

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/60/26 Part 5

Title: General Staff, Headquarters ANZAC
Mounted Division

April 1918



AWM4-1/60/26PART5

D. G. A. T. G. I.

War Diary
Appendix 21A
E/178
Copy No.
- APR 1918
JERICHO,
16/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
ORDER No. 123.

Reference Map - ES SALT Composite Sheet.

1. INFORMATION.

Information as regards the enemy on our immediate front will be issued later.

2. INSTRUCTIONS.

In order to inflict losses on the enemy, and, to convey the impression that we are about to advance again to ADDMAN, operations will be carried out against SHUMET NIMRIN, which will take place as follows on April 18th and 19th.

- (a) From 1500 on the afternoon of April 18th the B.G.C., 20th Indian Infantry Bde will take over charge of the Bridgehead at EL GHORANIYEH from the B.G.C., 1st L.H. Bde under arrangements to be made between the Brigadiers.
- (b) During April 18th the enemy's position will be bombarded by the 10th Heavy Battery and 383 Siege Battery. This bombardment will begin as soon as possible after daylight.
- (c) At 1500 on April 18th the 180th Infantry Bde will march to bivouac about 1 mile West of EL GHORANIYEH. This march is intended to look like a move against SHUMET NIMRIN, and, therefore the B.G.C., 180th Bde will make his Brigade as conspicuous as possible, and, arrange his march in such a way that it cannot escape the notice of the enemy.
- (d) During the afternoon and evening 18th April the ANZAC Mounted Division will carry out a close reconnaissance of the enemy's position. During the night he will be closely watched.
- (e) During the night 18th/19th April the ANZAC Mounted Division, and 302 Field Artillery Bde will move East of the river, the Artillery covered by the ANZAC Mounted Division. Positions will be occupied from which a bombardment of the enemy's position will be carried out. The C.R.A., ANZAC Mounted Division and 302 F.A. Bde will reconnoitre positions at once under cover of our patrols from which the guns will open fire, and, routes leading to these positions from the Bridgehead. They will report at once if these routes require any improvement for passage of the Artillery by night.
- (f) On April 19th the enemy's position at SHUMET NIMRIN will be bombarded by Heavy, Siege, Field and Horse Artillery Batteries. The G.O.C., R.A. 60th Division will be attached to the ANZAC Mounted Division to command and coordinate the action of the Artillery. He will as soon as possible submit the artillery plan to this Division, for the operation.
- (g) During the day the ANZAC Mounted Division will demonstrate against the enemy. The demonstrations will be made towards TABR MUJAHID on the South and in the direction of ES SALT in the North, combined with keeping his attention by pushing forward direct on SHUMET NIMRIN. The Division will not however be committed to an attack.

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EM
APB 1918

2. If the enemy retires he will be followed but no troops will enter ES SALT, as it is important that no occasion should be given to the Turks to ill-treat inhabitants on our subsequent withdrawal.

3. During these operations the B.G.C., Imperial Camel Bde will hold the AUJAH front with his own Brigade, the Patiala I.S. Infantry and the 301 Field Artillery Bde. The Squadron Hyderabad I.S. Horse will be attached to the Imperial Camel Bde from 1500 on April 18th.


4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

[Signature]
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

1550
Issued at.....

- Normal distribution plus
- Staff Corps.
- Imperial Camel Bde.
- 180th Inf. Bde.
- 20th Indian I. Bde.
- G.O.C., R.A., 60th Division.
- G.R. B. AUJAH.
- 14th Sqdn R.A.F.
- 5th Wing R.A.F.

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1. MOVES:

Reference Order No. 123 of 16th April moves of the Division and attached troops will take place as follows. Orders for action on April 19th will be issued later.

Unit.	April 17/18th	April 18th	April 18/19th.
<u>H.H.Q.</u>	Remain as at present with a forward battle H. Qrs., on WEST bank of JORDAN $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the bridge on the NORTH side of the road Square 127.Q.7.b.		
<u>1st L.H. Bde.</u>	By 1500 hand over Bridgehead to B.G.C, 20th Indian Inf. Bde. Patrols pushed well out against SHUNET NIMRIN. Patrols remain out in close contact with enemy. Bde moves out to take part in operations..		
<u>2nd L.H. Bde.</u>	March to a position just West of Bridgehead on receipt of orders. Cross bridge during night and move out before dawn to take part in operations.		
<u>N. Z. M. R. Bde.</u>	Cross river & bivouac in bridgehead. Move out before dawn ready to take part in operations..		
<u>180th Inf. Bde.</u>	2 Bde Move to bivouac 1 mile West of bridgehead as in Order No. 123 of April 16th.		
<u>20th Indian Inf. Bde.</u>	Take over bridgehead from 1st L.H. Bde by 1500. Remain holding Bridgehead.		
<u>18th Bde R. H. A.</u>	Move into Bridgehead during night,	Remain.	Be ready to move under cover of darkness to take part in operations.
<u>302 Fld. Art. Bde.</u>	Move into position on West bank vacated by 18th Bde R. H. A.	Remain.	Be prepared to cross the JORDAN and take part in operations.
<u>383 Sigeer Bty.</u>	Move into position		

2. SUPPLIES.

All troops moving across the JORDAN will carry 2 days supplies, i.e., Forage and rations up to and including breakfast next day plus iron ration.

3. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

ANZAC Receiving Station will remain in its present position 1 mile WEST of JERICHO.

Divisional Collecting Station will be formed by the 1st L.H. F. Amb. in its present position WEST of GHORANIYEH BRIDGE..

4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

P. J. Mughal Maji
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff;

17/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Distribution as in O.O. 123.

AMENDMENT TO OPERATION ORDER No. 123- of 16/4/18.

Cancel para. 2 (g) and substitute -

During the day the ANZAC Mounted Division will demonstrate against the enemy by attacking his flank either at KABR MUJAHID in the South or towards ES SALT in the North combined with keeping his attention by pushing forward direct on SHUNET NIMRIN. The Division however will not become closely involved in a general attack.

Detailed orders in connection with the above will be issued later. If the enemy retires he will be followed but no troops will enter ES SALT, as it is important that no occasion should be given to the Turks to illtreat inhabitants on our subsequent withdrawal.

Handwritten signature and initials

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff;

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

17/4/18.

- Normal distribution plus XXth Corps..
- Imperial Camel Bde..
- 180th Inf. Bde..
- 20th Indian I. Bde..
- G.O.C., R.A., 60th Division..
- C.R.A. AUJAH..
- 14th Sqn R.A.F..
- 5th Wing R.A.F..

SECRET.

XXth Corps.

Subject:- Information on Country EAST of JORDAN.

Reference your OI.90 of 15/4/18.

1. Road No. 3 between TEL. WSH SHACHUR and KARR ABDULLA is impassable for wheels. Officer who inspected this road is being sent up to you today to your H.Qrs., and can describe the amount of work necessary. Our opinion is that it could not be made passable for wheels without a very great deal of heavy work.

2. No. 4 road from GHORANIXEH up to 127.V.7.c. is passable for wheels now. Beyond this road becomes more difficult and in places boggy, especially in the flat ground marked on Map which is a basin in the hills 127.N.27-28. The same applies to the next mile which passes through a valley bottom in 127.V.5-3-11-12. The next 8 miles would not present much difficulty. After this however the track runs through the WADI bed with ~~steep~~ banks, and the big stones would have to be removed or broken up by dynamite to make the bed of the stream possible for wheels. The stream was running rapidly when we passed but after a spell of dry weather the water itself should not present any difficulty and in dry weather a good road would be found on the flat ground just North of this part of the track. This last mentioned bad part is roughly located from memory in 128.S.26.a. Further up the road the track at present is single file only, close to the edge of the WADI bank. This could be made passable for wheels by pulling down in some places stone walls and filling in gaps on the track at other points. In short the road would have to be taken in hand even in dry weather by a party of Engineers from 128.S.26.a. up to the village of AIN ES SIR but no demolition would be required other than that mentioned but merely relatively small quantity of cutting and filling. Just South of the village of AIN ES SIR might require heavier cutting but there is ample standing timber close by which could be used for rivetting or corduroying. Beyond AIN ES SIR to plateau the road is fit for wheels now. On the plateau right to ANMAN the road is at present fit for wheels but rough, and in wet weather boggy on either hand. A track is reported striking off Northwards just South of AIN ES SIR which passes East along the higher ground North of the valley, and ultimately rejoining the road to SHARAF NIKRIN (possibly along the yellow line on the map marked possible for mounted patrols).

3. No definite coordinates can be accurately given for either SWELAH or WSH AMUD but after a good deal of careful cross questioning the following may be taken as approximately SWELAH 148.P.26.a and AIN HEMIAN 148.P.26.b. and WSH AMUD (the position of which is not altered on the map) is believed to be a mile further North viz- 148.Q.18.

4. The Railway Station was located at 148.X.33.b. not Y.30.b. as stated in the report. The railway line has been marked in ink on the map from memory with continuation in pencil from evidence taken since. The bridge to the North is also marked in pencil but again this is only approximate. It is possible the bridge was over the WADY HANMAN. It is certain that the WADI was being prepared for a railway track and that there was a fair road leading West somewhere from the bridge in this WADI. It is thought that a possible extension of the railway to ES SALT was under construction.

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SECRET.

XXth Corps.

Subject:- Information on Country EAST of JORDAN.

APR 1918

Reference your GI.52 of 15/4/18.

1. Road No.3 between TEL ESH SHAGHUR and KADR ABDULLA is impassable for wheels. Officer who inspected this road is being sent up to you today to your H.Qrs., and can describe the amount of work necessary. Our opinion is that it could not be made passable for wheels without a very great deal of heavy work.

2. No.4 road from GHORANIYEH up to 127.V.7.c. is passable for wheels now. Beyond this road becomes more difficult and in places boggy, especially in the flat ground marked on Map which is a basin in the hills 127.N.27-28. The same applies to the next mile which passes through a valley bottom in 127.V.5-6-11-12. The next 3 miles would not present much difficulty. After this however the track runs through the WADI bed with ~~strong~~ banks, and the big stones would have to be removed or broken up by dynamite to make the bed of the stream possible for wheels. The stream was running rapidly when we passed but after a spell of dry weather the water itself should not present any difficulty and in dry weather a good road would be found on the flat ground just North of this part of the track. This last mentioned bed part is roughly located from memory in 129.S.36.a. Further up the road the track at present is single file only, close to the edge of the WADI bank. This could be made passable for wheels by pulling down in some places stone walls and filling in gaps on the track at other points. In short the road would have to be taken in hand even in dry weather by a party of Engineers from 143.S.36.a. up to the village of AIN ES SIR but no demolition would be required other than that mentioned but merely relatively small quantity of cutting and filling. Just South of the village of AIN ES SIR might require heavier cutting but there is ample standing timber close by which could be used for rivetting or corduroying. Beyond AIN ES SIR to plateau the road is fit for wheels now. On the plateau right to AMMAN the road is at present fit for wheels but rough, and in wet weather boggy on either hand. A track is reported striking off Northwards just South of AIN ES SIR which passes East along the higher ground North of the valley, and ultimately rejoining the road to SHUNET NIMRIN (possibly along the yellow line on the map marked possible for mounted patrols).

3. No definite coordinates can be accurately given for either SWEILAH or UMM AMUD but after a good deal of careful cross questioning the following may be taken as approximately SWEILAH 142.P.38.a and AIN HEMLAR 142.P.38.b. and UMM AMUD (the position of which is not altered on the map) is believed to be a mile further North viz- 142.Q.10.

4. The Railway Station was located at 142.X.33.b. not X.30.b. as stated in the report. The railway line has been marked in ink on the map from memory with continuation in pencil from evidence taken since. The bridge to the North is also marked in pencil but again this is only approximate. It is possible the bridge was over the WADY RAMMAN. It is certain that the WADI was being prepared for a railway track and that there was a fair road leading West somewhere from the bridge in this WADI. It is thought that a possible extension of the railway to ES SALT was under construction.

/construction.

5. The ES SALT - ANMAN Road has been marked in approximately from evidence gathered with the two turnings one to AIN HEMAIR and the other just past SWELLEN towards UMM AMUD. It is this latter track that was used by the Field Ambulance waggon to to evacuate the wounded, and not the AIN HEMAIR road. It will be noticed that the road runs through each village.

6. ~~General~~. The telegraph line printed on the map was not seen. The only evidence of its existence came from the inhabitants of AIN EL HEMIR who stated that the telegraph line ~~was~~ ^{ran} across the country between them and NAABUR. It will be noticed that if the line is extended Northwards it hits off the new position for ES SALT. It is thought that the whole of the ANMAN sheet is relatively too far South and that ANMAN and the features around it in the same way as UMM AMUD are further North probably further Northwest because the distances between AIN ES SIR and ANMAN, SWELLEN and ANMAN on the map appear too great. No. 3 Road runs along a ridge of high ground. Hill 2089 has been roughly marked in in pencil as well as two other hills to the S.E.

Foot-hills are now marked near WADI ARSHEENIET.

Good information should be obtained from one of the maps taken off the prisoner HEMIR on 14th inst, and sent to Capt. MACHRAY I.O. JERUSALEM.

There seems to be some doubt about the existence of the telegraph line from ES SALT to ANMAN, but it is known to leave ES SALT and the portion marked in ink on the NADEBA - UMM AMUD Road and Northwards was definitely established.

Map returned herewith.

A. S. Stanley

Ident. Colonel,
General Staff,

18/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

APR 1918

E1/83

/construction.

5. The ES SALT - ANMAN Road has been marked in approximately from evidence gathered with the two turnings one to AIN HEMAIR and the other just past SWILEH towards UMM AMUD. It is this latter track that was used by the Field Ambulance waggons to to evacuate the wounded, and not the AIN HEMAIR road. It will be noticed that the road runs through each village.

6. General. The telegraph line printed on the map was not seen. The only evidence of its existence came from the inhabitants of AIN EL HEMIR who stated that the telegraph line was across the country between them and MAHR. It will be noticed that if the line is extended Northwards it hits off the new position for ES SALT. It is thought that the whole of the ANMAN sheet is relatively too far South and that ANMAN and the features around it in the same way as AIN AMUD are further North probably further Northwest because the distances between AIN ES SIR and ANMAN, SWILEH and ANMAN on the map appear too great. No. 3 Road runs along a ridge of high ground. Hill 3039 has been roughly marked in in pencil as well as two other hills to the S.E.

Foothills are now marked near WADI ARSENIYET. Good information should be obtained from one of the maps taken off the prisoner HRIM on 14th inst, and sent to Capt. MACHRAY I.O. JERUSALEM.

There seems to be some doubt about the existence of the telegraph line from ES SALT to ANMAN, but it is known to leave ES SALT and the portion marked in ink on the MADERA - UMM AMUD Road and Northwards was definitely established.

Map returned herewith.

[Handwritten signature]

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND WOUNDED DIVISION.

18/4/18.

[Large handwritten signature]
E1/83

General Officer Commanding,
ANZAC Mtd Division.

Reference your G/43/113 of 12/4/18, can the following information be supplied please.

1. Is road No. 2 between TEL ESH SHAGHUR and KABR ABDULLA passable for wheels or not - if not, does it require much work, Notes simply say "very stony and narrow".
2. Any particulars known about No. 4 road.
3. Give Co-ordinates of SWEILEH and UMM AMUD.
4. Can railway line be roughly marked in as it must be wrong on our map now the station is located at 142.X.30.b.
5. Mark in the SALT - SWEILEH - AMMAN Road.

Map enclosed herewith.

T.C. DUNLOP, Major,
for Brigadier-General,
General Staff,
XXth Corps.

15/4/18.

Information that has been obtained
the country EAST of JORDAN.

First provisional edition, March 15, 1918 "A report on the routes EAST of the JORDAN between MADABA and JERASH" is a good guide. This country was negotiated under the worst possible weather conditions but the general information set out in the handbook is fairly accurate.

JORDAN VALLEY.

From the actual banks of the JORDAN to the whitish clay ridges about 1 mile EAST of the river the ground was found marshy and difficult for wheels owing to recent flooding. The clay ridges are slippery after rain. The country is flat beyond these ridges with patchy scrub and affords good cover for Mounted men. The Wadis are small and may be crossed by all arms almost anywhere. Thorn and Salt bush abounds and fertile fields of barley which extend right to the foot of the foothills. TEL. EL MUSLIM is an insignificant mound covered with some ruins and was difficult to identify. The hill of KARR MUJAHID at the foot of which was a considerable tent colony of Arabs stands up most prominently as a cone shaped feature easily seen for miles and from which an excellent view of surrounding country is obtained. There are numerous small streams running into the WADY KERRIM. This latter was found to be a swift flowing torrent and the crossings other than that marked on the map were difficult even for Mounted troops. The foothills rise steeply and are often very stony.

ROADS.

Road No.1 - No remarks.

Road No.2. From the flat to TEL. EL SHAGUR passable all wheels thence to KARR ABDALLA very stony and narrow thence to MADABA unmetalled but passable for all traffic.

Road No.3. All wheels were turned back in the vicinity of AIN HEBESEH. This was not only on account of steep grades but also because the track frequently ran on to the shoulders of hillsides which had in no way been banked up and on which the wheels of guns and limbers slipped and skidded most dangerously also for some distance what was practically the bed of the WADY had to be followed and this was too narrow. Then later limestone formations of slippery rocks were met, which had to be ridden over in single file. The surrounding country up to this point consisted of high steep hills well clothed with herbage and grass. Beyond this a very indifferent Bedouin track in parts over boulders on tops of hills, partly in beds of rough mountain streams passable only in single file and with great difficulty so that no force by night could find their way without a guide. It led over limestone surfaces and boulders over which horses jumped, slipped and plunged in a manner that made it remarkable that a great number of casualties especially to pack animals did not occur. The plateau is reached at 142.C.16 AIN EL HEKR, thence to NAAUR the road is over undulating ground varying from bog to rock usually from one extreme to the other, the track is very ill-defined largely over cultivation but grades are easy. On leaving NAAUR we took the track through 142.B.25, 10, 13, 14 on to the main track at B.9. This latter track is similar to that from AIN EL HEKR to NAAUR, the proper track to the main road seemed to be South of the stream A.30.d., B.25.c & d, B.26.a. No telegraph was hitherto encountered. The MADABA - SWILEH was reached about 142.B.9.d., it seemed to have been roughly metalled with unbroken stones in places otherwise a mere track

/track

with fairly hard surface and boggy cultivation on either hand impassable to men and animals.

A telegraph line was encountered about 142.B.4.c., running roughly North and South the bearing of two poles was 185° but a mile further North the bearing 350° was obtained at night. Subsequently this line was traced to BKT UMM AMUD and SWEILEH. Occasional steel standards accompanied the wooden ones.

Road No.4. Not to be reported on.

Road No.5. This was used by the C.R.A., 18th Bde R.H.A., Field Ambulances and the No.1 Light Car Patrol from whose reports we obtain the following -

The road to AMMAN via ES SALT and SWEILEH is metalled and is only in a fair state of repair, bad in patches. Up to ES SALT it is steep and muddy and slippery when wet (detours are possible round both wooden bridges) and could easily be destroyed at certain points where the road is built up.

The first 4 miles from ES SALT is pretty good, the next 4 miles are the worst, beyond the road improves again. The C.R.A. considered that 4.5 Hows. could have been got forward but with considerable difficulty and that the road is passable for 18 and 13-pdrs in all weather. The main road and the road ES SALT - UMM AMUD was continuously used by 4 horse ambulance waggons and sandcarts.

Road No.6. This was found very steep and unfit for Camel transport but just passable for horses, water was not located.

Road No.7. UMM ES SHERT - ES SALT enters the hills at 127.D.26.d., It is very steep impossible for Camels and traverses a high point in 127.K.19.a. thence Eastward to No.6 road. At K.19.a. one track diverges down WADY ABY TARRA another to K.13.c. to No.6 road - Water not located.

Road ES SALT - ED DAMIE appears only passable for cavalry and pack animals.

TELEGRAPH LINES.

The line shown on map as running through AIN ET TERABIL, 142.S.26.c. does not exist.

An overhead line follows the ES SALT - MADEBA road, also ES SALT - AMMAN Road. An overhead line also runs alongside the railway.

PLATEAU.

This plateau was negotiated when the force was operating under the most adverse condition of weather and a great deal of the country was traversed in the dark but it is considered that in dry weather it would be passable anywhere by mounted troops and wheels except at the deep WADIS, such wadis were met with round AMMAN, especially the WADY of that name. This plateau is an undulating plain out of which hills rise fairly steeply but with no continuity except the fairly high ridges which look down on the undulating and wady intersected plain of AMMAN. This plain extends for 2 miles West of the WADY AMMAN to about 4 miles North-east of the Town and is an Arab village on the Western shoulder of Point 3039 where the only things to indicate the town of AMMAN from the N.Z.M.R.Bde position. To the Northward and Northwest an undulating plain extends apparently for many miles also much intersected by many WADIS. Prominent peaks for observing the country Eastwards are at Pt.2100, Sq.127.N.29., Pt.2556, 142.A.2.d., 142.T.7.b., 142.T.2., 142.T.5.a., 142.Z.21.d., 142.Z.7.d.,

/142.Z.7.d.

3.

and 142.H.10.d. This latter point RUJM TAHHIN dominates the railway. In 142.Y.20.a.8.a., there is a knoll with ancient ruins which form a definite land mark, there are also smaller ruins in 142.H.4. Round RAS EL MERKEB the country is very broken with WADIS running North and South, on RAS EL MERKEB there are two trees and on NAKET EN NEBI, 142.Z.18.c., there is one tree. The road running South from AMMAN to ES KASTAL is not clearly defined. MADEBA is a village of 2000 inhabitants, friendly, it has two stone churches one containing 6000 bushels of wheat. From ES SALT there are air-lines running to NABLUS, DAMASCUS, and formerly to JERICHO. The hill JEBEL ASCHA commands all approaches. In dry weather good Artillery positions could be found but in wet weather the boggy nature of the surface prevents manoeuvring. During rains forces on different roads cannot communicate owing to the bog.

WATER.

As described in the handbook. The Western slopes of the plateau have abundant streams and springs but it was difficult to judge of the permanent water supply owing to the heavy and continuous rains. An excellent supply was located at 127.D.8.d. enough for 1 Regiment and this could be improved without much labour. Only pool water was observed in the WADY AMMAN. The FORD at UMM ES SHERT offers excellent facilities for watering, as the East bank is quite level with the water. A good sized spring was located in 127.O.8.c., which was developed sufficiently to water 2 Regiments twice daily, this could be improved, the spring is situated in a clump of reeds and scrub. There are 2 cisterns in 142.Z.31.d., with a plentiful supply of water, it is thought that most of the WADIS except the WADI SIR which would probably become dry during summer.

AMMAN and Immediate Surroundings.

The aeroplane photographs proved of great value and enabled roads and hills and the location of the tunnel and the viaduct and the position of the Station to be identified. Round AMMAN the crests of the undulations are rough boulder escarpments giving plenty of cover to Machine Guns and making the latter very difficult to locate. Between the Citadel (142.Y.11) and our line of advance there is a deep FOSSE, probably artificial, a serious obstacle to approach. Hill 3039 was good for observation but troops thereon were greatly exposed to shell fire, particularly from EAST and Northeast also the North and East slopes give good cover for assembling for counter attack.

The WADY AMMAN formed a natural covered way for movement of the garrison from North to South and for the approach of reinforcements and was well hidden from view from the West, Northeast and South.

The Railway Station was ultimately located at 142.X.33.b. Our Infantry attack directed between the Station and AMMAN village found the ground there in the form of a convex slope on which the men advancing were soon lost to view; there progress therefore could not be watched nor could Artillery support be given, there being no good O.P.'s in this Northern area. The enemy were well /closeplaced/ to the WADY AMMAN and obtained excellent targets of our men advancing over this slope.

POPULATION.

All the native population we met with were friendly and seemed to expect great things of our arrival. At KABR MEJAHID 127.W.19., we found a large native encampment and there seemed to be some sort of a meeting of chiefs arranged for the occasion, these native chiefs were surrounded with some show of ceremony and state although under primitive conditions of Bedouin tents, they

/they were waited on by servants, seated on cushions and smartly dressed. We found all the ^{male} population bearing arms, for the most part modern patterns rifles both English and German with well filled bandoliers and pouches. As we ascended Road No. 3 a party of some twenty odd natives well mounted with small native ponies accompanied us and their numbers increased as we progressed up the slopes and we found ourselves accompanied during the night by parties of Arabs armed with every conceivable weapon. On reaching AIN HEKR this party perhaps reached 50 in number. The tent settlement of AIN HEKR with a population of at least 200 showed great friendliness and expected apparently to be allowed to massacre the Circassian population of NAAUR and appropriate for themselves their cattle and worldly possessions. Some disappointment seemed to ensue when they were told that we were not there to assist them in ~~such~~ any such enterprise. We easily procured guides from this settlement to take us to NAAUR and to put us on the track beyond. At NAAUR the villagers were undemonstrative, armed but willing to impart information about roads. General friendliness and a willingness to assist us was evinced but a leader seemed to be lacking to translate this feeling into active armed cooperation. One or two instances occurred of Arabs assisting us in the firing line at first and ~~finally~~ finally local arrangements were made for the assistance of some considerable bodies of these armed friendlies. Inhabitants of SWELLEH should be particularly mentioned for their assistance and goodwill. The goodwill was of the utmost value to us and enabled the unmolested use of despatch riders and the passage of single men up and down Road 3 even when the troops had long passed that locality. It was not until the rearguard commenced retiring through AIN ES SIR that a change of feeling manifested itself and soon took on the form of a deliberate attempt to take advantage of our situation and active sniping commenced apparently with the object of plunder as all the male population were armed it was impossible to tell friend from foe and strong measures became necessary and were adopted to deal with the situation.

NOTE.- While D.H.Q. was at KABR MUJAHID (24/4/18) a large body of mounted men appeared on tracks on the hill sides to the South in the direction of AIN SURIME, they descended a track on the Northern slopes of a spur into a valley and then ascended again in an Easterly direction, they were certainly not on road 3 and were not on what is believed Road 3 so that another track must exist in this direction passable for mounted men in single file.

12/4/18.

J. M. Stanley
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

XXth Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, N.Z.Bde, I.C.Bde,
20th Indian I. Bde. 53rd Division.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0300 21/4/18 to 0800
22/4/18.

1. SITUATION. Unchanged. Some enemy movement backwards towards
camps on No.4 Rd about 127.U.23 and V.5, suspected enemy position
located at 113.R.36.d, W.31.d, W.32.d.

2. PATROLS.

0840 7th L.H.Regt patrol reached 113.X.2.cent. and encountered
rifle fire from WADI BAKR in W.32.a & b. Patrols on infantry
right report all clear.

0905 6th L.H.Regt patrols reached 113.X.19.a & b. Slight rifle
fire from X.8.d and art. fire from 113.X.1.c & from N.W. No movmt.

1040 2nd Regt report patrol being fired on by 2 guns from 127.
R.C.cent when in R.14. They observed about 50 enemy inftry in
R.4 moving S. at 0830. Small patrol reached P.28 but met heavy
rifle fire. Appaers more activity of whole front centre sector.
Armoured Cars proceeded to T.1 report all clear no enemy seen.
Armoured cars proceede N. at 0430 reached P.28 saw no sign of
enemy N., fired on from very long range on Hills by M.Gs.

3rd Regt patrol report 0800 Lt.Kelly proceeded towards S.NIMRIN
pushed half way through scrub W. of foothills and fired on from
enemy holding foothills. No further enemy movement seen. No.6
road reports fired on by M.G & rifle fire from low hills G.13.d.
Patrols sent N. along foothills not yet returned. Valley from
foothills to JORDAN all clear. Armoured Cars sent along No.3 rd
to investigate movement ka reported to S.

Patrol from right sector visited R.22.c to R.30.c & then returned
to camp no enemy movement seen a number of wheel tracks seen
about R.21 probably enemy collecting grain but no sign of any
having been cut. Patrols from N. bank of NIMRIN to No.6 Rd
report about 20 enemy inftry holding E. ridge edge of timber W.
of foothills, a few dismounted men moving at intervals from
direction of EL HAUD to NIMRIN and back, no further enemy
movement. One gun fired on patrol from about P.36.

7th L.H.Regt patrols report enemy positions 113.R.36.d, W.31.d
W.32.d. Gun fire from direction of R.33. BEISAN Rd patrol has
nothing fresh to report. Patrol along ROMAN Rd H.33, 26. & 25
and B.24 & 18 for 3 1/2 miles report all clear & in touch with
53rd Divn by visual.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT.

50 Inftry in 127.R.4 moving S. at 0830.
Enemy transport and mounted men moving from 127.P.11.c to
P.18 at 1140.

3 horsemen were observed at 127.G.15.b. remained for 1/2 hour
then proceeded S.W.

0715 6 horsemen seen at 113.X.18.c.9,5. going W.

0730 4 men seen at 113.X.23.a.0.5.

1000 Considerable movement in 113.X.15.c.3.8.

1125. Small party inftry in 113.X.9.c,

1430 10 Inftry seen in 113.X.16.d.

1530 Several horsemen seen in 113.X.18.d.2.2. going S.W.

1545 100 horsemen seen in 113.V.16.c. going E.

4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

0830 From Y.30,a. 2 Albatross bombing planes from S. at 10000 Ft.

0840 1 Aviatik reconnaissance from S.E. at 7,000 went N.

0800 Reconnaissance 1 type unknown 10000 ft approached from W.
flew E.

5. ENEMY DEFENCES. At 113.X.15.C,3,B. there appears to be a trench and probably a M.G. emplacement.

Enemy position at 113. R.36.d., W.31.d & 32.d.

6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY.

Slight 77 mm shelling of our post in 113.Y.15.c during day. GHORANIYEH sector fired on by 2 guns from 127.R.5.cent.

Enemy fired 6 rds 77 mm shrap. on MUSALLAHBEH without effect.

One gun fired on patrol from about 127.P.36.

Hostile guns in 127.W.1.c.6.8. silenced by ours.

Hostile guns in 127.P.33.d.5.9. " " "

7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS.

2 guns 127.R.5.cent.

1 gun 127.P.36.

Bty 127.W.1.c.6.8.

Bty 127.P.33.d.5.9.

8. NIL.

9. TOPOGRAPHICAL.

Area E. of road 127.P.Cent, G.25, C.2 (composite sheet) and S. of ES SALT - JISR ED DAMIE rd and N.W. of NIMRIN - ES SALT road absolutely impassable to wheels, horsemen can go in single file on goat tracks. Ground in 127.C.13,14,19, 20,25 and 113.X.18 commands UMM ESH SHEET FOND and approaches from S.E.

10. GENERAL. Heavy gun heard for last 3 days in direction 320° Mag. from 113.L.13.d. still continues.

W. G. Urquhart Major
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

22/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

SECRET

XXth Corps, Lt L.H. Rie, Sgt J.H. Bie, N.S. P., J.C. P.,
80th Indian Inf. Bde, 8th Division.

22nd

E1194

Summary of Intelligence for period 0800 22/4/18 to
0800 23/4/18.

1. SITUATION. Unchanged. Some movement of enemy observed by patrols during the day.
2. MOVEMENTS.
0745 Patrol of W. NIBB to No. 6 Rd patrol report very little movement on enemy position. No. 6 Rd patrol to JORDAN report heard 6 barbed wire fence from 107.0.0.0. observed 6 pack animals moving N. along foot of hill 107.0.0.0. No. 6 Rd patrol to bank of JORDAN 107.0.0.0. cooperating with armoured cars to try and cut off. Slight movement observed Northwards. Later men seen in V. 7.0.0.0. disappeared in hill - unable to cut off. 1130 Patrol W. NIBB held on usual. NIBB Rd patrol report reached 113.0.10.0. No. 6 Rd patrol report reached 113.0.10.0. Troop of enemy seen in V. 7.0.0.0. 1340 W. NIBB patrol report reached within 100 yds of JORDAN. Enemy outpost observed N. of crossing. Big movement of enemy seen and heard N. of JORDAN. Cavalry report reached 1530 6th L.H. Regt patrol report of enemy strength 800 moving in direction of JORDAN from 113.0.10.0. 1630 Patrol towards JORDAN report enemy strength 800. Strong enemy machine gun posts at X. 10. 1840 Patrol T. 1. reports all clear. Patrol N. No. 6 Rd report all clear. Situation unchanged.
3. MOVEMENTS. 2130 Day patrols report having proceeded to R. 10.0.0. to T. 1.0.0. & to T. 1.0.0. 6 Mtd men seen about T. 1.0.0. at 1900 no other movement seen. Patrol N. of W. NIBB to 6 Rd situation unchanged. Patrol to No. 6 Rd report hills N. & S. of No. 6 Rd held by enemy to foothills through to 107.0.0.0. Valley clear patrolled to V. 7.0.0.0. Night patrol of No. 6 Rd report white lines fired from W. NIBB.
4. MOVEMENTS. 0745 Patrol through T. 1.0.0. to T. 1.0.0. & N. to enemy report all clear. No movement seen in foothills. Centre sector report no enemy movement observed during night, at 0830 60 men were observed in V. 7.0.0.0. and few Mtd men moving about W. NIBB.
5. MOVEMENTS. 0900 Patrol along JORDAN RD to 113.0.10.0. at 0900 report 600 Mtd men observed in 113.0.10.0. 1000 30 horsemen travelling N. disappeared over crest on hill in V. 7.0.0.0. 1000 About 40 Mtd men seen in V. 7.0.0.0. moving N. 1010 Party of men with about 50 horses which appeared to be grazing.
6. AVIATION ACTIVITY. 1 Aviatik reconnaissance seen from 113.0.10.0. approximately from N. E. at 0900 1st was also observed from 113.0.10.0. at 1040 Aviatik at 0900 1st approached from N. E. circle overhead and went N.
7. RECONNAISSANCE. 1045 1 reconnaissance at 0900 1st flying N. to N. seen from 127 030
8. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
9. AVIATION ACTIVITY. Nil.
10. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
11. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
12. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
13. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
14. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
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97. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
98. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
99. MOVEMENTS. Nil.
100. MOVEMENTS. Nil.

23/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Major General,
General Staff.

SECRET.

XXth Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, I.C.Bde, N.Z.M.R.Bde,
20th Indian Inf. Bde., 53rd Division.



Summary of Intelligence for period 0200 23/4/18 to 0300
24/4/18. E1192

1. SITUATION. Unchanged in consequence of information received from SHERIF FEISAL 1st L.H.Bde ordered to keep in close touch with enemy force about KAER MUJAHID and South of it.

2. PATROLS. UMM ESH SHERT Patrol reached within 300 yds of FORD and report it held as usual and met with rifle fire.

7th Regt patrol fired on by post of 12 rifles on ridge 113.Y.2.cent & M.G. from 113.T.6.

BEISAN Rd Patrol reached 113.W.23.d. no shelling - observed troop enemy cav. patrolling E. in 113.W.21.a.

Patrol of 3rd Regt reached 127.F.15 and met with no opposition.

2nd L.H.Bde patrol reported at 1230 infy on track in 113.Y.1.b. At 1140 20 enemy cav. moved S.W. from EL BAGHALAT towards W.BAKR. Post in 113.W.34.b.3.4. sniped at from W. enemy position not located.

1430 6th L.H.Regt patrol reached to 300 yds from UMM ESH SHERT and were shelled.

1530 1st L.H.Bde reported patrol from W.NIMRIN to No.6 Rd were fired on by post of 6 men on WEST EDGE of timber and that this post and another of 30 men on East edge of timber were seen to leave timber and withdraw to foothills.

No.6 Rd patrol reported 2 Cav. posts N. bank of W.ABU TARRA of about 8 men each. These at first held positions in 127.F.22 and F.23 but retired on approach of our patrols.

Southern patrol moved to 127.T.1 and then to 127.T.26.b. wherev enemy cav. post of 8 strong observed about 128.B.5. Our patrol moved to 127.T.20 and then to T.17 without seeing any enemy movmt.

Patrol moving E. from 127.T.1 reached 127.T.6.a. and were fired on by about 10 rifles from 127.Y.1.b. Patrol to N. reached 127.F.3.a and observed 8 enemy cav. along E. of UMM ESH SHERT who retired to hills when fired upon.

Centre Sector patrol report SH.NIMRIN very quiet.

1615. Camel Bde reported BEISAN Rd Patrol dropped back to 113.Y.6 cent. and reported Sgdn enemy cav. in W. EL MUDAHERAH at 113.W.24.b.

Night standing patrol ~~about 60 strong~~ from 1st L.H.Bde attacked by enemy reconnoitring patrol about 60 strong at 0300 on 24th April. Our patrol temporarily retired but afterwards reoccupied old line.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. See patrols. page 2

4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY. Nil.

5. ENEMY DEFENCES. 4 men seen about sangars in enemy defences N of WHITE HOUSE SH.NIMRIN.

Enemy post on ridge 127.G.13.d. M.G. fired from 127.G.15.c. & about 20 men in rocks on ridge 127.G.13.a.

M.G. & rifles reported at 127.R.24.a, extent of entrenchments could not be ascertained.

At 1800 enemy post of 6 men reported at 127.P.19.cent, and 8 enemy cav. about 127.C.33. 4 men on ridges 127.G.13.d. and about 20 men in vicinity of 127.F.18.c. No other enemy posts reported W. of foothills.

6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. Enemy opened with two 77 mm batteries and fired salvos for 3 minutes at MUSALLAHBEH at 2110, thought to be an attempt to catch our wiring parties - no casualties.

7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. Enemy brought a gun up behind RED HILL (113.X.18. - 127.C.19 & 20) and sniped our post in 113.Z.11.a. without effect.

8. INFORMATION from (a) Prisoners of War.

1 Turk intelligent and credible was in 3/178 in MAAN where 3 Btns of 178 now are but 300 men were drafted from their to 1/146 the 53rd Regt and 68th Regt latter with 3 Btns each now at NIMRIN but 3 other Btns 146 still in MAAN but are coming N. 178 Regt now only 400 strong. 1/146 now 300 rations. Only 1 infy Divn left in MEDINA. States German Cav. N. of NIMRIN. Other Turk unintelligent

SECRET.

8th Corps. 1st L.H. Bde. 2nd L.H. Bde. W.Z.H.A. Bde. I.C. Bde. 20th Ind. I. Bde.
53rd Division.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0830 24/4/18 to 0600 25/4/18.

E1190

1. SITUATION. Situation generally unchanged.

800 Cav. still camped near ~~WADI~~ MUJAHID 127.W.21.c. left bank of W. MUJAHID in 113.X.14.b held by snipers and a M.G. (mornigg 24th inst.) Enemy still holding position in timber at 127.P.1.a & c.

2. PATROLS.

1600 6th L.H. Regt reports reached point 113.X.19.a shelled from left front. Snipers and M.G. along left bank of WADI MUJAHID in 113.X.14.g.

1340 HEIBAN Rd patrol report & few mounted men and transport moving along Roman Rd in 113. Y.7 & 8 travelling both North and South.

Patrol to St.E. reached 127.R.23.c. when it came under shell fire and rifle fire from R.24.cent. Patrol reached T.24 and T.25 and was fired at from Y.1.

1715. 60 Cav. moved from foothills along North bank WADI TARRA in small parties to about 127.P.17.d. and fired on patrol in P.23.d, remained in observation until 1800 then withdrew to foothills along W. WADI TARRA otherwise front unchanged. Enemy M.G. located on hill in 127.P.16.d.2.5.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENTS. 500 cavalry scattered about 113.W.4.

4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY.

At 0830 Aviatik at 13.600 ft from N. turned and went W. observed from 113.L.4.d. also observed from 113.Y.31.a. at 1800 one Albatross bombing plane from N. at 6000 ft.

0745 Hostile plane observed N.W. flying S. height 15000 ft. Receded N.W. Albatross two seater. reconnaissance observed by 100 A.I. Sections.

5. ENEMY DEFENSIVE. Enemy position located in low chalk bluffs about 500 yds N.W. and N.N.W. with fringe of snipers 300 yds from WADI ASH SHERR ford, position consists of small rifle pits and very short trenches with 2 M.G. emplacements.

Enemy post located 127.P.21.a.

WADI MUJAHID is entrenched (127.Y.1.a.)

6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. 77 mm shelled 113.P.16.b, 113.W.35, 113.P.17 also 10 rds on 127.C.32 and 12 rds on 113.Y.5 all percussion shrapnel. also sniped our patrols.

7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. Artillery observed on post with helio in 127.C.18.

3 enemy guns located 127.W.14.d.2.5. 1/4 Gun located 127.C.30.a.

8. ENEMY CAPTURES. (a) Prisoners of War.

One Turk (Iraqi) deserter from 145 Regt taken on WADI front - unintelligent - states strength ratios are 8 to 30 men.

9. ENEMY SIGNALS. Track 127.P.16.c. to T.3. lit for tracked cars.

10. GENERAL. NIL.

10.9.18
[Signature]

Light. Colonel,
General Staff,

25/4/18.

ATTN: 1st L.H. BDE 53rd DIVISION

7/6
4/6

SECRET.

War Diary
Appendix 217



Desert Mtd Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, N.Z.Bde, I.C.Bde,
20th Indian Inf, Bde, 53rd Division.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0800 WK 26/4/18 to
0800 26/4/18.

E1/89

1. SITUATION. Unchanged.

2. PATROLS.

Roman Rd patrol to 115.B.10.d. reported clear. 6th L.H.Regt patrol shelled in 11e.X.25.d. and X.19.c at 1145. UMM ESH SHERT patrol report ford held as usual three shells fired at patrol at 1130. Armoured Cars patrolled to 128.A.12 report that at 1030 & again at 1230 Sqdn enemy cav. at 128.H.2.a. with scattered mtd men to N.W. 1st L.H.Bde patrol to 127.F.11.d. fired on M.G. and rifles from 127.F.18.d. and enemy shelled patrol from direction of UMM ESH SHERT. Usual enemy posts on all foothills to 1 mile N. of 127.G.13.a. Enemy cav. posts in timber about 200 yds W. of where No.6 Rd enters foothills. Patrol from N. bank of W.NIMRIN to No.6 Rd reports observation line on 127.O.17.d. to O.6.d. but owing to enemy fire had to withdraw posts to W. edge of timber from about 127.P.13.c. to P.1.a. Patrol reached 127.F.11.a. about 20 enemy Cav. appeared in gully to right. Fired on patrol from 127.F.13.d. with M.G. & rifles. Patrol to 127.R.22.d. was fired on by 10 rifles & 1 automatic rifle from 127.R.23. Patrol to TEL EL MOSELAR reached 127.T.6.b. & was fired on by about 12 rifles from 127.W.13.d. Enemy cav. posts observed about 127.Y.19. I.C.Bde report at 1630 small parties enemy cav. seen moving S.W. along foothills through 115.W.21.a. & d., & 115.W.27.a. & d. to WADI BAKR. At 1500 enemy 77 mm firing from position N. of 127.C.13 fired few shells on our patrol in 113.Z.12.b.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. At 1815 a column of 100 pack animals led by men passed S.W. across our front from the Roman Rd and disappeared in W. RISHEH about 11e.W.27.b. At 1820 a Sqdn of 150 animals (cav) was seen moving S. about 113.X.15.a. they then disappeared.

4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY. Enemy aircraft observed from 115.Y.30.a at 0815 1 Fokker reconnaissance from N. at 6000 ft circled twice proceeded N.E.

5. ENEMY DEFENCES. NIL.

6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. 2 shells 77 mm fell on MUSALLAHBEH and some rds on 127.F.17 & 19.

7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. NIL.

8. INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS OF WAR. 3 deserters taken 127.F.29.d from 11th Cav.Regt. 1 Sgt intelligent states his Regt and part 9th Cav. Regt total 540 sabres crossed JISR ED DAMIE 4 days ago now camped about 127.C.cent.

9. TOPOGRAPHICAL. NIL.

10. GENERAL. NIL.

J.H. Stanley

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

26/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

ROYAL ARTILLERY - A + NZ M DIV

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

0800 21/4/18 to 0900 22/4/18

OPERATIONS

A/301 advanced one section to Z 17 A 90

INTELLIGENCE

GHORANIYAH SECTOR

No enemy movement observed

AVTAH SECTOR

0700 5 horsemen seen at Q 13 6 21 they remained 1/2 an hour then proceeded SW

0715 6 horsemen seen at X 13 C 9 5 going W

0730 4 men observed at X 23 A 0 5

1000 considerable movement seen at X 15 C 3 8 there appears to be a French force possibly M.G. emplacement near here

1125 small party of infantry on X 9 6

1410 10 mpy seen at X 16 6

1530 several horsemen observed at X 12 0 2 2 travelling SW

1545 100 horse observed about V 16 0 travelling E.

GHORANIYAH SECTOR

10th Coy Artillery fired

0700 8 rds HE on hostile gun on 127 W 1 C 6 8 silencing their gun

0900 Engaged hostile MG on 127 P 2 0 a party of 6 mpy. Grenade was released. Later 1140 2 rds HE & 4 rds Shrapnel on enemy gun on 127 W 1 C 6 8 again silencing it. Later gun has not fired since

Entered on enemy transport & mounted new machine SE from 127 P 11 C 5 P 18 expended 9 rds HE on this target

AVTAH SECTOR

A/301 Artillery fired 15 rds on M.G. emplacement on X 15 C 3 8 with effect & registered bearings on X 24 A 3 6

0730 Artillery fired 10 rds on checking batteries separate section at 0835 fired 10 rds HE at hostile gun on V 13 6

at 1415 6 rds HE at same target

3 rds on shell on W 2 E C

Visibility	0600 - 1000	good
	1000 - 1600	fair
	1600 - Dark	poor

ARTILLERY

OURS

ENEMY

GENERAL

W. G. Abqubair
 Lt Col
 A + NZ Mounted Div

E/1/18

19



Royal Artillery - A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.

Summary of Intelligence.

0800 25/4/18 to 0800 24/4/18.

Reference Map 1/63,360.

1. OPERATIONS.

NIL.

2. INTELLIGENCE.
R.A.Sources.

GHORANIYEH SECTOR.

1615 Enemy convoy seen going N. over EL HAUD.

AUJAH SECTOR.

Large party enemy cavalry seen 127.F.29.

1755 Party of about 30 enemy cavalry observed travelling West on Roman Road in 113.U.12 & 17.

3. ARTILLERY.
(a) OURS.

GHORANIYEH SECTOR.

10th Heavy Battery fired :-

1510 3 rds H.E. on Transport & mounted men in P.11.c.

1535 4 rds H.E. and 4 rds T.S. on hostile guns in 127.U.25.c. - guns silenced.

1700 7 rds H.E. on enemy pack transport in P.11.c.

1800 2 rds H.E. on about 50 horses watering in about P.18.d.

AUJAH SECTOR.

60 pdr Section fired 7 rds H.E. on hostile gun in 113.U.36.c. & 3rds HZE2 on gun in 113.V.31.b.

(b) ENEMY.

2125 Enemy 4 gun battery opened fire on 113.W.35.

1630 A number of hostile 77 mm rds fell in Y.6.c.

Enemy gun firing from U.25.c. shells falling in R.15 approx.

4. GENERAL.

Visability.	0600 - 1000	FAIR.
	1000 - 1600	GOOD.
	1600 - Dark.	GOOD.

D. G. The General Staff

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

24/4/18.

E1/98

GENERAL STAFF
 No. 443/117
 Date 25.4.18
 ANZAC MOUNTED DIVISION

ROYAL ARTILLERY - A. & N.Z. MOUNTED DIVISION.

SUMMARY of INTELLIGENCE.

0800 24/4/18 to 0800 25/4/18.

Reference Map - 1/63.360.

1. OPERATIONS. GHORANIYEH SECTOR. NIL.
AUJAH SECTOR.- At 2200 301 F.A. Bde bombarded enemy line for five minutes. 60 pdrs doing counter battery work.

2. INTELLIGENCE. GHORANIYEH SECTOR.- Some new earthworks been built round the WHITE HOUSE in 127.P.16.d.
R.A. Sources. AUJAH SECTOR.
 0840 Cavalry patrol of ten men observed on road in 113.V.8. travelling West.
 1600 30 horses came down to water in vicinity of 113.X.18.
 1700 About 50 horses came down to water in 113.X.18.

3. ARTILLERY. GHORANIYEH SECTOR. NIL.
(a) OURS. AUJAH SECTOR.
 A/301 Bty dispersed small party of Turkish Infantry in 113.X.23.a. Registered barrage in 113.X.22.a. also M.G. emplacements in 113.X.30.b.9.5.
 2000 A/301 Bty fired 18 rds on enemy post in 113.X.22.a. and 15 rds on M.G. emplacements in 113.X.30.
 B/301 fired 30 rds on 113.W.33.b. and 113.W.34. at 2000 C/301 bombarded trenches and posts.
 60 pdrs fired on hostile batteries in 113.Y.31.b.3.7. 113.U.36.c.8.8.
(b) ENEMY. GHORANIYEH SECTOR.
 1030 2 Enemy 77 guns shelled about 127.Q.32 firing 10 rds percussion shrapnel.
AUJAH SECTOR.
 Enemy 77 mm shelled 113.Z.18.b. and 113.W.35.
 1730 Enemy guns 77 mm shelled 113.X.17.

4. GENERAL. Visability

0600 - 1000	Fair.
1000 - 1600	Fair.
1600 - dark.	Fair.

Alfred Standley
 Lieut. Colonel,
 General Staff,

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION

25/4/18.

F/197

SECRET.

Appendix 218

GENERAL STAFF
No. 467/62
Date 23.4.18
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS

Copy No. 19

The following extracts from DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Operation Order No. 14 dated 21st April 1918 for your
information.

1. On 25th April at 1800 the DESERT MOUNTED CORPS will take
over command of the front WEST of the JORDAN from right of
XXth Corps and the whole of the front EAST of JORDAN and the
DEAD SEA.

2. Dividing line between XXth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps
will be KURN SURTUBEH (112.M.17) - Point 830 (113.R.11.d.) -
EL KUSR (113.B.1.a.) - RAS ET TAWIL (113.C.14.) to Point
(100.J.20.a.9.9.) - (EL AZIRIYEH, to Desert Mounted Corps),
thence to mouth of WADI EN NAR (114.Y.16.c.).

3. The following units will be allotted to Desert Mounted
Corps:

- Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade.
- 20th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- Imperial Camel Brigade.
- Dead Sea Flotilla.
- 10th Heavy Battery, R.G.A.
- 383rd Siege Battery, R.G.A.

4. G.O.C., A. & N.Z. Mounted Division will remain responsible
for the defence of the whole front until further orders.

W. J. Hughes
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

23/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Normal Distribution less 1 and 13.
plus 20th Indian Infantry Bde.
Dead Sea Flotilla.
10th Heavy Battery R.H.A.
383rd Siege Battery R.G.A.
C.R.A. RUJAH.

Appendix 219

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
ORDER No. 124.

Reference Map 1/63,360

JERICHO,
26th April 1918.

1. INFORMATION.

The following troops come under orders of Desert Mounted Corps at hour and date stated.

1/1 Worcester Yeomanry.	2400	April 24th.
9th Mtn. Artillery Brigade.	2400	April 25th.
60th Divn (less 1 Bde group)	2400	April 26th.
No. 11 L.A.M. Battery.	1800	April 25th.
No. 12 L.A.M. Battery.	1800	April 25th.
Imperial Camel Bde.	6600	April 27th.
1/1 Staffs Yeomanry (less 1 Sqdn)	1200	April 28th.

2. AREAS.

Dividing line between bivouac areas have been allotted as follows and distribution of troops will be completed within these areas by 1200 April 28th.

(a) Between A. & N.Z. and Australian Mounted Divisions

The WADY KILT as far as ERIHA, thence ERIHA - EL GHORANIYEH road.
The EL GHORANIYEH bridgehead is in the area of A. & N.Z. Mtd. Divn.

(b) Between Australian Mounted Division and I.C. Brigade.

An East and West line through KH. ES SUMRAH. 113.J.14.

(c) Instructions will be issued later regarding the parts of the above areas to be allotted to Corps Troops and to 60th Division.

3. MOVES.

(a) The Corps Bridging Train and Imperial Service Cavalry Bde (less JODHPUR Lancers) have been ordered to join ANZAC Mounted Division by 1200 on April 28th. Bivouac sites will be allotted by D.A.Q.M.G. ANZAC Mounted Division on arrival in Divisional area.

(b)

Unit.	From.	To.	Date & hour to be completed by.	Remarks.
2nd L.H. Bde. (less 1 Rgt)	Austdiv area.	Former bivouac site South of JERICHO - EL GHORANIYEH Rd.	1600 on April 26th.	Under Bde arrangements.
1 Regt 2nd L. H. Bde.	I.C. Bde area.	Join Brigade.	As soon as relieved by 1/1 Staffs Yeo, on afternoon of April 27th.	

*Appendix
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Copy No..... 19

SECRET.

SUBJECT:- FORMATION OF BRIDGEHEAD.

1. G.O.C., ANZAC Mounted Division will by dawn on April 28th have thrown a bridge at MAHABAT HAJLA. This will be covered by 1 Mounted Bde and 1 Battalion of Infantry and 1 Squadron of Hyderabad Lancers.
2. This bridge is being made by the Corps Bridging Train ('D' Troop, Australian Engineers) under direction of C.R.E. Desert Mounted Corps.
3. The 2nd L.H.Bde will march via GHORANIYEH and East bank of the JORDAN and form a bridgehead at MAHABAT HAJLA by 0530 on April 28th.
- 4.(a) One Battalion (PARIALA Infy) of 20th Indian Inf. Bde will march by same route to MAHABAT HAJLA reporting on arrival to G.O.C., 2nd L.H.Bde.
(b) One Squadron HYDERABAD Lancers will be detailed as part of the garrison of the bridgehead at MAHABAT HAJLA. The G.O.C., Squadron will report to the G.O.C., as the Brigade move across the bridge at GHORANIYEH on the way to MAHABAT HAJLA and the Squadron will march with the 2nd L.H.Bde.
5. The G.O.C., 2nd L.H.Bde will have a guide detailed to take the Battalion 20th Indian Infy Bde to MAHABAT HAJLA by the East bank.
6. The G.O.C., 2nd L.H.Bde will be in command of all troops at MAHABAT HAJLA bridgehead from time of his arrival there.
7. He will have the bridgehead strongly held and entrenched, and, will have the country in front energetically patrolled by day and night.
8. From the time the G.O.C., 2nd L.H.Bde takes over MAHABAT HAJLA, the 2nd L.H.Bde will take over the patrolling of all ground South of and including an East and West line through the junction of roads 400 yards South of BUSHET MALUL (137.3.11.0)
9. The 2nd L.H.Bde and Battalion 20th Indian Infy Bde will be prepared to stay at bridgehead at MAHABAT HAJLA until further orders.
10. From 1800 on April 28th the command of the front now held by 1ST G.O.C., ANZAC Mounted Division passes to G.O.C., 6th Division. In addition to his own Division the following troops come under his orders.

ANZAC Mounted Division (less 1 st L.H.Bde)
 Imperial Service Cavalry Bde (less JOERPUR Lancers)
 Corps Bridging Train.
 20th Indian Inf. Bde.
 No.11 L.A.M. Battery.

*M. Wortham
Capt for*

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

27th April 1918.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Usual Order distribution plus ansdiv.
 20th Indian Inf. Bde.
 I.C.Bde.
 C.R.E. Desert Mounted Corps.
 Bridging Train.
 No.11 L.A.M. Battery.

Appendix 221

REPORT ON PATROL TO MAJIN.

Reference Map No. 1/63,562.

At 1900 on 25th. instant I proceeded to MAJIN to report on the No.1 Road and resources of MAJIN. I had with me Lieut. G.H.S. CUNY. 1st L.H. Regiment, 1 Troop, 2 Hotchkiss Rifles, 1 Visual Signal Station, 1 Interpreter and 1 Arab guide. Road was quite fit for wheels for about the first 10 miles, but after that became difficult even for packs in parts (see Road Report attached). No opposition was encountered and no enemy seen; reached MAJIN at 0315; interviewed GHAN of village who at first welcomed us but on learning our strength was only so asked us to leave the village as soon as possible. He stated that unless we came with sufficient strength to remain, he could not be friendly to us, because when we left, the Turks retaliated. We also learned from the villagers that two Armenians had told the Turks in MAJIN that we were in MAJIN, 150 Turks with 2 guns were reported in MAJIN. I therefore decided not to wait for nightfall to withdraw, but to move into the hills under cover and feed up and spell the horses after which to move into the hills under cover to move back into camp. It was impossible to remain hidden as the Bedouins sat round on the tops of the hills and fired their rifles in the air.

At 0800 one of the observation posts reported movement of infantry and cavalry in the high ridges to the North, apparently moving to a position to cover the road where it crosses the WADI HALAT at 128.3.20.c. I decided to try and reach the crossing before the enemy failed to do so as he was holding the wady with his cavalry, with his infantry on high ridges commanding it. These opened fire on our approach and we withdrew by way of the broken ground towards the DEAD SEA.

Estimated enemy strength, 100 Infantry, 70 Cavalry, 2 M.C. or Automatic Rifles.

The enemy followed and I established a post of 12 at 128.3.21.c and obtained visual communication with the Brigade through the Mount of Olives and Lieut. G.H.S. CUNY held a line 128.3.22.b - d. with remainder of troop and 2 Hotchkiss Rifles. Enemy attempted to advance but were held off with rifles and very effective Hotchkiss Rifle fire. The wounded having been evacuated I commenced to withdraw by way of broken ground bordering DEAD SEA at 1030 and assembled in vicinity of AIN SURIB at 1100 and returned to camp. Enemy observed to withdraw East.

Lieut. CUNY used his Hotchkiss Rifles in a very efficient manner materially assisting in stopping the enemy's advance.

Our casualties were 3 O.H.s wounded, 4 horses killed, 2 wounded, 1 Hotchkiss Rifle lost in steep wady owing to pack horse slipping and the gun dropping off.

Estimated enemy casualties 12 killed and wounded and several horses observed to be hit.

26/4/18.

(Sgd) LIEUT. EDWARD, Lieut.
1st L.H. Brigade.

Report on No.1 Road from QURAYYAH to MAJIN.

The road was found fit for wheels as far as WADI AMR, provided small amount of work were done on crossing at WADI AMR, 1 troop working one hour; after WADI AMR the road runs over hard ironstone hills for about 3 miles where the grades are bad and the going rough and quite impossible for wheels. To make it in any way possible regrading would have to be done and rocks blown away. The going would be difficult for axels owing to the sharp stones. The crossing at WADI BAHAKAT is bad and presents difficulties even for packs as it is rocky and narrow. Crossing at BAHAKAT is very difficult for packs as the track down into the wady is narrow and steep and then follow the wady bed for a distance and then up a very steep ascent. To make it passable for wheels a road would have to be cut into the rock which would entail a great amount of labour.

After crossing the WADI BAHAKAT the road becomes a series of mere goat tracks, which follow the tops of stony hills and in some cases hardly discernable; Horses have to proceed in single file.

AYUN ED DIB are a series of fine springs situated near head of WADI BAHAKAT. Abundant lasting supply of good water. Would require a good bit of work to water a large number of horses owing to difficult approaches.

MAJIN. Population. Mainly Christians not disposed to be friendly at time present owing to their fear of the Turks. A road fit for wheels runs to MAJIN.

MAJIN. 30 cisterns. Abundant supply at present but not lasting. Water reported at WADI AMR about 2 1/2 hours ride south of MAJIN.

GRAINING. Good and abundant.

SUPPLIES sheep and cattle are plentiful.

One inhabitant stated they could supply 100 sheep and 50 cattle per diem and this could be supplemented from the local Bedouins who have flocks.

Grain scarce.

CROPS. The crops are excellent and a great many acres are sown. They are much behind the crops on the plain and show no signs of ripening yet.

(sgt) I.H. ROYCE, Lieut.
I.C. 1st A.L.F. Brigade.

26/4/18.

Appendix 21

E1/105

REPORT ON PATROL TO MAJIN.

APR 1918

Reference HQ IN CASE 1/63,360.

At 1900 on 25th. instant I proceeded to MAJIN to report on the No.1 Road and resources of MAJIN. I had with me Lieut. G.M.S. CUNNEY. 1st L.M.Regiment, 1 Troop, 2 Hotchkiss Rifles, 1 Visual Signal Station, 1 Interpreter and 1 Arab guide. Road was quite fit for wheels for about the first 10 miles, but after that became difficult even for packs in parts (see Road Report attached). No opposition was encountered and no enemy seen; reached MAJIN at 0515; interviewed SHEAR of village who at first welcomed us but on learning our strength was only 50 asked us to leave the village as soon as possible. He stated that unless we came with sufficient strength to remain, he could not be friendly to us, because when we left, the Turks retaliated. We also learned from the villagers that two Armenians had told the Turks in MAJIN that we were in MAJIN, 150 Turks with 2 guns were reported in MAJIN. I therefore decided not to wait for nightfall to withdraw, but to move into the hills under cover and feed up and spell the horses after which to move into the hills under cover to move back into camp. It was impossible to remain hidden as the Bedonins sat round on the tops of the hills and fired their rifles in the air.

At 0600 one of the observation posts reported movement of infantry and cavalry in the high ridges to the North, apparently moving to a position to cover the road where it crosses the WADI HALLAT at 128.B.20.c. I decided to try and reach the crossing before the enemy failed to do so as he was holding the Wadi with his cavalry, with his infantry on high ridges commanding it. These opened fire on our approach and we withdrew by way of the broken ground towards the DEAD SEA.

Estimated enemy strength, 100 Infantry, 70 Cavalry, 2 M.G. or Automatic Rifles.

The enemy followed and I established a post of 12 at 128.B.21.cant and obtained visual communication with the Brigade through the Mount of Olives and Lieut. G.M.S. CUNNEY held a line 128.B.20.b - d. with remainder of troop and 2 Hotchkiss Rifles. Enemy attempted to advance but were held off with rifles and very effective Hotchkiss Rifle fire. The wounded having been evacuated I commenced to withdraw by way of broken ground bordering DEAD SEA at 1030 and assembled in vicinity of AIN SUDEIR at 1100 and returned to camp. Enemy observed to withdraw East.

Lieut. CUNNEY used his Hotchkiss Rifles in a very efficient manner materially assisting in stopping the enemy's advance.

Our casualties were 3 G.M.s wounded, 4 horses killed, 2 wounded, 1 Hotchkiss Rifle lost in steep Wadi owing to pack horse slipping and the gun dropping off.

Estimated enemy casualties 12 killed and wounded and several horses observed to be hit.

26/4/18.

(Capt) IAN. McDONALD, Lieut.
1.C. 1st A.L.H. Brigade.

Report on No.1 Road from GHORANIYEH to MAJIN.

The road was found fit for wheels as far as WADI AHEI, provided small amount of work were done on crossing at WADI AHEI, 1 troop working one hour; after WADI AHEI the road runs over hard ironstone hills for about 2 miles where the grades are bad and the going rough and quite impossible for wheels. To make it in any way possible regrading would have to be done and rocks blown away. The going would be difficult for animals owing to the sharp stones. The crossing at WADI BARRAKAT is bad and presents difficulties even for packs as it is rocky and narrow. Crossing at MAJIN is very difficult for packs as the track down into the Wadi is narrow and steep and then follows the Wadi bed for a distance and then up a very steep ascent. To make it possible for wheels a road would have to be cut into the rock which would entail a great amount of labour.

After crossing the WADI BARRAKAT the road becomes a series of mere goat tracks, which follow the tops of stony hills and in some cases hardly discernible; Horses have to proceed in single file.

AIN MO DIEH are a series of fine springs situated near head of WADI BARRAKAT. Abundant lasting supply of good water. Would require a good bit of work to water a large number of horses owing to difficult approaches.

MAJIN. Population, mainly Christians not disposed to be friendly at time present owing to their fear of the Turks. A road fit for wheels runs to MAJIN.

WADI. 30 cisterns. Abundant supply at present but not lasting. Water reported at WADI AHEI about 2 1/2 hours ride south of MAJIN.

B.

- APR 1918

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GRAIN. Good and abundant.

LIVELINE. Sheep and cattle are plentiful.

One inhabitant stated they could supply 100 sheep and 50 cattle per diem and this could be supplemented from the local Bedouins who have flocks.

Grain scarce.

CROPS. The crops are excellent and a great many acres are sown. They are much behind the crops on the plain and show no signs of ripening yet.

(sgd) LIEUT. ROBERTS, Lieut.
I.O. 1st A.L.E. Brigade.

26/4/18.

SECRET.

Desert Mounted Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, N.Z.Bde, 20th Indian Inf. Bde,
Audec, 53rd Division.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0800 28/4/18 to 0800 29/4/18.

1. SITUATION. Unchanged. Slight M.G. fire heard from N. at 0600.
2. PATROLS. 5th L.H. patrol reached TEL EL MUSLIM without opposition. Patrol to T.4. central met with no opposition. Patrol 7th L.H. fired at from SAIFA W.23 (rifle fire). Few shells fired from 5 mountain guns from direction KAER MUJAHID. 7th Regt patrol reached T.6. a.s.e. and R.36. a. Enemy post on KAER SAID withdrew to Y.2.d. Strength estimated 1 M.G. 20 rifles. KAER MUJAHID occupied by Cavalry. Patrol to 1040 in T.19 reports all clear. Patrol reached TEL EL MUSLIM Turks holding ruins 2000 yds due R. Patrol fired on by 50 rifles and 1 M.G. Small parties of enemy cavalry at foothills near KAER MUJAHID and about 1 mile further North. Patrol to 127. T.4. reports strong enemy position at 749 in Y.1. Patrol fired on by rifles and 1 M.G.
3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. NIL.
4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY. NIL.
5. ENEMY DEFENCES. NIL.
6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. At 1430 enemy fired 12 rds 7.5. 2 shrap. burst in vicinity of watering troughs GHORANIYEH Bridge and remainder in locality W. of No.5. road between JORDAN and left flank defences/ shells pitching fairly close to river bank. Silenced by our 60 pdrs at 1445. 4 77 mm guns from direction RUJM EL OSHIR fired 120 rds. Two rds of 4.2 from direction SHUNET NIMRIN and two rds direction EL ADEHIME in Y.19.
7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. NIL.
8. INFORMATION FROM (b) NATIVES. 3 different Bedouins state Turkish Inftry have moved to SHUNET NIMRIN. From 500 to 800 German and Turk Cavalry holding MUJAHID area. Also report small trenches about KAER SAID and Turks entrenching Road W.23 also state 4 guns behind MUJAHID.
9. TOPOGRAPHICAL. NIL.
10. GENERAL. Sheriffs messenger with a written message sent on to Intelligence Officer, JERICHO at 0800. R.A.F. report at 0650 dump seen at 127.W.3. & 4. At 0640 no movement or tents seen in UHM DSH SHERT area. At 0655 no movement observed on any road. Enemy reported digging in 127.P.10 verbally last night.

H. J. Cadell Major
for
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

29th April 1918.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

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- APR 1918

SECRET.

Copy No. 17.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
ORDER No. 125.

Reference Map M to 1 mile.

JERICHO,
29th April 1918.

1. INFORMATION.

- (a) Information about the enemy will be issued separately.
- (b) The Corps Commander intends to envelop the right of the enemy's main forces about SHEIKH HIRIN, capture ES SALT and advance to the line KUR (142.T.9.) - Pt. 2900 (142.O.35.)
- (c) In consequence the following moves are taking place on April 30th

(1) SHEA'S FORCE.

Detachment under Lt. Col. G.M.H. OSBORN, D.S.O. consisting of 1 Mounted Regiment (7th L.H.), 1 Sqn Hyderabad Lancers and 1 Battalion Patiala Infantry seize enemy advanced works near KAER SAID and KAER MUJAHID tracks (no. 2 and 3 Roads) under special instruction issued by 60th Division.

Occupy line MAKKAR ED DERBASI - TEL EL MUSTA - EL HAUD.

179th Bde attacking EL HAUD and 180th Bde MAKKAR ED DERBASI - TEL EL MUSTA.

Hour of attack 0200 April 30th.

The A. & N.Z. Mounted Division (less 1st L.H.Bde, 1 Regt and 1 Sqn 2nd L. Bde and 1 Regt N.Z.M.R. Bde) are held in readiness awaiting orders to occupy the line KUR (142.T.9.) - ES SALT.

(2) HODGSON'S FORCE.

Advance rapidly East of JORDAN not later than 0400, detaching 1 Mounted Brigade and 2 Batteries R.H.A. to face N.W. occupy position astride URM ISH SHEYF - JISR ED DAMIE and ES SALT - JISR ED DAMIE tracks. The remainder of this force move on ES SALT from the West and Northwest. When ES SALT is occupied, one Brigade advance to Pt. 2900 (142.O.35.) with object of capturing enemy retiring before SHEA'S FORCE. HODGSON'S FORCE are allotted GHORANIYEH crossings from 2200 April 29th to 0230 April 30th. No. 6 Road is allotted to this force.

(3) SMITH'S FORCE.

By 0400 throws the right flank forward to about 113.X.23.a. and establishes a post on right bank of JORDAN near the bend in 113.X.17.d.

(4) BRIDGEHEAD GARRISON.

20th Indian Infantry Bde are remaining in the Bridgehead.

(5) CORPS RESERVE.

1st Mounted Brigade including 1 R.H.A. Battery and Imperial Service Cavalry Bde form Corps Reserve, 2 miles West of EL GHORANIYEH.

2. MOVES.

The ANZAC Mounted Division will be under orders of Major-General T.S.M. SHEA, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and will be held in reserve for the first part of the operations.

- (a) N.Z.M.R. Bde (less 1 Regiment) will be in position in broken ground South East of EL GHORANIYEH Bridge at 0330 April 30th, alongside road No. 3 close to where the outer bridgehead wire crosses the road.
- The N.Z.M.R. Bde will not commence to cross the GHORANIYEH bridge until 0230 April 30th.

(b) The 2nd L.H. Bde (less 1 Regiment and 1 Squadron) will concentrate under cover about road junction SUFAYR BALZUL by 0200 on April 30th.

APR 1918 E/1109

3. DETACHMENTS.

- (a) One Regiment 2nd L.H. Bde will be detailed to operate with detachment mentioned in para 1.(c)(1) against KAFR MUWAHID.
 - (b) One Squadron 2nd L.H. Bde to be on Northern flank of 179th Inf. Bde. The Squadron will commence crossing the bridgehead EL GHORANIYEH at 1830 on April 29th and report to B.G.C., 179th Inf. Bde on arrival.
 - (c) One Regiment E.Z.H.A. Bde will guard the Southern flank of the 180th Inf. Bde which is attacking the line MAKKAR ED LAMBI - TEL EL MUSTA. Regiment to be in position by 0430.
- The Commander will report to B.G.C., 180th Inf. Bde during the 29th April for instructions.

4.

4. AEROPLANE COOPERATIONS.

The following have been arranged.

- (a) Aeroplane Contact patrols of the area of operations from 0530 to 0700, 1100 to 1230 and 1530 to 1700.
- (b) Tactical Reconnaissance to the Front from 0900 to 1030, 1300 to 1430 and 1500 to 1630.
- (c) Strategic Reconnaissance at 1200 and 1600.
- (d) Machine (Artillery Cooperation) throughout the day. Messages from (a) and (b) will not be dropped on formations lower than Divisional H.Qs.

5. COMMUNICATION WITH ARTILLERY.

The ANEAG Mounted Division will use Red and Yellow flags. Remainder of Corps Red flares to indicate position of advanced troops to Artillery.

6. ASSIGNMENT DUTY.

Will be formed West of GHORANIYEH Bridge and at SUFAYR NIMRIE.

7. MEDICAL.

Receiving Stations will be established on East bank of JORDAN near the bridge.

8. RESCUERS.

Collecting Station at the entrance to the Bridgehead on No.5 Road.

9. TRAFFIC CONTROL.

Instructions will be issued by A.P.M. Desert Mounted Corps.

10. MARSHAL HAJLA BRIDGE.

The bridge over the JORDAN at MARSHAL HAJLA is being left down until further orders.

11. DOCUMENTS.

All ranks will be searched for documents before going into action.

12. GALLOPER.

Capt. R.G.D. GARTHOKE will act as Galloper between ANEAG Mounted Division and Advanced Corps H.Qs., He will report to advanced Corps H.Qs., at 0400, 30th April.

13. COMMUNICATIONS.

- (a) The cable at present connecting the 2nd L.H. Bde with these H.Qs., will not be removed.
- (b) As little damage as possible will be done to any enemy telegraph routes which may be met. Poles must not be removed.

14. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS.

Administrative Orders and instructions have been issued separately.

15. D.H.Q., will remain in the present site until further orders.

16. ATTENTION.

Issued at 1500

Normal distribution plus 60th Divn, 1st Divn, I.C. Bde, 20th Inf. Bde., 6th Inf. Bde., 14th Bde, 2nd Bde., 5th Divn, 1st Divn.

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

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SECRET.

Desert Mounted Corps, 1st L.H.Bde., 2nd L.H.Bde., N.Z.Bde., I.C.Bde.,
20th Indian In.Bde., 53rd Division, Ausdiv.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0800 26/4/18 to 0800 27/4/18.

1. SITUATION. Unchanged. Enemy infantry definite found S. of MUJAHID see special report attached.
2. PATROLS. Patrol to 127.R.23 fired on from R.24. Patrol to 127.T.5 & 6 fired on from 127.W.31 by M.G. and 8 rifles. Patrol to Y.20.a. fired on from 127.W.31.c. Spring in T.27 contains good water. Other patrols fired on from G.19.c, G.13.a, F.28.c., R F.11.a. Patrol to T.6. was fired on from W.31.d. by fifteen rifles and one auto rifle. Patrol reached R.23.d. and was fired on from R.24.a. by twelve rifles. Patrol of six enemy cav. observed moving N. along road in R.17.b. at 1700 opposite NIMRIN small scattered groups of enemy observed along W. edge timber at 1530. 5 M.Gs fired on our aeroplane from timber but not located. Little movement seen on enemy defences in vicinity of SH.NIMRIN. At dark 20 cav. moved from foothills along W. TARRA but later withdrew during day small party appeared to be digging on V. slope of G.13.a. M.G. fired from 127.P.4 and 127.G.29.
3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Nil.
4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY. At 0830 Aviatik at 9000 ft from N.W. retired I.E. At 1030 3 Albatross bombing planes from E. at 12000 ft. 0645 Aviatik reconnaissance from N. at 6000 ft circled and went N.W. Above all observed from 113.Y.30.a.
5. ENEMY DEFENCES. Nil.
6. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. 1020. Fire from 77 mm experienced in XX. 113. W.35 and X.33.c.
7. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. Nil.
8. Information from Prisoners of War.
5 deserters mentioned our G.897 all Turks of medium intelligence. 3 from 1/146 agreed only their Btn here the other two still in MAAN also 1st & 2nd Bns 152 with them. 1 man caught trying to pass in as a refugee from 2/152 Sgt states ration strength 380 and from KATHANI, also one man a Sgt with identity paper 136 Regt M.G. Coy. was formerly in 72 Regt now serving in 146 Regt.
9. TOPOGRAPHICAL. Nil.
10. GENERAL. Enemy seen erecting Field hospital about 113.U.21 at 1530.

W. H. G. G. G.
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

27/4/18.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

E/111

REPORT ON PATROL TO MAAIN.

Reference Map ES SAIE 1/63,360.

At 1900 on 25th. instant I proceeded to MAAIN to report on the No. 1 Road and resources of MAAIN. I had with me Lieut. G.H.S. CUNDY. 1st L.H. Regiment, 1 Troop, 2 Hotchkiss Rifles, 1 Visual Signal Station, 1 Interpreter and 1 Arab guide. Road was quite fit for wheels for about the first 10 miles, but after that became difficult even for packs in parts (see Road Report attached). No opposition was encountered and no enemy seen; reached MAAIN at 0315; interviewed OMDAH of village who at first welcomed us but on learning our strength was only 30 asked us to leave the village as soon as possible. He stated that unless we came with sufficient strength to remain, he could not be friendly to us, because when we left, the Turks retaliated. We also learned from the villagers that two Armenians had told the Turks in MADEBA that we were in MAAIN, 150 Turks with 2 guns were reported in MADEBA. I therefore decided not to wait for nightfall to withdraw, but to move into the hills under cover and feed up and spell the horses after which ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ to move back into camp. It was impossible to remain hidden as the Bedouins sat round on the tops of the hills and fired their rifles in the air.

At 0800 one of the observation posts reported movement of infantry and cavalry in the high ridges to the North, apparently moving to a position to cover the road where it crosses the WADY HALAT at 128.B.30.c. I decided to try and reach the crossing before the enemy failed to do so as he was holding the Wady with his cavalry, with his infantry on high ridges commanding it. These opened fire on our approach and we withdrew by way of the broken ground towards the DEAD SEA.

Estimated enemy strength, 100 Infantry, 70 Cavalry, 2 M.G. or Automatic Rifles.

The enemy followed and I established a post of 12 at 128.B.31.Cent and obtained visual communication with the Brigade through the Mount of Olives and Lieut. G.H.S. CUNDY held a line 128.B.26.b - d. with remainder of troop and 2 Hotchkiss Rifles. Enemy attempted to advance but were held off with rifles and very effective Hotchkiss Rifle fire. The wounded having been evacuated I commenced to withdraw by way of broken ground bordering DEAD SEA at 1030 and assembled in vicinity of AIN SUEIME at 1100 and returned to camp. Enemy observed to withdraw East.

Lieut. CUNDY used his Hotchkiss Rifles in a very efficient manner materially assisting in stopping the enemys advance.

Our casualties were 3 O.Rs wounded, 4 horses killed, 2 wounded, 1 Hotchkiss Rifle lost in steep Wady owing to pack horse slipping and the gun dropping off.

Estimated enemy casualties 12 killed and wounded and several horses observed to be hit.

26/4/18.

(Sgd) IAN. McDONALD, Lieut.
I.O. 1st A.I.H. Brigade.

Report on No.1 Road from CHORANIYEH to MAAIN.

The road was found fit for wheels as far as WADY AMR, provided small amount of work were done on crossing at WADY ADELME, 1 troop working one hour; after WADY AMR the road runs over hard ironstone hills for about 2 miles where the grades are bad and the going rough and quite impossible for wheels. To make it in any way possible regrading would have to be done and rocks blown away. The going would be difficult for camels owing to the sharp stones. The crossing at WADY BARRAKAT is bad and presents difficulties even for packs as it is rocky and narrow. Crossing at MESHABBE is very difficult for packs as the track down into the Wady is narrow and steep and then follows the Wady bed for a distance and then up a very steep ascent. To make it passable for wheels a road would have to be cut into the rock which would entail a great amount of labour.

After crossing the WADY MESHABBE the road becomes a series of mere goat tracks, which follow the tops of stony hills and in some cases hardly discernable; Horses have to proceed in single file.

AYUN ED DIB are a series of fine springs situated near head of WADY MESHABBE. Abundant lasting supply of good water. Would require a good bit of work to water a large number of horses owing to difficult approaches.

MAAIN. Population. Mainly Christians not disposed to be friendly at ~~fix~~ present owing to their fear of the Turks. A road fit for wheels runs to MADEBA.

WATER. 30 cisterns. Abundant supply at present but not lasting. Water reported at WADY ZAGA about 2½ hours ride South of MAAIN.

2.

GRAZING. Good and abundant.

SUPPLIES Sheep and cattle are plentiful.

One inhabitant stated they could supply 100 sheep and 50 cattle per diem and this could be supplemented from the local Bedouins who have flocks.

Grain scarce.

Crops. The crops are excellent and a great many acres are sown. They are much behind the crops on the plain and show no signs of ripening yet.

(sgt) IAN. McDONALD. Lieut.
I.O. 1st A.L.H. Brigade.

26/4/18.

EMM

SECRET.

Date 28.4.18
ANZAC MOUNTED DIV.
E1/113
2A

Desert Mounted Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, N.Z.Bde, 20th Indian Inf. Bde, 53rd Division, Ausdiv.

Summary of Intelligence for period 0800 27/4/18 to 0800 28/4/18.

1. Situation - Unchanged.
2. Patrols. Patrol to ruins in 127.R.24.c. fired on by 20 rifles and 1 V.G. casualties 1 c.r. wounded. 1 horse killed. Patrol to 127.R.15.cent. fired on from R.16 by party which appeared to be covering working party cutting wood. Northern patrol fired at by strong enemy post holding hill 127.G.18.d. Enemy cavalry seen in small groups in G.13.d. Patrol as far as F.17.d. reported all clear. 7th L.H.Regt patrol towards WADI BAKR reached 113.Y.2 and found enemy holding usual position in WADI BAKR.
3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Cavalry estimated about 8 troops seen moving S.W. in ¹²⁷R.27.
4. ENEMY AERIAL ACTIVITY. 0700 one Albatross reconnaissance, 12000 ft approached from E. reconnoitred GHORANIYEH and flew WEST. Observed from 127.Q.3.a.
5. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY. 0900 15 77 mm shells fired at patrol in 113.Y.2. slight searching fire by 77 mm and 4.2. on front sector of bridgehead.
6. ENEMY GUN POSITIONS. Nil.
7. INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS. NIL.
8. TOPOGRAPHICAL. NIL.
9. ENEMY DEFENCES. NIL.
10. GENERAL. NIL.

W. J. Hughes

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

28th April 1918.

Australian & New Zealand Mounted Division.

GENERAL STAFF
No. C/43/111
Date 28.4.18
ANZAC MOUNTED DIV.

SECRET.

Desert Mounted Corps, 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, N.Z.Bde, 20th Indian Inf. Bde, 53rd Division, Ausdiv.

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28th April 1918.

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