


**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/53/5 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters New  
Zealand and Australian Division

August 1915



AWM4-1/53/5PART2



SECRET

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO COMMANDERS

in accordance with

DIVISIONAL ORDER No 11, dated 5th August, 1915.

Appendix No. 77  
77

842

## 1. INFORMATION.

No information regarding future plans or movements of Troops contained in Order No 11 dated 5th August, or in these instructions, is to be republished in Orders which reach lower than Brigade Staffs, except in so far as is necessary for the efficient carrying out of operations ordered.

## 2. ACTION BY COVERING FORCES.

## Right Covering Force.

(a) The Right Covering Force is to seize certain points now in possession of the enemy which if in his hands would seriously interfere with the initial advance of our Assaulting Columns.

The operations of the Right Covering Force should start with the attack on No 3 Post (80 B 4): the assault being timed for 9.30 p.m., i.e., when the shelling by the Destroyer ceases and the searchlight is switched off. The Troops detailed for the attack on BAUCHOP HILL (92 X 7 and 8) have in the first instance the task of protecting the initial advance of the Assaulting Columns up the CHAILAK DERE and towards 'VALDE' POINT (92 R 7). The attack on BAUCHOP HILL should begin simultaneously with the assault on Old No 3 Post and should aim at driving the enemy North of the AGHYL DERE so as to prevent him from molesting the Left Assaulting Column from the Northern spur of the BAUCHOP HILL Ridge.

TABLE TOP (80 C 9) should be attacked by two Columns moving via the SAZLI BEIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE, the former being timed so as to reach the level of OLD No 3 POST NOT SOONER than 9.30 p.m. (the time fixed for the assault on that Post: the latter Column issuing from No 3 Post as soon as the BAUCHOP HILL Force (vide b) has cleared the way sufficiently to admit of its doing so.

At 9.40 p.m. the searchlight will be switched on to TABLE TOP and the hill will be heavily shelled by the Destroyer and by our Howitzers till ~~9.45~~ p.m. at which time shelling will cease and the light will be switched off - the latter being the signal for the assault.

## Action by Left Covering Force.

(b) The objective of the Left Covering Force is the DA'AK JELIK BAIR from the "D" of DA'AK JELIK to the Knoll (92 O. 9) with the object of protecting the left flank of the Right Assaulting Column from interference from the North and North East: and directly assisting the operations of our troops further North who will be using the Beach as close to us as the mouth of the AS'IAH DERE (91).

This necessitates:-

An advance from the CHAILAK DERE past 'VALDE' POINT - This should closely follow the advance against BAUCHOP'S HILL.

The Assault of the DA'AK JELIK BAIR.

The occupation of the Northern spurs of the hill as far East as Knoll 92 O. 9.

Care will be taken not to open fire on our troops landing to the North West.

## 3. ACTION BY RIGHT ASSAULTING COLUMN.

The first objective is the line CHURUK BAIR - Head of KUR DERE.

This necessitates:

(General Johnston).

(a) An advance up the SAZLI BEIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE and the clearing of RHODODENDRON SPUR.

(b) Strongly picketting the Right of the Line of Advance towards BATTLESHIP HILL (80 O. 2).

(c) Seizing and holding RHODODENDRON RIDGE (80 J 3; K 1). The second objective is as indicated in para 2 (c) of Operation Order No 11. This necessitates an advance South West along the Ridge against BATTLESHIP HILL and down



the Southern slopes of BARI BAIR.

The G.O.C. wishes the Mountain Artillery attached to this Column to be provided with an ample escort, to be utilized as a battery, and to advance via the CHAILAK DERE IMPROVISEDLY in rear of the troops of the Right assaulting Column using this route.

4.  
Action by Left  
Assaulting Column  
(General Cox).

The objective is the line Head of KUR DERE (81 A 4) - KOJA CHEFEN TEPE.

This necessitates :

- (a) An advance up the AGHYL DERE.
- (b) The picketting of the line of advance so as to guard against interference from the North from the point KNOLL 92.0. (9, where the right of the Left Covering Force rests.
- (c) The seizure and consolidation of the line indicated as the objective: joining up on the right with the left of General Johnston's Column (para 3).

Brigadier-General Cox will NOT operate South of the line Square 82 till KOJA CHEFEN TEPE is in his possession.

The G.O.C. wishes the Mountain Artillery attached to this Column to be provided with an ample escort and to follow immediately in rear of the Column.

5.  
Reserve.

It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C. 13th Division to attach a proportion of Divisional Engineers to the Left Covering Force (para 2 b).

6.  
Guides.

The G.O.C. N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade will detail guides as under :

Right Assaulting Column, Lieut. Taylor, N.Z.M.R. & 1 Tpr.  
Left Assaulting Column, Major Overton, N.Z.M.R. & 1 Tpr.  
Right Reserve Column, - 2 Troopers N.Z.M.R.  
Left Reserve Column, - 2 Troopers, N.Z.M.R.  
Left Covering Force, Lieut Wilson and 1 Trooper.

7.  
Precautions.

- (a) It must be impressed on all ranks that speed and silence are factors which will do much to ensure success. Speed will enable us to forestall the enemy's Reserves : silence will prevent him from finding out our strength and disposition.
- (b) By night the bayonet only will be used by Troops attacking the enemy. Magazines will NOT be charged by Troops of the Assaulting Columns; they will only be charged by Troops left as Pickets and Garrisons of Posts.
- (c) The danger of striking lights or smoking while it is dark is to be impressed on all, and is to be strictly forbidden.

8.  
Re-forming  
Troops.

Every effort is to be made to re-form Troops into their original Companies, Platoons and Sections. Powerful assistance will be available by daylight from the guns of H.M. Ships and from those in position at Anzac. Under cover of this bombardment, Units will be re-organized, and all preparations made for a further advance.

9.  
Entrenching.

As soon as the main objectives are obtained, Troops will dig in. Trenches will be traversed, and communication trenches made. Heavy hostile Artillery force is to be expected when it becomes light.

10.  
Telephone Wires.

Troops are to be warned not to break or damage any of our own Telephone wires. Hostile wires met with by leading Troops are to be at once cut, and the ends knotted up separately, so that they may be recognised as hostile by troops coming after - otherwise they might be repaired under the impression that they were our own wires.

11.  
Punctuality and  
March Discipline.

The supreme importance of strict punctuality and accurate timing of initial movements cannot be over-rated. The various attacks are timed so as to afford mutual support and protection. Equally important is the closing up of Units while on the march. Any straggling either along the communication trench or along the gullies must inevitably cause troops in rear to be delayed, and therefore not immediately available when wanted.



S 44

Appendix No. 7/4

3.

Column Commanders and Commanders of Reserve Brigades will detail Staff Officers to march, one at the head of the Column or Brigade, the other at the rear, till they are clear of all communication trenches or roads within our lines. Divisional Staff Officers and Military Police will be stationed at important points within our lines to check timings and prevent loss of direction.

12.  
wounded.

No Officer, N. C. O. or man is to fall out to assist to the rear a wounded man; to do this is a serious Military Offence. Stretcher parties will follow all Columns and will attend to the wounded.

Stretcher parties are not to block or interfere with the forward movement of Troops - they are not to make use of any Communication Trench or Sap till all movement of fighting troops through it has ceased for the night.

*W. P. Braithwaite*  
Major,

~~Br~~ Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff.

New Zealand and Australian Division.



845  
N.Z.C./882.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,  
Anzac Cove, 5th Aug. 1915.

To : Brigadier-General Chauvel  
Hughes.

Appendix No. 78

MEMORANDUM

Supplementary Instructions in continuation of  
Appendix "B" of this date.

The objective of the Troops in No. 3 Section under Brigadier-General Chauvel, Commanding No. 3 Section, will be the "I" trenches in front of QUINN'S POST, securing these as a means of preventing reinforcements reaching the enemy opposing the assault on BABY 700, and of assisting the later advance on MORTAR RIDGE.

The Officer entrusted with this operation should be restricted to the "I" trenches, and such trenches North and South of them as are necessary to secure his position there.

The timing of this assault will naturally depend on that from No. 4 Section, viz. at 4. 30 a.m. on Aug. 7th, unless orders are received to the contrary. It is for the consideration of Brigadier-General Chauvel whether in view of the assistance the garrison of POPE'S HILL can give in covering fire for the assaults from No. 4 Section and QUINN'S POST, the action of that garrison should be confined to fire support or in any offensive action, which, if undertaken, must be vigorous.

A copy of the instructions given to the G.O.C. 1st Australian Division has been forwarded to Brigadier-General Chauvel, stating the action which has been taken with regard to the GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH.

The objective of the force holding No. 4 Section under Brigadier-General Hughes will be the trenches on the NEK (Group "A" on the trench Diagram) and those of the BABY 700 and CHESSBOARD positions as far South as is necessary to secure his right flank and as far to the East as the trenches of "D" Group which are all to be taken.

If and when the situation admits, this force will advance to meet the forces approaching from the direction of CHUNUK BAIR, and assist in the operations involving an advance down the spur to the East of BATTLESHIP HILL, and the consequent and necessary clearing of the ground East of our present position.

This attack will be delivered at 4. 30 a.m. on August 7th, unless orders are given to the contrary. Troops will be rested during the night as much as possible. If the assault is postponed, troops should remain in readiness to attack at half an hour's notice.

A copy of the instructions given to the G.O.C., 1st Australian Division has been forwarded to Brigadier-General Hughes as to the action being taken in regard to the GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut-Colonel,  
General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.



Para 1 and the dates are to be kept SECRET and not to be divulged except to your Staff, and to Brigade Commanders and their Staffs.

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Copy No. 48

Instructions for G.O.C. Australian Division.

Anzac Cove,

4th August, 1915.

Ref. Map Gallipoli  $\frac{1}{20,000}$  and Map of area occupied by  
A & N.Z. Army Corps.

1. Under instructions from G.H.Q. the operations of the Army Corps are to begin with a strong and sustained attack on Hill 125 (Plateau 400).
2. This task is allotted to you. In carrying it out you will bear in mind that every effort is to be made to deceive the enemy as to the locality against which our main effort is to be made, and to induce him to believe that it will be directed against his lines opposite the Southern portion of our position. The Army Corps Commander considers that this will be best attained by directing your principal effort against the Lone Pine group of works. The assistance which an occupation of Johnston's Jelly will give this operation and your further advance should be kept in mind.
3. The force at your disposal is the 1st Australian Division as constituted in Table "A" Order of Battle, issued with Army Corps Order No. 15 of 2nd August, with one section, Kohat Mountain Battery added.

Additional artillery support as detailed in Appendix "A" will be given, and you will be required to give assistance to other operations with some of your guns as detailed in the same appendix.

With this force you will:---

- (a) Occupy and hold the defensive line from and including Courtney's Post to the sea near Chatham's Post.
- (b) Attack the Turkish position on Plateau 400 as outlined above. The attack is to commence at 5<sup>30</sup>p.m. on 6th August.
- (c) Assault German Officers Trench during the night of the 6th/7th, preferably about midnight.  
In consolidating his position in German Officers Trench



the officer entrusted with the operation should keep in view the need for assisting the offensive from Nos. III and IV. Sections against the Chessboard and Baby 700 groups of trenches which is to take place during daylight of August 7th.


(d) If and when the situation admits, take advantage of the pressure which the success of our other operations produces on the enemy to advance your line to Gun Ridge from Scrubby Knoll to the sea.

4. The artillery support which will be given you, and the hours for which it will be available is detailed in Appendix "A", which has been distributed to the Divisional C.R.A's, to all battery commanders, and to the Naval Commanders concerned.

5. Casualty Clearing Station for all operations South of Maclagan's Ridge - Hill 180 will be the Australian Casualty Clearing Station on Anzac Beach. A dressing station will be established in its vicinity to deal with cases which have come down to the beach without passing through the hands of the Divisional Ambulances nearer the front.

6. Arrangements for replenishment of ammunition and water are detailed in attached Appendix Z.

7. The Army Corps Report Centre will be at its present site till further orders.

 Brig-General,  
General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.



Gen Platt Appendix 78.

446

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Appendix No. 78

Divisional Headquarters,  
ANZAC COVE, 5th August 1915.

Issued to :

- G.O.C. 13th Division.
- 1st Australian Division
- 29th Indian Infantry Brigade
- O.C. Indian Mountain Artillery Bde.
- All Brigades, N.Z. & A. Division.
- C.R.A., C.R.E., A.D.M.S., Admin. Staff.

With reference to Order No. 11 dated 5th August and the Instructions and Appendices issued therewith, the following amendments and additions are issued :-

ORDER NO. 11

Para 1 (b). The assault on PLATEAU 400 (68 C. ) will take place at 5.30 p.m.

Para 3 (b). The Left Covering Force on gaining the DEMAK JELIK BAIR will get in touch with the Forces effecting a landing North of the ASMAK DERE (Square 91).

Para 3 (c). The Mountain Battery attached to the Right Assaulting Column will not use the Communication Trench - it will move to the vicinity of No. 3 Post via the Beach, (vide Amended March Table attached). It will keep clear of troops moving along the Beach road.

The Assaulting Column moving via the BAZLI BEIT DERE will commence its forward movement at 10.45 p.m. (instead of at 10.30 p.m.).

Para 3 (f). The Officers Commanding Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of Defence will engage the enemy by fire and bomb attack on the night 6th/7th August at 8 p.m. and throughout the night.

Para 4 (a). The Bearer Division of the Indian Field Ambulance will be disposed of under the orders of the G.O.C. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

INSTRUCTIONS

Para 2 (a). At 9.30 p.m. the fire of our Howitzers will be turned on to BIG TABLE TOP : the searchlight, however, will not be directed on to it till 9.40 p.m., when the fire of the Naval Guns will be turned on to it in addition to that of the Howitzers.

Paras. 3(c) and 4(c). The G.O.C. directs that Mountain Batteries with their escort normally march not less than half a mile in rear of the Columns to which they are attached

Para 4 (c). The portion of this para. restricting Brigadier General Cox's movements South of the line Square 80 is cancelled.

3.  
Operations  
Night 6/7  
August.

In order to indicate to the Navy and to our Artillery the positions of our Troops on the morning of the 7th August, flares will be lit at dawn along our line. The flares will consist of Naval green lights, one of which will be burned at 3.45 a.m., and another at 3.55 a.m. by each Battalion in the front ~~positions~~ along the position occupied by its most advanced Troops. Care is to be taken to place the flare where it will be shaded from the view of the enemy. If the CHUNUK BAIR Ridge has been reached, the flares will be burned a short distance down our side of the slope. Brigadiers will indent on Captain Parry Okean, Officer in charge of Ammunition Supply, for flares to be used during the forthcoming operations.



847

Appendix No. 78

(2)

4.  
Communication

From 8 p.m. on the 6th August till 4 a.m. on the 7th August the Beach road from Reserve Gully northward is reserved entirely for the forward movement of troops and animals. The Covered Way leading to No. 2 Post will be reserved for rearward movement after 11.30 p.m. on the night 6th/7th August and on the 7th August.

5.  
Bombs.

Brigadiers and Officers Commanding Units will indent on the Ammunition Supply Officer for whatever bombs they require.

6.  
Interpreters

Interpreters have been detailed to each Brigade and have been ordered to report to their respective Brigade Headquarters at 9 a.m. 6th August.

7.  
Control of Movements.

In order to control movements along roads and covered ways during the operations now commencing, Staff Officers and Military Police have been posted at various points within our lines to regulate traffic.

8.  
Intercommuni-  
cation, Ships  
and Air Craft.

Instructions regarding intercommunication with Ships and air craft, Part 1, and Land Communications, Part 2, have been distributed to-day to all Brigadiers.

*W. G. Maitland*

Lieut. Colonel,

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.



848

SECRET

Copy No. 19

TO: G.O.C. 13th Division.  
Brigade Commanders  
N.Z. Indian M. Artillery Brigade.  
C.R.A.  
G.R.S.

In amplification of Divisional Order No. 11 dated 5th August, the following additional information is given for the information of Divisional Staff and Brigade Commanders only.

- (a) On August 6th/7th, the forces in the South of the Peninsula are to attack with the object of drawing part of the enemy's forces in that direction.
- (b) A force is to be landed North of the Anzac position with the object of securing SUVLA BAY as a base: an operation which includes the seizure of the "S" and "Chocolate HILLS" and the enemy guns there.
- (c) Action by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (as detailed in Operation Order No. 11).

*W. E. Braithwaite*  
Lieut. Colonel,

General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

Issued at 12 noon.



Appendix No. 79

Report on the Operations against the SARI BAIR Position

649  
6th - 10th August 1915.

- of the -

Appendix 79

Force under the Command of Major-General Sir A.J. Godley K.C.M.G., C.B.  
Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Reference Map :

Gallipoli 1:20,000 Sheet KOJA DERE.

No. 2 Post, ANZAC,  
GALLIPOLI.

August 16th 1915.

TO :

The Brigadier-General, General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows on the Operations of the Force under my command, between the 6th and 10th August 1915.

1.

For some time, operations on an extended scale against the enemy in front of the Anzac Position had been decided upon by the Army Corps Commander, of which an attack on the SARI BAIR position was entrusted to me.

The troops placed at my disposal for this Operation consisted of :-

New Zealand and Australian Division.

13th Division - less Divisional Artillery (not yet landed)

and  
Certain Battalions (3) at first allotted to Army Corps Reserve: but subsequently sent up to join the 13th Division.

29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, less 1 Section  
21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

2.

PREPARATORY  
MEASURES

For some time past careful reconnaissance of the country over which the operations were to take place had been made by General Officers Commanding and Staffs, Commanding, and other Senior Officers, and by specially selected junior Officers and non-commissioned Officers of the New Zealand and Australian Division. These reconnoissances were conducted from the Outposts at SO B. 4 and 7, and from destroyers between SUVLA BAY and ANZAC COVE, while as



850

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(Cont.)

an additional measure, 2 Officers and a party of selected troopers of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were sent to the Isle of Imbros to gain experience in night reconnaissance and the leading of troops by night.

During the period 3 - 6 August, the portions of my Force detailed for the attack on the SARI BAIK Ridge were assembled in bivouacs in the ANZAC Position and the necessary reliefs of Posts made in Sections. These bivouacs had been previously prepared so that the concentration might not be detected by the Turkish Artillery Observers, or from the air : and, in order to facilitate the movement of the Troops on to their respective objectives, communications were made or improved - notably a road along the Beach from ANZAC COVE to No. 3 Post : a road connecting REST GULLY (Square 80 R.7) with RESERVE GULLY (Square 80 R.4), and the widening of the communication trench between the Northern Spit of ANZAC COVE (ARI BURNU) and No. 3 Post : this being made to take Infantry in file, or loaded mules.

In order to avoid delays, clashing of the various Columns, or blocking of roads and communication trenches, elaborate arrangements were made to provide guides to lead Columns, and Military Police to direct and control traffic at road junctions and along communication trenches.

It is much to the credit of the Staff, and others entrusted with these important duties that the arrangements made worked smoothly and without any hitch, and that Units reached their rendezvous well up to time.

To assist the actual leading of the Left Covering Force, the Assaulting Columns and the Reserve, Officers and men selected from the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade were appointed as guides. These Officers and men had previously been given frequent opportunities of reconnoitring the ground to be traversed, and of examining it from



8 51  
various points of view. Detailed reconnaissance of the actual routes to be traversed had, however, not been found feasible owing to the activity and alertness of the enemy.

3. As the result of reconnaissance reports of the North Western slopes of the SARI BAIR Ridge, and of the various lines of advance on the enemy's position, the following conditions, based on the Orders of the Army Corps Commander were arrived at :-

- (a) That the principal primary objective was the portion of the summit of the Range lying between CHUNUK BAIR (Square 80 K. 3) and KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (Square 93 W. 9), both inclusive.
- (b) That the attack should be delivered by night ; the actual assault on the summit being timed to take place well before daybreak.
- (c) That, in order to bring a sufficient force into line for the assault, as many routes as were available should be utilized in the advance.
- (d) That the advance of the Assaulting Columns must be facilitated by the capture beforehand of certain commanding positions immediately to the North East and North of Outposts Nos. 1 (Sq. 80 H. 8 & 9), No. 2 (Sq. 80 B. 7) and No. 3 (Sq. 80 B. 4).
- (e) That in order to contain the enemy before Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of the Anzac Position, and to maintain this portion of our line, it was necessary to hold these two Sections with a sufficient Force : this Force to assist the main operations against the SARI BAIR Ridge by offensive action at dawn against the Turkish position in front of these Sections.

I therefore divided the Force at my disposal as follows :-



3.  
(Cont.)

Right and Left Covering Force.

Right and Left Assaulting Column.

Reserve, also sub-divided into two Columns.

Garrisons of Posts in Nos. 3 and 4 Sections.

The composition of these Forces was as follows :-

Right Covering Force.

Commander : Brig-General A.H. Russell, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.

Troops : New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.  
Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment.  
Field Troop, New Zealand Engineers.  
The Maori Contingent.

Left Covering Force.

Commander : Brig-General J.H. Travers, 40th Infantry Brigade.

Troops : The 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions).  
½ Field Company R.E., 13th Division.

Right Assaulting Column.

Commander : Brig-General F.E. Johnston, New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

Troops : New Zealand Infantry Brigade.  
26th (Jacob's) Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).  
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.

Left Assaulting Column

Commander : Brig-General H.V. Cox C.B., C.S.I., 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Troops : 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.  
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.  
21st (Kohat) Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).  
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.



453  
3.  
(Cont.)

(5)

Appendix No. 49 53

Reserve.

Commander : Major-General F.C. Shaw C.B., G.O.C. 13th Division.

Troops : The 13th Division

LESS

2 Infantry Brigades - except 1 Battalion.

Divisional Artillery.

2 Field Companies, Royal Engineers.

Garrisons of Sections of the ANZAC Position.

NO. 3 SECTION

Officer Commanding : Brig-General H.G. Chauvel C.M.G.,  
1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Troops : 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Half Battalion, 13th Division.

2 Sections Field Ambulance.

NO. 4 SECTION

Officer Commanding : Brig-General F.G. Hughes,  
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Troops : 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

1 Section 26th (Jacob's) Mountain Battery.

2 Battalions (less half Battalion) 13th Division.

2 Sections Field Ambulance.

Divisional Artillery.

Divisional Artillery, N.Z. & A. Division, stood fast in the positions already occupied.

4.  
ORDERS  
-tc-  
TROOPS

On the night 6th/7th August  
On the 5th August 1915, Orders for the Operations, were issued to the Troops under my command. These were based on the orders of the Army Corps Commander, and on the conclusions referred to in para 3.

- (a) Right Covering Force - to assault and occupy BIG TABLE TOP (Sq. 80 C. 9), OLD NO. 3 POST (Sq. 80 B. 9), BAUCHOP HILL



4. (a)  
(Cont.)

(Sq. 92 X. 7 & 8) with a view to covering the march of the Assaulting Columns in its initial stages up the SAZLI BEIT DERE, CHAILAK DERE and AGHYL DERE : these being the three routes selected for the advance.

- (b) Left Covering Force - to assault and occupy the DAMAKJELIK BAIR (Sq. 92 M.N.) with a view to assisting the march of the left Assaulting Column (vide c) up the AGHYL DERE, and to assist the landing of the 9th Corps which took place between SUVLA BAY and the mouth of the ASMAK DERE (Sq. 91.0)

The action of these covering forces to be prepared by the fire of guns of H.M. Ships, which were to commence firing at 8 p.m. on the 6th August on various targets. The assault of the Right Covering Force was to commence at 9. 30 p.m. The Left Covering Force was to pass No. 3 Post (Sq. 80. B. 4) at 9. 30 p.m., and was ordered to occupy the southern slopes of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR by 10. 30 p.m.

- (c) Right Assaulting Column - Objective - the line Point 161 (80 K. 6) - CHUNUK BAIR - Head of KUR DERE (81 A. 4) : with a view to making a further advance on to the line SCRUBBY KNOLL (Sq. 80 Z.) - CHUNUK BAIR, in co-operation with offensive operations from Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of Defence (vide f). Line of advance - the SAZLI BEIT DERE and the CHAILAK DERE : leading Troops to enter these Gullies at 10. 30 p.m.

- (d) Left Assaulting Column - Objective - KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (inclusive). This Column was directed up the AGHYL DERE, and was ordered to protect the left flank of the Force after clearing the Left Covering Force (para b).

- (e) Reserves were disposed in two Columns - Right and Left : Heads of Columns to be at the mouth of the CHAILAK DERE and AGHYL DERE respectively by 1 a.m. 7th August.



- 855
4. (f) The General Officers Commanding Nos. 3 and 4 Sections were ordered to engage the enemy by fire and bomb attack as soon as the attack of the Right Covering Force (para a) commenced. No. 4 Section was to assault at 4.30 a.m. 7th August with a view to seizing certain trenches on the NEK (80 N. 8), BABY 700 (80 N. 8 & 9) and the CHESSBOARD (80. S. 3). No. 3 Section was to assist No. 4 Section by fire and bomb action, and by the assault and capture of certain trenches opposite QUINN'S POST (80 S.7).

The final objective of these Troops was the line QUINN'S POST - SCRUBBY KNOLL ( 80 E. 2) in conjunction with the advance to the latter spot referred to in para 3 c.

5.  
COURSE OF THE  
OPERATIONS.

The operations of the Forces at ANZAC COVE commenced at 5. 30 p.m., the 1st Australian Division successfully attacking the LONE PINE (Square 68 B.2.3.5.6) position.

Between dark and 9. 30 p.m. in accordance with a pre-arranged programme, the Navy shelled the NEK (80 N.8) and OLD NO. 3 POST : bringing searchlights to bear at intervals. The time and sequence of firing the ships' guns had been practised nightly for some weeks, and the enemy was quite accustomed to it.

Covering (a)  
Forces.

RIGHT COVERING FORCE (para 4.a ):At 9.0 p.m. that portion of General Russell's force detailed to attack OLD NO. 3 POST crept forward from under cover of the Outposts. At 9. 30 p.m. the searchlight, which had been directed as usual on Old No. 3 Post, was switched off: this was the signal for the attack which was made swiftly and silently, and this portion of the enemy's position was soon in our possession.

At the same time, 9. 30 p.m., the forces detailed to attack BIG TABLE TOP and the BAUCHOP HILL series of Ridges advanced up the SAZLI BRIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE



5. (a)  
(Cont.) 4<sup>st</sup>

and across the latter Gully. Opposition was soon met with, and a wire entanglement placed across the CHAILAK DERE delayed the Troops advancing by this route for some time. It was, however, eventually removed.

In the meantime, excellent progress was made against the seaward spurs of the BAUCHOP HILL position, and under cover of these operations, the Left Covering Force made its way North for the attack on the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

OLD NO. 3 POST was captured by 10.50 p.m. 6th August, and BAUCHOP HILL by 1.10 a.m. 7th August, the gallant Commander of the Otago Mounted Rifles, Lieut.Colonel A. Bauchop, C.M.G. being, I regret to say, mortally wounded while in the act of leading his men to the assault.

The attack on BIG TABLE TOP was prepared by a heavy bombardment of this position by 4.5", 5" and 6" Howitzers and by Ships' guns. The fire and searchlight were directed on to the hill till 10 p.m. at which hour the assault was timed. The hill was captured at 11.50 p.m.

The Maori Contingent, which formed part of the Right Covering Force, was sent to BAUCHOP HILL in support of the Mounted Rifles, and acquitted itself well.

All the attacks made by this Force were by bayonet and bomb only. Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles, and much equipment, ammunition and stores.

(b) The LEFT COVERING FORCE (para 4. b), marching via the Beach Road to No. 3 Post, moved North when the attack on BAUCHOP HILL (para 5. a.) had somewhat developed. Its progress was hampered by the CHAILAK DERE which was crossed by a sunken road in which were Troops belonging to the Right Covering Force. Some temporary intermixture of Units and loss of Formations resulted, which was soon righted. After clearing the CHAILAK DERE, the force marched without interruption to the mouth of the AGHYL DERE, though exposed to a certain amount of fire from the Spurs of BAUCHOP HILL which had not then been captured, and attacked DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

Several Turk trenches were rushed by the South Wales Borderers. The Hill was occupied by 1.30 a.m. 7th August,



5.(b) and touch was gained with the Troops posted by the Left  
(Cont.) Assaulting Column (para 5.e. ) to picket the hills in the  
direction of KOJA CHEMEN TERE.

Situation (c) The SITUATION at midnight 6th/7th August was as follows :-  
Right Covering Force in possession of OLD NO. 3 POST and BIG  
TABLE TOP : fighting still proceeding on BAUCHOP HILL,  
(which was finally cleared at 1. 10 a.m. 7th August), <sup>and</sup> LITTLE  
TABLE TOP, ~~and the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.~~  
Left Covering Force in occupation of the Southern slopes of  
the DAMAKJELIK BAIR : fighting still in progress.  
Right Assaulting Column moving up SAZLI BEIT DERE : and  
CHAILAK DERE (Square 80 A. 3).  
Left Assaulting Column approaching AGHYL DERE.  
Reserves still in bivouac.

Assaulting  
Columns. (d) The RIGHT ASSAULTING COLUMN (vide para 4. c.), making use of  
two lines of Advance i.e. the SAZLI BEIT DERE and the  
CHAILAK DERE, commenced its advance up these Gullies at ~~that~~  
~~part~~ 12. 30 a.m. 7th August.  
That portion (One Battalion) which went by the SAZLI BEIT  
DERE met with little opposition, but its advance was slow  
owing to the extremely intricate nature of the country,  
which caused the Column to lengthen out considerably.  
Shortly before dawn, the Officer Commanding, Lieut. Colonel  
J.G. Hughes B.S.O., commanding the Canterbury Infantry  
Battalion, found himself at the foot of RHODODENDRON RIDGE,  
and at once led his Battalion on to its lower slopes where  
he joined up with the rest of the Column.  
The greater part of the Right Assaulting Column moved up  
the CHAILAK DERE, the Otago Battalion leading, and soon met  
with opposition which necessitated the deployment of the  
leading troops. Owing to the confined and broken nature  
of the country, this took time and the advance of the  
Column was slow though steady.  
After taking part in the attacks on BAUCHOP HILL (where a



5. (a)  
(Cont.)

Machine Gun was captured), TABLE TOP (250 prisoners captured), and the Ridges in the vicinity of LITTLE TABLE TOP (Square 80. D. 1), the force reached RHODODEN DRON SPUR, where it connected up with the Canterbury Battalion at about 5. 45 a.m. 7th August, and the whole Force moved up the SPUR and RIDGE and entrenched on the line Ridge 80 D. 5 & 9 - 80 J. 3 - 80 K. 1.

At this point the ~~Column~~ <sup>Left Assaulting Column</sup> ~~was joined by 6 Companies of 10th Gurkhas who had lost their way.~~ <sup>connected with it by means of the 10th Gurkhas.</sup>

Here it was exposed to enfilade fire from BATTLESHIP HILL (Square 80. O. 2 & 3) and a trench along the Ridge North East of CHUNUK BAIR.

At 9. 30 a.m. a further attack was made on CHUNUK BAIR; but without success, owing to the increasing opposition offered by the enemy, and the fatigue of the men.

- (e) The LEFT ASSAULTING COLUMN (vide para 4. d) began to move over the CHAILAK DERE FORD at 12.30 a.m. 7th August, and followed the Left Covering Force to the AGHYL DERE, up which Valley it turned. Opposition was soon met with and this, combined with the difficult nature of the country, made the advance extremely slow.

The 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade (Brig-General J. MONASH) moved up the spurs North of the AGHYL DERE, North Fork (Square 92 Y. 1), its objective being KOJA CEMEN TEPE. The country was exceedingly difficult and intricate, and in the face of considerable opposition, but slow progress was made. The 29th (Indian) Brigade advanced up the AGHYL DERE (South Fork) and the spurs to the North of it, its objective being HILL Q (Square 81 A.2).

At dawn, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade was on the line of the ASMAK DERE (Square 92 <sup>P</sup>U - 93 Q. 7) : the 29th (Indian) Brigade on a Ridge West of the FARM (80 F. 8) and along the Spurs to the North East.



5. (e)  
(Cont.)

8.59

Brig-General Cox then ordered Brig-General Monash to collect his Brigade, leaving half a Battalion on the line of the ASMA DERE, and to assault KOJA CHEMEN TEPE, giving him the 14th Sikhs from the 29th (Indian) Brigade.

(1/28 - 4/10)

Two Battalions of the Reserve were placed at General Cox's disposal to enable him to consolidate a position on the Main Ridge.

Increasing opposition on the part of the enemy and the fatigue of the troops, however, prevented this assault from being made.

(f) The Forces detailed to hold No. 3 Section (less COURTEY'S POST) and No. 4 Section (vide para 4. f) did all in their power to hold the enemy to his defences, and draw his fire, during the night 6th/7th August.

This was done by means of fire action and bombing, which kept the enemy on the qui vive all through the night and drew a heavy volume of fire from him.

From 4.30 a.m. 7th August, an exceptionally heavy bombardment of the Turkish trenches in front of RUSSELL'S TOP, POPE'S HILL and QUINN'S POST took place, all available guns, assisted by guns of H.M. Ships being engaged from 4.20 to 4.30 a.m.; heavy rifle and machine gun fire was also directed on <sup>to</sup> the same objective. At exactly 4.30 a.m. an assault by the 8th Light Horse Regiment was delivered from the trenches of RUSSELL'S TOP against the enemy trenches on and dominating the BEK (Sq. 80 K. 8).

This was met by a terrific rifle and machine gun fire, and although some of the men reached the enemy's trenches, they were unable to maintain their position there and were withdrawn. Simultaneously with this attack, two assaults were delivered from the Posts in No. 3 Section. From QUINN'S POST the 2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment assaulted the "I" trenches in spite of many difficulties, and in the face of a heavy rifle and machine gun fire.



5. (f)

Cont.

The leading line suffered severely, and the Officer Commanding exercised what was probably a wise discretion in discontinuing the assault.

From POPE'S POST the 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment, moving out round the flanks of the Post, delivered an assault and succeeded in reaching the third line of enemy trenches.

About 100 yards of these were held for two hours, but eventually strong counter-attacks compelled the troops to retire, as they could not be adequately supported. Severe loss was undoubtedly inflicted on the enemy by these assaults, and they fulfilled their object of engaging the enemy's attention and preventing him from detaching Troops to other portions of the line. Our losses, which were heavy, included, I regret to say, Lieut. Colonel A. Miell 9th Australian Light Horse, and Lieut. Colonel A.H. White 8th Australian Light Horse who were killed while leading their men to the Assault.

#### Situation (g)

The SITUATION at 3. 30 p.m. August 7th was as follows :- Brig-General Johnston's Column on RHODODENDRON SPUR and RIDGE.

The 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade on the FARM RIDGE, and along the Spurs to the North East.

The 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the line of the ABMA DERE.

The Right Covering Force in occupation of BIG TABLE TOP, OLD NO. 3 POST, and BAUCHOP HILL. General Russell had been ordered to hold this line with 2 Regiments of Mounted Rifles, and to assemble 2 Regiments and the Maori Contingent ready to move as required.

The Left Covering Force (Brig-General Travers) in occupation of the DAMAKJELIK BAIR.

Forces detailed for operations from Nos. 3 and 4 Sections of the Anzac Position in occupation of their original lines. All had suffered heavily, and the men were tired.

I therefore decided to halt on these positions and wait till nightfall before attempting to gain a footing on the Main Ridge (SARI BAIR).

The fighting had been severe throughout the day, and the Turks showed little disposition to retire completely from the low ground between the SARI BAIR Ridge & the sea.



SECOND ASSAULT ON THE SARI BAIR POSITION.861  
6.

During the afternoon of the 7th August, reconnaissances were made with a view to a further attack on the SARI BAIR Position, and orders were issued for an advance in three Columns as under :-

(a) RIGHT COLUMN : Brig-General F.R. Johnston.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)  
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.  
No. 1 Company N.Z. Engineers.  
N.Z. Infantry Brigade. (8th Welsh Pioneers  
2 Battalions, 13th Division 7th Gloucester-  
Maori Contingent. shire Regiment.)

Objective : The line Point 161 (80 K. 5. 6) - CHUNUK  
BAIR - Point 81 A. 4.

(b) CENTRE and LEFT COLUMNS : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)  
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.  
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.  
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion) and  
with 6th South Lanes Regiment attached.  
29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.

Objective : The line 81 A. 4 - HILL Q (81 A. 2) - Point  
305.

(c) The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (less Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment) to remain in occupation of BIG TABLE TOP - OLD NO. 3 POST - BAUCHOP HILL.  
The 40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions) to remain in occupation of the DAMAKJELIK HAIR.

7.

The attack, which was preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, commenced at 4. 15 a.m. 8th August.

(a) On the RIGHT, General Johnston's Column, headed by the Wellington Infantry Battalion, and supported by the 7th Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers and the Maori Contingent, the whole gallantly led by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Malone, Wellington Infantry Battalion, who I regret to say, was killed during the course of the action, made a determined attack, and succeeded in gaining the South Western slopes of the main knoll of CHUNUK BAIR.



7. 862

(b) In the CENTRE, the 39th Infantry Brigade and the Indian Brigade, advancing from the positions they occupied overnight, moved along the Gullies leading up to the SARI BAIR Ridge - Right moving South of the FARM (80 F. 8) on CHUNUK BAIR - remainder up the Spurs to the North East of the FARM on the NEK (81 A. 4) and on HILL Q (81 A. 2).

But little progress was made owing to the severity of the enemy's rifle and Machine Gun fire, but some ground was gained on the Spurs to the North East of the FARM.

(c) On the LEFT, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade advanced from its position on the ASMA DERE (92 P. U.) against the lower slopes of the ABDEL RAHMAN BAIR (93 L.) with the intention of wheeling to its right, and attacking KOJA CEMEN TEPE up the Spur. Considerable opposition was immediately met with from well-placed Turkish Machine guns, and Infantry in position. In spite of every effort, no material progress was made, and on the approach of heavy Columns of the enemy, the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, which was then virtually surrounded, was withdrawn to its previous line on the ASMA DERE ; and in this position withstood, for many hours, determined attacks by the enemy.

(d) The SITUATION at 12 noon was as follows :-

General Johnston's Column in occupation of the South Western slopes of CHUNUK BAIR.

The 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade in occupation of the FARM (80 F. 8) and the Spurs to the North East.

4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade on the ASMA DERE.

40th Infantry Brigade (less 2 Battalions) on the DAMAK-  
Fighting in progress all along the line. JELIK BAIR.

I then decided to break off the action till night-fall, preparatory to another attack on the Main Ridge, using the footing gained on CHUNUK BAIR as a pivot.



4.63

THIRD ASSAULT ON THE SARI BAIR RIDGE.

8. (a). During the afternoon of the 8th August, further reconnaissances of lines of approach to the enemy's positions were made, and orders were issued for a further advance in three Columns, and to attack the line CHUNUK BAIR - HILL Q under cover of the foothold gained by General Johnston's Column on the morning of the 8th August.

Distribution  
- of -  
Troops.

The Assaulting Columns were as follows, two Battalions of the 29th (British) Infantry Brigade (the 10th Hampshire Regiment and the 6th Royal Irish Rifles) having joined the Force from Army Corps Reserve, under command of their Brigadier, Brig-General R.J. Cooper :-

NO. 1 COLUMN : Brigadier-General F.E. Johnston.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)  
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment.  
Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment.  
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.  
New Zealand Infantry Brigade.  
2 Battalions, 13th Division (8th Welsh Pioneer  
and 7th Gloucestershire Regiment).

Objective : To hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 8th August, and in co-operation with other Columns, to gain the whole of the CHUNUK BAIR, extending to the South East.

NO. 2 COLUMN : Brig-General H.V. Cox.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section)  
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.  
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.  
39th Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion but  
with 6th South Lancs. Regiment attached).  
Indian Infantry Brigade.

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q" (81 A. 2).  
The advance to commence from present positions

NO. 3 COLUMN : Brig-General A.H. Baldwin, Commanding 38th (Infantry) Brigade.

Troops : 6th East Lancashire Regiment.  
6th Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment.  
10th Hampshire Regiment.  
6th Royal Irish Rifles.  
5th Wiltshire Regiment.



8. (a) Position of Assembly : the CHAILAK DERE : Head of Column at 80 D. 9.

64

Objective : The position known as HILL "Q": the Column to move East of the FARM. This Column was to be the main attack, and the other Columns were ordered to co-operate with it.

Course  
of the  
Operations

- (b) At 4. 30 a.m. on the 9th August, a heavy bombardment of the CHUNUK BAIR Ridge and HILL "Q" by the Naval guns and all those under my control, commenced : this was continued with increasing intensity till 5.15 a.m. at which time the fire was directed on to the flanks of the position being attacked, and on to its reverse slopes.

(less Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment who had been sent up earlier) in the meantime, No. 3 Column (General Baldwin's) had assembled at 8 p.m. <sup>8th August</sup> in the CHAILAK DERE, and moved up towards General Johnston's Headquarters.

General Baldwin's plan, of which I entirely approved, was to form up his Battalions immediately behind the trenches occupied by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and from there to launch his attack in successive lines, keeping as much as possible on the high ground. With this object, arrangements were made for the narrow track to be kept clear of all obstructions, such as wounded coming down, rations going up etc, and guides were provided for his Column. But in spite of all these precautions, he was so much delayed and hampered by the extreme difficulty of the scrub-covered country to be traversed, the steepness of the ascent, and the heavy fire which met him immediately he neared the summit, that his Column was unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the FARM - CHUNUK BAIR till 5. 15 a.m.

Meanwhile the 5th and 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Brigade gallantly led by Lieut-Colonel C.J.L. Allanson, 6th Gurkha Rifles, advanced up the slopes of SARI BAIR, and succeeded



8.  
(Cont.)865  
(b)

in crowning the heights on the Nek between CHUNUK BAIR and HILL "Q". From this vantage point, they looked down upon the DARDANELLES, and saw Turkish motor-cars and other Transport coming and going along the main roads to the Eastward. Unfortunately, no fresh Troops were sufficiently near to confirm this success, and a strong counter-attack delivered by the Turks, combined with heavy shelling, compelled them to withdraw to the lower slopes of SARI BAIR.

Two Companies of the East Lancashire Regiment, the leading Battalion of General Baldwin's Column, and the Hampshire Regiment, who gained ~~gained~~ the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on CHUNUK BAIR, now attacked: The Turks were by this time lining the crest in great strength, and they were unable to make any headway.

General Baldwin was eventually compelled to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the FARM. I regret to say that Colonel A.R. Cole-Hamilton, 6th East Lancashire Regiment, was killed at the head of his Battalion.

The New Zealand Troops, in spite of repeated attacks by the enemy, maintained their ground, ~~under orders of Brigadier-General R. H. Johnston~~ and at the end of the day still held a footing - a rather precarious one it is true - on the crest of CHUNUK BAIR.

During the evening, the 6th Leinster Regiment joined the Force from Army Corps Reserves and was placed under the Orders of Brig-General Johnston.

That night the general line held by us in this locality ran up the RHODODENDRON RIDGE to the forward trenches on CHUNUK BAIR, thence in a north-westerly direction through the FARM, and from there northwards to the ASMA DERE.



OPERATIONS ON THE NIGHT 10th AUGUST 1915.

866

9. (a) During the night 9th/10th August 1915, the New Zealand Troops in occupation of CHUNUK BAIR were relieved. They had been fighting for three days and three nights with no sleep and with little food and water, and their relief was imperatively necessary.

The position they had held under such difficulties was handed over to two Battalions of British Infantry - the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment : the 10th Hampshire Regiment connecting them with the Troops about the FARM. -----

(b) At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a determined attack from the line CHUNUK BAIR - HILL "Q" against our positions. This attack was particularly directed against the two Battalions (vide 9 a. ) holding the top of CHUNUK BAIR itself. These two Battalions, attacked by a force estimated at about a Division, and subjected to heavy shell fire ~~were, although they~~ held their own gallantly for some time, <sup>but were</sup> at length overpowered, and forced out of the trenches.

The onrush of the Turks was, however, stopped by our supporting Troops, by excellent shelling from the Wardips and by the highly effective fire of the New Zealand and Australian Field Artillery, the Mountain Artillery Brigade and 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery, which first caught successive lines of Turkish Infantry as they topped the crest of the Ridge, and then rained shell on them as they assembled in the various gullies.

In the meantime, a heavy attack was being made against our positions at the FARM and on the Spurs to the North East, and some portions of our line here were compelled to temporarily give ground. The ground so lost was,



9. (b)  
(Cont.)

667  
however, recovered after fierce fighting by bodies of Troops under command of Brigadier-Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper who, with their Commanding Officers, set an example of personal courage and leadership beyond all praise.

During these operations, I regret to say that Brigadier-General A.H. Baldwin, 38th Infantry Brigade, was killed, and Brigadier-General R.J. Cooper severely wounded. Lieut-Colonel M.H. Nunn, commanding the 9th Worcestershire Regiment, was also killed, and Lieut-Colonels H.G. Levinge, Commanding 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and J. Carden, Commanding the 5th Wiltshire Regiment, are, I regret to say, missing.

In view of the probability of further determined attacks on our positions, the Army Corps Commander sent up the 5th Connaught Rangers from Army Corps Reserve, thus completing the 29th Infantry Brigade (Brig-General R.J. Cooper): This Battalion was sent up the AGHYL DERE. By 10 a.m. the main attack of the Turks had expended itself, and those that remained on our side of the Ridge began to stream back over the Ridge suffering heavy casualties as they did so: and by the end of the day, there was scarcely a Turk left on the Slopes of the Ridge facing us.

During the morning, a determined attack was made on our Northern Positions along the ASMA DERE and on the DAMAK-JELIK BAIR, held respectively by the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General J. Monash, and the 4th South Wales Borderers. This attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

A second attack was delivered against the 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade at 3 p.m. and was also repulsed.

I regret to say that Lieut-Colonel F.M. Gillespie, Commanding the 4th South Wales Borderers, was killed in action while commanding his Battalion in this portion of our line.



~~Bridge facing us.~~  
(Cont.) In the evening

General Cox, finding the line of the FARM, and Spurs to the North East unsuitable, withdrew slightly to the line Knoll 80 D. 5 - 6 - 80 D. 2 - 92 Z. 7, and thence to the ASMA FERR.

(c) As a result of the last four days' fighting, it was found necessary to re-organize the line held by the Force Attacking SARI BAIR, and orders were issued accordingly.

The line held was divided into four Sections numbered 3 - 6 as follows :- (Nos. 1 and 2 Sections were held by the 1st Australian Division).

NO. 3 SECTION : Brigadier-General H.G. Chauvel C.M.G.

Troops : 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.  
2 Companies, 8th Cheshire Regiment.

NO. 4 SECTION : Brigadier-General F.G. Hughes.

Troops : 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.  
8th Cheshire Regiment (less 2 Companies).

NO. 5 SECTION : Major-General F.C. Shaw, C.B.

Outer Line : Brigadier-General J.H. Travers.

Troops : 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect.)  
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers.  
8th Welsh Pioneers, Divisional Troops,  
13th Division.  
6th Leinster Regiment (29th Infantry  
Brigade).  
6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (38th  
Infantry Brigade):  
7th Gloucester Regiment (39th Infantry  
Brigade).  
8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (40th Infantry  
Brigade).  
5th Wiltshire Regiment (40th Infantry  
Brigade).  
New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

Inner Line : Brigadier-General A.H. Russell.

Troops : New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.  
Maori Contingent.

NO. 6 SECTION : Brigadier-General H.V. Cox C.B., C.S.I.

Troops : 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect.)  
No. 2 Company, N.Z. Engineers.  
10th Hampshire Regiment (29th Infantry  
Brigade).  
6th Royal Irish Rifles (29th Infantry  
Brigade).



Troops in  
No. 6 Section  
 (Cont.)

6th Royal Lancaster Regiment (38th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 4th South Wales Borderers (40th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade.  
 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade.

and the following Battalions under the command  
 of Brigadier-General W. de S. Cayley:

5th Connaught Rangers (29th Infantry Brigade)  
 6th East Lancashire Regiment (38th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 6th South Lancashire Regiment (38th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 9th Worcestershire Regiment (39th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 9th Warwickshire Regiment (39th Infantry  
 Brigade).  
 7th North Staffordshire Regiment (39th Infan-  
 try Brigade).

The frontages of the Sections referred to above <sup>were</sup> ~~have been~~  
 allotted as follows :-

NO. 3 SECTION : COURTNEY'S POST (exclusive) - QUINN'S POST  
 (80 S. 7) - POPE'S HILL (80 B. 4) -  
 RUSSELL'S TOP (80 H. 7) (exclusive).

NO. 4 SECTION : RUSSELL'S TOP (80 H. 7) - WALKER'S RIDGE  
 (80 M. 8 - 4) (inclusive) to the sea.

NO. 5 SECTION : WALKER'S RIDGE (Exclusive) - No. 1 OUTPOST  
 (80 H. 8) - DESTROYER HILL (80 I. 1) -  
 RHODODENDRON SPUR (80 K. 1) - Knell on  
 Spur 80 D. 5 (exclusive).

NO. 6 SECTION : Knell on Spur 80 D. 5 (inclusive) - Knell  
 92 Y. 9 - Knell 92 U. 9 - 92 U. 2-3 -  
 DAMAKJELIK BAIR - KAZLAR CHAIR (exclusive  
 (92 A. 7), where it joins with the right  
 of the 9th Corps.

This general line ~~xxxxxxx~~ <sup>was ordered to be</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ being consolidated  
 with a view to a further advance, and Units, which had of  
 necessity become considerably intermingled in the course  
 of the severe and continuous fighting in such broken and  
 difficult country, <sup>to be as far as</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ possible, rec-  
 ganized into their Brigades and higher Formations.



470

10.  
Artillery

The Artillery of the Force, and the guns of the 1st Australian Division, at all times gave efficient support to the attacking Troops, and not only rendered material assistance to the Infantry in repelling the Turkish counter-attacks; but were, I am satisfied, responsible for the infliction of severe loss on the enemy.

11.  
Engineers

The Engineer Field Companies did much valuable work in improving communications up the narrow and tortuous gullies which were our only means of access to the Troops in the fighting line. The water supply, which was a matter of serious difficulty, was thereby much facilitated.

The specially good work done by these Companies in connection with work on trenches by night proved the men belonging to them to be possessed of courage and determination beyond the ordinary.

The Signal Companies efficiently kept up communication between my Headquarters and the various Columns, and the bravery and devotion to duty of the linesmen, who went out to repair faults in the dark, over difficult and intricate country, and often under heavy fire, is beyond praise.

12.  
Supply  
and  
Transport

The Supply and Transport arrangements of the Force worked smoothly and well, in the face of great difficulties of terrain and a shortage of easily obtainable water. The Troops were kept supplied with ample food and ammunition, and everything possible was done to supply water in sufficient quantities.

The personnel of the Indian Mule Cart Train rendered yeoman service in keeping the Troops supplied frequently under heavy fire.



671  
13.  
Medical

The Medical Arrangements were subjected to a considerable strain owing to the heavy casualties, and the difficulty of transporting the wounded down the narrow gullies which formed our sole means of communication with the fighting Troops. The Medical Officers and Stretcher bearers were indefatigable in their efforts, and did all in their power to cope with the rush of wounded.

14.  
Casualties

The Casualties, I regret to say, were severe, amounting to 375 Officers and 10,158 Other Ranks, Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

15.

Throughout the period under report, I received the greatest possible assistance from Major-General F.C. Shaw C.B., Commanding 13th Division, and his Staff. General Shaw's coolness and judgment throughout, and his services in command of a section of the attack during its latter stages, were of the utmost value to me personally, and to the operations generally.

I wish to bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-Generals H.V. Cox, C.B., C.S.I., Commanding 29th (Indian) Brigade, F.E. Johnston (North Staffordshire Regiment), Commanding New Zealand Infantry Brigade, J.H. Travers, Commanding 40th Infantry Brigade, and A.H. Russell, Commanding New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, who commanded the assaulting and covering columns.

The difficulty and responsibility of the conduct of these operations, necessitating, as they did, a night march, night attacks, and much movement by night, in an exceptionally broken and rugged country, proved these Officers to have qualities of leadership of a high order.

Brigadier-Generals W. de S. Cayley, 39th Infantry Brigade, H.G. Chauvel C.M.G. Commanding 1st Australian



472  
15. (Cont.)

Light Horse Brigade, F.G. Hughes, Commanding 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, and J. Monash V.D., Commanding 4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade, are also deserving of great credit for the manner in which they handled their commands and carried out the operations entrusted to them.

I would further bring to the notice of the Army Corps Commander, for his favourable consideration, the excellent work done throughout the operations by Lieut-Colonel W.G. Braithwaite, D.S.O., Royal Welch Fusiliers, General Staff Officer 1st Grade; Lieut-Colonel J.J. Esson, 5th (Wellington) Regiment (New Zealand), Assistant Quartermaster-General; Colonel N. Manders, Army Medical Service, Assistant Director of Medical Services (killed in action); Lieut-Colonel G.H. Johnston, R.A. Commanding the Artillery, and Lieut-Colonel G.R. Pridham, R.E., Commanding the Engineers, all of the New Zealand and Australian Division, upon whom fell the responsibility for the control, in their various branches, of the arrangements for the considerable force which I have the honour to command.

I propose to submit later a further list of names of Officers whose services were of such a nature as to merit special mention.

For the valuable and substantial help and co-operation rendered by the guns and searchlights of the Royal Navy to the operations of my Force, I cannot adequately express my thanks. At no time of day or night did they fail to respond immediately to any request for help which I made, and on the mornings of the 9th and 10th, their fire was in a large degree responsible for such success as we have achieved.



473  
15.  
(Cont.)

This Force is specially indebted to the following of

H.M. Ships :

H.M.S. BACCHANTE - Captain the Hon. A.D.H. Boyle M.V.O.  
H.M.S. ENDYMION - Captain A.V. Vyvyan.  
H.M.S. COLNE - Commander C. Seymour.  
H.M.S. CHALMER - Commander H.T. England.

I cannot close this report without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian Units have been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies have only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them have not previously been under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks - from the Old Country, Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Sd A. J. Godley.

Major-General.

Commanding New Zealand & Australian  
Division.



## DIVISIONAL ORDER No. 12. Appendix No 80

Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 3 Post.  
7th August 1915.

1. The Turks have been observed throughout the day retiring eastwards of the SARI BAIR RIDGE.  
Our troops have landed North and South of SUVLA BAY.  
1st Australian Division are gradually making good the LONE PINE Plateau (400), and have to-day successfully repelled a counter-attack.  
Over 600 prisoners have been taken during the last 24 hours, also several machine guns, trench mortars and other guns.  
The N.Z. & A. Division with the 13th Division has advanced to the line RHODOD EDRON SPUR - LITTLE TABLE - AGHYL DERE (92 Z. 1) - DAMAKJELIK BAIR.
2. The N.Z. & A. Division with 13th Division, 29th Indian Inf. Bde Indian Mtn. Art. Brigade attached, will attack the enemy in position on line 161 - CHUNUK BAIR - Q (81 A. 2) - 305 (inclusive at 4.15 a.m. to-morrow.
3. The attack will be preceded by a bombardment of the enemy's position, commencing at 3.30 a.m. and ending at 4.15 a.m.
4. The following troops under command of Br.Gen. F.E. Johnston will attack on the line 161 (incl) - CHUNUK BAIR - 81 A. 4.
- 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect).  
Auckland Mounted Rifles Regt.  
No. 1 Company, N.Z. Engineers  
New Zealand Infantry Brigade  
2 Bns. 13th Division.  
Maori Contingent.
5. The following troops under command of Bdr.Gen. H.V. Cox will attack on the line 81 a. 4 - Q (81 a. 2) - 305.
- 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Sect)  
No. 2 Coy. N.Z. Engineers.  
4th Australian Inf. Bde.  
39th Brigade less 1 Bn. and with 6th South Lancashire Regt. attached.  
29th Indian Brigade.



6. New Zealand Mounted Rifles Bde (less Auckland M.R.) will continue to hold BIG TABLE TOP - OLD No. 3 - BAUCHOPS HILL.
7. The 40th Inf. Bde (less 2 Bns) will continue to hold the DAMAK-JELIK BAIR.
8. The Auckland Mtd. Rifles and the Maori Contingent now in CHAILAK DERE will report for orders to Br.Gen. F.E. Johnston (see para 4 above).
9. The 38th Bde (less 2 Bns) will form the Divisional Reserve, and will move to a position of readiness in the CHAILAK DERE, head at 80 C. 5 at 4. 30 a.m. to-morrow.
10. 1 Bn. 38th Brigade is placed at disposal of Br.Gen. H.V. Cox reporting to him for orders. (6th R. Lan. Regt).
11. Nos. 3 and 4 Sections will assist in the attack by fire action and bomb attack.
12. Medical arrangements - same as for to-day.

Reports to Div. H.Q. (Report Centre) No. 3 Post.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lt.Col.

Gen. Staff.

Issued at 8. 30 p.m.  
as under :

Copy No. 1	War Diary	Copy No. 10	C.R.E.
" No. 2	Record	" No. 11	A.D.M.S.
" No. 3	"	" No. 12	A. & N.Z.A.C.
" No. 4	13th Div.	" No. 13	Aust. Divsn.
" No. 5	Br.Gen. Cox	" No. 14	No. 3 Section
" No. 6	Br.Gen. Travers	" No. 15	No. 4 Section
" No. 7	Br.Gen. Russell	" No. 16	A.D.G. for G.O.C.
" No. 8	Br.Gen. Baldwin	" No. 17	O.C. Ind.Mtn.Artly.
" No. 9	C.R.A.	" No. 18	N.Z.Inf.Bde.