

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit**  
**war diaries, 1914-18 War**

Light Horse

**Item number: 10/3/8**

**Title: 3rd Australian Light Horse**  
**Brigade**

September 1915

L

## HQ 3rd AIF Brigade.

- 31/8 1 officer (Lt R F TOOMEY) QM 12<sup>th</sup> and 7 others including  
 Arm<sup>d</sup> Serg<sup>t</sup> Trumps' Serg' Sig' Serg' R. QM Serg<sup>t</sup> and 2 Troopers  
 marched in - Cap<sup>t</sup> Cowlishaw goes as M-O to OTAGO  
 MR with 3 others.
- 1/9 Preparing new quarters in SAZZI BEIT DERE at S Slope  
 of TABLE TOP. visited Trenches to be taken over with  
 C. O: 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> LH and others. 9<sup>th</sup> LH. 4 men<sup>w</sup>
- 2/9 1 Troop D Sq<sup>n</sup>. 9<sup>th</sup> LH took over TABLE TOP post this  
 morning - made sketches of forward positions - Lt Col  
 Abbott visited AHQ + saw Gen<sup>l</sup> Burdwood - 8<sup>th</sup> LH.  
 1<sup>st</sup>: 10 LH 4 men<sup>w</sup> 1<sup>st</sup>: 18 men to Hospital - Lieut  
 Hughes (S.C.) to Hospital also BM<sup>2</sup> barman BUS -  
 Cap<sup>t</sup> Cowlishaw AMC to 16<sup>th</sup> Batt<sup>n</sup>: Lieut Oliver from  
 Hospital returned: Major Parsons sick to Hospital -  
 marched into B<sup>a</sup> Area and attached - three officers  
 206 of 1<sup>st</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> Suffolks: 50 other ranks of 1<sup>st</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> Hants:  
 25 others 8<sup>th</sup> M. G.: 20 others 9<sup>th</sup> M. G.: 5 officers 55 others,  
 including M. G. section;  
 D<sup>th</sup> Sq<sup>n</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> LH + 2 officers 172 of 52<sup>th</sup> Div<sup>n</sup> took over  
 Canterbury Slope from Canterbury Inf<sup>y</sup> (Lt Col Young): S. 929  
 8<sup>th</sup> LH M. G. to TABLE TOP. BM 699
- 3/9 Took over Area "B" Section 5 - Capt Skelton NZRE called " 703  
 and received instructions re defences of Post. All the  
 men of any experience whatever retained in W<sup>e</sup> to  
 area. Total number of rank and file available for  
 Trenches at present are 8<sup>th</sup> LH nil 9<sup>th</sup> LH 108 (new  
 and transferred from 11<sup>th</sup> LH) - 10<sup>th</sup> LH nil - Hants +  
 Suffolks 233 = 341. all together unsafe + inad- BM  
 equate as represented to Division. There are no Suffolks 711  
 9954

no Reserves, and all the men who are not new are dead beat - The Territorials are poor physique and undersized and when put at work with tools at digging make the poorest show - There are only 4 officers with them. Should any misadventure occur in this command the above is recorded but responsibility cannot rest with the Brigade for which all its men have been detached and sent to another Section -

- 5/9 Spent all the morning supervising new area - There is an accumulation of all sorts of arms, equipment, ammunition and unused - tools - clothing scattered everywhere - The place is filthy and covered with trees & rubbish - afternoon Major Wapleiff & General Charnell called and it was arranged mutually that the latter should take over Deshingen Hill from tomorrow - The S.O.C. also called and I accompanied him to TABLE TOP -
- 6/9 all quiet all the forenoon with C.O. 9<sup>th</sup> L.I. and C.O. Engineer in trenches and inspecting - gave general instructions for collection of scattered material and new trenches. B. 4741

### Local News

Attack on Knoll 60, 27<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup> August  
by G.O.C. Troop Forces - September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1915

During the action of 21<sup>st</sup> August a footing had been gained on Knoll 60 north of Kaiyik Aghala but the Knoll itself had not been captured. The capture of the hill was entrusted to Major - General Cox. The bombardment commenced at 4 pm and was continued until 5 pm at which hour the assault was delivered, on the right by 350 rifles from the 4<sup>th</sup> & 5<sup>th</sup> Australian Brigades, in the Centre by 400 rifles of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 5<sup>th</sup> Australian Brigade and on the left by 250 rifles of the 5<sup>th</sup> Bn Connaught Rangers. The attack instantly drew a heavy fire of enemy's shrapnel, machine guns and rifles, followed shortly afterwards by heavy shell on the Knoll and shrapnel all over the position, including trenches still occupied by the Turks. The Connaught Rangers, showing brilliant dash in the attack, reached their objective and commenced a gallant

fight along the communication trench. The right column was however checked by machine gun fire and for some time could make no headway. In the centre the New Zealanders with splendid dash, carried the cross communication trench, but were held up before reaching the top of the knoll and confused fighting continued until 9-30 p.m. by which time about nine-tenths of the objective had been taken.

It was arranged to put fresh troops in to capture the remainder of the hill at midnight. Before this could be done however, the Connaught Rangers were bombed out of their position and the 9th Australian Light Horse who attempted to retake it at 3.45 a.m. were unable to do so. During the 28th the day was spent in consolidating gains and making communication trenches from the original line, and preparations were made to take the remainder of the knoll on the night of the 28th - 29th.

"At one o'clock on the morning of the 29th the 10th Australian Light Horse carried the trench on the top and retained it, and the knoll passed

into our possession."

The position has been consolidated and a good view is now obtained over the valley to the North.

This gallant action adds 400 more acres of Turkish territory to the country occupied by Anzac. The fighting during these operations was almost entirely hand-to-hand and of a very severe nature. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the Indian Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the 5th the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade, and the 18th Battalion of the 5th Australian Brigade.

"The 9th and 10th Australian Light Horse Regiments were also engaged and took a conspicuous part in the final assault, the posts of honor in the line of Turkish trenches which we eventually held being occupied by the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and the 10th Australian Light Horse, supported by a mixed detachment of the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade."

The casualties in this force amounted to 1000 of all ranks, but very heavy loss was inflicted on the Turks, not

only in the desperate hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches but also from the artillery bombardment.

Three machine guns, two of which were used at once against the Turks and 46 prisoners were taken, as well as three trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of small arm ammunition, and 500 bombs. Judging by the heaps of Turkish dead in the trenches, and observation from the Kavajik Dere trenches, which commanded the Turkish line of retreat, and owing to our artillery getting at the Turks during the retreat, it is estimated that the Turkish losses must have been at least 5000.

Brigadier General F. G. Hughes wishes to record his highest appreciation of the fine work done by the 9<sup>th</sup> & 10<sup>th</sup> Light Horse Regiments in this series of actions and also of the excellent work by the 8<sup>th</sup> Light Horse Regiment who assisted the carrying on the defence of these trenches and successfully repulsed all counter attacks.

The General, in bearing

testimony to all this work is fully alive to the strenuous and continuous duties in No 4 Section, Russell's Top, from which trenches they were taken for this special task.

The casualties have been very heavy in all ranks and in addition to the wounded, he deeply deplores the loss of Lt-Col C Reynell, Captain H.P. Fry, P.D. Callery, A.J. Jaffray and Lieutenants G.A. Leake, W. Cameron & C.H. McBean and the grand men of the Brigade who one and all did such splendid work.

8/7 Of the original Brigade officers who left Australia the following only have not been sick or off duty - Lt-Col J.M. Antill C.B. : B<sup>th</sup> Major : 8<sup>th</sup> L.H. Lt-Col Deeble, Lt. Higgins 9<sup>th</sup> L.H. Lt A.J.S. Hutchison : 10<sup>th</sup> L.H. Major J.B. Scott, Capt Hamlin Lieut<sup>s</sup> H.C.H. Robertson, T.A. Kidd, Capt Bentley and 12 of 31 Reinforcement Officers 12 are on duty.

23 have been wounded 31 killed and 24 away sick

Hard at work deepening the new trenches and strengthening defences and building bivouacs: 2 N3. M. & Sections withdrawn. 1 officer 47 of Hants returned to 54 Div No 6 Section in return 18 of 8 L.H. : 1 officer and 14 9<sup>th</sup> L.H. and 18 of 10<sup>th</sup> L.H. from 54<sup>th</sup> Div<sup>n</sup>. Nothing to report but the enemy was unusually quiet - trenches being extended - Lt-Col P.P. Abbott appointed to command 5 R's 10<sup>th</sup> L.H. vice Lt-Col Braeger (wounded) resigned 562

9/9 Units of 8<sup>th</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> & 10<sup>th</sup> LH detached with 54<sup>th</sup> Div<sup>n</sup> returned to this Brigade and Suffolk Batt<sup>n</sup> moved out at 0900. to 54<sup>th</sup> Div<sup>n</sup> making of C.O. and new dispositions explained - No 1 Post 10<sup>th</sup> LH - No 2 Post 9<sup>th</sup> LH and 8<sup>th</sup> LH finding Post on Table Top and patrols as well as working parties - 350 men occupy trenches facing S from Canterbury Slope with 6 m. 8<sup>th</sup>. N.Z. Inf<sup>y</sup> B<sup>n</sup> find 50 men and 2 m 8<sup>th</sup> on N Slope facing N.E and 3 LH a Troop E end of DESTROYER HILL: Division asR for special ammunition return owing to general leakage: T

10/9 Labeland 10<sup>th</sup> LH killed and wounded by Col Merrington 1<sup>st</sup> LH B<sup>n</sup>. This man only arrived as a stowaway from Egypt a few days ago: Sniping is very consistent and accurate from BATTLESHIP and SNIPERS RIDGE men hit every day from a plunging fire. Busy making a plan of new position trenches and surrounding country.

11/9 Inspecting trenches and improving them 10 officers 50 others NORFOLK Reg<sup>t</sup> arrived for instruction and half detached to 9<sup>th</sup> balance to 10<sup>th</sup> Reg<sup>t</sup>. Temp<sup>l</sup> Capt Baker sick to Hospital - Transfer of Staff NCO of 11<sup>th</sup> 112<sup>th</sup> LH to 8<sup>th</sup> LH: Canteen stores distributed.

12/9 Continuing improvement of trenches - Snipers are bad. Casualties regular each day

13/9 Preparing a map of trenches and locality - Nothing Special: usual artillery fire from CH. BATTLESHIP no results.

14/9 While acting as a covering party to a sapping and bomb clearing detail in No 1 Post - one man killed by an enemy patrol. Inquiry to be held. Lt Col Doble

2<sup>nd</sup> Lieut Wilson and Lt Hutchison to Hospital. 12 men sick to Hospital - 13 Reg<sup>t</sup> - Signallers back for trench duty with Reg<sup>t</sup>. - Lieut Williams 9<sup>th</sup> Reg<sup>t</sup> to Hospital on 12<sup>th</sup> Inst: Sick with influenza - Major JB Scott probably on tomb of 8<sup>th</sup> LH see double SuR. 0 228/25<sup>th</sup>. Three men (2 of 8<sup>th</sup> LH, 1 NORFOLK's) straggled in trenches - Inquiry by B<sup>n</sup> Gen re death of J<sup>r</sup> Facey 10<sup>th</sup> LH while on reconnaissance duty with J<sup>r</sup> Bennett night of 14<sup>th</sup> Inst:

15/9 Authority in reply to BSM 823 to train a complete M-G Detachment for extra funds allotted and to form the detachment in addition to establishment. (S. 149 N2. and A Div<sup>n</sup>); Major Nicholas returned to duty 10<sup>th</sup> LH. Lt Arblester M.G. Staff officer see Hutchison sick - Lieut } 59.242  
Higgins to be adj<sup>t</sup> of 8<sup>th</sup> see <sup>see 10/9</sup> top<sup>l</sup> arblester. } 76<sup>th</sup>

1 Plat<sup>n</sup> "A" Coy 26<sup>th</sup> Batt<sup>n</sup> reported for working on Trenches and Roads 1 officer (2<sup>nd</sup> J.W. Murphy) 2 Serg<sup>ts</sup> - 41 others. attached 8<sup>th</sup> LH for quarters and Rations:

17/9 Work continuing in trenches and saps.

18/9 50 8<sup>th</sup> 73 Reinforcements for 8<sup>th</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> arr<sup>d</sup> from "Hutchison":

19/9 Inspection of trenches and saps - In afternoon enemy mine demonstration at 1730 for 1/2 hr an hour accompanied by Rifle and m. G fire from BATTLESHIP & SNIPERS RIDGE - one of our own 18 P<sup>m</sup> landed in our trenches few feet from Col Abbott failed to explode: NORFOLK's failed to march out without reference to BSM 823 evidently in instructions from them own to. O. Work going on well in trenches and saps: Haintzer and our M-Guns Shells NEK

20/9. One man killed one W<sup>e</sup> 26<sup>th</sup> Ball<sup>m</sup> while working in Saps - The Brigade Sick today and to Hospital Lt Col ~~Phillips~~ placed in com<sup>d</sup> during his absence - Lt WSK Hughes<sup>(S.E.)</sup> reports from Sick. He states many men at MUDROE well who cannot get back to duty owing to no methods existing; and that he was especially informed, until asked for by Brigade they would remain - see the extraordinary state of Brigade & State in last page - Howitzer Shelling Trenches preparatory Turps on W. Slope of BATTLE SHIP HILL as reported in B.M. - Much work was done during night by men as compared to the Saps we are working out from our Trenches on the CANTERBURY slope. Visited ANZAC and Beach today first time for several weeks away from Section and surprised to see the great changes - Trenches take the place of all our previous primitive dugouts - The tops of hills razed, tents erected, a tramline from ANZAC to old MULE GULLY thousands of tons of stores of all descriptions and altogether a transformation denoting a permanent camp. Water laid on at crowds of mules and road parties - In this Section we have made a good road up SAZLI (N) put up water tanks and laid in 14 days Supplies against the expected rain. The Brigade has worked hard to make defenses Saps. The Section is divided into two - No. 1 & No. 2 Post former 9<sup>th</sup> LN (Lt Col Grant) and latter 10<sup>th</sup> LH (Lt Col Abbott) while the 8<sup>th</sup> LH was very weak under

J.M. Antill  
etc

DRO  
616  
20/9

Major JB Scott 10<sup>th</sup> LH (Lt Col Double to Hospital) finds the Detached Post of 12 men TABLE TOP and the two nightly SAZLI (S) patrols from ANTILLS LOOK-OUT and KIDD SAP. - Health of B<sup>co</sup> fair but usual number of Sick chiefly "Stomachs" to Hospital also one Diphtheria case today. Lt WSK Hughes will take over B<sup>co</sup> Major vice Lt Col. J. M. Antill C.O. in command, and Lt Mackenzie acting Staff Captain. Lt Toomey will be B<sup>co</sup> Supply and Ordnance officer.

D.R.O  
616

21/9 Brigade clerk Sgt Latham to Hospital today (entire) and Lt Col Antill is now the only member of the Staff including batmen, left; a good deal of sniping goes on as do all on a lower grade than BATTLESHIP and cannot protect our trenches - we are digging out 2 Saps to cover dead ground between our trenches and the Donga and have done an immense amount of work since the B<sup>co</sup> has been here.

Casualties from Sick last few days have been 10-12-13-4 = 39.

22/9 Gen<sup>l</sup> Chauvel inspected position and trenches, which are going well forward: Placed GARLAND MORTAR in E2 Trench No 2 Post object of searching hiding places and pots of TURKISH Patrols:

23/9 Spent morning in trenches directing improvement of Trenches Saps etc: Four 18 P<sup>o</sup> shells fell in trenches and 9<sup>th</sup> Division from our own guns to S. serious by wounding one man: Reported same, this is the third occasion during last week. Sniping still very troublesome from BATTLESHIP and SNIPERS NEST.

20

9

24.9. Inspected trenches with C.O.R.E.: again shelled by our own 18 P<sup>o</sup>, third time in last 4 days: also by enemy at 1730, both Brickfields and trenches - One man killed and 3 wounded former by our own guns - Working incessantly to improve our trenches and saps but are very short-handed and men dropping out each day - We require at least double the number to hold against attack having less than one man per yard without either supports or Reserves - Demonstration at 2000 with Rifle M. G<sup>o</sup> + mortars to locate enemy positions + strength drew a lot of fire especially M. G<sup>o</sup> - we have a strong position very thinly held and could not hold against a determined attack.

26.9. Report to GHQ in detail showing number of officers + other ranks absent sick wounded etc. This is colossal representing  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the B<sup>o</sup> 55 officers and 1209 others - many of them dating back as "fit" from June-July. The condition of affairs indicates an absence of system or control once an individual is evacuated for a trifling sickness such as boils, cold, diarrhoea or other and from sufficient evidence it is clear once a man gets away he can stay away or go to England + elsewhere - This, to the mind of the writer who has been here throughout, constitutes the most serious phase of the most unsatisfactory conditions which exist and point to an entire lack of coordination and control once an officer or man gets sick - ample evidence is rampant in regard to this great abuse which no representative has been able to elicit or improve.

Major J B Scott goes back as 2<sup>nd</sup> in command of 10<sup>th</sup> L.H and Major Nicholas assumes temp<sup>o</sup> command of the 8<sup>th</sup> L.H which has no senior officer left: Capt<sup>o</sup> Anblaster of M. G<sup>o</sup> officer wounded by stray bullet and Lt. Harper, M. G. officer of the 10<sup>th</sup> recently promoted from ranks takes over their important duties - The B<sup>o</sup> is in a very serious condition in regard to its depletion in all ranks - It has been in trenches since May 21<sup>st</sup> without any rest or respite and is practically worn out - As already noted, if a serious attack were made we cannot hold our trenches and this has continually been represented with no result - We hold about 550 to 600 yds with less than 400 bayonets, no support or Reserves - 6 old M. Guns and only one M. G<sup>o</sup> officer left: Bombed last evening by enemy evidently with a long range mortar - Three long 4 feet bomb tails or round sticks found where bombs fell - Two men hit last night - Working very hard to put trenches safe -

27.9 Gen Godley (G.O.C. Div) inspected Area and Trenches and was very pleased with progress made - Saw men recommended for commissions - 8<sup>th</sup> L.H SSM M<sup>o</sup> Grath, Trooper C. S. Austin: 9<sup>th</sup> L.H. RSM Slattery (Bl200): 10<sup>th</sup> L.H RSM Rosevear, S. S.M MacCallum, Sgt Croxther - Very heavy shelling heard N around SUFLA BAY from 1900 for an hour and unusual stir about AMAFARTA - Star shells and small arm fire: Lieut<sup>o</sup> Fisher C.O Engineer away earlier also 8 men from usual sickness - Lieut<sup>o</sup> Oliver sent to 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade to instruct in MORTAR + Bombs - Patrols sent out to try and locate TURKISH



Watering places and Bivouacs - no success - News  
last night that our Army in France making a  
push. Sent list of officers and men away from  
Barrade they number 55 officers 1209 others -

28. 9. 13 to Hospital (1<sup>st</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> L.H.): Enemy now active in  
Bombs which are fired some 400 y<sup>d</sup> or more from  
a mortar with a long stick 4' 6" x 2". These are  
thrown with great accuracy - Last night 2<sup>nd</sup> Friday  
and two others under Ser<sup>g</sup> Linaere patrolled to the  
bottom of danga to try and ascend watering places  
of Turks came across two patrols - did not fire in ac-  
cordance with my instructions - approval at last re-  
ceived Ser<sup>g</sup> an officer to Egypt to purchase stores  
for Reg<sup>t</sup> for winter sending J<sup>r</sup> Olivier tomorrow -

29. 9. Visited 3<sup>rd</sup> L.H. with M<sup>r</sup> Abbott and saw Ser<sup>g</sup> Brunson  
and M<sup>r</sup> Meredith - Installed M.G. on TABLE TOP and  
did good work in rear and enfilade of SNIPERS  
NEST and Com<sup>d</sup> trenches - 4 Ser<sup>s</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> (D Sq<sup>d</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> LH)  
from Shrapnel, which is now very constant: Turks  
obviously concerned at our activity in extending Saps  
M. G<sup>s</sup> and bombs from Garland mortar, Capt STORE  
of 8<sup>th</sup> LH ret<sup>d</sup> from Wernid (Cairo) states our details and  
Ser<sup>s</sup> are being formed into units one Sq<sup>d</sup> per Reg<sup>t</sup>  
for service SOUDAN or SUEZ. This shuts off all our  
Reinforcements. Letter to Major Love 10<sup>th</sup> LH calling  
for explanation of his app<sup>n</sup> 29<sup>th</sup> Aug to G.O.C 2<sup>nd</sup> A.  
DW<sup>r</sup> for employment and conveying an instruction from  
G.O.C. A.N.Z. pointing out the extreme irregularity  
of his action in addressing me on a matter of this

B.M. 1023

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.RUSES EMPLOYED BY THE ENEMY.

(Issued with Notes on Trenches and Trench Fighting  
G. 3, dated 5th September, 1915).

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The following ruses have on various occasions been employed by the enemy against us :

- (a) A Party of Turks approached the 2nd Australian Inf. Brigade dressed in Australian uniform. This is a common practice, and must be guarded against carefully.
- (b) An order purporting to come from ANZAC was given to a portion of the Troops to cease firing. Immediate steps should be taken to verify any doubtful order of this sort.
- (c) On one occasion Turks advanced dancing towards our trenches and retired dancing, having seen what they wanted to see.  
Always take the opportunity of killing an enemy fairly.
- (d) On the night August 22nd, a number of Turks approached the left flank defences at KAIAJIK AGHALA shouting and with both hands held over their heads. As it was thought they wanted to surrender, they were allowed to approach though they had rifles in their hands and bombs on their waist-belts. On our men attempting to take away their rifles, a scuffle ensued and some were shot, the rest bolting.  
It is thought that they intended to gradually collect and bomb our trenches.

(Sgd) W.R. PINWILL, Major,  
General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. DIVISION.

Anzac,  
5th September, 1915.

name which first Submitting through authorized channels.  
In G. on TABLE TOP doing good work at IMPERS NEST.

"Special Order

by

General Sir Ian Hamilton GCB DSO ADC  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force  
General Headquarters

7<sup>th</sup> September 1915.

The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, desires formally to record the fine feat of arms achieved by the Troops under the Command of Lt-Gen. Sir W. R. Birdwood during the battle of Sari Bair.

The fervent desire of all ranks to close with the enemy, the impetuosity of their onset and the steadfast valour with which they maintained the long struggle, these will surely make appeal to their fellow-countrymen all over the world.

The gallant capture of the almost impregnable Lone Pine trenches by the Australian Division, and the equally gallant defence of the position against repeated counter attacks are exploits which will live in history.

The determined assaults carried out from other parts of the Australian Division's line were also of inestimable service to the whole force, preventing as they did the movement of large bodies of reinforcements to the northern flank

The troops under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, and particularly the New Zealand and Australian Divisions, were called upon to carry out one of the most difficult military operations that has ever been attempted — a night march and assault by several columns in intricate mountainous country, strongly entrenched, and held by a numerous and determined enemy. Their brilliant conduct during this operation and the success they achieved have won for them a reputation as soldiers of whom any country must be proud.

To the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to those who were associated with that famous Corps in the battle of Sari Bair — the Maoris, Sikhs, Gurkhas, and the new troops of the 10<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Divisions from the old Country — Sir Ian Hamilton tender his appreciation of their efforts, his admiration of their gallantry, and his thanks for their achievements. It is an honour to command a force which numbers such men as these in its ranks, and it is the Commander-in-Chief's high privilege to acknowledge that honour.

signed W. P. Braithwaite, Major General.


Chief of General Staff. M. E. F. "

Casualties

3<sup>rd</sup> A. L. H. Brigade

Sept-18<sup>th</sup> 1915

Unit	Effective Strength today		Killed		Away Wounded		Away Sick		Missing	Transferred	Total
	Off <sup>s</sup>	O. Ranks	Off <sup>s</sup>	O. Ranks	Off <sup>s</sup>	O. Ranks	Off <sup>s</sup>	O. Ranks			
Bde HQ	5	14	19	-	-	1	1	1	18	-	21
3 Sig TP	-	19	19	-	-	1	-	-	17	-	18
8 <sup>th</sup> LH	7	139	146	16	186	4	123	10	227	-	571
9 <sup>th</sup> " "	15	311	326	6	54	3	139	12	264	17	501
10 <sup>th</sup> " "	9	193	202	11	101	13	152	8	231	12	536
Total	36	676	712	33	341	22	415	31	757	29	1647
Total landed to date 2359			Losses All ranks								
including 107 <sup>th</sup> Rein <sup>ts</sup>			Killed		374						
and 11 <sup>th</sup> , 12 <sup>th</sup> LH absorbed			Wounded		437						
			Missing		29						
			Transf <sup>er</sup>		19						
Today's effective strength 412					1647						
					<u>1647</u>						



Re. an. till 9 Feb  
 Camp 3414 Bde  
 28.9.1915


## Daily State.

Sept. 29<sup>th</sup>/15.

UNIT.	Effective Strength		Killed.		AWAY. Wounded.		AWAY. SICK.		MISSING.	TRANS.	TOTAL.	
	Ofo	ORo	Total.	Ofo.	ORo	Ofo	ORo	Ofo				ORo
B. H. QAS.	5	16	21	.	.	1	1	1	20	.	.	23
3 <sup>rd</sup> Signal Troop	.	15	15	.	.	1	.	.	20	.	.	21
8 <sup>th</sup> L-H. Reg.	7	125	132	16	187	4	124	10	239	.	5	585
9 <sup>th</sup> L-H. Reg.	15	280	295	6	54	3	143	12	307	17	6	548
10 <sup>th</sup> L-H. Reg.	8	159	167	11	101	13	157	9	259	12	8	570
<b>Total.</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>425</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1747</b>

<p>Total landed to date.</p> <p>{ Including 7<sup>th</sup> Reings to v }          { 11<sup>th</sup> &amp; 12<sup>th</sup> Regts. aborted }</p> <p>To Days, Effective Strength.</p>	<p>Losses</p> <p>Killed.</p> <p>Wounded.</p> <p>Sick.</p> <p>Missing.</p> <p>Transferred.</p>
<p>All RANKS.</p> <p>2377</p> <p>630</p> <p style="border-top: 1px solid black;">1747</p>	<p>All RANKS.</p> <p>375</p> <p>447</p> <p>877</p> <p>29</p> <p>19</p> <p style="border-top: 1px solid black;">1747</p>



HEADQUARTERS  
N.Z. A. DIVISION.

Several cases of premature bursts in hand grenades have occurred lately, owing apparently to defective or quickly burning fuse.

(2) Each length of the fuse employed in the bomb factory is carefully tested, and great care is taken to cut it in uniform lengths. The same man in each shift places fuses in the detonator and he would certainly notice any material variation in the lengths of the fuse.

It is not possible, in existing conditions, to do more to ensure safety in the use of the grenades.

(3) These premature bursts may be due to:-

(a) Trickery on the part of the enemy. Some grenades have recently been thrown unlit into our trenches which on examination proved to be fitted with instantaneous fuse.

(b) Bad fuses employed by the enemy. That the enemy are using unreliable fuse is borne out by the following extract from a Turkish Divisional order:-

"The hand grenade cases which arrived recently have the word CARE written on the outside. The fuse of these grenades is thinner & they are likely to explode prematurely. Great care must be exercised in handling such grenades."

Unless therefore our own bombs have run out, enemy grenades should not be used but should be returned from time to time for re-fusing.

(c) It is possible that if grenades are much shaken about in transit to trenches or if they are kept long in the trenches or in regimental charge the wrapping of the fuses may get loose & the rate of burning be thus increased. Further, exposure to damp & other deterioration may lead to these premature bursts.

Arrangements should therefore be made to let a turn-over and periodical inspection of grenades - those whose fuses show sign of getting slack or of deterioration being returned for re-fusing.

(sgt) H. O. Knod  
Lt. Col. Ag. Mf.  
Aust. & N. Z. Army Corps.

1st Sept 1915

CO 8<sup>th</sup> LA White  
9<sup>th</sup> " " " " " "  
10<sup>th</sup> " " " " " "

M. A.

N2946

Headquarters  
3rd Light Horse Bde

Forwarded for your  
information & action.


J. Brown

2/9/15

Lt Col. Ag. Mf.  
N. Z. A. Division



Rough Sketch of  
Trenches on  
Rhododendron Ridge  
not drawn to scale



NEW Tunnel	No 2 Post. 19ft. 10 in.	NEW	56 ft Rank
" 5 "	" 1 "	"	"
" 6 "	" 5 "	"	"
" 1 "	" 5 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 19 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 39 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 33 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 25 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 172 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 60 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 20 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 25 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 172 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 60 "	"	"
" 5 "	" 20 "	"	"

available for trench work

Chandler left  
at 10 Regt  
4/9/15

SPECIAL ARMY CORPS ORDER.

Army Corps Headquarters,  
7th September, 1915.

In welcoming the 2nd Australian Division to join the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the General Officer Commanding on behalf of all their comrades now serving on the Peninsula wishes to convey to them our general feeling of admiration for the gallant behaviour of all ranks on board the transport "Southland", when that vessel was torpedoed on the 3rd instant.

All troops of the Empire now serving with the Army Corps have heard with pride of the courage and discipline shewn at a moment when the nerves of the bravest were liable to be so highly tried. Not only was there not the slightest confusion on the part of the troops, who quietly fell in prepared to meet whatever fate might be in store for them, but later on when there was a prospect of the "Southland" being able to make her way under her own steam, and volunteer stokers were called for, men at once came forward for this duty and successfully helped in getting the "Southland" into Hudros.

The 2nd Australian Division knows well the high reputation it has to live up to to carry on the brave deeds done by those who have been here earlier in the campaign, but with men like those on the "Southland" we are fully assured that our new comrades are going to prove themselves equal in all ways to the old hands who have fought so well.

7  
/

*W. W. G. ...*

Brig-General,  
General Staff,  
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

-----  
 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.  
 -----

The following Summary of Force Orders No 25 and 24 is circulated for information:-

The following names will be inserted in the new 1/30,000 Map of the Gallipoli Peninsular:-

ESKI HISSARLIK POINT.	at	Square	14.K.5.
DE TOTT'S BATTERY.	"	"	14.K.6.
MAGRAM. *	"	"	50.h.2.
IBRAHIM AGA. †	"	"	38.g.4.
ESKI KEULI. †	"	"	57.n.1-5.
KILIA LIMAN. †	•		The bay in which KILIA ISKELE is written, square 58.
AK BASHI LI'AI. *			The bay in which ODUN ISKELE is written, square 72.
SUVLA BAY. *			The bay in squares 116 and 103.
SARI DAIR. †			The whole mountain range in squares 80, 81 and 95.
OLIVE GROVE. *			The groups of trees marked SW of GABA TRIP, square 53 n to 47 c.

For the sake of uniformity the following names will be substituted for those on the 1/20,000 Maps:-

SIDD-EL-BAHR	will continue to be known as	SEDD-EL-BAHR.
ILIAS BURU (Sq. 13)	" " " " " "	" HELLES BURU. ✓
ERTOGHUL BAY (Sq. 15)	" " " " " "	" SEDD-EL-BAHR BAY. ✓
YALOVA DERE (Sq. 84)	" " " " " "	" AK BASHI DERE. ✓
HAUSLAR DERE (Sq. 40, 51)	" " " " " "	" JAMBAZ DERE. ✓
KURUJA DERE (Sq. 89)	" " " " " "	" KOJA DERE.
KUCHUK KEMIKLI (Sq. 105)	" " " " " "	" NIBRUNESI POINT.
BIYUK KEMIKLI (Sq. 116)	" " " " " "	" SUVLA POINT.
AJA LIMAN (Sq. 153)	" " " " " "	" EJEIMER BAY.

A. C. NZ Army Corps.

4th August, 1915.  
 Sept,

*No. 214*  
*to be inserted in the 1/30,000 map*  
*15/15*

214

No. G. 37

Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post, ANZAC.  
8th September 1915.From : Headquarters,  
N.Z. & A. Division.To : 1st A.L.H. Brigade.  
3rd A.L.H. Brigade.  
N.Z. M.R. Brigade.  
N.Z. Infantry Brigade.  
4/Aust. Infantry Brigade  
29th Brigade.MEMORANDUM

We have now got several varieties of hand grenades in stock, each of which has its special characteristics. The number of types is, it is understood, to be reduced, and only the most effective retained, but as we have a lot in stock it is as well to know the circumstances in which each type can be used most effectively.

1. (a) The Cane Handle No. 2 and the Hale's Rifle Grenade are percussion grenades. The defects of percussion grenades - the need for careful throwing, ample throwing room and a hard surface to strike on - make them unsuited to trench warfare and we have applied to get rid of these patterns.
  - (b) The Cricket Ball grenade is of inferior workmanship to the Turkish sample, bursts into a few large pieces, and is the least effective of our fuze ignition grenades though useful in a narrow trench.
  - (c) The Double Cylinder grenade is a far better weapon and has more wounding effect and is much feared by the enemy.
  - (d) The Lotbiniere grenade - guncotton fixed on a "hair brush" backing, which has little effect on personnel or trenches, but is particularly destructive in closed spaces or for breaking down head cover.
2. The remaining grenades are of a much superior type and power.
- (a) The Pitcher and Mills have a scattering effect, and get results from the many pieces into which the envelope is shattered. Both very powerful bombs and apparently safe to handle.
  - (b) The Time and friction No. 6 has an entirely different action. It gets its results from the highly localised destruction caused by the high explosive compound with which it is filled. Experiment shows that a bursting grenade will clear a circle of a yard diameter in bush, destroying roots to a depth of 6 inches, while leaves and twigs outside that circle are not even injured. In addition the explosion has a terrifying effect.  
This grenade is therefore obviously best suited for use in attacking up trenches - the thrower being immune from flying pieces.
3. At present we have a very large stock of double cylinders, a large stock of cricket balls, and a limited supply of the three better grenades.  
In using these grenades, therefore, the double cylinder

and cricket balls should be earmarked especially for use in the normal interchange of grenades between trenches.

The Lotbiniere grenade should be used whenever head-cover in enemy trenches has to be destroyed but not otherwise, as it is an expensive weapon, and in every other use has its superior in one or the other of the smaller grenades.

The Pitcher, Mills, and No. 6 Grenades should not be used daily except for special purposes such as the repelling of a bomb attack or for dealing with bombing parties who cannot be quieted by the local grenades - that is they should not be used for bombing trenches and areas as such so much as for dealing with trenches and areas in which the enemy is known to be in sufficient numbers to warrant the use of these more effective grenades, otherwise they should be used for -

- (a) Repelling attack.
- (b) Use by our bombing parties.
- (c) Attack on enemy trenches as part of an operation.

For these three purposes the Mills and Pitcher are indicated.

- (d) Clearing the enemy from trenches in which a lodgment has been made.

For this the Time and Friction No. 6 is specially indicated by its characteristics, and it should as a rule be reserved for this in an attack on enemy trenches.

(Sgd) W.R. Pinwill Major,  
General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

S. L. H. Bode

DIVISIONAL ORDER No. 23Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post.  
10th September 1915.1.  
ARRIVAL

The 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th Battalions, on arrival at ANZAC will be attached temporarily to this Division (less 1 Captain, 1 Subaltern, 2 Sergeants, 4 Corporals, and 100 men per Battalion which will be left in Reserve Gully at the disposal of the Army Corps Commander).

2.  
UNITS TO BE  
RELIEVED

After the arrival of the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, certain units of this Division will be sent to Lemnos for a short change and rest.

The first party to proceed will consist of the undermentioned units :-

- N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade (including Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment).
- N.Z. Infantry Brigade (less Maori Contingent).
- 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.
- N.Z. Field Ambulance.
- 4th Australian Field Ambulance.

3.  
RELIEFS

The line now held by the above units will be taken over by the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade as under, with Headquarters at the present New Zealand Infantry Brigade Headquarters :-

One Battalion will relieve the New Zealand Infantry Brigade on the APEX.

One Battalion will relieve the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade on CHESHIRE RIDGE.

One Battalion will relieve the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade on the lower slopes of CHESHIRE RIDGE.

One Battalion will bivouac in Divisional Reserve on BAUCHOP'S HILL.

4.  
DETACHMENTS  
TO BE LEFT  
BEHIND

Each Brigade proceeding to LEMNOS will leave behind in its present position detachments as under :-

N.Z. MOUNTED RIFLES BRIGADE : 1 Field Officer or Captain.  
2 Subalterns.  
50 N.C.O.'s and men (including Machine Gun detachments).  
5 Machine Guns.

N.Z. INFANTRY BRIGADE : 1 Field Officer.  
2 Captains.  
5 Subalterns.  
350 N.C.O.'s and men (including the Maori Contingent and Machine Gun detachments).  
11 Machine Guns.

4th AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE : 1 Field Officer.  
1 Captain.  
3 Subalterns.  
200 N.C.O.'s and men (including Machine Gun detachments).  
6 Machine Guns.

5.  
MACHINE GUNS

Each Regiment and Battalion proceeding to LEMNOS will take with it one Machine Gun for instructional purposes.

6.  
MACHINE GUN  
CREWS

All Officers, N.C.O.'s and men left behind are to be the fittest and most efficient available, and all Machine Guns left behind are to have thoroughly fit and efficient crews as far as available, and failing these being available for all the guns, the men now under instruction will be left.

7.  
NAMES OF  
OFFICERS LEFT  
BEHIND

The names of all Officers whom it is proposed to leave behind will be submitted to Divisional Headquarters by 12 noon Sunday, 12th September.

8.  
ATTACHMENT  
OF DETAILS  
LEFT BEHIND

Detachments left behind will be attached for duty, rations, and discipline to the relieving units in their respective areas.

9.  
EQUIPMENT

Units will proceed to LEMNOS fully equipped.  
All camp equipment, cooking utensils etc. will be taken.

10.  
AMMUNITION

Each man will carry 100 rounds of ammunition on the person. All ammunition surplus to the above will be handed over to the relieving Battalions.

11.  
TRENCH STORES  
& EQUIPMENT.

All trench equipment and stores is to be handed over to the relieving units. An inventory is to be made out showing articles handed over, and a receipt obtained for the same.

12.  
SANITATION

The General Officer Commanding directs that special attention be paid to the condition in which trenches and bivouac areas are handed over to the relieving Units.

Brigadiers will take special steps to ensure that the relieving units have no cause to complain of the sanitary condition of the trenches and bivouacs taken over by them.

13.  
RATIONS AND  
WATER.

Troops proceeding to LEMNOS will carry one day's rations on the person, and filled waterbottles.

14.  
SUPPLY  
DETACHMENTS

A certain proportion of supply personnel will accompany Brigades proceeding to LEMNOS.

15.  
DATE

The dates on which these reliefs will take place will be notified to each Brigade concerned.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut.Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

Copies as under at 3. 30 p.m.

No. 1	War Diary	12	A.D.M.S.
2 & 3	Records	13	Senior Supply Officer.
4	1st A.L.H. Bde.	14	O.C. Div. Train.
5	3rd A.L.H. Bde.	15	O.C. Signals.
6	N.Z.M.R. Bde.	16	A.D.C. (for G.O.C.)
7	7th I.M.A. Bde.	17	Anzac.
8	N.Z. Infty. Bde.	18	1st Aust. Division.
9	4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	19	2nd Aust. Division.
10	C.R.A.	20	54th Division.
11	C.R.E.	21 and 22	Admin. Staff.

-----  
To all units to notify  
Anzac Old  
Bn



No. G. 81

Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post.  
11th September 1915

From : N.Z. & A. Division  
To : 1st A.L.H. Brigade.  
3rd A.L.H. Brigade. ✓  
N.Z.M.R. Brigade.  
N.Z. Inf. Brigade.  
4th Aust. Infantry Brigade.

MEMORANDUM ON TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION  
WHILE AT THE CAMP, MUDROS.

1. Troops of the N.Z. & A. Division while in Camp at MUDROS will carry out the Syllabus of Training which accompanies this Memorandum.
2. The organization of Regiments and Battalions, Squadrons and Companies, will be thoroughly reviewed - Officers and N.C.O.'s being transferred as found necessary to produce the best results.  

Regimental and Battalion Signallers, Scouts, Bomb Parties etc. will be brought up to strength and will receive special training.

Supernumerary Machine Gun Crews are to be trained as far as circumstances admit.
3. For the first week, training will consist of Close Order Drill with arms, and short route marches only, and every effort is to be made to reach at least the same standard as that attained before the Division left Egypt.  

During this period, arms will be thoroughly overhauled and troops will as far as possible be completed as regards clothing, equipment, and necessaries : special attention being paid to men's boots. Inspections of arms and kit will be held frequently.
4. During the remainder of the time at MUDROS, training will be of a more advanced character : but not less than

half an hour Close Order Drill with arms will be practised DAILY (Sundays excepted). Night operations will be practised at least twice a week.

5. It is expected that considerable drafts of Officers and men will join various Units at MUDROS. These will be carefully instructed in the particular kind of fighting they will experience on the return of the troops to Anzac, i.e. in Trench warfare, the use of the periscope rifle, bomb throwing etc.

6. Owing to the large proportion of recently appointed Officers and N.C. Officers in the Force, it is essential that every opportunity be taken to give special instruction in the duties of Officers and N.C. Officers, i.e. map reading, tactical handling of men both in trench fighting and in the open and in interior economy.

Brigadiers will therefore arrange for lectures and other special instruction to be given to Officers and N.C. Officers throughout the period spent at MUDROS.

7. A report of the work done during the preceding week will be forwarded to Divisional Headquarters every Sunday.

8. No training will commence till the 4th day after arrival at LEMNOS.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut-Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

*W.G.*

CAMP - MUDROS

SYLLABUS of TRAINING

1st WEEK

Close Order Drill with arms or Route Marches not exceeding 5 miles	)	2 Hours daily.
Inspection of Arms	)	Daily.
Kit Inspections.	)	(As necessary).

2nd WEEK.

Close Order Drill with arms, Fire Control and Discipline, and Bayonet Fighting.	)	1 Hour daily.
Reute Marches combined with Field Operations including two night operations.	)	Not less than 3 hours daily in addition to above.

3rd and 4th WEEKS.

Close Order Drill with arms	)	$\frac{1}{2}$ Hour Daily.
Field Operations including two night operations weekly.	)	Not less than 4 hours daily in addition to above.

SPECIAL TRAINING FOR OFFICERS & N.C. OFFICERS  
(additional to above).

Map reading.  
Leading Troops by night.  
Outposts, Attack & Defence, Fire Control & Discipline.  
Interior Economy.

11th September 1915.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut-Col.  
General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

No. G.120.Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post.  
14th September 1915.From : N.Z. & A. Division.

To :

3<sup>rd</sup> Lt. H. BodeMEMORANDUM

The General Officer Commanding regrets that he is again compelled to draw the attention of Brigadiers and G.'s C. Units to the necessity for taking continuous offensive action against the enemy.

Only last night a case occurred of a man, forming part of a covering party to a working party, being shot dead by a Turkish patrol as he took cover in an old Turkish trench, in front of the working party and close to our own lines. This shows that the reconnoitring patrols of the Turks are in the habit of working close up to our trenches, unmolested and unseen. This, it is unnecessary to add, is the exact opposite state of affairs to what it should be.

The G.O.C. has frequently published orders and memoranda stating how necessary it is that we should assert our superiority by continuous patrolling to keep down those of the enemy.

The G.O.C. is not at all satisfied that all that is possible is being done in this direction.

We must maintain a continual fire superiority over the Turks in our immediate front, and prevent them from closing in on our lines.

Reconnoitring patrols, in addition to "Listeners" should be sent out nightly, and active measures taken to keep the enemy constantly in a state of uneasiness.

It should even be possible in many cases for keen and energetic men to go out and throw bombs into the enemy's trenches.

The important point to remember is that in the interval

(2)

between the enemy's trenches and our own, we should be more active than they are; and this activity can only be produced by reconnoitring patrols pushing well out at night, and by bombing the enemy's trenches.

Had the above been done, the unfortunate incident of last night might not have occurred.

There should be no question of Turkish patrols being able to come up to our trenches; any effort to do so on their part should be frustrated by our patrols working up to their trenches.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

No. 2 Outpost,  
16th September 1915.

STANDING ORDERS FOR MACHINE GUN DETACHMENTS.

1. CARE AND CLEANING OF MACHINE GUNS AND EQUIPMENT.

In order that the greatest results may be obtained from the first opening of fire by the guns, every precaution must be taken to have all the "points to be attended to before firing" carried out. The ammunition belts must be examined daily, all dust removed from them, and loose cartridges in the pockets pushed into position. In the event of rain the belt boxes will be covered over with a waterproof sheet.

2. MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENTS.

No articles of equipment are to be kept in the Machine Gun Emplacements other than those required to serve the Gun. This applies also to alternative positions. In the selection of emplacements, concealment and protection from hostile fire must be arranged for consistent with a good field of fire. A shelter pit will be prepared beside each Gun to accommodate the Gun and tripod in the event of Shell fire.

3. RANGE CARDS.

Range Charts of the enemy's position are to be prepared and kept hung up in the Machine Gun Emplacements. This applied also to alternative positions.

4. AMMUNITION

The ammunition for the Machine Guns must be of the latest date procurable from the Ordnance Depot. Dusty or gritty ammunition should not be used to fill the belts as this tends to an undue accumulation of dirt in the mechanism, and seriously handicaps the smooth working of the Gun.

3500 rounds per Gun filled in belts are to be kept at the Gun Emplacement, and 10,000 rounds per Gun (Reserve) at the belt filling Depot.

5. SANITATION.

Strict attention must be paid to the condition of Bivouacs, cooking places and ground allotted to Machine Gun Sections.

It is only by scrupulous cleanliness, so far as the local conditions will permit, that the health and efficiency of the Detachments can be maintained.

6. It is a point of honour with Machine Gunners that their guns are "always ready", that when a stoppage occurs it is not "their fault," that their Sections are thoroughly efficient, and guns and equipment complete and serviceable.

(Sgd) J.M. Rose Captain,  
N.Z. Staff Corps.  
Divisional Machine Gun Officer.

No. Ig 280.

Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post.  
21st September 1915.

TO :

W.A.  
 i.s.  
 i.s.  
 i.s.  
 3<sup>rd</sup> A.L.H. Bde

The following extract from the Intelligence Summary, 9th Corps, 18.8. 15, is forwarded for information, and favour of necessary action :

"At about 2000 last night two individuals were seen in the left communication trench going down it from front to rear. One was short, dark, and dressed in khaki drill with service cap and 3 stars on shoulder, the other was very tall, of large build and dressed as a Company Sergeant Major with 3 stripes and a crown, but had on dark blue or black trousers. On being questioned the supposed Officer said he was "Captain Ball of the Hampshires" and stated they had lost their way. They went towards support trenches occupied by the Hampshire Regt, but never went there nor do they belong to that Regt. They were last seen apparently going back the way they came. The description of these men might with advantage be circulated among our front trenches."

J.H. [unclear]  
 G. [unclear]  
 10/11 [unclear]

W.H. Hastings.  
 Capt.  
 General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

Divisional Headquarters,  
No. 2 Post,  
21st September 1915.

No. 12 584

TO :  
3rd Lt. A.L.H. Bore  
10th  
1st Lt. W.M.  
1st Lt. J.P.

The following extract from the Intelligence Summary,  
9th Corps, 18.8.15, is forwarded for information, and  
favour of necessary action :

"At about 2000 last night two individuals were seen in  
the left communication trench going down it from front  
to rear. One was short, dark, and dressed in khaki  
drill with service cap and 3 stars on shoulder, the other  
was very tall, of large build and dressed as a Company  
Sergeant Major with 3 stripes and a crown, but had on  
dark blue or black trousers. On being questioned  
the supposed Officer said he was "Captain Ball of the  
Hampshire" and stated they had lost their way. They  
went towards support trenches occupied by the Hampshire  
Regt., but never went there nor do they belong to that  
Regt. They were last seen apparently going back the  
way they came. The description of these men  
might with advantage be circulated among our front  
trenches."

W.H. Mackenzie  
Capt.  
General Staff,  
N.Z. & A. Division.

10th  
1st Lt. W.M.  
1st Lt. J.P.



Divisional Headquarters,

24th September, 1915.

From: N.Z. &amp; A. Div.

To: ~~1st A.L.H. Bde~~  
~~3rd A.L.H. Bde~~  
~~29th Bde~~  
~~7th Aust. Inf. Bde~~  
~~C.R.A.~~  
~~C.R.B.~~  
~~7th I.M.A. Bde.~~  
~~C.C. Signals.~~

MEMORANDUM:ANTI-AEROPLANE MACHINE GUNS.

1. The following machine guns have been selected for dealing with hostile aeroplanes :

<u>Division.</u>	<u>Position.</u>	<u>Nearest Telephone.</u>
1st Australian	(1) Bolton's Hill	H.Q. 6th L.H. Regt
	(2) Head of Clarke Valley	H.Q. 3rd Inf. Bde
2nd Australian	(1) Bottom Rest Gully	H.Q. 13th L.H. Regt. do. do. do.
	(2) do.	
N.Z. & A. Div.	(1) No. 2 Post	H.Q. N.Z. & A. Div.
	(2) do.	do. do. do.
54th Div.	(1) Top of gully	H.Q. 161st Bde
	(2) between 92 S. 3 and 92 T 1.	do. do. do.

2. When a hostile aeroplane is sighted it will be reported by signal message to -

- (a) Divisional Headquarters.  
 (b) The Divisional Anti-Aeroplane Machine Gun Officer, whose Code Address will be AEROGUNNER, N.Z.A. DIV.

The message should state the direction of the hostile aircraft and direction of flight.

(Sgd) W.R. PINWILL, Major,

General Staff.

N.Z. & Aust. Div.

Divisional Headquarters,  
24th September, 1915.

From: N.E. & A. Div.

To: ~~1st A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~2nd A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~3rd A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~4th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~5th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~6th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~7th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~8th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~9th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~10th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~11th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~12th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~13th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~14th A.I.H. Bde~~  
~~15th A.I.H. Bde~~  
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MEMORANDUM:

ANTI-AEROPLANE MACHINE GUNS.

1. The following machine guns have been selected for dealing with hostile aeroplanes:

Position.	Division.	Number.	Remarks.
1) Bolton's Hill	1st Australian	(1)	
2) Head of Clarke Valley	1st Australian	(2)	
1) Bottom Rest	3rd Australian	(1)	
2) Gully	3rd Australian	(2)	
1) No. 2 Post	N.E. & A. Div.	(5)	
2) do.	N.E. & A. Div.	(2)	
1) Top of Gully	24th Div.	(1)	
2) between 22 and 23	24th Div.	(2)	
3) do.	24th Div.	(1)	

2. When a hostile aeroplane is sighted it will be reported by signal message to -

- (a) Divisional Headquarters,
- (b) The Divisional Anti-Aeroplane Machine Gun Officer, whose Code Address will be AEROGUNNER, N.E. & A. Div.

The message should state the direction of the hostile aircraft and direction of flight.

(Sgd) W.R. PINWILL, Major,

General Staff,

N.E. & A. Div.

*Handwritten notes and signatures in the right margin, including a large signature that appears to be 'W.R. Pinwill'.*

*Handwritten number '107' in the right margin.*

*Handwritten mark or signature in the right margin.*

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

List of local names with references to squares on 1/20,000 map.

From south to North.

HARRIS RIDGE.	63	l 5/6 2/3 a 3/9.
HOLLY RIDGE.	63	l 3 g5/h1 a 9/07.
PINE RIDGE.	63	m 5 h3/11.
CHATHAM POST.	63	g 8 /12/3.
LEGGE VALLEY.	63	m 7 c 3.
SHELL GREEN.	63	g 2,3 to 5.
TASMANIA POST.	63	g 3 h 4.
LEAH'S TRENCH.	63	g 6 h 4.
LONE PINE.	63	b 3 6 7/8.
PLATEAU 400.	63	b 3 8 9 c 7 8 2 1.
JOHNSTONES JOLLY.	80	w 9 = 7.
WIRE GULLY.	80	w 6 x 4.
GERMAN OFFICERS TRENCH.	80	= 1-4/5.
MORTAR RIDGE.	80	= 5/6 - n 9.
COURTNEYS POST.	80	w 5/6 - 3. <i>S. south west corner</i>
BRIDGES ROAD.	80	v 3/6 v 1/2 w 78. W 5.
WHITES VALLEY.	80	v 8 9.
BROWNS DIP.	38	b 1/2.
ARTILLERY ROAD.	68	g 5/3 - b 2.
SHRAPNEL GULLY.	80	v 7-5 v 2.
MONASH GULLY.	80	w 2 r 9.
REST GULLY.	80	r 8 - r/1.
PLUGGES PLATEAU.	80	q 9.
RESERVE GULLY.	80	q 3/6 - r 4.
POBES HILL.	80	s 4 - 2.
MULE GULLY.	80	m 7 r 1/2.
WALKERS RIDGE.	80	r 2 - n 7.
TURK'S HEAD. <i>Point</i>	80	m 5/6. m 3.
RUSSELLS TOP.	80	r 5 n 7.
SNIPERS NEST.	80	m 2/5. 1 8.
HELI.	80	n 8.
CAMELS HILL P.	80	i 4/7 - 8.
DABY 700.	80	n 6-9.
HAPPY VALLEY.	80	m 1 h 9.
DATTLESHIP HILL.	80	o 2,5,6,5.
No 1 POST.	80	n 6. 4
RHODODENDRON SPUR.	80	i 3 ; 9 : 1.
No 2 POST.	80	b 7 H 1.
No 3 POST.	80	a 6 b 4 b 4/7.
OLD No 3 POST.	80	b 8 9 7.
TABLE TOP.	80	c 9.
TAYLORS HOLLOW.	92	w 4.
LAUCHOP HILL.	92	v 5/3 = 8.
WALDEN POINT.	92	q 6.
AUSTRALIA VALLEY.	92	n 4-3-n 9.
GILLESPIE HILL.	92	n 1-8.
V HILLS.	105	t - u.
CHOCOLATE HILLS.	105	l m.

Army Corps Head-quarters. 12th September, 1915.