500 yards to the North of the point of attack. - The Corps Heavy Artillery bombarded trench intersections by which the enemy could reinforce and engaged selected targets in rear. - The counter-battery groups engaged with gas all enemy batteries likely to come into action against us, from ZERO onwards for one hour. -

(c). The 10th. Machine Gun Coy. put down a belt of fire beyond the area to be penetrated, and also brought harassing fire upon approaches which could be used by counter-attacking troops. -

(d). The three Light Trench Mortar Batteries of the Division were employed to engage machine gun positions which might interfere with the assault and, also, to put down a VARLEY smoke barrage on the South bank of the river to cover our assault from view of the enemy position on that bank. -

(1).

P.T.O.

(2).

11/2/1918.

- (e). The Infantry Assaulting Force consisted of 9 officers and 179 other ranks, and was divided mainly into two assaulting teams operating respectively on the North and on the South of the Road leading into WARNETON. - Each of these teams was divided into eight separate parties, and to each of these sixteen parties was assigned a definite role, task and objective. - The total duration of our occupation of the enemy position was to be 26 minutes, and the total penetration of the enemy's works, measured from his front line, was to be 250 yards, on a total frontage of 500 yards. -
- (f). Appropriate arrangements were made for the Approach March and withdrawal by overland routes (not known communication trenches), for special signalling communications, - both by wire and by wireless, for evacuation of wounded, for custody and interrogation of prisoners and for rapid transmission of information. -

3.

EXECUTION.

- (a). The whole of the programme, as planned, was carried out in its entirety. - The wire cutting proved thorough and successful at the first attempt, and our patrols sent out for the purpose on the night preceding that of the raid reported that clear, practicable lanes had been cut. - The Assaulting Troops, who were drawn in equal quotas from the 37th. and 38th. Battalions of the 10th. Australian Infantry Brigade and placed under the command of Captain F. E. FAIRWEATHER, M.C., 38th. Battalion, assembled without incident or interference, and the action of the Artillery and Infantry synchronised precisely at the ZERO hour which was fixed for 10.0 p.m. - During the advance across NO MAN'S LAND, it was found that a number of the enemy had, to escape our barrage, moved forward into shell holes; - at least 30 of these were killed and some taken prisoner. - The Right Assaulting team met strong opposition from the outset, and the several parties had to fight their way to their final objectives. - Several dugouts in the enemy's Second Line South of the WARNETON Road were bombed with phosphorus and stokes bombs and demolition charges. - The Left Assaulting team met practically no opposition in the Front Line, but strong resistance in the Second Line. - They also bombed a number of dugouts in and near the Second Line, and report that three of them were definitely demolished. - In addition, two others were found to have been demolished by our Artillery. - Of the prisoners taken, several parties totalling 12 in all attempted to escape while being taken across NO MAN'S LAND, and had to be dealt with. - A conservative estimate of the number of enemy killed by revolver, bomb and bayonet by the Infantry, - apart from those (undoubtedly numerous) which had become casualties from our Artillery fire before our Assault had reached the enemy's position, - is a total of 102. - This figure is arrived at by a careful interrogation of each of the 16 storming parties. - - In addition, we captured and brought in 33 prisoners of whom 8 were wounded; also 3 machine guns, 1 "pineapple" mortar and a considerable quantity of smaller booty. -

(2).

P.T.O.

(3).

11/2/1918.

90

- (b). Two minutes before the time fixed for withdrawal, a strong counter-attack developed along the WARNETON Road; but this was repulsed by rifle fire and the withdrawal of our troops, without molestation, was thereby covered. -
- (c). The enemy put up a thoroughly good fight and their moral is considered to have been good. - There was no disposition readily to surrender. - So far as is known, the whole garrison, within the territory penetrated by us, was disposed of by capture or otherwise. - There is good reason to believe that the Company Commander, who, according to prisoners, occupied a dugout near the Front Line just North of the WARNETON Road, was killed. -
- (d). Simultaneously with the actual assault on the frontage under attack, a special party of Infantry carried out a 'dummy' attack with the use of silhouette figures on a Front about 400 yards North of the real objective. - This is believed to have had the result of further dislocating and dispersing the enemy Artillery re-action. -
- (e). Our Infantry are enthusiastic as to the accuracy and punctuality of our Divisional Artillery action; - that the action of our Heavy Artillery was also effectual was evidenced by the fact that the enemy's Artillery action was feeble, scattered and ineffective. -

4. OUR CASUALTIES.

Our total casualties incidental to the raid were 31, distributed as follows :-

Killed.	6.
Died of Wounds.	1.
Unaccounted for.	2.
Wounded.	5.
Slightly Wounded....	17.
<u>Total.</u>	<u>31.</u>

Of the two unaccounted for, both are officers of whom one is believed to have been killed, and the other was seen returning through our wire wounded, - but has not yet been traced up to the hour of this report. - Of the 17 slightly wounded cases, 3 are officers. - My A.D.M.S. considers that, of these 17 cases, only a very few will require evacuation from FRANCE; the injuries being in the main abrasions and flesh wounds. -

5. I cannot speak too highly of the excellent work done by all the staffs and services concerned; nor of the accuracy and rapidity in the transmission of information. - I wish particularly to commend the careful direction of all details by the G.O.C., 10th. Brigade, who was largely responsible for framing the plan, and of the fine leadership and painstaking training of his men by Captain FAIRWEATHER who commanded the Infantry during the operation. - The offensive spirit, determination and gallantry of the troops, who took part in the actual assault, left nothing to be desired. -

John Macrae
Major-General.
Commanding Third Australian Div

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copy No. 29

S E C R E T.Divisional Headquarters,
14th. February, 1918.THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER No. 74.

Ref: Maps: 1/20,000 - Sheet 28 S.W.

Sheet 36 N.W.

1. The 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will relieve the 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade in the Left Brigade area in the line on the 24th and 25th February 1918, - relief to be completed before 12 midnight 25th/26th February 1918.
Advance parties of the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will move into the line on night 24th/25th February 1918.
2. Upon relief, 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will move to KORTEPYP area and become Support Brigade, and will take over from the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade all duties, works, etc., on Second Zone, including the relief of the party at present supplied by 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade for work with the 184th. Tunnelling Coy.
3. All Defence Schemes, trench and area stores, log books, maps, etc., will be mutually handed over and receipts exchanged.
4. Careful arrangements will be made to ensure that there is a minimum of interference with continuity of work.
5. All further details of relief will be arranged mutually between Brigadiers concerned.
6. Completion of relief and change of command will be reported to Divisional Headquarters.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

PWP.


Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.DISTRIBUTION. - (See over).

3rd. Aust. Div. Order No. 74.

(2).

14/2/1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1	A.D.C. for G.O.C.	
2	"G" Staff.	
3	"A.Q." Staff	
4	C.R.A.	
5	C.R.E.	
6	3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.	
7	9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	
8	10th. -do-	
9	11th. -do-	
10	3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	
11	A.D.M.S.	
12	D.M.G.O.	
13	23rd. A.M.G. Coy.	
14-15	3rd. Aust. Div. Train.	
16	D.A.D.V.S.	
17	3rd. Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sectn.	
18	D.A.D.O.S.	
19	3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	
20	A.P.M.	
21	Camp Commandant.	
22-23	AUSTRALIAN CORPS	
24	38th. (Welsh) Division	
25	5th. Aust. Division	For information.
26	184th Tunnelling Coy.	
27	Area Cdt. RAVERLEBERG.	
28	Military Board, C.M.F.,	
29-31	War Diary.	
32	File	
33-35	Spare.	

General Staff.
Lieut.-Colonel.

DISTRIBUTION. (See over).

P22.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Report on Tests of Signals to and from Contact
Aeroplanes carried out North of YPERNS on
18th. February, 1918.

The tests were carried out on a section of old NO MAN'S LAND
where the ground was very broken.

About 300 Infantry were used on a front of 1500 yards.

The Contact Machine was marked in the ordinary way and flew
at a height of about 600-800 feet.

GENERAL IDEA.

An advance has been made from the line - LANCASHIRE FARM -
S. SWAANHOF FARM in a northerly direction, with the old German
Front Line as the final objective from C.14. central to the CANAL
at C.7.e.0.9.

1st TEST.

11.15 a.m. A contact plane will call for position of Infantry
by dropping Xmas paper streamers.
Infantry show position by means of white circular
fans (12 inches diameter). All fans will be put
out of sight at 11.25 a.m.

Result. The Xmas papers were not seen. However, white fans
were shown by the Infantry at the appointed hour.
The aeroplane map placed accurately 50% of the line.

2nd TEST.

A contact plane will call for position of Infantry
by means of coloured paper balloons.
11.30 a.m. Infantry show position by means of bright tin discs
(6 inches diameter). All discs will be out out of
sight at 11.40 a.m.

Result. The balloons were seen, but with difficulty. The aero-
plane map placed accurately about 85% of the line.

3rd TEST.

A contact plane will call for position of Infantry
by means of smoke balls and red lights.
11.45 a.m. Infantry show position by means of Watson's fans.
All fans will be closed at 11.55 a.m.

Result. The smoke ball was seen, but would not have been of
any use had there been artillery fire. The aero-
plane map placed accurately about 35% of the line.

4th TEST.

A contact plane will call for flares by KLAXON HORN
and Silver TINSEL.
12 noon. Infantry show position by means of Red, Green and
White Flares.

Result. The KLAXON HORN was heard only faintly and the Silver
Tinsel could not be regarded as a success. The
flares were lit and placed on the ground. Each man
had a flare and, unfortunately, all were used simul-
taneously. The aeroplane observer reported that he
saw no flares.

- 2 -


5th TEST. A contact plane will call for flares etc. by dropping smoke bombs which burst into 14 purple or 14 yellow balls of smoke.
12.10 p.m. No action on part of Infantry.

Result The smoke bombs burst well up and threw off a shower of 14 smoke streamers about 200 feet long. Those coloured Yellow were most easily seen and the signal was remarkably distinctive.

CONCLUSIONS. -

1. - On a bright day something shiny - like tin - is the best and surest means of showing Infantry positions, but would be of no use on a cloudy or dull day. In dull weather, probably the White fans (or Watson's) fans) would be more conspicuous.

2. - A combination of KLAXON Horn and smoke bombs bursting into 14 Yellow (or Red) balls of smoke is probably the best means of attracting the attention of Infantry to a Contact Aeroplane.


Major.
General Staff.

Divisional Headquarters,
18th. February, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No.69A.

Patrols.

1. - The Divisional Commander directs that the organisation and employment of offensive and defensive patrols be more definitely regulated than hitherto.

2. - An order to battalions or companies to carry out 'vigorous patrolling' is too vague. The general responsibility for patrolling rests with the brigade commander, the execution with the battalion commander. That is to say, that the brigade commander supervises to the extent -

- (i) that the brigade front is adequately patrolled;
- (ii) that important localities in the enemy line are watched;
- (iii) that the method of patrolling does not become too stereotyped;
- (iv) that a minimum ^{number} of patrols are out on each night, especially during reliefs, dark nights and foggy weather;
- (v) that reconnaissance is made of any particular portion of the enemy line on which he requires information.

The battalion commander is responsible for the actual arrangements in detail :-

- (i) the formation, strength, and route of patrols;
- (ii) the allotment of objectives in detail;
- (iii) the maintenance of liaison patrols;
- (iv) The prompt rendition of reports and passages of urgent information to higher formations;
- (v) detailed arrangements for protective patrols during battalion reliefs and inter-company reliefs.

The battalion commander, in organising patrols, naturally will do so in consultation with his company commanders; and he should explain to them that battalion control in no way absolves them from their responsibility for vigilance in the defence of their portion of the front.

3. - Patrolling requires careful preparation, e.g., study of ground by day, aeroplane photographs, etc., A programme of patrolling should be mapped out after such study and patrols should be warned, and receive their orders, well in advance.

Geo. F. Duck
Major.
General Staff.

Distribution.-

9th.Aust.Inf.Bde
10th. -do-
11th. -do-
War Diary (3).

Divisional Headquarters,
20th. February, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 70A.

S.G. 32/230.

Organisation - Trench Garrisons, etc..

The Divisional Commander desires the following issued for information and action :-

1. - For effective defence the organisation and preparation of the troops to meet attack must be taken in hand concurrently with the construction of entanglements and defences.

The Divisional Commander now wishes Unit Commanders to take energetic steps to ensure -

- (i) efficient look-out;
- (ii) that garrisons of sufficient strength are definitely told off, and that they are quartered according to tactical requirements;
- (iii) effective alarm arrangements;
- (iv) that arms, ammunition and munitions are ready to hand.

2. - In the distribution of companies and platoons to localities, posts, etc., endeavour should be made to keep the platoon and section organisation in order to ensure that no party is without a leader, and that Officers and N.C.Os. are constantly supervising the detachments of their command.

Whatever the enemy's future action, it may be taken for granted that he will lose no opportunity of gaining even a small success by surprise action.

Provided that our arrangements and organisation are complete, and proper vigilance is maintained, our defences are now in such a state that we should have considerable advantage over the enemy should he attempt an enterprise without previous preliminary bombardment; - provided our garrisons are alert, organised and use their rifles and machine guns, such attempt must fail.

(1).

20/2/1918.

The organisation of the defence must aim at the following: -

I. All posts are to be held. The idea that our present front line is an outpost system from which advanced troops will fall back to the support line, when attacked, is incorrect.

II. On the other hand, local supports must be placed close at hand, so that they may -

- (a) reinforce the forward line - in the event of heavy casualties through bombardment, -
- or
- (b) counter-attack (at once) in the event of local enemy penetration.

It will be realised that these local counter-attacks must be thought out beforehand, and delivered by the platoon or company commander on the spot, on his own initiative, without waiting for orders, and to be effective, should be delivered promptly.

III. All posts should know, in addition to their action in case of attack -

- (a) the exact location of the posts on their right and left;
- (b) where their own supports are, and the action these will take in case of attack.

IV. Flanks of battalions and brigades should ensure that no gaps are left uncovered, by establishing either -

- (a) a combined post near the boundary, - or
- (b) posts in close proximity to each other.

This physical contact is quite as necessary in the support and reserve lines, as it may happen that the point of enemy penetration may be on the flank of a unit, and a combined local counter-attack is necessary.

V. Similarly, positions of readiness should be laid down to which support and reserve companies will move from their normal living places on alarm.

Overland routes should be marked and used by night parties in order that these routes may be known to all ranks.

VI. The various methods of communication available (i.e., wireless, power-buzzer, telephone, visual, pigeons) should be kept in mind and utilised during the present period in order to test and improve, if necessary.

VII. Runners' routes between adjacent battalion headquarters should be chosen, and occasional runner messages sent in order to check times required, etc.,

VIII. All ranks in charge of S.O.S. posts should keep in mind that this signal should not be fired unless the enemy is actually seen massing, as otherwise fire is brought to bear on an empty zone, whereas on another area the enemy may be massing without interference from our artillery fire, which is being wasted elsewhere.

On the other hand, troops who are properly trained in the use of the rifle and Lewis gun, and are confident of their ability to use same, realise that by their fire alone they can deal with any attack (even in masses) IF NOT SURPRISED.

Surprise should be impossible if systematic and constant patrolling of NO MAN'S LAND is carried out.

Mechanical patrolling, whereby patrols leave the same point at the same hour every night and move over the same route, is not only useless but dangerous, as troops in the line are in false security, while the patrols are easily ambushed.

IX. The Divisional policy is that all working parties move forward to their tasks. Therefore, all working parties in the forward area should know -

- (a) where to assemble in case of enemy attack,
- (b) to whom to report for orders.

The action of a support or reserve battalion commander whose companies are all working forward, when attacked, should be carefully considered and laid down by brigades.

Any question as to moving to selected assembly positions in rear should be discountenanced.

C. M. Jones

Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

For Distribution (See over).

20/2/1918.

- 4 -

Distribution.

C. R. A.

C. R. E.

3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th. -do-

11th. -do-

3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.

'A.Q'. (For information.)

War Diary.

File.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

A.H.

Divisional Headquarters,
22nd. February, 1918..

"A.Q."

C. R. A.

C. R. E.

3rd. Aust. Divsnl. Signal Coy.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.

A. D. M. S.

23rd. A. M. G. Coy.

D. M. G. O.

D. A. D. O. S.

D. A. D. V. S.

3rd. Aust. Divsnl. Train.

3rd. Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Section.

3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.

Divisional Paymaster.

A. P. M.

Camp Commandant.

G.13/212.

Regardless of the fact that all ranks must by now be aware of the serious effects of gas, and that our gas helmets, if used in time, are proof against all enemy gas, the following disregard of orders has been noticed :-

(a). On the road from NEUVE EGLISE to DE SEULE, troops of all arms and Divisions are constantly seen without Box Respirators.

(b). Two working parties, encountered moving forward in the forward area, with -

(i) Officers and men with box respirators slung under the arm;

(ii) Some men without respirators - (forgotten).

The excuse given was that the officers thought that box respirators had only to be worn in the "alert" position when "actually in the trenches".

The presence of men without box respirators in the parties showed clearly that no inspection of equipment had been made previous to moving off.

(c) Mounted men, in the "ready" zone, have been seen with the box respirator straps under the belt (to prevent it bumping, when riding).

The Gas Zones are very clearly marked, and instructions as to position in which gas respirators are to be worn, clearly laid down.

The Divisional Commander is aware that the comparative absence of gas shelling during the past two or three months may be accountable for the slackness of the individuals concerned, and realises that proper safety precautions can only be maintained by the keen supervision of all officers in charge of units.

(signed) C. H. JESS.
Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES.

NO. 1 SECTION.

Serial No.	Number regd.		When	To Report		Nature of work.	Tools to be brought by Working Party.	Locality of Work,
	Off.	O.R.		Where.				
1.	6	5	8.30 a.m.	LE BIZET C.13.b.5.0.		Building shelters WISDOM POSTs.	1 pick, 4 shovels.	C.19.b.8.5.
2.	6	5	"	"		Flank Post - digging fire bays.	" "	C.13.d.1.3.
3.	6	15	"	"		Building concrete pill-box.	15 shovels.	C.13.d.3.6.
4.	6	15	"	"		"	"	C.14.a.5.3.
5.	6	15	"	"		"	"	C.14.a.8.5.
6.	6	55	"	"		Drainage WHITE & WALLABY Posts.	5 shovels.	C.14.b.4.5.
7.	6	10.	"	"		5 - Erection shelters for WHITE POST. 5 - Erection shelters for WALLABY Post.	10 Shovels.	C.14.b.2.6. C.14.b.3.5.
8.	6	5	"	"		Clearing & Revetting MARK HILL AVENUE.	5 shovels.	C.14.b.3.5. -
9.	6	5	"	"		Salvg. A frames & dkbds. for disused RABECQUE AV.	"	C.8.d.8.5.
10.	6	5	"	"		Fire-stopping NICHOL- SON AVENUE.	1 pick, 4 shovels.	-
11.	6	20.	"	"		15 wiring; 5 thinning hedges.		C.14.
12.	6	15.	"	CHAPELLE ROMPU C.7.c.90.25.		Loading & fwdg. material from dumps.		-
13.	1	50.	5 p.m.	GASOMETER CRNR. C.7.b.5.1.		WHIZZ-BANG POST, buildg. breastwork.	50 shovels.	C.2.d.5.1.

Appendix 9

APPENDIX 9

101

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES.

NO.2 SECTION.

Serial No.	Number reqd.		When	Where	Nature of Work.	Tools to be brought by working party.	Locality of Work.
	Off.	O.R.					
1.	1.	25	8.30 a.m.	GASOMETER CORNER C.7.b.5.1.	10 building breastworks. 10 clearing hedge & wiring 5 clearing drains at UGLY POST.	-	C.2.d.9.7.
2.	1	25	"	DELENELLE FARM C.1.d.4.1.	10 building breastworks. 5 clearing ground for field of fire. 5 excavating for small English shelter. 5 digging drain at WEASEL POST.	-	U.27.b.5.1.
3.	1	25	"	PLOEGSTEERT CRNR. U.25.b.8.6.	10 building breastworks. 5 clearing old wire. 5 strengthening new wire. 5 draining UNION POST.	20 shovels.	U.27.b.8.3.
4.	1	10	"	GASOMETER CORNER C.7.b.5.1.	Building pill-box.	-	C.7.b.4.9.
5.	1	10	"	"	"	-	C.8.a.4.5.
6.	1	10	"	"	Salvage.	Gum Boots.	C.1 & 2.
7.	1	10	"	DELENELLE FARM. C.1.d.4.1.	Building pill-box.	-	C.1.d.6.6.
8.	1	50	5 p.m.	PLOEGSTEERT CRNR U.25.b.8.6.	Bldg. breastworks; spit- locking new trench (UNION P).	50 shovels.	U.27.b.8.3.
9.	1	60	"	DELENELLE FARM. C.1.d.4.1.	40 bldg. breastworks. 10 wiring. 10 evacuations for shelters. (Ugly Post)	-	C.2.d.9.7.
10.	1	50	"	"	30 building breastworks. 10 cutting drain. 10 bldg. shelters (WEASEL POST).	-	U.27.b.5.1.

APPENDIX 9
102

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES.

No. 3 Section.

Serial No.	Number reqd.		When.	To report Where.	Nature of Work.	Tools to be brought by working party.		Locality of work.
	Off.	O.R.						
1.	1	(15	8.30 a.m.	HYDE PK. CORNER U.19.b.3.7.	No. 20 concrete dugout.			U.14.c.7.7.
2.		(10	"	"	Repairing M.G. emplcemnt.			U.14.c.40.35.
3.	1	(15	"	"	No.19 concrete dugout.			U.25.a.7.8.
4.		(15	"	"	Carrying and loading.			PLOEGSTEERT Area
5.	1	25	"	"	Wiring & digging S.P.			U.25.b.2.7.
6.	1	30	"	"	Repairing C.T. ONLY WAY.	20	prs. gum-boots.	U.14.c.
7.	1	30	"	DEAD HORSE CORNER U.21.a.30.95.	Repairing S.P. PALK VILLA.	30	" "	U.21.d.5.6.
8.	1	30	"	"	Wiring and cutting rides.			U.21.d.
9.	1	15	"	"	Wiring.			U.26.a & b.
10.		(10	"	"	New communication Trench.			U.15.c.
11.		(10	"	"	Unwivil S.P.	10	" "	U.15.c.4.8.
12.	1	(10	"	"	ST. YVES S.P.			U.15.d.2.5.
13.		(10	"	"	WEEKLY S.P.	5	" "	U.15.d.1.7.
14.	1	20	"	"	Salvage			PLOEGSTEERT Area
TOTAL	9	245						

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES.

No. 4 Section.

Serial No.	Number regd.		To Report		Nature of Work.	Tools to be brought by working party.	Location of Work.
	Off.	O.R.	When	Where.			
1.	1	20	8.30 a.m.	DEAD HORSE CORNER	No.2 O.P.	---	U.15.d.5.9.
2.	1x	20	"	U.21.a.30.95.			
2.	1	20	"	"	No.1 O.P.	---	U.13.b.25.50.
3.	1	20	"	"	No. 21 Pill-box.	---	U.13.b.8.6.
4.	1	25	"	"	ASH CRATER.	8 prs. Gum-boots.	U.15.a.7.8.
5.	1	(5	"	"	AVENUE FM.dugout.	2 "	U.9.c.3.8.
6.		(20	"	"	AVENUE FM. C.T.	20 "	U.9.b.10.15.
7.	1	(25a	"	"	ONLY WAY C.T.& drnge.)		
8.		(25.	"	"	BAKERY POST & shelters)	15 "	U.14.a.6.4.
9.		(15	"	"	ONLY WAY C.T.& drnge.)		
10.	1	(20	"	"	UNUSUAL POST)	5 "	U.8.d.40.15.
11.		(15	"	"	ONLY WAY C.T. & drnge.)		
12.	1	(20	"	"	LONELY POST & shelters)	15 "	U.9.d.8.8.
13.	1	25	"	"	WASHINGTON POST.	2 "	U.9.b.2.0.
14.	1	25	"	"	LONG RUIN POST.	---	U.9.d.70.15.
15.		15	"	"	DEAD HORSE DUMP.	---	U.21.a.3.9.
16.		20	"	"	KEEPAWAY DUMP.	---	T.11.c.7.2.
17.		10	"	"	DONNINGTON HALL.	---	U.8.c.4.9.
18.		5	"	"	Wiring.	---	U.8.d.5.2.
19.		10	"	"	DECAVILLE TRAMWAY.	---	U.9.c.9.1.
20.		15	"	"	Draining Pill-Boxes.	15 prs. Gum-Boots.	U.9.d.8.8.
10		345.					

WORKING PARTY TABLE "A".

GARRISONS.

LOCATED AT.	N.C.Os.	Men.	W O R K.
PALK VILLA.	1	4	Work with party at PALK VILLA POST.
ELGAR HOUSE.	1	4	" " " " ELGAR HOUSE POST.
ULTIMO CRATER	1	4)	Work by night on Post ZAMBUK to WESTMINSTER AVENUE.
No.14 Post, near WHISKEY POST.	1	4)	
GREY FARM. Post No.17.	1	4	Work on LONG RUIN by night.
ST. YVES, No.15.	1	4	" " ST. YVES POST.
ASH CRATER	1	4	" " ASH CRATER POST.
AVENUE FARM	1	4	To keep dugout in AVENUE FARM maintained and dry.
HASTED HOUSE.	1	4	Work on ONLY WAY.
BAKERY POST.	1	4	" " BAKERY POST.
DONNINGTON HALL	1	4	" " Post at DONNINGTON HALL.
11 N.C.Os. 44 men.			

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES.

SUPERNUMARY SECTION.

Serial No.	Number reqd.		When	To Report		Nature of work.	Tools to be brought by working party.	Locality of work.
	Off.	O.R.		Where				
1.	1	40	8.30 a.m.	DEAD HORSE CORNER U.21.a.30.95.		Strong Point ELGAR HOUSE.	20 prs. gum-boots.	U.21.b.6.8.
2.	1	30	"	"		Reclaiming pill- boxes ASH CRATER.	30 " "	U.15.a.7.7.
3.	1	10	"	"		Post. fr. ZAMBUK WKE. to WESTMINSTER AVENUE.	----	U.15.d.
4.	1	10	"	"		ZAMBUK POST.	----	U.16.a.15.00.
	4	90.						

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,
24th. February, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 75.

Reference Maps: Sheet 28, S.W. & S.E.
(parts of) Scale 1/20,000.

000



1. On "Z" Day, at an hour to be arranged, the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will raid the enemy trenches between the following points :-

U.18.a.28.55.	to	U.18.a.70.85.
U.12.c.50.25.	to	U.12.c.10.15.
2. The 11th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will also carry out an operation against the enemy on their front on the same day at an hour to be arranged.

Centre Division of the Australian Corps has also been asked to arrange a diversion on its front.
3. "Z" Day and selected hour will be notified later.
4. The objects of the raid are as follows:-
 - (i) To capture or kill as many enemy as possible.
 - (ii) To damage or destroy material and defences.
 - (iii) To obtain identifications, documents and other information.
5. The C.R.A. will make the necessary arrangements for wire cutting, bombardment, barrages, etc., with B.G.H.A. and C.R.A., 5th. Aust. Divn. He will also allot tasks to 9.45" and 6" mortars.
6. "Q" of Division will arrange for necessary issues of special clothing, equipment, weapons, etc., extra to that taken over from 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
7. The L. T. M. Batteries of the Division are placed at the disposal of G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. for the operation, and he will arrange with Brigades concerned as to their movement and employment.
8. 10th. Aust. M. G. Coy. will be placed at disposal of G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. for employment under arrangement with D.M.G.O.
9. O.C., Divisional Signal Coy. will arrange for power buzzer and necessary trained personnel as on occasion of raid on 10th. Feby. '18, in conjunction with G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
10. Medical Arrangements for evacuation of wounded will be arranged by A.D.M.S. with G.O.C., 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
11. Lieut. J. J. HERBERTSON (attached 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.) will assist in the interrogation of prisoners taken.

(1).

P.T.O.

24/2/18.

12. The A.P.M., Third Australian Division, will arrange for necessary escorts to be available at 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. Collecting Camp at Advanced Brigade Headquarters.

13. A C K N O W L E D G E.



Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

- Copy No. 1. A.D.C. for G.O.C.
 2. "G" Staff.
 3. "A.Q." Staff.
 4. C. R. A.
 5. C. R. E.
 6. 3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
 7. 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
 8. 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
 9. 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
 10. 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
 11. A. D. M. S.
 12. D. M. G. O.
 13. 23rd. Aust. M. G. Coy.
 14. A. P. M.
 15-16. Australian Corps.)
 17-18. 5th. Aust. Divn.) for
 19. Military Board, C.M.F.) information.
 20-22. War Diary.
 23. File.
 24-27. Spare.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,
26th February, 1918.

REFERENCE THIRD AUST. DIV. ORDER NO. 75 dated 24-2-18.

MACHINE GUN ACTION.

1. The 10th A.M.G. Coy., will relieve the 9th A.M.G. Coy., on "Z" day. Relief to be complete by 4 p.m. Details of relief will be arranged mutually by O.C.'s concerned, and completion of relief reported to Headquarters 9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

On completion of Operation on "Z" day 9th A.M.G. Coy., will withdraw to the CATACOMBS and will re-occupy their barrage positions by ZERO minus two hours on "Z" plus one day. On the conclusion of operation on "Z" plus one day, the 9th A.M.G. Coy., will resume their normal defensive positions and the 10th A.M.G. Coy., will return to PENZANCE LINES.

2. The action of the 9th A.M.G. Coy., will be as follows:-

10 guns will barrage the line from U.12.d.45.10 to U.12.a.90.72.

2 guns will fire on Bridge over LYS at U.18.b.00.55, and

1 gun will fire on road at U.12.d.55.80.

Rates and times of fire as under:-

ZERO plus 3 minutes to ZERO plus 10 minutes

ZERO plus 10 " " " " 13 "

" " 13 " " " " 20 "

" " 20 " " " " 25 "

" " 25 " " " " 30 "

" " 30 " " " " 35 "

" " 35 " " " " 40 "

FIRE.

CEASE.

FIRE.

CEASE.

FIRE.

CEASE.

FIRE.

CEASE FIRE at ZERO plus 40 minutes.

Rate of fire - RAPID.

3. Indirect Fire Sheets will be submitted to D.M.G.O. for purposes of checking.

4. O.C. 9th A.M.G. Coy., will be responsible for supply of, -ammunition, Oil, Water, Flannelette, Spare Parts, etc.

5. Sketch Plan issued to 9th A.M.G. Coy., and 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. herewith.

6. The time during which the normal S.O.S. will be inoperative will be notified to O.C. 10th A.M.G. Coy., later.

7. Watches will be synchronised at 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. Headquarters ZERO minus three hours.

8. O.C., 9th A.M.G. Coy., will ensure that communication with 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. Headquarters is maintained.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

J. M. D. Carr
Major.
Third Aust. Divnl. M. G. Officer.

For Distribution P.T.O.

Copy No. 1. G.O.C. 9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

2. Bde. Major 9th A.I. Bde.
3. Staff Capt. -do-

4. }
5. } 3rd Aust. Division.

7. 9th A.M.G. Coy.

G. 10th -do-

9. O.C.Raid (Lieut-Colonel J. MILNE, D.S.O).

D. M. G. O.

2)

Excluded from issuance to the A.M.O. 1937, and 1938. Int. Reg. 1937.

Appendix 10a

APPENDIX.

111

10a



THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Copy No.....

S E C R E T.

Divisional Headquarters,
27th February, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 76.

Reference Maps: Sheets 28 S.W. & S.E.
(parts of) Scale 1/20,000.
-----000-----

On continuation of Third Aust. Division Order No. 75 dated 24-2-18.

1. On "E" night, in conjunction with the Operation mentioned in the abovenamed order, the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. will carry out an Operation with projectors on trenches and dugouts in C.11.
2. The hour selected will be 10 minutes before the ZERO hour of 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. Operation.
3. The "L" Special Coy., R.E., has been placed at the disposal of G.O.C. 11th Aust. Inf. Bde., who will supply necessary labour for carrying, etc.
4. On "A" night, if considered desirable the Operations of 9th and 11th Aust. Inf. Bdes. will be repeated at a ZERO hour to be arranged. Detailed arrangements will be promulgated later.
5. A C K N O W L E D G E.

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

T.C.

DISTRIBUTION.

- | | | | |
|----------|--------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Copy No. | 1. | A.D.C. for G.O.C. | |
| | 2. | "G" Staff. | |
| | 3. | "A.Q." Staff. | |
| | 4. | C.R.A. | |
| | 5. | C.R.E. | |
| | 6. | 3rd Aust. Div. Signal Coy. | |
| | 7. | 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. | |
| | 8. | 10th -do- | |
| | 9. | 11th -do- | |
| | 10. | 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. | |
| | 11. | A.D.M.S. | |
| | 12. | D.M.G.O. | |
| | 13. | 23rd A.M.G. Coy. | |
| | 14. | A.P.M. | |
| | 15. | "L" Special Coy., R.E. | |
| | 16-17. | AUSTRALIAN Corps. | |
| | 18-19. | 5th Aust. Div. | } for
information. |
| | 20. | 38th (Welsh) Division. | |
| | 21. | Military Board, C.M.F. | |
| | 22-24. | War Diary. | |
| | 25. | File. | |
| | 26-27. | Spare. | |

Divisional Headquarters,
26th February, 1918.

TABLE OF WORKING PARTIES FOR CABLE BURYING IN "A" SECTOR.

NO. OF PARTY.	DATE.	STRENGTH.		LENGTH BURIED.	REMARKS.
		Officers.	O.R.		
1.	15th Feb.	5	350.	500 yards.	From SUPPORT FARM at
2.	16th "	4	150	200 "	C.I.b.80.40 via PLOEGSTEERT
3.	17th "	8	400	300 "	WOOD to STRAFER'S NEST at
4.	18th "	9	400	350 "	U.14.c.35.50.
5.	19th "	9	329	440 "	
6.	20th "	9	270	400 "	
7.	21st "	10	270	480 "	
8.	22nd "	8	270	400 "	
				3070 yards.	

T.C.

Robert Smith
Major.
General Staff.

APPENDIX.

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SECRET.

Appendix 12
COPY.

APPENDIX. 12113



Copy

Australian Corps.
24th February, 1918.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS ORDER NO. 21.

1.- (i) The 2nd Aust. Division (less Artillery) will relieve the 3rd Aust. Division (less Artillery) in "A" (the right) divisional sector and area of the corps front between the 4th and 8th March, 1918.

(ii). Command of "A" divisional sector and area will pass from the G.O.C. 3rd Aust. Division to the G.O.C. 2nd Aust. Division on completion of relief in the line at 11 a.m. on 8th March, when Headquarters of Divisions will be established at NIELLES-les-BLEQUIN and RAVELSBERG respectively.

(iii). The 3rd Aust. Div. (less Arty & Pioneers) on relief from the line will move into Corps reserve in the LUMBRES Area.

2.- The above will be effected in accordance with movement table attached.

3.- (i) That portion of the transport of Inf. Bde. Groups for which train accommodation is not provided will move by road in accordance with the march table attached.

(ii) Accommodation in staging areas will be obtained on application to Area Commandants concerned.

(iii). Transport staging through Army Areas will be clear of billets by 10 a.m. daily.

4.- The instructions contained in Fourth Army No. G.S. 148 dated 15th December, 1917, re "Distances to be observed on the March &c" will be strictly adhered to.

5.- (i). For the purpose of this order, an Inf. Bde. Group will be composed of:-

- 1 Infantry Brigade.
- 1 Field Company.
- 1 Coy. A.A.S.C.
- 1 Field Ambulance.

(ii). Div. Machine Gun Coys, will be attached to Infantry Brigade Groups under Divisional arrangements.

6.- Defence Schemes, maps, works policy, and all information concerning the divisional sector and area will be handed over on relief.

7.- Separate instructions, including detailed arrangements as to movement by train, are being issued by the administrative branch.

8.- Instructions for the relief of Engineer and Medical Units will be issued by the C.E. and D.D.M.S respectively.

9.- All further arrangements not herein specified will be made direct between Divisional Commanders concerned.

10.- Acknowledge.

(Sgd) N.M. CUTHBERT. Capt.
for Brigadier-General.
General Staff.
Australian Corps.

Copy No..9.

AUSTRALIAN Corps.
24th February, 1918.AUSTRALIAN CORPS ORDER NO.22.
-----

1.- The following field artillery reliefs will take place on the Corps front:-

(a) After the completion of the divisional infantry relief the G.O.C. 1st Australian Division will arrange to interchange the 1st and 4th Australian Divisional Artilleries covering "C" (the left) divisional front. This interchange will be completed by 10 a.m. 4th March.

(b) (i). The 2nd Australian Divisional Artillery will relieve the 3rd Australian Divisional Artillery on "A" (the right) divisional front between the 11th and 13th March. Relief will be completed by 10 a.m. 13th March.

(ii). On relief the 3rd Aust. Divisional Artillery will concentrate in the MERRIS Area.

(iii). Detailed orders concerning the above will be issued by the G.O.C., R.A. Australian Corps.

2.- (i) The 2nd Aust. Divisional Artillery will move by road to the Corps Area in accordance with table issued.

(ii). Billeting parties will proceed 24 hours in advance of each move.

(iii). Accommodation in staging areas will be obtained on application to Area Commandants concerned.

3.- The instructions contained in Fourth Army No.G.S.148 dated 15th December, 1917, re "Distances to be observed on the March" will be strictly adhered to.

4.- Separate instructions are being issued by the Administrative branch.

5.- ACKNOWLEDGE.

(Sgd) N.M.CUTHBERT. Capt.
for Brigadier-General.
General Staff, Australian Corps.

SECRET.

Divisional Headquarters,
 27th February, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION ORDER NO. 77.

Reference Maps: HAZEBROUCK 5A & CALAIS 13.
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1. (i). The Third Australian Division (less Artillery) will be relieved by the Second Australian Division (less Artillery) in "A" Divisional Sector of the Corps Front between the 4th and 8th March, 1918.
 (ii). Command of the Sector will pass to the G.O.C. Second Australian Division at 11 a.m. on 8th March.
 (iii). Command in Brigade Areas will pass when the relief of the Infantry is complete.
 (iv). The Divisional Artillery will be relieved by the Second Aust. Div. Artillery between 11th and 13th March under arrangements to be made direct between C.R.As. After relief the Third Aust. Div. Artillery will be concentrated in the MARRIS Area.
 (v). The 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn., on relief by the 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn., on 7th March will come under the orders of the C.R. Corps for employment on railways in accordance with instructions issued separately.
2. The relief and move will be effected in accordance with the Movement Table attached.
3. For the purposes of the move Engineer Field Companies, Companies of the Divisional Train, and Field Ambulances, will be grouped with Infantry Brigades to which they are affiliated; the Demonstration Platoon with the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. Group; the 23rd A.M.G. Coy., with the 11th Aust. Inf. Bde. Group; the 3rd Div. Signal Coy., and other Divisional Units and Details with the 9th Aust. Inf. Bde. Group.
4. Marching portions of Brigade Groups will move by road and observe the following instructions:-
 (i) Accommodation in staging areas will be obtained on application to Area Commandants concerned, 24 hours in advance.
 (ii) Transport staging through Army Areas will be clear of billets by 10 a.m. daily.
5. Engineer and Machine Gun Companies will move and billet with their Brigade Groups, but will be concentrated later in accordance with instructions to be issued.
6. Distances laid down in Fourth Army Standing Order No. 358 will be observed during the move.
7. Instructions for the relief of Engineer and Medical Units will be issued by the C.R.E. and A.D.M.S. respectively.
8. Defence Schemes, works, policies, special maps, aeroplane photographs, log-books, etc., will be handed over on relief and receipts obtained.
9. Separate instructions, including detailed train arrangements, are being issued by the Administrative Branch.
10. Divisional Headquarters will close at RAVELSBURG at 11 a.m. on 8th March, and open at NIELLES-les-BLEQUIN at same hour.
11. A C K N O W L E D G E.

T.C.

Ch. Jers. Lieut-Colonel.

General Staff.

For Distribution P.T.O.

DISTRIBUTION.

- Copy No. 1 A.D.C. for G.O.C.
 2. "G" Staff.
 3. "A.Q." Staff.
 4. C. R. A.
 5. C. R. E.
 6. 3rd Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
 7. 9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
 8. 10th -do-
 9. 11th -do-
 10. 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
 11. A. D.M. S.
 12. D. M. G.O.
 13. 23rd A.M.G. Coy.
 14. 3rd Aust. Div. Train.
 15. D.A.D.V.S.
 16. 3rd Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sec.
 17. D.A.D.O.S.
 18. A.P.M.
 19. Camp Commandant.
 20. 3rd Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.
 21-22. AUSTRALIAN Corps.
 23. XV Corps.
 24. 38th Division.
 25. 1st Aust. Division.
 26. 2nd -do-
 27. 4th -do-
 28. 5th -do-
 29. Area Cdt. NIEPPE.
 30. do LUMBRES.
 31. do STRAZELLE.
 32. do KINES.
 33. do RENESCOUE.
 34. do LOTTINGHEM.
 35. do HENNEVAUX.
 36. Military Board, C.M.F.
 37-39. War Diary.
 40. File.
 41-42. Spare.

For information.

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MOVEMENT TABLE ISSUED WITH THIRD AUSTR. DIV. ORDER NO. 77.

Serial No.	Date.	Unit.	From	To	Route	Remarks.
1.	3rd Mar.	10th Inf. Bde. Group Transport (Marching portion)	KORTENPYP Area.	STRAZELLE Area.	BAILLEUL.	March Route.
2.	4th Mar.	5th Inf. Bde. Group & 22nd M.G. Coy.	LUMBRES Sub-area.	KORTENPYP.	By Train (2 personnel & 1 omnibus).	Personnel detrain STERN- WERCK. - Omnibus detrain BAILLEUL.
3.	4th Mar.	10th A.I. Bde. Group (less as shown in serial 1).	KORTENPYP Area.	LUMBRES Sub-area.	-do-	Personnel entrain STERN- WERCK - detrain LUMBRES. Omnibus entrain BAILLEUL detrain WIZERNES.
4.	4th Mar.	As in Serial 1.	STRAZELLE Area.	RENESCURE Area.	PRADALLEZ-HAZEBROUCK.	March Route.
5.	5th Mar.	11th Inf. Bde. Group Transport (marching portion)	WIEPPE Area.	STRAZELLE Area.	BAILLEUL.	By March Route - Not to enter METZ.
6.	5th Mar.	As in Serials 1 and 4.	RENESCURE Area.	LUMBRES Sub-area.	ARJONS-WIZERNES-LUMBRES.	By March Route.
7.	5th and night 5th/6th.	5th Inf. Bde. & 22nd M.G. Coy.	KORTENPYP Area.	Line (Right) & nucleus garrisons of 2nd Zone.	-	-
8.	5th & night 5th/6th.	11th Inf. Bde. Group & 23rd M.G. Co.	Line (Right) & WIEPPE Area.	KORTENPYP Area.	-	Nucleus Garrisons of 3rd Aust. Div. will re- join their Units.

MOVEMENT TABLE (CONT.).

Serial No.	Date.	Unit.	From	To	Route	Remarks.
9.	6th Mar.	6th Inf. Bde. Group	LOTTINGHEM Area.	KORTEPYP Area.	By train (2 personnel & 1 omnibus).	Personnel detrain STEEN-WERCK, -Omnibus detrain BAILLEUL.
10.	6th Mar.	11th Inf. Bde. Group (less Serial 5).	KORTEPYP Area.	LOTTINGHEM Area.	-do-	Personnel entrain STEEN-WERCK & detrain LOTTINGHEM. Omnibus entrain BAILLEUL & detrain DESVRES.
11.	6th "	As in Serial 5.	STRAZELLE Area.	RENESECURE Area.		By March Route.
12.	7th "	As in Serials 5 & 11.	RENESECURE Area.	MINES Sub-Area.	ARQUES-WIZERNES.	-do-
13.	7th Mar.	9th Inf. Bde. Group Transport (Marching portion).	PLOEGSTEERT Area.	STRAZELLE Area.	BAILLEUL.	By March Route - Not to enter METZ.
14.	7th Mar. & night 7th/8th.	6th Inf. Bde. Group.	KORTEPYP Area.	Line (LEFT)..	-	-
15.	7th & Night 7th/8th.	9th Inf. Bde. Group.	Line (LEFT).	KORTEPYP Area.	-	-
16.	8th Mar.	7th Inf. Bde. Group.	HENNEVAUX Area.	KORTEPYP Area.	By train (2 personnel 1 Omnibus).	Personnel detrain STEEN-WERCK, -Omnibus detrain BAILLEUL.
17.	8th Mar.	9th Inf. Bde. Group (less Serial 13).	KORTEPYP Area.	HENNEVAUX Area.	-do-	Personnel entrain STEEN-WERCK & detrain DESVRES. Omnibus entrain BAILLEUL & detrain DESVRES.

APPENDIX

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MOVEMENT TABLE (CONT).

Serial No.	Date.	Unit.	From	To	Route	Remarks.
18.	8th Mar.	As in Serial 13.	STRAZAKLE Area.	RENESECURE Area.	PRADELLES-HAZEN-BROUCK.	By March Route.
19.	8th Mar.	As in Serials 5 & 11.	ELNES Sub-Area. ELNES	LOTTINGHAM Area.	Any.	-do-
20.	9th Mar.	As in Serials 13 & 18.	RENESECURE Area.	ELNES Sub-Area.	ARQUES-WIZERNES.	-do-
21.	10th Mar.	As in Serials 13, 18 & 20.	ELNES Sub-Area.	HENNEVAUX Area.	Any.	-do-

APPENDIX, 12^B
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21. To defend a feature of the ground, or a strong point, it is better to site machine guns so as to sweep their approaches than to site them *on* the feature or *in* the strong point.

22. Although forward guns may also be employed to produce an S.O.S. barrage by indirect fire, their siting should be governed by the ground which they have to defend by direct fire, and not by S.O.S. targets.

23. It is unscientific to apply defensive S.O.S. barrages across the whole of our front, without regard to the character of the ground. The scientific method is to place and concentrate the S.O.S. barrages only upon those portions of the front which the enemy is able to or is likely to use should he attempt an attack or counter-attack. This ensures that fire power is not frittered away.

24. In the offensive and during the battle, machine guns may be employed in three categories, viz.

(a) *Barrage guns* whose sole duty is to deliver an advancing barrage—by indirect fire—in front of our advancing infantry; and to maintain it as a protective or S.O.S. barrage when our objective has been reached.

(b) *Consolidation guns* which advance by bounds behind the infantry in order to take up pre-determined tactical positions (chosen so as to enable them to defend the conquered territory *in depth*), and *to dig in there*. These consolidation guns ought not to look for, or,—except in emergency—engage opportunity targets, until after they have been dug in and wired in. If they attempt to do so, they will probably never get dug in.

(c) *Sniping guns*, sometimes called "batteries of opportunity" which also follow our assault and whose role is to look out for and engage enemy targets from any suitable open position from which good observation can be had. Their role is not to dig in. They must be handled boldly and offensively.

25. After the battle dies down, the role of any of these three categories of guns may of course be changed, as the situation gradually passes from the *offensive to gain ground to the defensive to hold the ground won*.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS,

17th February, 1918.

General Staff Circular No. 68 A.

The following statement, of the principles underlying modern machine gun tactics and the employment of machine guns, is promulgated for the guidance and information of Infantry Officers. Only leading principles are dealt with, and are expressed in the briefest language. These notes do not, therefore, profess to be either complete in themselves, or exhaustive as to all the questions involved. They intentionally avoid purely technical matters which are for the expert machine gunner to solve and apply. They will, nevertheless, if thoroughly grasped beforehand, assist in properly mastering S.S.192, which has recently been promulgated and deserves most careful study by all Infantry Officers.

Uniformity of thought on this matter throughout the Division, and indeed throughout the whole Army, is of vital importance.

C. H. JESS, Lieut-Col.

General Staff.

General Principles of Machine Gun Tactics.

1. The machine gun is to be regarded more as an *Offensive* than as a *Defensive* weapon. Next to Artillery, it is the most effective weapon we possess.
2. The machine gun is merely a machine to produce *fire power*. This consideration controls the whole tactical employment of this arm.
3. This is the principal reason why it is the soundest policy for any given tactical situation or operation to *pool* the whole machine gun resources of a Division or even of a Corps.
4. *Barrage fire* is the collective fire of a number of guns under a centralised control. It is usually indirect fire.
5. A *Battery* is any suitable number of guns (from two up to eight), under one Commander, as a fire unit. It is not necessarily a regular arrangement of guns in the field; the only necessary condition being that all guns of a battery must be so sited as to be capable of control by a single Commander.
6. Any convenient number of such batteries may be formed into a *group* under one Commander. He will usually be at a Brigade Headquarters.
7. Machine Guns use either *direct* or *indirect* fire. Either form may be used either *offensively* or *defensively*; thus:—
8. *Offensive indirect fire* is typified by the *barrage* advancing in front of our assaulting infantry.
9. *Defensive indirect fire* is typified by S.O.S. barrages put down to meet enemy attack and counter-attack.
10. *Offensive direct fire* is typified by the engagement, over the sights, of opportunity targets during or after an assault by us. As, for example, by sniping guns or batteries referred to below.
11. *Defensive direct fire* is typified by the engagement of opportunity targets during an attack by the enemy, both before he has reached and after he has penetrated our defensive system.
12. Other forms of machine gun action not fully covered by the above cases are *searching fire* and *harassing fire* which are usually delivered by indirect fire.

13. *Indirect fire* is generally employed only by definitely organized batteries of machine guns.

14. *Direct fire* may be employed by any or all of the guns of a battery and also by guns not grouped in batteries. The different guns of any one battery may have allotted to them either the same or different *direct* fire tasks; although usually the *indirect* fire tasks of all the guns of any one battery are identical.

15. While direct fire over the sights is the most effective form of machine gun fire, the fire power of this arm is wasted if full advantage is not also taken of *every opportunity* for employing indirect fire.

16. In an organized system of defence, machine guns are classified as *forward* guns and *rear* guns; the former usually, though not invariably, have direct tasks only. The latter primarily have indirect fire tasks (S.O.S. Barrage), with alternative direct fire tasks in case the enemy should penetrate our defences.

17. In defence, no machine gun should be placed without clearly and explicitly allotting to it a definite task or tasks, either direct or indirect, either primary or alternative, or all these in combination. That is, in defence, no machine gun should be left with a vague duty or a roving commission.

18. All machine guns should, under all circumstances, be sited as *inconspicuously* as their tasks and the conditions of each case permit. Cover from view is more important than cover from fire.

19. Much of the work for which machine guns have in the past been employed can be equally well done by *Lewis guns*, as, for example, the local defence of minor features. The machine guns should be reserved for the more important tactical purposes for which the fire power of the Lewis gun is inadequate.

20. In defence it is better, instead of attempting to defend a trench line, to defend a feature of the ground; that is, to deny the use of that feature to the enemy and thereby break up his lateral communications. To defend a trench line usually ends in placing the gun in the trench and crossing its fire with another gun placed further along the trench. This tactical conception is obsolete, and wasteful of fire-power; such tasks can be equally well performed by *Lewis guns*.

Map A

DISPOSITION MAP-RIGHT DIV SECTOR

