

**AWM4**


**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,  
1914-18 War**

Camel Corps

**Item number:** 11/6/1 Part 2

**Title:** 1st ANZAC Battalion, Imperial Camel  
Corps

April 1917



AWM4-11/6/1PART2

# WAR DIARY

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

1st BATTALION <sup>Army</sup> Form C. 2118.  
 IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS  
 No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 ORDERLY ROOM

Page 1

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Abassan el Kebir.	2.4.17		The 1st Bn Imperial Camel Corps relieved the 3rd Bn Imperial Camel Corps at outposts 1 to 11 inclusive at 0900.	
	3rd		1st Bn relieved from Outpost. A body of about 100 enemy mounted troops were seen about 1700 approaching from the south in the direction of SHEIK NURAN. At 1930 Companies Lewis Guns took up positions and placed all in state of defence. Men at post and in because sleeping by their arms.	
	4th		No 4 Company provided 2 Sections to man the Redoubt south of FUKAR, going out dismounted after dark remaining till 0545 when "all clear" was given.	
	5th		1st Bn relieved the 2nd Bn on Outpost at 0900. 1 N.C.O & 8 O.R remained at FUKAR redoubt until relieved at dusk.	
	6th		No 2 Company provided 2 Officers & 70 O.R to garrison the "GRAND GARAGE" redoubt remaining till "Allclear" given at 0545.	
	8th		No 4 Company provided the patrol of one Section, including Lewis Guns & Signallers to proceed to WEH SHEIK NURAN moving out at 0400 and returning at nightfall. At 0900 No 1 Bn relieved the 2nd Bn at the Outposts.	
	10th		No 3 Company at TEL EL JEMMI. Lt-Col Langley, Capt Goldenstedt with Lt Stead R.E making a reconnaissance per Motor to MENDUR- reporting re crossing WADISHERIA. (for report see appendix) "A" etc. Hostile Aircraft machine gunned JEMMI post.	
	11th		No 4 Company to JEMMI. No 1 Company to NURAN & Farrag to round up Natives. JEMMI post increased so as to make up 150 rifles exclusive of Machine gunners.	
	12th		No 1 Coy to JEMMI. The Adjutant, Capt Goldenstedt reconnoitred to MUNKELER and RASM el ETAWANEH. RAFA bombed while at JEMMI. Lieut Clark with section 3 miles south of "RENDREXX GRAND GARAGE" redoubt brought back 11 bedouins, 1 shot; Enemy Aeroplane flew outpost line at 0445, machine gunned the line, no casualties.	

251

*[Signature]*  
 Adjutant 1st Bn, Imperial Camel Corps

# WAR DIARY

or

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

1st BATTALION  
IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS Army Form C. 2118.  
No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
ORDERLY ROOM

Page 2

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Tel el Jemmi	April	13	No 3 Company at Tel el Jemmi. Air fight over Outpost lines. Two of our machines brought down. 1 extre section sent to Tel el Jemmi.	
		14	No 4 Coy to Jemmi and 2 sections of No 2 Company. Heavy Turkish shelling in the dirrection of DIER EL BELAH. Day patrol from Jemmi fired at on moving out from across WADI SHERIA. No casulties, 1 Camel killed. Additional day patrol to MENDUR.	
		15	No 1 Company and 2 Sections of No 2 Coy to Jemmi. Hostile plane machine gunned the post at 1100, no casualties.	
		16	Preperations to move- 1 Section escort to H.H.S.B Section to Jemmi at 1445. No 3 Coy and 2 Sections of No 2 Company to Jemmi. Body of Turkish Cavalry seen approaching Jemmi near dusk.	
		17	Saddleup -Stand to- moved south of Camp and awaited orders.	
		18	Standing by all day- Two bombs dropped by hostile plane but no damage resulted. Left bivouac at 1800- Halted at CHARING CROSS at 1045- Under the Command of Major A.J. Mills Camels returned to behind SHARIA at 0330 the following morning.	
		19	Moved dismounted from "Charing Cross" to "Dumbell Hill at 0445. moved to the attack at 0730- (attack order see appendix) withdrew at 1945 and returned to CHARING CROSS for the night, reaching there at 2130. Led Camels at CHARING CROSS bombed 8 killed but no casualties amongst the men.	
		20	Main body moved out dismounted from CHARING CROSS at 0345 to act as reserve behind SHEIK ABASS. in position by 0515. 2 & 3 Battalions entrenching all day, occasionally shelled but no casualties.	
		21	No change in dispositions. working party of 2nd Battalionshelled through the day had a number of casualties- Led Camels bombed at EL KUTSHEN, several casualties-amongst camels and men in the 2nd Bn. Brigade relieved by the 161st Brigade at 2400.	
		22	Retired from SHEIK ABBASS at 0230 and reached ABASSIAN EL KEBIR AT 0730.	
		23	Moved up to ABU SITTA at 0920.	
		24	No change in dispositions.	

*[Signature]*  
Adjutant 1st. Bn. Imperial Camel Corps

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IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS


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ORDERLY ROOM

Page 3

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	April			
	25		No change in dispositions.	
	26		At 0430 the Bn moved up to the trenches between the points 330 and 360. The Bde moved out at 1730 <del>h</del> The Bn moved up to hold the crossing and BRIDGEHEAD at HARIMEL HASIRE- Digging operations commenced.	
	27		Digging at Bridgehead continues. 3 works taken in hand- Wiring started.	
	28		Digging continues. <del>trenching</del> Trenches approaching completion. Heavy the=night bombardment through the night (28/29) sounded as from SHEIK ABBASS.	
	29		Relieved at Bridgehead by a Squadron of A.L.H at 1230. Moved to a position of reserve behind 2nd and 3rd Battalion occupying trenches from hill <del>36</del> 310(inc) to the right of <del>XMM</del> infantry south of Jemmi. Heavy Artillery active to the direction of SHEIK ABBASS through the night <del>29/30</del> (29/30) Led Camels to Dier el Belah under the Command of Major Mills	
	30		No change in disposition. 2 Companies digging- 2 with the 3rd Bn and 1 with 2nd Bn.	

  
 Adjutant 1st Bn. Imperial Camel Corps

25/3

# APPENDIX 'A'

## REPORT.

1st BATTALION  
 IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS  
 ORDERLY

EL MENDUR - SHARTA & WADI SHERIA? S of MENDOR

2  
 1/4

Ref Maps. Rafa 1: 125,000  
 Bersheeba 1:125,000

**Roads:**

- (a) The formed road from TEL EL JEMMI passed through the east of MENDUR and not through the village marked XC (position of cistern) on the map.
- b. The portion of the road from XC on the map to where it joins the track marked as passing through the east of MENDUR is not distinguishable.
- c. As a result of this MENDUR is found to be east of what has been taken to be the place before.
- d. The MENDUR  $\frac{1}{2}$  EL SHALLAL road is clearly distinguishable and suitable for all traffic.
- e. The road passing east of MENDUR south east to KHALASA has not been located.

**Crossings:**

- (a) The crossing over the WADI EL SHERIA via the before mentioned road passing through the east of MENDUR has been repaired and is now passable to all arms.
- b. The crossing of the WADI EL SHERIA via the EL SHALLAL MENDUR road would be practicable to all arms after a small amount of repair. (vide R.E. report)
- c. A suitable crossing of the WADI SHERIA further south exists at what was taken to day to be that via the track running north and crossing the WADI  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile south of the K in KHIRBIT UM RIJL (map: Beersheeba 1:125,000)  
 The identity of this track is still in doubt owing to the now location of the MENDUR - KHALASA road. another reconnaissance would place it beyond doubt.

**TACTICAL.**

A crossing of a force at the point ~~marked~~ mentioned in 2 (c) would suggest itself as more suitable to outflank EL MUNKHEILER & RIJM EL ATAWINEH than one at MENDUR.  
 The MENDUR crossing affords cover for an advance up to as far east as the SHARIA ridge but this line of advance possesses all the disadvantages of a frontal march.  
 The Southern crossing permits of covered approach to within threequarters of a mile of KHIRBIT UM RIJL.  
 At this point the left rear of EL MUNKHEILER is visible and exposed, and the left flank of the RIJM EL ATAWINEH position is distinguishable in the distance.  
 Troops from the point  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile south of KHARBIT UM RIJM would be exposed to hostile Artillery fire.  
 Concealment would be afforded by moving up the Wadi passing through EL MAGAM south of the KHIRBIT ZUMMARAH.  
 Another reconnaissance extending over a full day would be advantageous.

Abbassan el Kebir

10/4/1917

*John*  
 Capt. R.E.  
 M.C.

Ref Maps:

REPORT ON OPERATION AGAINST GAZA ON 19.4.17.

23/10

125.000

ORDER

In the general attack to be made on the enemy's position between the Wadi running ~~between~~ from KHIRBET SIHAN to KHIRBET ASHIFRIYEH on the south east and the coast on the north west on the morning of April 19th, the 1st I.C.C Bde was allotted the section of the enemy's line from REDOUBT Sq W 23 A (exclusive) to KHIRBET SIHAN (inclusive) with the 1st Bn on the left taking up in roughly 1000 yards of the position from the REDOUBT. (exclusive).

The Bn assembled for the attack behind DUMBELL HILL at 0500 on the 19th April, and 4 Companies were detailed to lead the attack- No 2 with orders to conform to the movements of the 163rd Bde on its left- No 3 was detailed to support No 2 and No 1 Company to support No 4. This latter Company was later held in local reserve.

Nos 2 and 3 Companies deployed at 0730 and moved out to the attack-

Heavy enemy shell fire at effective range and accurate long range rifle fire in the early stages necessitated a rapid advance at wide intervals- the ground was bereft of cover and no fire position from which the Turkish infantry could be effectively engaged existed, consequently No 3 Company was pushed up in support earlier than was originally intended with a view to rapidly thickening the line to establish fire superiority- the rapidity of the movement of the 163rd Bde on the REDOUBT forced the left Company (No 2) to move up practically without engaging and as in consequence touch was lost with the slower moving Companies on its right (No 4).

As the REDOUBT was neared, casualties increased and No 3 Company reinforced.

In the short fire fight that ensued the strength of the two Companies was considerably reduced and at the moment of assault only a remnant remained under the O.C of No 2 Company.

The REDOUBT was carried at 0930 and about 50 prisoners were taken, the remainder retired to a prepared position in the rear.

From this moment the accuracy of the enemy artillery fire became such that Lieut Campbell after a consultation with a senior Officer of the 163rd Bde decided to withdraw.

This was done but apparently some men did not receive the order and were taken prisoners when the enemy counter attacked at about 1400.

Meanwhile No 4 Company had come to a dead stop on the low ridge about 1400 yards from the enemy position behind and to the left rear of the REDOUBT.

Further advance was impossible. No 1 Company held in local reserve were sent in to ~~fill~~ fill the gap that existed between No 2 and No 4 Companies and ~~the~~ any advance beyond the line on the left. No 4 was likewise held up. At 1125 Artillery support was asked for on enemy works extending from W 18 C to W 24 B and orders were issued to dig in with a view to minimising casualties and awaiting further developments.

At 1635 advice was received that our aircraft had observed a column of infantry about a mile long advancing from point 468 towards SIHAN.

At 1755 orders were issued from Bde for the 1st and 3rd Bns to withdraw at 1945.

NOTES.

In country such as that over which the operations was carried out the use of runners as means of communication proved dangerous, inefficient and costly. Four messages despatched from No 2 Coy did not reach their destination at Bn H'Qtrs although these H'Qtrs were well in advance.

Visual signalling was likewise out of the question owing to the lack of cover.

Suggest that field telephones be issued at the rate of 1 per Company with the necessary H'Qtrs equipment.

2. The medical arrangements were favoured by the presence of a small Wadi close up to the firing line where a dressing station was established. All wounded were attended to and passed through without any hitch and by the time the Bn withdrew the station was completely cleared.

Killed off 2  
Wounded off 10  
O.R. 30  
Missing off 1  
O.R. 16

George Hendry  
Lieut Colonel  
Candg. with I.C.C.