


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/53/3 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters New  
Zealand and Australian Division

June 1915



AWM4-1/53/3PART2

Headquarters,

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Order for the destruction, tonight of the Turk  
Blockhouse overlooking "A" CRATER, in QUINN'S POST.

At 9 p.m. three volunteers of the New Zealand Engineers, carrying 12 pounds of gun cotton, will creep out by the same route as was followed last evening, to the left side of the Blockhouse as looked at from our trenches. They will place the charge on the roof of the blockhouse. The charge will have been fitted with both means of explosion, that is, to be fired either by fuse, or electrically exploded. After placing the fuse, they will immediately retire, and, should there be any delay in the explosion, this will be carried out electrically.

During this period, the troops should be in the support trenches.

The organization of the attack will be as follows :-


Immediately the explosion takes place, a working party, consisting of 6 men, will occupy the ruined structure, and will place it in a state of defence against the enemy's trenches and bombs, and so arrange it that it will command the Crater "A". If possible, at the same time, a small working party will start from the end of the ruined structure, and a similar party from our trenches, to dig a communication trench between our trenches and the blockhouse.

Previous to the attack, an ample supply of timber and sandbags, for the repair of the blockhouse, will be collected immediately in rear of the fire trenches.

Should it be required, arrangements will be made for ample supply of covering fire to be directed from the fire trenches of the Post, and also from neighbouring Posts on the flanks, on that portion of the enemy's trenches opposite the blockhouse. Arrangements will also be made to keep down the enemy's bombing by an ample discharge of bombs from our fire trenches.

The new supporting trenches on the top of the knoll in rear of QUINN'S will also be held.

1st June 1915.



NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G. No. 26.Divisional Headquarters,  
Anzac Cove, 7th JUNE 1915.BOMBS AND HAND GRENADES IN TRENCH WARFARE

The following notes compiled from a circular memorandum by G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, are reproduced for guidance.

In the attack it is doubtful if hand grenades would be of much use till the first trenches are captured. If held up, e.g. by wires, near the hostile trenches, it is possible that a hand grenade party might be of use to pitch grenades into the enemy's trenches, but it is unlikely that grenades would be up at that period of the action.

The time when they will be of most use in an attack on opposing trenches will be when the front trenches are gained. Hand grenades should then be sent up each of the communication trenches and along the fire trench. In either case, the best position to take up would be in the trench behind a traverse or bend, from which cover grenades would be thrown at any of the enemy approaching.

2. To organize a grenade party, the following is suggested :-  
Squad to consist of 2 men (with rifles and bayonets) 2 men for throwing (rifles slung) and two men to carry basket of grenades (trained as throwers to replace casualties) and 1 N.C.O. in charge of squad.
3. The party would move off up the trench in the following order:-  
Man with rifle and bayonet - ready for use.  
Bomb throwers with grenades.  
Carrier with basket of grenades.  
N.C.O.  
Second thrower.  
Second carrier.  
Spare man.

As soon as the first basket of grenades is finished, it should be passed back for a further supply, and the full basket of the 2nd carrier passed to the No. 1 carrier.

4. The grenades squad should act on the offensive, bombing the enemy wherever found, and then passing on to bomb the next section between traverses, for if they remain stationary when the enemy is approaching they will be located, and probably themselves bombed.

5. When an enemy's fire trench has been captured, it will be necessary to make a second advance, usually from the communication trenches, after which the next trench will have to be tackled, the bombing squad being split in two, and turned outwards so as to avoid being taken in rear.

6. In the defence, grenade squads are probably best in the support trenches, ready to advance up communication trenches to meet the enemy should he take the fire trench and try to advance.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite, Lieut.Col  
General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G. No. 26.Divisional Headquarters,  
Anzac Cove, 7th JUNE 1915BOMBS AND HAND GRENADES IN TRENCH WARFARE

The following notes compiled from a circular memorandum by G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, are reproduced for guidance.

In the attack it is doubtful if hand grenades would be of much use till the first trenches are captured. If held up, e.g. by wires, near the hostile trenches, it is possible that a hand grenade party might be of use to pitch grenades into the enemy's trenches, but it is unlikely that grenades would be up at that period of the action.

The time when they will be of most use in an attack on opposing trenches will be when the front trenches are gained. Hand grenades should then be sent up each of the communication trenches and along the fire trench. In either case, the best position to take up would be in the trench behind a traverse or bend, from which cover grenades would be thrown at any of the enemy approaching.

2. To organize a grenade party, the following is suggested :-  
Squad to consist of 2 men (with rifles and bayonets) 2 men for throwing (rifles slung) and two men to carry basket of grenades (trained as throwers to replace casualties) and 1 N.C.O. in charge of squad.
3. The party would move off up the trench in the following order:-  
Man with rifle and bayonet - ready for use.  
Bomb throwers with grenades.  
Carrier with basket of grenades.  
N.C.O.  
Second thrower.  
Second carrier.  
Spare man.

As soon as the first basket of grenades is finished, it should be passed back for a further supply, and the full basket of the 2nd carrier passed to the No. 1 carrier.

4. The grenades squad should act on the offensive, bombing the enemy wherever found, and then passing on to bomb the next section between traverses, for if they remain stationary when the enemy is approaching they will be located, and probably themselves bombed.

5. When an enemy's fire trench has been captured, it will be necessary to make a second advance, usually from the communication trenches, after which the next trench will have to be tackled, the bombing squad being split in two, and turned outwards so as to avoid being taken in rear.

6. In the defence, grenade squads are probably best in the support trenches, ready to advance up communication trenches to meet the enemy should he take the fire trench and try to advance.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite, Lieut.Col

General Staff,

N.Z. &amp; A. Division.

6.23

Appendix No. 39<sup>A</sup>  
App. 39<sup>A</sup> 23

TO N.E. & A. Division.

Bn 6 1st June.

At 5 p.m. yesterday on the bomb proof <sup>shelter</sup> being ready a Serjeant and 6 men of 7th Canterbury Rifles endeavoured to crawl out into the crater known as work "A" when they were immediately exposed to fire from some loopholes from their left flank and it was discovered that these loopholes commanded and enfiladed the crater. Under these circumstances it was considered that no defensive operation could be made by party occupying the crater and the party was therefore withdrawn. At 9 p.m. two parties, one of an N.C.O. and 6 men, and one of a Serjeant and 6 men were sent out. The former was to demolish the construction containing loopholes while the latter were to follow out to work "A" when the work of No. 1 party had been completed.

No. 1 party got over parapet about 9 yards to left of proposed egress of No. 2 party. No. 1 party carried sandbags. The structure being reached, sandbags were dropped in front of loopholes, but these all slid down into crater, and failed to block the loopholes. The whole party tried to knock the structure down by pushing and with picks, but found the work six feet high constructed of heavy timber laced with wire with overhead cover of sleepers sandbags and barbed wire on top. The party was out ten minutes when they were exposed to heavy fire from the right. Finding they could do nothing with the implements at their disposal, the party returned to our fire trench. The fire was continued from these loopholes on to the egress from our trench towards the crater while No. 1 party was endeavouring to demolish the structure.

The structure and the crater are exposed to fire from plateau 400 and the crater is commanded at a few yards range by the loopholes which are on the left edge of it. The opening in our trench commands the crater, but it does not command the loopholes or the Turkish trenches. The structure appears to be built on the communication trench between the Turkish trenches and ours, and is probably connected by tunnels and communication trenches with the enemy fire trenches.

The structure is about 9 yards from our fire trench and its present aspect is one of passive defence. It will be impossible to destroy it except by explosives, and it is considered that a charge heavy enough to destroy it would injure our own post considerably. This message has been held up pending arrival of General Godley in the Section, but as the General is not now coming, the report is forwarded.

No. 3 Section,  
Monash Gully, 12.22 p.m.

6 7/4  
TO N.Z. & A. Division.

Bm 17 1st June

app 40<sup>B</sup>  
Appendix No. 40<sup>A</sup>

The following orders have been issued already to O.C. QUINN'S POST. The enemy structure of timber and sandbags a few yards in front of the right centre of your post is to be blown in tonight by firing a charge of guncotton to be placed and fired by the engineers attached to your post. Immediately prior to the explosion which will be at 9 p.m. the men are to be withdrawn from the fire trenches in the immediate vicinity of the works. Immediately the explosion has taken place the trenches will be remanned and a small party of one Officer or N.C.O. and six men will go out with sandbags and tools to complete, if necessary, the demolition of the structure and occupy the crater or the blackhouse, as may be most suitable. Another small party will be told off to be ready in our own trenches to pass out sandbags and timber to the party in the crater. The post must be otherwise fully manned and bomb throwers organized and ready in the fire trenches and behind the support trenches to protect the working party if necessary, but no bombs are to be thrown unless the party is attacked. The operation should be carried out as quietly as possible. As soon as the party is established a communication trench is to be made to the fire trench in our post. Order enclosed. The engineers have been instructed in accordance with first paragraph of N.Z.G. 893. Approval is requested for the order which differs only in one respect i.e. the occupation of the blackhouse only.

No. 3 Section,

Menash Valley 6.34 p.m.

Ca 627

6.25

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 14th May, 1915.

From:- General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand  
Army Corps.

app

41

To :- ~~Australian Division~~  
New Zealand and Australian Division.

Memorandum.

The following message was despatched to General Headquarters on the 14th instant:-

"G.11., 14th, I am anxious to hear how my five batteries are getting on AAA It is reported that Colonel Christian, Commanding Field Artillery Brigade, has returned in "INDIAN" to ALEXANDRIA AAA Can you confirm this."

2. General Headquarters directed the O.C., 29th Division to report direct to Army Corps Headquarters in connection with the above message, and the undermentioned reply has been received.

"Ga. 3., 14th, The five ANZAC batteries have done excellent work both in reconnaissance and occupation of ground and in action AAA Their selection and registration of targets has been thoroughly done, and their shooting in support of the infantry attack has been uniformly good AAA The batteries have had few casualties, and are all in good fighting condition AAA Lieut-Colonel Christian was placed on the sick list five days ago and sent to H.M.T. "INDIAN". Whereabouts of this ship at present unknown."

rec'd 8.30pm

Asken  
Lieut-Colonel,  
for Brig-General,  
General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Copy sent to C.R.A

them to be  
by C.R.A



6.26

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Ga/25

Anzac Cove,  
1st. June, 1915.

From: Brig.-General,  
General Staff,  
A. & N. Z. Army Corps,

To: Headquarters,  
~~Australian Division,~~  
N. Z. & A Division,  
~~I. M. A. Brigade,~~ for information

MEMORANDUM

1. When any section or part of a section is instructed to carry out an enterprise which may require the support of any of the adjoining sections, the Divisional Headquarters under whose orders the section comes, is responsible for -
  - (a) Concerting arrangements between sections under its own control-
  - (b) Informing the other Division
    - i. of the object, scope and hour of the intended operations:
    - ii. of the nature of assistance required in the first instance and in anticipated developments:
  - (c) for informing Army Corps Headquarters of all arrangements made.
  
2. Any section which decides on its own initiative to carry out an enterprise will inform its Divisional Headquarters in time to allow the above arrangements to be carried out.

Asker  
Lieut.-Colonel,  
for Brig.-General, G. S.  
A. & N. Z. Army Corps.

627  
SECRET

ARMY CORPS ORDER No. 12

App. 43. (2) 27.  
Copy No. 2.

ANZAC COVE  
4 : 6 : 1915.

- (1) An assault on the Turkish fire trench in front of QUINN'S POST is to be delivered during the night of 4/5th. June, with the object of occupying permanently the portion immediately facing QUINN'S POST.  
The assault is to commence at 11 p.m., 4th. June.
- (2) New Zealand & Australian Division will arrange :-
  - (a) For assaulting and working parties to carry out this operation on the lines arranged with O.C. No. 3 Section of the Defence.
  - (b) For a strong demonstration from No. 4 Section of the Defence towards the Northern angle of the enemy's trenches facing ours on the col leading to Baby 700.
  - (c) For fire support from COURTNEY'S POST as may be necessary to assist the attack from No. 2 Section of the Defence on GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH (Para. 3 a below)
- (3) Australian Division will arrange :-
  - (a) For an assault on the Western end of GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH, with the object of
    - i. Stopping the machine gun fire from that trench on the operation in front of QUINN'S.
    - ii. Engaging as much as possible of the enemy's attention.
    - iii. Demolishing any bomb-proof structure found.
  - (b) For machine guns to assist in keeping down hostile fire from the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700; in addition to those engaging targets immediately menacing the operations of the Division.
  - (c) For demonstrations aiming at distracting attention from (a).
  - (d) For an operation towards KABA TEPE on the lines of that of May 28th, to commence at 10 p.m.  
An officer will be sent to Army Corps Headquarters at 4 p.m. to-day to arrange co-operation with the Navy.

A. Skeen Lieut. Colonel;  
for Brig. Genl. General Staff.  
A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

OPERATION ORDER No. 8.

- by -

Major-General Sir A.J. Godley K.C.M.G.  
Commanding N.Z. & A. Division

Reference Map ANZAC POSITION.

ANZAC COVE

4 - 6 - 1915.

1. An assault on the Turkish fire trench in front of QUINN'S POST, No. 3 Section of Defence will be delivered to-night with the object of permanently occupying the portion immediately facing the Post.  
Prior to the assault the 1st Australian Division attacks a hostile trench in the direction of KABA TEPE with a small party.
2. The above assaults will be supported as follows :-
  - (a) By the 1st Australian Division which arranges for
    - (1) An assault on the ~~Western~~ <sup>Northern</sup> end of GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH from No. 2 Section of defence: this assault to start at ~~10.55 p.m.~~ <sup>11 p.m.</sup>
    - (2) Machine gun fire to be directed on to the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700
  - (b) By No. 3 Section of Defence the O.C. of which will arrange for
    - (1) Fire support from COURTNEY'S POST to assist the attack on GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH
    - (2) Fire support from POPE'S HILL in the direction of the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700
  - (c) By No. 4 Section of Defence the O.C. of which will arrange for a strong demonstration from his Section towards the Northern angle of the enemy's trenches facing ours on the Col leading to BABY 700
  - (d) By Artillery which will support the operation as follows :-
    - (1) 2nd Battery (Sykes), 4th Australian Battery (Phillips) and the 21st Jacob's Mountain Battery will bring fire to bear on enemy to the front and left front of QUINN'S.
    - (2) One Section, N.Z. Howitzer Battery will engage enemy's main communication trench leading to QUINN'S.
    - (3) 1st Battery (Symon) will engage the Northern Face of JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY
 All Artillery fire will commence at 11 p.m. The O.C. No. 3 Section will exercise a general fire control through the C.R.A.'s representative at Headquarters, No. 3 Section.
3. The Officer Commanding No. 3 Section of Defence will arrange for the assault to be organized as follows :-
  - (a) An Assaulting Party, who after occupying the enemy trench will prepare the parapet for use against the enemy. A bomb throwing party (with rifles slung) will accompany the assault and will clear the Turkish trenches on either side of the captured portion.
  - (b) Working Parties. The Assaulting Party will be followed immediately by Working Parties (without arms) carrying filled sandbags and tools. These parties will be distributed as under :-
    - (1) Right Party, to construct a loopholed traverse on the right of the captured trench - and to pass out sandbags and material as required to the above.
    - (2) Left Party - To perform similar work on the left of the captured trench.
    - (3) A party will also be detailed to dig communication trenches to the captured trench.
  - (c) Stretcher Bearers are to be detailed and formed up ready to move out as required

(2)

- (d) Previous to the assault, QUINN'S POST will be fully manned and Local Reserves will be brought close up on the side of the hill.
4. The assault from QUINN'S POST will commence at 11 p.m. 4th inst. punctually. Watches to be compared beforehand by the O.C.No. 3 Section with C.R.A. and O's C. Nos. 2 and 4 Sections.
  5. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade (in Reserve) will hold itself in readiness to move at short notice.
  6. Reports to Divisional Headquarters.

(Sgd.) W.G.Braithwaite Lieut.Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. &amp; A. Division.

Copies as under at *9* p.m.

Copy No. 1	to War Diary by
2	File
3	No. 3 Section
4	" 4 "
5	4th Aust. Inf. Bde
6	C.R.A.
7	C.R.E.
8	A.D.M.S.
9	A.D.C. for G.O.C.
10	Administrative Staff
11	General Staff
12	" "

Summary of events from 6 a.m. 4th June 1915 to 6 a.m. 5th June 1915.

NO. 3 SECTION

Preparations were made during the day for a sortie from QUINN'S POST at 11 p.m. last night in accordance with Army Corps Operation Order No. 12.

The object of the sortie was to take and occupy the enemy's fire trench immediately facing the centre of QUINN'S POST.

The 1st Australian Division, on the right, was to co-operate by assaulting the northern end of the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH in order to keep down the Machine Gun fire from that trench, to engage as much as possible the enemy's attention, and to demolish any bomb-proof shelter found there: By Machine Gun fire on the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700, and generally, by demonstrations, to distract the enemy's attention from the assault on the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

A movement towards KABA TSEPE was also to be carried out at 10 p.m.

No. 4 Section was also to assist by making a strong demonstration towards the northern angle of the enemy's trenches facing ours on the Col leading to BABY 700.

The Artillery of both Divisions were to support the operation.

The assaults and movements were to take place simultaneously at 11 p.m.

The arrangements made by O.C. No. 3 Section for the assault were as follows :-

- (a) An Assaulting Party, consisting of 60 men to occupy the enemy trench, and transpose the parapet for use against the enemy.

A bomb throwing Party (with rifles slung) to accompany the Assaulting Party, and clear the Turkish trenches on either side of the captured portion.

The Assaulting Party to be followed immediately by Working Parties (without arms) carrying filled sandbags and tools.

The working parties were distributed as under :-

- (a) The Right Party, consisting of 10 men to construct a loopholed traverse on the right of the captured portion of the enemy's fire-trench.
- (b) The Left Party of 10 men, similar work on the left portion.

Additional parties were also told off as follows :-

- (a) 10 men (unarmed) on each flank to pass out sandbags and material, tools etc. to the party in the captured trench.
- (b) To dig 2 communication trenches to the captured trench - 3 men at each end of the trenches to be dug.
- (c) The bomb throwing parties were to carry a few Lotbiniere bombs.

~~Under no pretence whatsoever was anyone, either in the Assaulting Party or Working Party, to touch a wounded man.~~

~~This work was to be done entirely by stretcher-bearers.~~

QUINN'S POST to be fully manned, and Local Reserves brought up.

The operation was under the direction of Lieut. Col. C.H.J. Brown of the Canterbury Infantry Battalion.

Punctually at 11 p.m. the assault commenced.

Both parties (right and left) successfully occupied the enemy's trench, and working parties at once commenced erecting traverses.

There were many casualties in both parties, especially from Machine Gun fire from the right flank.

Lieut. Col. Brown did not consider that his men would be able to hold on to the captured trench by daylight unless this Machine Gun fire was silenced in the meantime.

At 12 midnight, a message was received from the 1st Australian Division stating that the enterprise on the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH by a party of 24 men had failed as the dis-used enemy trench in the Gully was found to be full of the enemy.

6 31  
Lieut. Col. Malone, commanding COURTESY'S POST, was warned of this, and especially to watch the gap between COURTESY'S POST and the left of No. 2 Section.

The troops in the enemy forward trench in front of QUINN'S then became subjected to very heavy rifle and Machine Gun fire.

They held about 70 to 80 yards of Turkish trench, and in spite of the heavy fire, erected traverses at each end, and by 1.40 a.m. completed a communication trench back to the Post.

When the trench was captured, a good many Turks were bayoneted, and 28 were taken prisoners.

About 1.30 a.m. the enemy practically ceased throwing bombs, but the Machine Gun fire from the right flank was still giving a lot of trouble, and Colonel Chauvel, commanding No. 3 Section, considered it most important that steps should be taken, before daylight, to deal with the Machine Gun in the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

Accordingly representations were made to the Army Corps with a view to a further attempt on the flank part of the 1st Australian Division to take the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

Arrangements were accordingly made to carry this out.

The Troops in QUINN'S were ordered to take every opportunity of pushing forward communication saps from QUINN'S fire trench to the captured trench.

At 2.20 a.m. the O.C. No. 3 Section reported that the fire trench in QUINN'S, and the captured trench, were strongly strengthened, that a good communication trench had been cut between them, and that a 2nd communication trench towards the captured trench was being improved.

The 2nd Assault of the 1st Australian Division was ordered for 3 a.m. but was only partially successful.

Apparently no Machine Gun was found in the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

An Artillery bombardment was ordered at daybreak.

After daybreak, the captured trench was subjected to constant fire attack, and, as time went on, it became more and more doubtful whether the garrison could hold on.

At 6.30 a.m. the O.C. No. 3 Section reported that they had been compelled to withdraw from the captured trench owing to heavy "bombing", but that they were still holding on to the communication trenches which are to be provided with overhead cover.

Lieut. Col. C.H. Brown has been slightly wounded with a bomb.

It has not been found possible to obtain the casualties, but they will be forwarded later.

#### NO. 4 SECTION

Nothing of importance occurred during the day.

The communication trench to Nos. 1 and 2 Posts has been made fairly safe, and with a little deepening, it should be absolutely safe by this evening.

At 11 p.m. the demonstration ordered in Divisional Operation Order No. 8 was carried out as follows :-

All available machine Guns, before dark, were trained to cover the trenches in front of POPE'S on QUINN'S left, and in front of QUINN'S.

15 grenade throwers were sent forward into the scrub between our forward trench and the Turk position on the Neck.

They crawled up to the edge of the scrub about 20 yards from the Turks' trenches, and threw their grenades into the trenches, and they all exploded.

This party returned to their places via the small secret sap.

For an hour, the enemy kept up a heavy fire on our trenches, and at intervals, up to 1 a.m., fired a number of fire balls over our trenches.

In the meantime, the enemy in front of POPE'S and QUINN'S were heavily engaged.

The enemy replied very briskly at first showing that his trenches were fully manned.

By 1 a.m. the fire almost ceased.

6.32

32

The number of Japanese mortar bombs expended during the day -  
not yet known.

CASUALTIESKILLED

Officers : -  
Other Ranks : Not yet reported.

WOUNDED

Officers : 1 (other names to follow)  
Other Ranks : 47 (more to follow)

SICK

Evacuated :  
to ship. : 35

---

Major-General.

Commanding W.E. & A. Division.

SECRET

6-33

O.C.

## QUINN'S POST.

Appendix No. 43

1. A sortie will be made from your Post on the night 4/5th. inst. with a view to taking and occupying the enemy's fire-trench immediately facing the centre of your Post.
2. This sortie will be organised as under :-
 

Assaulting Party. This party will consist of 60 men who after occupying the enemy trench will transpose the parapet for use against the enemy.

Working Party. The Assaulting Party will be followed immediately by a Working Party (without arms) carrying filled sand-bags. This party will be sub-divided as under :-

<u>Right Party.</u> 10 men	- To construct a loopholed traverse on the right of the captured portion of the enemy's fire-trench.
<u>Left Party</u> 10 men	- To construct a loopholed traverse on the left of the captured portion of the enemy's fire trench.
3. ADDITIONAL PARTIES. The following Parties are also to be arranged :-
  - (a).- 10 men (unarmed) on each flank to pass out sand-bags and material, tools, etc. to the Party in the captured trench as may be possible.
  - (b).- To dig two communication trenches to the captured trench, 3 men at each end of trenches to be dug.
  - (c).- Bomb-throwing party (rifles slung) to accompany Assaulting Party (or to form part of it). This party will carry a few Lobiniere bombs to destroy the enemy trench on each flank of the captured portion.
4. -WOUNDED. On no pretence whatsoever is anyone in either the Assaulting Party or the Working Party to touch a wounded man. This work will be done entirely by Stretcher Bearers who should be organised ready to move out where and when required.
5. -MANNING OF POST. The Post will be otherwise fully manned and Local Reserves brought up to the side of the Hill.
6. -CO-OPERATION. Arrangements for co-operation from Plank Posts and Sections have been made.
7. -HOUR OF ASSAULT. The assault will commence at 11 p.m. which will be about five minutes after the 1st. Brigade has commenced a sortie on a machine gun near GERMAN OFFICER'S TRENCH
8. The operation will be under the direction of Lieut-Col C.H.J. Brown.

E.M. Williams Major  
B.M. 1st. A.L.H. Brigade,  
No. 3 Section Defence.



6/34

app 44

Appendix No. 1411  
No 23 3A

FORCE ORDER No. 19

General Headquarters,

2nd June, 1915.

1. It is notified for information that the ravine shown as KEREVES DERE on the official operations map, scale 1/40,000, will continue to be called by that name and not DOMUZ DERE, which name appears in captured Turkish maps.
2. The ravine named CHOMAK or DOMUZ DERE will be known as CHOMAK DERE, and the hill named ACHI BABA will continue to be known by this name and not as ATCH TEPE.

(Sgd.) W.P. Braithwaite

Major-General,  
C.G.S.  
Medtn. Exp. Force.

Copies to :-

- G.O.C., A.N.Z.A.C.
- G.O.C., 29th Division.
- G.O.C., 42nd (East Lancs) Division.
- G.O.C., Royal Naval Division.
- O.C., Armoured Car Squadron, R.N.A.S.

Issued at 12 noon.

Copies forwarded to

- G.O.C., Australian Division
- G.O.C., N.Z. & A. Division.
- O.C., I.M.A. Brigade.

12 noon, 4/6/15.

Sig  
General Staff,  
A. & N.Z.A.C.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.N.Z.G. 25.

Divisional Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 7th June 1915.

From : N.Z. &amp; A. Division

To : ANZAC

In accordance with your telephone message, G.a.30, of the 2nd June, I have obtained reports on the circumstances attending the withdrawal of troops from No. 3 Picquet on the night 30th/31st May.

I herewith enclose a copy of the reports from Brig. General A.H. Russell, commanding No. 4 Section, - Major P.J. Overton, 2nd in command of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, who was sent out to get in touch with Major Chambers, and who returned to Lieut.Col. Meldrum to report the situation, - from Major Chambers, commanding a Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles, and who was the Officer in command of No. 3 Picquet, - and a report from Capt. Spragge of the Wellington Mounted Rifles.

The report of Major G.F. Hutton, commanding the Nelson Squadron of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, who relieved Major Chambers at No. 3 Picquet when the latter withdrew, cannot be obtained until Major Hutton returns from sick leave at Mudros, as a result of his wound received during this action.

(4 enclosures)

A.J. Godley.

Major-General,

Commanding N.Z. &amp; A. Division.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

No. G.a.125.

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 8th June, 1915.

From :- General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand  
Army Corps.

To :- General Officer Commanding,  
New Zealand & Australian Division.

MEMORANDUM.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the reports submitted with your N.Z.G.25 of 7th June together with your remarks thereon, and to say that the Army Commander considers, from reading the reports, that the responsibility for abandoning the dead, and the rifles and equipment in the evacuated post rests with Major G.F. Hutton - from whom a report should be obtained when that officer returns from sick leave.

(Sgd.) A. Skeen.

Lieut-Colonel,  
for Brigadier-General,  
General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Headquarters,

Anzac Cove,

20th June 1915.

Headquarters,

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

N.Z.G. 195

In continuation of my N.Z.G. 25 of the 7th June and in accordance with your Ga 125 of the 8th June 1915 I herewith enclose a copy of the report of Major G. F. Hutton, Commanding the Nelson Squadron of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, on the circumstances under which No. 3 Post was evacuated on night 30th/31st May 1915.

From a careful study of all the reports and from the communications which reached me while the action was in progress, I am of the opinion that from the afternoon of the 30th May, the idea of all concerned was to evacuate the post and that this idea was naturally communicated to Major Hutton and undoubtedly influenced his action.

I quite agree with the remarks of the Brigadier that there was evidently too much discussion on the part of the subordinate commanders chiefly concerned; but I am not satisfied that it was definitely made clear to Major Hutton that he was not to withdraw from the post unless or until he received orders to do so.

I think that, under the circumstances, there was good reason for his action in evacuating the Post, and for not burying the dead, and much excuse for his not having brought away all the arms, ammunition, and tools.

Enclosed are copies of :-

- (1). Memo from Brigadier General Russell o/c No. 4 Section
- (2). Report by Major G. F. Hutton, Canterbury M.R.

A. J. Godley,

Major General,  
Commanding New Zealand & Aust. Division.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.No. Ga 250.Army Corps Headquarters,  
Anzac Cove, 21st June, 1915.From :- General Staff,  
Australian & New Zealand  
Army Corps.To :- General Officer Commanding,  
New Zealand & Australian Division.MEMORANDUM.

I have to acknowledge receipt of the report, forwarded with your N.Z.G. 185, on the circumstances in which No. 3 Post was evacuated on the night of 30th/31st May 1915.

2. The Army Corps Commander considers that the circumstances of the withdrawal, as detailed in the report, cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and that this appears to be due mainly to the absence of definite instructions as to the object of the operation.

3. As regards the burial of our dead, the Army Corps Commander recognizes that the commander on the spot alone can judge of the needs of the situation; and if delaying to bury dead risks the loss of more lives, our dead must be left.

The same applies to loss of equipment, but in this case there appears to have been time at least to remove the bolts of the rifles left behind and the Army Corps Commander wishes to emphasize the fact that, having regard to the known shortage of rifles and ammunition with the enemy, neglect to render abandoned weapons useless to him places in his hands means of inflicting loss on us which he otherwise might not have.

4. I am to draw your attention to the fourth paragraph of Major Hutton's report, and to ask you again to impress on all newly arrived units the necessity of digging in on any captured position and of making the ground so occupied thoroughly tenable without delay.

(Sgd.) A. Skeen,  
Lieut-Colonel,  
for Brig-General, G.S.,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

N.Z.G. 979

HEADQUARTERS,  
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Anzac Cove, Gallipoli Peninsula,  
5th June 1915.

Headquarters,

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

I have the honour to forward herewith Reports on the  
Actions in which the Division under my command took part,  
on the

18th and 19th May 1915 (Quinn's and Courtney's Posts)

29th May 1915 (Quinn's Post)

29th, 30th, and 31st May 1915 (No. 3 Picquet, No. 4)  
(Section of Defence )

30th May to 1st June 1915, both dates inclusive (Quinn's)  
(Post. )

(Sgd.) A. J. Godley,

Major-General,

Commanding New Zealand & Australian Divsn.

Encls: 4.

C O P Y

APPENDIX NO. 44.

4. 6. 1915.

From No. 4 Section

To N.Z. and A. Dn.

Loss of Rifles and Equipment - No. 3 Post

From the evidence obtained from the O/C the squadron (9th.W.E.C.), from his second in command, and from Major Overton the Officer to whom I gave the order to evacuate this post, it appears that the O/C the relieving squadron Major Hutton (10th Nelson) took over the trenches from Major Chambers together with the tools, and is therefore responsible for their loss.

It further appears that an understanding was reached between Major Hutton and Major Chambers that the former would see to the burial etc. of the dead. This requires the corroboration of Major Hutton.

(Sgd.) A.H. Russell, Brig.Genl.

Cmdg. No. 4 Section.

3 reports enclosed.



To Hdqrs.  
No. 4 Section

2. 6. 1915.

In reply to your B.M. 318 re withdrawal from No. 3 Post. I reached No. 3 Post at about 11.30 p.m. 30/31 May. I made arrangements with Major Chambers to withdraw what was left of his squadron and remove his wounded. This was well under way when I left No. 3 Post at about 12.30 p.m. to proceed to No. 2 Post in order to get in touch with Gen. Russell by telephone, and ~~ask~~ ask that axes entrenching tools rations and water be forwarded to No. 3 Post and to explain the situation.

Previous to my leaving No. 3 Post I had placed the defence of the Post in the hands of Major Hutton until my return. I conferred with Gen. Russell on the telephone and received orders to evacuate No. 3 Post. I returned to No. 3 arriving at about 1 a.m. to find that Major Hutton had already retired from the Post. His last troop was climbing over the parapet as I reached it, the Turks being already in possession of part of the trenches. It was then too late for me to do more than ascertain that all the wounded had been removed.

I then took charge of the retirement reaching No. 2 Post safely with all detached parties taking part in operation at 1.30 a.m.

(Sgd.) P.J. OVERTON

Major  
C Y C

(Copy).

To/

New Zealand &amp; Australian Division.

Forwarded herewith Major Hutton's report. It appears that this officer did agree with Major Chambers, whom he relieved, to look after rifles, etc., and attend to the dead; that he abandoned the trench without definite orders to do so, and I am of the opinion that too much irresponsible discussion of the difficulties to be met, and a want of determination in carrying out orders without questioning, contributed to the result. Instead of a fixed determination to see the thing through there appears to have been a half-formed intention of getting out of the Post as soon as possible. I consider the whole circumstances were very trying.

(Sgd.) A.H. Russell,  
Brigadier-General.  
O/C No. 4 Section.

18/6/'15.

C O P Y

Anzac Cove  
2. 6. 15.To  
O.C. Wellington Mounted Rifles

## Report on the evacuation of No. 3 detached post.

As directed I have to report : After being with Major Chambers in occupation of No. 3 detached post on the 30th ult., that at about 10 p.m. when in charge of the rear trenches of the post, I saw the reinforcements approaching and after ordering my men not to fire called out to the reinforcements to "keep down". Lieut. Mayne with the reinforcements, and I exchanged names and the reinforcements drew up to the trenches. Major Hutton came up and ordered me to get my men out of the trenches as quick as possible and let him get in. I replied that I had already sent for Major Chambers, who would hand over the trenches, and had sent word round for all men to be ready to be immediately relieved. I also ordered the men in the trenches to file out. Major Hutton pointed out that he was in command and that my men must at once come out of the trenches. Major Chambers then came up and met Major Hutton and I heard them arrange if we the 9th Squadron would get the wounded out, Major Hutton would bury our dead, and take charge of our spare ~~equipment~~ equipment, neither of which undertakings were then possible for the 9th Squadron. I then instructed Lieut. Maunsell to collect the wounded outside the trenches, and I with Capt. Talbot superintended the interchange of the Canterbury men for the 9th Squadron men in the trenches and saw the wounded out to Mr. Maunsell who conveyed them to the beach.

The remainder of the 9th Squadron men then covered the retirement of Lieut. Chaytor and his troop into the trenches.

Under the guidance of Captain Hastings I withdrew the 9th Squadron leaving Major Chambers in the trenches with Major Hutton.

I have the honour to be Sir

Your obedient servant

(Sgd.) C.R. Spragg Capt.

(Copy).

From : Major G.F. Hutton,  
Canterbury Mounted Rifles

To : The Adjutant,  
Canterbury Mounted Rifles.

Walker's Ridge, 17/6/15.

In reply to your request for a report on the circumstances attending the withdrawal of troops from No. 3 Post on the night of 30th./31st. May, and the reason why the dead with their rifles, accoutrements and ammunition were not disposed of or brought in before withdrawal, I have to report as follows:-

At about 7 p.m. on May 30th. I received orders to take 3 Troops of my Squadron to the Supply Depot and to draw and carry out to No. 3 Post rations for 24 hours for the garrison of that Post.

While I was waiting for these rations to be issued, Colonel Finlay arrived and informed me that Major Chambers' Squadron were hard pressed in No. 3 Post, and ordered me to leave the rations and to go with my Squadron as quickly as possible to No. 3 Post and assist Major Chambers to withdraw his Squadron and to get his wounded away. He also told me that Major Overton would be in charge of these operations. Before I got to No. 1 Post Hill I met Major Overton who discussed the situation with me. He told me that he anticipated that it would be only possible to cover the removal of the wounded and the withdrawal of Major Chambers' Squadron. On arrival at Clay Hill (halfway between Nos. 1 and 2 Posts) I met Captain Hastings. He told me that the Turks were on the hill between No. 3 Post and No. 1 Post and he did not think it was possible to get through. I then moved my Squadron forward along the Southern slope of No. 3 Post Hill and reached No. 3 Post without coming under fire. At this time the Turks were not pressing hard and there was rather a lull in their attack. I discussed the situation with Major Chambers and arranged and carried out the taking over of the Post from him. Major Overton arrived then and told me he thought it would be possible to hold the Post if rations could be got up, and also the necessary tools and assistance to put the Post in a proper state of defence. He then went to the telephone at No. 2 Post

(2).

enquire about these matters, leaving me in charge of the Post. I told Major Chambers that I would bury the dead. At the time I believed it would be possible to do this, as the Turks' fire had decreased considerably.

Very soon after this the Turks commenced to attack heavily. Their rifle and Machine Gun fire became very intense, and they threw a great many bombs. They pressed their attack particularly at the point where they had blown away a section of our parapet with a mine. They also worked round both our flanks through the scrub. About half the length of our fire trench was deep enough to cover a man properly; the remainder only averaged about 2 feet deep. Thick scrub was standing right up to the parapet the whole way round the Post. On three sides of the Post the Turks crept up to within ten yards of the parapet and less. The whole trench was very narrow - less than 18 inches in many places, so that intercommunication and control was very difficult. I had not been able to ascertain the whereabouts of our dead owing to the darkness and the fact that some of them were covered over by earth from explosions of bombs and the mine. Major Chambers' wounded were now reported to be all well clear of the danger area. In the meantime three of my own men had been wounded and I was next concerned with getting them into safety. I was convinced that if I could get them away it would be wrong to hold the Post after that. The Turks had so surrounded the Post by this time that the chances of evacuating it at all were becoming very small. As soon as my own wounded were reported safe, I decided that I must abandon the dead, or run a very grave risk of my men being cut up. I do not consider there was time to search for the collect tools, equipment, etc., in the dark. An attempt to do that would have given the tip to the Turks and brought on the rush which was impending the whole time. Accordingly I gave the order to evacuate the Post. This was done without loss.

In connection with these operations I received no written orders or information. The verbal orders I received were as follows:

From Colonel Finlay -

1. To carry out rations and water to No. 3 Post; and, later,

(3).

2. To take my Squadron as quickly as possible to No. 3 Post and to assist in the withdrawal of Major Chambers' Squadron and the removal of his wounded.

When I arrived at No. 3 Post I had no order to hold the Post longer than was necessary to cover the removal of the wounded.

It was only at this juncture that Major Overton gave me an order to hold the Post, while he endeavoured to get up the necessary assistance to make it tenable. But qualifying this order was his opinion given very definitely to me that to attempt more than the removal of the wounded would be to risk the lives of the whole party.

Both at the time and now I very much regretted abandoning the bodies of comrades killed in action, and I also realised the importance of not abandoning the arms, equipment and tools to the enemy, but under the circumstances I believe I did right.

(Sgd.) G.F. Hutton, Major.  
Canterbury Mounted Rifles.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Report on the action of 29th, May 1915 at QUINN'S POST.O.C. Lieut.Col. G.J. BURNAGE V.D. 13th Battn.

The 28th May was unusually quiet, but, for the last few days the enemy had been digging trenches, and mining towards QUINN'S POST. On the 27th May and at 11 a.m. on the 28th, it had been found necessary to blow up two shafts at which we had been working, to counter the enemy's mining efforts.

At 6 p.m. on the 28th May it was reported that the enemy had re-established himself on the RAZOR BACK Ridge. This Ridge commands the upper end of MONASH Gully.

The above facts gave grounds for the assumption that the enemy intended to make a determined effort to gain a strong footing at the head of the Gully, which would jeopardise our position in the MONASH Valley.

At 3.30 a.m. on the 29th May, a mine was suddenly exploded close in front of QUINN'S POST, damaging a portion of the fire trench in No. 3 Subsection, thus isolating No. 4 Subsection. The mine also damaged the inter-communication trench.

A heavy attack accompanied with incessant throwing of bombs followed, and the Turks succeeded in making an entry into the fire trench, 50 feet of the parapet of which had been badly damaged by the explosion of the mine, which also unfortunately buried a large number of our hand grenades and mortar bombs.

At 4.30 a.m. the Turks commenced working round the left Subsection which had been cut off from the remainder as a result of the explosion. Col. H. G. CHAUVEL, O.C. No. 3 Section, then ordered the 16th Battalion to work up the Gully between QUINN'S POST and POPE'S HILL in order to protect the left of the former post. This Battalion, however, had not proceeded very far before it was held up by Machine Gun fire. Instructions were then sent by the G.O.C. N.Z. & A. Division to the O.C. No. 3 Section to have fresh troops ready, with material to repair the parapet as soon as possible.

At 4.45 a.m. a further report was received that the enemy was firmly established in No. 3 Section of QUINN'S, but that we

still held Nos. 1, 2 and 4 Sections intact. All available reinforcements were despatched by Col. CHAUVEL to QUINN'S POST, but owing to the destruction of the inter-communication trenches, it was found very difficult to reach the lost section of the fire trench.

At 5 a.m. the General Officer Commanding N.Z. & A. Division issued orders that the lost section of the trench was to be retaken at all costs. Arrangements were made for covering fire from other Sections and the assaulting party was followed by a working party carrying tools and sandbags, which was to restore the fire trench and communications as rapidly as possible. About this time Lieut. Col CHAUVEL proceeded personally to QUINN'S POST to supervise operations, and, finding Lieut. Col. BURNAGE had been wounded, appointed Lieut. Col POPE to command the Post.

At about 5.30 a.m. the enemy were reported to be moving up reinforcements to the right of QUINN'S POST. By 6 a.m. the lost portion of the trench had been gallantly retaken by a party of the 15th Battalion under Major QUINN, at the point of the bayonet; all the Turks in the trench were either killed or captured, and the work of restoring the damaged parapet and communication trench commenced. At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, and the rifle and Machine Gun fire was very heavy, accompanied by bombs and shell fire of every description. *The attack was however beaten back with loss*

The defence was ably assisted by Artillery fire from Major Sykes' and Phillips' Field Artillery Batteries and by the Mountain Battery in No. 3 Section; to the fine shooting of the Artillery the repulse of the enemy is largely due.

By 7.15 a.m. the O.C. No. 3 Section reported that all his local reserves had been absorbed, and that the 10th Light Horse Regt. from the Sectional Reserve had been ordered up; he also stated that his casualties had been severe, amongst whom it is regretted that Major QUINN - so long associated with the able defence of QUINN'S POST was killed; Lieut. Col. BURNAGE, as previously stated, was also wounded.



(3)

The General Officer Commanding thereupon ordered 1 Battalion of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade to proceed to MONASH Valley, and the 1st Australian Division, in response to the G.O.C's request, promised to afford all the assistance possible.

At 8.15 a.m. Col. MONASH - commanding in the Valley during the temporary absence of Col. CHAUVEL - reported that the attack had slackened off considerably, that the position was quite satisfactory, but that it would take some time to restore the parapet and clear out the trench, as it was full of dead and dying Turks. Moreover, the working party was much interrupted by Turkish fire.

Whilst the work of clearing the communication trench was in process, 16 Turks were discovered out off in the trench; on finding there was no hope of escape they surrendered. By 8.45 a.m. the attack had practically ceased, firing becoming desultory.

The question of assuming the offensive then arose, but, owing to the fact that the trenches opposite QUINN'S POST were still held in force, and the hostile Machine Guns on the flanks had not been located, it was deemed inadvisable to attempt it.

Our casualties amounted to 33 killed, including 2 Officers, and 178 wounded; the enemy's casualties must have been heavy as 30 were found and buried by our men in the trenches, and more than double that number were lying dead outside.

All ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage. The Turkish Gun, Rifle and Machine Gun fire was very heavy. Our trenches were constantly subjected to hostile shrapnel and time lyddite gun fire. Pope's, Courtney's and Nos. 1, 2, and 4 Sections afforded excellent covering fire; the Artillery support was invaluable, especially that of No. 2 Battery, N.Z. Field Artillery, from PLUGGE'S Plateau (Major Sykes R.F.A.)

To O.C. W.M.R.

Report on disposal of dead, their arms and Equipment  
in No. 3 Post. 30. 5. 15.

I beg to report that after holding No. 3 Post with 5 Officers and 91 others for 24 hours from 9.15 p.m. on the 29.5.15 I was relieved by some of the C.M.R.

About 10 p.m. on the 30.5.15 when on the far side of the trenches from the entrance I received word from Captain Spragg who was on the look out for reliefs that they had arrived and Major Hutton had taken over the trenches.

Telling all the men I passed to hold on until actually relieved by a man to take the place of each one I went to meet Major Hutton. Seeing Major Hutton we arranged that his men should go in at once and mine should retire, and Captain Spragg superintended the withdrawal of the Ninth while I explained the positions. Major Overton came up and asked what I was doing with the wounded, and I told him we were taking them with us, and I had put Lieut. Maunsell in charge of them. Major Overton called for Mr. Maunsell and told him not to shift any who were wounded in the stomach or head. I said have you Medical assistance coming and will you undertake the care of any we may have to leave on that account, and he replied "Yes". However we managed to move the lot. There were 13 wounded 8 of whom had to be carried, and it required 4 men to each one, besides a covering party and men to carry rifles and equipment of the bearers thus taking about 50 men out of the 65 sound ones left.

I asked Major Overton to see to the burial of the dead, an collection of all equipment and said our picks and shovels were left for the use of the relieving Squadron. Major Overton promised to see to all this, and then went to No. 2 Post to ring up Headquarters and explain the position. By this time all my men including the wounded were outside the trenches, and the 10th Squadron men were in, with the exception of Lieut. Chaytors troop, which was covering the entrance; while this troop went in to the trenches I sent Capt. Spragg with the remainder of the Squadron

(2)

to take his place.

At this time Captain Talbot came up with a message for Major Hutton to the effect that he was to use his own discretion about holding on to the trenches, and while he was speaking the enemy opened a heavy fire. Major Hutton decided to abandon the post and withdraw his men.

It was not possible before we were relieved to bury our dead, as I was expecting the enemy to rush the trenches at any time and it could not be done in daylight. After being relieved my Squadron retired taking all the wounded, and it was not possible with the men available to take the dead or even their equipment without making two trips.

Following are details of those injured.

	Killed	Wounded	Minor Injuries
Bullets	10	8	5
Bombs	3	5	Nil
Shrapnel	Nil	Nil	Nil

I have the honour to be Sir

Your obedient servant

(Sgd.) Selwyn Chambers.  
Major.

2. 6. 15.

new zealand and australian division  
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Report on Action of 18/19 May 1915.

During the afternoon of the 18th May, the Turks heavily shelled our posts, more particularly QUINN'S and COURTNEY'S in No. 3 Section of defence: the latter was attacked by an 8 inch gun which did considerable damage to the parapets and support trenches of the Post.

During the evening, information was received from Anzac that Turkish Troops (guns and infantry) were moving in a North Westerly direction from the North and East of KRITHIA (sq. 176.0)

It was also reported that Turkish Staffs had been observed reconnoitring the Anzac Position from the slopes of the KILID BAHR Plateau (sq. 203).

Accordingly all posts were warned to be on the alert and to ensure that a maximum number of rifles could be efficiently brought into line along the fire trenches. Troops were ordered to stand to arms at 3 a.m. on the 19th May.

NO. 3 SECTION (Colonel CHAUVEL C.M.G.)

At exactly 12 midnight 18/19 May, a heavy fire was opened all along the line, but especially opposite COURTNEY'S POST, which was subjected to the heaviest fire yet directed against any of our Posts.

The Artillery opened on the enemy's trenches - the shooting of No. 2 Battery N.Z.F.A. (Major Sykes) being particularly effective on the trenches immediately in front of QUINN'S POST. The shells of this Battery burst only a few feet immediately above our fire trenches and covered the enemy with a hail of shrapnel.

The 5th(Australian) Field Artillery Battery under Major Phillips and No. 26 (Jacob's) Indian Mountain Battery (Major J.E.L. Bruce R.G.A. - since killed in action) also rendered valuable assistance.

QUINN'S POST.

Garrison : 15th Battn. Aust. Inf.  
 30 men 2nd A.L.H. (working party)  
 3 Coys. 16th Regt. (sent up during the  
 action)

At 3 a.m. 19th May, the enemy made an attempt to rush QUINN'S POST, but was repulsed with loss: at 5 a.m. a similar attack was repulsed with the assistance of 2 Coys. 16th Regt., and another, but less sustained effort, was made at 7 a.m.

At 9 a.m. a determined attempt to capture the post was made, which lasted till 10.30 a.m.

Between, and during, all these attacks, showers of bombs were rained on the post, and the Machine gun and rifle fire were exceptionally severe. The overhead cover erected in some of the support trenches saved many casualties.

At 2 p.m. 19th May, the Garrison was relieved by 16th Battalion Australian Infantry, and 150 men, 13th Battalion Aust. Inf.

At 1 a.m. on the 20th May, a feeble attack was made which was easily repulsed. 1 Company, 15th Regt. Aust. Inf. reported

At 3 a.m. the enemy attacked the right of the Post: this was met by machine gun fire from the adjoining post, and few of the enemy got back to his trenches.

At 4 a.m. conditions became normal, no further attack being made.

#### COURTNEY'S POST.

Garrison : 14th Battalion  
                  Details 13th Battalion.

During the 18th May, the enemy heavily shelled this Post, particularly such Machine Gun emplacements as he had located. The parapets and emplacements were considerably damaged by 8 inch shells: much of this damage was, however, repaired after dusk.

Heavy firing started at midnight 18/19 May.

At 3.30 a.m. 19 May, the fire increased in volume, and shortly after, an assault was made on the Post, the enemy throwing bombs when they got close to the trenches. The assault was made in a most determined manner, and four of the enemy actually got into our trenches; they were attacked with bombs, and finally bayoneted.

At dawn, the pressure on the Post relaxed, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy as he returned to his trenches.

During the 19th, the Post was again subjected to shrapnel fire, but little damage was done.

The night 19th/20th May was normal so far as COURTNEY'S POST was concerned.

#### POPE'S HILL

Garrison : 1st A.L.H.  
                  1 Squadron 3rd A.L.H.

At 3 a.m. on 19th May, a small party of the enemy endeavoured

to work its way down MONASH GULLY to the left of POPE'S HILL. This move was frustrated by the picquet in the Gully with a loss to the enemy of 12 killed.

At 3.15 a.m. after a heavy burst of fire, a rush was made against the trenches on the left flank. This was stopped by rifle fire, only two of the enemy reaching the parapet.

Supporting fire was given by 18-pr. Q.F. Guns, Mountain Guns and by the Machine Guns of No. 4 Section.

C Squadron, 1st A.L.H. did excellent work in connection with this attack.

Soon after, it was observed that the enemy was pushing forward against the right flank of No. 4 Section. This was stopped by fire delivered from the left of POPE'S HILL.

NO. 4 SECTION (Brig. General A.H. Russell)

On the 18th May, the garrison was warned to be alert, and the supports were kept well closed up to the fire trenches: the 3 saps leading towards the "Neck" leading to "Baby 700" were fully manned, and were each placed in charge of an Officer.

At 9 p.m. fairly heavy rifle fire was opened by the enemy.

At 12 midnight 19/20 May, a general attack was made on us with rifle and machine gun fire and hand grenades: this was continued until shortly before daybreak when the enemy charged the extreme left of our position opposite the Neck, our sapheads and across the Neck- the frontage of the attack being about 60 yards.

During this assault, they advanced along both sides of No. 4 sap, and inflicted several casualties on the men in it.

The men in No. 3 sap which runs at right angles to the line of attack were compelled to climb up on to the parapet in order to fire, as the sap had not been made into a fire trench.

The men of No. 2 Sap which lies behind No. 3 being also unable to fire on account of the depth of the sap, rushed forward and joined the men of No. 3 lying on top of their parapet.

When the attack was brought to a standstill by the fire from our main fire trenches, all these men charged, but were unable to get

(4)

home owing to the darkness, and thickness of the scrub. They were stopped when they had cleared the head of No. 4 sap.

The enemy now retired to the Neck, under cover of a Machine Gun.

Any further advance would have entailed heavy casualties, as two enemy Machine Guns, in addition to the one already mentioned, are known to command the Neck, and which had been firing at our trenches during the night. These were located at daylight, and the 26th Indian Mounted Battery silenced them, knocking at least one out completely.

The Auckland M.R. Machine Guns, which command the ground between the sapheads and the MONASH gully, were well and boldly handled, and inflicted loss on the enemy especially after daybreak, when the Turks were moving to the rear along their various trenches.

The Wellington M.R. Machine Guns on the left also did good work in assisting to clear the left of No. 4 sap.

By 4.30 a.m. the attack on No. 4 Section was over, and the enemy's fire died down.

As day broke, considerable parties of the enemy were observed from No. 1 Outpost (on left flank of No. 4 Section) - three or four hundred about the Neck leading to "Babt 700", and two or three hundred on the North slopes of Snipers' Gully, immediately in front of No. 4 Section. Rifle and Machine Gun fire was opened on these bodies, and some loss inflicted.

Loss was also inflicted on the enemy located in the trenches in front of POPE'S HILL, particularly when these began to retire along their communication trenches.

During the fight, an order was passed down No. 4 sap and thence to a Machine gun and No. 5 sap to the effect that the men advancing against us were Australians. Fire immediately ceased, and it was some minutes before it was started again - this occurred just as the enemy's charge reached its limit.

This order almost certainly came from the Turks.

CASUALTIES.

The following casualties were reported as the result of this action :

	Killed	Wounded	Missing
Officers :	3	8	-
Other Ranks :	62	219	-
Total :	65	227	-

The enemy's casualties have been estimated by the Intelligence Department at 600 killed, and 7000 wounded along the entire front held by the Army Corps.

Of these, a large proportion were in front of QUINN'S and COURTNEY'S POSTS.



NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONReport on the Action at No. 3 Picquet, No. 4 Section of Defence.  
29th, 30th, and 31st May 1915, both dates inclusive.

On the night of the 28th May, an enemy trench immediately to the North East of No. 2 Picquet, and about 500 yards from it, was rushed by a party of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, and then permanently occupied by a Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles under Major Chambers.

During the remainder of that night and the following day the picquet was improved, and the garrison consolidated and strengthened its position.

On the evening of the 29<sup>th</sup>/30<sup>th</sup>, a report was received by the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section that this Squadron (9th Wellington East Coast) was being heavily attacked.

The Officer Commanding No. 4 Section did not think it wise to reduce the strength of No. 2 Picquet, already garrisoned by troops of the Otago Mounted Rifles, therefore, he accordingly ordered out the remaining two Squadrons of the Wellington Regiment (the 2nd Taranaki, and the 6th Manawatu Squadrons), the former under Major Elmslie, the latter under Major Dick.

At 11 p.m. the 2nd Squadron under Major Elmslie moved out and got in touch with the enemy 150 yards away from No. 2 Picquet.

The enemy was found to be in force on the plateau on which No. 3 Picquet was situated, and particularly on its northern and southern slopes. The Picquet was practically surrounded.

The advance of Major Elmslie's Squadron was checked, but not until he had cleared the southern slopes.

This Squadron then took up a defensive position within a few yards of the crest which the Turks held, and remained in this position during the whole of next day, the 30th.

The 6th Manawatu Squadron under Major Dick came up at daylight, and with one troop Captain Hastings tried to find a covered way round the base of the southern slope up to the right of No. 3 Picquet.

Captain Hastings did in fact succeed in getting within a few yards of No. 3 Picquet, but could attract no attention owing to the heavy rifle fire and the noise.

Both relieving Squadrons now came under heavy maxim gun fire from the Turkish trenches in front of the neck, and very little movement took place during the remainder of the daylight, but the enemy kept gradually creeping round the North and North West slopes of No. 3 Picquet.

They repeatedly got within a few yards of our trenches on both sides, but the top plateau was kept by our machine guns and mountain battery.

Bombs were frequently used by the enemy against the garrison of No. 3 Picquet, but with little effect.

The Turks made no attempt to attack with the bayonet either by day or night.

At dusk the Turks came over the crest on to the plateau.

An urgent request for help was then sent by Major Chambers, and an order was given to Lieut. Colonel Meldrum, commanding the Wellington Mounted Rifles, to send forward his two supporting Squadrons. They found it impossible to advance in the face of a heavy fire which was brought to bear on them.

In the meantime, part of the parapet of No. 3 Picquet had been broken by shell fire from the "W" hills, ~~as~~ the telephonic communication between Nos. 2 and 3 positions was cut, and the Turks got into one end of the trench, but were driven out.

As the two Wellington Squadrons were unable to effect a junction with the garrison, the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section ordered a Squadron of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment, under Major Overton, 2nd in command, to work round and reinforce the Picquet, by what appeared to be a sheltered gully on the South West side.

This Squadron (Nelson), having got into communication with the two Wellington Squadrons, which were already held up, and working up on their right, got in touch with Major Chambers, and sent some men into the Picquet as reinforcements.

Major Overton then went back to Lieut. Colonel Meldrum to report the situation, leaving Major Hutton in command of the relieving Squadron, the orders given by Brigadier-General Russell to Major Hutton being that he was to occupy the Picquet to enable Major

Chambers to withdraw to No. 2 Picquet, and to evacuate his wounded.

Lieut. Colonel Meldrum then reported to Brigadier-General Russell that he considered the Picquet was untenable without further reinforcements.

Brigadier-General Russell then informed the G.O.C. Division that he was ordering Lieut. Colonel Meldrum to withdraw the garrison to No. 2 Picquet, if, to hold No. 3, would entail calling for further reinforcements.

Brigadier-General Russell also advocated its evacuation as he considered the position of the Picquet unsatisfactory owing to the difficulty of communication, its being commanded on all sides, requiring a strong garrison, and undesirable as being in front of our line instead of being thrown back.

The G.O.C., after consulting the Army Corps Commander, gave permission to the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section for the evacuation of the Picquet.

On receiving these orders, at 9 p.m. Major Overton returned to No. 3 Picquet to help Major Hutton to withdraw his Squadron, but on reaching the Picquet, he found that they were already retiring, as Major Hutton considered it untenable.

The wounded had all been removed safely in the dark, and the balance of Major Chambers' Squadron withdrew into the gully below with the relieving squadron.

The evacuation of the trenches was not discovered by the Turks for 2 or 3 minutes.

The troops then fell back on the little hill between Nos. 1 and 2 Posts followed by the Turks who were loudly shouting, but burst of rapid fire kept them in check.

Some of the Turks actually overtook them near this little hill, under cover of which a dressing station had been established. A few of our men charged with the bayonet successfully.

A covering position was then taken up in the communication trench beyond No. 1 Picquet, the Turks all the time advancing down between the little hill and No. 3 Picquet.

About 2 a.m. on the 31st May, a Squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles was sent out to assist the withdrawal and to relieve the 2nd Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles. Under cover of these two Squadrons the 9th Squadron was withdrawn.

The enemy, although threatening, made no further attack, and all the troops, with the exception of the fresh Squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles who remained out till daylight, returned to camp by 3.30 a.m.

The 9th Squadron was very much exhausted, having been fighting hard for 48 hours.

The garrison of No. 3 Picquet at the outset was 5 officers and 93 other ranks, of which 14 were killed and 15 wounded.

Lieutenants Cameron and Emerson were among the killed, and Major Chambers among the wounded.

It is estimated that the strength of the enemy was between 2/3000, and that their losses were not less than 250.

It is unfortunate that in their withdrawal the relieving Squadron were unable to remove the rifles, ammunition and equipment of the dead, and that 60 picks and shovels had to be abandoned.

It has later been reported that early on the morning of the 31st the Turks were seen to have stripped the bodies of our dead.

In addition to the casualties above noted, Captain Hardham, V.C., was seriously wounded, and Lieutenant MacDonald dangerously wounded.

Since the above withdrawal a new No. 3 Picquet has been established on rising ground 200 yards to the North of No. 2 Picquet, which renders our left flank a good deal stronger than under the previous arrangement.

(3)

The total casualties during the action were :-

KILLED

Officers	3
Other Ranks	22

WOUNDED

Officers	4
Other Ranks	61

MISSING

Officers	-
Other Ranks	1

---

Total	91
-------	----

---

---

Report on the Operations 11th - 31st August 1915.

of the

Force under the command of Major-General Sir. A. Godley, K.C.M.G.Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.Reference Map :  
Gallipoli 1/20000, Sheet KOJA DERE.No 2 Post, ANZAC,  
GALLIPOLI,  
3rd September 1915.To : The Brigadier-General, General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows on the operations of the Force under my command between the 11th and 31st August, both dates inclusive.

1. - Speaking generally, the operations herein reported on come naturally under two headings :

(a) Operations against the enemy on my left flank conducted by Major-General H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., with the object of effecting a satisfactory junction with the right of the 9th Army Corps and, in conjunction with this Corps of gaining ground to the East.

(b) A re-organisation of the line held, entailing movements of troops within the area occupied by my Force. These had for their object the assembly of formations, which had become much spilt up during the arduous and intricate operations described in my previous report (G.351, dated 16th August 1915.)

2. - On the 11th August 1915, the date up to which my previous report carried the operations, the line was garrisoned as follows :-

<u>No 3 SECTION.</u>	Troops.
	1st Australian Light Horse brigade.
	2 companies, 8th Cheshire Regiment.
<u>No. 4 SECTION.</u>	
	3rd Australian Light Horse brigade.
	8th Cheshire Regiment (less 2 companies).
<u>NO. 5 SECTION.</u>	<u>Outer Line.</u>
	26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
	No 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.
	8/Welsh Pioneers (Divisional Troops, 13th Division.
	6/Leinster Regiment (29th Infantry Brigade).
	6/L.N. Lancashire Regt. (38th Infantry Brigade)
	7/Gloucester Regiment (39th Infantry Brigade)
	8/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, (40th Infantry Brigade)
	5/Wiltshire Regiment. (40th Infantry Brigade)
	New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
	<u>Inner Line.</u>
	New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.
	Maori Contingent.

No 6 SECTION.

- 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)
- No 2 Company, New Zealand Engineers.
- 29th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion)
- 38th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion)
- 39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion)
- 4/8<sup>th</sup> W<sup>th</sup> Borderers (40th Infantry Brigade)
- 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.
- 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.

(b) On this date 11th August, orders were issued for the consolidation and strengthening of the position now held and each Section was allotted to an area of the country which was to be studied and reconnoitred to the utmost extent possible, with a view to a further forward movement in the near future.

The 2 Batteries of the 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, which had been placed at the disposal of Generals Shaw and Cox, were brought under the direct command of their Commanding Officer, Lieut-Colonel J.L. Parker, R.G.A., and certain batteries of Field Artillery (18 pr and 4.5" howitzer) were transferred from their positions in the old ANZAC positions to other positions in rear of the left flank of my forces.

3. - OPERATIONS UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL H.V. COX.

On August 11th 1915, on conclusion of the first phase of the operations against SARI BAIR, the left Section of the line held by the Force attacking SARI BAIR was under the command of Major-General H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., who had at his disposal troops as detailed in para. 2 a. These troops were disposed (vide Sketch Map No 1), generally speaking, from Knoll 80.D.5 - 6 to the KXX KAJAJIK DERE across the DAMAKJELIK BAIR to the vicinity of DAMAKJELIK KUYU, the lines on the plains consisting of picquets only, which were used as observation posts by day and were fully manned by night.

THE FIRST ATTACK ON KABAK KUYU.

(a) On the night 12th/13th August, an attempt was made to seize the KABAK KUYU wells. 2 Companies 9th Worcestershire Regiment, followed by a working party of the 1/6 Gurkha Rifles, advanced against the wells from DAMAKJELIK BAIR covered by a heavy fire from the South Wales Borderers. The Wells were not captured, though two attempts were made; the enemy's resistance being <sup>unexpectedly</sup> ~~exceptionally~~ strong. Under cover of this operation, the picquet line was ~~xxxxxx~~ advanced slightly and extended to the left, more favourable positions being gained : but it was very much in the air,

as no connection had as yet been made with the right of the 9th Army Corps.

On the night of the 13th/14th August, the picquet line was still further extended to KAZLAR CHAIR (vide sketch map no. 2) and Brig-General Cayley took over command of the left portion of No 5 Section.

During the next few days no further forward movement was made: the line gained was, however, put in a satisfactory state, posts being connected up and communication trenches dug. The line was shelled at intervals, and sniping was very prevalent till our troops took the matter in hand, and kept it down.

THE CAPTURE OF KABAK KUYU AND KAJAJIK AGHALA.

(b) On the 21st August, the 9th Corps undertook operations with the object of gaining ground to the East and capturing ISMAIL OGLU TEPE. The Force under my command was ordered to co-operate especially on my left; accordingly, orders were issued to Major-General Cox to advance on to the line KAJAJIK ~~XXXXXXXX~~ DERE - KAJAJIK AGHALA - SUSAK KUYU } at which place he was to connect with the 9th Corps.

To assist in these operations, the N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade, less 2 Regiments, under Brig-General A.H. Russell, was moved over to the left flank.

The artillery bombardment of the enemy's position was somewhat curtailed owing to a portion of our artillery being ~~maintained~~ placed at the disposal of the 9th Corps.

At 3 p.m. on the 21st August, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (less 2 regiments), 500 men of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, 1 battalion of the 29th Infantry Brigade (1 Hants), and No 2 Company N.Z. Engineers, all under the command of Brig-General A.H. Russell, advanced from the lines of the 4th Australian Infantry brigade and attacked the lower portion of ~~KXX~~ KAJAJIK DERE ~~xxxx~~ Spur and HILL 60. The advance was covered by the fire of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.

At the same time, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, under Lieut-Col. A.J. Palin, 14th Sikhs, advanced against the line KAJAJIK AGHALA - SUSAK KUYU, and at 3.10 p.m. the Connaught Rangers under the direction of Brig-General G.Q. Agnew, 29th Brigade, assaulted and captured KABAK KUYU. The leading portion of this Regiment, however, instead of reforming as ordered, continued to advance in a Northerly direction and suffered heavily.

In the meantime, a portion of General Russell's force quickly gained the South western slopes of KAI AJIKAGHALA; but the troops issuing further up the Dere met with much opposition, and were checked. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the Turks retiring up the spur by the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.

By 6 p.m. the Australians had gained but a precarious footing on the northern side of the KAI AJIK DERE. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles, after capturing ~~two~~ two lines of trenches, had reached the line 92.I.5-9, and the Indian Brigade was halted on the line 92.H.9-6 - SUSACK KUYU. The 14th Sikhs were then ordered to connect the right of the Indian Brigade with the left of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade; and the Connaught Rangers were put in to support the attack of the latter.

In the meantime parties of the South Wales Borderers had been putting KABAK KUYU in a state of defence, and making communication trenches to the rear. During the night of the 21st/22nd August, the Turks made two distinct attempts from KAI AJIK AGHALA (HILL 60) to recapture their lost trenches, but were beaten off.

(c) On the morning of the 22nd August, an attempt was made to improve our position on HILL 60; the 18th Battalion, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade, being sent up to General Cox for the purpose. Two more lines of Turkish trenches were captured: but the position was still not satisfactory, particularly as Turkish reinforcements were known to be coming up.

At 7 a.m. it was discovered that the 9th Corps had fallen back from the vicinity of SUSACK KUYU to KAZLAR CHAIR. As this left our flank exposed, the 19th Infantry Battalion (5th Australian Infantry Brigade) was sent up to fill the gap, and a company of the <sup>4th</sup> S.W. Borderers was ordered to proceed from KABAK KUYU to SUSACK KUYU. Owing to the heavy cross fire, it was, however, unable to reach the latter place. By midday, the 18th Australian Infantry had found themselves unable to maintain their position in the trenches they had captured, and the position was much the same as at nightfall on the 21st August (vide sketch map No 3).

During the night 22nd/23rd August, the 19th Battalion found two picquets connecting KAZLAR CHAIR and SUSACK KUYU.

From the 23rd to the 27th August, the line gained was consolidated:

the 9th Corps, however, did not succeed in connecting up with our left at SUSACK KUYU; consequently General Cox was compelled to hold the greater portion of the line SUSACK KUYU - KAZLAR CHAIR.

On the 26th and following days, the 8th, 9th, and 10th Light Horse Regiments ( 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade) were placed at the disposal of general Cox.

(d) On the 27th August, a further attempt was made to improve our position on HILL 60. This operation was entrusted by Major-General Cox to Brig-General A.H. Russell with the following :-

<u>Troops</u>	<u>Strength</u>
N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade.	300
Connaught Rangers, 29th Infantry Brigade.	250
4th Australian Infantry Brigade.	250
17th Battalion, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade.	100
18th Battalion, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade.	100

The assault which was preceded by a heavy bombardment of the enemy trenches on HILL 60 and on the KAJAJIK DERE Spur, took place at 5 p.m. on 27th August. Considerable opposition was met with, especially on the right from the KAJAJIK DERE Spur: but a firm footing was obtained by the New Zealanders on Hill 60, and by the Australians on the lower portion of the KAJAJIK SPUR.

At 7 p.m. most of the enemy trenches on the South Western slopes of the hill were in our possession. The top of the hill, however, was still held by the enemy.

During the night 28th/29th August, another assault was delivered on the Turk trenches on HILL 60, and further progress was made. The 10th Australian Light Horse captured two rows of trenches, and a satisfactory footing was gained on the Hill.

The position gained is now being strongly fortified. Machine guns and trench mortars have been placed in position, obstacles erected, and covered communication with the rear established. Bomb proof shelters are in course of construction.

As a result of these operations, a position has been gained, which is likely to be of value in the event of ~~the~~ future forward operations: for it dominates a considerable portion of the low country towards ISMAIL OGLU TEPE and in the direction of BIYUK ANAFARTA (vide sketch map No. 4).

(e) The fighting was almost entirely hand to hand with bayonet and bomb,



and was of a severe nature. Two Turkish machine guns were captured (and are now in use against the enemy), as well as a quantity of rifles, bombs, and ammunition. The Turkish casualties are estimated at between four and five thousand. Our casualties ~~were~~ were about 2000.

The brunt of the fighting was borne by the following:

On the left by the Indian Infantry Brigade.

Against KAJAJIK AGHALA by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.  
the Connaught Rangers (29th Brigade).  
S.W. Borderers. (13th Division).  
13th and 14th Battalions, 4th Australian  
Infantry Brigade.  
18th Battalion, 5th Australian Infantry Bde.  
The 9th and 10th Australian Light Horse Regiments were also engaged, and played a conspicuous part in the final assault.

The posts of honour, in the lines of Turkish trenches we eventually held, were occupied by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment, supported by a mixed detachment of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.

The greatest credit is due to Major-General H.V. Cox and Brig-General A.H. Russell for the manner in which these operations were planned and carried out. Both these officers have shown a capacity for the organisation and carrying out of offensive operations far beyond the ordinary.

4. - (a) During the period under report, little activity was shown by the enemy opposite Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Sections. At QUINN'S POST in No 3 Section considerable bombing and rifle fire took place at intervals: similarly opposite the NEK at RUSSELL'S TOP in No 4 Section. In no 5 Section, the chief centre of interest lay in the most easterly point reached by our line on RHODODENDRON SPUR, and which has been named the APEX. Our positions there, though naturally unfavourably situated, have been strengthened, and are now in a satisfactory condition. To keep the enemy on the alert, and to prevent him from establishing himself within bombing distance of the APEX trenches, minor enterprises have on several occasions been undertaken, principally by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. On these occasions some loss has been inflicted on the enemy, who has shown little disposition to push forward within effective bombing distance of our trenches; they have, however, erected a substantial bombproof shelter, which is believed to be used as an observation post. Attempts to demolish this structure have so far only met with partial success.

(b) The enemy has been busily engaged in strengthening his positions all along the line - CHUNUK BAIR and THE FARM being especially strong - while the whole SARI BAIR RIDGE from BATTLESHIP HILL to KOJA CHEMEN TEPE is rapidly becoming a maze of trenches and defensive works.

(c) I omitted to state in my last report G 351, dated 16th August 1915 that, at the request of G.O.C. 9th Corps, 3 officers and some 100 men were sent to SUVLA BAY to be used by the Divisions of the 9th Corps as scouts and shrapshooters. After being employed by the 9th Corps for about three weeks, they were returned to my Division at the end of August.

The G.O.C. 9th Corps in this connection wired : "I take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to you for sending these men. They have worked splendidly and all Divisions are unanimous in the opinion that their attachment has been of the very greatest value."

5. - (x) RE-ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS TO SECTIONS.

(a) On the 13th August, a re-allotment of troops to Sections was made, with the object of getting formations together and complete under their Commanders; and further orders on the same subject were issued on the 16th and 22nd August.

The 5th Australian Infantry Brigade (2nd Australian Division) arrived at Anzac between the 20th and the 23rd August, and was placed under my command.

As a result of these orders, the distribution of my troops on the 24th August was as follows :-

No 3 SECTION : Brig-general H.G. Chauvel, C.M.G.

1st Australian Light Horse brigade.  
2 companies, 6/Leinster Regiment.

No 4 SECTION : Brig-general F.G. Hughes, V.D.

3rd Australian Light Horse brigade.  
6/Leinster Regiment (less 2 companies)

No 5 SECTION : Major-General F.S. Maude, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

13th Division (less 3 Section, Royal Engineers).  
New Zealand Infantry Brigade with Maori Contingent attached.

No 6 SECTION : Major-General H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I.

New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.  
No 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers (less 1 section)  
Field Troop, N.Z. Engineers.  
29th Infantry Brigade (less 2 battalions)  
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.  
4th Australian Infantry Brigade.  
3 Battalions, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade.

IN RESERVE : 5th Australian Infantry Brigade (less 3 battalions).  
No 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.

ARTILLERY.

69th Brigade R.F.A. (5" howitzer) (less 1 battery) disposed between the  
CHAILAK DERE and WALDEN POINT.

10th (Heavy) Battery, R.G.A. disposed between the CHAILAK DERE and WALDEN  
POINT.

1st Brigade, N.Z.F.A. (less 1 battery) - South of the ASMAK DERE (91.U.1)  
and on RUSSELL'S TOP (80.N.7).

2nd Brigade, N.Z.F.A. disposed between the CHAILAK DERE and DAMAKJELIK BAIR  
(1 section of 4.5" howitzers North of ARI BURNU).

7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade - distributed throughout the area  
North of the CHAILAK DERE, and with one section on  
RHODODENDRON SPUR.

(b) On the 28th August, orders were received from the Army Corps  
Commander regarding the re-distribution of troops operating in the Northern  
zone. This re-distribution in so far as it affected the force under my  
command was as follows :-

Nos. 3 & 4 SECTIONS to be occupied by the 2nd Australian Division on  
its arrival at Anzac.

No 5 SECTION to be occupied by the New Zealand and Australian  
Division, and 29th Infantry Brigade, less 2  
battalions.

No 6 SECTION to be occupied by the 54th Division and the 29th (Indian)  
Infantry Brigade.

(c) As a preliminary measure, Nos. 3 and 4 Sections were to be taken  
over by the 5th Australian Infantry Brigade thus releasing the 1st and 3rd  
Light Horse Brigades. This move was interfered with by the operations  
against KAJAJIK AGHALA (vide para 3 c); but on the 27th August, the  
Headquarters, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade, and the 20th Australian  
Infantry Battalion moved to No 4 Section and ~~took over~~ and commenced to  
take over from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. The three ~~regiments~~ regiments  
of this brigade were, on various dates, sent to join General Cox, and took  
part in the operations against KAJAJIK AGHALA. On the 28th August, Brig-  
General F.G. Hughes handed over command of No 4 Section to Brig-  
General Holmes, 5th Australian Infantry Brigade and transferred his Headquarters  
to the SAZLI BEIT DERE.

On the same date, orders for the movements of troops, in accordance  
with the orders of the Army Corps Commander, were issued. The relief is  
being effected on the principle that the 13th Division and 54th Division  
each send 2 battalions nightly to their new stations. The movements of  
troops remaining under my command are made to fit in with this arrangement.

(d) When these moves are complete, the force under my command will be

disposed as follows, from right to left, (vide sketch map No 5) :-

1st Light Horse Brigade - occupying OLD NO 3 POST and DESTROYER HILL.  
Bivouac Area : OLD NO 3 POST.

3rd Light Horse Brigade - occupying the ~~ARRX~~ CANTERBURY SLOPE and portion of RHODODENDRON SPUR (Sq. 80.J.1-4). *Bivouac Area: Big Table Top and Sayli Beit Dere (Sq. 80.I 1-2).*

N.Z. Infantry Brigade - occupying the APEX and a portion of the RHODODENDRON SPUR. Bivouac Area : the CHAILAK DERE, Southern slopes.

N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade - occupying CHESHIRE RIDGE to knoll (Sq. 80.D.5-6)  
Bivouac Area : CHAILAK DERE, Northern slopes.

4th Australian Infantry Brigade - from Knoll (Sq. 80.D.5-6) to the AGHYL DERE (South branch). Bivouac Area : BAUCHOP HILL Northern slopes.

29th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion) - In Reserve. Bivouac Area : BAUCHOP HILL, Western slopes.

ARTILLERY. - disposed as on the 24th August (vide para 5 a)

ENGINEERS → No 1 Company N.Z. Engineers : Beach at No 3 Post - (Water supply duties)  
No 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers: RHODODENDRON SPUR.  
N.Z. Field Troops : with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.

The beach Area between the SAZLI BEIT DERE and the AGHYL DERE is being defined, and will be placed in charge of a selected officer.

6. - In conclusion, I would say that the arrangements made for the re-distribution of the troops are working smoothly. The defences being constructed all along my front are being rapidly improved, particularly in the vicinity of KAJAJIK AGHALA and HILL 60. This portion of the line has now been taken over by the 54th Division under Major-General F.S. Inglefield, C.B.: but owing to the importance of the recently captured positions it has been found necessary to leave several units of the N.Z. & A. Division in occupation of the defences there, as a temporary measure only till the new arrivals have settled down.

In addition to this, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, 3rd Light Horse, and 4th Australian Infantry Brigades, on relief by the Brigades of the 54th Division, are each to leave a proportion of their men in the trenches with the relieving troops, in order to give the latter the benefit of their experience, in the particular form of fighting which pertains on this front.

That my Brigades might not be unduly reduced in strength an equal number of men of the 54th Division are being attached to them for duty, and orders have been issued to Brigadiers that everything possible is to be done in the way of giving the attached troops help and instruction in the art of trench warfare.

(sgd) Alex. Godley, Major-General,  
Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Report on the action at QUINN'S POST on 30th May to 1st June, 1915, both dates inclusive.29th May

As a result of the action on the 29th May in front of QUINN'S POST when the garrison successfully repelled the Turkish attacks with heavy losses, it was considered advisable to fire another mine in QUINN'S POST.

This was done at 11.40 p.m. Very little damage was done to our trench which could not be rapidly repaired.

30th May

At 8 a.m. a message was received at Divisional Headquarters from the Officer Commanding No. 3 Section to the effect that the enemy had sapped to within 2 yards of QUINN'S POST, and had erected 2 sand-bag works in close proximity to No. 3 Section of QUINN'S POST, on the right and left respectively of that portion of No. 3 Section fire trench which had been damaged on 29th May by the explosion of an enemy mine.

The situation was considered so serious that it was decided that this structure should be demolished without delay. Accordingly the sections on the right and left and the Artillery were warned to be ready to co-operate in this operation which was timed for 1 p.m.

The instructions were for two small parties of 30 men each to rush the enemy's work, followed by two parties of 15 men each with tools for demolishing the work.

At 1 p.m. under cover of Artillery and supporting fire from Machine Guns, the assaulting party, divided into two, one under Lieut. Kidd, 10th A.L.H., consisting of 30 all ranks 10th A.L.H., attacked the erection on the right, reaching it, though under a heavy fire, and succeeded in turning the enemy out of it, but, owing to most of his men being wounded and the fact that the position he was in was commanded from front and both sides by enemy fire, was unable to do much demolition and finally retired to our trenches. The working party which was detailed from the Canterbury Battalion was not allowed to go out.

The left party, under Lieut. Colpitts of the 10th A.L.H., consisting of 30 all ranks 10th A.L.H., succeeded in establishing themselves in the enemy's work, and holding it until relieved by means of a tunnel which was mined out to them from our fire trench.

The casualties were heavy, but they were able to build up sufficient sandbag protection to enable them to hold it.

In this case also, the working party had been detailed from the Canterbury Battalion, but was unable to proceed owing to the fact that a counter attack was almost immediately launched against the Post, and severe fighting was continuous most of the afternoon.

During the evening, the men in the left sap were relieved by fresh troops who strengthened and consolidated it.

31st May

A determined attempt to seize the work "A" in front of the right of QUINN'S at the point of the bayonet, before dusk, failed on account of the fire at close range from the left front.

A 2nd attempt was made at 11 p.m. by a party of 6 men to demolish the bomb-proof shelter which had been erected by the Turks in their communication trench a few yards in front of the right centre of QUINN'S POST.

This party met with little opposition, but were unable, with the tools available, to demolish the work.

It was not found possible to sap forward as the ground would not hold, and such an operation would have entailed much timber and an elaborate structure.

There was no necessity to sap in order to get into this work as only dead Turks were in it.

When the above-mentioned party did succeed in getting into it, they found that it was commanded by loopholes from the strong structure in the communication trench.

Colonel CHAUVEL, Commanding No. 3 Section, then reported that this structure could only be demolished by gun-cotton which the Engineer Officers considered to be too dangerous to handle, and would cause too much damage to our trench.

It was then decided to do this on the following morning by means of mining.

### 1st June

On 1st June, elaborate arrangements were made to destroy by gun-cotton the bomb-proof shelter which had been erected by the enemy a few yards in front of the right centre of QUINN'S POST.

Two Engineers, who volunteered for the duty, were to lay the charge on the top of the work, and immediately the explosion had taken place, a party of 6 under an Officer or N.C.O. were to go out and complete the demolition, and occupy the crater, or remains of the enemy structure, as might be most suitable.

The explosion was to take place at 9 p.m.

All preparations were completed and the 2 sappers,

Lance Cpl. F.J.H. Fear) 1st Field Coy. N.Z. Engineers  
and Sapper E.A. Hodges)

were just moving out when a fusillade commenced punctually at 9 p.m. and continued for some time.

On account of the heavy fire and alertness of the enemy immediately in front, the operation had to be postponed.

At 10.11 p.m. the charge was fired and the O.C. QUINN'S POST reported the structure entirely demolished.

The party detailed to occupy the work rushed out, but were met by a heavy burst of fire from the Turkish trench immediately in front, and being unable to hold on, retired to our trenches.

As it was considered impossible to occupy this work under the circumstances, it was decided to tunnel under it, and occupy it from below.

This work is still proceeding, but is necessarily very slow as the soil is very broken up by recent explosions.

The total casualties during the above action were :-

#### KILLED

Officers : -  
Other Ranks : 3

#### WOUNDED

Officers : 2  
Other Ranks : 64

#### MISSING

Officers : -  
Other Ranks : 2

---

Total 71


---

# OPERATION AGAINST KABAK KUYU & KAJAJIK AGHALA


Sketch map showing Situation 11<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> August 1915.

Tracing of sheet KOJA DERE.


Sketch Map No. 1 Situation 11<sup>th</sup> August




Sketch Map No. 2 Situation 14<sup>th</sup> August



Sketch Map No. 3 Situation 21<sup>st</sup> August



Sketch Map No. 4 Situation 29<sup>th</sup> August



Scale  
Yards 1000 500 0 1000 2000 Yds.

УБЪЕНДИХ ИО. 114