

AWM4

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AWM4-1/53/3PART3

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

35

Report on Action of 18/19th May, 1915.

During the afternoon of the 18th May, the Turks heavily shelled our posts, more particularly QUINN'S and COURTNEY'S in No. 3 Section of defence: the latter was attacked by an 8 inch gun which did considerable damage to the parapets and support trenches of the Post.

During the evening, information was received from Anzac that Turkish Troops (guns and infantry) were moving in a North Westerly direction from the North and East of KRITHIA (sq. 176.0.)

It was also reported that Turkish Staffs had been observed reconnoitring the Anzac Position from the slopes of the KILID BAHR Plateau (sq. 203).

Accordingly all posts were warned to be on the alert and to ensure that a maximum number of rifles could be efficiently brought into line along the fire trenches. Troops were ordered to stand to arms at 3 a.m. on the 19th May.

NO. 3 SECTION (Colonel CHAUVEL C.M.G.)

At exactly 12 midnight 18/19 May, a heavy fire was opened all along the line, but especially opposite COURTNEY'S POST, which was subjected to the heaviest fire yet directed against any of our Posts.

The Artillery opened on the enemy's trenches - the shooting of No. 2 Battery N.Z.F.A. (Major Sykes) being particularly effective on the trenches immediately in front of QUINN'S POST. The shells of this Battery burst only a few feet immediately above our fire trenches and covered the enemy with a hail of shrapnel.

The 5th (Australian) Field Artillery Battery under Major Phillips and No. 26 (Jacob's) Indian Mountain Battery (Major J.E.L. Bruce R.G.A. - since killed in action) also rendered valuable assistance.

QUINN'S POST.

Garrison: 15th Battn. Aust. Inf.
30 men 2nd A.L.H. (working party)
3 Coys. 16th Regt. (sent up during the action)

At 3 a.m. 19th May, the enemy made an attempt to rush QUINN'S POST, but was repulsed with loss: at 5 a.m. a similar attack was repulsed with the assistance of 2 Coys. 16th Regt., and another, but less sustained effort, was made at 7 a.m.

(2)

6-36.
At 9 a.m. a determined attempt to capture the post was made³⁶ which lasted till 10.30 a.m.

Between, and during, all these attacks, showers of bombs were rained on the post, and the Machine gun and rifle fire were exceptionally severe. The overhead cover erected in some of the support trenches saved many casualties.

At 2 p.m. 19th May, the Garrison was relieved by 16th Battalion Australian Infantry, and 150 men, 13th Battalion Aust. Infantry.

At 1 a.m. on the 20th May, a feeble attack was made which was easily repulsed. 1 Company, 15th Regt. Aust. Inf. reported.

At 3 a.m. the enemy attacked the right of the Post: this was met by machine gun fire from the adjoining post, and few of the enemy got back to his trenches.

At 4 a.m. conditions became normal, no further attack being made.

COURTNEY'S POST.

Garrison. : 14th Battalion.
Details 13th Battalion.

During the 18th May, the enemy heavily shelled this Post, particularly such Machine Gun emplacements as he had located. The parapets and emplacements were considerably damaged by 8 inch ~~small~~ shells: much of this damage was, however, repaired after dusk.

Heavy firing started at midnight 18/19 May.

At 3.30 a.m. 19 May, the fire increased in volume, and shortly after, an assault was made on the Post, the enemy throwing bombs when they got close to the trenches. The assault was made in a most determined manner, and four of the enemy actually got into our trenches: they were attacked with bombs, and finally bayoneted.

At dawn, the pressure on the Post relaxed, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy as he returned to his trenches.

During the 19th, the Post was again subjected to shrapnel fire, but little damage was done.

The night 19th/20th May was normal so far as COURTNEY'S POST was concerned.

POPE'S HILL

Garrison : 1st A.L.H.
1 Squadron 3rd A.L.H.

At 3 a.m. on 19th May, a ~~small~~ party of the enemy endeavoured

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6.34
to work its way down MONASH GULLY to the left of POPE'S HILL. This move was frustrated by the picquet in the Gully with a loss to the enemy of 12 killed.

At 3.15 a.m. after a heavy burst of fire, a rush was made against the trenches on the left flank. This was stopped by rifle fire, only two of the enemy reaching the parapet.

Supporting fire was given by 18-pr. Q.F. Guns, Mountain Guns and by the Machine Guns of No. 4 Section.

C Squadron, 1st A.L.H. did excellent work in connection with this attack.

Soon after, it was observed that the enemy was pushing forward against the right flank of No. 4 Section. This was stopped by fire delivered from the left of POPE'S HILL.

NO. 4 SECTION. (Brig. General A.H. Russell)

On the 18th May, the garrison was warned to be alert, and the supports were kept well closed up to the fire trenches: the 3 saps leading towards the "Neck" leading to "Baby 700" were fully manned, and were each placed in charge of an officer.

At 9 p.m. fairly heavy rifle fire was opened by the enemy.

At 12 midnight 19/20 May, a general attack was made on us with rifle and machine gun fire and hand grenades: this was continued until shortly before daybreak when the enemy charged the extreme left of our position opposite the Neck, our sapheads and across the Neck - the frontage of the attack being about 60 yards.

During this assault, they advanced along both sides of No. 4 sap, and inflicted several casualties on the men in it.

The men in No. 3 sap which runs at right angles to the line of attack were compelled to climb up on to the parapet in order to fire, as the sap had not been made into a fire trench.

The men of No. 2 sap which lies behind No. 3, being also unable to fire on account of the depth of the sap, rushed forward and joined the men of No. 3 lying on top of their parapet.

When the attack was brought to a standstill by the fire from our main fire trenches, all these men charged, but were unable to get

6-38
home owing to the darkness, and thickness of the scrub. They were stopped when they had cleared the head of No. 4 sap. 38

The enemy now retired to the Neck, under cover of a Machine Gun.

Any further advance would have entailed heavy casualties, as two enemy Machine Guns, in addition to the one already mentioned, are known to command the Neck, and which had been firing at our trenches during the night. These were located at daylight, and the 26th Mountain Battery silenced them, knocking at least one out completely.

The Auckland M.R. Machine Guns, which command the ground between the sapheads and the MONASH Gully, were well and boldly handled, and inflicted loss on the enemy especially after daybreak, when the Turks were moving to the rear along their various trenches.

The Wellington M.R. Machine Guns on the left also did good work in assisting to clear the left of No. 4 sap.

By 4.30 a.m. the attack on No. 4 Section was over, and the enemy's fire died down.

As day broke, considerable parties of the enemy were observed from No. 1 Outpost (on left flank of No. 4 Section) - three or four hundred about the Neck leading to "Baby 700", and two or three hundred on the North slopes of Sniper's Gully, immediately in front of No. 4 Section. Rifle and Machine Gun fire was opened on these bodies, and some loss inflicted.

Loss was also inflicted on the enemy located in the trenches in front of POPE'S HILL, particularly when these began to retire along their communication trenches.

During the fight, an order was passed down No. 4 sap and thence to a Machine gun and No. 5 sap to the effect that the men advancing against us were Australians. Fire immediately ceased, and it was some minutes before it was started again - this occurred just as the enemy's charge reached its limit.

This order almost certainly came from the Turks.

CASUALTIES.

The following casualties were reported as the result of this action :

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Officers :	3	8	-
Other ranks.:	62	219	-
Total :	65	227	-

The enemy's casualties have been estimated by the Intelligence Department at 600 killed, and 7000 wounded along the entire front held by the Army Corps.

Of these, a large proportion were in front of QUINN'S and COURTNEY'S POSTS.

Report on the action of 29th May 1915 at QUINN'S POST.O.C. Lieut. Col. G. J. BURNAGE V.D., 13th. Battn.

The 28th May was unusually quiet, but, for the last few days the enemy had been digging trenches, and mining towards QUINN'S POST. On the 27th May and at 11 a.m. on the 28th, it had been found necessary to blow up two shafts at which we had been working, to counter the enemy's mining efforts.

At 6 p.m. on the 28th May it was reported that the enemy had re-established himself on the RAZOR BACK Ridge. This Ridge commands the upper end of MONASH Gully.

The above facts gave grounds for the assumption that the enemy intended to make a determined effort to gain a strong footing at the head of the Gully, which would jeopardise our position in the MONASH Valley.

At 4 a.m. on the 29th May, a mine was suddenly exploded close in front of QUINN'S POST, damaging a portion of the fire trench in No. 3 Subsection, thus isolating No. 4 Subsection. The mine also damaged the inter-communication trench.

A heavy attack accompanied with incessant throwing of bombs followed, and the Turks succeeded in making an entry into the fire trench, 50 feet of the parapet of which had been badly damaged by the explosion of the mine, which also unfortunately buried a large number of our hand grenades and mortar bombs.

At 4.30 a.m. the Turks commenced working round the left Subsection which had been cut off from the remainder as a result of the explosion. Col. H. G. CHAUVEL, O.C. No. 3 Section, then ordered the 16th Battalion to work up the Gully between QUINN'S POST and POPE'S HILL in order to protect the left of the former post. This Battalion, however, had not proceeded very far before it was held up by Machine Gun fire. Instructions were then sent by the O.C. N.Z. & A. Division to the O.C. No. 3 Section to have fresh troops ready, with material to repair the parapet as soon as possible.

At 4.45 a.m. a further report was received that the enemy was firmly established in No. 3 Section of QUINN'S, but that we

6.41
still held Nos. 1, 2 and 4 Sections intact. All available reinforcements were despatched by Col. CHAUVEL to QUINN'S POST, but, owing to the destruction of the inter-communication trenches, it was found very difficult to reach the lost section of the fire trench.

At 5 a.m. the General Officer Commanding N.Z. & A. Division issued orders that the lost section of the trench was to be retaken at all costs. Arrangements were made for covering fire from other Sections and the assaulting party was followed by a working party carrying tools and sandbags, which was to restore the fire trench and communications as rapidly as possible. About this time Lieut. Col. CHAUVEL proceeded personally to QUINN'S POST to supervise operations, and, finding Lieut. Col. BURNAGE had been wounded, appointed Lieut. Col. POPE to command the Post.

At about 5.30 a.m. the enemy were reported to be moving up reinforcements to the right of QUINN'S POST. By 6 a.m. the lost portion of the trench had been gallantly retaken by a party of the 15th Battalion under Major QUINN, at the point of the bayonet; all the Turks in the trench were either killed or captured, and the work of restoring the damaged parapet and communication trench commenced. At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, and the rifle and Machine Gun fire was very heavy, accompanied by bombs and shell fire of every description.

The attack was, however, beaten back with loss.

The defence was ably assisted by Artillery fire from Major Sykes' and Phillips' Field Artillery Batteries and by the Mountain Battery in No. 3 Section; to the fine shooting of the Artillery the repulse of the enemy is largely due.

By 7.15 a.m. the O.C. No. 3 Section reported that all his local reserves had been absorbed, and that the 10th Light Horse Regt. from the Sectional Reserve had been ordered up; he also stated that his casualties had been severe, amongst whom it is regretted that Major QUINN - so long associated with the able defence of QUINN'S POST - was killed; Lieut. Col. BURNAGE, as previously stated, was also wounded.

The General Officer Commanding thereupon ordered 1st Battalion of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade to proceed to MONASH Valley, and the 1st. Australian Division, in response to the G.O.C.'s request, promised to afford all the assistance possible.

At 8. 15 a.m. Col. MONASH - commanding in the Valley during the temporary absence of Col. CHAUVEL - reported that the attack had slackened off considerably, that the position was quite satisfactory, but that it would take some time to restore the parapet and clear out the trench, as it was full of dead and dying Turks. Moreover, the working party was much interrupted by Turkish fire.

Whilst the work of clearing the communication trench was in process, 16 Turks were discovered cut off in the trench; on finding there was no hope of escape they surrendered. By 8.45 a.m. the attack had practically ceased, firing becoming desultory.

The question of assuming the offensive then arose, but, owing to the fact that the trenches opposite QUINN'S POST were still held in force, and the hostile Machine Guns on the flanks had not been located, it was deemed inadvisable to attempt it.

Our casualties amounted to 33 killed, including 2 Officers, and 178 wounded; the enemy's casualties must have been heavy as 30 were found and buried by our men in the trenches, and more than double that number were lying dead outside.

All ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage. The Turkish Gun, Rifle and Machine Gun fire was very heavy. Our trenches were constantly subjected to hostile shrapnel and time lyddite gun fire. Pope's, Courtney's and Nos. 1, 2, and 4 Sections afforded excellent covering fire; the Artillery support was invaluable, especially that of No. 2 Battery, N.Z. Field Artillery, from PLUGGE'S Plateau (Major Sykes R.F.A.).

6.43

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Report on the Action at No. 3 Picquet, No. 4 Section of Defence, 29th, 30th, and 31st May 1915, both dates inclusive.

On the night of the 28th May, an enemy trench immediately to the North East of No. 2 picquet, and about 500 yards from it, was rushed by a party of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, and then permanently occupied by a Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles under Major Chambers.

During the remainder of that night and the following day the picquet was improved, and the garrison consolidated and strengthened its position.

On the evening of the 29th/30th, a report was received by the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section that this Squadron (9th Wellington East Coast) was being heavily attacked.

The Officer Commanding No. 4 Section did not think it wise to reduce the strength of No. 2 Picquet, already garrisoned by troops of the Otago Mounted Rifles, therefore, he accordingly ordered out the remaining two Squadrons of the Wellington Regiment (the 2nd Taranaki, and the 6th Manawatu Squadrons), the former under Major Elmslie, the latter under Major Dick.

At 11 p.m. the 2nd Squadron under Major Elmslie moved out and got in touch with the enemy 150 yards away from No. 2 Picquet.

The enemy was found to be in force on the plateau on which No. 3 Picquet was situated, and particularly on its northern and southern slopes. The Picquet was practically surrounded.

The advance of Major Elmslie's Squadron was checked, but not until he had cleared the southern slopes.

This Squadron then took up a defensive position within a few yards of the crest which the Turks held, and remained in this position during the whole of next day, the 30th.

The 6th Manawatu Squadron under Major Dick came up at daylight, and with one troop Captain Hastings tried to find a covered way round the base of the southern slope up to the right of No. 3 Picquet.

Captain Hastings did in fact succeed in getting within a few yards of No. 3 Picquet, but could attract no attention owing to the heavy rifle fire and the noise.

Both relieving Squadrons now came under heavy maxim gun fire from the Turkish trenches in front of the neck, and very little movement took place during the remainder of the daylight, but the enemy kept gradually creeping round the North and North West slopes of No. 3 Picquet.

They repeatedly got within a few yards of our trenches on both sides, but the top plateau was kept by our machine guns and mountain battery.

Bombs were frequently used by the enemy against the garrison of No. 3 Picquet, but with little effect.

The Turks made no attempt to attack with the bayonet either by day or night.

At dusk the Turks came over the crest on to the plateau.

An urgent request for help was then sent by Major Chambers, and an order was given to Lieut. Colonel Meldrum, commanding the Wellington Mounted Rifles, to send forward his two supporting Squadrons. They found it impossible to advance in the face of a heavy fire which was brought to bear on them.

In the meantime, part of the parapet of No. 3 Picquet had been broken by shell fire from the "W" hills, the telephonic communication between Nos. 2 and 3 positions was cut, and the Turks got into one end of the trench, but were driven out.

As the two Wellington Squadrons were unable to effect a junction with the garrison, the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section ordered a Squadron of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment, under Major Overton, 2nd in command, to work round and reinforce the Picquet, by what appeared to be a sheltered gully on the South West side.

This Squadron (Nelson), having got into communication with the two Wellington Squadrons, which were already held up, and working up on their right, got in touch with Major Chambers, and sent some men into the Picquet as reinforcements.

Major Overton then went back to Lieut. Colonel Meldrum to report the situation, leaving Major Hutton in command of the relieving

Squadron, the orders given by Brigadier-General Russell to Major Hutton being that he was to occupy the Picquet to enable Major Chambers to withdraw to No. 2 Picquet, and to evacuate his wounded.

Lieut. Colonel Meldrum then reported to Brigadier-General Russell that he considered the Picquet was untenable without further reinforcements.

Brigadier-General Russell then informed the G.O.C. Division that he was ordering Lieut. Colonel Meldrum to withdraw the garrison to No. 2 Picquet, if, to hold No. 3, would entail calling for further reinforcements.

Brigadier-General Russell also advocated its evacuation as he considered the position of the Picquet unsatisfactory owing to the difficulty of communication, its being commanded on all sides, requiring a strong garrison, and undesirable as being in front of our line instead of being thrown back.

The G.O.C., after consulting the Army Corps Commander, gave permission to the Officer Commanding No. 4 Section for the evacuation of the Picquet.

On receiving these orders, at 9 p.m. Major Overton returned to No. 3 Picquet to help Major Hutton to withdraw his Squadron, but on reaching the Picquet, he found that they were already retiring, as Major Hutton considered it untenable.

The wounded had all been removed safely in the dark, and the balance of Major Chambers' Squadron withdrew into the gully below with the relieving squadron.

The evacuation of the trenches was not discovered by the Turks for 2 or 3 minutes.

The troops then fell back on the little hill between Nos. 1 and 2 Posts followed by the Turks who were loudly shouting, but bursts of rapid fire kept them in check.

Some of the Turks actually overtook them near this little hill, under cover of which a dressing station had been established. A few of our men charged with the bayonet successfully.

A covering position was then taken up in the communication trench beyond No. 1 Picquet, the Turks all the time advancing down ~~between the little hill and No. 3 Picquet.~~ between the little hill and No. 3 Picquet.

About 2 a.m. on the 31st May, a Squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles was sent out to assist the withdrawal and to relieve the 2nd Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles. Under cover of these two Squadrons the 9th Squadron was withdrawn.

The enemy, although threatening, made no further attack, and all the troops, with the exception of the fresh Squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles who remained out till daylight, returned to camp by 3. 30 a.m.

The 9th Squadron was very much exhausted, having been fighting hard for 48 hours.

The garrison of No. 3 Picquet at the outset was 5 Officers and 93 other ranks, of which 14 were killed and 15 wounded.

Lieutenants Cameron and Emerson were among the killed, and Major Chambers among the wounded.

It is estimated that the strength of the enemy was between 2/3000, and that their losses were not less than 250.

It is unfortunate that in their withdrawal the relieving Squadron were unable to remove the rifles, ammunition and equipment of the dead, and that 60 picks and shovels had to be abandoned.

It has later been reported that early on the morning of the 31st the Turks were seen to have stripped the bodies of our dead.

In addition to the casualties above noted, Captain Hardham, V.C. was seriously wounded, and Lieutenant MacDonald dangerously wounded.

Since the above withdrawal a new No. 3 Picquet has been established on rising ground 200 yards to the North of No. 2 Picquet, which renders our left flank a good deal stronger than under the previous arrangement.

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95

The total casualties during the action were :-

KILLED

Officers	3
Other Ranks	22

WOUNDED

Officers	4
Other Ranks	61

MISSING

Officers	-
Other Ranks	1

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Total	91
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Report on the action at QUINN'S POST on 30th May to 1st June 1915, both dates inclusive.

App 48

29th May

As a result of the action on the 29th May in front of QUINN'S POST when the garrison successfully repelled the Turkish attacks with heavy losses, it was considered advisable to fire another mine in QUINN'S POST.

This was done at 11.40 p.m. Very little damage was done to our trench which could not be rapidly repaired.

30th May

At 8 a.m. a message was received at Divisional Headquarters from the Officer Commanding No. 3 Section to the effect that the enemy had sapped to within 2 yards of QUINN'S POST, and had erected 2 sandbag works in close proximity to No. 3 Section of QUINN'S POST, on the right and left respectively of that portion of No. 3 Section fire trench which had been damaged on 29th May by the explosion of an enemy mine.

The situation was considered so serious that it was decided that this structure should be demolished without delay. Accordingly the sections on the right and left and the Artillery were warned to be ready to co-operate in this operation which was timed for 1 p.m.

The instructions were for two small parties of 30 men each to rush the enemy's work, followed by two parties of 15 men each with tools for demolishing the work.

At 1 p.m. under cover of Artillery and supporting fire from Machine guns, the assaulting party, divided into two, one under Lieut. Kidd, 10th A.L.B., consisting of 30 all ranks 10th A.L.B., attacked the erection on the right, reaching it, though under a heavy fire, and succeeded in turning the enemy out of it, but, owing to most of his men being wounded and the fact that the position he was in was commanded from front and both sides by enemy fire, was unable to do much demolition and finally retired to our trenches. The working party which was detailed from the Canterbury Battalion was not allowed to go out.

The left party, under Lieut. Colpitts of the 10th A.L.B., consisting of 30 all ranks 10th A.L.B., succeeded in establishing themselves in the enemy's work, and holding it until relieved by means of a tunnel which was mined out to them from our fire trench.

The casualties were heavy, but they were able to build up sufficient sandbag protection to enable them to hold it.

In this case also, the working party had been detailed from the Canterbury Battalion, but was unable to proceed owing to the fact that a counter attack was almost immediately launched against the Post, and severe fighting was continuous most of the afternoon.

During the evening, the men in the left sap were relieved by fresh troops who strengthened and consolidated it.

31st May

A determined attempt to seize the work "A" in front of the right of QUINN'S at the point of the bayonet, before dusk, failed on account of the fire at close range from the left front.

A 2nd attempt was made at 11 p.m. by a party of 6 men to demolish the bomb-proof shelter which had been erected by the Turks in their communication trench a few yards in front of the right centre of QUINN'S POST.

This party met with little opposition, but were unable, with the tools available, to demolish the work.

It was not found possible to sap forward as the ground would not hold, and such an operation would have entailed much timber and an elaborate structure.

There was no necessity to sap in order to get into this work as only dead Turks were in it.

When the above-mentioned party did succeed in getting into it, they found that it was commanded by loopholes from the strong structure in the communication trench.

Colonel CHAUVEL, Commanding No. 3 Section, then reported that this structure could only be demolished by gun-cotton which the Engineer Officers considered to be too dangerous to handle, and would cause too much damage to our trench.

It was then decided to do this on the following morning by means of mining.

1st June

On 1st June, elaborate arrangements were made to destroy by gun-cotton the bomb-proof shelter which had been erected by the enemy a few yards in front of the right centre of QUINN'S POST.

Two Engineers, who volunteered for the duty, were to lay the charge on the top of the work, and immediately the explosion had taken place, a party of 6 under an Officer or R.C.C. were to go out and complete the demolition, and occupy the crater, or remains of the enemy's structure, as might be most suitable.

The explosion was to take place at 9 p.m.

All preparations were completed and the 2 sappers,

Lance Spl. F. J. H. Pear)

and Sapper E. A. Hodges) 1st Field Coy. R.E. Engineers

were just moving out when a fusillade commenced punctually at 9 p.m. and continued for some time.

On account of the heavy fire and alertness of the enemy immediately in front, the operation had to be postponed.

At 10.11 p.m. the charge was fired and the O.C. QUINN'S POST reported the structure entirely demolished.

The party detailed to occupy the work rushed out, but were met by a heavy burst of fire from the Turkish trench immediately in front, and being unable to hold on, retired to our trenches.

As it was considered impossible to occupy this work under the circumstances, it was decided to tunnel under it, and occupy it from below.

This work is still proceeding, but is necessarily very slow as the soil is very broken up by recent explosions.

The total casualties during the above action were :-

KILLED

Officers : -
Other Ranks : 3

WOUNDED

Officers : 2
Other Ranks : 64

MISSING

Officers : -
Other Ranks : 2

Total 71

N.Z.G. No. 172.O.C. No. 3 Section.

Headquarters,

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Anzac Cove, 19th June, 1915.

Circular Memorandumfor Commanders of Sections of the Defence.

The General Officer Commanding is very glad to see in his visits to posts that a marked improvement has taken place lately in the alertness of the men in the trenches, and that, in most posts, superiority of fire has been established over the enemy. Also, that the enemy's sniping is now kept down to a far greater extent than formerly.

The work done in the trenches, and their improvement, is also, in most cases, satisfactory, but much can still be done in this respect.

The following points in particular require attention:-

1. Many iron loopholes are still not in use, and, when used, are not yet properly covered with sacking, and so put into the parapet as to be screened from the enemy's view. This must be done in all cases, and, when not in use, the loopholes must invariably be plugged.

These loopholes, where not required for firing, are most valuable for observation.

2. Fascines are not nearly as much used as they might be. More should be made in all posts, and they should be used for many purposes whereby the use of sandbags might be saved. The pictures in the illustrated papers of the trenches in France show that a great deal of revetting in them is done with fascines and gabions, which should also be made.

3. Sandbags are scarce, and a great many are used for unnecessary purposes. All Commanders of posts must stop this, and must collect all sandbags from any places where they are not required, for use where they are urgently necessary.

N.Z.G. No. 172.O.C. No. 3 Section.

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3. Sandbags are scarce, and a great many are used for unnecessary purposes. All Commanders of posts must stop this, and must collect all sandbags from any places where they are not required, for use where they are urgently necessary.

4. There are not, as a rule, sufficient machine gun emplacements. More must be made, and every maxim gun in use must have at least one, or even two, alternative places from which to fire.
5. The cleanliness and tidiness of the trenches leaves a great deal to be desired in many cases. Because we are on Active Service, and fighting, there is no reason for any relaxation in these matters, and, from both a sanitary and disciplinary point of view, "Trench Discipline" is most important. It is just as easy for a man to fold his overcoat, waterproof sheet, and other gear, etc., and put it somewhere where it is out of the way, as to leave it kicking about somewhere in the trench, as is so often the case. Rifles and accoutrements are frequently kicking about in the bottom of the trench, and this must be stopped at once. The necessity for niches, or improvised racks, for the rifles has been already brought to notice, and they must be provided. A strict order must be given against any accoutrements, or clothing of any kind, being left lying on the floor of the trench.
6. In some cases, where no enfilade fire is to be expected, the trenches might be slightly widened, just enough to allow two men pass. This should only be done with the greatest caution, and must be accompanied with ample depth in proportion, and the General Officer Commanding only wishes to see it in cases where it can quite safely be done.
7. All mines and saps should be given consecutive numbers in each post, and a good-sized notice board, with the number tidily and clearly painted on it in large letters - not scrawled on anyhow, in pencil - should be placed on the mouth of it.
8. Each Post Commander should always have a plan of all trenches, works, saps, etc. of his post with him, and a fresh plan should be prepared whenever necessary, and additions shown day by day, so that anybody visiting the post can see at a glance from it the progress of all work, and what is being done. The enemy's trenches should always be shown on this as far as possible.

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM.

No. 3 Section Defence,
MONASH GULLY,
21/6/15.INTERIOR ECONOMY.

The O.C. Section wishes especially to draw attention to the Divisional Circular Memorandum No. N.Z.G. 172, dated 19th June, a copy of which has been sent to each O.C. Post, and he trusts that the points therein referred to will receive special and immediate attention of all ranks.

Nothing will tend to improve the comfort and health of the troops more than paying attention to these small details, and all Officers and Non-commissioned Officers are requested to make it their immediate and personal concern to straighten up their trenches and to make the position as comfortable and sanitary as the conditions of war will admit.

The following points demand special and immediate attention:-

1. The provision of wooden range cards 6"x6". Distances from the firer's position to be shown by semi-circles and the tracings of the enemy's trenches drawn over them.
2. Distinctive boards, marking the H.Q. of the Company and the H.Q. of the Sentry Group.
3. The provision of notice boards conveying the following instructions :-
 - (a) Strict silence to be maintained in tunnels or saps in the front part of the firing line.
 - (b) Troops in the trenches are forbidden to loiter at the entrance to saps and tunnels.
 - (c) Make way at once for men carrying earth through communication trenches.
4. Notice Boards with the word S I L E N C E printed in bold type.
5. Finger posts should be displayed in all directions such as "TO FIRE TRENCH NO. I SECTION OR NO. I GROUP." "TO HEADQUARTERS SO-AND-SO BATTALION."
6. Each tunnel must be numbered such as D1, D2, D3, E1, E2, E3 from the right in each post.
7. AMMUNITION. In addition to the 200 rounds for which each man is personally responsible and which he carries in his bandolier or pouches. Each O.C. Post is responsible that the trench reserve of 60 rounds per rifle is maintained in the fire trenches of each post. This ammunition is not to be scattered about the trenches but it is to be neatly packed in boxes or tins placed in recesses cut into the back of the trench.
8. Rifles not actually in use are to be neatly packed in recesses cut into the backs of the trenches, and empty card-board clip boxes placed over the muzzle ~~xxx~~ to prevent grit and dirt getting down the barrel.
9. For each group and post there should be tins of fresh drinking water provided and placed in the shade away from the sun.
10. BOXES FOR RESPIRATORS. Sufficient Respirators against asphyxiating gases have been allotted to each post to allow one for each man of the garrison. These are not the personal property of the men and are to be considered part of the equipment of the post and are to be handed over on the post being relieved. They should also be stacked neatly away in boxes cut into recesses in the wall and clearly marked.

O.C.

QUINN'S POST.

Op/49

1. A sortie will be made from your Post on the night 7/8th inst. with a view of taking and destroying the enemy's fire-trench and works immediately facing the centre of your Post.

2. This sortie will be organised as under :-

Assaulting Party. This party will consist of 60 men who after occupying the enemy trench, will cover the working party.

Working Party. The Assaulting Party will be followed immediately by a Working Party without arms, carrying filled sandbags. This party will be sub-divided as under :-

Right Party. To construct a loopholed traverse on the right of the captured portion of the enemy's fire trench.
10 men.

Left Party. To construct a loopholed traverse on the left of the captured portion of the enemy's fire trench.
10 men.

After erecting the traverses these parties will assist centre party in destruction of enemy's fire trench.

Centre Party. To remove all material, arms and ammunition from the captured trench and then destroy the enemy's fire trench and works lying between enemy fire trench and our own fire trench.
10 men

3. Additional Parties. The following parties are also to be arranged :

(a).- To fill in trenches dug between our trench and enemy trench

(b).- Bomb-throwing party (rifles slung) to accompany Assaulting Party (or to form part of it). This party will carry a few Lobiniere bombs to destroy the enemy trench on each flank of the captured portion.

4. WOUNDED. On no pretence whatsoever is anyone in either the Assaulting Party or the Working Party to touch a wounded man. This work will be done entirely by Stretcher Bearers who should be organised ready to move out where and when required.

5. MANNING OF POST. The Post will be otherwise fully manned and Local Reserves brought up to the side of the Hill.

6. CO-OPERATION. Arrangements for co-operation from Flank Posts and Sections have been made.

7. HOUR OF ASSAULT. The Assault will commence at 10.30 p.m.

8. The operation will be under the direction of Lieut-Colonel B. Young.

(Sgd.) F.M. Williams Major.
B.M. 1st. A.L.E. Brigade.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONReport on the Sortie from QUINN'S POST on the night 4th/5th June 1915.

In accordance with Army Corps Order No. 12, dated 4th June 1915, a sortie was made from QUINN'S POST at 11 p.m. on the night of the 4th June by volunteers from the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

The sortie was made with the object of occupying permanently that portion of the Turkish fire trench immediately facing QUINN'S POST.

Prior to the assault the 1st Australian Division was to attack a hostile trench in the direction of KABA TEPE with a small party.

The assaults were supported as follows :-

(a) By the 1st Australian Division

(1) An assault on the Northern end of GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH from No. 2 Section of defence : this assault to start at 11 p.m.

(2) Machine gun fire directed on to the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700

(b) By No. 3 Section of Defence

(1) Fire support from COURTNEY'S POST to assist the attack on GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH

(2) Fire support from POPE'S HILL in the direction of the CHESSBOARD and BABY 700

(c) By No. 4 Section of Defence

A strong demonstration towards the Northern angle of the enemy's trenches facing ours on the Col leading to BABY 700

(d) By Artillery as follows :-

(1) 2nd Battery (Sykes), 4th Australian Battery (Phillips) and the 21st Jacob's Mountain Battery to bring fire to bear on enemy to the front and left front of QUINN'S.

(2) One Section, N.Z. Howitzer Battery to engage the enemy's main communication trench leading to QUINN'S.

(3) 1st Battery (Symon) to engage the Northern Face of JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY.

All Artillery fire to commence at 11 p.m. The O.C. No. 3 Section to exercise a general fire control through the C.R.A.'s representative at Headquarters, No. 3 Section.

The Officer Commanding No. 3 Section of Defence made arrangements for the assault as under :-

Assaulting Party. This Party consisted of 60 men who, after occupying the enemy trench, were to transpose the parapet for use against the enemy.

Working Party. The Assaulting Party to be followed immediately by a Working Party (without arms) carrying filled sandbags.

This party was sub-divided as under :

Right Party. - To construct a loopholed traverse on the right of the captured portion of the enemy's fire trench.
10 men

Left Party. - To construct a loopholed traverse on the left of the captured portion of the enemy's fire-trench.
10 men

The following Additional Parties were also arranged :

(a) 10 men (Unarmed) on each Flank to pass out sandbags and material, tools etc. to the Party in the captured trench as might be possible.

(b) To dig two communication trenches to the captured trench, 3 men at each end of trenches to be dug.

(c) Bomb-throwing party (rifles slung) to accompany Assaulting Party (or to form part of it). This party to carry a few Lotbiniere bombs to destroy the enemy trench on each flank of the captured portion.

Stretcher Bearers were detailed and formed up ready to move out as required.

The Post was fully manned, and Local Reserves brought close up on the side of the hill.

The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade (in Reserve) held itself in readiness to move at short notice.

The operation was under the direction of Lieut. Colonel C.H.J. Brown.

(2)

At 11 p.m. the assaulting party, divided into a right and a left section, issued from our trenches closely followed by the working party.

The enemy's trench was taken without much opposition; but, nevertheless, there were casualties in both parties, especially from Machine Gun fire from the right flank.

A few Turks were bayoneted in the trench, and 28 prisoners were taken.

Working parties immediately commenced their allotted tasks in spite of an enfilade fire, rifle and Machine Gun, from the right flank.

About 70 yards of the enemy's fire trench was occupied.

About midnight, a message was received from the 1st Australian Division that the party of 24 men, who had been sent out against the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH, had failed to reach it owing to heavy rifle fire from Turks in the dis-used trench in the Gully opposite the left of No. 2 Section.

The failure of this party to gain their objective made the task of the men of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade in front of QUINN'S POST all the more difficult.

Lieut. Col. Brown, commanding QUINN'S POST, reported that he did not consider that his men would be able to hold on to the captured trench during daylight unless the enemy's Machine Gun on the right flank was silenced in the meantime.

The Officer commanding COURTNEY'S POST was warned of this, and particularly requested to watch the gap between COURTNEY'S POST and the left of No. 2 Section.

Representations were then made to the Army Corps with a view to a further attempt being made by the 1st Australian Division to take the GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.

Arrangements were accordingly made to carry this out.

The work in the captured trench in front of QUINN'S POST proceeded satisfactorily in spite of heavy fire; traverses were erected at each end, and communication trenches cut back to the Post.

The 2nd assault of the 1st Australian Division was ordered for 3 a.m., but was only partially successful.

At 4 a.m. the enemy commenced a counter-attack in front of QUINN'S, and by constant "bombing" from their support trenches, they gradually destroyed the traverses and head cover erected by our men, and drove them slowly into a contracted portion of the captured trench about 30 yards long.

Our Artillery were ordered to co-operate against this counter-attack.

After daybreak, the captured trench became subjected to constant fire attack in spite of most gallant efforts to retain it; but, as time went on, it became more and more doubtful whether the garrison could maintain their position.

The party gradually found themselves surrounded except on the rear side, and were finally driven out at 6.30 a.m.

A vigorous bomb attack, combined with heavy rifle and Machine Gun fire, was then directed on QUINN'S POST, and was continued until 10 a.m. at which hour we held the same position that we held before the attack commenced, except that the fire trench in QUINN'S POST, and particularly that of No. 3 Section, was badly damaged by bomb fire.

We still hold the communication trenches leading towards the Turkish trench, and these are being provided with overhead cover.

Lieut. Col. C.H. Brown, N.Z.S.C., in command of the Canterbury Battalion, and O.C. QUINN'S POST, was wounded by a bomb.

(3)

Our casualties were as follows :-

<u>KILLED</u>	
Officers :	1
Other Ranks :	12
<u>WOUNDED</u>	
Officers :	8
Other Ranks :	102
<u>MISSING</u>	
Officers :	-
Other Ranks :	14
Total :	----- 137 -----

It is impossible to estimate accurately the enemy's Losses, but they were severe.

NZ.G.172.



No 3 Section
No 4
4th Light Inf Bn (Det Bn)
War Diary
File.

HEADQUARTERS,

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Anzac Cove, 18th June. 1915.

Circular Memorandum

for Commanders of Sections of the Defence.

The General Officer Commanding is very glad to see in his visits to posts that a marked improvement has taken place lately in the alertness of the men in the trenches, and that, in most posts, superiority of fire has been established over the enemy. Also, that the enemy's sniping is now kept down to a far greater extent than formerly.

The work done in the trenches, and their improvement, is also, in most cases, satisfactory, but much can still be done in this respect.

The following points in particular require attention:-

1. Many iron loopholes are still not in use, and, when used, are not yet properly covered with sacking, and so put into the parapet as to be screened from the enemy's view. This must be done in all cases, and, when not in use, the loopholes must invariably be plugged.

These loopholes, where not required for firing, are most valuable for observation.

2. Fascines are not nearly as much used as they might be. More should be made in all posts, and they should be used for many purposes whereby the use of sandbags might be saved. The pictures in the illustrated papers of the trenches in France show that a great deal of revetting in them is done with fascines and gabions, which should also be made.

3. Sandbags are scarce, and a great many are used for unnecessary purposes. All Commanders of posts must stop this, and must collect all sandbags from any places where they are not required, for use where they are urgently necessary.

4. There are not, as a rule, sufficient machine gun emplacements. More must be made, and every maxim gun in use must have at least one, or even two, alternative places from which to fire.
5. The cleanliness and tidiness of the trenches leaves a great deal to be desired in many cases. Because we are on Active Service, and fighting, there is no reason for any relaxation in these matters, and, from both a sanitary and disciplinary point of view, "Trench Discipline" is most important. It is just as easy for a man to fold his overcoat, waterproof sheet, and other gear, etc., and put it somewhere where it is out of the way, as to leave it kicking about somewhere in the trench, as is so often the case. Rifles and accoutrements are frequently kicking about in the bottom of the trench, and this must be stopped at once. The necessity for niches, or improvised racks, for the rifles has been already brought to notice, and they must be provided. A strict order must be given against any accoutrements, or clothing of any kind, being left lying on the floor of the trench.
6. In some cases, where no enfilade fire is to be expected, the trenches might be slightly widened, just enough to allow two men pass. This should only be done with the greatest caution, and must be accompanied with ample depth in proportion, and the General Officer Commanding only wishes to see it in cases where it can quite safely be done.
7. All mines and saps should be given consecutive numbers in each post, and a good-sized notice board, with the number tidily and clearly painted on it in large letters - not scrawled on anyhow, in pencil - should be placed on the mouth of it.
8. Each Post Commander should always have a plan of all trenches, works, saps, etc. of his post with him, and a fresh plan should be prepared whenever necessary, and additions shown day by day, so that anybody visiting the post can see at a glance from it the progress of all work, and what is being done. The enemy's trenches should always be shown on this as far as possible.

9. A very good idea which the General Officer Commanding has seen in some of the trenches of the Australian Division, is to have the various posts occupied during the day in the trenches marked as sentry posts. If this system is carried out, orders for the sentries are required.
10. In some posts the General Officer Commanding has found that definite alarm signals have not been arranged.
11. The exact garrison for each ~~part~~ section of a ~~part~~ trench has not always been laid down.
12. Though there is a marked improvement in the interest taken by subordinate Commanders in their trenches, the General Officer Commanding has still found that in some cases platoon commanders have not been given a definite responsibility for definite sections of the trench, and have not understood that their business is not only to put their men into the trench, but also to be perpetually repairing and improving it.
13. Reports from the trenches are not as frequent as they should be, and platoon and company commanders do not take all the opportunity they might, of acquiring information about the enemy and their front, and the direction of his saps and other works.
14. The written records which should be kept by picked observers are generally conspicuous by their absence.
15. Pickets are not sufficiently used in all cases in front of the trenches, and in the gullies.
16. More notice boards, clearly printed and painted, are required, to show the direction of all trenches, and where they lead to, and these should have a permanent direction on them, and not the name of some unit which will probably be relieved in the course of a few days. Anyone should be able to visit the trenches and walk about them, by means of the signboards, without having to ask the way from anybody.

17. The General Officer Commanding is very glad to find that the bomb throwing is so much on the improve, and that in this respect, as well as in the sniping, we are in a fair way to acquire a definite ascendancy over the enemy. It should be a golden rule that for every bomb thrown by the enemy, at least two, or, if possible, three, should be sent in reply - not at, but into, his trench. This should be quite possible of attainment by means of regular practice, bomb throwing competitions, and the use of trained bomb throwers; bombs are scarce, and we cannot afford to waste any on bad shots.

W. B. Purdie

Major,
General Staff.

New Zealand and Australian Division.

SECTION ORDER No. 9

by
COLONEL H. G. CHAUVEL, C. M. G.
Commanding No. 3 Section Defence.

Headquarters,
 Monash Valley,
 9th June, 1915.

ADMINISTRATION-

- Snipers (1) No one excepting recognized snipers are to go into sniper positions, as anyone not accustomed to the post is liable to give its position away to the enemy.
- Temporary Appointments (2) Major P. Ferguson is temporarily appointed Staff Officer to No. 3 Section of Defence, dated 8/6/15.
 2nd Lieut. T.M.P. Grace is temporarily appointed Officer in Charge of Snipers No. 3 Section, dated 5/6/15.
- Badges of rank (3) The General Officer Commanding has noticed lately, in a number of units of the Division, that officers and N.C.O's are not wearing their badges of rank.
 He directs that all officers and N.C.O's are to invariably wear these on their jackets. He has no objection to them being worn on the shoulder straps, provided all individuals of a unit wear them in the same way.
- Rations (4) On comparing ration strengths with effective strengths it has been found that rations for numbers considerably in excess of effective strength have been drawn. Steps will be taken at once by units to rectify this.
- Sign Boards. (5) It has come to notice that sanitary area sign boards have been removed and used as fire wood. Commanding Officers will take necessary steps to ensure that this practice is discontinued forthwith.
- Empty fired S.A.A. cases (6) Empty fired S.A.A. cases will be collected and returned to the nearest Ordnance Depot.
- Arrival Reports (7) Officers Commanding Units will report arrival of every officer, giving rank, name initials and date of last promotion.
- Ordnance Stores. (8) In future ordnance stores will be issued by the D.A.D.O.S. for units of this Section on the following days:-

1st A.L.H. Brigade	-	Tuesdays.
N.Z. Infantry Brigade	-	Wednesdays.

(Sgd.) E. M. Williams,
 Major,
 Brigade Major, No. 3 Section.

SECTION ROUTINE ORDER No. 10

No. 3 Section Defence
MONASH GULLY
11/6/15.

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N .(1) WATER.

It is the intention to place tanks in Sanitary Areas from which specified Areas will draw. These tanks will be labelled. The Officer Commanding the Area in which the tank is situated must immediately place a Water Guard over this tank, with definite instructions regarding the care to be taken in issuing the water from same. The Guard on each tank should not be less than 1 N.C.O. and 1 man. This Guard in the case of Areas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 will assist in the filling of the tanks from the Water Carts which come from the beach. The remaining Areas will be responsible for the filling of their own tanks from the wells. This water must be boiled or chemically treated. When however, transport is available, water will be brought from the beach for Area No. 6.

from wells

(2) TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT.

That portion of D.O. 206 referring to the appointment of Major F. Ferguson is cancelled and the following is to be substituted :-

Major F. Ferguson, R.E. is temporarily appointed Staff Officer for Engineer Services to No. 3 Section of Defence.

(3) WATER.

~~The water in well beyond No. 3 Outpost is found to be, E.M.W. on analysis, unfit for human consumption.~~

(Sgd.) E. M. Williams,
Major,
B. M. No. 3 Section Defence.

NOTICE.

LOST. A pair of ROSS FIELD GLASSES with name "G.A.F. BELASARIO, UNION CLUB, SYDNEY."
Finder, please return to No. 3 SECTION, HEADQUARTERS.

656

TO : Aust Divn
N.Z. & A. Divn.
I.M.A. Bde.

Ga 20 28th June

SECRET Eighth Corps is attacking at 11 a.m. to-day aaa
With object of preventing enemy leaving our front to reinforce
in South the Army Corps will take action as follows aaa
Australian Division to push out a force of equivalent of four
companies with orders to engage enemy trenches in direction of
ECHELON TRENCHES and SNIPERS RIDGE aaa
Divisional Artillery will support this movement and engage the
rear slopes of LONELY PINE and JOHNSONS JOLLY aaa
In other portions of Australian Division Sections rifle and bomb
attack will be carried on aaa
N.Z. & A. Division will similarly engage the enemys attention with
bomb & rifle fire wherever possible paying particular attention to
the trenches facing WALKER'S TOP aaa
Artillery to assist in whole operation as opportunity offers aaa
The operation will commence with the attack from the right of the
Australian Division which will inform N.Z. & A. Division and Army
Corps H.Q. when about to begin aaa
H.M.S. HUMBER is engaging OLIVE GROVE and guns further South aaa

Issued to Aust.Divn. N.Z. & A.Divn I.M.A.Bde Brig.Gen.R.A.
From ANZAC.

(494)
(Sgd.) A.Skeen Lt.Col.
for Brig.Genl. G.S.
ANZAC.

TO : No. 3 & 4 Sections
C.R.A. 4th Aust.Inf.Bde.

N.Z.G. 296 28th June.

SECRET The 8th Army Corps attacks to-day in the Southern Zone
at 11 a.m. In order to prevent the transfer of troops from the
Anzac Zone the following action is being taken aaa
Australian Division pushes out a force the equivalent of Four
Companies in the direction of the ECHELON TRENCHES and SNIPERS
RIDGE aaa Aust.Div.Artillery assists this move and engages rear
slopes of LONELY PINE and JOHNSTONS JOLLY aaa Other portions of
the 1st Aust.Div Line engage the enemy with rifle and bomb attackaaa

(2) The N.Z. & A. Division will engage the enemy with bombs, &
rifle & machine gun fire as opportunity offers. The Officer
commanding No. 4 Section will pay particular attention to the
trenches facing WALKER'S TOP.

N.Z. & A. Divisional Artillery will assist the whole operation
as opportunity offers paying particular attention to the Trenches
opposite WALKER'S TOP and POPE'S HILL and the bivouacs in rear of
MORTAR RIDGE aaa The operation will commence from the right at a
time to be notified by the 1st Aust.Div. to the N.Z. & A. Div. who
will pass it on to those concerned. Ackdge.

From N.Z. & A. DIV.
1100. (Sgd.) W.R.Pinwill Major.

TO : C.R.A.
3 & 4 Sect. 4 Aust.Inf.Bde.
N.Z.G. 298 28th June.

Operations referred to in my N.Z.G. 296 commence at 1300.
Ackdge.

From N.Z. & A. Div.
1155. (Sgd.) W.R.Pinwill Major.

6.57

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

App 53. 57

Appendix No. 53

Report on the action of night 29th/30th June 1915.

On the 28th June, an attack was made at CAPE HELLES by the 29th Division on a portion of the ACHI BABA position.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was asked to help in any way they could so as to ensure that the Turks facing the Anzac position should be contained to their trenches, and be prevented from detaching troops to reinforce their main body about ACHI BABA.

A small force, equivalent to 4 Companies, of the Australian Division advanced to attack the Turkish trenches towards KABA TEPE, supported by all Batteries of the Australian, New Zealand and Indian Artillery, and Howitzer Battery of the Lowland Division.

The New Zealand & Australian Division assisted by a fire demonstration only, and did not make any forward movement.

This demonstration on the part of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps had the desired effect, and evidently puzzled the Turks in our front as to our real intentions. They appeared to imagine that we intended attacking from our right, or perhaps it was their intention to make a feint against our right before heavily attacking our left.

In any case, the next evening, 29th June, at about 9.30 p.m. a brisk rifle fire, distinctly heavier on the left than on the right, broke out along the whole front of Nos. 3 and 4 Sections. Our troops looked upon this more in the nature of a demonstration than as a preliminary to an attack, and the Turks did not succeed in drawing our fire.

The rifle fire gradually died down opposite No. 3 Section, but on the left there was intermittent Artillery and rifle fire up till 12.15 a.m. when the rifle fire increased with greater volume from the direction of the NEK, supported by Artillery fire from the two 75 mm. guns on 971 Ridge and the position beyond POPE'S left. Our trenches in No. 4 Section were held by the 8th and 9th Light Horse Regiments, and the 6th (Manawatu) Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, all under the command of Lieut. Colonel A. MIBLL, in temporary command of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, and in command of WALKER'S TOP during this engagement.

The combined rifle and Artillery fire continued till about 1 a.m. when it ceased, and the Turks delivered a determined attack on foot with fixed bayonets from the direction of the NEK on to our salient position between Saps Nos. 1 and 8. The enemy's first rush was of a very determined nature, 16 of them being shot down and bayoneted as they reached the sap. Owing to a mistaken order, about 30 actually succeeded in getting into and over Sap No. 1, but were instantly killed. Some tried to work round our left flank, evidently being quite unaware of an excellent secret sap which had been thrown out by Brig. General A. H. RUSSELL, Commanding No. 4 Section, and which completely guards the left flank.

The fighting was particularly severe in Saps 1, 2, and 3 where the men of the 8th and 9th Light Horse repulsed the repeated charges of the enemy with bombs and rifle fire. Flares were also used with considerable success. It is estimated that the enemy's Artillery fired 300 rounds over our

6/58

(2)

Appendix No. 53⁵⁸

position, but their elevation was too high, and the shells either fell into the sea, or hit the CATHEDRAL Cliff. The Torpedo-boat Destroyer, H.M.S. COLNE, gave great assistance by replying to the enemy's Artillery, and working her search-light over the ground to our immediate front. The movement of the Turks advancing over the BEK against the trenches in No. 4 Section was observed from POPE'S HILL, and from the Picquet posted in MONASH GULLY between WALKER'S RIDGE and POPE'S HILL.

In their endeavours to reach WALKER'S TOP a number of Turks were observed moving along under the crest line some distance down MONASH GULLY, where they were fired upon by the Picquet in the Valley and the machine gun on POPE'S HILL. Lieut. Colonel ROWELL, Commanding POPE'S HILL, then sent two Troops up the Valley to drive them out, whereupon they withdrew to their own trenches, but not without suffering severe losses; 25 of their dead have since been seen lying out in front of POPE'S HILL, and in addition 5 prisoners were taken, of whom 3 were wounded.

By 1.45 a.m. the attack against No. 4 Section was practically ended, but the ground in front was not cleared of the enemy till 4 a.m.

At 3 a.m. the enemy again opened fire in front of POPE'S left, and about 30 Turks rushed over the parapet in front of QUINN'S right, but were soon driven back with rifle fire.

At dawn, it was seen that the enemy's losses were severe, and it is estimated that at least 250 of their dead are lying out in front of our trenches. 15 prisoners were captured including 5 wounded.

The number of our troops engaged in No. 4 Section amounted to about 350, of whom 7 were killed and 19 wounded.

Among the prisoners was an English speaking Armenian who has given some valuable and interesting information. Among other items of interest, he has stated that SEVER PASHA had visited their camp the previous day, and had ordered this attack against the Anzac position, directing them to drive us into the sea. The troops entrusted with this duty consisted of the three newly arrived Battalions of the 18th Regiment.

It was noticed that the enemy were particularly well supplied with food and ammunition.

Major-General,
Commanding N.Z. & A. Division.

ANZAC COVE.

2nd July 1915.

HEADQUARTERS,

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Anzac Cove. 20th June, 1915.Memorandum for Brigades.

In the event of an advance from our present positions it will be necessary to make special arrangements for attack of the Turk trenches in front of us, and pursuit throughout the trenches, by means of bombs and bomb throwers. Will you please consider the question, and report -

1. How you propose that the bomb throwers shall be organized in the attack.
2. What number of bomb throwers there shall be.
3. What number of bombs they will carry.
4. What will be their tactical distribution and employment.
5. What arrangements would be made for replenishment of bombs sufficient to ensure their incessant use on a large scale for an attack lasting perhaps a day and a night, and against counter attack lasting perhaps another day and a night.
6. What arrangements you would make for the lighting of fuses.
7. What kind of bombs and hand grenades would you propose to employ, and in what proportions of each.
8. What relation the attack by bombs and hand grenades would bear to the ordinary attack with the rifle and bayonet.

It appears to the General Officer Commanding that hand grenades and bombs will play a most important part in the attack on the enemy's trenches in front of us, and that an organization whereby a considerable number of men, armed with an ample supply of these weapons, and with most careful arrangements made for ample replenishment of them, will go far to ensure success. Bomb throwers advancing along the enemy's communication trenches, at the same time as men with the bayonet, may be of the greatest value in clearing our front, and inflicting great loss on the enemy. The question of the appointment of a brigade bomb throwing Officer, similar to Brigade Machine Gun Officer, for instructional purposes, and possibly for command, should receive consideration.

Major,

General Staff.