

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/50/5 Part 3

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 5th  
Australian Division

July 1916



AWM4-1/50/5PART3



ES.

## 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## TRAINING MEMORANDUM No.28.

## 'GAS SCHOOL'

1. A course of instruction in 'GAS' will be held at the Divisional Gas School under Lieut. W.H. Waters, commencing 14th July 1916, and terminating on 16th July 1916.

2. The following will attend:

- 1 Subaltern Officer each Infantry Brigade,
- 1 Officer Divisional Artillery,
- 1 N.C.O. each Battalion (including Pioneers)
- 1 N.C.O. each Brigade of Artillery,
- 1 N.C.O. Corps Cyclist Details,
- 1 N.C.O. Divisional Headquarters,
- 1 N.C.O. Engineers.

Total:- 4 Officers 20 N.C.O's.

3. Officers and N.C.O's detailed for this course will report to Lieut. W.H. Waters at Divisional Headquarters at 0900 on 14th inst.

4. For the duration of the course, the class will be billeted and rationed under arrangements made by Divisional Headquarters.

5. Names of those detailed to attend will be forwarded to D.H.Q. by 1800 to-day.

13/7/16.

*W.H. Waters* for  
Lieut. Colonel,  
Gen. Staff, 5th Australian Division.



## APPENDIX

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ES.

## 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 29

## 'ENGINEERING SCHOOL'

1. A course of Instruction in Military Engineering will be held at the Divisional Engineering School (Sheet 36 G.9 c 3/9) commencing Monday July 17th and terminating Saturday July 22nd.
2. The following will attend:
  - 2 Officers each Infantry Brigade
  - 1 Officer Pioneer Battalion,
  - 2 other ranks each battalion (including Pioneer Battalion)

Total 7 officers 26 other ranks.
3. Officers and other ranks detailed for this course will report at Engineering School at 0900 on 17th inst.
4. For the duration of the course, the class will be billeted in the vicinity of the School and rationed under arrangements made by Divisional Headquarters.
5. Names will be forwarded to D.H.Q. by 1800 on 15th inst.

13/7/16.

*W. H. King*  
Lieut. Colonel,  
Gen. Staff, 5th Australian Division.



5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 30.

'GAS SCHOOL'

A 3 days course of instruction in 'GAS' will be held at the Divisional Gas School (Sheet 36, G.27.d) under Lieut. W.H.Waters, commencing Saturday July 29th, 1916.

The following will attend:-

8th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades: 6 other ranks from each Brigade.

N.C.O's and men detailed for this course will report to the Divisional Gas School at 5.0 p.m. to-morrow 28th July. They will be billeted and rationed under arrangements made by Divisional Headquarters.

The next course will commence on Tuesday, August 1st, 1916.

*W.H. Waters* Major for Lt-Colonel,

G.S. 5th Australian Division.

7/7/16.



ES.

## 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 31.

"BOMB SCHOOL"

1. The Divisional Bomb School will be re-opened to-morrow 28th July, 1916 for the training of platoon teams of 1 N.C.O. and 8 men each.  
Bombers must be carefully selected and it should be borne in mind that men fond of out-door games are the easiest to train.
2. Each course will last six days, and details will report at the Divisional Bomb School (Sheet 36, G.15.b) at 5 p.m. the day previous to commencement of the course.  
The following courses have been arranged:-

1st Course	29 . 7 . 16	to	5 . 8 . 16
2nd Course	4 . 8 . 16	to	9 . 8 . 16
3rd Course	10 . 8 . 16	to	15 . 8 . 16
4th Course	16 . 8 . 16	to	21 . 8 . 16
3. 8th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades will detail two teams for each course.
4. Rations and billets will be arranged by Divisional Headquarters.

*W. King* Major for Lt-Colonel,

27/7/16.

G.S. 5th Australian Division.



ES.

## 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 32.

"GAS SCHOOL"

1. The second three day's course of instruction at the Divisional Gas School (Sheet 36, G.27.d) will commence on Tuesday, August 1st, 1916. The following will attend:-

Divisional Engineers	3 other ranks
Div.Sig.Co.	1 "
8th, 14th, and 15th Inf.Bdes	6 " from each Brigade.

2. N.C.O's and men detailed for this course will report at the Divisional Gas School at 5.0 p.m. Monday, July 31st, 1916.
3. All ranks will bring with them the unexpended portion of the day's ration.
4. A nominal roll of N.C.O's and men detailed for the course will be sent to Lieut. W.H.Waters, Divisional Gas Officer.
5. The third course will commence on Friday, August 4th, 1916.

*W.H. Waters* for Lt-Colonel,

29/7/16.

G.S. 5th Australian Division.

DISTRIBUTION

G.O.C.	1
8th Bde	7
14th Bde	7
15th Bde	7
C.R.E.	4
Div.Sig.Co	1
Gas Officer	1
Files.	



## 5TH. AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,

25th. July, 1916.

Headquarters,

XIth. Corps.

I have the honor to submit the following report on the operations of the 19th. July, 1916, as far as the 5th Australian Division is concerned.

## PRELIMINARY ORDERS.

At 11 p.m. on 13th July, a short meeting was held at LA MOTTE, the Headquarters of the 2nd A.N.Z.A. Corps, when I was informed that the 5th Australian Division would be employed in an offensive operation under the G.O.C. XI Army Corps.

At that time the 5th Australian Division, leaving BLARINGHEM Area on 8th July, had just taken over from the 4th Australian Division on the 12th July the front from BOND STREET to BURNT FARM with three Brigades in line. The Divisional Artillery came into the front on the night of 12th July.

At the conference at LA MOTTE preliminary orders were received for the Division to contract its front with a view to attack. The front allotted was from N.9.d.4.1 $\frac{1}{2}$  to N.6.c.6.5. An outline of the proposed attack was given, it being understood that 3 Divisions would attack, the 5th Australian Division being on the left. The 5th Divisional Artillery would be reinforced by the 4th Divisional Artillery, and an extra Brigade R.F.A. There would also be a large force of heavy Artillery. The moves into the new position were to be carried out on the nights of the 14/15th and 15/16th July. The Artillery action would commence on 14th and continue (ue



2.

for 3 days, the actual attack being fixed provisionally for the 17th July.

Orders were accordingly issued at 7.0 a.m. on 14th for the Brigades to be prepared to withdraw on the nights of 14/15th and 15/16th into the contracted front, and for reconnaissances to be made on the fronts provisionally allotted to the Brigades. (5th Australian Division Order No. 28)

At 9.45 a.m. on 14th a conference was held at HINGES at the Headquarters of Lieut. General Sir R. Haking K.C.B., Commanding XI Corps. I and my G.S.O. 1 were present. At this Conference the probable programme of the attack was given out. It was ordered however, that the attack should be made with two Divisions only, and this necessitated a change in the fronts allotted. Under the changed programme the front allotted to the 5th Australian Division was from BOND STREET - N.8.d. $\frac{1}{2}$ .8 to N.10.b. $\frac{1}{2}$ .2. The objectives given to the 5th Australian Division were, the enemy's front and support lines from the Apex of the SUGARLOAF N.8.d.6.2. to the road at N.10.c.9.6. It was also suggested that FARME DELAPORTE and FARME DELANGRE should be taken if possible.

In subsequent interviews it was ordered by the Corps Commander that the two Farms would not be included in the first objectives and that the right of the 5th Australian Division attack should rest on the point where the RIVER LAIES crosses the German line at N.8.d.9.1.

At the Conference, and in the orders issued subsequently, (XI Corps Order No. 57) it was laid down that the Divisions would each attack with 3 Brigades in line and each Brigade would have 2 assaulting Battalions, the remaining two Battalions



of each Brigade were not to be employed for the attack without the permission of the Corps Commander.

Various administrative arrangements were also made.

Commencement of  
Preparations.

2. On the morning of the 14th the work of collecting Stores, Ammunition and Engineering material was commenced. In the afternoon a conference was held at Divisional Headquarters, at which the plans were explained to Brigadiers, the C.R.A. and C.R.E. as far as they were known. The G.O.C. 60th Brigade, who was taking over some of the line, was present at this Conference.

During the night 14/15th July the first part of the withdrawal from the occupied front was carried out, (Division Order No. 29 of 14th July), the 8th and 14th Infantry Brigades being withdrawn to billets and being replaced by Battalions of the N.Z.Rifle Brigade and 60th Brigade.

On the 15th July preparations were made for forming up the Brigades of the Division on the fronts of attack. Much work was done in getting up stores and ammunition to forward dumps. Positions for 5 Medium Trench Mortar Batteries were selected and prepared and ammunition for these was pushed up.

Orders for the occupation of the front line in attack formation were issued at 12 noon - (Divisional Order No. 30) - and detailed instructions were issued personally to Brigadiers regarding the method of forming up and of attack.

By this time the artillery of the 4th Australian Division and the 171st Brigade R.F.A. had arrived and were distributed to their Groups.



5 Medium Trench Mortar Batteries had also arrived together with Major Sir T.KEANE R.F.A. who took charge, as Divisional Trench Mortar Officer.

During the night of the 15/16th the remainder of the withdrawal from the old front was effected without incident on the front relieved, but the enemy effected a heavy bombardment about N.9.c.1.9 accompanied by a raid, which caused some 100 casualties in the 58th Battalion. The collection of ammunition and stores at the advanced dumps continued, necessitating the use of large working parties from the Infantry in billets in SAILLY at BAC St.MAUR. XIth Corps Order was received at 11.30 p.m.

EVENTS OF 16th JULY.

3. During the 16th such artillery as was in position carried on their registration and wire cutting. The effect of the latter was not very great as yet, though more damage had been done by a battery of 2" Trench Mortars which fired some rounds for practice without provoking any retaliation.

Orders were issued for the forming up of the Brigades in depth at 12.30 p.m. (Divisional Order No.31) By the evening of the 16th it was noticed that the strain of successive night movements and the heavy carrying work had fatigued the infantry.

During the night of the 16/17th Brigades took up their frontage in depth. As far as possible Infantry were rested in view of the attack which was ~~ex~~ expected to take place at 11 a.m. on the 17th but there was still much essential work to be done, and the move into position and some necessary patrolling caused a further strain on the troops.



THE 17th JULY.

4. The morning of the 17th was foggy. It was impossible for the Artillery to register, and so zero time was postponed from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. then to 11 a.m. and then to the next day the 18th. When this latter was known arrangements were made for filtering back some troops from the front and 300 yards lines where they were assembled thickly for the assault.

The G.O.C. 15th Brigade changed his Battalions in the front line altogether, as the 57th and 58th Battalions had been in line for some time and were tired from all the preparatory work they had had to do.

In the afternoon of the 17th intimation was received that the operations would not take place on the 17th or 18th. Orders were issued for a thinning out of the front line and for the pushing on of the work of getting up more stores and ammunition.

Patrolling and reconnaissance were continued

The delay in the attack was a great relief to the troops, who were really quite done up by their work and want of sleep.

Time was also given for the completion of the dumps of stores required for consolidating and holding the positions when captured.

The activity of our artillery had provoked considerable retaliation, and this, besides causing casualties in the front line trenches, had damaged the forwards ends of the communication trenches necessitating a large amount of work in keeping them open for the traffic which had to go on.

THE 18th JULY.

5. On the 18th July - a clearer day - the



Divisional Artillery, which was now in its battle positions, continued wire cutting and registration. A special retaliation of the SUGARLOAF was also carried out in response to a bombardment of our line about N.8.b.7.0 with guns and minenwerfer on the 17th.

At the same time more stores and ammunition were pushed up to the forward dumps, which were organized and sorted out. The communication trenches were repaired and cleared of Trench Mortar ammunition and Engineering Stores which had had to be left there owing to congestion the day before.

The orders that the operations would take place on the 19th commencing after 11 a.m. were received at 7 a.m. on the 18th. Troops were warned of this in an order issued at 8 a.m.

Final orders regarding the attack and holding of the captured position were issued at 4.0 p.m. and a special point was made in them that the assaulting troops should be rested as much as possible during the night 18/19th and on the morning of the 19th; also that good breakfasts and dinners should be given on the 19th.

By evening the forward dumps were filled up to expectations, and all communication trenches were clear.

An arrangement was made with the Controller of Mines Second Army, in the evening of the 18th to fire a 1200 lbs mine at N.10.d.1.8 at the moment of the assault. It was hoped this would cover the left of the assault from machine gun fire. The left brigade was notified of this arrangement.



IGHT OF 18/19th JULY.

6. During the night 18/19th reconnaissance were pushed out to find out the state of the enemy's wire and damage done to parapets by the fire of the heavy Artillery during the 18th.

In the right Sector the patrols were unable to approach the enemy's wire owing to enemy's posts about 80 yards in front of enemy parapet.

In the centre sector not much damage had been done by the Artillery.

On the left some lanes had been cut, which the enemy had not attempted to repair.

This information was passed to the C.R.A. It was hoped that wire cutting by artillery and Medium Trench Mortars on the 19th would do more damage.

At 8 a.m. on 19th intimation was received that zero time would be 11 a.m. This was notified to Brigades and C.R.A.

#### THE FIRST PHASES OF THE ATTACK.

7. The morning passed quietly in the trenches. There was no retaliation to our heavy artillery up till 2.15 pm. when some began, and at 3 p.m. there was a fairly heavy fire on our front line and support trenches. The left sector reported Trench Mortar fire, and in the centre sector PINNEY'S AVENUE, a main approach, was blown in by Howitzers. The right sector was also shelled with shrapnel, but casualties were few.

At 3.45 p.m. the 8th Brigade in the left sector was heavily shelled and suffered considerable casualties. They reported, however, that the enemy's parapet was being much damaged and wire was



being cut well.

The assaulting battalions of the three Brigades from right to left were in position in the front line at 3.26, 3.45, and 4.0 p.m. respectively.

At 4.15 p.m. the enemy fire increased on the right sector (15th Brigade) and another approach trench was blocked but soon cleared. At the same time the fire increased on the left sector and trenches and supports in rear. An ammunition dump was set on fire but replaced immediately. The enemy fire continued till 5 p.m. when it decreased appreciably on our right, and was doing less damage on our left and centre, although some casualties had occurred, including three Company Commanders of the 53rd Battalion. At this time both flanks reported considerable apparent damage to enemy's parapets from our heavy Artillery.

At 5.40 to 6 p.m. (the time of the assault) the enemy put on a barrage on our 300 yards line and shelled the communication trenches.

#### DEPLOYMENT.

8. The deployment of the assaulting Battalions in 'NO MAN'S LAND' was carried out by all three Brigades at 5.45 p.m. the men being passed over the parapet. In the centre and left sectors there was not much musketry fire at this time and the deployment of the first two waves and the assembly of the next two was carried out with only a few casualties.

In the right sector machine gun fire from SUGAR LOAF worried the troops directly they came over the parapet.



## THE ASSAULT.

9. Right Sector - 15th Brigade. The 59th Battalion on the right was struck with machine gun fire after going 50 yards. It pressed on some 300 yards when it was brought to a standstill in some slight cover. The machine gun fire was in enfilade from the SUGARLOAF. This battalion was finally held up and never reached the enemy's line.

The 60th Battalion on its left pressed forward, losing heavily, and was still advancing at 6.30 p.m. It reached the enemy's wire but was held up there by machine gun fire from the SUGARLOAF and by musketry from the parapets. Major Macrae, the Commanding Officer, and his Adjutant, were killed near the enemy's parapet. Survivors say that the enemy's parapet were manned by about a man a yard, with several machine guns also. Some men on the left of the Battalion entered the trenches and reached the support line, capturing some prisoners.

Touch with these was subsequently lost.

Centre Sector - 14th Brigade. The assaulting lines - 53rd Battalion on the right, 54th Battalion on the left - got into the enemy's first line trench with only slight losses. There was heavy fighting inside where the crews of two machine guns were killed and the garrisons engaged as they came out of dugouts. Lt-Colonel, Commanding 53rd Battalion, was killed between the two lines. By 6.45 p.m. the second line of dugouts was all in our hands and a line taken up. 10 machine guns were pushed across and were safely over at 7.45 p.m.

Left Sector - 8th Brigade. The first and second waves - 31st Battalion on the right, 32nd Battalion on the left - moved forward steadily at



6 p.m. from their positions close to the enemy's wire, and took the German 1st. line trench along the whole of the sector. The 3rd and 4th waves followed at 100 yards distance. All waves were in the first trench by 6.15 p.m. and at 6.30 p.m. the first two waves had captured the German 3rd line trench. Major Higgon who was leading the left of the 32nd. was killed during this fighting.

#### CONSOLIDATION.

10. Right Sector. The 59th Battalion endeavoured to make a line where they were held up 100 yards from the enemy trench, but movement was difficult in face of the machine gun fire from the SUGARLOAF. A sap was pushed out from our line towards the Battalion, and this work went so well that when the troops in this Sector eventually retired it had reached some 250 yards from our parapet.

Centre Sector. When once the trenches were clear of the enemy, consolidation went on without difficulty. A good line was obtained which was made into a parapet and recessed with the aid of two Co's. of the 55th Battalion who had brought up stores and tools.

A fine piece of work was done by the 14th Field Company of Engineers assisted by infantry working parties. A communication trench was dug right across NO MAN'S LAND, 4 feet deep, giving in places 6 feet of cover. This was partially duck-boarded and was opened for traffic at 2.a.m. It was this trench ~~alone~~ which alone made possible the retirement of the 14th Brigade without heavy losses on the morning of the 20th.



Left Sector. Vigorous efforts were made to consolidate the position gained in the enemy's third trench - a ditch. Owing to the sticky soil digging was found difficult, and only mud could be found to fill sandbags. Digging continued however, and a line was linked up with the centre sector at 8.30 p.m.

Immediately after the assault at 6 p.m. the 8th Field Company and "A" Company 30th Battalion commenced to link up the left of the 8th Brigade in the German trenches with our own original front line. A series of potholes were first dug at intervals across NO MAN'S LAND. These were enlarged and more men thrown in to link them up. The workers nearest to the enemy's trenches suffered heavily from fire from the unassaulted portions of the German trenches, and work at this end proceeded very slowly. The few men here could make no effective resistance to the enemy on his eventually outflanking the 32nd Battalion holding the trenches near FARM DELANGRE.

EVENTS IN THE RIGHT  
SECTOR.

11. The attack of the 15th Brigade was held up in NO MAN'S LAND, and from 6 p.m. onwards the 59th Battalion was shelled, in addition to being subjected to heavy machine gun fire. At 7 p.m. the 59th Battalion reported they could not advance without support. At 7.30 p.m. it was learnt that the attack of the 61st Division against SUGARLOAF had failed, but that arrangements were being made for another attack at 9 p.m. The 15th Brigade were asked to co-operate and authority was given to use half the 58th Battalion for this attack. Arrangements were completed at 8.45 p.m. and the 2 Companies of



the 58th Battalion moved forward with great dash, carrying the remnants of the 59th with them, to a point about 100 yards from the enemy's parapet, where the attack melted away under enfilade machine gun fire from the SUGARLOAF. Major Hutchinson, who led this advance, fell close to the German parapet.

Meanwhile information had been received that the attack of the 61st Division would not take place, but the information could not reach the 58th in time.

At 11.15 p.m. the 58th and 59th endeavoured to dig themselves in, but it was impossible to form a definite line and some men began to drift back.

At 12.15 p.m. the G.O.C. 15th Brigade was offered the rest of the 58th Battalion and half the 57th Battalion to carry on the attack in conjunction with another projected attack by the 61st. Division on the SUGARLOAF. He was to use his discretion whether to carry this out, or to fall back to the RHONDDA SAP, but not to stay 100 yards from the enemy trenches.

The attack of the 61st Division was, however, postponed, and at 1.10 a.m. the G.O.C. was ordered to withdraw to our original front line.

The withdrawal had already commenced and the remnant of three battalions were nearly all back in our original front line. These were collected as far as possible and passed to the rear to reorganize the defence of our line being taken up by the 57th Battalion.

#### THE CENTRE SECTOR.

12. The O.C. 54th Battalion (Lt.Colonel Cass) asked for reinforcements at 7.36 p.m. At that



time the units of the 14th Brigade were consolidating a good position along their front and had blocked their flanks. Sanction was obtained and given for 2 Co's of the 55th Battalion, then in our front line, to go forward. 2 Co's of this Battalion were already employed on carrying duties and digging.

By 10 p.m. the reinforcements had gone up under Lt-Colonel McConaghy, Commanding 55th Battalion. One Company went to support the 54th, and the other to look for and support the 53rd, who were out of touch with the 54th.

At 11 p.m. the position of the 54th Battalion was satisfactory though the shelling was severe and casualties were numerous.

The 54th Battalion improved their position as the night went on, and together with the 55th held on well, so that at daylight the situation was reported by Lt-Colonel Cass to be much easier.

Touch was lost with the 53rd Battalion. One party is known to have been cut off on the extreme right of the 14th Brigade line in the German third trench. The bulk of the survivors of the Battalion found their way back to ~~the~~ lines before daylight. Some remained with the 55th in the German trenches. All the officers of this Battalion, except the Adjutant, were killed or wounded.

#### THE LEFT SECTOR.

13. The line held by the 31st and 32nd Battalions was some 200 yards beyond the German front trench. Our Artillery barrage had been lifted on this flank to avoid hitting our own troops. At 8.50 p.m. the 31st and 32nd Battalions asked for support. Authority was asked for and given for the remainder



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of the 30th Battalion to be sent forward. When they moved up, the 29th Battalion was moved into the front and 300 yard line, and two companies were used as carriers to the forward position.

Every effort was made by the 30th, 31st, and 32nd Battalions, with the Machine Gunners, to hold and consolidate the position occupied.

At 3.15 a.m. the enemy made strong counter attacks on the left and front of the Brigade and forced the line back to the original German front line trench. This was held till 3.40 a.m. when the 32nd Battalion, being enfiladed by machine guns from the TADPOLE and DELANGRE and DE MOUQUET, and being heavily shelled, were forced to retire on our original front line.

The 31st Battalion was unable to hold on, when its left was uncovered. The 30th Battalion being being mixed up with the 32nd and 31st, retired with them.

At 4.10 a.m. the 32nd Battalion was back in our original front line, followed by the 31st Battalion at 4.30 a.m.

All Vickers Guns were brought back or subsequently recovered.

Our own line was heavily shelled at this time, and many casualties occurred while the line was being thinned and the battalions were being reorganized in rear.

## THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL

14. A meeting was ordered at 5.0 p.m. to arrange a fresh attack by the 61st Division on the 20th. At 5.0 a.m. news was however gained of the retirement of the 8th Brigade, and of the consequent



precarious position of the units of the 14th Brigade in the German trenches. The Army Commander who was present, directed the withdrawal of this Brigade to our own line.

These orders were passed to the 14th Brigade who got them through Lt-Colonel Cass at 6.30 a.m. with a definite order to retire which was acknowledged by Lt-Colonel Cass at 7.50 a.m.

Communication at this time was difficult and 8 runners were sent before the message got through.

An artillery barrage was put up round the portion of the trenches known to be occupied by the 14th Brigade. This was most promptly done and proved a great help. The retirement was skilfully arranged. All the wounded were got away who could move. All the Vickers Guns were saved and all the Lewis Guns also of this Brigade. The sap constructed by the 14th Field Company under Major Bachtold made the evacuation possible.

The rearguard behaved most devotedly. 3 of the four officers with the rearguard were killed - the fourth was wounded.

The survivors of the assaulting units were back in our lines at 9 a.m. They were heavily shelled in the front line, where more casualties occurred, but were moved to the rear as soon as possible and reorganized.

#### CONCLUSION OF THE ACTION

15. The artillery fire was kept up at a slow and deliberate rate till 12 noon.

At 9.50 a.m. the enemy were reported to be massing as if for attack but nothing of the sort developed. No infantry action occurred after 9.30 a.m.



16.

except for the reorganizing of the assaulting Battalions in the positions of our second line.

## SUBSEQUENT WORK.

16. The remainder of the 20th was quiet our intact Battalions carried on the defence of the front line and some good work was done in sniping at the Germans who exposed themselves freely while repairing the main damage done to their parapets.

During the night 20/21st July strong parties went out into "NO MAN'S LAND" and brought in wounded. Some 250 were recovered this night - the 57th Battalion being specially active in this work, as also were volunteer parties from the 5th Pioneer Battalion.

More wounded and bodies were brought in on the succeeding nights, and some very plucky cases were noticed where wounded were helped in daylight under a sniping fire. One man, still living, was found and brought in at 8 a.m. on 24th inst. from close to the German trenches.

Otherwise there was very little activity on either side. Our men were busy repairing and organizing the damaged trenches which were full of debris.

DAMAGE DONE TO  
ENEMY

17. The SUGARLOAF was evidently not seriously damaged by the Artillery bombardment. The concrete machine gun emplacements were intact, though the earth was blown away from their fronts.

In the Centre Sector the front parapet was breached over one machine gun, otherwise it was very little damaged. The second trench was



good except on the east of the Sector. The third line was damaged in places, but not much. In rear of the third line about the tramline, our shells had made the place into a huge rubbish heap, no sign of trenches was apparent there.

In the left Sector the enemy parapet was well knocked about, but little damage had been done to dugouts. Many Germans were killed here by the bombardment.

In the fighting in the trenches many casualties were caused to the enemy with bomb and bayonet, chiefly in the left sector, where the enemy was caught before he could get away. In the centre sector he fled quicker.

One man of the 8th Brigade killed 12 Germans in a dug-out with two bombs. This Brigade estimates the number of German dead in their Sector at 600, including a number of officers. The 14th Brigade did not see quite so many.

About 120 prisoners were brought back alive.

More were taken but were killed on the way back over NO MAN'S LAND by the enemy's Artillery and machine guns.

Two machine guns were captured by the 14th Brigade and brought back. Many others were destroyed by both Brigades, as were also several Trench Mortars including one very large one on a concrete platform.

Detailed reports are being submitted separately regarding the enemy's trenches as found.



## OUR CASUALTIES.

18. The casualties in the 5th Australian Division amount to:-

	Killed	Wounded	Missing.	Total
Officers	30	103	45	178
Other ranks	476	3224	1655	5355
Total	506	3327	1700	5533

AA detail of these by units is given in an appendix (A).

## THE ARTILLERY.

19. A separate report on the action of the Divisional Artillery under Brig-Gen. S.E. Christian C.M.G. is attached (B). I consider the work done was most creditable for novice artillerymen and all ranks worked most devotedly for several days and nights continuously at high pressure.

## THE ENGINEERS

20. The Engineer Field Companies did excellent work with their respective Brigades. Three communications were dug across NO MAN'S LAND and these, though meant for communication with the captured trenches were extremely valuable where the troops were ordered to withdraw.

The work of collecting Engineer Stores in large quantities in a short time was most successfully carried out by Lt-Colonel A.B. Carey, C.M.G., R.E. A special report on the Engineer Services is attached. (C)

## COMMUNICATIONS.

21. Communications on the whole were good. From Divisional Headquarters to Brigade Headquarters by underground lines was uninterrupted throughout.

From the Brigades forward communication was cut at least once in each Sector but



19.

repairs were effected and between Brigade Headquarters and the Advanced Signal Stations of Brigades, communication was fairly consistent.

Forward from our front line to the captured trenches communication was precarious. Telephone lines held badly and the chief means of communication was by runners. Pigeons were used also, and signalling shutters also were found useful.

The Artillery communication suffered very little from shell fire except in the zone near our original front trenches where lines were frequently cut and messages from F.O.O's had to be sent by runner to telephone stations about the RUE PETILLON. A short range wireless station was erected in the RUE PETILLON, but this was not used much as it was out of action early and the telephone communications from that region were sufficient to take the traffic.

#### MEDICAL SERVICES.

22. The evacuation of wounded was most expeditious and thorough, being most carefully organized by the A.D.M.S., Lt-Colonel C.H.W.Hardy, A.A.M.C. who fully deserves most special mention.

3200 wounded were cleared from a narrow front - 3000 of them in 36 hours. The devotion of the Regimental Medical Officers was beyond all praise.

A special report on the medical arrangements is attached.

23. I wish to bring to notice the



22.

three officers commanding the 8th, 14th, and 15th Infantry Brigades, who handled their Brigades well and coolly under difficult and novel conditions:

Br.Gen E.Tivey D.S.O. Commanding 8th Brigade

Colonel H.Bope C.B. Commanding 14th Brigade

Br.Gen H.E.Elliott Commanding 15th Brigade.

24. I have to thank my own Staff, especially my G.S.O. 1, Major (tempy. Lt-Colonel) C.M.Wagstaff, C.I.E., D.S.O., and my A.A. & Q.M.G. Lt-Colonel J.P.McGlinn C.M.G., though the whole of the Staff worked unremittingly and well.

25. I must also thank the following officers who gave their services to the Division during the operations and who were of the greatest help.

Lt-Colonel J.G.B.Allardyce R.F.A.

Lt-Colonel G.J.Henderson R.F.A.

Major L.W.LaT.Cockcraft D.S.O. R.F.A.

Major Sir T.Keane R.F.A.

and

Major G.B.Howard D.S.O., General Staff, 2nd Army.

26. I have a number of other names to bring to notice for gallantry and devotion to duty, and these will be submitted in due course.

(sgd) J.W.McCAY

Major-General

Commanding 5th Australian Division.



Appendix 'E' 88

ARTILLERY ACTION BY 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY  
AND ATTACHED ARTILLERY DURING THE 19th AND THREE (3) PREVIOUS DAYS.  
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The following is an account of the work done by the 5th Australian Divisional Artillery, 4th Australian Divisional Artillery and 171st Brigade R.F.A. including Medium Trench Mortars during the operations of the 19th, and also the action of the artillery leading up to the operation.

A map is appended shewing the action of the Divisional Artillery on the 19th.

The whole of the artillery was divided into three (3) groups (vide D.A.O. No. 6) attached, and given similar zones to those of the three (3) Infantry Brigades allotted to them.

Orders were issued as to their objectives, rates of fire and timing. For copy of these orders, see Appendix "A" attached. Groups allotted individual tasks to batteries.

The closest touch was kept between Group and Infantry Brigade Commanders.

Five (5) Medium Trench Mortar Batteries (2 from the 6th Division, 1 from each of the 50th Division, 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions) were attached to the Division for the operations and were placed under the charge of Major Sir T. KEANE R.F.A. who was lent to the Division as D.T.M.O. for the operations.

The 4th Divisional Artillery and 171st Brigade R.F.A. arrived on the 15th inst. and all the batteries of the division commenced registration and wire cutting on the 16th inst. and continued until the day of the operations.

The Medium Trench Mortars were placed in position as they arrived, necessary emplacements being prepared for them in the trenches.

The general plan was wire cutting along the whole front before the 19th and registration of the area prior to the 19th.

TIMES (Registration and wire cutting. 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.)  
11 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. Registration by Divisional Artillery.  
1 p.m. to 6 p.m. Wire cutting by 18-pdrs and T.M. Batteries.  
3 p.m. to 6 p.m. Bombardment by 18-pdrs and 4.5" Hows.

The fire was equally distributed between front and support lines in order to cut wire both on front of line and support lines, and to destroy the enemy's parapet in front and support lines.

During the bombardment and wire cutting, 'Lifts' to barrage lines were made at:-

3.25 p.m. to 3.29 p.m.  
4.4 p.m. to 4.9 p.m.  
4.29 p.m. to 4.36 p.m.  
5.21 p.m. to 5.31 p.m.

At 6 p.m. the whole of the artillery lifted to barrage lines.

Previous to the 19th, the 110th Battery and the 52nd Battery were heavily shelled. The latter had to move its position.

On the 19th, the 48th and 51st Battery were heavily shelled. None of the latter were however, damaged. Generally the enemy seemed to have few guns.

The communications during the day were good, though much has yet to be done in burying and protecting wires.

Owing to the lack of material and the short time at our disposal prior to the attack being delivered this could not be done, and it was due mainly to the ineffective artillery reply from the enemy that the communications were preserved intact.

The enemy does not appear to have been an obstacle to our Infantry and from reports received seems to have been well cut.

The front parapet was also very heavily damaged.

Our first false barrage apparently had no effect as the forward Officer in the trenches reported that the enemy did not appear to man his parapet during the 'lift'



The action of the Trench Mortar Batteries was good and their tasks were carried out in a thoroughly capable and praiseworthy manner.

CASUALTIES

	4th D.A.	5th D.A.	Total
Total number of officers killed	1	-	1
" officers wounded	5	-	5
" O.R. killed	1	10	11
" O.R. wounded	14	14	28

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

<u>15th, 16th, 17th, 18th</u>		<u>19th</u>	
A & A X	B X	A & A X	B X
16501	1433	62092	4507

TRENCH MORTARS

..... Rounds

CASUALTIES TO EQUIPMENT

18-pdr - One wheel blown off.

I append a statement showing messages received and action taken during the operations of the 19th.

*(Sgd.) L. E. Christian*

SAILLY  
24/7/16

Brig-General  
C.R.A. 5th Australian Division.



Prior to the attack of the 19th inst. Engineer Stores were collected:-

- (a) In Brigade Dumps in the front line, revetting and wiring materials likely to be most quickly required.  
Tools,  
Trench ladders and bridges,  
Water supply stores.
- (b) In Brigade Dumps in the RUE PETILLON, supplementary revetting and wiring and other trench material.
- (c) In Divisional advanced Dump at start of trench tramway. reserve stores of every description likely to be required

The quantity of stores required was estimated on the basis that we should take and hold approximately 2000 yards each of the German front and support trenches and that, in addition to consolidating these, it would be necessary to construct two flank trenches communicating the two German lines as also a left flank fire trench and three or four communication trenches across 'NO MAN'S LAND'

A special type of Low Hurdle was provided for the rapid revetment of the communication trenches, also duck-walks. A special Mobile Reserve of three lorries laden with tools and special stores was held at the C.R.E.'s disposal ready to be sent where required. One of these lorries was subsequently called for early by the 8th Brigade and sent immediately.

Sections from each Field Company followed the 4th wave of the attacking Infantry to assist in consolidating the position. Other Sections were detailed to the communication trenches. One Section of the 8th Field Company was on the left flank fire trench; the remaining sections kept open communications behind the front line and assisted in the despatch of engineering and other stores in their respective Brigade areas. Infantry parties were told off for each of the above works but these parties rapidly dwindled as they were called upon to reinforce the firing line.

Special water <sup>supply</sup> arrangements were made utilising the mine shaft in the front line with their pumping gear, and some 2000 petrol tins. Arrangements were also <sup>made</sup> for the rapid sinking of water holes in the German lines so as to avoid waste of labour and casualties in carrying water. The officers commanding Field Companies had their arrangements thoroughly well planned out. Trenches across 'NO MAN'S LAND' had been reconnoitred both by day and by night and both Engineer and Infantry parties were thoroughly well organized. Casualties among the Engineers averaged 1 officer and 34 men per company. Disorganization due to these casualties was rapidly rectified by O's.C. Companies whose work was thoroughly efficient.

Besides consolidating <sup>captured</sup> trenches, sending forward stores, and keeping open tramway and trench communications behind the firing line (this latter being one of the most trying jobs) the following are the approximate results of work done on trenches across 'NO MAN'S LAND':-

This work was supervised by Lieut. Farr, 8th Field Company who was considerably hampered by casualties and by the passing of munitions and stores through the trench.



14th BRIGADE Communication Trench laid out and supervised by Lieut. Fry, 14th Field Co. This trench was very well laid out and constructed. At dawn on the 20th, the trench was complete from end to end. Total length 195 yards, duck-boarded throughout except for 25 yards length near our own lines. The bottom of the trench varied from 4' to 6' below ground level, the excavated earth giving additional cover.

In the 15th Brigade Section the fire was too hot for digging in the open. Lieut. Noedl, although severely wounded at the start, carried on for some hours distributing the remaining men in various drains and sapping in both directions from each resulting in a total length of 687' of sap from PINNEY AVENUE averaging 3' 6" deep, of which 180' feet was duck-boarded, and a second sap put out by the same company from V.C. AVENUE was carried out 270 feet, of which 90 feet was duck-boarded.

The whole of the Field Companies did extremely well from the Majors commanding the Companies down to the last sapper.

The Majors planned out, supervised, and reorganized wherever necessary owing to casualties, with good judgement. Subalterns carried out their work under trying conditions with ~~trying~~ great coolness and skill and all ranks worked hard to assist the Infantry to the best of their ability. I could not wish for anything more efficient than the three Field Companies of the 5th Australian Division.

(Sgd.) A. B. Carey

Lt-Colonel,

Commanding 5th Australian Div. Engineers.

24/7/16.



from 19th to 20th July 1916 **APPENDIX E****DISPOSITION.**

At Divisional Rest Station, DOULIEU, the staff was reduced to 1 Medical officer and 37 other ranks.  
At Divisional Rest Station 1'ESTRADE to 1 medical officer and 56 other ranks.

**MAIN DRESSING STATIONS.**

Fort Rompu was retained with 5 medical officers and 166 other ranks.  
Bac St. Maur was opened in a factory; the 15th Field Ambulance with 3 medical officers, 80~~th~~ other ranks and 3 Ambulances (motor) on one side. and the 14th Field Ambulance on the other with 3 medical officers, 52 other ranks, and 5 Motor Ambulances.  
The latter position (Bac St. Maur) was chosen because both Saily and le Nouveau Monde were rendered inaccessible during the operations.

**ADVANCED DRESSING POSTS.**

These were established at PORT A GLOUS, le CROIX LES CORNEX, FLEURBAIX, ROUGE DE BOUT, and CROIX BLANCHE.  
During the opening of the attack these posts were strongly reinforced, but a few hours later when troops were in their positions the reinforcing bearers were withdrawn and advanced so that Port a Glous, Le Croix Les Cornex and Fleurbaix were practically abandoned.

**REGIMENTAL MEDICAL POSTS.**

These were situated at RIPLE VILLA, EATON HALL, MEIKLE HOUSE, FORAY HOUSE, WYE FARM and J POST.  
They were strongly reinforced by a medical officer and bearers from the Field Ambulances. CROIX MARECHAL and ELBOW FARM had a small party and stretchers at first but these also quickly advanced.

**TRANSPORT**

21 Motor Ambulances were lent by the 14 M.A.C. as the Motor Ambulances for the 5th Australian Division had not arrived. Two Motor Convoys from 14 M.A.C. evacuated from the Main Dressing Stations.  
For walking cases, horse drawn ambulances were provided when the fighting slackened.

**ROUTES**

Definite routes were arranged and set apart for each Field Ambulance for their Motor Ambulances to the Main Dressing Stations. These comprised 21 in all.  
At the Bac St. Maur Main Dressing Station the Ambulance Cars entered the quadrangle and the M.A.C. Convoy Cars circled outside the building and loaded at two separate doors. Thus two of these cars were loaded at the same time and moved to a park a few yards away until the convoy was formed up. In this way the road was not encumbered by waiting ambulance cars and no confusion ensued.

**FEEDING**

Soyer Stoves were placed at all posts and at Main Dressing Stations to provide hot water for dressing wounds and soup for patients and personnel. These were of the greatest benefit. Men who came in shivering, cold, and tired felt much better after a drink of soup.

**REINFORCING**

From 12.30 a.m. on 20/7/16 the posts were reinforced with medical officers and bearers with stretchers as rapidly as possible. On the left flank as there were very few casualties coming in, nearly the whole of the 8th Field Ambulance posts were emptied and all available personnel with stretchers were sent up to the right Flank and centre. The A.D.M.S. New Zealand Division was asked to assist and he very kindly forwarded 36 other ranks and 7 Motor Ambulances at 12.30 a.m. and at 11 a.m. 2 medical officers and 40 other ranks.



**STRETCHERS** There was an ample supply of stretchers, but the trench stretchers were of no assistance; navy pattery stretchers would have been of greater service in the trenches.

**DIRECTION OF CASUALTIES** The flow was towards the centre and right flank.

**RATE OF TREATMENT** Casualties were evacuated at the rate of 1 per minute and increased to 2 per minute when the rush was greatest.

**RATE OF EVACUATION** All wounds were treated, all bleeding stopped and where necessary vessels tied and amputations or operations done. All cases were injected with Anti-Tetahic Serum and all fractures properly set. It was found quicker and more satisfactory to dress with dressings cut at the time to suit the case than to use first aid dressings.

**COMMUNICATIONS.** These were weak and irregular. The D.A.D.M.S. 5th Australian Division by means of a motor cycle was able to constantly visit the various posts, Advanced Dressing Stations and give valuable first hand reports to the A.D.M.S. D.A.D.M.S. 2nd ANZAC also visited the posts and reported as well.

**BOMBS.** These were all removed from the pockets of patients and taken charge of at Bac St.Maur by the Artillery.

**TABS** Time would be saved at trenches or aid posts if tabs were only used when medicine had been given or in severe cases. Tabs are better applied at the Main Dressing Stations where more accurate information can be obtained.

**POSITION OF WOUNDS** In those admitted to the Ambulances the wounds were most largely in the upper or lower extremities.

**WATER** Water was supplied by water carts and 4 gallon tins placed at the various dressing stations. The supply was ample.

(Sgd.) C. H. W. Hardy

Colonel  
A.D.M.S. 5th Australian Division.



	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.		GRAND TOTAL.	
	Offrs.	O.R.	Total.	Offrs.	O.R.	Total	Offrs.	O.R.	Total.	Offrs.	O.R.	Offrs.	O.R.
8th Inf.Bde													
29th Battalion.	-	11	11	5	133	138	2	65	67	7	209		
30th do	3	51	54	6	224	230	-	68	68	9	343		
31st do	1	69	70	10	380	390	5	79	84	16	528		
32nd do	4	73	77	9	431	440	4	197	201	17	761		
Mach.Gun Co.	-	13	13	5	28	33	-	8	8	5	49		
Light T.M.Bty.	-	1	1	-	12	12	-	3	3	-	16	54	1846
14th Inf.Bde.													
53rd Battalion.	6	23	29	10	351	361	8	227	235	24	601		
54th do	4	71	75	11	284	295	4	166	170	19	521		
55th do	2	30	32	5	150	155	4	150	154	11	330		
56th do	-	21	21	2	114	116	-	14	14	2	149		
Mach.Gun Co.	2	9	11	3	25	28	2	12	14	7	46		
Light T.M.Bty.	1	1	2	1	4	5	-	-	-	2	5	65	1652
15th Inf.Bde.													
57th Battalion.	-	12	12	1	21	22	1	-	1	2	33		
58th do	-	27	27	7	161	168	4	49	53	11	237		
59th do	1	18	19	14	386	400	5	271	276	20	675		
60th do	4	20	24	6	393	399	6	328	334	16	741		
Mach.Gun Co	-	9	9	2	24	26	-	1	1	2	34		
Light T.M.Bty.	-	-	-	-	5	5	-	-	-	-	5	51	1725
5th Pioneer Bn.	-	1	1	1	20	21	-	1	1	1	22	1	22
13th F.A.Bde.	-	6	6	1	3	4	-	-	-	1	9		
14th F.A.Bde.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1		
15th F.A.Bde.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1		
25th F.A.Bde.	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	3		
5th D.A.Column.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	15
5th Div.Engineers.													
8th Field Co.	1	3	4	-	25	25	-	8	8	1	36		
14th Field Co.	-	3	3	1	14	15	-	4	4	1	21		
15th Field Co.	-	2	2	1	21	22	-	4	4	1	27	3	84
Div.Signal Co.	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
14th Field Ambce.	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2		
15th Field Ambce.	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	3		5
4th Div.Artillery.	1	1	2	2	4	6	-	-	-	3	5	3	5
	30	476	506	103	3224	3327	45	1655	1700			178	5355

APPENDIX

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19/20th JULY 1916.

APPENDIX

B  
E 95

From 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. Registration was carried out in each Group Sector, Wire Cutting Batteries continued wire cutting at a slow rate. Observations were difficult owing to a mist.

At 10.45 a.m. hostile Batteries shelled the positions of 48th and 51st Battery, causing no damage to material but wounding several men.

At 1 p.m. Wire Cutting Batteries commenced in accordance with Programme and on target shown in sketch attached. At 2.40 p.m. reports were received that their fire was effective and that much wire was being cut, at this time a large explosion was observed in GERMAN trenches on the right and wire netting and wood work was observed flying through the air.

At 3.20 p.m. enemy's shells were falling on our trenches at N 8 and 9. Flashes were visible at N 11 d 8.5; heavy Artillery were at once informed.

At 3.25 p.m. the first lift was made. At 3.30 p.m. F.O.O. reported that enemy did not appear to man his parapets during the lift.

At 4 p.m. hostile battery opened fire on FLEURBAIX.

At 4.15 p.m. enemy Battery was reported shelling H 34 a from direction of RADINGHEM. This was passed on to HEAVY ARTILLERY for action.

At 5 p.m. our Artillery fire was reported very effective and the wire on the left was practically cleared. Enemy were reported shelling heavily the Sap M 10 a 3.3. This was forwarded to the heavy Artillery.

At 5.5 p.m. the wire was cut from N 8 d 9.1 to N 9 c 2.1 to N 9 c 6.1 and parapet badly damaged but wire was not cut between N 9 c 6.1 and N 9 c 7.1. This was reported to the Right Group who brought another Battery to bear on it. Enemy using 77 mm, 4.2", 5.9" and 8.2" on H 31 d 5.5 from direction of AUBERS. At 5.10 p.m. it was reported that the wire was cut from N 9 d 2 to the left but that tripping wires could be located at N 9 c 7.2. Information passed to the Right Group for necessary action. At 5.56 p.m. the enemy fire was very heavy on H 35 a 0.5 but no damage was reported. At 6 p.m. Artillery fire was lifted on to Barrage lines and reports were received that Infantry had started to advance. At 6.10 p.m. the Balloon Observer reported Artillery active H 24 d 3.5, N 23 d 6.6 and O 13 b 8.5 and enemy Artillery enfilading BROMPTON AVENUE with shrapnel. This was passed on to the Heavy Artillery. Aeroplane of 16 Squadron was forced to descend in field H 19 a. At 6.25 p.m. report was received that the first line had gone forward practically and that the fire on the trenches was very slight. At 6.55 p.m. our Infantry was observed in front line and enemy Artillery were shelling N 9 c 9.1.


At 7 p.m. reports were received that the left and centre Brigade occupied the front and 2nd line of the German Trenches. Left and Centre Barrage lifted 200 yards. At 7.10 p.m. Infantry at N 9 d 5.3 and heavy rifle fire about LES CLOCHERS. At 7.17 p.m. fire was seen blazing at N 9 c 6.1 and small parties were seen returning from the captured trenches, apparently with prisoners. At 7.21 p.m. about 100 Infantry were seen near N 16 a 10.95 with patrols in front. At request of Infantry, Barrage was lifted on left. At 7.25 p.m. message was received that the 8th Infantry Brigade on our left were being fired on from TADPOLE. The Group Commander reported that he was shelling TADPOLE. Also passed to Heavy Artillery for fire to be brought to bear on this point. At 7.30 p.m. 14th Infantry Brigade reported being heavily pressed and requested more fire. Centre Group increased its rate. At 7.37 p.m. 150 Infantry were observed in the ruins of ROUGES BANCS. At 7.40 p.m. 32nd Battalion reported being heavily pressed on our left - Left Group increased its rate. At 7.46 p.m. hostile balloon from the right of FROMELLES. At 7.54 p.m. the 32nd Battalion were reported holding the 3rd Line and being shelled by our own Artillery. Barrage raised another 100 yards by Left Group. At 8.10 p.m. Infantry were being heavily pressed from DELAPORTE FMe. and that Guns firing on LE MOURQUET FMe were shelling our own troops. This was passed to the 24th Brigade R.F.A. to alter their range. Report received that on the left and centre we occupied



the trenches 150 yards beyond German front line and that attack on the right had failed. At 8.20 p.m. large volumes of smoke were observed from the direction of LES CLOCHERS. this made observation very difficult. At 8.25 p.m. red flares were being sent up from the direction of this village and Infantry reported being pressed in the centre. Rate of barrage fire increased. At 9.0 p.m. Infantry reported digging communication trench between our trench and captive German trench on the left. At 9.5 p.m. succession of red rockets were sent up from the rear of the German lines. At 9.15 p.m. smoke was still reported from the right of LES CLOCHERS. At 9.30 p.m. Infantry called for more fire on their left. Left group increased its rate. At 9.31 p.m. red rockets were observed from vicinity of DELAPORTE FME. At 9.45 p.m. information was received that the left and Centre Brigades held their objective, and the two Battalions of the Right Brigade had been held up in "NO MANS LAND". Barrage slowed down to Battery fire 60 minutes. At 10.35 p.m. heavy artillery were firing on Infantry on our left joining up the captured and our old trenches. At 10.58 p.m. heavy fire was being received from FME.DELANGRE. Four 4.5" Howitzers of Centre Group were ordered to increase their fire on this point. At 11.12 p.m. Infantry reported that fire from FME. DELANGRE was lessened. 4.5" Howitzers go back to normal rate. 8th Brigade hold N.10.c.9.5 to N 10.c.5.3 but their right was not joined up with 14th Brigade. The 14th Brigade left Infantry withdrawing from right sector to their original lines. At 11.15 p.m. searchlight was being used by the Germans on SUGARLOAF. At 12.30 a.m. 15th Infantry Bde. were reported clear of the enemy's trenches, the barrage on the right was changed to a line running N.14.b.75.75 - N 14.b.5.9. to N.8.d.45.15. At 2.35 a.m. information was received that enemy were threatening to attack our line at the new trench commanding the captured trench with the old firing line. Barrage of left Group was put on the portion of "NO MANS LAND" N.10.d.1.7 to N.10.d.2.9 and range was shortened on the communication trench N.10.d.4.0 to N.10.d.2.9. At 2.56 a.m. increased enemy activity was apparent in the vicinity of FME. DELANGRE. Centre Group ordered to watch this point closely again with 4.5" Howitzers. At 3.15 a.m. orders were received to bombard area contained in N.8.d.45.00 - N.8.d.45.30 - N.8.d.8.3 - N.8.d.8.0. Right Group was ordered to move 18 pdr. battery on to this area and continue shelling at a deliberate fire. At 3.45 a.m. in order to protect the right flank of the 14th Brigade barrage of Right Group was placed on the front line and support system of the German trenches, from a North and South line running between N.8 and N.9 Enfilade Batteries were not used. At 4.0 a.m. enemy were reported to be heavily shelling the Left and Centre Sectors. At 4.20 a.m. information was received that enemy were preparing for a counter attack along the front H.15 a.2.6 to N.15 b.4.6 and were moving towards ROUGE BANCS. Groups were warned to be alert for an attack. At 4.30 a.m. 8th Infantry Brigade withdrew from the enemy's trenches to their original line. At 5.0 a.m. groups were warned to cease barrage fire as soon as it was clear enough to observe. At 6 a.m. information was received that the 14th Infantry Brigade were to withdraw to their original line. Barrage fire was arranged as follows to cover their withdrawal. Left Group to bombard 1st line parapets from N.10.c.35.35 to the left. Centre Group keep barrage as they were. Right Group bombard 1st line parapets from N 9.c.5.1 to the right. At 7.35 a.m. enemy reported shelling the trenches N.10.c.40.65 to N.10.a.90.05. At 9.45 a.m. the 14th Infantry Brigade had withdrawn to their original line and barrage of fire of centre group was raised to the 1st line parapets of the Centre Sector. This fire was continued at a very slow and deliberate rate until 12 noon when it was stopped. At 9.50 a.m. enemy were reported massing in their trenches for counter attack but nothing eventuated. All batteries, were, however, kept on the alert. At 11.35 a.m. the Centre Group reported no unusual movement along the whole line.



COPY



Blue = Bombardment  
Red = Barrage

SCALE 1/2500  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 YARDS



APPENDIX *E*

XIth Corps.  
R.H.S.1146/16.

G.O.C.

5th Australian Division.  
-----

The G.O.C. XIth Corps has made the attached report in forwarding your Report on the Operations of 19th July to 1st Army.

XIth Corps  
26th July 1916.

W.H.ANDERSON  
B.G., G.S.



S E C R E T

APPENDIX *E* - 99

XIth Corps  
R.H.S.1146/16

Advanced First Army.  
-----

I forward herewith the report of the G.O.C. 5th Australian Division on the attack carried out on 19th inst.

The report clearly describes the operations and there is nothing for me to add except that I think the attack of the Australian Division which was new to fighting out here, was carried out in an exceptionally gallant manner. There is no doubt that the men advanced with the greatest determination. Their difficulties on the right flank were caused by the failure of the 61st Division to carry the SUGARLOAF. On their left flank the Australian Division was unable to consolidate sufficiently during the night and consequently when that flank gave way the remainder of the line was compelled to withdraw.

I am quite sure that on the next occasion when the Division is ordered to attack it will distinguish itself even more than on this occasion. I have nothing but admiration for the fine fighting spirit displayed by Commanders and all ranks in the Division.

The artillery work turned out even better than I expected though many of the batteries had had very little experience.

XIth Corps  
26th July 1916.

(Signed) R.HAKING Lieut-General  
Commanding XIth Corps.



S E C R E T.

## APPENDIX

5th Australian Division.

In forwarding these remarks I am directed by the Corps Commander to say that he is very glad that the first Division of the Corps to be seriously engaged, should have earned such high and well deserved praise . He ~~is~~ also sure that the 5th Australian Division is only waiting for another opportunity of distinguishing itself.

Cohen  
Brig.  
Gen.

Brig.-General,  
General Staff,  
2nd A. & N. Z. Army Corps.



5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

SPECIAL DIVISIONAL ORDER

by

Major-General the Honourable J.W. McCay, C.B., V.D.  
Commanding 5th Australian Division.

Headquarters,  
20th July 1916.

LAUDATORY: 613. (a) The following letter from Lieut. General Sir R.C.B. Haking K.C.B., Commanding XIth Corps, under whose command the Division was for the operations of 19th/20th July, is published for the information of all ranks:-

"XI Corps,  
G.R. 38

G.O.C.,  
5th Australian Division.

I should be glad if you will convey to all ranks of the Division under your command my deep appreciation of the gallant and successful manner in which they carried out the attack on the enemy's lines yesterday afternoon.

Officers and men displayed a fine spirit throughout the attack and drove back the enemy with true British vigour. The Commanders and Staff Officers also worked with untiring energy and great skill in a difficult attack, and I am very proud to have had such a fine Division as yours under my Command on such an important occasion.

Although the Division was unable to hold the position gained for a long time, the attack must have made a great impression upon the enemy and fulfilled its main purpose, which was to assist our Comrades who are fighting in the South and prevent the enemy from moving reserves away from our front in that direction.

I wish you all a still more complete victory in your next attack and I hope I shall be somewhere near when it takes place.

(Sgd) R. HAKING Lt. Gen.  
Commanding XI Corps!

20.7.16.

(b) The G.O.C. Division desires to add, that he and all his command cannot fail to appreciate these eoniums bestowed on the Division, which behaved with such steadfast courage and passed through a fierce fight in a manner of which Australia will rightly be proud.

  
Lieut. Colonel,  
A.A. & Q.M.G. 5th Australian Division.



5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
SPECIAL DIVISIONAL ORDER

by

Major-General the Honourable J.W. McCay, C.B., V.D.  
Commanding 5th Australian Division.


Headquarters,  
21st July, 1916.

Y. 314. The G.O.C. Division has great pleasure in publishing for the information of all ranks in the Division who have so gallantly maintained the ANZAC tradition, the following messages, the first from General Sir Douglas Haig the Commander-in-Chief, and the second from the Corps Commander, embodying a message from General Sir Herbert Plumer Commanding 2nd Army.

- (I) "Please convey to the troops engaged last night my appreciation of their gallant effort and of the careful and thorough preparations made for it. I wish them to realize that their enterprise has not been by any means in vain and that the gallantry with which they carried out the attack is fully recognised." (20th July 1916)
- (II) "The Corps Commander has much pleasure in forwarding the following message received from General Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding 2nd Army:-

'The Army Commander has received with great pleasure the report of the operations carried out by the 5th Australian Division, under the 11th Corps. He wishes you to convey to the Commander and all ranks his appreciation of the gallantry displayed during their first serious engagement in France, and his congratulations on the success achieved.'

The Corps Commander congratulates the Division not only on their gallantry, but also on the fact that they are the first Australian Division to earn such recognition in France." (20th July 1916).

  
Lieut. Colonel,  
A.A. & Q.M.G. 5th Australian Division.



