

AWM4
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/46/22 Part 3

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 3rd
Australian Division

August 1918



AWM4-1/46/22PART3

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO.1.

The following instructions, consequent on Third Aust. Division Order No.103 are forwarded for information.

INFANTRY.

(i). The assault will be carried out by the 9th and 11th Aust. Inf. Bdes., 9th A.I. Bde. on Right, 11th A.I. Bde. on Left. Forming up line is shown on Map issued to those concerned.

(ii). Forming up Troops detailed to the capture of the first objective will be deployed on the Forming Up Line by ZERO minus one hour.

(iii). The 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. will hold the forward line of the Divisional Area until the whole of the 4th Aust. Division attacking troops have passed through, when Battalions will be reorganized, and await instructions.

(iv). The Objective of the Division will be as shown by the GREEN LINE on Maps issued.

(v). On reaching the GREEN LINE, troops will consolidate and reorganize for defence in depth; at least one Battalion being maintained as a Reserve in each Brigade Sector.

(vi). The 4th Aust. Division, on a frontage of two Brigades, with one Brigade in Reserve, will assemble in rear of the 3rd Aust. Div. assaulting troops prior to ZERO, and will follow the troops attacking the GREEN LINE.

At ZERO plus four hours the 4th Aust. Div. will pass through troops on the GREEN LINE, and advance to attack on BLUE LINE.

(vii). Command of troops on the GREEN LINE will pass to G.O.C. 4th Aust. Division at ZERO plus four hours.

(viii). From ZERO plus four hours the advance will be continued under the conditions of open warfare.

(ix). (a). Each Brigade will be allotted one Coy. of Mark V Tanks (12) of 13th Tank Brigade Bn. The Officers of these Coys. will maintain the closest liaison with Infantry Brigadiers.

(b). Tanks will move into positions on Y/Z night, and special tank tapes of White, with Black Centre, will be laid beforehand.

After the capture of the GREEN LINE these Tanks will reorganise and, under the orders of the Tank Bn. Commander, be available as a reserve for BLUE LINE Troops.

(c). One Carrying Tank of 1st Carrying Tank Coy. will also be allotted to each Brigade for the purpose of carrying forward stores and tools, and establishing dumps.

Localities for dumps should be selected beforehand, and "lookout" men appointed to guide the Tanks.

One Sapper will be detailed to each Tank, and two men per Brigade as Loaders.

Loading will be carried out as soon as possible after the 4th instant.

(d). Carrying Tanks will arrange to pick up those Stokes Mortars of Infantry Brigades which are allotted special tasks during the barrage; and carry same forward to localities selected.

(x). The following Light Signals will be employed in the Aust. Corps:-

(a). S.O.S. - No.32 Grenade - GREEN over GREEN over GREEN.

(b). Success Signal. - No.32 Grenade - WHITE over WHITE over WHITE.

The Light Signals of the III Corps are similar to those of the Australian Corps

(xi). (a). Red Ground Flares will be used to indicate the Infantry positions to Contact Aeroplanes which will fly along the line of the first objective at ZERO plus two hours thirty minutes. Flares will be lit by Infantry in the most advanced lines only.

(b). Flares will be called for by a series of "A's" on the Klaxon Horn, and by firing a WHITE VERY Light.

(c). Should the aeroplane fail to mark the line, it will return and repeat it's call ten minutes later.

(d). If flares have been utilized, and an aeroplane calls for flares, three or four rifles about 2 ft. apart laid, (pointing forward), across the trench, will be seen by the Contact 'planes.

(e). Metal discs, sewn in the inside of the cover of the Box Respirator, and displayed to aeroplane, may be used to indicate Infantry dispositions.

(f). In the case of our Aeroplanes observing an enemy counter-attack actually developing, the Artillery will be informed by Wireless, and a WHITE parachute flare fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the enemy troops moving for the counter-attack.

(xii). Message Carrying Rockets will be carried forward by Brigades, and relay posts arranged.

ARTILLERY.

(i). In view of the nature of the enemy defences, the fire of Heavy Artillery not employed on counter-battery work will be used to engage special strong points or localities.

(ii). Field Artillery allotted to the Division will be divided into three Groups of three Brigades each.

(iii). After capture of GREEN LINE -

(a). 1 Brigade will be attached to each of the Inf. Bdes. of 4th Aust. Division.

(b). 3 Bdes. will move forward as defence guns for the RED LINE.

(c). 3 Brigades will remain as Corps Reserve.

(iv). It will be necessary for all field guns to move into forward prepared positions prior to ZERO day.

(v). Guns will not be dug in, but will be concealed as much as possible in old trenches, banks and crops.

(vi). All Unit Commanders must ensure that men of their Units do not loiter round these concealed guns and so attract the enemy's attention.

(vii). Care will be taken that vehicles and ration parties at night do not displace Artillery aiming posts, or the Red and White Flags, which are placed in position by the Survey Section, R.E.

(viii). The necessary accommodation for Artillery personnel in the neighbourhood of the guns will be made available by the Infantry Commanders concerned.

(ix). (a). The Field Artillery 18-pdr. barrage will open at ZERO 200 yards in advance of the Forward Up line. At ZERO plus three minutes the barrage will commence to advance; lifts will be 100 yards at two minute intervals. There will be two lifts at this rate.

The rate will then decrease to lifts of 100 yards every three minutes. There will be eight lifts at this rate.

From the eleventh lift inclusive until the GREEN LINE is reached lifts will be of 100 yards each at four minute intervals.

(b). The 4.5" Howitzer Barrage will move 200 yards in advance of the 18-pdr. barrage.

(c). A protective barrage will be maintained in front of the GREEN LINE until ZERO plus four hours. During this period approx. 50 per cent (50%) of the guns remaining in the barrage will be employed in a protective line barrage; the remainder will be employed to search and sweep deeply into the enemy's position. At ZERO plus four hours all barrage fire will cease. Barrage Maps will be issued later.

(x). Artillery Smoke will be as follows:-

(a) Three rounds per gun will be fired during the first three minutes of the barrage.

(b). Three rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession, on the Field Artillery barrage reaching the Artillery halt line of the first objective.

MACHINE GUNS.

(i). The C.O. 3rd Aust. M.G. Battalion will arrange for a creeping barrage to be brought down by all available guns up to a range of 2,000 yards from the Infantry jumping off line.

(ii). Machine Guns will be allotted duties as under:-

One half Coy. to each Attacking Bde. - Opportunity Guns.

One Coy. to each Attacking Brigade - for consolidation.

One Coy. with 10th A.I. Bde. - Reserve.

(iii). Guns employed as Opportunity Guns will not take part in barrage firing, but will form up and accompany the rear Units of the Infantry as desired by Brigade Commanders.

(iv). Barrage guns will fire at such times and rates as arranged by C.O. 3rd Aust. M.G. Bn. in accordance with Infantry movement and rate of Artillery barrage. At completion of their barrage task, the consolidation guns will move forward in rear of the Infantry Brigade to which allotted, and will reorganize a defence in depth, as desired by the G.O.C. Infantry Brigade.

(v). An outlined plan should be arranged beforehand, subject to the alteration necessitated by tactical requirements.

(vi). The Reserve guns, after completion of their barrage task, will reorganize and receive further instructions from the G.O.C. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde.

(vii). The C.O. 3rd Aust. M.G. Bn. will make the necessary arrangements for the provision of ammunition, belts, etc., for the barrage, and will assist Brigade Commanders in arrangement of details for later tasks.

(Sgd) S.H. JACKSON. Capt.
for Lieut-Colonel.-
General Staff.

4th August, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1.	A.Q.
2-17.	C.R.A.
18-21.	C.R.E.
22.	3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
23-26.	9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
27-31.	10th -do-
32-36.	11thn -do-
37.	3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.
38.	3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
39.	A.D.M.S.
40.	5th Tank Bde.
41-42.	AUST. Corps.
43.	2nd Aust. Div.
44.	4th -do-
45.	5th -do-
46.	18th Division.
47-49.	War Diary.
50.	File.

A.H.

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BATTLE INSTRUCTION NO.2.

APPENDIX

SECRET.

1. Movement of transport wagons in the forward area has been such to-day, as to draw a certain amount of enemy shell-fire.

2. Commanders will realise the grave necessity for secrecy, and must, therefore, exercise the greatest amount of personal supervision to ensure that all officers and other ranks assist to obtain the desired result.

3. It must be impressed on all officers and n.c.os. that they are responsible for, and must insist on, the obedience of orders by all personnel, irrespective of the unit to which they belong.

4. To-day's fault may be turned to to-morrow's advantage by actions which will tend to lead the enemy into the belief that a Divisional or other relief is taking place. As no two units act the same in the line (as to VERY Lights, movement, night firing, etc), the relief of the 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. by the two Battalions of the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. to-night may further help to deceive the enemy.

The enemy may have discovered that the Australians are taking over from the French in the vicinity of HANGARD, and may therefore surmise that another local operation of the size of recent ones is likely to take place to straighten out the CACHY re-entrant.

Therefore, every precaution will be taken that, after dawn to-morrow, no excessive movement is visible and that, in every way, the Divisional area appears normal.

Special measures will be arranged by Divisional Headquarters to stop traffic and, in the event of individual wagons or groups of wagons (other than those which are absolutely necessary) moving in prohibited areas, the Commanding Officer concerned will be held responsible for allowing such vehicles to leave transport lines on such a mission. Such traffic, after the name of the driver and his unit has been taken, will not be allowed to proceed forward, but will either be swung off the road to wait for night-fall, or ordered to return to rear areas.

Officers and men of incoming Brigades, in particular, must be warned against showing themselves in exposed areas. Excessive numbers swimming at one time must be prevented.

Troops from areas some distance from the river may be marched to and from swimming parades in small parties at considerable intervals.

No troops of any Brigade are to be permitted to leave their area, except on duty.

5. No fires will be allowed in the forward area between dawn and sunset, as numerous small columns of smoke will give the enemy the best clue to the number of troops in the area, and the location of their bivouacs.

6. Special vigilance in the foregoing must be exercised in this respect throughout to-morrow and succeeding days, particularly in the areas which will be occupied by the 10th, 4th. and 12th. Aust. Inf. Brigades.

Special aeroplanes are being employed to report any excessive movement, or other indication of other than normal activity, in the Divisional area.

4th. August, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

"A.Q."

A.D.M.S.

10th. A.I.Bde.

12th. -do-

3rd. M.G.Bn.

3rd. Div.Sig.Coy.

C.R.A.

A.P.M.

11th. A.I.Bde.

12th. -do-

3rd. Pioneer Bn. AUST. CORPS.

4th. Aust. Div. 2nd. Aust. Div.

C.R.E.

9th. A.I.Bde.

4th. -do-

3rd. Div.Train.

AUST. CORPS.

2nd. Aust. Div.

Lieut.-Colonel.
General Staff.

T.C.

SECRET.



BATTLE INSTRUCTION NO.3.

1. 1st Cavalry Brigade, plus one Company of Whippets attached, comes under the Command of the AUSTRALIAN Corps at 9 p.m. on "Y"/"Z" night.

2. Its function is to assist in carrying out the main Cavalry role by seizing any opportunity which may occur to push through the Australian Corps Front.

3. 1st Cavalry Brigade will operate North of the AMIENS-CHAULNES Railway in conjunction with 5th Australian Division.

It will push forward patrols to keep in touch with 8th and 15th Aust. Inf. Brigades.

After crossing the railway the main body of 1st Cavalry Brigade will march roughly parallel to it, keeping close touch with the remainder of 1st Cavalry Division to the South.

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

7th August, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.	3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.
C.R.A.	3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
C.R.E.	O.C. Troop 13th Light Horse.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.	O.C. Platoon Cyclists.
10th -do-	AUST. Corps (2).
11th -do-	War Diary (3).
	File.

APPENDIX

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BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B", No.1.

1. The III Corps is to push forward to ETINHEM as early as possible and gain the old AMIENS defence line between ETINHEM and DERNANCOURT. This position is to be consolidated, and form a defensive flank to the forward movement of the Fourth Army South of the SOMME.
2. The role of the Australian Corps is to pivot on the SOMME, and to swing forward its right in accordance with the advance of the Canadian Corps.
3. The left division of the Australian Corps will maintain its position for the present. It may be required to thrust forward its extreme right flank North of the main road, as shewn on map.
4. South of the road the movement will be continued in a series of advances, the longest advance being along the railway. The rate of this advance and the number of troops employed are dependent on the advance of the Canadian Corps.
5. The map. X shows the series of three probable future advances marked respectively in GREEN, RED and BLUE.
6. It is not possible to forecast in detail the moves that this will entail, but it is probable that the 1st. Australian Division will be required to advance to the GREEN LINE, Phase "A", and possibly to the RED LINE, Phase "B", on the 9th instant. In the event of the advance to the GREEN LINE only being carried out on 9th. inst., the 1st. Australian Division will move through the 5th. Australian Division, taking over the line between the railway and Square X.7.c.0.0. The 5th. Australian Division would be required to advance a flank North of this point, vide map.
7. In the event of operation Phase "A" and Phase "B" being carried out in a single advance on 9th. instant, the 1st. Australian Division, with two brigades in the line and one in reserve, would carry out the main operation, and the 5th Australian Division, using its reserve brigade, would carry out the extension of the flank. In this event the junction of the 1st. and 5th. Australian Divisions would be Square X.10.d.2.0 approximately, the main road forming the boundary between the 4th. and 5th. Australian Divisions as at present.
8. The situation on the evening of the 9th would then be 1st. Australian Division on the right, 5th. Australian Division centre, and 4th. Australian Division on the left, with the 2nd. and 3rd. Australian Divisions in reserve. Phase "C" would probably then be carried out on 10th instant as follows :- 1st Australian Division would operate on the right, the 2nd Australian Division would relieve or pass through the 5th Australian Division and carry out the operation in the centre, the 4th Australian Division in the line on the left would be relieved by 3rd Australian Division.
9. If "C" operation were carried out on the 11th instant this would be done as above by the 1st Australian Division on the right and the 2nd Australian Division in the centre. On the left the 3rd Australian Division would relieve the 4th Australian Division.
10. The above must be taken as merely an indication of the proposals in the matter and are subject to very considerable alteration, should opposition be met which necessitated it, or should other circumstances arise that require that these arrangements should be reviewed.

Acknowledge by wire.

9th. August, 1918.

For Distribution



Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff.

Distribution.

X	A.Q.	
X	C.R.A.	
X	C.R.E.	
	3rd. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	
X	9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade	5th Tank Brigade
X	10th. -do-	3rd. Squadron, A.F.C.
X	11th. -do-	AUST. CORPS
X	3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.	1st. Aust. Div.
	3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	2nd. Aust. Div.
X	A.D.M.S.	4th. Aust. Div.
	O.C., Troop Light Horse	5th. Aust. Div.
	O.C., Platoon, Cyclist Bn.	War Diary.

(Maps issued only to those marked X).



BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B", No. 2.

1. The Fourth Army has attained all its objectives yesterday, except at one or two minor points.

2. The attack will be resumed on 9th. instant. The objective of the Australian Corps is the general line LIHONS - FRAMERVILLE - MERICOURT. The role of the Australian Corps is to form a strong defensive flank to the advance of the Canadian Corps. The various bounds of the attack are shown on the map forwarded with Battle Instructions, Series "B", No. 1, to be issued today.

3. It is not anticipated that the attack will be launched before 10 a.m. Zero will be notified as soon as it is ascertained. Troops will be prepared to move to a starting line at very short notice, from 7 a.m.

4. The controlling factor in the advances will be the rate of advance of the Canadian Corps, which is to push on in the direction of ROYAL and CHAULNES.

5. The first phase of the attack by the Australian Corps will be carried out by 1st. Australian Division on the right, with the 5th. Australian Division on its left. The 4th. Australian Division will not advance.

6. Tanks are allotted for the operation as follows:-

<u>1st. Australian Division.</u>	2nd. Tank Battalion - 14 tanks. Tanks near WIENCOURT - Hqrs. P.30.a.
<u>5th. Australian Division.</u>	8th. Tank Battalion - 7 tanks. Tanks in Squares P.29. and 35. Hqrs. in Chalk Quarry, P.29.d.
<u>2nd. Australian Division.</u>	15th. Tank Battn. - 10 tanks. Tanks in DOG WOOD. Hqrs. in vicinity of DOG WOOD.

7. The boundaries between Divisions are as follows:-

- (a) between the right and centre Divisions - a line from our front line at about Sq. W.12.d.6.0. eastwards along the grid line through Sq. X.7.c.0.0.
- (b) between the centre and left Divisions - the main AMELNS Road inclusive to the left Division.

8. The attack on the objective of the first phase will be carried out by the troops of 1st. Australian Division passing through 5th. Australian Division in the right sector at Zero hour.

5th. Australian Division will make arrangements to co-operate with this attack North of the new inter-divisional boundary given above, and will attack the Green Line (vide Battle Instructions, Series "B", No. 1).

After the capture of the Green Line, the 2nd. Australian Division will pass through the 5th. Australian Division in the centre sector and will attack the second objective (Phase "B") in conjunction with 1st. Australian Division.

9. ARTILLERY. The following shows the distribution of artillery for three divisional sectors, and the reliefs required in order to effect the same.

The Brigades of 2nd. Australian Divisional Artillery and 14th. Army Brigade, R.F.A., will be under the C.R.A., 2nd. Australian Division;

F.T.O.

(2).

Brigades of 3rd. Australian Divisional Artillery and 3rd. Army Brigade, A.F.A., under the C.R.A., 3rd. Australian Division, and come under the orders of the Corps as a Mobile Reserve.

These C.R.A.'s will withdraw the Brigades mentioned to positions as far as possible of rest, forward of the line HAMIL - VILLERS BELTOMN-LUX.

Changes in artillery dispositions necessary to bring about the distribution given below will be completed in time to open fire at 10 a.m. on 9th. instant.

Left Sector.

4th. Aust. Divnl. Arty.
16th. Army Bde., R.H.A.
12th. Army Bde. A.F.A.

Centre Sector.

5th. Aust. Divnl. Arty.
6th. Army Bde., A.F.A.
23rd. Army Bde. R.F.A.

Right Sector.

1st. Aust. Divnl. Arty.
298th. Army Bde. R.F.A.
189th. Army Bde. R.F.A.

R E S E R V E.

3rd. Aust. Divnl. Arty.
3rd. Army Brigade, A.F.A.

2nd. Aust. Divnl. Arty.
14th. Army Brigade, R.F.A.

Acknowledge by wire.

9th. August, 1918.

John Connelly
Major
for
Lieut-Colonel. -
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th. do.
11th. do.
3rd. Aust. M. G. Bn.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A.D.M.S.
5th. Tank Brigade.
3rd. Squadron A.F.C.
Aust. Corps.
1st. Aust. Div.
2nd. Aust. Div.
4th. Aust. Div.
5th. Aust. Div.
War Diary.
O.C., Troop, Light Horse
O.C., Platoon, Cyclist Bn.

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SECRET

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B" No. 3.

LIAISON FORCE.

1. A force to be known as the "Liaison Force" will be constituted with the object of carrying on the battle North of the river SOMME and effecting a liaison between Australian Corps south of the river and the III Corps.

2. The force will be commanded by Brigadier-General E.A. WISEDOM, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

3. INFANTRY. 13th Australian Infantry Brigade.
131st American Regiment.

MACHINE GUN UNITS. 1 Coy 4th Aust. M.G. Battalion.
124th American M.G. Battalion.

The following auxiliary troops will be detailed by the 4th Australian Division.:-

1 Company 4th Australian Divisional Train.
1 Company Field Engineers.

Instructions for the detailing of the necessary medical units are issued by D.D.M.S.

4. SIGNAL ARRANGEMENTS. A Headquarters Signal Section will be organized under Capt. F. TINKLER, MC., 2nd Div. Signal Company.

5. Headquarters of the "Liaison Force" will be constituted forthwith.

6. The 132nd American Regiment will replace 13th Australian Brigade in 4th Australian Division. It arrives in Australian Corps Area on 11th inst. and will come under the orders of 4th Australian Division on arrival.

7. Detailed instructions for the completion of the organization will be issued later.

• ACKNOWLEDGE.

[Signature]

Lieut-Colonel
General Staff.

11th August, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Co.
9th A.I. Bde.
10th A.I. Bde.
11th A.I. Bde.
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A.D.M.S.

O.C., Troop Light Horse.
O.C., Platoon Cyclists.
AUST. CORPS,
1st Aust. Div.
2nd Aust. Div.
4th Aust. Div.
5th Aust. Div.
Liaison Officer, 4th Aust. Div.
58th London Division.
Liaison Officer, 58th London Div.

APPENDIX

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BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B", No. 4.

APPENDIX

1. The advance of the Fourth Army and First French Army is to be continued on the 16th. instant.
 2. The role of the Australian Corps is to effect a considerable penetration of the enemy's position on the right and form a defensive flank towards our left.
 3. An attack will be carried out at Zero by the 5th. Australian Division on the right, 4th. Australian Division in the centre, and the 2nd. Australian Division advancing its right flank conforming to the advance of the 4th. Australian Division.
The 1st. and 3rd. Australian Divisions will be in Corps Reserve.
 4. Corps and Divisional boundaries are as shown on attached map, and necessary changes are to be effected by dawn on 15th. instant.
 5. Watches will be synchronised by units on afternoon and evening of 14th. instant.
 6. The 3rd. Australian Division will move to Reserve Positions in vicinity of HARBONNIERES - CAIX on the evening of 15th. instant, at times to be notified later.
 7. Brigade Groups will be constituted as under:-
 - 1 Infantry Brigade.
 - 1 Section Cyclists.
 - 1 Coy. Engineers.
 - 1 Coy. Machine Gun Battalion.
 8. Areas will be allotted Brigade Groups as follows:-
 - 9th. A. I. Bde. area West of HARBONNIERES.
 - 10th. A. I. Bde. area South & South-West of HARBONNIERES.
 - 11th. A. I. Bde. area West of HARBONNIERES.
 - M. G. Battalion vicinity BAYONVILLERS.
 - Pioneer Battalion vicinity MARCEL CAVE.

A.D.M.S. will arrange for moves and bivouac grounds for Field Ambulances.

Necessary reconnaissances and advance parties will be arranged for 14th. instant.
 9. Routes.
 - (a) 9th. A.I. Bde. via roads O.17., O.24., P.31., or O.18., P.25., MARCEL CAVE.
 - (b) 10th. A.I. Bde. via vicinity of BAYONVILLERS.
 - (c) 11th. A.I. Bde. roads North of main FOUILLOY - WARFUSEE road, inclusive.
 - (d) M. G. Bn. (less 3 Coys) any route.
 - (e) Pioneer Bn. any route.
 10. Advanced Divisional Headquarters will be established at RED CHATEAU, VILLERS BRETONNEUX from 4 p.m. on 15th. instant.
 11. Locations selected for Brigade Headquarters will be notified to Divisional Headquarters before 8p.m. on 15th. instant.
- ACKNOWLEDG.

13th. August, 1918.
D.C.

Distribution P.T.O.

Lieut-Colonel. -
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

- X A.C.
- X C.R.A.
- X C.R.E.
- 3rd. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
- X 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
- X 10th. do.
- X 11th. do.
- A.D.M.S.
- X 3rd. Aust. M. G. Bn.
- X 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.

- O.C., Platoon Cyclist Bn.
- Aust. Corps.
- 1st. Aust. Div.
- 2nd. Aust. Div.
- 4th. Aust. Div.
- 5th. Aust. Div.
- Liaison Force.
- 17th. Division.
- 5th. Tank Bde.
- 3rd. Squadron A.F.C.
- Liaison Officer att. 2nd. Aust. Div.
- do. 4th. Aust. Div.
- do. 5th. Aust. Div.

War Diary.

X Maps issued to.

[Handwritten signature]

1.1.1918



BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B", No. 5.

1. HEADQUARTERS.

(a). Advanced Headquarters, Australian Corps, have been established as follows:-

General Officer Commanding.	..	GLISY Chateau.
General Staff.	..	GLISY Chateau, No. 2.
Administrative Staff	..	GLISY Dugouts (N.20.d.8.7).
G.O.C., R.A.	..	GLISY Dugouts -do-.

(b). Headquarters of Formations will be established for the operations as follows:-

1st Aust. Division.	..	BUSSY.
2nd Aust. Division.	..	O.28.c.1.3.
3rd Aust. Division.	..	Red Chateau, VILLERS BRETON-NEUX.
4th Aust. Division.	..	VILLERS BRETONNEUX (O.29.c.6.3).
5th Aust. Division.	..	O.25.c.1.1.
5th Tank Brigade.	..	BIANGY TRONVILLE (N.22.d.3.8.)
17th Division.	..	P.7.c.1.8.
Liaison Force.	..	J.22.d.0.3.
Heavy Arty. Aust. Corps.	..	O.2.a.9.6.
3rd Cavalry Brigade.	..	W.25.d.5.9.

2. DIVISIONAL SECTORS.

Divisional Sectors for the operations will be distinguished from the Right as "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E".

"A" Sector.	..	5th Aust. Division.
"B" Sector.	..	4th Aust. Division.
"C" Sector.	..	2nd Aust. Division.
"D" Sector.	..	17th Division.
"E" Sector.	..	Liaison Force.

3. COMMAND.

G.O's.C. 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions will assume Command in their respective Sectors on the night 14th/15th inst.

14th August, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.
 CC.R.A.
 C.R.E.
 3rd Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
 9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
 10th -do-
 11th -do-
 3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.
 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
 A.D.M.S.
 C.C. Platoon Cyclist Bn.
 War Diary.

John Connolly
 for Lieut-Colonel.
 General Staff.

SECRET.



BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES "B", No.6.

GENERAL POLICY.

1. The Operations prepared under Battle Instructions No.4 is postponed till further orders.

The main object of the postponement is to ensure that the wired defences of the Southern portion of the Australian Corps front and on the front of the Canadian Corps are adequately dealt with, to ensure that the enemy's artillery defence can be effectively overcome, and to endeavour by more complete preparation to obtain the same degree of success as that which has characterised the action of the Australian Corps during its recent operations.

DEFENCE SECTORS. 2. The Australian Corps front is to be held defensively within its present limits with three Divisions in the line south of the River SOMME. The Divisional Sectors will be known as "A", "B", "C" and "D" Sectors in that order from the right. "D" Sector will be held by the Liaison Force.

MOVES AND RELIEFS.

3. The following moves and reliefs will take place:-

The 4th Aust. Division is relieving the 1st Aust. Division in "A" Divisional Sector on the night 15th/16th instant.

The 5th Aust. Division will relieve the 17th Division in "C" Divisional Sector on the night 16/17th instant.

The 17th Division will be withdrawn to the vicinity of the CRISY Valley on relief and will come into G.H.Q. Reserve.

LIAISON FORCE.

4. The Liaison Force will continue to hold its sector with the 13th Brigade on the Left and the 131st American Regiment on the Right, each with one Battalion in the line, one Battalion in Support and one Battalion in Reserve.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

5. The distribution of Field Artillery will be six (probably five later) Brigades to "A" Sector, three Brigades to "B" Sector, five Brigades to "C" Sector and three Brigades to "D" Sector. Remainder will be held in Corps Reserve.

PREPARATORY MEASURES.

6. The preparations for the action will be continued. The Divisions to be employed in the battle are to be determined by the date finally selected.

In order to secure and strengthen the battle front the nibbling tactics which the Corps has employed throughout the summer will be continued in "B" and "C" Sectors. A map is attached which shows the general objectives which should be the aim of these tactics. The line shown in green represents the first phase, and the line shown in brown the completion. When these objectives are secured further objectives will be considered.

It is desired in this manner to obtain a strong position from which to continue the offensive, to secure adequate protection to the flank of the offensive, and to continue the pressure which is being exerted on the enemy.

Artillery activity in addition to ordinary protection will embrace the destruction of all wire shown within the limits of the objectives laid down for the battle and subsequent exploitation.

It is considered that the interval allowed will permit of more complete preparation of counter battery action.

HOSTILE ACTIVITY.

7. Reports tend to show that the present enemy artillery activity is almost entirely based on the employment of larger calibre guns, such as 5.9" guns.

The enemy has, however, employed heavy gas shoots on the fronts of the French, Canadian and III Corps. It is, therefore, to be anticipated that these tactics will be pursued, and careful arrangements will be made with regard to all places likely to be objectives of

P.T.O.

artillery action of this nature. Troops should be withdrawn from woods and villages and from any other places which it may be anticipated that the enemy will shell. Where carrying parties are required to pass through such localities, special measures will be prepared to ensure that they are checked and adequate police arrangements made in the event of a gas bombardment.

SALVAGE.

8. The great shortage in signal cable requires that all good cable should be salvaged as far as possible. Divisions in the forward area will salvage as much as possible in their areas.

A.D. Signals is arranging for the salvage of cable in back areas and will be given the necessary assistance from this Division while in Reserve.

Ammunition left in back dumps and in old battery positions will be collected without delay.

TRAINING.

9. The period during which the Division is in Corps Reserve will be devoted to completion of reorganization and equipment, and to continuation of training for the attack. In this training, as many as possible of the principles of Open Warfare should be demonstrated.

Units which have not yet performed the practice attack with tanks, will do so as early as possible. Arrangements will be made by Division with the 5th Tank Brigade for suitable demonstration site and dates of training, on similar lines as during July.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

15th August, 1918.

G. J. J.
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.	x
C.P.A.	x
C.R.E.	x
3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Co.	x
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.	x
10th -do-	x
11th -do-	x
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.	x
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	x
A.D.M.S.	
O.C. Platoon Cyclist Bn.	
Div. Salvage Coy.	
AUST. Corps.	x
1st Aust. Div.	
2nd do.	
4th do.	
5th do.	
5th Tank Bde.	
3rd Squad. A.F.C.	
War Diary. (3).	x
17th Div.	

For information.

(x) Maps attached.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS. SERIES "C". No.1.

1. The 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will be prepared to carry out either of the following roles, the first of which (a) is the more probable :-

- (a) In order to release the 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Battalion for other work, one Battalion of the 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will be held in readiness to relieve the 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn. on the Right of the Line held by the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade on the night 22nd/23rd. instant and, if this be ordered, such Battalion will pass under the command of the G.O.C. 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.
- (b) On the night 22nd/23rd. instant, the 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will be prepared to relieve the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade by a deployed movement up to the Consolidation line held by the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. on that night and take over its defence. If this operation is carried out, all unit headquarters and command posts of the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will be relieved by the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. and all troops of 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will be withdrawn when the troops of the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. have passed through them. Command will pass to G.O.C. 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. as arranged between the Brigadiers concerned. Upon such relief the 9th. Aust. Inf. Brigade will move to the area vacated by 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

21st. August, 1918.

Wm. J. Connelly
for Lieut.-Colonel. Major
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

"A.Q."
C. R. A.
C. R. E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
3rd. Aust. M. G. Bn.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A. D. M. S.
O.C. Troop 13th Aust. L.H. Regt.
Aust. Corps.
III Corps.
1st. Aust. Div.
2nd. Aust. Div.
4th. Aust. Div.
5th. Aust. Div.
47th. Div.
C.R.A. 58th. Div.
5th. Tank Bde.
Liaison Officer. attached 47th Div.
-do- " 3rd. Aust. Div.
War Diary.

BATTLE INSTRUCTION. SERIES "C" NO. 2.EXPLOITATION.

1. Battle Instruction Series "C" No. 1 is CANCELLED.

2. The 47th Division propose to exploit the Operations of the 22nd instant by gaining ground to the North of the CHALK PIT in L.3.d. central, beyond the line of their final objective.

3. In the event of the enemy resistance W. of the final objective of the 3rd Aust. Division not being serious, the 9th A.I. Bde. will push forward patrols as soon as the protective barrage lifts at 8.5 a.m. on the lines indicated below.

This exploitation will not take place unless the village of BRAY is reported clear of resistance, and the success of the Operations on our Left clearly established.

4. The Northern Divisional boundary runs from L.8.central to L.5.central, thence grid line to G.27.central.

The future Brigade boundary runs from L.13.central to fork road at L.15.b.50.80, thence via most direct road to cross road L.11.d. central (the road inclusive to the North Brigade).

5. The 9th A.I. Bde. patrols will push forward from the consolidation line at 8.5 a.m. with 1 Battalion North and 1 Battalion South of the Brigade Boundary mentioned in para. 4, so as to occupy a series of posts:-

(a). In the S. half from L.16.c.60.00 via road forks near L.17.a.10.20 to Copse in L.11.d.00.00.

(b). In the N. half from thence exclusive via L.11.central, crest of hill in L.11.b. to centre of Cutting in L.5.c.60.00, thence by most direct line to the W. edge of the SCARPE running N. and S. from L.4.central (Right flank of 47th Division).

6. 11th A.I. Bde. with 1 M.G. Coy. will form up 300 yards West of our Jumping Off Line near L.13.central by 7.30 a.m., with 2 Battalions in line, remainder in Brigade Reserve in readiness to move forward,

and (on receipt of Orders) to relieve the Battalion of the 9th A.I. Bde. in the South Sector of the zone of exploitation, which will become the line of resistance for the Division as soon as 11th A.I. Bde. reaches the line of posts.

These orders will not be issued from Divisional Headquarters until the situation of the forward Battalions of the 9th A.I. Bde. is clearly established.

7. "D" Squadron, 13th L.H. Regt., now N.W. of SAILLY LAURETTE, is placed at the disposal of 9th A.I. Bde. - O.C. to report at 4.45 a.m. 22nd instant to 9th A.I. Bde. H.Q. Squadron to be at K.22.d. Valley ready to move at 7.0 a.m. 22nd instant.

8. 7th F.A. Brigade will be in readiness to move as required from 8.0 a.m. onwards.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

21st August, 1918.

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
Div. Sig. Coy
9th A.I. Bde.
10th -do-
11th -do-
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.

3rd Aust. Pnr. Bn.
A.D.M.S.
O.C. Light Horse Squadron.
AUST. Corps.
47th Division.
1st Aust. Div.
2nd -do-
4th -do-
5th -do-

3rd Squad. A.F.C.

T.G. 122

War Diary

SECRET.

BATTLE INSTRUCTION, SERIES "D", NO.1.

DIVISIONAL POLICY.



APPENDIX 23

Map Reference: Sheet 62C N.W., 1/20,000.

1. The Advance will be continued.
2. The advance of the Third Aust. Division will be regulated by the progress of the Right Flank of the 58th Division.
3. The Northern Divisional Boundary will be a line drawn Eastwards through G.89.central-B.26.central.
4. The reliefs and dispositions (as arranged) are to enable the 10th and 11th A.I. Bdes. to rest and refit.
5. The Artillery will carry out an active policy, with portion of the guns well advanced, against CURLU and high ground East, and in the neighbourhood of HMM.
6. Machine Guns will also carry out active harassing fire under the orders of the C.O. 3rd A.M.G. Bn., with 1 Coy. forward, 1 Coy. in close support, and two Coys. in Reserve, ready to move at short notice.
7. Under covering fire from the heights in vicinity of VAUX WOOD, Patrols will be pushed out to endeavour to gain foothold and exploit the PENINSULA in G.5 and G.12, in order to co-operate in our advance towards CURLU.
The Pioneer Coy. attached to 9th A.I. Bde. will assist in the construction of the necessary bridges and crossings.
8. The 9th A.I. Bde. will take over the Divisional frontage as arranged, but two Battalions of the 10th A.I. Bde. will remain in the vicinity of SUZANNE, ready to again take up an active role when required, either:-
(a). Defensive - against counter-attack from the N.E.
or
(b). Offensive - when the advance continues.
9. When the advance is continued it may be necessary to move troops through the Right of the 58th Divisional Area, but the Battle Front of this Division will not be extended North of the Divisional Boundary.
10. When the advance is continued beyond the River bend at A.29.central and beyond CURLU, the 10th A.I. Bde. will operate on the Right, with the 9th A.I. Bde. on the Left. The Boundary between Brigades will be B.25.c.O.O-B.29.c.O.O.
11. The C.R.E. will arrange for the construction of necessary roadways and bridges across the SOMME as soon as possible:-
(a). From vicinity of VAUX WOOD to LODGE WOOD and,
(b). later, from FARGNY MILL to LODGE WOOD, from vicinity of G.6.c.central to G.6.d.8.8, and from GREENOILLER to TEST WOOD.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

27th August, 1918.

C.H. Jones

Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.	11th Aust. Inf. Bde.	1st Aust. Div.
C.R.A.	3rd A.M.G. Bn.	4th -do-
C.R.E.	3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.	5th -do-
Div. Signal Coy.	A.D.M.S.	3rd Squad. A.F.O.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.	2nd Aust. Div.	"D" Squad. L.H. Regt.
10th -do-	58th Div.	War Diary.
	AUST. Com.	
	Liaison Officer (att. 58th Div.)	
	" (att. 3rd Aust.Div.).	



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NOTES ON DIVISIONAL CONFERENCE 14th. August, 1918.

1. Special attention is drawn to the Notes on Open Warfare - G.401 - 1 - 56 - of August 8th. and the following definitions are approved.

- (a) "Command Post" is the place where a Commander supervises the work of his troops in action. It must be in close touch with the formed reserve of the unit, also in proximity to a good O.P.; and have certain communications to higher formations in rear.
- (b) "Headquarters" is the place where the business of the unit is transacted, and it is here that the flag or distinguishing mark of the unit must be displayed.
- (c) "Rear Headquarters" are not recognised and are not to be formed in any unit of the Division. Personnel not required in the line will be either with the nucleus or wagon lines.

2. Control of traffic and march discipline concerns every officer, and the latter alone renders the former possible. The way in which transport moves is a clear indication of the value of the regimental system, and of the supervision exercised over such systems.

3. The immediate construction of latrines for troops on halting and the immediate burial of the dead are common-sense precautions in the interests of health. These demand the constant care and energetic action of all commanders.

P.O.W. may be employed, whilst awaiting escort, in digging latrines, burying their own dead (and horses) and evacuating their own wounded; the treatment to be the same as we expect for any of our men taken prisoner.

4. A "captured trophy" is one that was actually taken in the actual presence of the enemy, and no effort will be spared to secure such trophies for the units concerned.

All other trophies are of the nature of salvaged souvenirs, and claims for such will be reported on by a Board of Officers (D.H.Q. - Arty - 3 Inf. Bdes), with a view to ensuring the fairest possible distribution.

5. The wording of reports requires considerable attention, with a view to avoiding vague terms. The source of information must be stated, as well as the time of occurrence. Every effort must be made to use alternative methods of transmission: e.g. power-buzzer, mounted orderly, rocket, etc., as well as cable and runner.

6. In future one artillery brigade will be allotted to each Brigade Sector in Open Attack and Defence, necessitating the closest personal touch between Infantry and Artillery Commanders. The responsibility for the safety of troops on the flanks, as well as on the Brigade front, rests with the Infantry Brigade Commanders and the action he requires from the guns.

Additional artillery support will be called for through the Artillery chain of command, as the co-ordination of all artillery fire on the Divisional front is carried out by the C.R.A.

Neither the accuracy of the maps in use, conditions of guns or the time available under open warfare conditions allow of close firing. An ample margin of safety is required for firing in front of infantry, probably not less than 400 yards.

(1).

P.T.O.

The difficulties of ammunition supply in the field prohibit the volume of artillery fire that is possible under trench warfare conditions.

S.O.S. is inapplicable to open warfare, and artillery action must be looked for more in "lanes" and on specially selected targets.

7. Narratives on Operations in triplicate with comments by Commanders are required at the earliest possible opportunity, and should not be later than the recommendations for honours and awards.

8. Increased efforts are required throughout the Division to maintain intelligence work, and to circulate information of general interest, as well as of tactical value.

9. The use of the four letter code in describing units is restricted to telephone messages forward of Brigade Headquarters.

10. Special names for localities will be issued as early as possible before Operations, and the marking of such points will be specially allotted to Engineer details with Brigades (normally one section).

18th August, 1918.

Information from prisoners captured during operations
from 8 a.m. 26-8-1918 to 6 a.m. 29-8-1918.

1. - PRISONERS.

(a) On the 26th instant, one prisoner passed through the Divisional Cage, establishing the following identification :-

43rd. Res.Div. 203 R.I.R. 10th Coy.

(b) During the night of 26th/27th inst., the following prisoners were captured :-

43rd. Res.Div.	203 R.I.R.	3rd. Bn.	2 O.R.
117th. Div.	11 Gren.R.	All 3 Bns	49 "
	157 I.R.	3rd. Bn.	3 "
25th. Div.	117 I.R.	All 3 Bns	12 "
27th. Div.	13th Bearer Coy.		1 "

			67 "

During this period, 1 O.R. wounded prisoner was evacuated through medical units.

(c) Prisoners passed through Divisional Cage as result of operations during night of 27th/28th were as under :-

117th. Div.	157 I.R.	2nd & 3rd Bns	48 O.R.
	11 Gren.R.	1st Bn.	2 "
43rd. Res.Div.	201 R.I.R.	2nd Bn.	5 "
	202 R.I.R.	1st Bn.	1 "

			56 "

and 4 wounded prisoners O.R. passed through medical units.

(d) From 9 p.m. 28-8-18 to 6 a.m. 29-8-18, two O.R. unwounded passed through Divisional Cage :-

117th. Div.	157 I.R.	2nd M.G. Coy.	1 O.R.
43rd. Res.Div.	201 R.I.R.		1 "

			2 "

2. - SUMMARY - of prisoners passed through Divisional Cage since commencement of operations on 22nd. instant :-

	Officers	Other ranks.
23-8-1918	13	192
24-8-1918	1	108
25-8-1918	5	149
26-8-1918	-	1
27-8-1918	-	67
28-8-1918	-	56
29-8-1918 (to 6 a.m.)	-	2
Wounded evacuated through medical units for period	1	103
	20	678
	---	---

3. - ORDER OF BATTLE & ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

During the period under review, the most notable feature has been the identification in line of two regiments of the 117th Division, which were apparently hurried up to support the enemy's front opposite MARICOURT about the 25th instant.

P.T.O.

Of this Division, the 11th Grenadier Regt. was brought down into line in the vicinity of HARBONNIERES where it suffered heavy losses during our attack on the 8th inst., it being stated that of the 10th. Coy. only one stretcher bearer remained, the balance of the Coy. having been killed or made prisoner.

In spite of the appearance of this Division, elements of the 43rd Res. Division (201, 202 and 203 R.I.Rs.) and 25th Division, (115 Body Guard I.R., 116 I.R., 117 Body I.R.) have been identified, indicating that notwithstanding the losses they have sustained since the commencement of our operations on the 22nd, these Divisions have not yet been relieved.

The 43rd. Res. Division was, however, apparently withdrawn temporarily into support on 26th/27th inst. but reappeared in line 27th/28th inst.

No exact order of battle has been ascertained, but elements of all the above Divisions are still likely to be encountered.

Some dislocation of the enemy's forces is apparent, as the 22nd R.I.R. (the 3rd Regt. of the 117th Division) has been identified by our right flank Corps as fighting in the DELVILLE Wood-BERNAFAY - LONGUEVAL area.

4. - STRENGTHS & MORALE.

The regiments of the 117th Division came into line with Coy. strengths varying from 50-80 and 3 officers. From prisoners' statements their losses have not been very considerable - except in prisoners - since they came into this sector.

This division contains a large proportion of Polish-speaking Silesians and a small number of Alsations (French-speaking), and the morale cannot be classified as good, though prisoners of the 157th I.R. seemed to be of better stamp generally than those of the 11th Gren. Regt.

The percentage of young soldiers in the 11th. Gren. Regt. seems to be abnormally high; no less than 7 out of a batch of 13 prisoners from this regt. being between the ages of 18½ to 20!

An item which has seriously affected the morale of some of the enemy's troops has been the scarcity, and in one case the entire absence for 3 days, of rations. This, it is stated, was due to the field-cookers being destroyed by our aerial bombs.

During the past few days the absence of officer prisoners has been marked, in view of the high proportion of officers captured during the earlier stages of the battle. Prisoners' statements tend to indicate that officers no longer remain in the front line but leave their men, in charge of their N.C.Os., to shift for themselves.

5. - ENEMY INTENTIONS.

As during the period previously reviewed, there seems still to exist a certain amount of disorganization among the enemy units. The troops, in most cases, had received no definite orders as to the attitude they were to maintain in this sector, but in one case it was stated that a withdrawal was to be made - fighting; but the rate and extent of the withdrawal could not be ascertained.

29th. August, 1918.

G. H. Sawcutt
for Lieut-Colonel, *Lieut*
General Staff.

PART II - Attached.

INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.EFFECT OF ALLIED BOMBING RAID.

APPENDIX 25

The following extract translated from a letter written from FRANKFURT.a.M. 13-8-1918, is of instant :-

" Yesterday we Frankfurters had a very sad day, for last year on the same date, similar happenings occurred, but they were not so serious as this time. The day before yesterday at about 1/2 to 9 there were about 12/15 planes here over FRANKFURT and they caused endless damage.....

The first bomb fell in front of 's bookstore; another directly opposite in one fell in front of the Opera House; one directly on the left wing of the Opera - and it was here that most of the casualties were caused, for there were at least 15 seriously wounded and an, (as yet unknown number of killed) in the Opera alone.....

In a villa 4 people were killed by one explosion and in street there were also many wounded.

.....Two houses have now no "balconies" - everything smashed. In front of this house a lieutenant had both legs blown off and was dead in ten minutes. pointed

Of course the papers will not make any particular/reference to these occurrences.as to the number of killed and wounded, nothing definite is known yet, but the dead are estimated at from 25-30.

Is it not sad that in the 5th year of the war we have to lead such a life.

SITUATION - 27-8-18 & night 27th-28th.

.....
The 2nd Guard Division lost very heavily in the MARNE battle, but has been resting nearly a month. One Coy. per battalion has apparently, however, been disbanded, in order to bring the other 3 Coys. up to strength. This division has lately been practising rearguard action.

With reference to other units identified, great disorganisation is apparent, prisoners belonging to 21 different Bns. of 6 different divisions being captured in BERNAFAY WOOD and vicinity, the divisions being the 13th, 25th, 233rd, 225th, 87th and 2nd Guard. Prisoners belonging to 4 of these divisions were also captured by the Army on our left in the BAZENTIN-LONGUEVAL area.

Prisoners belonging to two regts. of the 117th Div. were captured in the MARICOURT-VAUX area, while prisoners belonging to this same division were also taken in DELVILLE WOOD.

Elements of the 13th, 25th, 225th and 233rd Divisions are inextricably intermingled in the northern area.

Considerable resistance is still likely to be met with opposite the northern half of the battle front.

There are now 15 divisions, fit for offensive operations, in reserve, of which 4 are considered to be between the Sea and the OISE. Beyond the possible presence of the 232nd Div. in back areas, there would only appear to be available to reinforce this front divisions withdrawn exhausted since August 8th.

WAR DIARY

of

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL GAS SERVICES.

AUGUST 1918.

1918.

Aug. 1st. Division in the Line. CORBIE - HAMEL Sector.
"B" DIVISIONAL AREA.

Left Sector. 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
Right Sector. 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
Reserve Sector. 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Interviewed D.A.G.O. reference Anti-gas clothing and the immediate protection of artillery gun positions when batteries move forward to new areas.

2nd. Inter-Brigade Relief. 11th. Inf. Bde. relieved 9th. Inf. Bde. in Left Sector area - S. of SOMME River. 11th. Inf. Bde. moved back to Reserve area.

Interviewed B.G.O. reference American troops in our area, and the observance of the Gas Alert.

3rd. Discussion with D.A.G.O. regarding action during active operations.

10th. B.G.O. arranged a series of instructional lectures by Divisional Gas N.C.O. to N.C.Os. of American forces.

4th. D.A.G.O. reported arrival of 4th. Aust. Divl. Artillery in "B" Divisional Area.

Visited by D.A.G.O. of this Division and arranged that all precautionary anti-gas measures be ~~operat~~ adopted during the active operations.

5th. Heavy hostile gas-shell bombardment.

Time. 4.15 a.m. to 6.0 a.m.

Localities shelled.

P.14.15.19. I.24.30.35.36.

J.26.c. and O.6.b.

Wind S.W. & S.S.W. 5 to 6 m.p.h.

Rain during previous 24 hours, Heavy.

Temperature. 50 - 55 Fr.

Units affected.

10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Field Artillery. Corps Troops. A.I.F.

Heavy Artillery. " " B.E.F.

The enemy used approximately 4,550 GREEN and YELLOW CROSS gas shells. Calibre. 7.7 and 10.5 c.m. as follows :-

P.14. & 15.	1,100 rnds.	7.7 c.m.	GREEN CROSS	=	PHOSGENE?
P.14. & 15.	150 "	10.5 c.m.	" "	"	"
P.14. & 19.	150 "	10.5 c.m.	YELLOW	"	MUSTARD.
P.14. & 19.	100 "	15.0 c.m.	" "	"	"
I.35. & 36.	150 "	7.7 c.m.	" "	"	"
I.36.	200 "	15.0 c.m.	GREEN	"	PHOSGENE.
O. 6.b.	600 "	7.7 c.m.	" "	"	"

(1).

APPENDIX

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26

Small Box Respirators had been worn in many cases for three hours and gas-proof doorways had been in use for the same period.

Gas casualties passing through M.D.S. to NOON 7-8-18 (30 hours after bombardment) were reported as follows :-

28.

I. Close proximity to bursts and splashes. In one case 5 men of Q.M. personnel 11th. A.I.Bde. were badly splashed with YELLOW CROSS Liquid from a shell which hit the shelter they were in and, although their clothing was changed and they were washed with soap & water and Bi-Carb. of Soda was used, these men had to be evacuated.

Remarks.

In some areas there was a very high concentration of PHOSGENE and MUSTARD GAS and, had adequate ~~usual~~ precautions not been taken, many serious casualties would have resulted.

7th. Visited Forward Area, was unable to get into touch with the B.G.O. who had left for a tour of inspection of area S. of the SOMME, recently taken over by his Brigade.

All Bdes report being prepared for active warfare and that anti-gas apparatus was in good order.

8th. Division engaged with the enemy throughout the day.
Visited Prisoners of War Compound, examined prisoners anti-gas equipment and obtained a number of "Drums" - normal pattern -

June and July, 1918.

All enemy masks examined were of the leather pattern and found in good order.

9th. D.H.Q. moved to new location "QUARRY" at P.7.a.05.30 (sheet 62.D.) late 10th. Bde. H.Q.

10th. Visited forward area and inspected dugouts in positions recently occupied by enemy in P.10. 11. 12. 16. 17. 18. and Q.7. and 13.

Found a number of good dugouts of the tunnel system; in most cases no attempt had been made by the enemy to gas-proof these, and where it had been attempted the doorways were poor. These have since been improved in some cases by Gas personnel of this Division.

Inspected a number of Salvus Sets and Gas Alarms. These have been salvaged and will go through usual channels to the Corps Salvage Dump, being too heavy for me to transport.

Collected a number of enemy respirators Drums and brought same to D.H.Q.

11th. Visited forward area in Q.13. 14. 19. and 20. and obtained further supplies of enemy unused respirator Drums.

Located a dump of enemy gas shells, which had been blown up by our fire and were not of much value.

12th. Visited Prisoners of War Compound and collected a number of unused enemy respirator drums; also visited D.G.O. 17th. British Division at BUSSY regarding Divisional Relief.

Division relieved on the Battle Front before AMIENS by 17th. British Division.

The Hand Over applied principally to the gas-proof dugout system used prior to the 4th Army operations of July 8th 9th & 10th 1918.

The Relief took place at short notice and an accurate return of Trench and Area Stores was not possible as the Divisional Troops were engaged in mobile warfare.

13th. Visited the 11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. at P.10.b. and the 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. at VAIRE-sous-corbie and interviewed B.G.Os. regarding immediate inspections of S.B.Rs. and all defectives were replaced at once.

14th. Visited 10th. Aust. Inf. Brigade at Q.14.c. in the forward area, interviewed B.G.O. and D.G.N.C.O., arranged for a thorough examination of all respirators before the Bde. re-enters the line.

Inspected recently captured territory.

15/16th. Small Box Respirator inspections carried out in each Brigade and defectives replaced. B.G.Os. instructed to maintain reserve supplies of Bi-Carb. Soda and Chloride of Lime.

Enemy reported to be gas-shelling the Divisions holding the Line.

An inspection of the captured area has been completed and a quantity of enemy anti-gas equipment salvaged - most of which was of normal type and handed to C.A. Aust. Corps who visited the Divisional Area.

D.A.G.O. reported everything satisfactory with Artillery Units.

17th. Inspected areas in P.11. 12. 16. 17. and 18 (Sheet 62.D.) for dumps of enemy Yellow Cross gas shell, none were located, - the enemy evidently only bringing these forward to battery positions for immediate requirements.

Large quantities of Blue Cross gas-shell are noticed at old battery positions, but there is a remarkable absence of GREEN and YELLOW CROSS shells.

Visited 10th. Inf. Bde. and interviewed Div. Gas N.C.O. regarding S.B.R. Inspections and obtained used N.C. containers.

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- Visited 9th. Inf. Bde. reference condition of Anti-gas equipment, maintenance of reserves and the gas proofing of enemy dugouts in the forward area.
This Brigade relieved Liaison Force in the Line in area North of the SOMME opposite BRAY-sur-somme.
- 20th. Division relieved LIAISON FORCE in the above sector, D.H.Q. moving to ravine in J.22.d.
Interviewed D.A.G.O. reference precautions to be adopted during active operations.
Visited 11th. Inf. Bde. at J.29.c.5.8 regarding the protection and repair of enemy dugouts. Upon inspection of the Bde. area, it was found that this work was in progress.
- 21st. Again visited 11th. Inf. Bde. - interviewed B.G.O.
As in the case of captured area S. of the SOMME, it was noticed that the enemy has made very little attempt to gas-proof his dugout system in this sector.
Also visited 9th. Inf. Bde. at K.28.d.7.5. and 10th. Inf. Bde. in HAMELET, and inspected gas proof dugouts in the former sector - many of these were protected temporarily and others improvised by personnel of Units in occupation.
- 22nd. Visited 10th. and 11th. Inf. Bdes. and interviewed B.G.Os. Obtained from Bde. in the Line (9th) a complete German oxygen set of portable type as used by their A.M.C.
Inspected enemy prisoners at the Divisional Compound - protective anti-gas equipment normal.
Chemical Adviser Aust. Corps visited the Divisional area.
Interviewed D.A.G.O. 58th. Division.
- 23rd. Visited Divisional Salvage Dump and arranged for all Strombos Horns salvaged to be forwarded to Aust. Corps Salvage Dump.
Interviewed by the D.A.G.O. 58th. Division reference supplies of anti-gas cloth and gas proofing of dugouts at Battery positions.
- 24th. Visited 9th. Inf. Bde., interviewed B.G.O. regarding the collection of strombos horns in rear of the battle area. 5 Strombos horns were located :-

1 installed at entrance to gully in J.28.c.9.6. (62.D)
1 " " "B" Echelon (Divl) " J.19.c.5.3. "
3 dumped in gully at J.22.c.9.1. and marked for transference to forward area by the Gas Services.
- 25th. B.G.O. 11th. Inf. Bde. wired information of the leakage of gas from enemy gas shell dumps in K.22. c.&d (Sheet 62.D)
I visited this area and made a thorough inspection of gas shell dumps, several were found leaking at the joints but insufficient to cause a dangerous concentration.
Reports were received from Divisional units and the left flank division of a slight concentration throughout the area.
This concentration could not have originated from the leaking shells, but possibly were due to an enemy bombardment further S. of our sector.
Issued instructions for the immediate burial of all leaky gas shells.
During the night 23rd/24th. August, the town of BRAY (recently captured) was heavily shelled with approx. 3000 rds. of YELLOW CROSS gas shells.
10th. Inf. Bde. troops moving up for active operations had to mop up the town under these conditions. The vicinity of Bde. H.Q. in L.19. was also shelled with 50 rounds of YELLOW CROSS on night of 24th/25th. August.
Casualties. Nil.
The fact that no casualties were reported is worthy of note.

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August

26th.

D.A.G.O. reported the completion of a check inspection of S.B.Rs. of all the Divisional batteries and defective respirators were replaced. Divisional Headquarters moved forward to CHATEAU ETINEHEM.

27th/
28th.

Interviewed B.G.O. 9th. Inf. Bde. reference gas-proofing of enemy dugouts and inspections of S.B.Rs. being maintained. Visited prisoners of war compound - enemy anti-gas equipment normal.

29th.

D.H.Q. moved forward to SUZANNE (Sheet 62^c). Visited 11th. B.G.O. regarding the gas-proofing of enemy dugouts and maintaining S.B.Rs. inspections. Also visited 10th. Bde. H.Q. but the B.G.O. had moved forward to Command Post.

30th.

Interviewed D.A.G.O. reference supplies of Bi-Carb. Soda and maintenance of reserves of S.B.Rs. with batteries in forward area.

Remarks.

During the month, gas shelling was below normal, doubtless owing to the disorganization during enemy retreat.

One heavy bombardment was however reported. During night 23rd/24th. August, the 40th. Battalion with one Coy. of the 37th. Bn. attached mopped up the town of BRAY after 3,000 rounds of Yellow Cross gas had been fired into and around the town. The gas discipline was good and, even under these adverse conditions, the operation was successfully carried out with few gas casualties.

During night 29th/30th. August, the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. advanced the line through a concentration of YELLOW CROSS and GREEN CROSS gas - casualties were again light.

During the night 30th/31st. the 9th. Inf. Bde. advanced through the HEM VALLEY and was subjected to a fairly heavy bombardment of YELLOW CROSS gas. Respirators were worn for one hour and gas casualties were light.

Only one case of a gas bombardment on artillery positions was reported. This was during the morning of the 31st. inst. when 12 rounds of 15 c.m. YELLOW CROSS gas shell fell on 27th. Battery position in H.4.c. (Sheet 62.c). The Battery was in action at the time and a few casualties were reported, as the Battery had to remain in position until the advance on the same night.

(signed) S.H. SMITH. Lieut.
D. G. O.

H.4.d.8.4.
3/9/18.

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On the right, the Second Australian Division was to similarly advance, while the III Corps was to swing forward the right flank to include the CHURCHILL BATTALION and continue to the movement of the Australian Corps, on its Northern flank.

On the right, the Second Australian Division was to similarly advance, while the III Corps was to swing forward the right flank to include the CHURCHILL BATTALION and continue to the movement of the Australian Corps, on its Northern flank.

The Objective for the GRENZ LINE, allotted the Third Australian Division on 8th August, which also

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS.

The outstanding feature of the preparation for the attack was the fact that the III Corps, in the initial stages of the attack, was to be supported by the CHURCHILL BATTALION, and were to be taken immediately.

8th. AUGUST TO 13th. AUGUST, 1918.

The date fixed for the attack was 8th. August, and on the 8th. August a general attack was ordered and the general intention outlined.

C O N T E N T S.

The Australian Corps was to be supported by the CHURCHILL BATTALION, and were to be taken immediately.

SECTION 1. OPERATIONS.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE.

3. COMMENTS & LESSONS.**4. MAPS.**

1. The attack on the Northern Divisional front was divided into three phases:

(a) The capture and consolidation of the GRENZ LINE by the Third Australian Division under an artillery barrage, and with the assistance of tanks.

(b) The "leapfrogging" through the Third Australian Division by the Fourth Australian Division, and the capture by the latter of the GRENZ LINE (Map "A"). This operation was to be carried out on the principle of "Open Warfare", with the assistance of tanks.

(c) The exploitation, by the Fourth Australian Division, of the success so gained, by pushing on and gaining the old British Reserve line. (Map "B").

2. On the night 4th/5th. August, the 10th. Inf. Brigade relieved the 11th. Inf. Brigade in the line, and then, until the battle, held the whole Divisional front with four battalions in line.

3. The 9th. 11th. 12th. and 13th. Inf. Brigades were concentrated in the area shown on the attached Map "C" by the morning of the 8th. August, the 4th. and 12th. Inf. Brigades being bivouacked furthest forward, as their objectives were furthest; and it was desired that they should arrive at the GRENZ LINE (from which they jumped off) as fresh as possible.

I. PREPARATORY ARRANGEMENTS.

1. In the 1st. Phase, August Offensive, on the SOMME, the Third Australian Division was allotted the role of capturing the first objectives on the Northern Flank of the Australian Corps, with its left resting on the River SOMME.

2. On the right, the Second Australian Division was to similarly advance, while the III Corps was to swing forward its right flank to include the CHÉPILLY Spur and conform to the movement of the Australian Corps, on its Northern flank.

3. The Objective (or the GREEN Line), allotted the Third Australian Division, is shown on the attached Map "A", which also shows the Divisional boundaries.

4. The outstanding feature of the preparation for the attack was SECURITY; therefore, in the initial stages, conferences of Brigadiers were called and instructions issued verbally, and were passed, by them, only to those by whom action had to be taken immediately.

5. The date fixed for the attack was the 8th. August, and on the 2nd. August a conference of Brigadiers was called and the general intention outlined.

6. The Australian Corps was to penetrate the enemy defences to a depth of 8,500 yards and seize the old British Reserve Defence System from MERICOURT-sur-SOMME to HARBONNIERES, thus providing a strong Northern flank for a deeper penetration by the Canadian Corps, which was to operate South of the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX - ROSIERES-en-SANTERRE. Later the Australian Corps was to conform to further penetration by the Canadian Corps.

II. PLAN.

1. The attack on the Northern divisional front was divided into three phases :-

(a) The capture and consolidation of the GREEN Line by the Third Australian Division under an artillery barrage, and with the assistance of Tanks.

(b) The "leapfrogging" through the Third Australian Division by the Fourth Australian Division, and the capture by the latter of the RED Line (Map "A"). This operation was to be carried out on the principles of "Open Warfare", with the assistance of Tanks.

(c) The exploitation, by the Fourth Australian Division, of the success so gained, by pushing on and gaining the old British Reserve line. (BLUE LINE).

2. On the night 4th/5th. August, the 10th. Inf. Brigade relieved the 11th. Inf. Brigade in the line, and thus, until the battle, held the whole Divisional front with four battalions in line.

3. The 9th., 11th., 4th. and 12th. Inf. Brigades were concentrated in the areas shown on the attached Map "B" by the morning of the 5th. August, the 4th. and 12th. Inf. Brigades being bivouaced furthest forward, as their objectives were furthest; and it was desired that they should arrive at the GREEN Line (from which they jumped off) as fresh as possible.

(2).

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4. To permit of this concentration, and as they were to take no part in the battle, all personnel of the 65th. American Brigade were withdrawn from the Line and reported to their Brigade at ALLONVILLE on night 4th/5th. August.

5. The 9th. and 10th. Field Coys. A.E., with 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Battalion, were allotted for duty under the C.E. Corps, from 6th. August, - two Coys. of the 2nd. Aust. Pioneer Battalion being placed at the disposal of G.O.C. 3rd. Aust. Division from the same day.

6. The attack was to be carried out by the 9th. and 11th. Inf. Brigades, the 9th. Inf. Brigade being on the South and the 11th. Inf. Brigade on the North; inter-brigade boundary is shown on Map "A".

7. The 9th. Inf. Brigade was to attack with two battalions in line, the 33rd. Battalion on the right and 35th. Battalion on the left, and the 34th. Battalion in support. The attack was to be launched in two waves of two lines each, and the Support Battalion was to follow with two Coys. in rear of the right flank of 33rd. Battalion and two Coys. in rear of the left flank of 35th. Battalion; so that the weight of the attack would fall on the flanks of the WOOD. In case the troops moving through the Wood should be held up after the main attack had passed around the flanks, Lieut.-Colonel MORSHEAD, D.S.O., (who was in charge of the operations for the capture of ACCROCHE WOOD) had the right to call on a battalion of the 10th. Inf. Brigade (37th. Battalion). This battalion was to be ready to encircle the Wood, two Coys. passing around the North and two Coys. around the South, and then attack it from the East.

8. The 11th. Inf. Brigade was to attack with two battalions in line (44th. and 42nd. from right to left). The 41st. Battalion, plus one Coy. of 43rd. Battalion, was to be in Support, and the 43rd. Battalion, less one Coy., was to be in Reserve. Upon reaching a line about 200 yards East of the GAILLY-WARFUSEE Road in Q.1.b., Q.7.a., and c., and P.18.b. (which line was well marked by the steep re-entrant LONG Valley and by the Cross-roads in P.7.a. and the Village of GAILLY); the 41st. Battalion, plus one Coy. of 43rd. Battalion, was to leapfrog through the 44th. Battalion and, with the 42nd. Battalion, continue the advance and consolidate the GREEN Line.

Attached to the 42nd. Battalion were to be two platoons of the 39th. Battalion (10th. Inf. Brigade) who were to establish liaison with III Corps North of the River SOMME, and follow along the North bank to ensure that any machine gun nests were dealt with, and that the North flank of the 42nd. Battalion was protected.

9. - For the operation the 3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion was to be disposed as follows :-

Eight guns of each of the 9th. and 11th. Coys. were to move with the 9th. and 11th. Inf. Brigades respectively in the attack as "Opportunity" guns. The 3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion, less the above 16 guns and plus one coy. of the 4th. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion, from ZERO till limit of range was reached, were to be employed on barrage work. At ZERO plus 4 hours each of the 9th. 10th. and 11th. Machine Gun Coys. were to come under the command of the Brigades to which they are affiliated, and the 23rd. Machine Gun Coy. was to become Divisional Reserve.

10. "B" Coy. of 13th. Tank Battalion was to operate with the 9th. Inf. Brigade and "C" Coy. of the same Battalion with the 11th. Inf. Brigade.

One Supply Tank was to be allotted to each of the 9th. and 11th. Inf. Brigades; but, unfortunately, the one allotted to the

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11th. Inf. Brigade went out of action on the night of the 6th. August. This necessitated G.S. wagon being employed, and was the only alteration of the original plan throughout the operation. The Supply Tanks were to be loaded with stores and ammunition on the night of the 6th/7th. August, and lie up (concealed) in VILLERS BRETONNEUX till the morning of the 8th. August, when they were to pick up and bring forward the Stokes Mortars near ACQUARE WOOD.

11. All Artillery of the Corps was placed under the orders of the G.O.C., R.A., Australian Corps. The following was allotted to the Third Australian Division to cover its advance to the GREEN Line :-

"A" SUB-GROUP. Commanding Officer. Lt.-Col. L.T. RAIKES. D.S.O.

23rd. Army Brigade. R.F.A.

189th. -do- R.F.A.

12th. -do- A.F.A.

"B" SUB-GROUP. Commanding Officer. Lt.-Col. G.H.M. KING. C.M.G., D.S.O.

7th. A.F.A. Bde.

8th. A.F.A. Bde.

3rd. Army Brigade. A.F.A.

"C" SUB-GROUP. Commanding Officer. Lt.-Col. T.M. ARCHDALE. D.S.O.

16th. Brigade. R.H.A.

10th. A.F.A. Brigade.

11th. A.F.A. Brigade.

"A" SUB-GROUP was to move forward at ZERO plus 4 hours as mobile artillery with the Fourth Australian Division.

"B" SUB-GROUP was to move forward and take up positions to cover the BLUE Line (shown on Map "A").

"C" SUB-GROUP was to become Corps Reserve after ZERO plus 4 hours.

III. APPROACH MARCH and ASSEMBLY.

1. For the Approach March four routes were marked out, lettered "A", "B", "C" and "D", from South to North and reconnoitred: the 9th. Inf. Brigade used "A" and "B" tracks and the 11th. Inf. Brigade used "C" and "D". These routes, as far as possible, were cross-country and avoided roads and localities where either congestion or shelling was likely to be met with.

2. The night of the 7th/8th. was dark and misty; but, despite the large number of infantry, tanks and guns in movement, the approach march was completed without a hitch. During the march, one halt of fifteen minutes was made, and the troops arrived on the assembly tapes quite fresh.

3. The Infantry was unmolested throughout the assembly, save for normal harassing fire; and, in accordance with instructions, were on their tapes by 3.20 a.m., thus having an hour's rest prior to ZERO.

4. The movement of the Artillery into action was carried out on nights 6th/7th., 7th/8th. and 8th/9th. August, 1918, as follows :-

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(4).

1st. Move consisted of two sections per battery of those Brigades not normally used for the defence of the line.

2nd. Move consisted of remaining guns of the Brigades mentioned above and two sections of the Brigades covering the line.

3rd. Move (y/z Night) consisted of the remaining sections of the Brigades normally holding the line. These sections moved at last possible moment, carrying out harassing fire in their old positions as long as possible.

The ordinary harassing fire up to ZERO hour, in addition to that done by those sections which moved under Move 3, was also carried out by those batteries in the battle positions which were sited furthest back, and in closest proximity to old positions lately vacated.

IV. ATTACK. (8th. August. 1918).

1. At ZERO, 4.00 a.m., the Artillery and Machine Gun barrage came down punctually and accurately, and both attacking brigades got off well at 4.24 a.m.

The enemy barrage came down at about 10 minutes after ZERO on the old front line but was very weak and, as the attack progressed, ceased altogether.

2. At about 4.0 a.m. a dense fog had developed which (although it shielded our troops from observation) with the smoke and dust, made the keeping of direction an extremely difficult task.

3. The 11th. Inf. Brigade attacked in lines of sections in file, and this formation proved very successful in the fog, as direction was better maintained - owing to the small groups of our troops being more easily handled and (with the tanks) better able to deal with any centres of resistance.

4. The 9th. Inf. Brigade attack quickly developed into a similar formation, small parties working forward together on their own initiative.

5. The whole plan operated successfully, the attack being driven home with great energy. It was expected that in the initial stages the capture of ACCROCHE Wood would prove a difficult task, but the surprise to the enemy was so complete, and the fog so dense, that our troops were upon the garrison before much resistance could be offered. The garrison was a strong one, but was driven into dugouts by our barrage and, in most cases, came out only to surrender. At 5.16 a.m. the 9th. Inf. Brigade were beyond ACCROCHE Wood, which had yielded a large number of prisoners. The 11th. Inf. Brigade in the meantime had been entirely successful also, the enemy surrendering freely. Along the whole of the Divisional front hard fighting took place in a number of enemy strong points, and battery positions, which were protected by machine gun nests, but the vigour of the attack quickly overcame this resistance and the garrison were wither killed or captured.

6. Owing to the density of the fog, the rate of the advance was slower than had been expected and the infantry were unable to keep right up to the barrage. The dangers resulting from this were nullified, however, by the good work of the tanks, which were of the greatest possible assistance in attacking strong points and the small woods, and enabling them to be mopped up.

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V. CONSOLIDATION and RE-ORGANISATION.

1. The GREEN Line had been entirely captured and consolidation commenced by the 9th. Inf. Brigade at 6.50 a.m. and by the 11th. Inf. Brigade at 7.30 a.m., some of the platoons of the 41st. Battalion being late as a result of the fog.
2. The 9th. Inf. Brigade were in touch with the 5th. Inf. Brigade on their right; but on our left flank the 58th. Division (174th. Inf. Brigade) had met with heavy resistance at MALARD WOOD, which checked their advance.
3. As consolidation by the 9th. Inf. Brigade progressed, the 33rd. and 35th. Battalions took up defensive positions, each with three Coys. in the front line and one in support; whilst the 34th. Battalion was disposed with four Coys. in Reserve Line. The 9th. A.L.T.M. Battery had four mortars covering the front line and four in Reserve, and the 9th. A.M.G. Coy., plus 8 guns of the 10th. A.M.G. Coy. was disposed with 24 guns in depth, 12 of which could bring direct fire to bear in front of the GREEN (front) Line. (See Map "E").
4. 11th. Inf. Brigade took up and consolidated defensive position on GREEN Line with 41st. Battalion in Line Right, 42nd. Battalion in Line Left and swinging back westerly along S. bank of SOMME to cover our N. flank. 44th. Battalion were in support and 43rd. Battalion in Reserve. See Map "E".
Meanwhile, the Assaulting Brigades (4th. and 12th.) of the Fourth Australian Division moved forward into ACCROCHE VALLEY and from there followed the attacking troops of the Third Australian Division, ready to move through the GREEN Line at ZERO plus four hours.
5. At 8.10 a.m. the 10th. Inf. Brigade reported re-organisation complete and the units ready to move.
6. At 8.20 a.m. command of the battle front passed to the Fourth Australian Division.
7. At 8.22 a.m. the 10th. Inf. Brigade was ordered to take over the old enemy trench system running from P.22.d. to junction with our old front line in P.16.b. (the portion of the AMIENS Line which had been held by the enemy) as a reserve system and to improve HUNS WALK as a communication trench.
8. As the advance of the Fourth Australian Division had progressed very satisfactorily, at 11.50 a.m. the three infantry brigades were instructed to re-organise and rest in area between GREEN Line and our old front line; brigades to remain tactically disposed with local precautions against surprise, and to be prepared to move at one hour's notice after 3.0 a.m. on 9th. August.
9. At 3.0 p.m. orders were received from Corps by telephone and repeated to the 10th. Inf. Brigade immediately for them to move to Q.20.c. to come under orders of the Fourth Australian Division. The Brigade was not to be used, except as a last resort, as it was expected that the Brigade might have to form a defensive flank on the North, owing to CHIPILLY Ridge not having been taken by the 58th. Division. These orders were confirmed by wire from Corps at 3.43 p.m. At 4.17 p.m. a wire was received to say that 10th. Inf. Brigade were moving and that report centre would be ALWAYS CROSS until headquarters moved to old German gunpits at Q.14.c.80.80.
The move was carried out over open country in artillery formation, three battalions and Machine Gun Coy. moving around the South of ACCROCHE WOOD and one Battalion and the Trench Mortar Battery

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around the North edge of the Wood. The Battalions moving South of the Wood came under harassing artillery fire and suffered slight casualties, otherwise the move was completed without mishap.

Throughout the remainder of the day, troops remained disposed as shown on Map "F", re-equipping and resting and 10th. Inf. Brigade was not called on for any service by Fourth Australian Division.

9-8-18.

10. Divisional Headquarters moved forward on 9th. August and opened at Quarry (P.7.a.0.3) at 5.0 p.m. - Units rested throughout the day.

11. During the afternoon, the III Corps, plus American troops, attacked again North of the SOMME and captured the CHIPILLY Spur, thus freeing the North flank of the Fourth Australian Division and enabling their left flank to push forward.

10-8-18.

VI. OPERATIONS DURING THE NIGHT 10th/11th. August, 1918.

1. A conference was held at Fourth Australian Divisional Headquarters, CORBIE, at 11.0 a.m. to enable the Corps Commander to explain his policy and give verbal instructions as to the action expected.

2. Instructions were issued for the Third Australian Division and the Fourth Australian Division to carry out an encircling operation on night 10th/11th. August; so as to cut off the REINEHEM Spur North of the SOMME and the Ridge East of PROYART South of the SOMME.

The 13th. Inf. Brigade was to carry out the Northern operation and the 10th Inf. Brigade the Southern.

3. The 10th. Inf. Brigade (plus 2 sections 10th. A.M.G. Coy. 2 sections 10th Field Coy. A.E. 6 Light Horsemen and 6 Tanks) was instructed to move East along the general line of the main VILLERS BRETONNEUX Road to AVENUE CROSS (i.e. cross-roads at R.23.c.5.3), thence turning North to occupy a general line from AVENUE CROSS to cross-roads at R.9.a.9.2. and to link up with the 13th. Inf. Brigade at L.33.c.1.9. The line taken up was to be organised defensively facing both East and West.

4. The Second Australian Division was to conform on the Right and link up at AVENUE CROSS.

5a. To enable same to be carried out, the Division was ordered to relieve the Fourth Australian Division as early as possible on night 10th. August on front from VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road to the SOMME. I therefore ordered the 9th. Inf. Brigade to relieve the 12th. Inf. Brigade on the right and 11th. Inf. Brigade to relieve the 4th. Inf. Brigade on the left.

6. It was intended that, if the operations of the 10th. Inf. Brigade was successful, the 9th. Inf. Brigade should mop up the country forward to the 10th. Inf. Brigade line, and would take over from the battalion holding the southern portion of the line. This would have released two battalions of 10th. Inf. Brigade (including the battalion held in Reserve at LA FLAQUE) which would then have moved North to mop up, one battalion working North through R.13. and R.7. and the other working North through 14. and 8, leaving the 11th. Inf. Brigade to mop up any enemy West of the grid line running North and South between Q.12. and R.7.

7. On completion of the operation, dispositions would then have been 9th. Inf. Brigade in line right - 10th. Inf. Brigade in line left and 11th. Inf. Brigade in Reserve.

P.W.O.

8. Reliefs of Brigades of Fourth Australian Division by the 9th. and 11th. Inf. Brigades were completed without any hitch, though enemy shelling was incessant throughout. The 9th. Inf. Brigade completed at 1.20 a.m. but message from 11th. Inf. Brigade reporting completion was not received until 5.45 a.m. owing to communications breaking down.

9. The operation by the 10th. Inf. Brigade, however, owing to enemy bombing, artillery and machine gun fire could not be completed. At 7.46 p.m. a message was received from 10th. Inf. Brigade saying "established new location (i.e. Q.30.c.5.4, near hospital) and retard Zero half hour." The G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Brigade took this action as, owing to the light and lack of cover and the large number of enemy balloons, he considered that movement would be seen and the success of the operation imperilled. Zero hour, however, had been fixed to coincide with the operation of the 13th. Inf. Brigade and, therefore, a wire was sent to 10th. Inf. Brigade to cancel alteration, but it arrived too late for this to be done.

The head of the column passed 10th. Inf. Brigade Headquarters (Q.30.c.5.4) at 9.15 p.m. and everything was reported as going well until 9.50 p.m. when enemy aircraft dropped bombs along the main road, causing many casualties, and wounding and killing teams of wagons taking up Stokes ammunition. This caused a certain amount of disorganisation; but, notwithstanding fairly heavy shelling near dump in R.25. and along the road, the leading troops in artillery formation passed cross-roads LA FLAQUE (as arranged by 10th. Inf. Bde) at 10.0 p.m. (the original Zero hour having been 9.30 p.m.).

The original plan had intended the tanks to move, one on the road and one on either side, but it was found impracticable to move off the road, owing to the darkness and the many small enemy dumps.

10. When the leading battalion (37th) and the Tanks were about 300 yards beyond this point, the enemy put up a number of VERY Lights and very heavy machine gun fire was encountered from both sides of the road, and a heavy hostile barrage came down in the vicinity of LA FLAQUE. Many casualties were suffered by the Infantry.

The concentration of machine gun fire on the tanks is reported to have been such that they appeared to be lit up with the splash of the bullets. A large number of the personnel in the tanks became casualties; in the last tank to return to our lines only the driver was unwounded. An enemy anti-tank was also firing and causing casualties.

11. The troops continued to push forward in extended order, but, owing to the necessity of taking advantage of all available cover, this was done at a slower rate. The flank guards were slightly better off for cover, but the main body could only move by means of the drains along the road-side and by crawling. The Tank Officer and the Infantry Officer, who were acting as guides to the tanks, both became casualties and the tanks stopped, after the leading troops had worked forward to within a short distance of AVENUE CROSS. It subsequently transpired that the leading tank swung in order to get its side guns to bear on the machine gun nests, and this caused the two in rear to stop and blocked the road.

12. Lieut.-Colonel M.K. KNIGHT, commanding the 37th. Battalion, instructed the Tank Section Commander to keep the tanks going at all costs; so that he might push on. The Section Commander, on going forward to do so, found that they had already turned around and the advance of the Infantry was blocked, particularly as the tanks themselves were firing at enemy machine gun positions on both sides of the road. The tanks then commenced to come back and the crews stated they had received orders to do so, but were unable to say who gave them.

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13. At this stage Lieut.-Colonel E. K. KNIGHT was killed by a shell from an anti-tank gun. The machine gun fire increased when the tanks again commenced to move and continued to cause casualties, compelling the infantry to keep down.

14. Considering surprise in the initial stages essential to the success of the operation and being out of communication with Divisional Headquarters, General MCNICOLL decided that the operation, as planned, could not be carried out. He thereupon ordered the 38th. and 40th. Battalions to form a line facing North-East running from the road about R.27.d.0.4 to R.26.a.1.5 (approx) and the 37th and 39th. Battalions to withdraw to the old trench system near R.30.d.

15. A report was received at Divisional Headquarters at 11.20 p.m. stating that the enemy commenced a heavy barrage on main VILLERS - BRETONNEUX Road near LA FLAQUE at 10.0 p.m. and it was still continuing at 10.35 p.m. and one at 11.35 p.m. reporting that enemy aeroplanes dropped 50 bombs at 9.50 p.m. near Brigade H.Q. causing casualties to men and horses, and that tail of column passed LA FLAQUE at 11.10 p.m."

The cable wagon had difficulty in getting the line through to 10th. Inf. Brigade H.Q. which was not yet connected by telephone, but only by wireless and D.R.

16. At 12.10 a.m. a message sent by wireless was received from the Brigade saying that Lieut.-Colonel KNIGHT was dangerously wounded and asking for Major STORY (who was liaison officer with Second Australian Division) to be sent forward to take command. This was arranged.

17. At 12.30 a.m. the telephone line was through and the first information received from Brigade Headquarters as to the actual situation. I spoke to G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Brigade and ascertained that the head of the column was held up, the tanks returning and that the 37th. Battalion had suffered severely. The line was cut by enemy bombs or artillery before full details could be obtained.

18. As all efforts to get in touch again by telephone failed, an order was sent by D.R. at 1.40 a.m. to 10th. Inf. Brigade in the following terms - "Consequent on telephone report to G.O.C. at 12.30 a.m. In the event of being unable to carry out the operation as previously ordered, co-operate with 9th. Inf. Brigade in taking up a position from cross-roads at R.27.d.4.5. round to Eastern side of PROYART Village to vicinity of R.13. central and Report as early as possible as to action taken and a full report on sequence of events since 9.30 p.m. last night particularly concerning the action of tanks and protective arrangements will be forwarded to Divisional Headquarters by returning D.R. and Telephone communication has been broken since 12.30 a.m." This was addressed to 10th. Inf. Brigade and repeated to 9th. Inf. Brigade and Second and Fourth Australian Divisions.

19. At 3.15 a.m. the line was again through to the Brigade, and G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Brigade reported that the order mentioned in para.20 had not yet reached him, that he was withdrawing the 37th and 39th Battalions to the old AMIENS Line, and had ordered the 38th. and 40th. Battalions to take up a line from about R.27.d.2.4. to join the present front line somewhere near R.26.b. on about a 1,000 yards front. Instructions were given for the 10th. Inf. Brigade to join with the 9th. Inf. Brigade on road running diagonally from R.27.d. and in co-operation with 9th. Inf. Brigade to send out patrols towards PREYART and if unoccupied work out in front of it.

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20. At 4.8 a.m. 10th. Inf. Brigade reported that the 37th. and 39th. Battalions had been withdrawn to the AMIENS Line in R.19 and 25, and that heavy gas shelling commenced in R.25. at 3.15 a.m. and was still continuing at 3.50 a.m. also that the 39th. and 40th. Battalions had been instructed as to the line they were to hold and the 5th. Inf. Brigade asked to prolong it southwards from R.27.d.2.4. Tanks were ordered to withdraw at 3.30 a.m.

21. At 4.52 a.m. the following message was sent to Corps and flanks :-

"Re Operation 10th. Inf. Brigade. Owing to visibility and the large number of enemy low-flying aeroplanes the zero hour was altered to 10.0 p.m. by G.O.C. 10th. Inf. Bde. At 9.50 p.m. numerous enemy planes heavily bombed many places in the forward area including the main road between WARFUSEE and LA FLAQUE causing many casualties to personnel horses and transport. At 10.0 p.m. advance started but at 10.15 p.m. enemy put down heavy artillery barrage along front line across WARFUSEE LA FLAQUE Road which continued until after 10.30 p.m. but in R.27.d. the tanks came under such heavy machine gun fire that many casualties were caused, the Section Commander wounded and the advance of the tanks stopped. Lieut.-Colonel KNIGHT, 37th. Battalion, endeavoured to get the tanks and column forward but was killed by machine gun fire. Fire was received from trenches on North and South sides of the road, and was exceptionally heavy. The subsequent sound of movement caused by the tanks caused enemy to fire lights which brought down heavy artillery barrage. The operation was therefore unable to be carried out. A line is being constructed from the main road at R.27.d.2.4. across the N.E. side of LA FLAQUE to our original front line in R.26.b. to link with Second Australian Division on our right flank and 9th. Inf. Brigade on left flank. Communication to all forward brigades interrupted by bombing from 12.30 a.m. to 3.0 a.m. "

22. At 4.0 a.m. the Second Australian Division on our right continued the advance in conformity with the line further south, following an artillery barrage, and their left flank reached a point South of the road in vicinity of AVENUE CROSS with a company disposed along the road to connect up with right of 10th. Inf. Brigade.

23. The 10th. Inf. Brigade at once ordered the 38th. Battalion to take over from this Coy. and protect the flank of the Second Australian Division and arranged for covering artillery fire to keep down enemy machine gun fire whilst this was being done. With this artillery assistance, the 38th. Battalion patrols rushed several enemy posts and captured 3 officers and 28 O.Rs. with four machine guns, which were manned and used against the enemy.

24. Thus, during the day 11th. August, the Division was disposed with the three brigades in line - 10th., 9th. and 11th. Inf. Brigades from South to North. (See Map "G").

25. In the meantime, the 13th. Inf. Brigade had been able to carry out the major portion of their operation with very little opposition, and had dug in on the forward slope of the ETINEHEM Spur.

VII. OPERATIONS DURING NIGHT 11/12-8-18.

1. It was apparent that, in order to protect the right flank of the Fourth Australian Division, the enemy on the MERICOURT Spur must be cleared, and I therefore ordered that the 11th. Inf. Brigade should, on the night 11th/12th. August, with artillery assistance, capture this ridge.

2. The plan was that the artillery should concentrate on PROYART prior to ZERO, to take the attention of the enemy off the real operation, and then, at ZERO, should suddenly switch off and form two flank barrages across the neck of the MERICOURT Peninsula in Squares R.1. and 7, and for the Infantry to advance, between them, under a

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creeping barrage to the SOMME at R.1.b. and R.2.a. and thus cut off all the enemy within the band of the river.

3. Zero Hour was fixed for 8.15 p.m. but by arrangement between the artillery and infantry and after reference to Divisional Headquarters this was altered to 8.30 p.m.

4. The Operation was covered also by 16 guns of the 11th. M.G. Coy. and 8 guns of the 23rd. M. G. Coy., the latter being specially sent up.

5. The attack was well carried out by 41st. Battalion and was entirely successful, although the whole of the objective was only captured after a very hard fight in which many enemy were killed.

6. After the capture of the objective a party of about 2 officers and 80 O.Rs. surrendered from CATEAUX WOOD, in which there was some fighting, the total number of prisoners captured in the Operation being approx. 2 officers and 200 O.Rs.

7. On the same night (11th/12th August) the 10th. Inf. Brigade relieved the 9th. Inf. Brigade and the inter-brigade boundary was altered to extend the 11th. Inf. Brigade front further Southwards. On the morning of the 12th. August, the 10th. Inf. Brigade was in line Right with 38th. Battalion Right, 40th. Battalion Centre, and 37th. Battalion Left - the 39th. Battalion being in Support; and the 11th. Inf. Brigade was in line Left with 42nd. Battalion Right, 41st. Battalion Left, 44th. Battalion Support Right, and 43rd. Battalion Support Left. (See Map "R").

VIII. OPERATIONS DURING DAY. 12th. August. 1918.

1. Commencing at daylight on 12th. August, the 43rd. Battalion mopped up the area bounded by the SOMME on the West and North, the line occupied by the 41st. Battalion on the east and our old front line on the South. In cleaning up this area about 40 more prisoners were captured.

2. In the early hours of the morning and continued throughout the day, patrols from the 10th. Inf. Brigade and the right of the 11th. Inf. Brigade pushed out to and beyond PROYART.

During the day, arrangements were made for the relief of the Division by the 17th. Division, which was carried out during the night without hitch, command passing to G.O.C. 17th. Division at 4.30 a.m. on 13th. August. The Brigades withdrew as follows :-

9th. Inf. Bde.	ACCROCHE VALLEY.
10th. -do-	MORCOURT MERICOURT VALLEY.
11th. -do-	HAMELET.

The Divisional Artillery withdrew to HAMELET on relief but, on morning of the 13th. August, orders were received for them to move to the vicinity of ROSIERES forthwith to assist an intended operation of the Fifth Australian Division.

McEllibrand

Major-General.
Commanding Third Australian Division.

4th. September, 1918.

SECTION "2."

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Commander. Major-General J. GELLIBRAND. C.B., D.S.O.

G. S. BRANCH.

G. S. O. I. Lieut.-Colonel C. H. JESS. D.S.O.
G. S. O. II. Major E. W. CONNELLY. D.S.O.
G. S. O. III. Captain S. H. JACKSON. M.C.

A. & Q. BRANCH.

A.A. & Q.M.G. Lieut.-Colonel R. E. JACKSON. D.S.O.
D. A. A. G. Captain (T/Major) C. A. PYKE. M.C.
D. A. Q. M. G. Major *Capt. W. S. KING. D.S.O. M.B.E.*

Administrative Service & Departments.

A/ A. D. M. S. Lieut.-Colonel R. W. CHAMBERS.

Special Appointment.

A. P. M. Captain J. W. COLPITTS.

H.Q. Divisional Artillery.

Commander. Brig.-General H. W. GRIMWADE. C.B., C.M.G.

H.Q. Divisional Engineers.

Commander. Lieut.-Colonel H. BASHTOLD. D.S.O. M.C.

Australian Light Horse.

1 Troop. (Lieut. WILSON).

Artillery.

A. SUB-GROUP.

Cmdr. Lt-Col. L.T. RAIKES.

D.S.O. Lt-Col. G. H. M. KING.
C.M.G. D.S.O.

23rd Army Bde R.F.A.
189th -do- R.F.A.
12th -do- A.F.A.

B. SUB-GROUP.

78th A.F.A. Bde.
8th -do-
3rd. Army Bde.

C. SUB-GROUP.

Lt-Col. T. M. MARCHDALE.
D.S.O.

16th Bde R.H.A.
10th A.F.A. Bde.
11th. A.F.A. Bde.

Engineers.

11th. Field Coy. A.E. "A" & "B" Coys. 2nd Div. Pion. Bn.

3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.

Infantry.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Lieut-Col J.E.C. LORO D.S.O.
Brig-Gen. H.A. GODDARD.
D.S.O.

33rd. Bn.
34th. Bn.
35th. Bn.

9th A.L.T.M.Bty.

10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Brig-Gen. W.R. MONICOLL.
C.M.G. D.S.O.

37th. Bn.
38th. Bn.
39th. Bn.
40th. Bn.

10th. A.L.T.M.Bty.

11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Brig-Gen. J.H. CANNAN.
C.B. C.M.G.

41st Bn.
42nd. Bn.
43rd. Bn.
44th. Bn.

11th A.L.T.M.Bty.

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MACHINE GUNS.

3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion.

TANKS.

13th. Bn. Tanks. (Mark V).

A. A. S. C.

22nd. 23rd. 24th. 25th. Coys. A. A. S. C.

A. A. M. C.

9th. Field Amb. 10th. Fld. Amb. 11th. Fld. Ambulance.

1 Troop. (Lieut. Wilson).

ARTILLERY.

A. SUB-GROUP.

B. SUB-GROUP.

C. SUB-GROUP.

Lt-Col. T.M. WILSON.
D.S.O.Lt-Col. R. W. KING.
D.S.O. D.S.O.Capt. L.T. BAKER.
D.S.O.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.

ENGINEERS.

11th. Field Coy. A.S. "A" & "B" Coys. 2nd Div. Pion. En.

3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.

INFANTRY.

11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Brig-Gen. J.H. GIBBON.
D.S.O. D.S.O.Brig-Gen. W.R. MCKINNON.
D.S.O. D.S.O.Brig-Gen. H.A. GORDON.
D.S.O.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.
1st Bn. R.H.A.

11th. A.L.T.M. Bty.

10th. A.L.T.M. Bty.

9th. A.L.T.M. Bty.

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III. LESSONS and COMMENTS.

APPENDIX

1. SECRECY OF PREPARATION.

The concealment of all preparation from the enemy, particularly the assembly of additional troops and guns, was the greatest difficulty to be overcome. The majority of the ground in the forward sector of the Divisional area was flat and low-lying, the enemy having direct observation on to the whole of the forward Divisional area in the vicinity of HAMEL, HAMELET, VAIRE and also in rear of our positions behind ARQUAIRE WOOD.

The roads running forward through the area were few, and their condition such that even the slowest moving traffic caused endless dust.

On the day of the 5th. August, the augmented transport of the two Divisions on the roads was so great that it is hard to now understand why the enemy did not notice it. Strict orders were issued and carried out; so that on succeeding days only normal traffic appeared on the roads. This was only made possible by issuing passes and working the road on the "Block" System, any unauthorised traffic being side-tracked and made to remain till dusk.

The allotment of at least one metalled road to each Division in such cases seems essential.

In order to accommodate the assault troops of the Fourth Australian Division and obviate the necessity of a long approach march on the battle day, the assaulting troops of the Third Australian Division were withdrawn to CORBIE, and the 4th. and 12th. Inf. Bdos. of the Fourth Australian Division were stationed in the Reserve System of trenches (most of which were under direct view of the enemy). That this congestion of troops for three days was not noticed by the enemy speaks well for the discipline and "Secrecy" arrangements of the Brigades concerned.

2. ARTILLERY.

The country in the Northern portion of the Divisional area was not favourable for the secret emplacement of the extra artillery employed, as, besides being under enemy observation, it was almost devoid of natural features to aid concealment.

The forming up place of the Infantry was on the crest of a "Hog-backed" ridge, and the difficulty of placing the guns in such a position that they could clear the crest and place a barrage on the valley in the front of the infantry, whilst still retaining the ability to employ fire on extreme range, was a difficult problem. Advantage was taken of Sunken Roads, growing crops and portions of the trench system to conceal the forward guns and ammunition dumps during the three days prior to the attack. No digging, except to lower the wheels and trail, was all owed; nor was anyone allowed to approach these gun positions during daylight.

The movement of guns to their battle positions took place in three stages, viz:- on the nights 5th/6th and 6th/7th and on the night 7th/8th when the remaining guns (which had been carrying on the normal harassing fire during the day and evening of the 7th) moved into their selected positions.

3. TRENCH MORTARS.Medium Trench Mortars.

The proximity of ACCROCHE WOOD to the front line system on the Right Flank prevented any preliminary bombardment to knock out the many machine guns and trench mortars which were known to be in position there. Therefore the 6" Trench Mortars of the Division were emplaced near ARQUAIRE WOOD to strengthen the barrage on this area, and there is no doubt that these considerably assisted in destroying the defences and demoralising the garrison. After ZERO these T.Ms. were not moved forward but the Crews were formed into Guns Crews which moved forward behind the Infantry and turned the captured enemy guns, firing many rounds in front of our advancing line.

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APPENDIX
Light Trench Mortars.

The Light Trench Mortars of the Right (9th) Inf. Brigade and 10th (Reserve) Inf. Brigade were also employed in the preliminary bombardment on ACCROCHE WOOD. Those of the 9th. Inf. Brigade were afterwards picked up and carried forward by the store tank. Similar transport arrangements had also been made for the L.T.Ms. of the Left (11th) Inf. Brigade but, unfortunately, the Store Tank detailed broke down on the night of the 6th. August. The Trench Mortars had, therefore, to be taken forward later in the day by Infantry transport.

The L.T.Ms. throughout the succeeding day proved extremely useful in the cleaning up of the numerous machine gun nests and strong points.

The question of providing transport for L.T.Ms. during operations is very important as they are of the greatest use to the Infantry but, with the present normal loads of infantry transport and the unavoidable casualties to transport animals, it is always extremely doubtful if the Mortars could be brought up and a supply of ammunition maintained.

4. MACHINE GUNS.

The Machine Gun Battalion organisation undoubtedly proved its value during the operation.

The co-ordination of barrage arrangements with the artillery, the detailing of Coys. or detachments for subsequent work with Infantry Brigades, the ability to employ Reserve Coys., when most required, as rapidly as possible (i.e. in cases of reported enemy assembly or threatened counter-attack) was only practicable because of these units being controlled by one individual officer in close touch with the changes of the whole situation and able to control the whole of the machine gun arrangements both offensive and defensive. The attachment of one coy. of Machine guns to Brigades,, irrespective of the nature of the operation is not considered sound.

5. ENGINEERS & PIONEERS.

Prior to the Operation, Engineers and Pioneers were employed :-

(a) On improving accommodation in the line for Brigade and Battalion Headquarters, and constructing Aid Posts, Dressing Stations, etc.

(b). Constructing and marking of overland tracks for the Approach March of Infantry and guns, and the later movement of Reserves and pack animals.

All wiring and improvement of trenches was stopped from about the 3rd instant, and all available personnel employed on such works as would facilitate the attack.

The broken bridge at BOUZENCOURT was placed in such a condition that on "Y" night a bridge to carry Infantry in file was easily constructed.

During the Operation.

The provision of pontoon equipment near BOUZENCOURT, to be brought up along the SOMME as the Advance progressed, was not made use of on the first day owing to the advance of the III Corps being held up at MALARD WOOD, but later on they were of great value in providing lateral communication in vicinity of SAILLY LAURETTE.

Following the Advance of the Infantry, Engineers were employed on -

Construction of Headquarters accommodation.

Erection, on selected sites, of notice boards with the locality name, which had been previously selected. (All Units report on the great value of these).

Arrows marking routes to Headquarters, Batteries, and overland tracks, were also erected.

The searching of dugouts for mines, and arrangements for Water Supply was also entrusted to parties of Engineers and Pioneers, and well carried out.

Pooling of Engineers & Pioneers.

The Corps Pool of Engineers and Pioneers left the Division with the equivalent of 3 Engineer or Pioneer Companies belonging to different Units - 2 from another Division. If considered necessary to pool Engineers and Pioneers for future operations, it is recommended that instead of taking away such a complete organisation as a Pioneer Battalion from a Division, and replacing it by a portion of similar personnel from other Divisions, that each Division be called upon to supply a quota of such technical personnel, leaving the normal Headquarters and the bulk of the personnel with their own Divisions.

As the Units composing the Corps pool were allotted special tasks under their own Commanders some days prior to the operation, the necessity of taking complete Units from Division is not apparent.

6. ISSUE OF ORDERS.

Except for the issue of a preliminary order, and instructions, the majority of Divisional instructions were conveyed personally to Commanders by means of Conferences, and visits of the Staff. The result obtained is considered due in many ways to these Conferences, where points were discussed and decided, difficulties or uncertainties brought to notice, and the whole Plan of Operations made known to all Officers present..

7. WEATHER CONDITIONS.

The weather conditions during the preparations were generally favourable, being dull with occasional heavy showers, without which movement on roads must have been noticed by the enemy. The state of the ground, however, was so sodden that without the 24 hours dry period prior to the attack, the progress of Infantry and Tanks at the rate required would have been doubtful. On the day of the Attack weather conditions were in every way suitable.

8. PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE.

The previous reconnaissance of forward areas by the additional Artillery and Infantry was carefully organised, only parties of 3 or under being allowed, and all parties being ordered to report at Forward Brigade Headquarters. This enabled supervision to be exercised and visits to special O.P.s. regulated to prevent crowding.

9. APPROACH MARCH.

The night of the 7th/8th August was exceptionally favourable for the Approach March, being dark, but clear, enabling our aeroplanes to fly over the enemy lines to hide the noise of the Tanks. Despite the large number of Infantry, guns and tanks moving forward in the Area, no hitch or delay was occasioned during the Approach March.

The importance of clearly marking approach tracks was evident. All tracks were marked with Posts about 4 ft. high with a square white board, several days previously. Early on "Y" night more posts were inserted at an average distance of about 200 yards apart. At any places where doubt was likely to arise, tapes were laid between the Posts. The marking of these tracks was continued into the captured territory on "A" day, after the Infantry advance, and has been of great value for fresh troops, reserves, runners, ration and transport parties.

Short lengths of tape perpendicular to the jumping off tape were also found extremely useful, both for assisting the Assembly and for giving direction when jumping off.

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10. HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO ZERO.

Brigade and Battalion Headquarters were established prior to ZERO in the front system of trenches, thus facilitating personal observation of the assembly; considerably shortening the journey of Runners both during the assembly and after the advance. Localities for future Headquarters in the captured area were also selected beforehand and made known to all Units. This proved exceptionally useful in many ways and prevented the chain of communication being broken during moves of Headquarters.

11. TRAFFIC & MARCH DISCIPLINE.

Enough advantage was not taken of the dry weather tracks, perhaps because of notices not being placed in places sufficiently conspicuous and certainly, in many cases, because of Drivers not pulling off the main road where the deviation was seen to be for a short distance only.

Many instances were seen where Officers in charge of Batteries and transport who, while commencing a march with good march discipline in their own Unit, did not worry as to the consequences of joining a main stream of traffic with its many checks and the consequent blocking up of vehicles.

The failure to comply with traffic regulations undoubtedly rests on the prevalent habit of Officers and N.C.Os. in charge riding throughout the march at the head of the column.

Driving on the crown of the road, instead of well to the side, was noticed particularly with A.A.M.C. and Engineer Units.

Most of blocks of traffic occur in the one main street so common in French Villages. Avoiding tracks should always be provided round the Village, particularly in the Forward Area, where the road through the Village is always a target for the enemy's harassing fire.

12. COMMAND.

The change of Command of the GREEN LINE at ZERO plus four became only a nominal one, as the 4th Aust. Divisional Staff were most concerned with the getting away and consequent action of their own attacking troops, had no direct communication with the 3rd Aust. Divisional troops on the GREEN LINE, and could not exercise any command or control over them during the transitive period. It was not clear after ZERO plus four, as to who commanded the area in rear of the GREEN LINE, particularly as regards administration, traffic, responsibility for clearing the battle field, provision of dumps, etc., though not a single hitch occurred in the continuity of policy.

It is recommended that in future Operations of this type, Command of the first objective does not pass, but that the "leapfrogging" Division have precedence in all matters, such as routes, right of way and dumps, leaving the G.O.C. of the Division which has gained the first objective in charge of the rear Area. This permits of first objective troops either consolidating their Division's gains, or re-organising to "leapfrog" through the forward Division if necessary at any early future time, while the G.O.C. of the exploiting Division is only concerned with his own troops, the task in hand and the area forward of his jumping off line, without having to worry about any organisation in rear.

13. BATTALIONS SECONDS-IN-COMMAND.

It is extremely doubtful whether, in Operations where the enemy's defences are penetrated to such a depth, the withdrawal of the Battalion Second-in-Command is desirable, with the consequent exploiting of success, the strain on Commanding Officers and Company Commanders is continuous. In mobile warfare, as opposed to the attack in trench warfare, the Second-in-Command of an Infantry Battalion is necessary with the Unit to perform his normal duties throughout the Operation. Every yard of progress forward means a new local situation and increase of the distance from the Nucleus Camp. Consequently in case of casualties to Officers Commanding Battalions, or Companies, considerable delay is unavoidable in replacing them by the next Senior Officer, and in the meantime a Junior Officer is placed in a position of responsibility for which he has never been trained or tested.

14. DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

The normal location of Divisional Headquarters for offensive Warfare is too far back for the most effective carrying out of an attack of this nature, as in the event of any interruption of Communications, the Divisional Headquarters Staff is quite in the dark for a considerable length of time, generally until a reconnaissance or visit to the Unit has been made by a Staff Officer, which takes a considerable period of time.

Further, the advance of the Troops lengthens the distance by adding on an Area of more or less doubtful communication. Change of location of Headquarters during an Operation is also undesirable. Divisional Headquarters, therefore, must either remain well in rear till the conclusion of the Operation, or move forward during the time that consolidation is going on.

The alteration of telephone communication and connections takes a considerable time, and it is considered that this can best be done before the operation, enabling at least the fighting portion of Divisional Headquarters Staff to be established at a forward Battle Headquarters prior to ZERO.

15. BRIGADE & BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

Similarly, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters must be situated well forward prior to ZERO hour.

Though Battalion Headquarters must remain more or less stationary, the Battalion Commander must not be tied to this locality as in trench to trench attacks.

Horses of Mounted Officers must be maintained well forward, and used as the opposition weakens, and the conditions approach those of Open Warfare.

The personal reconnaissance of Mounted Officers, and the ability of a Commanding Officer to rapidly move from place to place, to personally supervise the fighting, is a tactical necessity.

16. TRANSPORT.

The Country being open, with very little wire, transport was able to work well up behind the Infantry. Packs were arranged and used, but wheeled transport was generally used after the first hour.

17. ENEMY ARMS.

The use by our Troops of enemy rifles and machine guns saved much of our ammunition, and obviated the necessity of much carrying, the machine guns considerably augmenting the fire power of consolidating Units.

The use of captured field guns against the enemy, if it did nothing else, had a great moral effect on the spirits of our Troops.

18. FOUR-LETTER CODES.

The change of normal Code Names and Code Calls prior to an Operation is not considered sound, as new names are unfamiliar to all Units and, in the event of a message from a neighbouring Unit being received by an Officer in the Forward Area who has not a list of such Code Names in his possession, the message is comparatively worthless.

The possibility of enemy Listening Sets detecting the change of Calls prior to ZERO, and thereby suspecting either relief or possible attack, and opening artillery counter-preparation (at a time when such action would seriously hamper the Approach March and Assembly) is considered far greater than the possibility of a dazed enemy again setting up Listening Apparatus during the progress of such an attack.

W. E. H. Brand

Major-General.
Commanding Third Aust. Divn.

4th September, 1918.

Narrative of Operations of Third Australian Division,
North of the SOMME, from August 13th 1918
to 2nd September 1918.

1. The operations of the Third Australian Division north of the SOMME can be roughly divided into the following six phases :-

- (i) Attack on the flank of III Corps on 22-8-1918.
- (ii) Minor operation against BRAY and capture of LA NEUVILLE Peninsula on 25-8-1918.
- (iii) Night attack against CEYLON WOOD Ridge on 26-8-1918.
- (iv) Clearing of VAUX WOOD Peninsula.
- (v) Advance to CLERY.
- (vi) BOUCHAVESNES Road (MONT St QUENTIN).

2. The country over which the Division operated was free of highly organised trench systems, although the greater part of the fighting was over the old Battlefields of 1916. The ground was, therefore, for the most part, covered with derelict trenches, old wire and shell-holes, and denuded of prominent landmarks. The SOMME River formed a series of hairpin bends which necessitated frequent changes of direction and alteration of flanks. The direction of valleys and spurs was at right angles to the general line of advance.

3. After the operations of 8th-12th August, the Division was withdrawn and distributed south of the SOMME as Corps Reserve in the vicinity of GAILLY, HAMEL and HAMELET. The length of period as reserve was very uncertain, but as far as possible every opportunity was taken of resting the men, as the recent operations, combined with a long period of defensive work, had been a severe test on all ranks; although reorganization, re-equipment and training in lessons from the recent fighting had to be carried out during the short time available.

4. On the 17th August the 34th Battalion relieved the 49th Battalion in the line west of BRAY. This relief was to have been for 48 hours only, but consequent on the withdrawal of the 131st American Regiment and the change of Corps Policy, the Third Division was ordered, on the 18th August, to take over the area and sector north of the SOMME occupied by the Liaison Force.

5. On the 19th August instructions were received from Corps that the Third Division was to take over the duties of the Liaison Force, and operate tactically with the III Corps, maintaining touch and protecting or prolonging the right flank of this Corps as required throughout subsequent operations.

6. By 1000 (20-8-18) relief of the Liaison Force was complete; Divisional Headquarters was established at J.19.c.5.3 and Divisional Command Post at J.22.c.9.1 (Valley north of SAILLY-le-Sec).

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7. It was at first intended to relieve the Liaison Force with portions of both the 9th and 11th Brigades, but in view of the possibility of the early continuation of the operations, it was decided that the 9th Brigade should take over the whole of the forward area, thus leaving the two remaining brigades fresh for offensive action.

Phase (1) - Attack on flank of III Corps - 22/8/1918.
(Map "A")

8. On 20th August Corps Battle Instruction Series "C" No.1 was received, arranging for an attack in conjunction with the 47th British Division (III Corps) on the 22nd August. Third Australian Divisional Order No.107 was issued giving details of the co-operation of the Division in the forthcoming operation. In addition, Battle Instructions Series "C" Nos. 1 and 2 were issued, containing details of the proposed intentions with regard to the exploitation of any success gained. For this purpose a Light Horse Troop had already been attached to the Division and concentrated in the valley north of SAILLY-Laurette.

9. In order to free as many troops as possible of the 9th Brigade, the Pioneer Battalion was made responsible for holding the ETINEHEM Peninsula as far north as the main BRAY-CORBIE Road. To simplify the Artillery barrage plan, the infantry tape line was drawn back to the ETINEHEM-MEAULTE Road.

10. The approach march and assembly of units of the 9th Brigade was carried out successfully despite heavy shelling of the whole forward area by the enemy. During the night, the 43rd and 44th Battalions moved into close support in the vicinity of GRESSAIRE Wood.

11. Owing to the limited artillery available to support the attack, it was not considered advisable to extend the barrage further south than the main BRAY-CORBIE Road; special arrangements were therefore made to blind this flank with a proportion of smoke.

12. The attack was to be delivered in three stages by the 9th. Brigade (Brig-General H.A. GODDARD, DSO): Firstly, the advance to the BROWN Line, followed by a halt of 66 minutes to enable the 47th Division to gain their first objective, and, Thirdly, the advance to the final objective (GREEN Line). No assistance was available from Tanks.

13. A study of the objectives of the III Corps will show that the distance to the final objective varied considerably in the three Divisions. The Third Australian Division had to advance only 2,000 yds, while the 47th and 12th British Divisions on their left had to cover approximately 4,000 yds. It was thus necessary to arrange for an intermediate objective for the III Corps, and to conform to this, a first objective was also chosen for the Third Division. A halt of 66 minutes was therefore necessary on this line to enable the British Divisions to arrive into line.

14. At Zero the Order of Battle was as follows :-

)	9th. Brigade	(
)	33rd Bn.	35th Bn.
)	1 Coy. 34th Bn.	3rd Pionr Bn
47th)	34th Bn. (less 1 Coy)	(
Division))	11th. Brigade	(
)	43rd Bn.	44th Bn
)	41st Bn.	42nd Bn.
)	10th. Brigade	(
)	38th Bn.	37th Bn.
)	Light Horse	39th Bn. 40th Bn.
)		(

2nd.
Aust.
Division

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15. The barrage opened well, and keeping close up, our infantry advanced to the BROWN Line, quickly overcoming any resistance and dealing with machine gun crews before they could come into action. It was largely due to this close following of the barrage that the greater part of the resistance of the enemy was so dealt with. A German Battalion Commander and Staff, captured early in the advance, could speak of nothing but the rapidity with which our men were on them and round their machine guns.

16. The halt on the BROWN Line enabled the enemy to partially reorganize and to shorten his artillery barrage, causing casualties among our troops. Despite this local reorganization, the enemy resistance was again quickly broken and the advance to the final objective was carried out with great dash, the whole of the GREEN Line being in our hands by 0830.

17. As the general line of advance of this Division and that of the 47th Division tended to separate, a company of the 34th Battalion followed in the rear of the right flank of the Northern Division. This company captured the Chalk Pit in L.3.d. and held it until relieved by the 22nd London Regiment later in the day. The village of BRAY, which was strong in machine guns, was not included in the attack owing to the difficulty of assembling troops and including them in the artillery barrage scheme. It was further concluded that the capture of this village would be much simplified by the result of this operation, enabling the village to be attacked from the north and west. Although not working under the barrage, the Pioneer Battalion maintained touch with the right of the 35th. Battalion and swung their line in front of the Crucifix to conform with the general advance.

18. The final objective being situated in an enclosed valley, the heat was particularly oppressive and trying to the troops, but despite this and heavy enemy shelling, consolidation was proceeded with throughout the morning.

19. About 1600 the enemy delivered a determined counter-attack on the front of the Third and 47th Divisions with the probable object of regaining the Chalk Pit and Happy Valley. On the front of this Division the line was held throughout and the attack repulsed with loss to the enemy. The troops on our left, however, were forced to withdraw to their first objective (the BROWN Line). This left the flank of the 33rd Battalion exposed to attack from the rear. The situation was saved, however, by the prompt action of the Left Company Commander, who immediately occupied the Chalk Pit and formed a defensive flank along a minor spur running into Happy Valley. Extra machine guns were moved into position on the high ground north of the BRAY-CORBIE Road and later, when the enemy using Happy Valley as a covered approach, attempted to penetrate behind our left flank, these guns were able to assist in checking this new thrust.

20. As soon as the situation became known, the 43rd and 44th. Battalions were moved up to the vicinity of the old front line: the 42nd Battalion, then north of GRESSAIRE Wood in the vicinity of K.17.c. and d., was moved to the north of the Brickyards in K.16.c., as a further precaution against our flank being turned. Later, a brigade of the 47th Division was moved into the vicinity of L.7 and 8, and the 43rd Battalion was withdrawn to its original position.

21. All further attempts to advance were effectively checked and by nightfall the line appeared secure; there was no further action on the part of the enemy beyond heavy shelling of certain localities, especially in the vicinity of the Crucifix west of Bray and all roads in the forward area.

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Phase (ii) - Minor operation against BRAY & LA NEUVILLE Peninsula - 25/8/1918 - (Map "B")

22. South of the SOMME the First Australian Division had advanced its line to CHUIGNES and CHUIGNOLLES and in order to maintain touch, arrangements were made for the capture of BRAY and the LA NEUVILLE Peninsula.

23. During the 23rd. the Pioneer Battalion had constructed light footbridges across the SOMME river about the vicinity of L.33.a. to permit of troops being moved on to the Peninsula with a view to gaining touch with the 3rd Brigade in the vicinity of the bridge at L.28.c.6.3.

24. Reconnaissance of BRAY by patrols disclosed the fact that the enemy had increased his machine gun defences to such an extent that only an organized attack could hope to carry the town. To carry out the attack, the 10th Brigade was instructed to relieve the 9th Brigade and to make arrangements to capture BRAY in conjunction with an attack by the III Corps to re-establish the GREEN Line. The 40th Battalion was detailed for the task, with the 37th Battalion to assist on the left flank - both battalions to establish posts on the far side after mopping up the town.

25. Throughout the night of the 23rd. an artillery programme of harassing fire on enemy centres of activity and defences, including BRAY and LA NEUVILLE, was carried out. The Pioneer Battalion, crossing by the bridges, was able to report by midnight that the Peninsula was clear of the enemy: the bridges connecting LA NEUVILLE with BRAY had been destroyed.

26. At 0100 on the 24th. under cover of an artillery and machine gun barrage, the 40th Battalion advanced to the attack, but owing to the defences and size of the town, the troops found great difficulty in maintaining touch and direction. The enemy put up a determined resistance from the western and north-western hedges and the attacking troops were met with heavy machine gun fire when trying to leave the gardens on the north-eastern outskirts.

27. Information as to the situation was quickly carried back and arrangements were made to extend the artillery barrage for 15 minutes, under cover of which, and with the assistance of a party of the 37th Battalion, the area in the vicinity of the railway was mopped up and the posts established as originally arranged. The capture of the railway sidings included a large dump of timber and material & three loaded trains, also a large ammunition dump partially prepared for demolition.

28. The attack of the III Corps on our left was equally successful and all the high ground north of the Chalk Pit was recaptured. No attempt to counter-attack was made by the enemy, and his general attitude made it unlikely that any large operations of this nature would be undertaken.

Phase (iii) - Night attack against CEYLON WOOD Ridge 26-8-1918 - (Map "C")

29. From various indications and air reports, it appeared that the enemy meant at any time to withdraw to the high ground west of CEYLON Wood, or to positions farther to the east. Preparations were immediately made to continue the advance and to seize the high ground overlooking SUZANNE and the SOMME, and thus prevent the enemy disengaging if such were his intention, or to take advantage of the disorganization that would be caused had the withdrawal already commenced.

30. The advance was planned to be carried out under a creeping barrage; the grid line just east of BRAY was taken as the tape line: this necessitated the withdrawal of the posts established by the 37th and 40th Battalions. Owing to the winding of the SOMME, the frontage of the final objective was much greater than that of the tape line and the 10th Brigade, which was to attack on the right, was given a narrower frontage than the 11th Brigade on the left. The attack was to be delivered in conjunction with that of the 47th Division on our left, and the artillery timetable was arranged to coincide with that of the III Corps.

31. The Order of Battle at Zero (Q230) was as follows :-

47th Division	}	43rd Bn.	44th Bn.	39th Bn.	37th Bn.
		42nd Bn.	41st Bn.		40th Bn. 36th Bn.
			34th Bn.		35th Bn. 33rd Bn.

32. At Zero the advance was commenced and very little opposition was encountered until reaching the old trench system on the crest. Here resistance was put up by elements of the enemy, but disposed of with little difficulty. Later, from prisoners' statements, it was learned that the enemy had anticipated an attack and had withdrawn the bulk of his troops and guns during the night of the 24th; the resistance encountered being from rearguards.

33. Consolidation on the GREEN Line was at once commenced, but as soon as it became sufficiently light for observation, our troops were subjected to very heavy fire from the direction of SUZANNE and MERICOURT, mostly 77 mm. and 10.5 cm. This fire was so accurate that further advance could not be made and certain troops had to be withdrawn slightly from the exposed forward slope. A feature of the enemy defence was the use of isolated field guns in the many small woods and copses. Whether this distribution was made for anti-tank defence, or whether the rapidity of our advance rendered any other disposition impossible, is not known. The result, however, was that these guns played a considerable part in the stiffening of the enemy defence.

34. The large number of small copses on our left, which were often difficult to identify, caused complications through reports being received from the left flank division that certain woods were in their possession, while the 11th Brigade reported these woods as being strongly held by the enemy, and that machine gun fire from the same woods rendered any further advance by our left flank battalion impossible. It was not till late in the afternoon that the situation was cleared and it was definitely established that the enemy was still in possession of BRONFAY Wood and BILLON Copse, and that the line of the 47th Division swung back in a north-westerly direction.

35. As reports from the First Australian Division south of the SOMME advised that their left brigade was progressing towards CAPPY, one company of the 40th Battalion took up a position from the road junction at L.11.d.5.5 to the river in L.18.a., thus covering the point of juncture at the CAPPY Causeway.

Phase (iv) - Clearing of VAUX Wood Peninsula.
(Maps "D" and "E")

36. It was apparent that the enemy had withdrawn his troops from CENDON Wood and that he probably held the line to the west of SUZANNE. As the SOMME takes a bend to the north, it was evident that this line could not be used for a prolonged defence and instructions were

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therefore issued that vigorous patrolling and continued pressure were to be maintained on the enemy.

37. Shortly after dusk on the 25th, the 44th and 43 Battalions were able to push forward to beyond COPSE "S" and RAVINE COPSE, while patrols on the whole divisional front continued to make progress. By 0600 on the morning of the 26th, the 37th Battalion had reached the western outskirts of SUZANNE and were in touch with the 44th Battalion in the vicinity of COPSE "U", while the 43rd Battalion prolonged the line to the north. BILLON Wood proved to be a serious obstacle to the advance of the 47th Division and necessitated the 43rd Battalion refusing their left flank to maintain touch.

38. It was not considered advisable to continue the advance, as owing to the bending of the SOMME at this point, any action by the enemy on our left flank would place the division in a very precarious position. The 11th Brigade was instructed to maintain its position, whilst the 10th Brigade was ordered to push out and seize SUZANNE, and by 1400, after stubborn fighting on the western outskirts, the village was captured and the enemy retired to the high ground to the east.

39. Up to this point very little progress had been made by the 47th Division, and, after consultation, it was agreed to maintain a general line from west of "M" COPSE and MURRAY Wood to the river. Throughout the night patrols worked forward towards VAUX Wood, and by 0300 on the 27th, the wood was in our possession and the 38th Battalion had mopped up the remainder of the Peninsula.

40. The general line of advance was now changed from an easterly to a north-easterly direction, and our line ran approximately along the north of VAUX Wood to COPSE "K", being prolonged by the 47th Division to the eastern outskirts of BILLON Wood.

41. In conjunction with an attack (timed for 0515) by the 58th Division (which had relieved the 47th Division during the night), the 41st Battalion, at 0800, advanced to the general line - CHAPEAU de GENSDARMES - south of FARGNY Wood - south of COPSE "D" - thus forming a defensive flank to the division. The objective of the 58th Division was the old German front line in A.22 and 23, but owing to opposition in MERICOURT, this line was not reached, and during the morning it became apparent that the enemy still held FARGNY Wood and the high ground of MERICOURT Plateau. The enemy made full use of his excellent observation to harass all movement.

Phase (v) - Advance to CLERY - (Maps "F" and "G")

42. On the night of the 27th-28th, the northern divisional boundary was altered to the grid line running east and west between A.23 and 29. As the enemy was still holding FARGNY Wood it was evident that an attack would be necessary before the northern bend could be cleared and thus enable the divisional front to be again taken up. The operations of the last three days had told heavily on the Left Brigade. The 9th Brigade, which had been resting north of ETINHEM, was ordered to move forward and relieve the 11th Brigade on night 27th-28th. The relief was carried out with little interference from the enemy and, in conjunction with the 58th Division, the 35th Battalion attacked on the morning of the 28th and succeeded in driving the enemy out of FARGNY Wood and, after much fighting with enemy posts in quarries and dugouts round CURLU, advanced the line to just east of the ruins of that village.

43. The Division on our left gained the crest of the MERICOURT Plateau but was unable to exploit further during daylight owing to the open nature of the country. Arrangements had again to be made for refusing the left flank: in the event of an enemy counter-attack in a south-westerly direction, there was a grave danger of the 35th Battalion being cut off. Engineers and Pioneers were therefore at once set to work on repairing the causeway between VAUX and CURLU, and by 0100 on the morning of the 29th, a company of the 38th Battalion had crossed on to the Peninsula, gained touch with the 9th Brigade and advanced south to the outskirts of FRISE.

44. Throughout the night of 28th-29th, patrols pushed resolutely forward and by 0500 had occupied HEM, the 10th Brigade taking from the river to 1500 yards north, and the line being extended to the north for a further 1000 yards by the 9th Brigade. During the day the British Division on the left attacked and made considerable progress, particularly south of MAUREPAS, thus relieving to a great extent the danger to the left flank of this division.

45. It was evident that the enemy was fighting a determined rear-guard action, strong in machine guns. These fought stubbornly but surrendered as they were manoeuvred out of position and threatened with assault. Prisoners were of all types and for the most part were very dispirited, and all agreed that units were very much disorganized and that communication, except by runner, had practically ceased to exist. Progress was continued during the day and by night the general line ran from CLERY Causeway - COPSE "5" (10th Brigade) to HILL 110 (9th Brigade).

46. The division on our left, however, had been held up by enemy resistance at WOOD "22" and it again became necessary to form a defensive flank by a series of posts along the divisional northern boundary, while the 33rd Battalion, then in support, was moved to a position of readiness in the vicinity of HINDLEG Wood. The village of CLERY was not cleared until 2200 and then only after much hand to hand fighting among the dugouts and ruins. By this time the strength of companies had been reduced to an average of only 50 rifles, but the men were in excellent spirits.

Phase (vi) - BOUCHAVESNES Road (MONT St QUENTIN).
(Maps "H", "I" and "J")

47. Throughout the operations from the east of BRAY to CLERY, the enemy action had almost entirely been by strong rearguards. As the SOMME at this point turns sharp to the south, any further advance eastward of CLERY would have enabled our troops to push in a south-easterly direction and so nullify the defensive advantages the enemy then had from the river SOMME. The enemy therefore strongly reinforced his line at this point, probably with the intention of holding the old front line of early 1917 as a main defensive line, with strong outposts to the west. Prisoners captured later gave the identification of the reinforcements as being the 2nd Guards Division, and stated they had received orders to hold on at all costs.

48. Throughout the night 29th-30th, the enemy made a series of local counter-attacks in which the eastern extremities of CLERY changed hands several times. Despite this change of policy on the part of the enemy, our patrols still maintained the mastery, and on the morning of the 30th orders were received from Corps to press the attack and to seize the high ground from the river through CLERY Copse to ROAD Wood. This high ground gave the enemy great advantage as regards observation, but for reasons not known, his artillery failed to take advantage of the situation and much larger bodies of troops were moved over open country than would have been possible under other circumstances.

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49. The attack was continued by the 37th and 34th Battalions and progressed satisfactorily both in the centre and on the left, meeting with little resistance, but on the right the enemy was still in considerable force and our troops were unable to advance beyond the limits of CLERY.

50. During the morning the enemy's artillery fire increased and local counter-attacks succeeded in driving our troops from ROAD Wood and CLERY Copse, but on the remainder of the line the troops were able to hold their ground or regain that lost by local counterattacks.

51. During the afternoon the Second Australian Division attempted to force a crossing at OMMIECOURT-les-Clery, but owing to heavy artillery fire were unable to make progress. Two battalions of the Second Australian Division (18th and 20th), working on our right, crossed the SOMME at FEUILLERES, advanced through CLERY about 1700 and attacked in a south-easterly direction towards the cutting of the Canal du Nord, and were thus able to clear the Causeway between CLERY and OMMIECOURT-les-Clery, which had only been partially destroyed by the enemy. This action on the part of the Second Division helped considerably to open up the situation in the vicinity of CLERY and made our hold on the ridge secure.

52. The enemy resistance made it clear that attempts at peaceful penetration would only lead to very severe fighting and heavy casualties before any results could be obtained. An attack was therefore arranged for the morning of the 31st and timed for this division at 0542. This attack was to precede one on the part of the 58th Division, timed 30 minutes later, which had as its objective, the high ground in the vicinity of BOUCHAVESNES.

53. As the situation on the divisional front was not clear at certain points, the jumping-off line was arranged on a north and south line just east of CLERY.

54. At Zero the order of Battle was as follows :-

	33rd Bn.	39th Bn.	38th Bn.	(
	1 Coy. 42nd Bn.			(
58th	34th Bn.	37th Bn.	40th Bn.	(2nd
Division	42nd Bn. (less	35th Bn.	43rd Bn.	(Aust.
	1 Coy).	41st Bn.	44th Bn.	(Division.

55. The attack was successful in driving the enemy from the crest and enabled us to establish our outposts along the old German front line of early '17. On the left, the 9th Brigade were able to cross the FEUILLACOURT-RANCOURT Road and seize the Old Quarry and Quarry Farm in C.20 and 21. Enemy counter-attacks, later in the day, succeeded in driving our troops out of the Farm, but the attack was held and beaten back at the Old Quarry, with loss to the enemy. The number of guns and machine guns captured made it evident that the enemy had intended to hold his ground as long as possible. The field guns were mostly distributed singly, and in many cases were fought to the last moment, and it was only by bayonetting the gunners that they could be put out of action.

56. The 5th Brigade on our right had been equally successful, but the 38th Battalion had to extend its right flank beyond the divisional boundary to the Canal du Nord before touch could be obtained. On the left, the 58th Division had not progressed beyond the eastern outskirts of MARRIERES Wood, and the 34th Battalion moved to ROAD Wood to protect our left flank.

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57. The fighting of the last three days, with the seizure of the ROAD Wood - BERLIN Wood spur, had opened the way for an attack on MONT St QUENTIN, the most important tactical feature in this locality. Orders were received for the attack to continue and early on the morning of the 1st September the 11th Brigade relieved the 9th and 10th Brigades in the forward area, and at 0500, in conjunction with the Second Australian Division on the right, and the 58th British Division on the left, the attack commenced.

58. The Order of Battle was as follows :-

58th Division	{	42nd Bn.	41st Bn.	43rd Bn.	{	2nd Aust. Division.
		(less 1 Coy)				
		44th Bn.				
		1 Coy. 42nd Bn.				
	{	Remainder			{	
	{	9th Brigade.		10th Brigade	{	

59. Good progress was made on the left and centre and the trench system running along the spur in C.21 and 27 was captured by our troops. On the right, however, the 43rd Battalion met with heavy resistance from trenches north-west of ALLAINES. The situation on the northern flank was again uncertain and the 11th Brigade had to extend its flank to the north.

60. On the morning of the 2nd September, the advance was continued in conjunction with the Second Australian Division and the 74th British Division (which had relieved the 58th Division). The task of the 11th Brigade was to mop up the triangle formed by the Canal du Nord and their front line.

61. A large number of the enemy, who had been driven from FEUILLAUCOURT and MONT St QUENTIN through ALLAINES had worked up into this triangle and, when finally captured, included a very large number of machine guns.

62. During the night 2nd-3rd September, the advance of the 74th Division and the Second Australian Division finally joined beyond our divisional front. The task of this division was then completed, and the 11th Brigade was withdrawn and concentrated in the vicinity of HEM.

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TOTAL ACTUAL CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN OPERATIONS8th. to 13th. August, 1918.

<u>UNIT.</u>	<u>KILLED</u>		<u>WOUNDED.</u>		<u>MISSING</u>		<u>INJURED.</u>	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
3rd Aust. Div. Artillery.	-	5	1	36	-	-	-	10
3rd Aust. Div. Engineers.	-	2	-	8	-	-	-	1
3rd Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
9th. Aust. Infantry Bde.	1	22	10	243	-	8	1	4
10th. Aust. Infantry Bde.	4	36	13	258	-	56	2	9
11th. Aust. Infantry Bde.	2	50	19	277	1	6	1	6
3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Bn.	-	5	8	33	-	4	-	2
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
A. A. M. C.	-	2	-	10	-	2	-	-
<u>TOTAL.</u>	7	122	45	869	1	76	4	33

KILLED.	7	122
WOUNDED.	45	869
MISSING.	1	76
INJURED.	4	33

TOTAL CASUALTIES 57 1100.

(x) An average of 4 per day from 13/8/18 to 19/8/18 of the original number of Missing reported (102 O.R.) have been traced as either Killed, Wounded or Safe with Unit and Not Missing.

Prisoners captured.

8. 8. 18.	34 officers.	1465 other ranks.
10. 8. 18.		1 " "
11. 8. 18.	3 "	15 " "
12. 8. 18.	5 "	347 " "

Total : 42 officers. 1828 other ranks.

Identifications.

8. 8. 18.	41 Div.	148 I.R.
		152 I.R.
		41 M.W. Abt.
		152 M.W.
	43 Res. Div.	201 R.I.R.
		202 R.I.R.
		43 Res. F.A.R.
	13 Div.	13 I.R.
		15 I.R.
		55 I.R.
		13 M.W. Abt.
		50 F.A.R.
	108 Div.	97 I.R.
		137 I.R.
		265 I.R.
		108 M.W. Abt.

Also other detachments. Kapaonen Batterie 10 (19 men)
13 Div. Wireless Sect.
7th Pioneer Bn 1st Coy (13 Div)

11. 8. 18.	107 Div.	232 R.I.R.
	43 Res. Div.	203 R.I.R.
12. 8. 18.	108 Div.	97 I.R.
	13 Div.	13 I.R.
		15 I.R.
		55 I.R.
	107 Div.	232 R.I.R.
	243 Div.	473 I.R.
	108 Div.	33 Pion. Bn. 1st. Coy.

Material captured.

10.5 cm guns.	13.
10.5 cm hows.	5.
77 mm guns.	21.
Machine Guns.	220.
Minenwerfer.	30.
Granatenwerfer.	5.
Anti-Tank Rifles.	3.

1. (a) Divisional Strength at Zero -
22nd-23rd August 1918.
28th August 1918.
31st August 1918.
3rd September 1918 at conclusion
of operations.
(b) Strength of Infantry Units for same phases.
(c) Strength of Animals (Horses-Mules) at Zero,
22nd-23rd August 1918
3rd September 1918.
(d) Vehicles.
 2. Casualties -
(a) Daily from 22nd August to 3rd September 1918,
inclusive.
(b) Total casualties sustained by Units.
 3. Summary of Orders of Battle for each day.
 4. Captures of Material.
 5. Total prisoners daily and Identifications.
 6. File of Telephone conversations - (War Records
original copy only).
 7. Maps -
(i) Daily rate of advance to ground captured.
(ii) Dispositions and Headquarters of all Infantry
Units throughout operations - (War Re-
cords original copies only).
-

APPENDIX 1 (a).TOTAL STRENGTH OF DIVISION(Not including "Detached" outside Division)

	Off:	O.R.	Off:	O.R.
Strength, 17-8-18 ...			664	12934
LESS -				
Casualties to 21-8-18 ..	5	74		
Sick Wastage to 21-8-18 (appx)	6	107	11	181
<u>22-8-1918 - APPROXIMATE STRENGTH</u> ...			<u>653</u>	<u>12753</u>

(Allows for reinforcements to 17-8-18).

Strength, 24-8-18 ...			632	12376
LESS -				
Casualties to 27-8-18 ..	29	626		
Sick Wastage to 27-8-18 (appx)	8	153	37	779
<u>28-8-1918 - APPROXIMATE STRENGTH</u> ...			<u>595</u>	<u>11597</u>

(Allows for reinforcements to 24-8-18).

Strength, 31-8-18 ...			583	11600
LESS -				
Casualties to 2-9-18 ..	41	621		
Sick Wastage to 2-9-18 (appx)	3	89	44	710
<u>3-9-1918 - APPROXIMATE STRENGTH.</u> ...			<u>539</u>	<u>10890</u>

(Allows for reinforcements to 31-8-18).

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APPENDIX. 27

APPENDIX 1 (b).

INFANTRY UNITS.

Off: O.R. Off: O.R.
Available Fighting Strength,
17-8-1918 ... 383 7926

LESS -

Casualties to 21-8-18 ... 5 69
Sick Wastage to 21-8-18 (appx). 3 57 8 126

22-8-1918 - APPROXIMATE FIGHTING STRENGTH. ... 375 7800

(During this period there were 31 Officers
and 274 O.R. at Reinforcement Wing).

Available Fighting Strength,
24-8-1918 ... 355 7284

LESS -

Casualties to 27-8-18 ... 28 596
Sick Wastage to 27-8-18 (appx). 4 78 32 674

28-8-1918 - APPROXIMATE FIGHTING STRENGTH ... 323 6610

(During this period there were 32 Officers
and 350 O.R., at Reinforcement Wing).

31-8-1918 - APPROXIMATE FIGHTING STRENGTH ... 309 6369

LESS -

Casualties to 2-9-18 ... 39 560
Sick Wastage to 2-9-18 (appx). 2 49 41 609

3-9-1918 - APPROXIMATE FIGHTING STRENGTH ... 268 5760

(During this period there were 280 O.R.,
at Reinforcement Wing).

PWP.

APPENDIX 1 (c)

STRENGTH OF ANIMALS.

			<u>Rides</u>	<u>L.D.</u>	<u>H.D.</u>	<u>P.</u>	<u>Total</u>
22-8-1918			842	2510	473	105	3930
3-9-1918			825	2430	467	104	3826

APPENDIX 1 (d).

VEHICLES.

22-8-1918) On these dates there were no deficiencies,
3-9-1918) the complete Divisional establishment being
maintained.

PWP.

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APPENDIX 2 (a).

KILLED and WOUNDED

Date.	Killed Off. O.R.		Wounded Off. O.R.		Missing Off. O.R.		Injured Off. O.R.		Total Off. O.R.	
22-8-18	6	69	23	377	-	5	-	3	29	454
23-8-18	-	3	1	75	-	-	-	5	1	83
24-8-18	2	22	9	172	-	-	-	6	11	200
25-8-18	1	18	5	192	-	-	1	10	7	220
26-8-18	1	19	4	113	-	-	-	4	5	136
27-8-18	-	5	6	61	-	-	-	4	6	70
28-8-18	-	17	9	58	-	-	-	2	9	77
29-8-18	1	5	5	44	-	-	-	3	6	52
30-8-18	9	29	9	125	1	12	-	7	19	178
31-8-18	7	65	15	246	1	1	1	4	24	317 ⁶
1-9-18	9	48	6	228	-	2	-	12	15	290
2-9-18	-	3	1	6	-	-	1	5	2	14
3-9-18	-	1	1	4	-	-	-	1	1	6

⁶ Includes 1 O.R. - P.O.W.

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APPENDIX 2 (b).

CASUALTIES

22-8-1918 to 3-9-1918.

Unit.	Killed		Wounded		Missing		Injured	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
Artillery ...	1	10	2	78	-	-	-	10
Engineers ...	-	2	-	6	-	-	-	4
Signal Company ..	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	7
9th. A.I. Brigade	9	90	28	474	-	10	-	8
10th. -do- ...	9	88	31	524	1	8	2	11
11th. -do- ...	15	91	25	472	1	2	1	22
Machine Gun Bn. ..	1	10	5	76	-	-	-	1
Pioneer Bn. ...	1	8	3	47	-	-	-	1
Divisional Train.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
A.A.M.C. ...	-	6	-	20	-	-	-	1
Provost ...	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	36	305	94	1701	2	20	3	66

Includes 1 D.O.W.

	Officers		Other Ranks.	
Killed	36	305
Wounded	94	1701
Missing	2	20
Injured	3	66
	135		2092	

PWP.

APPENDIX 3.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

For Operations - 22nd August to 3rd Sept. 1918.

		From	To
Commander	Major-General J. GELLIBRAND, CB. DSO.,	22-8-18	3-9-18
A.D.C. to Cdr.	Lieut. J.W. STABBACK, MC.	"	30-8-18
A/A.D.C. to Cdr.	Capt. J.L. COLMAN, MBE.	30-8-18	3-9-18

G.S. Branch.

G.S.O.I.	Lieut-Colonel C.H. JESS, DSO.	22-8-18	3-9-18
G.S.O.II.	Major E.W. CONNELLY, DSO.	"	"
G.S.O.III.	Capt. S.H. JACKSON, MC.	"	29-8-18
A/G.S.O.III.	Capt. G.A. DUNBAR (42nd Bn. attached)	29-8-18	3-9-18

A. & Q. Branch.

A.A. & Q.M.G.	Lieut-Col. R.E. JACKSON, DSO.	22-8-18	3-9-18
D.A.A.G.	Capt. (T/Major) C.A. PYKE, MC.	"	"
D.A.Q.M.G.	Major W.S. KING, DSO.	"	"

Administrative Service & Departments.

A.D.M.S.	Lieut-Col. (T/Col). F.A. MAGUIRE, DSO.	"	"
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Special Appointment.

A.P.M.	Capt. J.W. COLPITTS.	"	"
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H.Q., Divisional Artillery.

Commander	Brig-Gen. H.W. GRIMMEADE, CB., CMG.,	"	"
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H.Q., Divisional Engineers.

Commander	Major (T/Lt-Col). H. BACHTOLD, DSO. MC.	"	"
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Attached.

Div. Intelli- gence Officer	Lieut. G.H. FAWCETT.	"	"
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Australian Light Horse.

"A" Squadron, 13th Aust. Light Horse.

Commanders	(1) Major J.A. NICHOLL	22-8-18	24-8-18
	(2) Major D.D. BUCHANAN	24-8-18	9-18

This Squadron was attached to and worked with whatever Unit or Units held the line during this period.

PWP.

APPENDIX

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ARTILLERY.

22nd. August.

Barrage Group.

Lt-Col. G.H.M. KING C.M.G. D.S.O.
 7th. A.F.A.Bde. less 4.5 hows.
 290th. R.F.A. Bde.) " "
 291st. R.F.A. Bde.) attached.

Bombardment Group.

Lieut-Col. W.G. ALLSOP D.S.O.
 8th. Bde. A.F.A.
 107th. . A.F.A.
 D/290 R.F.A.)
 D/291 R.F.A.) attached.

23rd. Aug. -do-

24th. Aug. -do-

25th. Aug.

North Sector. { Bombardment
 and
 Barrage Group.

South Sector { Bombardment
 and
 Barrage Group.

Lt-Col. G.H.M. KING. C.M.G., D.S.O.

Lt-Col. W.G. ALLSOP. D.S.O.

7th. Bde. A.F.A.

108th How. Bty. & X how. Bty. of
 1st. Aust. Div.
 7-18 par. Patts. 1st. Aust. Div.
 291st. Bde. R.F.A. (less hows)
 (attached).

How. Battery. 291st. Bde R.F.A. Attached.
 290th. Bde. R.F.A. " "
 291st. Bde. R.F.A. " "

25th. Noon.

290th. Bde. R.F.A. (attached).
 291st. Bde. R.F.A. " "

26th. Aug.

290th. Bde. R.F.A. "
 251st. Bde. R.F.A. "

27th. Aug.

7th. A. F. A. Bde.
 8th. A. F. A. Bde.
 290th. Bde. R.F.A. (attached).
 251st. Bde. R.F.A. "
 51st. Bde. R.F.A. "

28th. Aug.

7th. A.F.A. Bde.
 8th. A.F.A. Bde.
 250th. Bde. R.F.A. (attached).
 251st. Bde R.F.A. "
 137th. Heavy Battery. "

29th. Aug.

(do) less sections
 attached Inf. Bdes.

30th. Aug. -do-

31st. Aug. -do-

1st. Sept.

7th. A.F.A. Bde.
 8th. -do-
 3rd. Army Bde. A.F.A.
 14th. -do- R.F.A.
 51st. Bde. R.G.A.
 3rd. D.A.

ENGINEERS.

1918. August.	9th. Field Coy.	10th. Field Coy.	11th. Field Coy.	Attached Units.
22nd.	detached 9th Bde	present	present	nil
23rd.	"	"	"	"
24th.	"	"	"	"
25th.	"	"	"	"
26th.	"	"	"	3rd Pioneer
27th.	rejoined	"	"	"
28th.	"	"	"	A.B.D. Coys."
29th.	"	"	"	nil
30th.	"	"	"	nil
31st.	"	"	"	3rd Pioneer
Sept. 1st.	"	"	"	"
2nd.	"	detached 10th. Bde.	detached 11th Bde.	A.B.D. Coys.

INFANTRY.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.			10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.		11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.	
Brig-Gen. H. A. GODDARD. D.S.O.			Brig-Gen. W. R. McNICOLL. C.M.G., D.S.O.		Brig-Gen. J. H. CANNAN. C.B., C.M.G.	
33rd. Bn.			37th. Bn.		41st. Bn.	
34th. Bn.			38th. Bn.		42nd. Bn.	
35th. Bn.			39th. Bn.		43rd. Bn.	
9th. A.I. Bde Sig. Section.			40th. Bn.		44th. Bn.	
9th. A.L.T.M. Battery.			10th. Bde Sig. Section.		11th. Bde. Sig. Section.	
			10th. A.L.T.M. Battery.		11th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	
AUG.	Attached.	Detached.	Attached.	Detached.	Attached.	Detached.
22nd.	9th. Fld. Coy.	nil.	nil.	nil.	nil.	nil.
	3rd Pioneer Bn.					
23rd.	"	"	"	"	"	"
24th.	"	"	"	"	"	"
25th.	9th. Field Coy.	"	7th. A.F.A. Bde.	"	8th. A.F.A. Bde	"
26th.	"	"	"	"	"	"
27th.	9th. Fld. Coy.	"	"	"	"	"
	'C' Coy 3rd Pnr. Bn.		"	"	"	"
28th.	'C' Coy 3rd Pnr. Bn.		Sectns of Arty		Sectns of Arty	
	& Sectn of Arty.					
29th.	"	"				
30th.	42nd. Bn. A.I.F.				42nd Bn.	
	& Sectns of Arty.	"				
31st.	"	"			42nd Bn. A.I.	
1st Sep.	nil	35th Bn.	nil	"	35th Bn	nil
2nd.	nil	"	10th Fld Coy.	"	35th Bn.	nil
3rd.	nil	nil	nil	"	11th Fld Coy	nil

3rd. Aust. Machine Gun Battalion.

Commander. Lieut.-Colonel A. C. BLACKLOW. D.S.O.
9th. Coy. 10th. Coy. 11th. Coy. 23rd. Coy.

A. A. S. C.

22nd. Coy. 23rd. Coy. 24th. Coy. 25th. Coy.

A. A. M. C.

9th. 10th. 11th. Field Ambulances.

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APPENDIX 4.

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APPENDIX.

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CAPTURES OF MATERIAL.

(These are not estimated captures, but details of material actually returned through ~~MAAR~~ D.A.D.O.S).

Material.	O p e r a t i o n s					Totals
	Ridge N. of BRAY 22-8-18	BRAY 24-8-18 Ridge W. CEYLON WOOD 25-8-18 Period 26-8-18 27-8-18 incl.	CURLU 28-8-18 CLERY 29-8-18 30-8-18	ROAD WOOD 31 8 18	BOUCH- AVESNES Road 1-9-18 HAUT ALLAINES 2-9-18	
15 cm. Guns ...	-	-	-	-	1	1
10.5 cm. Hows. ...	-	-	-	-	1	1
10.5 cm. Guns ...	-	-	1	3	-	4
7.7 cm. Guns ...	-	-	4	17	-	21
Limber, 7.7 cm Gun.	1	-	-	-	-	1
Machine Guns ...	124	98	70	110	16	418
Mountings for M.G.	7	3	2	-	-	12
M.W., & Trench Mtrs	13	15	13	15	-	56
Base Plates, M.W.,	-	4	-	-	-	4
Light M.W., carriage	-	2	-	-	-	2
Light M.W., trailer	-	1	-	-	-	1
Granatenwerfer ...	6	2	-	-	-	8
Elevators for Projectors	-	-	2	-	-	2
G. S. Wagons ...	4	-	-	-	8	12
Field Kitchen ...	1	-	-	-	-	1
Field Buzzers ...	7	-	-	-	-	7
Night Signalling Sets	1	-	-	-	-	1
Anti-Gas Res- pirators (Horse)	1	-	-	-	-	1
Miners' Respirators	1	-	-	-	-	1

PWP.

Appendix No. 5.

APPENDIX

A.H.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

PRISONERS CAPTURED FROM MIDNIGHT 21st/22nd August,
to 3rd. SEPTEMBER, 1918.

<u>DATE.</u>	<u>UNWOUNDED.</u>		<u>WOUNDED.</u>	
	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>		
August 22nd.	12	97	61	Officers and O. Rs. not distinguish- ed by R.A.M.C. Records.
" 23rd.	1	97	28	
" 24th.	1	93	19	
" 25th.	5	135	8	
" 26th.	-	35	-	
" 27th.	-	67	1	
" 28th.	-	26	4	
" 29th.	-	33	6	
" 30th.	2	24	8	
" 31st.	5	217	12	
Sept. 1st.	10	338	57	
" 2nd.	2	329	103	
" 3rd.	-	9	19	
<u>TOTALS.</u>			326.	

⌘ This total includes 40 prisoners - receipts for
whom were given to the 2nd. Aust. Div.

Divisional Headquarters,
4th. September, 1918.

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THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

IDENTIFICATIONS.

22/8/18 - 3/9/18.

<u>Regt.</u>	<u>Division.</u>	<u>Regt.</u>	<u>Division.</u>
120 I.R.)	27th. Div.	2 Gd Fd Art. R.	2 Gd Div.
123 I.R.)		94 I.R.)	38th. Div.
124 I.R.)		95 I.R.)	
		96 I.R.)	
201 R.I.R.)	43rd Res.Div.	4 Bav. I.R.)	14th Bav. Div.
202 R.I.R.)		8 Bav. I.R.)	
203 R.I.R.)			
449 I.R.	233rd. Div.	28 R.I.R.	185th. Div.
13th Fd Art.R.	"	2 Gd. Pion.	2nd. Gd. Div.
213th. Flight.	"	419 M.W. Coy.	232nd. Div.
13th. Fightg Sqdn.	"	221 Fd Art. R.	"
116 I.R.)	25th. Div.	478 I.R.	243rd. Div.
117 I.R.)			
11 Gren. R.	117th. Div.	2 Gd. Wireless Section.	2 Gd. Div.
31st Bearer Coy.	27th. Div.	516 Bearer Coy.	185th. Div.
445 I.R.)	232nd. Div.	3 Res.Foot Art. R.	
446 I.R.)			
447 I.R.)			
1 Gd Gren. R.)	2nd Gd.Div.		
2 -do-)			
4 -do-)			
80 Fus. R.)	21st. Div.		
81 I.R.)			
25th. Bav. I.R.	5th. Bav. Div.		
4 Bav. Storm Coy.	14th. Bav. Div.		

4th. September, 1918.