

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/53/4

Title: General Staff, Headquarters New
Zealand and Australian Division

July 1915



AWM4-1/53/4

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or

P 77

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

NZ & A Div - General Staff.

(Erase heading not required).

A.G.'s OFFICE AT THE BASE
LONDON, M. E. F.
7 SEP. 1915
CENTRAL REGISTRY.
No. M. F. C/

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
<p>NZ & A DIVISION ANZAC COVE, Gallipoli 1 July 1915</p>	<p>A quiet period: the usual shelling of posts and Beach took place. The question of organizing bomb parties for offensive operations has recently been considered and instructions (Appendix 54) issued. Instructions were also issued re the appointment of Bomb Officers to Sections of Defence. Special ANZAC order dt-29/6/15. reaction 29/6/15.</p>	<p>Appendix 54. Appendix 55. Appendix 56.</p>
<p>2nd July 1915, Friday.</p>	<p>Major PINWILL G.S.O.(2) left for Hospital Ship, sick. Diary resumed by Capt CONINGHAM, G.S.O.(3). A very quiet period. Enemy repaired certain trenches damaged by our shell fire. Enemy guns from ANAFARTA & KOJADERE fired at intervals, but did no damage. A certain number of Turkish dead in front of NO IV Section were buried & their rifles & ammⁿ brought in. The water supply tapped in the creek N. of NO 3 out post is proving ample for all purposes. Within the last 48 hours, 8 officers & 249 other ranks joined N.Z. M.R. Bde as reinforcements. We set alight the enemy head cover opposite QUINNS with bombs, and our 4.5" Howitzer shelled the enemy trenches opposite the NEK with effect. up to midnight 2/3 July, 118 Turks had been buried, 128 Turk rifles brought in & 6400 Rds ammⁿ collected - by NO 4 Section. Circular Memo re Grenade parties & Grenades dt-1 July issued. app 57.</p>	<p>RL G.S.</p>
<p>2nd July 1915 Saturday.</p>		

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WAR DIARY
or
WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Gen. Staff
N.Z.A. Div.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
NZA Div. H.Q. ANZAC Cove Saturday, July 3rd 1915.	<p>6 a.m. Enemy gun fr. ANAFARTA opened fire on No 4 Section without effect. During the morning the enemy were heard tunnelling towards our trenches on the NEK. They were estimated to be about 6 feet away & a little above our tunnel.</p> <p>2 p.m. Enemy are said to have broken through into our mine tunnel. A charge was therefore fired. Results believed good.</p> <p>6 p.m. H.M.S. CHELMER shelled trenches at NEK effectively. Enemy's 75 mm gun replied.</p> <p>10 p.m. H.M.S. CHELMER shelled old No 3 Outpost & Rifle & M.G. fire was opened from WALKERS Ridge, NO IV Section & from the outposts. At the same hour the enemy fired 5 bombs with a catapult into the gully at the back of POPE'S Hill.</p> <p>During the day, enemy working parties were observed entrenching on KILID BAHAR plateau - sq. 193. G & H.</p> <p>The N.Z. MAORI Contingent, 16 officers - 461 O.R., arrived & are now attached to N.Z.M.R. Bde. At present they are bivouacked near No 1 Picquet.</p> <p>Col. N.M. SMYTH, V.C. assumed command of 3rd L.H. Bde.</p> <p>The track from the main Communication Trench to No 2 Outpost is to be widened to admit passage of Mule Transport.</p>	
Sunday - July 4th, 1915.	<p>12.30 a.m. A fire balloon was sent up from No 3 Section H.Q. to alarm enemy & draw fire. Unfortunately, wind carried it over WALKER'S Ridge. The day was an extremely quiet one & the night uneventful.</p> <p>The enemy gun from direction of ANAFARTA fired a few shells at WALKER'S Ridge early in the morning, and the long range Naval 4" gun from the South fired a few rounds in the morning.</p> <p>Early in the morning the enemy mountain guns up towards the CHESSBOARD opened fire on QUINNE line trenches & did</p>	<p>G.S.</p> <p>20</p>

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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12.79.
Gen. Staff
NZADiv.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Sunday July 4th (Contd)	<p>10.50 am Enemy reported missing towards our trenches on neck.</p> <p>15.30 pm a countermine was charged & fired at 6 p.m. Results considered satisfactory but not yet definitely known.</p> <p>During the night H.M.S. CHELMER fired upon TABLE TOP and old NO3 Post and the gully to North of latter. This drew a certain amount of hostile fire.</p> <p>Cot. N.M. SMYTH, V.C. assumed Command of NO4 Section vice Brig Gen RUSSELL, sick.</p> <p>Cot. MELDRUM comm. and NZMR Bde via Col. BAUCHOP wounded.</p> <p>1700. NZ Hvy Bty opened fire on 2 gun emplacements on MORTAR Ridge, & secured 4 direct hits.</p> <p>2015 10 effective shells were fired on old NO3 outpost, 200 of the enemy having been seen going into the post. This is evidently the garrison, by day only snipers occupy post, remainder being in Reserve.</p> <p>In future PHILIPS' Bty - 1st Aust. Div. - will fire a few rounds daily at the enemy trench on S. side of NEK, at top of MONASH Gully. From this trench, the Turks can fire on to Reserve slopes of POPES and snipe into MONASH Gully.</p> <p>Tomorrow the Aust. 5th Hvy Bty & N.Z. 4th Hvy Bty will register the long valley running N. & S. beyond LONELY PINE, JOHNSTON'S JOLLY & MORTAR Ridge, with aid of aeroplane.</p>	<p>RR G.S.</p>
Monday July 5th, 1915. 0415	<p>Enemy Mtn Gun opened fire on QUINN'S Post & damaged fire parapet.</p> <p>Hostile guns also shelled WALKERS TOP, there being apparently 4 guns, including 2 75 mm guns. None of these were located. Little damage was done, but the bombardment lasted from 0430 to 0730.</p> <p>For the last few days the enemy guns have started opening fire on our trenches in both sections, at dawn. By the time our artillery get to work they have ceased firing. To-day the enemy fired between 250 & 300 shells.</p> <p>0700 a hostile 11" gun - possibly Naval gun from GOEBEN now placed on KILID BAKR fired a few rounds into cove, then shortened & a few shells struck hill above Aust Div H.Q., shell burst & splinters flew down into cove. This gun was reported by an I.O.O. to be about 225 W 9 & our 6" Hvy registered the spot, but later information placed it on the seaward.</p>	<p>RR G.S.</p>

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Gen. Staff
NZA Div

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
NZA Div H.Q. ANZAC COVE GALLI POLI Peninsula. Monday, July 5th, 1915 (Contd)	<p>1800 a mine was fired in NO 4 Gallery of QUINNS Post, within 10 feet of Turkish trenches. The explosion threw up a good deal of earth, hiding a portion of the enemy's trench & formed a crater.</p> <p>2000 The enemy were again heard working towards No 2 Sap in No 4 Section, and a charge was prepared and fired. Results unknown at present.</p> <p>The enemy Mtn gun emplacement on DEADMAN'S Ridge from which QUINNS Post is shelled was registered by the N.Z. 4.5" Howr - 2 direct hits were made.</p> <p>H.Q. ANZAC issued a circular Memo on the subject of steps to be taken in case the enemy fire shells containing asphyxiating gas. (The G.H.Q. Bulletin of 5 July contained the information that 15 Mortar guns capable of firing gas bombs to a range of 450 yds had arrived in the peninsula.) The Memo was distributed to all Sections, Bdes & Battns.</p> <p>The 16th Bn, 4 Aust. Inf. Bde, left for a few days rest at IMBROS.</p> <p>The barges & lighters were shelled by 4 guns from the OLIVE GROVES till they were far out to sea. Movements such as these might well be carried out under cover of darkness. The enemy shooting did not appear very effective.</p> <p>ANZAC letter Ga 132 was also received, detailing certain works. Such as widening Roads & Comm^{ns} leading to the outposts.</p> <p>This work is essential in case reinforcements arrive or a move is made towards the ANAFARTA plain. Possibly the time of our advance & move from ANZAC is approaching.</p>	<p>app. 58.</p> <p><i>Rd</i> G.S.</p> <p>app 59</p>

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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H. 81.
Gen. Staff
NZA Div

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Tuesday, July 6th, 1915 ANZAC Cove 9am	The enemy guns from the South shelled the beach & lower hill slopes at intervals during the morning, but not severely. NO IV Section reported that the usual relief of about 100 Turks was observed entering old No 3 outpost. The enemy appear to have ceased mining towards No 2 Sub in No 4 Section on WALKERS TOP, since the explosion of a 4th charge fired to-day at 5 p.m. During the afternoon an officer from No 2 Post went on board H.M.S. CHELMER to point out targets & gun positions. H.M.S. CHELMER shelled old No 3 Post, NEK trenches & those beyond BAUCHOP Ridge; results appeared good. 50 to 100 Turks were observed going into old No 3 Post & about 30 towards TABLE TOP. Nothing else to note, as nothing of importance occurred. The work of improving BEACH Rd & widening communication from ANZAC Cove to N flank has been commenced.	
8-4 p.m.		Rel G.S.
Wednesday, July 7th, 1915 ANZAC Cove	A quiet & uneventful day with little fire of any description. At midday a report was received that the Turks had shown crosses at different times & places over their parapet opposite COURTNEY'S Post. Our men eventually fired on these & they were withdrawn. It is considered this was a religious gibe only. 1500. Enemy were observed using a sling for bomb throwing opposite QUINNS. 1645 Usual enemy reliefs were observed going into old No 3 Post. They evidently change the time of relief daily, so as not to with draw fire. 1730 QUINNS Post succeeded in setting fire to enemy overhead cover opposite, by bombing. Enemy replied & a severe bomb engagement took place; our fire trench in No 2 Subsection was slightly damaged, but was repaired. Later, in the evening, our bomb throwers at QUINNS succeeded	Rel G.S.

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff
NZA Div

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Friday July 9th, 1915 Midday	Nothing to note till 0630 when the enemy ANAFARTA gun started fire & continued shelling beach & hill slopes intensively. A 50lbs charge of cordite was fired by Engineers in front of NO 3 subsection QUINNS Post. At 1.30 p.m. a second was fired. Both explosions were followed a few seconds later by explosions on the Turkish side, as though our mines had detonated their charges. After the 2nd explosion, smoke was seen issuing from the Turk fire trench. The Turks have strengthened their trenches on SNIPERS NEST & on the CHOCOLATE Hills, E. of SALT LAKE.	
5 P.M.	The artillery of the NZA Div. cooperating with the artillery of the 1st Aust. Div. shelled JOHNSTON'S JOLLY & LONESOME Pine effectively.	
9 P.M.	H.M.S. CHERMER shelled old NO 3 Post. The result of the perpetual shelling of the Turkish trenches on the N. flank & on the NEK has been that, by day at any rate, the Turks dare not show their heads above the parapets. Sniping has practically ceased & their trenches are barely held. To avoid loss, their men appear to be kept in Reserve trenches. A Red star sign with a lamp centre is being erected on WALKERS Top to show the limit of our forward saps & facilitate the shooting of destroyers.	
9.30 P.M.	Col STODDART & 3 men, 2nd L.H. Rgt., effectively bombed a party of Turks working on DEADMAN'S Ridge; this drew some fire all along the line. From 9 to 10 P.M. there were short hostile bursts of Rifle & M.G. fire. Sprayers & chemicals for dissemination of asphyxiating gas clouds have been received & distributed. Full instructions for their use have been issued.	<u>ES</u> - App 60

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Gen Staff
N2A DW

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
<p>Saturday, July 10th ANZAC Cove</p>	<p>0300. Destroyer shelled NEK, and all our M. Guns covering the NEK opened a burst of fire. The Turks opened a slight fire in response all along the line, a few Turks crawling towards QUINNS were driven off with a bomb.</p> <p>A quiet day on the whole with some bombing and shelling. Bombing was unusually heavy during the afternoon at QUINNS POST. Our artillery engaged trenches and wire entanglements on LONESOME PINE. During the night every effort was made to draw the enemy's fire by means of bomb attacks & rifle & machine gun fire. An Officer & 6 men, Auckland Mth Rifles made a successful bomb attack on an enemy trench opposite RUSSELLS TOP in No 4 Section. This drew a considerable volume of rifle & M Gun fire. The 16th Batt^{le}, 4th Aust Inf Bde returned from Rest Camp IMBROS.</p>	<p>WMP Map 10</p>
<p>Sunday, July 11th ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.</p>	<p>An unusual amount of rifle fire during the early hours of the morning. During the afternoon our bomb throwers at QUINNS POST set fire to the enemy's overhead cover - some 30 yards burnt furiously in spite of the efforts of the enemy to extinguish the fire. ^{Artillery} Enemy again fired</p>	<p>8</p>

WAR DIARY

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~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

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General Staff

N.2. & A Division

5

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Sunday, July 11 th (Cont)	at Trenches and Entanglements on LONELY PINE. The enemy shelled WALKERS RIDGE somewhat heavily during the afternoon.	MMHingy
Monday, July 12 th 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli	The A & I 2 Army Corps gave orders for concerted action with the object of containing the enemy to our front during the progress of operations in the Southern Zone. As part of this action the artillery of the Division bombarded JOHNSTONES TOLLY and LONELY PINE ^{at 4.30 pm} . An enemy Mountain Gun on MORTAR RIDGE did some damage to the parapets of COURTNEY'S POST in No 3 Section. At 9.15 pm a fire demonstration was undertaken to alarm the enemy and draw his fire. This was very successful and showed that the enemy trenches are fully manned. The usual shelling of posts and the beach took place during the day.	MMHingy
Tuesday, July 13 th ANZAC COVE Gallipoli	A quiet day till 5 pm. when COURTNEY'S POST was heavily shelled by a 5.7" gun from the direction of Point 971. The usual bursts of fire to alarm the enemy were made during the night. A report on Operations 6 June - 5 July 1915 was compiled (N2G 522 d/13 July 1915)	Appendix 61 MMHingy

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff.

NZ & A Divisions

Hour, Date, Place.

Summary of Events and Information.

Remarks and references to Appendices.

Wednesday 14 July 1915
ANZAC COVE.
Gallipoli

The usual shelling took place, COURTNEY'S POST being again severely damaged by the 5.7" gun from ridge 971 and by a gun on MORTAR RIDGE. During the night the enemy showed considerable nervousness and exposed himself more than usual. It would appear as if fresh troops have been put into the trenches opposite us. The N.Z. Howitzer Battery shelled a hostile trench opposite RUSSELL'S TOP. In spite of careful laying the range varied by 100 yds. from shot to shot. On weighing the shells it was found that they varied in weight by as much as 17 ounces. This makes shooting at enemy trenches close to ours very uncertain and dangerous. Special Army Corps Order d/14 July issued

Appendix 62
MMP Major

Thursday 15 July
ANZAC COVE.
Gallipoli

A quiet day only broken by the usual shelling and desultory rifle fire.

MMP Major

WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff

NZ & A Divisions.

2/12

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
<p>Friday, 16 July 1915</p> <p>ANZAC COVE</p> <p>Gallipoli</p>	<p>Considerable bombing at QUINNS POST during the early morning. The 5.7" gun fired a few shots into COURTNEYS POST. A mine was successfully exploded from QUINNS POST. Bursts of fire were drawn from the enemy during the night by air bomb attacks.</p>	<p>WMP Maying</p>
<p>Saturday, 17 July 1915</p> <p>ANZAC COVE</p> <p>Gallipoli</p>	<p>During the morning enemy infantry were seen practising the attack near KUTCHUK ANAFARTI. Mounted men were also seen drilling near the same place. A mine was exploded by us from Courtney's Post which uncovered a long shallow tunnel, which the enemy had constructed unknown to us. The use of this shallow tunnel has not yet been discovered. It may be intended to facilitate either bomb or gas attack. Some bombing during the night - the Turks making use of mechanical bomb throwers.</p> <p>Special Force Order d/17 July 1915 issued</p>	<p>Appendix 63</p> <p>WMP Maying</p>

WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff

N2 & A Division

1/15

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Sunday, 18 July 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	An unusually quiet day - very little shelling or rifle fire. During the afternoon a lecture on meeting gas attack was delivered to Officers from each Unit by Capt Mackenzie, an expert from England. At 7 pm an enemy mortar firing a 12 inch spherical shell was fired from the vicinity of MORTAR RIDGE.	WMP mapin
Monday, 19 July ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	Nothing unusual during the day. At 10.30 pm the 15" Batt ⁿ , 4 th Aust Inf Bde was placed at the disposal of the 1 st Aust Division. Intelligence Reports indicate that an attack in force by the enemy is possible within the next few days. Our guns were engaged in searching various gullies where enemy troops might be massing. Information was also received that the enemy is likely to make use of gas and inflammable liquid. During the day the G.O.C. (Major General Sir A. J. Godley) held a conference of Brigadiers. - for Agenda vide Appendix 64.	Appendix 64. WMP mapin 92

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff

N 2 & A Division.

25
1/2

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
<p>Tuesday 20 July 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.</p>	<p>Nothing unusual during the day. Our artillery engaged a Camel Train moving East through SALT LAKE Valley (in direction of KUTCHUK ANAFARTI). During the night there were several bursts of fire by the enemy. We fired star shell and threw bombs and drew a heavy fire from the enemy particularly opposite the right of our section. Special Army Corps order of 19 July 1915 issued under cover of N 2 G 615 vide Appendix 65</p>	<p>Appendix 65. <i>W. H. H. H.</i></p>
<p>Wednesday, 21 July Anzac Cove Gallipoli</p>	<p>Aeroplane reported two guns in position in the vicinity of NIBRUNESI POINT. The locality was kept under observation but nothing new was seen. During the day there was some bombing and a little shelling. During the night our bomb attack failed to draw as much fire as usual. Entanglements were erected in front of posts and saps liable to be rushed and also in MONHIS GULLY in front of the picquet there. N 2 G 623 containing further instructions re meeting gas issued.</p>	<p>Appendix 66. <i>W. H. H. H.</i></p>

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WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Page 90
General Staff NZ & A Div

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Wednesday 21 July (Cont).	<p>Army Corps Order No 14 d/21 July 1915 was received and N. Z. & A. Divisional Order No 9 was issued at 7 p.m.</p> <p>During the day a Pamphlet on Gas Precautions (App 68) and a Memorandum to the Troops by the Army Corps Commander (App 69) were issued.</p> <p>In view of reports as to the assembly of fresh enemy troops and of his intention to attack us soon, all defensive measures were reviewed & posts were inspected by the G.O.C. Gas helmets were issued to all ranks & order issued that these were to be invariably carried on the persons.</p>	<p>Appendix 67</p> <p>" 68</p> <p>" 69</p> <p>MMP Magn Gr.</p>
Thursday 22 July 1915. ANZAC COVE Gallipoli	<p>All working parties were discontinued from 4 p.m. today in order that the men might rest before the expected attack.</p> <p>The day passed quietly. There was little firing at night. Our Troops had orders to make no reply to hostile fire unless a good target presented itself. Troops stood to arms from 11.45 p.m. to 1.10 a.m. 23rd i.e. about the time the moon set.</p>	<p>MMP Magn Gr.</p>

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff - M 24 A Dec 3/6

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Friday, 23 July ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	About 2 am there was a sharp burst of rifle fire along the line. Troops stood to arms 3-3.30 am. At 6.15 a.m. a hostile mine was exploded in front of Quinn's Post - no damage was done. This post was bombed somewhat heavily during the afternoon. A 3.7 Trench mortar was erected on RUSSELL TOP, No 4 Section. We exploded a mine in front of this post at 4 pm. The day passed quietly. A few shells were directed on to the beach during the night.	W.H. May
Saturday, 24 July ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	Troops stood to arms at 3 am. The Turks exploded a small mine in front of QUINN'S POST, killing a small number. An incendiary shell was thrown into MON 412 Gully. Bombs were thrown throughout the day and there was rather more rifle fire than usual at night. Rather more shelling than usual - the beach suffered considerably. Two guns opened from the ANZAC direction from new positions.	W.H. May

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Page 92
General Staff. M2 + A 210

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
<p>Sunday 25 July 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.</p>	<p>More incendiary shells were thrown into our lines, apparently by some mechanical contrivance as no report was heard. The shells are 15" long & 3" diameter roughly made of sheet iron with wooden plugs. The composition is yellow & apparently contains resin & sulphur. There was considerable shelling during the day and the beach again suffered. Three limbered guns each drawn by 6 oxen were observed moving West to KUTCHUK ANA-FARTA where they halted for the night. There was heavy bombing at QUINN'S POST during the night - bombs being apparently thrown from the vicinity of the mound raised by the mine exploded by them yesterday. A conference was held by the G.O.C. during the afternoon - present the General Staff, C.A.A. Brig Gen Russell O.C. No. 4 Section, Brig Gen Johnston, O.C. No. 3 Section of Defence. For agenda vide Appendix 70.</p>	<p>Appendix 70 MMPH 10</p>

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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General Staff - NZ + H Div - 1/5

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Monday 26 July 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	<p>For some time past preparations have been in progress for a concentration of Troops in the ANZAC Position, with a view to an attack on the enemy's position opposite our left, i.e. from behind Nos 1, 2 + 3 Outposts in No 4 Section of Defence. These involved (a) The construction of terraced bivouacs to give cover from view + fire. (2) The construction or improvement of communications to facilitate movements within our position (3) Covered positions where guns and vehicles could be parked out of sight of aeroplane observers.</p> <p>There was the usual shelling during the day.</p>	J.M. Murphy Cps.
Tuesday 27 July 1915 ANZAC COVE Gallipoli.	<p>Very heavy working parties employed during the night & when possible by day improving communications & landing guns and ammunition.</p> <p>Nothing to report beyond the usual shelling of beach & posts.</p>	J.M. Murphy Cps.

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General Staff. NZ & H Division

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices.
Wednesday 28 July 1915 ANZAC COVE, Gallipoli	Nothing special to report.	WMP Major G.
Thursday 29 July 1915 ANZAC COVE, Gallipoli.	An enemy aeroplane passed over during the afternoon and was reported to have burst into flames & fallen. It is doubtful if this was the case as the machine may well have exploded down to some landing place near KOTADERE. Nothing unusual to report.	WMP Major G.
Friday 30 July 1915 ANZAC COVE, Gallipoli	Enemy aeroplane passed over during the morning dropping bombs and shells. No damage was reported from the latter which mostly fell on the sea. It is not possible to see. Shelling of the beach from our position as usual.	WMP Major G.
Saturday 31 July 1915 ANZAC COVE, Gallipoli.	Usual shelling during the day - otherwise quiet. At 9 pm a sharp burst of fire from the Turks. At 9.45 pm we opened fire from the 14 Australian Redoubts as an operation on the extreme right flank. The Turk. replied briskly.	WMP Major G.

New Zealand and Australian Division

WAR DIARY

1-31 July 1915

A. G's OFFICE AT THE BASE
3rd. ECHELON. M. E. F.
7 SEP. 1915
CENTRAL REGISTRY.
No. M. F. C/

list of Appendices.

- App No
- 54^A Organization of Bomb Parties
 - 55 Appointment of Bomb officer in Section
 - 56 Special ANZAC Order to Troops
 - 57 Circular memo re Grenade Parties
 - 58 ANZAC Circular memo re Asphyxiating Shell etc.
 - 59 ANZAC G/L 132 re preparing cipher communication
 - 60 Instruction re use of Chemical Sprayers
 - 61 Report on operations 6 June - 5 July (N2G 522)
 - 62 Special A. Corps Order d/14 July
 - 63 Special Force Order d/17 July 1915
 - 64 Agenda - Conference of Brigadiers
 - 65 Special A. Corps Order d/19 July + N2G 615.
 - 66 Further instruction re meeting Gas
 - 67 A. Corps Order No 14 d/21 July + N2 A Div Order No 9
 - 68 Pamphlet on Gas Precautions
 - 69 A. Corps Memo to Troops
 - 70 Agenda of conference by GOC + Brigadiers

1 August 1915

W. R. Pearce Major
G. Staff, N2 + A Div

From : Headquarters,
N.Z. & A. Division.

To : Headquarters
A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

App. 54. A.

Duplicate.

Organization of Hand Grenade Parties
for offensive Operations.

1. I have under consideration the organization and formation of hand grenade parties for use offensively against an entrenched enemy.

In order to enable me to proceed with the matter, it is essential that I should know what 1st Line Transport can be made available for carrying grenades and bombs in the field, and the grenade carrying capacity of such Transport.

2. The tentative organization is as follows :-

In each Squadron of Mounted Rifles :

- 1 Sergeant or Corporal.
- 2 Throwers per Troop carrying in all 80 jam tin or 160 small grenades.
- 2 Carriers per Troop carrying in all 160 jam tin or 320 small grenades.

In each Company of Infantry :

- 1 Sergeant and 1 Corporal.
- 4 Throwers per Platoon carrying in all 160 jam tin or 320 small grenades.
- 4 Carriers per Platoon carrying in all 320 jam tin or 640 small grenades.

3. It is obvious that Transport cannot be provided to carry bombs on the above scale for every Squadron and Company in my command: but I would recommend that ^{at least} half a mule cart per Regiment and 1 mule cart per Battalion be allotted for the transport of Grenades and Bombs in the field. I shall be glad, therefore, if the matter may be laid before the Army Corps Commander for his decision, and that I may be informed as to the carrying capacity of any Transport allotted for the purpose.

4. As possibly the organization and equipment of hand grenade parties is being considered by other formations, I submit the

following to indicate the lines on which I am working :-

- (a) Hand grenade Throwers - carry no rifles, bayonets only : 10 jam tin or 20 small grenades in a special belt or haversack : fire stick for lighting. Each party has a thrower and assistant thrower both being armed and equipped similarly.
- (b) Carriers - carry rifles slung : 20 jam tin or 40 small grenades in a special haversack or basket : spare fire stick (unlit). These men will be fully trained to act as throwers.
- (c) Each hand grenade party is accompanied by two men (fully armed and with fixed bayonets) as escort.
- (d) Transport of hand grenades. Normally carried in the Mule Cart or other Transport provided together with special belts and haversacks. ⁸ Lotbiniere Bombs on each cart in addition to the jam tin and small grenades.

When grenades are likely to be required by any Unit, the Grenade Parties proceed to the Cart which normally would be with the Regimental S.A.A. Reserve, draw the special equipment and grenades and rejoin their Units : the Throwers would leave their Rifles in the Grenade Cart.

In the event of it being impossible to bring the Grenade Cart sufficiently close to the Unit requiring Grenades, it is proposed to make use of the S.A.A. Pack mules - the S.A.A. on the latter being deposited at some convenient spot. To enable this to be done it is necessary that the grenades should be packed in such a manner that they will form convenient mule loads.

5. It is understood that detonating hand grenades are not being supplied. I am of opinion that this class of grenade would be of great value in the assault of enemy trenches delivered from beyond throwing distance of these trenches. A shower of detonating grenades thrown just as our troops were closing with the enemy could not fail to seriously affect his morale. I would suggest, therefore, that, provided the matter has not been finally settled and that an efficient detonating grenade can be obtained, the provision of such grenades be considered.

- 7-22
6. The present method of lighting the fuze of the grenade is by slow match - the JURD SLOW MATCH, made by wrapping a small round soft wood stick with several folds of khaki drill cloth, has proved efficient. But I consider that some other method is preferable. It has been suggested that the end of the fuze be prepared with the phosphorus mixture used in making Non-safety matches and lit by rubbing the prepared surface with glass paper or other suitable material. It is recognised that there would be a certain amount of added danger of accidental explosion during transit, should this method be adopted.

The prepared surface would require to be protected from damp and from accidental contact with anything capable of firing it.

Major-General,

Commanding N.Z. & A. Division.

Headquarters

23

Anzac Cove.

28th June, 1915

original

N.Z.A. 1307

Issued to Nos 344

4 Aust Inf Bde

Capt Pavy, Officer in Charge

Appointment of Bomb Officers in Sections of Defence.

1. Appointment in each Section.

The Officer Commanding each Section of Defence will appoint an officer to act as "Bomb Officer". The name of the officer selected will be submitted to Divisional Headquarters.

2. Duties of a Bomb Officer.

The Bomb Officer in each section will be responsible, under the orders of the Officer Commanding Section, for the following:-

- (a) Indenting on the Officer in charge of ammunition for all bombs required.
- (b) The maintenance of Section Reserves and Post Reserves of bombs.
- (c) The safe storage of all bombs whether in Reserves or in Posts.
- (d) Assisting ^{the} Post Commanders within the section as regards the disposal of mortars and other mechanical means of throwing bombs allotted to their post.
- (e) Assisting Post Commanders in the distribution of bomb parties in the trenches and for special enterprises.
- (f) Supervision of the training of bomb throwers: 100% of men additional to actual requirements to be trained to meet casualties.
- (g) Prevention of waste in the use of bombs. Use of the various kinds of bombs against suitable targets. Records of expenditure of bombs.
- (h) Examination and submission to the C.R.E. of useful inventions or ideas in connection with bombs.

MR

Major,
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 29th June, 1915.

7.24
app 56

We received information yesterday morning from the Commander in Chief that an attack would be made by our troops at Cape Helles on a portion of the Achi Baba position, and asking us to help in any way we could, so as to ensure the Turks facing our troops there not being reinforced by men from here. Consequently, 2 squadrons of the 5th Light Horse under Majors Midgeley and Johnston, and 2 troops of the 7th Light Horse, from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, with 2 companies of the 9th Battalion, supported by the 11th Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, advanced on our right front to attack the Turkish trenches towards Kaba Tepe, and towards the lower ridges of the Lonesome Pine position. The consequence of this advance was that Turkish reinforcements at Eski Keui, (which is between here and Achi Baba) which in all probability would have gone to oppose our force down South, were turned back and advanced to meet our attack.

Our Light Horse and Infantry succeeded most excellently in doing what was intended, and were ably supported by all batteries of the Australian, New Zealand and Indian Artillery, and by the newly arrived Howitzer Battery of the Lowland Division. Between them the guns fired 1400 rounds into the advancing Turks and into their reserves. On several occasions they caught small bodies of Turks advancing in the open, killing and wounding many of them. The Turks were also seen to mass in large numbers in the deep valley behind Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jelly.

Our howitzer batteries got well into them there, and though it is impossible to say what the casualties were, we may take it that we probably inflicted very heavy losses upon them.

The Army Corps Commander much regrets the casualties that took place in the 5th and 7th regiments of Light Horse and 9th and 11th Battalions, which were unavoidable, and which must always be expected when we undertake such operations. He is quite sure that the Commander in Chief will be more than satisfied with the way in which the Army Corps carried out his wishes, and General Birdwood wishes to convey his grateful thanks to the troops for their excellent work.

A. Skew

Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig-General,
General Staff,

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Anzac Cove,
1st, July, 1915.

N.Z.G./349

Organization of Grenade Parties and Supply of Grenades
with a view to offensive operations.

1. In the event of the Division being required to attack an enemy holding a position prepared with successive lines of trenches, connected by communicating trenches, it is probable that grenades will prove necessary to clear him out of his trenches.

It must, however, be clearly understood that the grenade is only to be used to assist the bayonet, never to replace it. Troops assaulting are never to wait for grenade throwers, though these, when available, can render valuable assistance - ~~if well trained & properly organized -~~ and can render success attainable with fewer casualties.

2. Regimental and Battalion Organization.

In order to take full advantage of the grenade as a weapon of offence, it is essential that a regular organization of grenadiers and of grenade supply be adopted. The General Officer Commanding therefore directs that the following organization be adopted throughout the N.Z. & Australian Division :-

In each Squadron of Mounted Rifles.

- 1 Grenade Sergeant or Corporal.
- 4 Bomb Parties each consisting of :-
1 thrower, 1 assistant thrower and 2 carriers.

In each Company of Infantry

- 1 Grenade Sergeant,
- 1 Grenade Corporal,
- 8 Bomb Parties, each consisting of :-
1 thrower, 1 assistant thrower, and two carriers.

In each Regiment and Battalion an Officer will be selected as Grenade Officer. Normally his duties in this connection will consist in training the various grenade parties and supernumeraries to replace casualties. In special cases, however, he may be detailed to take charge of Grenade Parties for special enterprises.

3. Organization of Grenade Parties.

- A Grenade Party will normally consist of :-
- 1 thrower carrying 10 jam tin grenades or 20 small grenades (bayonet but no rifle).
- 1 assistant thrower carrying 10 jam tin grenades or 20 small grenades.
(bayonet but no rifle).
- 2 carriers, each carrying 20 jam tin grenades or 40 small grenades, and slung rifles.
- 2 Escort with rifles and fixed bayonets.

The throwers will carry their grenades in special belts or haversacks - the carriers in special haversacks or baskets.

4. Supply of Grenades.

It is hoped to arrange that grenades will normally be carried in mule carts, one of which will be allotted,

for this purpose to each Battalion of Infantry and half a cart to each Regiment of mounted troops.

The load for a grenade cart is:-

6 boxes jam tin grenades = 300 large or 480 small.

1 box Lotbiniere bombs = 8 bombs.

Special belts and haversacks for throwers and carriers.

When grenades are likely to be required by any unit, the Grenade parties proceed to the cart which normally will be with the Regimental S.A.A. Reserve, draw the special equipment and grenades, and rejoin their units.

The throwers (and assistant throwers) will leave their rifles in the grenade cart.

In the event of it being impossible to bring the grenade cart sufficiently close to the unit requiring grenades, S.A.A. pack mules of the unit will be made use of: the S.A.A. loaded on these mules being deposited at some convenient spot.

5. Tactical Employment of Grenade Parties.

Grenade Parties acting offensively will be employed under the following conditions :-

(a) When the enemy's trenches are within throwing distance of our trenches. In this case the assault will be prepared by showers of grenades thrown into the enemy's trenches immediately prior to the assault, special grenade parties being formed up opposite the enemy's communication trenches as far as these have been located. In the actual assault on the trench, grenade throwers will accompany the assaulting party.

After the enemy trench has been occupied the grenade parties bombard the enemy's support trenches while the special parties previously referred to work up the enemy communication trenches, and to the flanks of the unit, (if any), and prevent the enemy collecting for counterattacks.

(b) When the enemy's trenches are assaulted from beyond throwing distance. In this case bomb parties come up with the last troops to be thrown in prior to the assault, and join in the assault: when the trench is taken they act as in (a). Should any obstacle be met which checks the assault within throwing distance of the enemy, they cover the destruction of passage of the obstacle ~~being~~ by bombarding the enemy.

Time fuse bombs are not to be used during an assault owing to the danger of causing casualties among our own men; except in the case of an obstacle being met as mentioned above.

Should detonating bombs, however, be available, they should be thrown as soon as the assaulting line gets within throwing distance of the enemy, and up to the last possible moment.

(Sgd). W.G. Braithwaite.
Lieut.-Colonel,
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

Army Corps Headquarters,

5th July, 1915.

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM.

Information has been received indicating that the Turks have received, probably from Germany, a few guns built to throw shell containing the ingredients of asphyxiating gases over short distances. All ranks are to be warned that we must therefore be prepared for attack of this nature.

2. The attention of all is directed to Para 7 and 8 of General Headquarters Instructions of June 9th, 1915.

Men equipped with respirators have nothing to fear from gas except discomfort, and as the enemy is unlikely to use gas unless he intends to follow it up by an attack, all we have to do is to be ready for his gas, and then prepare for his attack and the opportunities of killing which he will give us.

3. To ensure that all can be equipped rapidly, respirators in charge of units will be made up to one per individual plus 50% spare. These will be kept in platoon^{troop} or section charge by all units not in the firing line, or in the support and reserve trenches and communication trenches connecting these with the firing line trenches. Here they are to be distributed in packets of not more than 3 in places^{where} they will be immediately available for use. They are to be placed in recesses cut in the rear wall of trenches or right hand wall of communication trenches, the recesses being clearly marked with white placards.

Askeu - Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig-General,
General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

7.26
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS

Appendix No. 59
A/4/59 28

No. Ga 132.

Army Corps Headquarters,

Anzac Cove, 5th July 1915.

From : General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

To : New Zealand and Australian Division.

MEMORANDUM.

Please arrange to have the following works carried out, by July 15th - No. 3 being the most urgent.

1. Complete the widening and recessing of the covered way leading to No. 2 Outpost. This should be tested throughout by marching at least half a Company along it both ways in file closed up. Improvements must be made wherever the slightest check occurs.
2. A covered egress from this covered way into the main Sazli Bikita Deresi Eastward. The engineer officer entrusted with this should report to Army Corps Headquarters to receive instructions on the object of the work.
3. A road along the beach practicable for wheeled artillery from the Northern point of Anzac Cove, on to the level fields North of the nullah containing the water hole and pump in rear of No. 1 Outpost.
This will necessitate,
 - (a) hardening a portion of the existing road just North of of the Point.
 - (b) levelling and hardening with clay the existing beach track from the present mule cart road leading to the No. 2 A.S.C. Depot up to the beach breastwork, through which an opening must be cut. About 100 yards.
 - (c) clearing, levelling, and hardening a road from the breastwork up to the water nullah. About 80 yards.
 - (d) a ramp on to the fields North of the water nullah, connecting on to the old Turkish road skirting the fields towards SUVLA.

4. Ramping the nullahs South and North of the Fishermans Puts so as to make the old Turkish road along the fields from (3) to No. 2 Outpost practicable for wheeled artillery.
Works (3) and (4) must be done in darkness and must be laid out and executed so that nothing is seen from any position held by the enemy indicating that a road has been made.

(Sgd.) A. Skeen Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig-General,
General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

7.29

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

N.Z.G.No. 470

Divisional Headquarters,
 Anzac Cove, 9th July 1915

TO:

MEMORANDUM

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST GAS POISONING

In order to dissipate poisonous gas clouds you will be issued with spraying Machines in the proportion of 4 Sprayers to each Infantry Brigade and Mounted Rifles Brigade, and 3 to each Light Horse Brigade.

Instructions for the use of these Sprayers are enclosed in each box, but they appear to be the ordinary ones in use for spraying fruit trees, of which no doubt many of the men have a knowledge: but you should ensure that several men in each unit are trained in the use and care of the machines.

A proportion of chemicals for the use in the sprayers is also being issued to you.

The proportion of each is as follows:-

SODIUM HYPOSULPHITE	6 lbs.
SODIUM CARBONITE	$\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
WATER	3 gallons.

GLYCERINE is not essential, but if used, 2 ounces should be added to above mixture.

The Machines should be kept constantly filled and ready for use, and the liquid sprayed into the advancing cloud of gas as soon as it is within reach.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

7-30

Appendix No. 61
A/p/p 61

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

30.

N.Z.G. NO. 522/13 July 1915.

Report on Operations 6th June - 5th July 1915
both days inclusive.

TO : Headquarters,

Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

I have the honour to forward a report on the Operations in which this Division has been engaged during the period 6th June - 5th July.

1.
OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS.

During the period under report, endeavours have been made to render our defence more active. Patrols have been sent out from all posts, and these have had the effect of disturbing the enemy and restricting the movements of his patrols and sharpshooters.

On the night 7th/8th June, a sortie was made from QUINN'S POST in No. 3 Section of Defence with the object of recovering engineer stores, tools and wire left behind after the sortie of 4th/5th June, and of destroying the enemy's fire trench and bomb-proofs opposite the centre of QUINN'S POST. The party detailed left our trenches at 11 p.m. 7th June, and occupied some portion of the enemy's trenches. It was, however, subjected to heavy bomb attack and to enfilade Machine Gun fire, and by 2 a.m. 8th June, had been forced to evacuate the enemy trenches. The casualties were as follows :-

	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Missing.</u>
Officers	-	1	1
Other Ranks	3	28	7

The enemy delivered a counter-attack at 1.30 a.m. : this was checked by gun and rifle fire.

On the night 9th/10th June, a party went out from the left of No. 4 Section with the intention of lying up for enemy sharpshooters and observing his movements. This party met the enemy and retired down a shallow nullah to the beach where it remained till dark. The enemy following up were dispersed by the fire of our guns situated on WALKER'S TOP, and by the guns of one of H.M. Destroyers.

Patrols from QUINN'S POST and POPE'S HILL at various times crept forward and bombed the enemy's trenches, thereby drawing a considerable amount of rifle fire, and making him nervous.

2.
SHARPSHOOTERS

There has been a marked diminution in the enemy's sharpshooting. This is due partly to the good work done by our own sharpshooters, and partly to improved communications, more especially in MONASH GULLY.

3.
TRENCHES AND
COMMUNICATIONS

The construction of an inner line of defence was proceeded with : This line runs from the defences on WALKER'S TOP along the Western edge of MONASH GULLY and thence down a spur into the GULLY where it connects with the inner line constructed by the 1st Australian Division on BRAUND'S HILL. Saps and communication trenches were constructed and improved, and communications generally placed on a more satisfactory footing. A road and

communication trench capable of taking pack animals was made connecting MONASH VALLEY with RESERVE GULLY, and thence to the Posts on the left of No. 4 Section of Defence.

Shallow tunnels leading towards the enemy were commenced from COURTNEY'S POST and WALKER'S TOP: the object being to form new fire trenches secretly, and to provide communication trenches which could be rapidly opened up in case of necessity.

4.
RUSES TO DRAW
ENEMY FIRE.

During the period under report, several attempts were made to draw the enemy's fire and induce him to waste ammunition. For this purpose, flares and coloured lights were burnt: short bursts of rifle fire were delivered, and our guns shelled the enemy's trenches. These attempts met with varied success: but it became clear that the enemy's fire was well under control, and that he was not to be induced by such means to waste any great amount of ammunition.

5.
ARTILLERY.

The enemy's artillery was fairly active during the period, but the amount of shells fired at insignificant targets showed a marked decrease. On the other hand, the shelling of the beach and slopes in the vicinity of Divisional Headquarters increased in accuracy, and guns firing high explosive shell were brought into action: these did considerable damage at times, particularly to No. 3 N.Z. Field Ambulance and to the Ordnance Depot. The former was moved to a safer position below WALKER'S RIDGE. The enemy also brought into action at least one heavy howitzer (8.5), also a 6-inch gun with which he shelled our Posts at intervals.

On the 21st June, a Mountain Gun (26th Jacob's Mountain Battery) installed in COURTNEY'S POST, No. 3 Section of Defence, engaged and silenced two enemy Mountain guns on MORTAR RIDGE. These guns had been regularly shelling COURTNEY'S POST at a range of four to five hundred yards, and had done much damage to our parapets.

Generally speaking, our guns held their own against guns which could be located: but some of the enemy howitzers were well concealed and could not be engaged. The want of an aeroplane for spotting purposes is being more and more severely felt.

6.
MINING
OPERATIONS.

During the period, Mining and Counter-mining proceeded without interruption: the chief centres of activity being QUINN'S POST and WALKER'S TOP. At the former Post a complete protective girdle was completed and listening galleries driven out from it.

Frequent camouflôts were fired to check the enemy's efforts to undermine us, and on at least two occasions our miners broke into the enemy's galleries where fights occurred with rifle, revolver, and bomb. The gallantry of the Officers, N.C.O.'s and men engaged in these enterprises can hardly be praised too highly. Our miners have clearly established an ascendancy over those of the enemy, and have inflicted loss on them on several occasions while our casualties have been insignificant.

7.
BOMBS AND
HAND GRENADES

Bombs and Handgrenades have been used freely by both sides during the period. The Garland and Japanese Mortars have proved most useful and effective. In grenade throwing our men have established an ascendancy over the enemy, and have compelled him to erect elaborate bomb-proof cover over his trenches. The enemy brought into action opposite COURTNEY'S POST a catapult for throwing bombs. The bombs fell on the reverse slopes of the Post, and did some damage among the local Reserves.

7.32

Bomb-proof shelters have been erected and have proved most satisfactory.

"Bomb Officers" have been appointed in each Section of Defence : these have charge of the Section Reserves of bombs and grenades, assist in training the grenade throwers, and give advice to Post Commanders regarding the distribution of grenade parties in the various Posts.

The organization of Grenade Parties in Squadrons and Companies, with a view to offensive action in the event of an advance, was completed and orders were issued as to the carrying of grenades in the attack and the tactical employment of the parties.

8.
ENEMY ATTACK
- ON -
WALKER'S RIDGE

Between the 26th and 30th June, the enemy showed considerable activity in front of No. 4 Section of Defence, particularly WALKER'S TOP. This culminated on the 29th/30th June in a determined attack on our positions there which was defeated with heavy loss to the enemy. A detailed report on this action was forwarded under cover of my N.Z.G. 366, dated 2nd July 1915.

9.
OPERATIONS
28th. JUNE.

On the 28th June 1915, a demonstration was undertaken by the A. & N.Z. Army Corps with the object of preventing enemy troops in front of ANZAC from being transferred to the Southern Zone, where offensive operations were in progress. The part played by the N.Z. & A. Division consisted of fire action only. The enemy were observed massing behind JOHNSTONE'S JOLLY and LONELY PINE during the afternoon, and the operation as a whole was deemed successful.

10.
IMBROS
REST CAMP

In order to give the Troops a rest, orders were issued by the Army Corps Commander for one Battalion at a time to proceed to IMBROS for a few days' rest.

The 16th Battalion, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, proceeded to IMBROS on the 5th July.

Other Units of the Division will be sent in due course.

11.
MAORI
CONTINGENT

On the 3rd July 1915, the New Zealand Maori Contingent arrived at ANZAC, strength 16 Officers and 461 other ranks. The Contingent was posted to No. 4 Section of Defence (Brigadier-General A.H. Russell, N.Z. M.R. Brigade).

12.
COMMAND OF
SECTIONS OF
DEFENCE

On the 14th June, Colonel H.G. Chauvel, 1st Light Horse Brigade, O.C. No. 3 Section of Defence, was placed on the sick list, and the command (temporary) devolved on Colonel F.E. Johnston, Commanding New Zealand Infantry Brigade. This latter Officer also went sick on the 16th June, and Colonel F.G. Hughes, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, was sent from No. 4 Section of Defence to take temporary command. Colonel F.G. Hughes was also placed on the sick list on the 19th June, and Lieut. Colonel W.G. Braithwaite, General Staff, N.Z. & A. Division, was sent up to take over temporary command. Colonel Johnston resumed command on the 26th June 1915, and Lieut. Colonel Braithwaite returned to Divisional Headquarters. Colonel N.M. Smyth V.C. assumed temporary command of No. 4 Section of Defence for a short period in the absence of Brigadier-General A.H. Russell.

Major-General,
Commanding N.Z. & A. Division.

Appendix No. 62
Anzac Cove,
14th July 1915.

On the evening of July 11th, we were told that as the 8th Army Corps were to make an attack in the South we were to act so as to prevent reinforcements going there from in front of us.

A demonstration was ordered with much the same idea as on the 23th June, Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine were bombarded early in the morning and again at 8.15 a.m., when the infantry also took part.

On the right the 2nd Light Horse Brigade (6th and 7th Regiments) passed men over the parapets and down into the gullies and up onto Holly Spur. This was at once seen, as it was intended to be, by the enemy who opened heavy rifle, gun, and machine gun fire on our men, and on the 5th Light Horse from Chatham's Post and the ^{12th} Battalion further up to the North.

It is noticeable that none of our casualties occurred while the men were going over the parapets or down the forward slope. It was later, when the men were lying in the open and were hit by shrapnel, which shows that when we do push forward the faster we rush the enemy's trenches the better in every way.

Further to the North, in No 2 Section, by firing and other means we induced the Turks to mass in the main works, some of them exposing themselves while manning the second lines of trenches. The 2nd Brigade also made a bomb attack on Gorman Officers trench and further to the North our fire had the effect of drawing a lot of fire from the opposite trenches.

This went on till about 10 a.m., after which the enemy's fire slackened and died away about 11 a.m.

The result was most satisfactory for the enemy brought his reserves into the trenches and moved a number of men up from the South of Gaba Topo, thus doing what we set out to make him do.

He also expended a great deal of rifle, and gun ammunition both of which are said to be scarce with him at present.

Asker Brig-General,
General Staff,
Australian & New Zealand Army Corps.

7. 24

Appendix No. 63
Appendix 63

SPECIAL FORCE ORDER.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

17th July, 1915.

The General Commanding has received information, which is believed to be reliable, that the enemy is concentrating a large force to attempt to make a final decisive attack on the Allied Forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula. A large party of Turkish notables — deputies, Ulemas, journalists, etc. — are about to visit the theatre of operations to see for themselves what is taking place.

In these circumstances, Sir Ian Hamilton thinks it will interest the force under his command to know some details of the state of the Army which announces the intention of attacking us.

The bravery of the Turkish soldier is proverbial, especially in defence, but the Turkish soldier of to-day labours under two disadvantages, viz :—

- (a). He is controlled, although unwillingly, by his German taskmaster.
- (b). His heart is not in the present struggle except in so far as the safety of Constantinople is concerned.

The following reports are significant :—

(I). In recent engagements, owing to bad sanitary arrangements and hot weather, a large proportion of the Turkish wounded have died.

(II). A Turkish force estimated at 100,000 is now being collected for a final attack in the Peninsula. These are the last reinforcements that can be scraped together from anywhere, and many of the men are stated to be totally untrained.

(III). Information derived from prisoners taken by the French on July 12th and 13th established the fact that the whole of the 4th Division was in action on the French front during those days.

It is stated that each regiment consisted of 4 battalions. The 1st line of trenches was held by the 10th Regiment (first 3 battalions in front and 4th in reserve). The regiment appears to have been almost annihilated, for according to the prisoners its companies were reduced to 60 or 80 men, and almost every officer killed.

The 11th Regiment is said to have been on the Turkish right of the 10th Regiment and probably in front of our troops.

The 12th Regiment was in the second line of trenches. It led the counter-attacks and also suffered heavy losses.

(IV). Prisoners state that they only arrived from Adrianople six days before the attack and on the way between Uzun Keupru and Keshan met the 15th Division on its way back to Adrianople. So heavily had they suffered that the whole three regiments made up no more than a total of two battalions.

The Divisional Artillery, which followed, was reduced to two batteries and all seemed in sorry plight.

(V). The Turkish rank and file having complained that their officers remained behind and did not go forward in the fighting line like the officers of the Allied Forces, an order was given by Enver Pasha that all officers were to enter the firing line with their companies, and that a Colonel of a battalion should be not further than 800 yards to the rear. As a consequence in the 70th, 71st and 72nd Regiments 52 officers were killed.

(VI). Weber Pasha, who ten days ago was commanding the army on the Peninsula, has been superseded for incompetence by Vehib Pasha.

These extracts do not speak well for the morale of the rank and file; on the other hand the Turk is a natural fighter.

We have strong defences, and our own stout hearts will make them stronger. Added to which we have the advantage of believing in the justness of our cause, for, though the Turk is actually opposed to us, here, as in France, our enemy is Germany; the nation which uses poisonous gas and sinks a Lusitania, a nation which breaks every convention governing the conduct of hostilities, and abuses the red cross flag.

This is the nation which we are fighting and against which we shall prevail.

The threatened attack will, once more, give us all the opportunity of dealing one more defeat to the German nation through their allies the Turks.

Your courage in both attack and defence has already been amply proved. Now stand firm and, if the anticipated general attack should take place, Sir Ian Hamilton need hardly point out what a chance this would be to confirm the ascendancy over the enemy which you have gained at the price of so much blood but with such noble gallantry.

W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Printing Section, M.E.F.

POINTS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE 19th July 1915.

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- (1) How was it that only 604 ^{gas} helmets out of 4200 issued to No. 3 Section can now be found ?
- (2) To whom did the D.A.D.O.S. issue them ? Was any receipt obtained ?

- (3) The Lecturer yesterday was very emphatic in his endeavours to impress us with the seriousness of the gas menace.

I do not think that the Troops realise the importance of it. According to him it means certain death if a man is caught in the trenches without a helmet or respirator. The gas will come like a thief in the night when it is least expected. In Flanders it usually comes in the night, and all sentries must be warned to be on the look-out for it or for any indications of its approach. Its approach is heralded by a noxious smell which is very irritating to the throat. The indications would be Transport, Mules etc., carrying tubes or cylinders which are sure indications of gas. In France every man has four helmets of which he carries two on the person, one is carried in regimental reserve, and one is retained for him at the Base.

Every man should know exactly what to do on the caution "gas" being passed quietly round. The man must be informed that there is no need for panic and that either the helmet or the respirator is a certain prevention against it, just as the want of one means certain death. Fumes being heavier than air hang about gullies and dug-outs and the only way to combat them is to use the sprays of which 43 have been issued to this Division, which works out roughly at about 2 per unit. These sprays must be kept absolutely ready and clean at all times and in good repair with a solution ready mixed inside, and at least 25 M.C.O.'s and men per unit should be specially trained to use them.

Sprays, not jets, should be used as the jet is so wasteful. These sprays will dispel chlorine, and are a certain preventative against the gas, and the men have nothing to fear if these sprays are available.

The Lecturer was very emphatic in declaring that every man should sleep with either a respirator or a helmet on his person. In France when a gas attack is considered imminent, the men tie the respirators loosely round the neck and the two on the person are carried thus : one in the haversack, and the other in a pocket within the flap of the coat on the opposite side to the Field Dressing.

Troops should be warned that the most suitable weather for a gas attack is when a mild Zephyr is blowing, just sufficient to move the gas. A breeze or wind of any sort is unfavourable for it. In Flanders the effect of gas poison has been felt as far as 20 miles in rear of the firing line. An advanced General Headquarters woke up one morning with very bad sore throats 20 miles in rear of the firing line as a result of gas fumes.

Every man should be instructed in the way to fold up the helmet, and it is used best when it is bone dry.

From the above it will be observed that our system of having helmets and respirators packed in tins of a dozen will not work, as it would lead to much confusion during the darkness. The gas will kill animals just as easily as men, and it is a matter for consideration whether there should not be helmets provided to place over the heads of the mules.

The way in which the respirator should be placed on the face was explained to all Officers present, the main point being that the nose should not protrude through the wad. Troops should be forbidden to use any respirators other than those issued by the War Office as the latter are the only guaranteed safe pattern.

It is not in the least necessary to wet or damp either the helmet or the respirator.

TO: O.C. No. 3 Section.
No. 4 Section.
4th Australian Inf. Bde.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
A.D.M.S.
Divisional Train.

MEMORANDUM

I forward herewith copies of Special Army Corps Order for distribution.

2. The attack referred to will most likely be in one of two forms, either a strong night attack or an assault after heavy bombardment by day.

As regards an attack by night, we are well prepared for this and no attack has yet succeeded against our arrangements. At the same time, no serious attack has yet been delivered which has not penetrated our trenches at some point of other - so that our measures for meeting night attack and for launching local counter attacks at once at any time of day or night must be reviewed and set in order.

Particular attention must be paid to an ample provision of bombs and of flares: while all telephone communication must be guarded against injury by the enemy's fire as much as possible.

An attack by day is unlikely to be delivered except after a heavy bombardment of our fire and support trenches. The enemy have not the guns or the ammunition to batter our trenches on the scale employed in Flanders but still we have seen that much damage can be caused.

An infantry assault cannot, however, be delivered till this bombardment has ceased, and the following principles should be kept in mind when a heavy artillery bombardment of our line begins :-

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When it is decided to evacuate the trenches temporarily, the trenches on either side of the part evacuated are to be warned of the intention. The commanders so warned will at once make arrangements to bring part of their fire - and particularly of machine gun fire, on the ground in front of the evacuated portion.

At the same time the Section commander will be informed, and he will in turn inform all other sections of the defence, who will similarly make arrangements to bring cross fire - bearing in mind that the portion most likely to be assaulted is the one which has been bombarded.

The troops withdrawn will be formed up in readiness in the nearest covered place or intact trench, with several observers out watching for signs of the enemy. As soon as the enemy assault begins, all are to take up firing positions - the battered trenches being as useful as any, in readiness (aided by the cross fire referred to) to destroy the attackers.

As the garrison will not, probably, be able to employ its full strength in fire, the remainder are to be formed up ready to counter attack at once with the bayonet, if the enemy manages to effect a lodgment in our trenches. Bomb parties are to be well supplied with bombs and a good supply kept at hand in regimental reserves.

A close look out will be kept on all known approaches and all unusual massing of troops will be reported at once to Section commanders and commanders in the fire trenches such information being at once passed on by
of Defence
Sections to Divisional Headquarters.

3. In recent bombardments of our trenches, the fire has moved slowly down from North to South. In the event of a serious bombardment, made with the intention of preparing for an attack on the trenches selected, work

7.39

on restoring the trenches is to begin as soon as the bombardment passes on. With this in view stocks of sand bags, and French wire entanglement where entanglements are required, are to be kept close at hand in Posts ready for use at once.

4. We may have to meet an artillery bombardment late in the evening combined with or followed by musketry fire to prevent rebuilding the trenches, with an infantry assault on top. The notice given by bombardment will prepare us for this form of attack which in any case is unlikely to be delivered until the waning of the moon gives an interval of darkness between sunset and moonrise.

5. Finally - to prepare for the attack which is not unlikely all our present arrangements should be reviewed in detail and improved where necessary, and steps for rapid rebuilding of our defences and for delivery of immediate local counter attack thought out beforehand and ready to put into action.

6. The G.O.C. will be glad to know as soon as possible the arrangements of Commanders of Sections of Defence for delivering local counter-attacks.

Sd M. G. Braitwaite.

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

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SPECIAL ARMY CORPS ORDER.

ALZAC COVE, 19th July, 1915.

We have recently received information that at a Council of War held among the Turkish leaders, it has been decided to send another 100,000 men to the Peninsula and to make a final tremendous attack upon the British troops here. Whether such an attack is likely to be delivered mostly upon us or upon Cape Helles we cannot say, but as we are the weaker force it is quite possible they may think they can drive us out of our trenches, if they can only come in large enough numbers. I am quite certain there is not an Australian or a New Zealander who believes this, or who will for one moment allow them to do so in whatever numbers they might come. In fact, from my daily visits to the trenches, I know well that you are all only longing for the Turks to come and attack us, so as to give you yet another chance of showing them what Australian and New Zealand soldiers can do.

Our trenches are strong and our shooting is good, so we know we can wait any attack with perfect confidence. The only thing we have to remember is to be fully prepared for it in every way, and to be fully determined to destroy every Turk who appears in front of our trenches: accurate and rapid fire in the first instance, and if he ever gets up to the trenches, then the bayonet.

We have to remember that we may now be faced with the brutal contrivances of the German in the way of asphyxiating gases. Helmetts are being served out to all ranks which give complete immunity from this, and instructions have been given to all as to the exact procedure to be adopted in the event of the enemy's attack being preceded by asphyxiating gas. If these orders are followed, you need have no fear whatever of the gas, the very use of which will more than ever determine you to wipe out an enemy who can sink to such dastardly devices.

W. B. Inwood.
J. L.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

N.Z.G. 623.

Divisional Headquarters,
Anzac Cove, 21st July, 1915.

In continuation of Memo. N.Z.G. 524 dated 12th July, 1915
on the subject of dealing with gas attack.

1. Should the enemy release the gas from cylinders, the same procedure will be followed as in dealing with guns projecting shells containing gas, namely, bringing our gun fire to bear on the ~~sight~~^{site} of the cylinders as quickly as possible.
2. It may happen, however, that the cylinders are employed close to our trenches or they cannot safely be reached by our guns. In this case they will be within reach of our bomb mortars or hand grenades.
All ranks will therefore be warned that if a gas attack is begun from close range, they are to make every effort to locate the places in which the cylinders are being used, and smother it with bombs, at the same time giving notice to the Garland, 3.7" and Japanese mortar bomb squads, and to the nearest artillery observer.
A well aimed Lotbiniere bomb will probably be as effective as anything in upsetting the enemy's gas apparatus, and so liberating the gas in the enemy's own trenches.
3. In addition to the method of giving warning of the approach of gas referred to in N.Z.G. 524 para. 3, the use of a gong made of an empty shell case in each post is suggested.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite, Lt-Col.
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

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Copy No. 4

OPERATION ORDER No. 9

- By -

Appendix No. 67

Major-General Sir A.J. Godley K.C.M.G.
Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Anzac Cove, Gallipoli.

21st July 1915.

1.
INFORMATION

Information has been received that a Turkish attack in force may be expected on the 23rd July - the Turkish Constitution Day : but that it may be delivered earlier.

2. Section and Brigade Commanders will take the following steps :

- (a) Regimental, Post and Brigade Reserves of Ammunition to be completed : pouch ammunition to be made up to at least 200 rounds per rifle (3,500 per machine gun).
- (b) Bombs and Grenades to be brought up to the following minimum numbers :-

Japanese Bombs	40 per gun.
Garland Bombs	50 " "
3.7" Bombs	120 " "
Hand grenades	
No. 3 Section	800
No. 4 Section	800

In view of the fact that there may be difficulty in sending up bombs to Posts during a general attack, Section Commanders will increase the Post Reserves of Bombs up to probable maximum requirements.

Lotbiniere bombs to be kept especially for use against gas cylinders - 4 per Post in No. 3 Section, and 8 on Russell's Top in No. 4 Section.

Arrangements for lighting bombs will be completed - bomb sticks will be lit just before the moon sets (vide Para 4): an ample proportion of bombs will be kept up in the fire trenches within easy reach of the bomb throwers.

- (c) Materials for oil and tow flares and ship's flares

will be drawn sufficient to light the fronts exposed to attack for three hours. Motor headlights and acetylene flares will be kept ready for instant use.

- (d) All ^{anti} ~~smoke~~ gas arrangements are to be perfected.
- (e) All fatigues not considered absolutely essential are to be knocked off from 4 p.m. on the 22nd inst.

3. COMMUNICATIONS

The O.C. Divisional Signal Company will see that telephonic communication between Section Headquarters and Posts and between Section Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters are in good order and the wires as far as possible protected from the enemy's fire. He will also arrange for and test lateral communication along fire and support trenches.

4. Standing to arms.

All troops will stand to arms 10 minutes before the moon sets on the night 22/23 and 23/24 for half an hour, and again at 3 a.m. A likely hour for attack will be as the moon goes down.

The following approximate timings of moon set and daylight are given :-

Night of	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25
Moon sets	11.13 p.m.	11.54 p.m.	0.25 a.m.	0.54 a.m.
Daylight - Light enough to distinguish objects about	3.30 a.m.			

5. NAVAL SUPPORT

Arrangements for Naval support are as follows :-

Right Flank. Day. H.M.S. TALBOT and HUBBEN. Station South of Gaba Tepe. Target. Searching valley 224 0 to 8 and slopes to East of it. These vessels will arrive within from two to three hours of receiving warning, one or more destroyers assisting by fire as far as possible.

Night. The same vessels, on station throughout the night of 22/23rd and 23/24th - ready to open fire on first sign of attack and destroyer illuminating right flank.

Left Flank. Day or Night. One or more destroyers engaging enemy approaching this flank, and shelling the Neck.

6.
ARMY CORPS
RESERVE

The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade (Colonel J. Monash) (less 1 Battalion) will be in Army Corps Reserve. In case of attack it will be in readiness to move at half an hour's notice, equipped as follows :-

- Shirtsleeves - No packs.
- Waterbottles filled - Gas helmets.
- 200 rounds per rifle.
- NO Machine guns.
- Entrenching tools, heavy, 1 per 4 men.

A Staff Officer of this Brigade with two Orderlies will report to the General Staff, Army Corps Headquarters as soon as an attack becomes general.

7.

The C.R.E. will, in consultation with the O.C. No. 4 Section, arrange to store in the vicinity of Russell's Top the following Engineer Stores :

- 4000 sandbags
- 600 handgrenades
- 60 coils French wire entanglement
- Materials for 100 running feet of head cover.

He will also detail one Engineer Company to be in readiness to move to Russell's Top at short notice. This Company will move to Mule Gully should an attack become general.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

Copies at 7 p.m. by hand

To	No.	No.
Office	1 - 3	
War Diary	4	C.R.A. 8
No. 3 Sect.	5	C.R.E. 9
" 4 "	6	A.D.M.S. 10
4th A.I. Bde.	7	Div. Train 11

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GAS PRECAUTIONS.

Appendix No. 68

Precis of important points.

Official types of respirators and helmets have been tested and found efficient. The helmet is considered the better and should be used in preference, but is liable to become torn or injured so the respirator should be kept to supplement it should occasion arise.

1. Respirators consist of a veil with cotton waste pad for nostrils and mouth. The pad is issued prepared with anti-gas chemical and should never be wetted, as this is apt to remove a greater part of the chemicals. When used for some time the pad should be moved so as to breathe through another portion.

2. Helmets are made of flannel with non-inflammable cellular windows and give complete protection when the material is intact.

When wearing, if the window becomes dim, it may be cleaned by gently rubbing it against the forehead; on no account should it be removed or a hand slipped up underneath.

The helmets are issued chemically prepared, are quite effective dry and should never be moistened. Having been once in contact with poisonous gas a helmet should be withdrawn and a new one issued. Used helmets must be returned to ordnance as they can be chemically recharged. Helmets should be folded carefully when being replaced in bag so as not to break the windows.

3. Improvised Methods.

1. Wet and wring out any **woolen** article, sock, muffler, etc., and press over nostrils and mouth.
2. A pad of damp earth in handkerchief or sock.
3. Woolen pad soaked with water and soda solution or tea.

Knapsack Sprayers. To be used for clearing gas out of the trenches or dug-outs after the cloud has blown over. The poisonous gas is heavier than air and sinks into and remains in the trench and should be removed by spraying. Troops entering a trench charged with gas should be preceded by a man using a sprayer.

Spraying Solution. Dissolve 6 lbs of sodium and niosulphate in a bucket of water and add a handful of washing soda. Pour the solution through the strainer into the sprayer. If the knapsack sprayer is not available garden syringes and buckets may be used.

Notes on combatting gas.

1. The helmet or respirator must be kept **ever** handy with the man himself and not kept in a central store.
2. If attacked by gas, breath must be held and respirator or helmet quickly adjusted.
3. To move with the wind courts disaster—better to face the gas cloud under cover of the helmet or respirator.
4. Special attention must be paid by all officers to the direction of the wind and warning given to units in dangerous places.
5. Sprays or syringes and buckets must be kept full and ready in selected places.
6. Important to have sentries watching the wind to notice its direction and on the first suspicion of gas to arouse their comrades.
7. Respirators and helmets for actual use are not to be used for instructional purposes.

First aid.

1. Give as much **fresh air** as possible to the victim.
2. Oxygen inhaled by a funnel or better by holding the tube to the teeth.
3. Some have found that the fluid can be drained out of the lungs by raising the foot of the stretcher.
4. A drink of **hot milk** gives relief.
5. An emetic (salt or mustard and hot water).

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Boys,

We have now heard that the Turks propose to celebrate their Constitution Day, which is the 23rd, by a big attack, but whether this is to be on us or at Cape Helles we do not know.

If they attack us we must be quite sure to make of it a Constitution Day for ourselves, and to give them such a lesson as they have never had in their lives before.

Remember they are an absolutely inferior army to ourselves in moral and training, and will only be driven to the attack, which will not be made with their hearts really in it.

It is probable that any attack will be commenced by a heavy bombardment, and it is possible that during this bombardment shells containing asphyxiating gases will be fired at us. It is therefore essential that every man should carry the new helmet which has just been served out, and if there is any gas anywhere about, these helmets are at once to be worn. They may be found hot and a little uncomfortable, but remember they ensure absolute immunity from the gas, which therefore can do us no harm. If at any time you find yourself in a cloud of gas, the best thing is to stand still and keep quiet.

It is quite possible that if the attack commences at night, the enemy may precede it by quietly ejecting gas from cylinders. Here again there need be no fear if helmets are immediately worn, while we must at once see if we can locate the position of the cylinders, and knock them out either with gun fire or with bombs, or if possible maxims if they can be brought to bear upon them. Should we be able to upset a few cylinders in the enemy's trenches, they would find their dastardly use of gas recoiling entirely on their own heads.

During the bombardments trenches will be kept as empty as possible with due consideration for safety, as we want to avoid all possible losses by shell fire. Then, when the bombardment is over, and the enemy are likely to attack, we will fill up our trenches with our full strength, and if our 20,000 boys here cannot pump lead into any unlimited number of Turks so as completely to wipe them out, I shall indeed be astonished.

If any Turks get near the trenches they will of course be well bombed and bayoneted, and it is more than probable in several places they will be so demoralised that you will be able to follow them up and take their trenches and I hope machine guns without further opposition. A double issue of rum will probably be found in their trenches.

W. B. Inwood LG

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

Troops are already allocated to Posts, Post Reserves, and Section Reserves, and Machine Guns are distributed throughout both Sections so as to give the best mutual support by covering and enfilade fire. To change the allocation of the troops at the present juncture might be considered unsound, but it is a matter for consideration whether the present distribution in No. 3 Section is not too congested and could not be improved. The first principle in the employment of Reserves is that they should be utilised for counter-attack only. Up to the present they have not been solely employed in their proper capacity during an action. The Section Reserve should be a complete unit specially told off for offensive action, and never be used up in reinforcing the firing line, which has been done on previous occasions.

Of course, if it was a matter of necessity, and it was a question of a Post being rushed, then their employment in reinforcing Posts might be justified, but only on very rare occasions.

QUINN'S POST.

The length of fire trenches in this Post is approximately 240 yards. Its present garrison is approximately 850 all ranks, made up thus : The Canterbury Battalion and 150 all ranks of the Wellington Battalion.

The latter apparently could be spared and allotted to the Section Reserve. This would necessitate the Post Reserve being taken from the actual garrison, the latter being reduced to about 500 rifles which should be ample to hold the trenches.

What has to be guarded against is the tendency of increasing Post Reserves at the expense of the Section Reserves, which should be kept as strong as possible for offensive action.

DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE ACTION.

When the question arises of adopting counter-measures, the situation should be considered from the following points of view :-

- (a) The employment of Sectional Reserves separately in their own Section.
- ~~(b)~~ The employment of Sectional Reserves in conjunction with the Reserves of other Sections and the Divisional Reserve.

Under (a) the only occasions on which they could be employed in purely local effort would be when the enemy has succeeded in getting close up under the parapets in dead ground or when a few of the enemy had established themselves in a commanding position and were being reinforced, and in each case it was necessary to drive them out at the point of the bayonet.

This would be a purely local effort to be carried out at all costs.

The second situation would be on a larger scale, and would entail the mutual assistance from other Sections of Defence, as the isolated action of one Local Reserve.

Garrison
✓ 450 -
Local Reserve
450 -

fire

without the assistance of covering from its neighbour, would entail too heavy losses from enfilade fire.

Our position here is rendered the more difficult owing to the fact that, in order to launch a counter-attack, we have to deploy out of narrow gullies, commanded by enemy trenches on higher ground, and by Machine Guns admirably placed so as to bring enfilade fire on to every movement; and any forward movement entails the commitment of the troops to a general engagement between the Australian salient and the NEK.

In any offensive movement undertaken by this Division East of the NEK, the co-operation of the 1st Australian Division is absolutely necessary in bringing heavy fire, especially Artillery and Mortar, to bear on the GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH, JOHNSTON'S JOLLY, and LONESOME PINE. By so doing, we can prevent the troops from being enfiladed who are going forward towards the CHESSBOARD, trenches at the head of MONASH GULLY, and the lower slopes of BABY 700.

In a similar way, any forward movement by the 1st Australian Division on to JOHNSTON'S JOLLY etc. will require assistance from us in the shape of ~~art~~ effective Artillery fire, especially directed on the enemy's Machine Guns.

The next point for discussion is what amount of assistance No. 4 Section could give to No. 3 in the event of a deliberate attack on POPE'S, QUINN'S, or COURTNEY'S, either separately or combined, being partially or wholly successful.

Would a move across the NEK up to BABY 700 have any effect ?

Yes, it would if the position gained could be rapidly consolidated, and the Australian Division made a forward movement as previously described; but not otherwise, as the enemy could bring reserves up from the Camp under BATTLESHIP HILL. They might also be able to bring up enough reserves to make good their assault on our Posts in addition to reserves brought up against our newly gained position.

The only way to prevent this is to bring Artillery to bear on the junctions of their communication trenches, that is, Artillery support which will not only pulverise and smash up their parapets, but also their Machine Gun emplacements and loop-holes, preventing them from firing except over their own parapets, thus exposing themselves to our rifle fire. By this means alone can any ground be made good.

Our strong flank is our left flank as enfilade fire can only be brought against it from the right; thus, when No. 4 Section launches a counter-attack over the NEK, a similar move should be made from No. 3 Section up the BLOODY ANGLE GULLY, and the Gully between DEAD-MAN'S RIDGE and POPE'S, and up MONASH GULLY.

Such a move would prevent enfilade fire from being brought to bear on General Russell's right.

In a similar way, a forward movement from the 1st Australian Division on to JOHNSTON'S JOLLY would prevent General Johnston's right from being enfiladed.

Another subject for discussion is the question as to how the troops are to be deployed on to a broad or adequate front from these narrow valleys, commanded as the heads of these valleys are by enemy trenches.