

AWM4


**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/60/31 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters ANZAC
Mounted Division

September 1918



AWM4-1/60/31PART2

E1/42

War Drills appx. 20

To. 1st L.H.Bde. Signal Sqdn.
2nd L.H.Bde. 142nd Sqdn R.A.F. JERUSALEM.

Original

G.256 10/9

Practice with Popham Panel 12th September AAA Begin 0530
aeroplane fly over 7th L.H.Regt pick up message for 2nd
L.H.Bde AA Fly to 2nd L.H.Bde deliver message and pick up
one for Division AAA Deliver message to Division and pick
up one for 1st L.H.Bde AA Deliver message 1st L.H.Bde and
pick up one for Division AAA Deliver message to Division AAA
Practice complete AAA 142nd Sqdn R.A.F. will wire if
convenient AAA Addressed 1st L.H.Bde, 2nd L.H.Bde, Signal
Sqdn, Adv. 142nd Sqdn R.A.F.

From. ANZACS.
1015.

War Drills appx. 21

Original

To. 2nd L.H.Bde.
N.Z.M.R.Bde.
C.R.A. JORDAN VALLEY.

G.211 8/8

In order have proportion personnel of each Bde trained in the
working of 75 m.m. gun so that in event such guns being
captured they may be employed against the enemy following
classes will be held daily commencing tomorrow AAA 2nd L.H.Bde
10ff. 20 O.Rs to be GHORANIYEH Bridge at 1500 tomorrow AAA
N.Z.M.R.Bde 1 Off. 10 O.Rs to be Inverness Battery Z.28.c.cent
at 1600 tomorrow aaa Bdes may send one additional officer in
each above parties if desired AAA Duration of class one hour
AAA Different personnel will be sent each day AAA After
tomorrow C's.R.A. RIGHT and LEFT Sectors will arrange direct
with 2nd L.H.Bde and N.Z.M.R.Bde respectively as to time of
class etc AAA Addressed 2nd L.H.Bde repeated C.R.A. JORDAN
VALLEY

From. ANZACS.
2110.

War Diary

E 1/43

appm. 2 2

Original

SECRET.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
Intelligence Summary for 24 hours ending 0700 12/9/18.

1. OPERATIONS.

(a) 1 Off. 6 o.r.s., to reconnoitre Sq's. F.1.a &c. Patrol moved from Gafu Post and reached Z.6.a.l.l. at 0200.

Information. No enemy defences were seen but voices were heard in Z.6.a.

(b) 1 Off. 6 o.r.s., to reconnoitre enemy post reported in Z.35.b. Patrol moved from TICK POST through K.35.a & b and reached T.35.b.east. at 2100.

Information. Barbed wire obstruction across Wadi at T.35.b.east.

(c) Day patrol of 1 off. 32 o.r.s., to reconnoitre S. of JORDAN as far as F.29.a, 23, 16.b. to F.14.b.

Information. Patrol drew fire from Y.8.b. and saw traces of enemy patrol having camped previous night at F.14.b.

(d) 1 Off. 1 o.r. special day patrol to reconnoitre marsh in T.25/26. Patrol left TURTLE POST at 0300 and moved thru K.25 & T.26 and reached K.26 central.

Information. Patrol drew rifle fire from T.15.a. Marsh in T.25.b. 26.a & b is impassable for all arms.

(e) Patrol to TEL EL KHUL encountered no opposition.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Normal.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. 40 Mounted men moved N. from T. RISHM T.20.e., 0900 100 horses grazing all day at C.4.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. 20 men observed repairing wire in F.15.b. Party observed digging in Y.10.e.

5. P/V and DESERTERS.

Deserters
2 Turks
1 Serbian

Unit.

2nd Part, 24th Div.

Taken by

18th L.H.D.

Taken at

Z.35.b.

6. CASUALTIES.

K.I.L.

1. OPERATIONS. Usual patrols encountered no enemy opposition.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Normal.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Normal.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. No new work or wiring observed.

5. P/V

Deserters
1 Turk
2 Turks

Unit.

1/66th REGT.
2/66th REGT.

Taken by

10th C.R.B.
6th L.H.R.C.

Taken at

M.J.L.A.
CHORALTY.H.

6. CASUALTIES.

K.I.L.

E 1744

~~Handwritten note: But no record in morning
of 12th September 1918.~~

12th September 1918

GUNNERSHIP

12th Sept

2.

TOURIST AREA LICKY - JORDAN VALLEY.

ENEMY. 1000ft above Jordan valley about 3000 feet above sea level.

Time.	No. Rds.	Cal.	Nature.	Area shelled	Fired from.
0900	7	77	H.E.	MELLAHAN	
0930	11	77	H.E.	JORDAN TELLUL & VINE	523° from Y. 10. 4. 0. 7.
0930	20	77	H.E.	MUALLAHAN	
0630-0700	-	A.A. 40MM	in 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 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1103. 1104. 1105. 1106. 1107. 1108. 1109. 1109. 1110. 1111. 1112. 1113. 1114. 1115. 1115. 1116. 1117. 1118. 1119. 1119. 1120. 1121. 1122. 1123. 1124. 1125. 1126. 1127. 1128. 1129. 1129. 1130. 1131. 1132. 1133. 1134. 1135. 1136. 1137. 1138. 1139. 1139. 1140. 1141. 1142. 1143. 1144. 1145. 1146. 1147. 1148. 1149. 1149. 1150. 1151. 1152. 1153. 1154. 1155. 1156. 1157. 1158. 1159. 1159. 1160. 1161. 1162. 1163. 1164. 1165. 1166. 1167. 1168. 1169. 1169. 1170. 1171. 1172. 1173. 1174. 1175. 1176. 1177. 1178. 1179. 1179. 1180. 1181. 1182. 1183. 1184. 1185. 1186. 1187. 1188. 1189. 1189. 1190. 1191. 1192. 1193. 1194. 1195. 1196. 1197. 1197. 1198. 1199. 1199. 1200. 1201. 1202. 1203. 1204. 1205. 1206. 1207. 1208. 1209. 1209. 1210. 1211. 1212. 1213. 1214. 1215. 1215. 1216. 1217. 1218. 1219. 1219. 1220. 1221. 1222. 1223. 1224. 1225. 1226. 1227. 1228. 1229. 1229. 1230. 1231. 1232. 1233. 1234. 1235. 1236. 1237. 1238. 1239. 1239. 1240. 1241. 1242. 1243. 1244. 1245. 124		

appm. 23

War Diary



STRENGTH

LOCATION OF TROOPS, JORDAN VALLEY DEFENCES
as at 0900 13th September 1918.

UNIT.

A & N.Z. Mtd Divn. H.Q.
Q.B.A. Artillery.

IN-ORDERS

H.34.e.b.e
H.34.e.b.e

Original

E1/45

NIGHT SECTOR.

2nd Le.H.Bde H.Q.
5th Le.H.Rgt.
6th Le.H.Rgt.
7th Le.H.Rgt.

20th Indian Inf. Bde. H.Q.
10th Mahrattas
Gwalior Inf.
Alwar Inf.
Patiala Inf.

11th Le.A.H.Battery.
No. 1 Le.G.Patrol.

N.10.e.b.e
N.5.e.b.e
Q.3.e.a.central.
Q.25.e.d.e

O.32.e.d.e.6.e
O.26.e.d.e.5.e.9.e
O.32.e.d.e
J.12.e.d.e.6.e.5.e
S.2.D.7.3

Q.5.e.b.e
Vall.e

Artillery.

H.Q. R.A. NIGHT SECTOR.
Ayrshire Bty R.H.A.
Somerset Bty R.H.A.
32nd Indian Mtn. Bty.
75 m.m. 1 Section
A/263 1 Section.

Q.7.e.c.al.e
Le.6.e.2.e.4.e
Q.7.e.c.al.e.b.e
J.11.e.b.e.7.e.4.e
Q.5.e.b.e.9.e.6.e
S.7.e.c.e.ctrn.l.e

Corps Artillery.

195 Hwy. Batty R.G.A. (Night Section).

Le.6.e.d.e.2.e

MID SECTOR.

H.Z.M.R.Bde H.Q.
Auckland Mtd Rifles.
Canterbury Mtd Rifles.
Wellington Mtd Rifles.
1st N.Z.M.G.Sqdn.
1st Btne. B.W.I.
2nd Btne. B.W.I.
36th Btne. Royal Fusiliers.

Y.e.29.e.2.e.7.e.4.e
Y.e.29.e.2.e.6.e.3.e
J.e.5.e.b.e.8.e.2.e
Y.e.27.e.d.e.6.e.4.e
H.e.4.e.d.e.5.e.8.e
Y.e.25.e.c.e.4.e.9.e
Y.e.22.e.c.e.3.e.5.e
Z.e.18.e.c.e.7.e.7.e

1st L.H.Ddg. H.Q.
1st L.H.Rgt.
2nd L.H.Rgt.
3rd L.H.Rgt.

K.e.8.e.b.e.6.e.8.e
H.e.23.e.d.e.5.e.9.e
H.e.33.e.a.e.1.e.2.e
K.e.4.e.b.e.2.e.7.e

12th Le.A.H.Battery.
No. 7 Le.G.Patrol.

H.e.29.e.3.e
H.e.35.e.2.e

Artillery.

H.Q. R.A. Left Sector.
29th Indian Mtn Bty.
Inverness R.H.A. & 2 - 75 m.m.s.
No. 6 T.M. Battery 1 Section.
- do - 1 Section.
5.9 Howitzer.
A/263 (less 1 section).
Corps Artillery.
195 Hwy Batty R.G.A. Left Section.

Y.e.29.e.2.e.8.e.2.e
Y.e.17.e.c.e.19.e
Z.e.28.e.3.e.central.
Z.e.5.e.a.e.5.e.5.e
X.e.34.e.2.e.3.e.2.e
Y.e.28.e.d.e.5.e.5.e
Z.e.25.e.a.e.0.e.5.e
Z.e.27.e.b.e.4.e.0.e

M. S. [Signature]
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

13th September 1918.

S E C T O R .

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
Intelligence Summary for 24 Hours ending 0700 13/9/18.

No. 21.

E1/46

Appen. 24

Original

YAHMOUTA RIGHT SECTOR.

Original

1. OPERATIONS. Usual patrols report all clear.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Day patrol from No. 3 Subsector fired on from about B.6/E.3.b. and McG. from about B.6/E.14. Snipers active off and on throughout the day. On remainder of Sector quiet.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. 0510-0540 Parties of horsemen from N. MELAK moving N.

0550 80 bullocks grazing 20° from B.6/C.7.s. 10.e.s.

0715 30 men in B.7/G.22.

0815 35 men seen running about in C.7/C.36 during firing of 32 mm Batty.

1730 20 men blasting in B.7/G.29.e.s.

Several small watering parties in B.7/P.17.

Usual movement vicinity of LONDON and D.OC.L HOUSE.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. 150 yards of trenches observed at B.7/I.24.e.s. unoccupied at 0530 12th September.

5. P/W. Deserters. Unit. Taken at. Taken by.
1 Bulgarian 1st Bn. 25th Divn. B.7/O.39.e.s. 6th L.H.R.C.

1 Turk needs confirming.

LEFT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS. (a) 6 cars, reconnoitred B.6/E.6.b & d. via B.6/Y.11.b through E.6.d.e. working party heard in B.6/Y.1.a. w. sentry soon about Pels. e.5.e. apparently over working party.

(b) 1 Offr., 6 cars, reconnoitred C.6/I.35.e.s & d. working party heard about N.55.b.9.e.s.

Usual patrols report all clear.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Snipers active in No.1 subsector. These were engaged by our own snipers.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. 100 horses grazing all day in C.7/C.4.e.s.

0500 200 Infy moved N. to N. EL YAR.

50 horses grazing all the morning in C.6/I.16.e.s.

Usual movement elsewhere.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. Fresh earth about C.6/I.19.e.s. 00.e.s.

5 men repairing wire in C.6/I.16.e.s. 5.7.e.s. Party of men appeared to be laying wire at foot of CHIK RIDGE.

5. P/W. Deserters. Unit. Taken at. Taken by.
2 Turks. 8th Coy. 2nd Bn. 12th Fd. Regt. B.6/I.24.e.s. 2nd Bn. 27th L.

E1/47

JORDAN V. LEBY: ARTILLERY.

תְּמִימָנָה בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה כָּל-עַמּוֹד

OUTS.

min. no. Pds.	petty.	Area of loss	Date
0800 100	gathered 32 lbs. B&G. 21. missing fire on 20 Feb/Je. 19. 5 80-80-X-56, S.S.b. 2nd G. L. (in 20-5)		
1200 20 C lbs. missing on 26. H. R. 20. 1. 20-5	Inverness 7 lbs. 21. missing D.G.H.A. 21. trunks and cigar boxes 2nd G. L. 20. 1. 20-5		
1600 21	29th Ma. 20. postm. 20. Autocrat 21. 20-5		
2000-2400 94	5.9 lbs. 20. 21. missing fire (not pronounced) Inverness 7 lbs. 21. missing fire		

M. Enevoldsen

Colonel, General Staff,
15th September 1918. Yours truly ANTHONY EDWARD HOUSE, DIVISION

USUAL ADDRESSES. — Long Island is noted for its beauty and its great variety of scenic beauty.

and the ILB system also has a large number of other features.

~~and the other side of the building, covered with greenish-yellow moss, at
the bottom of which was a low stone wall, about one foot high,
and above it a rough stone wall, about two feet high, covered with
moss and lichen.~~

•
•
•

•id. agilis
•id. agilis
•id. agilis
•id. agilis

E1/48

To 39th Btn. R.F.

G.282

13/8

War Drawn. Appin. 25

- Original

On arrival in the Valley you will be met by an officer who will hand you these instructions AAA In conjunction with the reconnaissance at present going on it is intended to give the enemy the idea that more Infantry is being moved into the Valley and therefore it is necessary that you be seen AAA Therefore you will march straight on through JERICHO and after passing through the town you will form into four parallel columns and move due East from JERICHO for $\frac{1}{2}$ mile after which your Btn will move to the bivouac in Square K.11 AAA Your transport will move direct to bivouac

From. ANZACS.

2100

~~SECRET.~~

DESERT MOUNTED CORPS.

Dairy

E1/49

appar. 26/3/18

Original

SUBJECT:- REPORT ON RECONNAISSANCE ON SEPT. 14th 1918.

1. TROOPS. 5th L.H. Regiment and 4 Machine Guns.

2. ROUTE & ACTION. Left MAKHADAT HAJLA at 0200 on September 14th and established line North and South from R.26.central., R.32.central to T.2.c. and observation post at T.7.d. at 0430 Regimental H.Q., at T.1.a.2.7.

0500 At 0500 all clear reported.

0515 PATROL TO T.22. No.1 Patrol.
Strength :- One troop with one Troop in support.

R. H. Brown's Unit
ROUTE. Patrol reached foothills in T.22. without opposition. 6 dismounted men seen in high ground T.29 and same number in T.24.a. Two Troops in Y.7.b., these moved South through T.18.b.

INFORMATION. Patrol fired on heavily in T.22.a. from T.23.b. and d. chiefly rifle fire and a few bursts automatic rifle. Fresh Cavalry tracks leading North seen in T.22.a. Signs of enemy post having been on 1040 (T.14.b.). About 20 rifle pits and M.G. emplacements had been dug here. Crossings over WADI EL JORFE and WADI EL ADEIME suitable for wheeled traffic. WADIS easily crossed by Mounted Troops for $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile on both sides of road.

0715 This patrol back.

0900 No. 2 Patrol. 1 N.C.O. and 14 o.rs.

ROUTE. From KABR FENDI EL FAIZ in East direction along South bank of WADY ER RAMEH through T.6.central., T.6.d., Y.1.c., and back to R.36.d.

INFORMATION. TEL ER RAMEH has a traversed trench running round the base of the hill, and trench running up the hill on the Southern side; also some sangars on top of the hill. One sentry seen in trench.

No wire seen. (This has since been seen to be *wire* as already reported).

No movement anywhere in foothills.

No rifle fire encountered.

4 shells (believed to be 77 m.m.s) fired from Northerly direction.

1100 Patrol back at 1100.

0900 No. 3 Patrol. 1 N.C.O. and 14 o.rs.

ROUTE. North bank of WADY JORFE ABU ZIGHAN to KHURRET EL KEFREIN (R.23.central.).

INFORMATION. No opposition. Two unoccupied trenches found at KHURRET KEFREIN, one 70 yards long on Western side of the mound, was partly filled in, the other on the Eastern side in good repair. No signs of recent occupation.

Tracks of Mounted men seen along the road. Post of 6 men seen on KABR MUJAHID, and another about the same number on a hill North of KABR MUJAHID.

1130 Patrol returned at 1130.

1300 Regiment withdrew leaving 2 troops in observation.

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION. Shrine at KABR FENDI EL FAIZ is a good observation post and any movement in direction of KABR SAID is easily seen.

War Diary

appm. 26

E1/50

2.

appm. 27

CONCLUSIONS.

As the enemy made no attempt to interfere with our patrols, and, as very little was seen it appeared as if there was very little in front.

On the other hand they have for sometime had their Cavalry chased, and in many cases badly handled by the Indian Cavalry, it is quite likely that they are most unwilling to show themselves in any place they can be got at. This is borne out by our patrols today which report that the enemy do not appear to come very far forward from the foothills.

2. On September 16. h you will find

no difficulty in the mission that you

are carrying out.

3. 15th Sept. 1918. AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

3. Operations will also push forward by the 15th Sept. and the advance will be to Kastanik at 20 miles. There is no need to hold the 20 miles but will cover beyond it as required.

4. Mission given will be right & full information is held by the General so particular has not been given. It is however to be understood to be exact.

5. If this can be done I will receive from the General a copy of Australian General's orders & the same general will be sent to you as well as General's copy for the safety of your men. I am sure that the General will be pleased to do so until such time as the division

is given to him. He will then give you his instructions.

Yours truly,

Major-General,
Commanding,
R. H. D. M. M.

War diary

appm. 27



S.D.O.R.T.

C.O.C. RIGHT SECTOR
1st L.H.B.D.
C.R.A. JORDAN VALLEY.

Original

SUBJECT:- RECONNAISSANCE.

1. On September 16th you will carry out the following reconnaissances with a view to creating the impression that our advance is intended Eastward via KABR MUJAHID on the morning of 17th September.
2. At 1730 on 16th September one Regiment will be pushed forward in the direction of KABR MUJAHID through BUREIF HALUL.
3. Detachments will also push forward up the WADE NIMRIN and from MAKHADAT HAJLA to KABR MENDI EL FAHZ. These reconnaissances will run in during the night but will return before it is light.
4. Bivouac fires will be lighted in WADE NIMRIN and BUREIF HALUL. These should be placed where they are seen from certain points but must not be obviously meant to be seen.
5. At 1730 one Regiment 1st L.H.B.D. will march from its bivouac in the direction of GHORANEYEH covering as wide a front as possible and will continue its march until it is too dark for the enemy across the river to see their movement. That is about 1830. It will then return to bivouac.
6. The C.R.A. JORDAN VALLEY will arrange for the co-operation of all the Artillery in the valleys and, will submit his plan to this office as soon as possible.

14th September 1918.

J. P. Bithorne
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

Copy to - Desert Mounted Corps.
C.O.C., Left Sector.
Signal S.dn.
'A' Branch.
A.D.M.S.

Tar Scars

E/52.

appn. 2⁸

Original

SECRET

No. 22.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
Intelligence Summary for 24 hours ending 0700 14/9/18.

LEFT SCTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

(a) 1 Off. 6 c.r.s., to reconnoitre Sqd C.6/P.1.a &c. Patrol moved from SAME POST N. through C.6/Z.6.d. and reached C.6/P.1.c. at 2100.
Information. Enemy trench located in C.6/P.1.a. No movement seen or heard.

(b) 1 Off. 6 c.r.s., to reconnoitre C.6/Y.27.b., 28.b., 22.d. Patrol moved from THIS POST N. through C.6/Y.28.b. and reached C.6/Y.22.d. at 2300.

Information. No enemy seen or heard. Ground is very broken in C.6/Y.28.d and b. but passage can be made under cover by Infantry in fours.

(c) Day patrol to reconnoitre B.7/F.29., 23., 17 & 14.b. Patrol left AUJAH bridgehead at 0400 and returned at 1830.

Information. Enemy snipers at B.7/F.29.b. fired on patrol but were driven back to redoubt in C.6/S.2.b.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Normal.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENTS. 100 horses grazing all day in C.6/C.6.
0830 ~ 10 men & 80 horses moved from WADE EL WAR to grazing in C.6/U.25.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. Apparently new earthworks in Y.20.d. & L.16, central.

5. P/W & DESERTERS. Unit. Taken by. Taken st.
1 Turk 24th Divn. H.E.L. 2.300. F.15.d.

6. CASUALTIES. NIL.

RIGHT SCTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

(a) Day patrol to reconnoitre country EAST of HAJLA. Patrol proceeded through night O.P. line to road in B.7/S.6.a. and thence to KABA BIDI N. HAJLA. Patrols were sent to B.7/S.5., R.26., & Q.30. where they met 6th Regt. patrols.

Information. Patrols met with no opposition. About 0800 1 Sqdn enemy Cavalry appeared on road between B.7/Y.5.b. & Y.2.b. appeared to be going to water and disappeared in B.7/Y.2.b.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Normal.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. Small working party in B.7/G.29. defences.
1730-1800 Blasting heard in same w/r/c.

5. P/W & DESERTERS. NIL.

6. CASUALTIES. NIL.

E1/53

20

YOU'RE GOING TO LOVE THE NEW YORKMAN WALLACE.

• 小說家 GENE KRUEGER 著
• 翻譯者 周曉雲、黃曉暉
• 編輯者 陳曉雲
• 設計者 陳曉雲
• 製版者 陳曉雲
• 制圖者 陳曉雲
• 裝訂者 陳曉雲

BRUNN.

<u>TIME.</u>	<u>No. Rds.</u>	<u>Cals.</u>	<u>ARCS Shelled.</u>	<u>Fires</u> <u>From</u>
0930-1000	77	HeG.	B•7/F•10•5•	VADI MUSALIABH (?) Sound
"	20	"	"	"
"	9	"	MUSALIABH	"
1045	3	"	MUSALIABH	"
1445	20	"	C•6/F•5•6•14•	Sound 16° from C•6/F•13•

De 85. A 660 m above sea level, the ground surface is at 966.6/1.25 = 788.4.

1550-1630. At 1600hrs we were halfway between AJJAH and the S. of the
island.

•EDOC 400: Information from 2019 on Amendment to the Water

OLTRAS

<u>Time.</u>	<u>Batty.</u>	<u>No. Rds.</u>	<u>Distance in Miles.</u>
"	52 I.E.B.	100	100
"	75 mm (L.E.)	-	CHATH-RIDGE road & trenches.
1530	75 mm (R.E.)	19	DIG-SAN HOUSE.
1615	75 mm (R.E.)	30	LONDON HOUSE, MONTANA MINE.
"	29 I.E.B.	44	Cav. in B.C./P.I.C. - 000
"	"	20	C.S./T.20.C., T.25.C. C. 0.
"	75 mm (L.E.)	96	Krasnaya Sloboda, TURKEstan.
"	75 mm (R.E.)	99	- do -
2000	29 I.E.B.	8	C.6/T.20.C. - 000
2030	"	8	C.6/R.20/C. 2000 1
2100	"	6	C.6/T.25.C.

J. McDonald

between 2000 & 2500 men were on board as follows for 1st. Colonel,
B. REGT. 1200 of which were sailors of the 1st & 2nd & 3rd Battalions 1 Sqn.
A 2000 men 1st & 2nd & 3rd Battalions 2nd & 3rd Divisions
14th September 1916.

USUAL ADDRESSES.—The postmaster has no business getting into it between him and me or

•LITERATUR •SIEBENVON ZEHN•

கால்வாய் குதிரை மீண்டும் போன்று வரும் நிலை என்று சொல்ல வேண்டும்.

E1/54

War Diary appen. 2 9

To. LEFT Sector. 39th Btn. R.F., C.R.A. JORDAN VALLEY.

G.289 14/8

Original

39th Btn. R.F. will leave present camp K.11 at 1730 tomorrow 15th Sept. and marched to site to be selected by G.O.C.m LEFT SECTOR AAA G.O.C., LEFT SECTOR will arrange for guides to direct Bns to camp site AAA If still light when approaching the AUJAH Btn should march in Artillery formation AAA Btn comes under orders of G.O.C., LEFT SECTOR on moving from K.11 AAA Addsd G.O.C., LEFT SECTOR, 39th Btn. R.F.m reptd C.R.A. JORDAN VALLEY. Copy to 'A', A.D.M.S., A.D.V.S., A.P.M., Fld. Sqdn., Sig. Sqdn. Div. Train%

From. ANZACS. 1005.

~~SECRET~~

Dairy

E1/55

appn. 30



SUBJECT:- INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS.

Ouganal

The following instructions with regard to all future operations are issued and are to be circulated to all concerned.

1. FOOD AND FORAGE.

(a) It is of the greatest importance that all food and forage which is discovered is made the fullest use of.

A report will be sent at once of any supplies so found, giving place and approximate amount.

No guards will be placed on supplies found.

Troops who are in advance of the force, and discover supplies may replenish when time is of importance, but must report what they have done. No one must help themselves indiscriminately.

(b) All requisitioning must be made on authorised forms, pro-forma of which will be issued.

2. TUNNELS AND IMPORTANT BRIDGES.

Tunnels and important bridges will not be destroyed without special instructions. Destruction on a railway will be limited to what will take only a short time to repair.

3. REPORTS ON TELEGRAPH LINES.

(a) Early reports are required on enemy Telegraph lines, giving their condition and direction they run in. A specimen form is attached showing the manner in which such information should be forwarded.

(b) On no account will Telegraph poles be interfered with.

(c) Advanced units who may have availed themselves temporarily of portions of such lines must vacate them immediately they are required for H.Q. use.

4. DAILY REPORTS.

Each evening, brigades and units will report the following :-

- (a) Line held.
- (b) Casualties.
- (c) Any detachments which are away.
- (d) How they stand for supplies, water and ammunitions.
- (e) Any factors affecting the situation.

5. STRENGTH.

Units will only take strength of par establishments into action. No surplus officers or men will be taken.

6. HOSTILE LANDING GROUNDS.

All hostile landing grounds will be especially preserved. Troops or transport will not move on to them and small guards will be placed by troops arriving first at such landing grounds to ensure this.

This point is of the greatest importance as only one or two are known to be in the area.

7. AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION.

As soon as one of our aeroplanes appear over any body of our troops, those must make their presence known to the aeroplane by the usual signals without waiting for a call from the aeroplane.

8. DUMPS.

Brigades will dump all surplus stores and equipment in one dump in their present camp areas under a small guard.

E/56

S. L. PLANT.

Stock help to will be left at brigade dump.

10. SUPPLIES.

10. SUPPLIES.
Staff Operations will keep in touch with private Suppliers and be responsible
to supply guides when necessary. at charges determined by mutual agreement
allowing 15% of balance of all our fees earned.

11. CLOTHING.

11. CLOTHING. Greatcoats and a change of shirt and socks will be carried.
12. TRINIDAD WATER. All ranks must be careful as to what water they drink without

chlorination or boiling.

13. DELIVERY OF WIRES AND MESSAGES.
During the advance northwards from the KERSHIBA - TAZA line, difficulty was experienced in delivering wires and messages to small units in the plateauing La Bé area owing to their failing to report their presence.

Units moving in the Palestine L. of C. area should therefore be informed
instructed to report their arrival and departure to a Signal Office, providing
there is one within reasonable distance. See also Annexes I & II (4).

Wm Anderson

Lieut. colonel.

Enclosed find the movements of your Major ^{Major} ~~Major~~ GONE WITH THE WINDS OF
15th September 1918. Grade of Australia AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.

10 - G+O+Co., RIGHT SECTOR	(9)	Sigorl Sjdn	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet
G+O+Co., LEFT SECTOR	(8)	Dawn Train	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet
1st LeR+Dde	(4)	Delta-Be. Regt	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet
C+R+A. Jordan Valley	(8)	A+D+V+B+Lars	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet
Ge+He	(1)	Police	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet
*A+Br+He	(2)	Camp Cond	(1)	Actions of anti-Soviet

4000 लक्ष रुपये की बजाय 2000 लक्ष रुपये की अवधि तक 10%

CHURCH COUNCIL BLESSING. —
To support a "wonderful pilgrimage" and other abounding trials of clissed life,
against yet having no like abiding grace but such as no even from life's greatest
miseries can bring, the church of Shrewsbury presented down to us such a
blessing over us as none else can; a most singular blessing and we of Shrewsbury
are grateful for it.

E1/57

Aug 30

PRO-FORMA.

REPORTS ON TELEGRAPH LINES.

LOCALITY & DIRECTION OF LINE	REMARKS.
BURJISHERA, towards HEBRON	Iron poles undamaged; 3 wires, broken No. of towns.
DANARCHEH, towards HEBRON	wooden poles, 2 wires cut near village; few poles removed, remainder intact but wires slack.
HUJ, towards AMK.	wooden poles, 6 wires undamaged.
JULIS, towards Junction alongside railway.	wooden poles, 3 wires much damaged for 2 miles.

~~SECRET~~

appar. 31

Biany

E/58

No. 25.

AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
Intelligence Summary for 24 hours ending 0700 15/9/10.

Original

LEFT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

- (a) Special Patrol to reconnoitre Sqn. B.6/Z.6.b & report working party were heard in C.6/X.5.b &c.
- (b) Special Patrols to C.6/Y.29.c.5.5. and Sqns C.6/Y.28, 27.b & d, 22.c. and 21.d. report no movement seen or heard.
- (c) Usual day patrols to TEL EL IRINY and Sqns B.7/T.29., 23., 17 to B.6/P.14.a & b. report all clear.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. 100 horses grazing all day in C.6/C.6.
0645 About 40 men in full marching order with mess tin or some shining article on their back moved from C.6/U.27 to C.6/U.13. Usual movement in remainder of front.

4. ENEMY DEMONSTRATIONS.

0830-1000) 25 men working in C.6/O.33.d.2.b.

1330-1530)

0620 6 men working on wire in C.6/Y.15.c.

1400 6 men digging C.6/X.9.c.

Fresh earth outside a hole on side of a hill in B.6/Y.2.b.8.8. Fresh earthworks reported yesterday in C.6/Y.20.b. is incorrect, but found to be communication trench from C.6/Y.16.c.9.5. to top of hill C.6/Y.16.c.2.6.

P/U.	Deserters	Unit.	Taken at	Taken by.
	1 Turk	S/2/24th Divn.	B.7/T.22.c.	C.M.R.

RIGHT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS. 5th L.H.Rgt (less one troop) plus 4 M.G.s. crossed the JORDAN at Makhadat Hajla and established a line approx N and S. from B.7/R.25.cent., R.32.cent to B.7/T.2.c. and an O.P. in B.7/R.7.d. 0500. Reported all clear.

(a) 0515. A patrol of 2 troops was sent along the road to B.7/R.22.d. Information. Patrol fired on by about 2 troops Cavalry from B.7/R.25.b. & 15.c. A good deal of movement seen in vicinity of B.7/Y.7. Fresh tracks were seen in B.7/T.22.a. leading N. apparently there was an outpost the previous night on Hill 1040 (R.14.b) About 20 rifle pits and H.Q. positions had been here. Topographical. The crossings over W. EL JORFE and W. EL ABULI are suitable for wheeled traffic and are easily crossed by mounted troops for $\frac{1}{2}$ mile on either sides of roads.

(b) 0900. Patrol proceeded along S. bank of Wadi Ram H through B.7/T.6.0.cent., T.6.a & Y.1.c., then back to R.3.5 & d.

Information. Enemy defences:- TEL T RAMH has a trav road trench running round base of hill also one up S. side of hill. Sensors observed on top of hill. 1 mortary observed in trench.

Remarks. 4 shells fired on patrol from N. direction, probably 77 mm.

(c) 0900. Patrol proceeded along W. bank of JORDAN ABU AL WIGH to LY. B KERBLAH.

Information. Enemy defences :- One trench about 70 yards long was found on W. side of KERBLAH and was partly filled in, but in good repair. No signs of recent occupation. Tracks of Cavalry seen along road. A group of 6 men observed on KAH MUJAHID and another of about same number on hill E. of MUJAHID.

Topographical. The shrine at KAH MUJAHID is a good observation post and any movement in direction of KAH SAID can easily be seen.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. 0540 Sept 15th. Dawn patrol fired on in P.14.

P/U	Deserters.	Unit.	Taken at	Taken by.
	2 Turks (Cadets)	1/66/Comp.Divn.	B.7/O.34.d.	Malior Infantry.

4. CASUALTIES. 1 o/r missing.
1 horse wounded.

E1/59

卷之三十一

1715 6 77 - 3000 ft. L. H. design no 6 modified
in 247/3-25.

100-130 75 m.s. - 100
100-130 75 m.s. - 100
100-130 75 m.s. - 100
100-130 75 m.s. - 100

1400-1550	75 min.	10	B.C. 5000' Eiro 3.7/P.17.
L.E. 5000'			
1600-1800	1265	22	RESIDENTIAL OFFICES DECCAN HOUSE, NEW DELHI Previous to 1947
	5.9	-	(OCT-47)
2000-2200	75 min.	72	RESIDENTIAL OFFICES DECCAN HOUSE, NEW DELHI Eating Bar
A. 10.10			(C. 6/1.20. b. 1948) See 3.042

M. G. Thompson
Lieut. Colonel,
U.S.A. Staff

To General Staff, General Staff,
15th September 1915. The General Staff, General Staff,
15th September 1915. The General Staff, General Staff,
15th September 1915. The General Staff, General Staff,

Friday

Appm. 3²

E1/60
Original

No. 24.

~~SECRET~~

S U M M A R Y
AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION
Intelligence Summary for 24 hours ending 0700 18.9.15.
Reported by J.E. WILSON, Major, R.A.M.C.,
Commander, Australian & New Zealand Mounted Division, to the Commander-in-Chief, South African Army, regarding operations in the LIDDELL SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS

- A. Day patrol EAST of JORDAN reconnoitred B.7/T.29, 25, 17 & N. to F.9.a.s. Patrol left AUJAH Bridgehead at 0400 and returned at 1900. Patrol drew rifle fire from B.7/T.1.c. & T.2.d.
B. 2 Offrs. 6 o.x.s., reconnoitred Sqd C.6/F.1.a. & C. Patrol left C.6/T.12.d. & moved N. to T.1.a.1.3.

Information. Patrol had nothing to report.

Information. Patrol had nothing to report. Final.
Patrol to TEL HI TRUNY reported all clear. Final.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY.

ENEMY MOVEMENT.
0530 5 enemy 2 of which were phle blue uniforms and red bands (cap) moved W. along WADI MUREJIB from C. 6° W. 34° d. to WADI BAKR (3° 6' W. 33° 30' N.)

100 horses grazing all day in C.7/C.4.

4. ENEMY DEFENCES. New wire observed running N & S in B.7/F.5. & 11.

5. P/W Deserters. Unit. Taken by. Taken at.
2 Turks. 3/1/74 Regt 25th Div. 1st Inf.B.W.I. C.6/W.30.b.

RIGHT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

A Day Outpost Report.

Six troops of 7th L.H.Rgt made B.7/T.I.2. good at 0500.
1 Offr. 40 o.r.s., proceeds to K.L. TURRIN making it good by
0550.

1 Offr, 17 yrs., proceeded to TEL ER RAMEH occupying it by 0600.

Offr. 23 hrs., moved towards B.7/T.22, 23. Patrol held up by 12 infantry in B.7/T.17 and 30 cavalry in B.7/T.22, 23. Remaining two troops based in B.7/R.22.b. until 0700 then withdrew to T.1, 22, 23.

ENEMY do not appear to operate far from their positions in foothills. These appear to be held in most cases by Cavalry.

B 1 offr. 4 grs., to occupy KH. KEFREIN. Patrol left B.7/R.1.s.a. and reached objective at 0550 and advanced to trenches in B.7/R.24.c.

Information. Trenches unoccupied, consisted of three lines about 3 ft deep and 70 yards long capable of holding 2 Coys. No wire. Patrol proceeded tyowards KABR MUJAHID advanced to B.7/R.24.d.

and was fired on from MUJAHID by M.G.
Wire entanglements observed round bottom of MUJAHID and across

to the right in direction of MASHRA JODA. Considerable dust

cloud along road between MUJAHID and JODA. Enemy post of six men near B.7/R.18. Enemy gun firing on TEL ER RAME bearing 125° from B.7/R.24.C.

C 1 offr. 17 o.r.s., to patrol to TEL ER RAME and reconnoitre that area. Patrol left B.7/T.1.a. and proceeded by S. bank of WADI RAME to TEL ER RAME.

For Scary

appx. 33

Original

E1/62.

~~SECRET~~

1000 RDS. AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION

Intelligence Summary for 24 hours ending 0700 17.9.1..

1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS.

1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS. - 1000 RDS.

LEFT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

A. 2 Offrs. 6 o.r.s., to proceed to S.6/I.22. and explode bombs on trip wire reported to be on W. side of GRANT HILL. Patrol left HUSKAMEN and proceeded through S.6/I.34.b., 28.d., 22.c. to I.22.a.

Information :- Large tanks were seen on N. end of GRANT HILL no movement seen or heard. No trip wire was seen but 12 armed men discovered in a heap as if for removal.

B. 1 Off. 6 o.r.s., proceeded from TELL POST to C.6/I.29.a. Patrol had nothing to report.

C. 1 Offr. 6 o.r.s., to E.5/I.3.b. had nothing to report.

D. Day patrol E. of JORDAN to reconnoitre Sqd. P.7/0.5., F.29., 23 and 12. Patrol left AUJAH Bridgehead and proceeded to B.6/W.15 and were fired on by about 15 rifles from F.9.

(?) The enemy were driven back to F.3.a. Enemy fired 10 rds H.E. on patrols day O.P. in F.15.c.

E. TEL TELTRUNY patrol report all clear.

RIGHT SECTOR.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITY. Quiet.

3. ENEMY MOVEMENT. Morale.

4. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. NIL.

5. ENEMY DEFENCES. No new work observed.

6. P/W & DESERTERS. NIL.

7. CASUALTIES. NIL.

RIGHT SECTOR.

1. OPERATIONS.

A. D/CO P.M. & Patrols. 2 Troops, 5th L.H. Reg. moved to B.7/I.1.a. and established a post there. Patrol was sent towards HAER MUJAID B.7/W.19.b. and reached B.1/H.19.b. where it was fired on by 2 M.G.s and about 10 rifles.

Information :- 40 infantry were seen to move from B.7/W.15.c. to HAER MUJAID and a party of Cavalry at point 250 in B.7/W.15.c. Patrol to TEL EL RAHIM B.7/I.6.b. reached within 400 yards of TEL and were fired on by about 10 rifles from a point about 700 yards S. of TEL EL RAHIM.

In the night, 3 men were seen in trenches in S.7/I.6.d. small party of Cavalry in B.7/I.2. moving. Patrol proceeded to B.7/I.3. and were fired on by 1 M.G. and 10 rifles from B.7/I.3.c.

Officers & personnel states first they could plainly see large clouds of dust over the line due to movement of troops and it must have been equally plain to the enemy.

B. Minor Operations.

Intention :- To carry out a reconnaissance with a view to creating the impression that our advance is intended Eastward via HAER MUJAID on morning 17.9.1. ~~unsuccessful~~.

Plan. Two troops of 6th L.H. Reg. to move up the W. NUMRIN and two troops of 5th L.H. Reg. to move on KHER FEINDI EL FAIZ.

Information :- Main body reached R.15.00c. by dark and forward patrols reached B.7/H.17.a & c. No enemy seen. Fires were lighted at P.31, R.17, and Q.1.d. Patrols reported all clear throughout the night.

Appen. 34

Mr. Army



E/64
Original

SECRET.

G.O.C., RIGHT SECTOR.	36th Bn.R.F.	C.R.A., JORDAN VALLEY DEFENCES
G.O.C., LEFT SECTOR.	39th Bn.R.F.	C.R.E. JORDAN VALLEY DEFENCES
1st L.H.Bde.	1st Bn. B.W.I.	Signal Sq Adron.
20th Indian Inf. Bde.	2nd Bn. B.W.I.	

The G.O.C., wishes to draw the attention of all Commanding Officers to the following points and directs that they are made known to all Officers in each Brigade and Unit in this FORCE.

1. The greatest success which this FORCE may gain will depend on its mobility. Everything should give way thereto to bringing a Unit, as mobile as possible without taking away from its fighting efficiency ~~into~~ ~~with~~ action.

Ammunition Supply is one of the greatest difficulties we are faced with. Units can help in this by strict fire discipline so that men do not fire a large number of rounds at useless targets and so get short. Firing at night to be done as little as possible, and the bayonet used instead on all possible occasions. Ammunition to be collected from Dead and Wounded and to be distributed among the remainder.

2. Care of men is most essential. The essence of good leading and command is to bring men into action in the fittest state to fight. Strict march discipline is essential to effect this. Drinking from water bottles should be controlled especially at the start of a march. Marching in the heat of the day, especially for Infantry should be done as little as possible, and frequent halts made if it is necessary to be done.

3. Indiscriminate drinking of water must be prevented. Every chance to replenish at known good supplies always taken. Medical Officers will arrange for supplies of chlorinated water at every opportunity.

4. Success in all operations will depend on co-operation. To secure this early information of action in any part of area where the FORCE is working is essential.

Thus an enterprise may be carried out by a few men, which, if reported at once, can be followed up and may be most far-reaching in its effects; whereas a great chance may be lost by slowness in reporting.

5. Reports to be of value must be clear and should be as short as possible consistent with clearness. Clear writing is essential. A report must be so written that it can be read in a bad light. A most valuable report may be entirely lost to use by being illegibly written, and as it often is, on operations with a very light pencil on a number of small sheets of paper. Also, although rain is unlikely, on no account should a message be written with an indelible pencil, when it is wet, as the message is then totally illegible.

A small sketch accompanying a report is of greater value than a great deal of writing. Before sending a report it should be read over to another person, who should if possible not know all the sender does, to see if it is quite understandable, and expresses what it is intended to convey to the recipients, and cannot be read differently.

J. H. Braine
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
CHAYTOR'S FORCE

17th Sept. 1918.
Copy to 'A' Branch.

5. INSTRUCTIONS.

5.C.C., SECTORS will ensure therefore ;-

(a) That the closest watch is kept on the enemy from now onwards by patrols both day and night and that patrolling is bold and energetic.

(b) That early information of my movement is sent to Force Headquarters without delay.

(c) That objectives for harassing the enemy, by minor enterprises are chosen, and schemes made for carrying them out at short notice.

Brigades and Units will also have plans ready for a move in case of the action described in Para. 2 (d) and (e) being put into operation; and for leaving nucleus garrisons in posts to guard stores, immobile Machine Guns etc.,

4. AIRCRAFT CO-OPERATION.

One flight 142nd Squadron is remaining at JERUSALEM, and is operating independently with CHANTRY'S FORCE in the JORDAN VALLEY. In order to communicate to our troops the position and approximate numbers of hostile troops in country where it may be impossible or undesirable to drop messages, the following method may be used ;-

An Aeroplane after spotting enemy will draw attention of any of our troops that he can see by circling over them and will then fly directly over the heads of the hostile troops, releasing Veray's Lights when vertically above them.

This will indicate the presence of the enemy. Whenever possible a message giving fuller details will be dropped in addition.

5. HANDING IN OF ALL CAPTURED MATERIAL.

All captured enemy material will be handed into A. & N.Z. Divisional Ordnance through the usual channels, bagged up and labelled by the Unit capturing. This can be done on wagons going to the refilling points and returning supply convoys. D.A.D.O.S. of Division will issue necessary instructions to Ordnance personnel and arrange for collecting and storing.

6. MOSQUITO NETS.

Mosquito nets will be carried.

7. GREAT COATS.

Great Coats, or blankets, will be taken by all.

8. STEEL HELMETS.

Steel helmets will be left in Unit Dumps in the case of Mounted men, and, carried by all Artillery and Infantry.

9. REPORTS.

Reports will be furnished during the forthcoming operations to this office by Brigades and Units at 0700 - 1100 and 1600 daily from 'Z' day inclusive.

Reports at intermediate hours will be rendered whenever changes in the situation occur.

These reports are additional to the evening report mentioned in our G/66/142 of 15/9/18 which will also be furnished.

10. RATIONS.

All units are being issued with one Iron Ration for men, and two Field rations for men and horses. Arrangements will be made to have these loaded at short notice. These rations are to be used only when the daily supply cannot be issued; the Iron Ration to be retained until authority for consumption is given by G.O.C. Personnel remaining in present posts will be issued with these rations ready to move at short notice if required.

11. WATER.

There will be a reserve of water in tanks just South of MUSALLAMAH. This will not be touched without reference to Force Headquarters.

12. RESERVE WIRE.

The C.R.B., will arrange that a reserve supply of 300 coils of barbed wire, with iron standards and plain wire will be placed just South of MUSALLAMAH. This will not be used without reference to Force Headquarters.

13. SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES.

From September 1st onwards, watches will be synchronized by telephone with Force Headquarters at 0900 and 1700 daily.

14. ACKNOWLEDGEH.

Gifford Browne
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
CHAYTOR'S FORCE.

Issued at 2000.

Distribution ;	No. 1	G.O.C., RIGHT SECTOR.
"	2	G.O.C., LEFT SECTOR.
"	5	1st L. Brigade.
"	4	C.R.A., JORDAN VALLEY DIVISIONS.
"	5	C.R.A., JORDAN VALLEY DIVISIONS.
"	6	MIAZADA Flotilla.
"	7	Adv.Flight 14 th Sqdn R.A.F. Jerusalem.
"	8	Signal Squadron.
"	9	Divisional Train.
"	10	'A' Branch.
"	11	A.D.C.S.
"	12	A.D.S.S.
"	13	A.P.M.
"	14	Interrogation Officer.
"	15	Camp Commandant.
"	16	D.A.D.G.B.
"	17	G.H.Q.
"	18	Desert Mounted Corps.
"	19	XII th Corps.
"	20	53rd Division.
"	21/25	War Diary.

S E A R C H E T.

War Diary
Appendix 36

G/26/91
18.9.18
A.I.A.C. (1918)

APPENDIX 'B' E/168
Original

INTERCOMMUNICATION.
DEFENCE SCHEME, JORDAN VALLEY
DEFENCES.

1. Main telegraph lines run from Divn. H.Qrs., to G.H.Q., XXth Corps and Headquarters of Right and Left Sectors, from where cable is laid to the various Units and Posts in the Sectors.
2. Metallic circuits exist at GHORANIYEH Bridgehead and system of Posts North of the AUJAH. These are so laid out that alternative routes exist in all cases.
3. The GHORANIYEH and AUJAH Bridgeheads are linked up with lines both East and West of the Jordan and both Bridgeheads are in direct touch with H.Qrs., of G.O.C., Right Sector.
4. All posts in the Valley are able to get into touch with the central Visual Station at H.29.b. whence a telephone runs to D.H.Q. Exchange.
5. This Central Visual Station is also in touch with 53rd Division together with a Station at the H.Qrs., of N.Z.M.R. Brigade.
6. The post at the DEAD SEA is in Telephonic and Visual Communication with H.Qrs., of G.O.C., Right Sector and direct Visual Communication with D.H.Q.
7. Wireless Stations are erected at D.H.Q., H.Qrs., Right and Left Sectors and at the AUJAH Bridgehead. A Continuous watch is kept at each of these Stations.
8. A Pigeon Service is established and flights from various front line Posts take place daily. A second loft has now been erected and as soon as these birds become settled the supply of pigeons should be sufficient for all requirements.
9. The Artillery System of Communications is separate from the Main. Although the C.R.A. is directly connected to the Artillery Exchanges in each Sector he is also connected to the D.H.Q., Exchange through which any part of the Valley can be got. The various Batteries and Sections of Artillery in either Sector are to be reached through their various Exchanges and these Exchanges are also linked up with the H.Qrs., of the G.O.C., of their respective Sectors.

17th Sept. 1918.

(Sgd) J. McCLOY, Major,
O.C., Signal Squadron.

Distribution as per this office G/26/91 dated 9.9.18.

Original

E1/69

Mobile emergency-24 hours on 0700 10/9/10.

5. 2/1. Desertosa.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Taken by</u>	<u>Location at</u>
5. 2/18	Deserted.	Unit 5.		
	5 30-50.	S/1 74.5m Rn 76		
	1000 58.5m Rn 76	(10. 58.5m Rn 76 36.5m Divn).		
6. 3/18	1000 wounded.		Battal. 10.	3.6/1.36.50.

1. OPERATIONS.

AGE & SLOGAN.

- 1 S. C. moved out to K-37 BATT & R-7 BATT/R-14 ab. and occupied it at 0530.
1 Offr. & 20 C.S.M., proceeded to L-22 BATT. In my vicinity petrol engaged in
P.L. was driven in. Post on L-22 P-24 H of R-14 ab and 10 rifles opened
fire on petrol causing new losses (1 officer & 1 C.S.M. wounded 1 C.S.M.
killed missing 4 horses wounded).
1 Offr. & 20 C.S.M., proceeded along L-22 BATT to point 1640 in R-7/T-14 ab.
shouted to 2-22. At 0600. W's fired on by about 15 rifles from R-7/T-14 ab.
Information. 100 d.v. moving ^{of dest} in R-7/T-22 cent. 13 men seen in
R-22 & R-7. Large clouds due to movement also seen.

THE CITY. (cont'd.)

5. RENT BY THE MONTH. Normal.

4. A. IN D.R.M.C. Nothing new observed.
5. B. IN D.R.M.C.

5. PL. • Descriptions

5. P.L. * Deer tracks
2 miles.
Units. 1/66th acre.
Taken by 2nd Lollepde.
Taken at —

- 102 killed, 10 P.R. missing.
Injuries same as 2876-2880 to 102

- TELEGRAM - COMMENCEMENT 0710-0840 tactical areas MADI FUSAIR - UMM DASH SHIYEH
SHIYEH MIRRIH - AL ADHEE. All ^{tanks} occupied and movement normal.
KABR MUJAHID B-7/2-104X 7-19. bc is encircled by wire.
TA' A' MIRH. B-7/2-6.2 is wired 3/4 way round,

HOSPITAL AIRPORT F. 1 night reconnaissance machine approached from NORTH turned EAST
and descended to No. 1 height 12000 ft. Time 0645.

E170

THE AFGHANISTAN VALLEY.

N.A.T.

Time.	No. of shells.	Cal.	No. of shells.	Avg. shelling.	Direction.
0900-1015	10			B.7/P. 2. 33	W.E. N.W.
1030	7			B.7/P. 2. 36	N.E. N.W.
1055	0				
1105-1500	50	77	100	100	E.S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
1450	13	77	100	100	S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
0600-0615	13	42 or 59	100	100	E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E.

O.H.D.

Time.	No. of shells.	Cal.	No. of shells.	Avg. shelling.	Direction.
1030	100	100	100	100	N.E. N.W. N.W. N.W.
1400	100	100	100	100	N.E. N.W. N.W. N.W.
1430	100	100	100	100	N.E. N.W. N.W. N.W.
1500	75	20	20	20	E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E.
1530	12	30	30	30	E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E.
1600	75	20	20	20	E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E.
1630	6				
0530-0600	60	100	100	100	N.E. N.W. N.W. N.W.
0600	6				
0630	75	20	20	20	E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E. E.N.E.

amount of fire below, about 1000 feet towards the left of the valley.

in valley.

in valley.

16th November 1915.

Very cordially,

I am
 Ian McDonald,
 for Lieut. Colonel,
 General Staff,
 New Zealand
 Forces.

in valley.

in valley

~~SECRET~~

War Diary

appn. 3

E.T.

E1/71
~~Original~~
~~Duplicate~~
~~Duplicates~~

~~SECRET~~

Herewith account of operations of CHAYTOR'S FORCE
from September 16th to September 30th.

The principle operations during this period are
the following :-

September 16th - 22nd. Close touch kept with enemy
in JORDAN VALLEY and gradual
advance to JISR ED DAMIEH.

September 23rd. Capture of ES SALT and advance
up the hills EAST of JORDAN.

September 25th. Action at and capture of AMMAN.

September 29th. Surrender of Turkish Force at
ZIZIA Station and KASTAL.

6th October 1918.

C. W. C. Chaytor Major-General,
Commanding,
CHAYTOR'S FORCE.

~~SECRET~~

E172.

NARRATIVE OF CHAYTOR'S FORCE.

Sept. 16th. The Force consisted of the following units :-

A NZAC Mtn Division (less 1 Sqdn with Descorps)
A/263 Battery R.F.A.
10th Indian Mtn Bde.
98 }
109 } Sections A.A. Guns.
103 }
108 Heavy Battery.
2 Sections captured Turk 75 m.m.
1 Section captured Turk 82.9
1st Bn. B.W.I.
2nd Bn. B.W.I.
38th Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
39th Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
30th Indian Infantry Bde.
30th Machine Gun Squadron.
35th A.T. Coy., R.E.

It was first necessary to organise the Infantry so that a mobile force might be ready to accompany the Mounted Troops in the event of a move forward, and, garrisons be left in the Defences.

In accordance with instructions from G.H.Q., no forward move was to be made for the present by this FORCE; but, a careful watch to be kept on the enemy and active patrolling all along the line by day and night, and, if the enemy dropped back from any forward position this was to be occupied at once.

The position the enemy occupied was as follows : -
His Southern or Left Flank, bodies of Cavalry watched the tracks leading to MADEBA, the line of the foothills running to and North of NIMRIN were strongly entrenched, and, advanced posts on KABR SATD, TEL ER RAME and KAIR MUJAHD which were entrenched and wired, and difficult to approach through the scrub which gave opportunity for enemy ambushes. From a point 2000 yards North of SHUBET NIMRIN a line of redoubts and trenches ran across to the JORDAN facing South and meeting the river 1000 yards South of UMI ESH SHEH FORD. This line was being hurriedly wired. In rear of this line was RID HILL, which was entrenched, and, which was the chief Artillery observation point against our line. The entrenched line continued in a N.W. direction on the Northern side of the MANKATTAT EL MELLAHA and consisted of a series of single redoubts which were all wired in and had a field of fire over absolutely open ground. The line then ran in a series of trenches and redoubts towards BAKER RIDGE which was entrenched but not wired. A strong advanced position of well built sangars and wired in was held at BACHALAT, with a small advanced post on GRANT HILL. Posts in advance of the BAKER RIDGE were held at TEL EL MUSETTERAH, TEL ER RASHI and usually at TEL EL TRUNY.

The enemy as a rule were very unenterprising. No trench raids were made, and, it was rarely that he had parties beyond his entrenched positions. For this reason it was difficult to keep a close watch and make sure that he was not reducing his numbers without incurring some loss, but owing to the large number of deserters, information of his movements was gained.

~~Exhibit~~

/gained.

D.

E173

Sept. 17th. During the night of Sept. 17th and 18th close patrolling of the enemy's position was carried out, and at nightfall on the 17th a demonstration was made from the bridgeheads by a Regiment of the 2nd L.H. Brigade, and by the 1st L.H. Brigade from their Camp at TEL EL SULTAN towards JORDAN.

Sept. 18th. On the morning of September 18th the enemy opened fire with a long range heavy gun and shelled D.H.Q. Later they turned on to JERICHO.

During the night Sept. 18/19th patrols kept touch with the enemy, closely reconnoitring GRANT HILL, BAGHALAT and the trenches facing the WADY MELLAHA. Heavy rifle and Machine Gun fire was encountered, and, the enemy put down an Artillery barrage S.E. of BAGHALAT, on the ROMAN ROAD East of GRANT HILL, and opened on the ground immediately South of their trenches along the MUKADAT EL MELLAHA.

Sept. 19th.

0545 At 0545 the long range gun from SHUNET NTIRIN again shelled JERICHO and 2nd L.H. Brigade patrols encountered enemy Cavalry near TEL ER RAME moving East.

0610 At 0610 the 2nd B.W.T. Regt found BAKER RIDGE held, but TEL ER RASHID and TEL EL MIGHTERAH were found to be clear. Transport and men could be seen on the N. slopes of RED HILL.

0830 At 0830 the 2nd L.H. Brigade found TEL ER RAME occupied and the enemy also in position on the WADY EL ADEYME covering the track to MAATHI. The enemy also held KAHR MILAHID and TEL EL KEFUTIN and some movement was going on East of TEL EL SHAGHIER.

1145 Movement was also reported about SHUNET NTIRIN. At 1145 enemy guns from RED HILL shelled the MELLAHA trenches.

1330 At 1330 the 160th Brigade who had made progress along the hills asked if they could help by bringing fire from a Mountain Battery. Reply was sent giving BAKER and CHALK RIDGE and trenches N.W. of BAGHALAT.

1525 At 1525 the 2nd B.W.T. Regt took the ridge South of BAKER RIDGE. They were heavily shelled here; but dug in and held the position, while our guns shelled BAKER RIDGE.

1710 At 1710 2 Regts, 2nd L.H. Brigade pushed out towards KAHR MILAHID and SHUNET NTIRIN. About midnight bursts of rifle and Machine Gun fire were heard North up the JORDAN VALLEY and Red and White lights were seen.

Sept. 20th.

0450 At 0450 the 2nd B.W.T. occupied BAKER RIDGE and began pushing on to take CHALK RIDGE which the enemy could be seen leaving in small parties. Hospital in KH. FUSAIL had gone.

0610 Patrols to BAGHALAT during the night were fired on; but, about 0610 the 1st B.W.T. pushed out and occupied GRANT HILL and BAGHALAT and consolidated them. They were heavily shelled from RED HILL during the day. The 30th Bn.R.F. found the enemy still holding strongly the trenches North of the MELLAHA and were met by Machine Gun and Rifle fire. The enemy also put up lights and an Artillery barrage was put down. The 2nd L.H.B. found enemy still on KAHR MILAHID and in NTIRIN: patrols towards NTIRIN and DERBASI were heavily shelled especially by guns from about EL HAUD. The enemy also held positions in the foothills N. and E. of KAHR MILAHID from which they fired on parties attempting to get round that place. They continued to hold this position all day.

0915 At 0915 the 2nd B.W.T. captured CHALK RIDGE. N.Z. Patrols pushing out N. and N.W. from BAGHALAT came under shell fire and found enemy holding KH. FUSAIL.

Egypt

E 1/74

KH. FUSAIL.

S.

Sept. 30th.

- 1130 The enemy began to concentrate just South of KH. FUSAIL, possibly with a view to counter attack.
 1610 At 1610 the long range gun from W. HYSRIN again shelled JERICHO.
 1900 At 1900 orders were sent to N.Z.M.R. Brigade to push out towards TEL EL EDH DHYB and endeavour occupy it.

Sept. 31st.

- 0515 The 36th R.F. found enemy still holding the trenches opposite the MELLAHA. Patrols from AUKAH Bridgehead found enemy also holding the line South of RED HILL. The Auckland Mtd Rifles occupied KH. FUSAIL and TEL EL EDH DHYB and pushed patrols up the road running N. West and in the direction of JISR ED DAMTEH, HAFTD JOZLEH. TALAAT AIRAH was occupied at 0605. Enemy still held on in the broken ground along the JORDAN and were located finally holding a strong position along the line MELLAHA - ER MELLAHA blocking a further advance on JISR ED DAMTEH. TEL ER RAME was found still occupied by the enemy, and, considerable movement about KAER MELLAHA and the foothills strongly held. The enemy also continued to hold the trenches along the MANKATTAT EL MELLAHA. There appeared to be no guns West of JORDAN, and a great deal of movement Eastwards from behind RED HILL. During the day the enemy shelled HADEH area and JERICHO with the long range gun from HYSRIN and with 77 mm. GHORAYEH Bridgehead, and parties of 2nd L.H. Brigade moving towards HYSRIN or KAER MELLAHA.
 1615 At 1615 the enemy opened fire on EL HASKERAH. A report came from the Auckland Mtd Rifles that they seemed to be leaving HAFTD JOZLEH and patrols were investigating.
 1825 At 1825 orders were issued for N.Z.M.R. Bde to move on KH. FUSAIL at once with mobile portion of 1st and 2nd B.W.T., 36th Indian Mtn Batty and Ayrshire Batty all to be under Genl. MCILRUM. The line EL HASKERAH, EL MELLAHA, GRANT HILL and BAGHALAT to be held. The G.R.A. to push guns forward into the MELLAHA to deal with enemy guns on RED HILL. The 36th R.F. to continue pressure on tracks along the MANKATTAT EL MELLAHA especially those covering UBI ESH SHERT FORD. The 1st L.H. Brigade were ordered to HADEH in place of the N.Z.M.R. Brigade.
 As soon as Genl. MCILRUM had concentrated his force at KH. FUSAIL he was to attack JISR ED DAMTEH.

Sept. 22nd

- 0300 At 0300 the 36th R.F. found enemy weakening in the trenches on the MANKATTAT EL MELLAHA, and pushed in and occupied the trenches overlooking UBI ESH SHERT FORD. 2 Coys., 36th R.F. were brought up into the MELLAHA Posts vacated by the 36th R.F. The 36th pushed on and took UBI ESH SHERT at 0530, and continued their advance up the MANKATTAT EL MELLAHA. At the same hour the 2nd L.H. Brigade occupied TEL ER RAME, and pushed on to KAER MELLAHA where they encountered enemy.
 0700 By 0700 the N.Z.M.R. Bde took EL HAKHRUK and ABD EL KADER with 600 prisoners and the Commander of the 53rd Division. JISR ED DAMTEH was still strongly held and the enemy began to concentrate about HAFTD JOZLEH and threaten the flank of Genl. MCILRUM'S force. Therefore 1st L.H. Bde with Inverness Bty were ordered to KH. FUSAIL to deal with any attack on Genl. MCILRUM, and, to clear the West bank of the JORDAN, One Regiment 2nd L.H. Bde was ordered up to HADEH.
 1050 At 1050 the N.Z.M.R. Bde and 1st B.W.T. captured the bridgehead at JISR ED DAMTEH. Both N.Z.M.R. and B.W.T. charged the party holding the bridge under cover of Machine Gun fire and some hand to hand fighting occurred. A bridgehead was gradually established but the enemy covered the exits on the Eastern bank with Machine Guns.

Sept. 22nd.

1300

From 1500 on this day the 30th and 30th Btrn. R.F. were put together under Lt. Col. PATTERSON, DSO., and called 'PATTERSONS COLUMN'. The 1st L.H.Bde and 2nd B.W.I. concentrated to press the enemy back on HAFTD JOZEINH encountering considerable resistance in the MELAJAHT UMM AFKIN - For this operation the 2nd B.W.I. were placed under General COX'S Orders.

1810

At 1810 the enemy held the following line - TEL EL SHAGHR - KAER MULAYTD - SHUBET NYMRIN - RED HILL - position on West bank covering HAFTD JOZEINH - position on East Bank facing JISR ED DAMYEH.

2 Officers and 77 O/Rs. had been captured by the 2nd B.W.I. and the total captures for the day were 33 Officers, 660 O/Rs., 4 Machine Guns, 4 Automatic Rifles and many waggons, horses and stores.

2330

By 2330 it was known that the enemy was retiring and orders were issued to press him and inflict as much damage as possible next day. 2nd L.H.Bde on KAER MULAYTD and TEL ER RAMI sending one Squadron on NYMRIN, mobile part of 30th Inf. Bde to be directed on SHUBET NYMRIN. PATTERSONS COLUMN to concentrate in AUJAH Bridgehead, and follow 30th Inf. Bde; 1st L.H.Bde to press enemy across JORDAN opposite HAFTD JOZEINH and back into the foothills. Genl. MULAYEH to have one Btrn. B.W.I. and 1 Squadron to hold JISR ED DAMYEH, and, followed by the other Btrn. to press the enemy back into the foothills and follow him moving on ES SAID by the JISR ED DAMYEH track. G.R.A. to have all heavy artillery ready to open on NYMRIN if held. All wheels to move by the NYMRIN Road.

Sept. 23rd.

0445

At 0445 the 2nd L.H.Bde secured KAER MULAYTD and pushed on at once up the tracks leading to ATN ES STR. The 3rd L.H.Bde and 2nd B.W.I. took HAFTD JOZEINH at 0550 and found the bridge destroyed. All ground West of JORDAN was cleared of enemy. The N.Z.M.R.Bde pushed over JISR ED DAMYEH and advanced into the foothills, pushing patrols E. and N. The 1st L.H.Bde crossed JORDAN by UMM EKH SHUR FORD and moved up the ARGENTYAT Track. D.H.Q. moved to GHORANTYEH at 1420.

0910

1420

1820

1900

At 1810 the 30th Inf. Bde were in SHUBET NYMRIN with a Squadron 2nd L.H.Bde in front. The 2nd L.H.Bde were in visual communication with D.H.Q. from the hills to the South of the NYMRIN Road having encountered slight resistance. No communication was got with 1st L.H.Bde owing to their Wireless pack falling over a precipice. At 1900 the N.Z.M.R.Bde took ES SAID. The only opposition was from a body of enemy holding a wired in position with Machine Guns across the JISR ED DAMYEH Track. The Canterbury Bde Rifles outflanked, and then rushed this post. From the time they left JISR ED DAMYEH the captures of the Brigade up to and including the taking of ES SAID were 312 prisoners, 2 Machine Guns, 2 - 4.2 INCH and 1 - HM 77 M.M. PATTERSONS COLUMN (less 30th R.F. who were completely exhausted by their heavy work in the JORDAN among the clay hills) were on the march to NYMRIN. The Squadron 2nd L.H.Bde pushed on up the NYMRIN - SAID road to locate any damage done to it.

Instructions were received from G.H.Q. during the night to harass the enemy, and cut off his retreat North from AMMAN. The JISR ED DAMYEH Detachment was to remain. The force was to gain touch with the Arab Army.

Sept. 24th.

0345

At 0345 Squadron 2nd L.H.Bde reported road blown up about 6 miles ahead. 30th Inf. Bde were ordered at once to send working party with picks and shovels up the road to repair. Orders were left to PATTERSONS COLUMN for 30th R.F. to hold NYMRIN while 30th followed as rearguard to the Force.

/Force.

5.

- Sept. 24th. 0700 N.Z.M.R. Bde pushed reconnaissances out E. and N. of ES SAIT and met opposition about 0700 at SUMAYLIAH. The 2nd L.H. Bde met opposition XMAS at AYN ES SYR being fired on by 77 M.M. guns.
- 0850 By 0850 the road was repaired, and, the 20th Ind. Inf. Bde continued their march taking over ES SAIT from N.Z.M.R. Bde who marched to SUMAYLIAH followed by the 1st L.H. Bde. The 2nd L.H. Bde reached AYN HUMAR later in the day. By the evening the force (less 3rd R.F. at NTHRYN and the SYR ED DAHYEH detachment) was concentrated about ES SAIT with Mounted Troops about SUMAYLIAH.
- Orders were issued for the N.Z.M.R. and 2nd L.H. Bdes to move on AMMAN at 0800 next day, the 1st L.H. Bde following at 0930. The 1st B.W.T. to march to SUMAYLIAH and be there by 0700. If the enemy were found holding AMMAN lightly, attack to be pressed in, but, if strongly the troops holding outlying trenches were to be driven in and the place shelled and retreat Northwards was to be cut off; but, assault deferred until the Infantry should arrive. A request was sent for AMMAN to be bombed.
- Sept. 25th.
- 0600 During the night the railway was cut near KALAAT EZ ZERKA Station by a party of Auckland Mtd Rifles.
- 0745 The Mounted troops advanced on AMMAN at 0600, N.Z.M.R. Bde from N.W. with their right on the main ES SAIT - AMMAN Road, the 2nd L.H. Bde from the West. The 1st L.H. Bde followed keeping a watch on the Country to the North. D.H.Q. were established on Hill 3040 at 0745.
- 0850 At 0850 N.Z.M.R. Bde found enemy holding ridge N.W. of AMMAN about 200 strong. There was also some movement on Hill 3039. The enemy opened fire with two batteries of small guns and there was a considerable amount of Machine Gun fire. On the right 2nd L.H. Bde captured 106 prisoners with 4 Machine Guns.
- 1000 At 1000 one Regiment 1st L.H. Bde was sent to the Northern flank of N.Z.M.R. Bde and to be under Genl. MULDRUM.
- 1110 At 1110 N.Z.M.R. Bde reported that Canterbury Mtd Rifles were ready to gallop part of the defences opposite to them, but they were brought up by a steep cliff, the only other way being between two hills held by Machine Guns. The G.O.C., now ordered the attack to be pressed in, Mountain Guns with each Brigade being ordered well up to assist.
- 1430 At 1430 another Regiment 1st L.H. Bde was ordered to Genl. MULDRUM'S left.
- 1517 By 1517 the enemy's resistance was collapsing, the Canterbury Mtd. Rifles captured the Citadel, 2nd L.H. Bde the hill East of it. AMMAN Town was found clear, and the 2nd L.H. Bde crossed the WADY AMMAN and pushed up on to 3039. On the Northern flank the 1st L.H. Regt caught several enemy guns trying to get away and by 1630 the place was taken.
- The 20th Indian Infantry Bde were ordered to leave a Battalion at SUMAYLIAH and march to AMMAN, handing over ES SAIT to the 59th R.F. 18th R.H.A. Bde and 1st B.W.T. were also ordered to AMMAN. The 1st L.H. Bde took up a position near the Station with the N.Z.M.R. Bde just South of it. The 2nd L.H. Bde bivouacked on the Western slope of 3039.
- Owing to the report of the advance of the Southern Force of Turks, the 2nd L.H. Bde were ordered to push down South and blow up the railway line as far South as possible. The reason of this was as follows :- The Turkish Force unless it chose to try and get to the JORDAN VALLEY which was improbable would have to take the DARA EL HAJ and pass East of AMMAN or attack that place. Whichever course the Turkish Commander took it was to our advantage to make his march as long as possible and increase his water difficulties.

E1/77

- Sept. 25th. /difficulties. If he chose the DARB EL HAJ the nearest water from KASTAL excluding AMMAN was at the WADY EL HAMMAN. Orders were sent to the 1st L.H. Bde to push out towards WADY EL HAMMAN and KALAAT EZ ZERKA to clear up the situation there. In case the enemy should attempt to move by the JORDAN VALLEY the troops at SHUWEIR HURRAH, ES SATE and SUMAYLAH were ordered to strongly entrench those places, and the 2nd L.H. Bde to closely watch the country between the railway inclusive to HAUR, keeping a strong detachment at AIN ES STEY.
- Sept. 26th. The 1st L.H. Bde reconnoitred WADY EL HAMMAN and after a short action captured 106 prisoners and 1 gun at KALAAT EZ ZERKA. Enemy both Cavalry and Infantry were seen and reported to be moving South.
- 1910 A report was also received of Turks and Germans with guns at ER RUMAN, the N.Z.M.R. Bde sent a detachment to investigate. The 2nd L.H. Bde reconnoitring South encountered advanced troops of enemy Southern Force near KASTAL. The line was cut just North of ZIZA Station. The total captures at AMMAN up to date were 2563 prisoners (excluding 300 sick) 10 guns of which 3 were heavy, and many Machine Guns.
- Sept. 27th. 0700 The 1st L.H. Bde moved to WADY EL HAMMAN at 0700. The 3rd L.H. Regt were already at that place and engaged the enemy North of the WADY with Aeroplane Co-operation. The troops were directed by the Aeroplane to where the enemy were, the Aeroplane then came down and Machine Gunned the Turks as the troops attacked with the result that 300 prisoners and 2 Machine Guns were captured. A Reconnoitring party was sent through KH. ES SAMRA to MAFRAK.
- 0830 At 0830 the 2nd L.H. Bde met Turks South of LIBAN Station. From a prisoner taken here, it was known that the NAAM garrison were with the force moving on KASTAL and they were put by the prisoner at about 6000. The patrol to ER RUMAN found no enemy there.
- By this evening the 1st L.H. Bde held the water at WADY EL HAMMAN, with a Regiment at KALAAT EZ ZERKA. The N.Z.M.R. Bde were also ordered to have a detachment East of AMMAN, keeping watch on the DARB EL HAJ.
- The reconnaissance to MAFRAK found no water there and native reports gave none between that place and DERAA, except 2 small springs.
- Sept. 28th. 0655 At 0655 the Southern Turkish Force was located at KASTAL with 3 trains in the Station. At 1515 a message was dropped on the force by Aeroplane calling on the Commander to surrender, pointing out that all possible water he could reach North of KASTAL was held by us, and, promising that unless he did surrender our Aeroplanes would be over next day to bomb his force.
- 1st L.H. Bde found 10 Officers and 70 O/Rs sick in KH. ES SAMRA. These were sent in.
- PATTERSONS COLUMN ceased to exist from 1315 today.
- Sept. 29th. No answer was returned to the message calling on the Turks to surrender by 0845, and arrangements were made to bomb them in the afternoon. At 1145 however negotiations were opened with the 5th L.H. Regiment who were across the railway South of LIBAN. The situation was very difficult owing to large numbers of Arabs who surrounded the Turkish position intent on looting. Any sign of a White Flag was likely to precipitate matters, and, the 2nd L.H. Bde were despatched to KASTAL leaving at 1300. By dark two small collisions occurred owing to the Arabs pressing in on the Turks.

E.P.S.

E1/78

Turks.

7.

Sept. 29th. On the arrival of the Brigade a cordon was put round the Turks, and the Arabs were told that any attempt to rush in on the Turks would be met by force. Even after our troops were out, the Arabs attempted to get at the Hospital and had to be driven off. The Turkish Commander KAAIMAKAN ALI BEY WHAHABY was brought by car to D.H.Q.

Sept. 30th. The N.Z.M.R.Ds relieved the 3rd L.H.Ds at KASTAL, and took up a line of posts round the Turkish force. The Arabs gradually drew off, and the Turks who were able to march were marched into AMMAN. Large numbers of sick had to be left for the time being and were brought in later. The number of captures at KASTAL were as follows :-

Prisoners.	-	4068 (excluding 503 sick)
Guns.	-	13
Machine Guns.	-	35
Automatic Rifles.	-	2

The total captures of CHAYTOR'S FORCE from the beginning of operations to September 30th were as follows :-

Prisoners.	-	10,322 (including sick)
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A large number of Arabs and local inhabitants who were serving with the Turks deserted and are now in this district having returned to their homes.

GUNS.

5.9 gun	1.	77 m.m.	32
5.9 How	3.	75 m.m.	6
A.A.	1.	3"	2
10 c.m.	10	13-pdr H.A.C.	2

TOTAL -	57
Machine Guns.	132
Automatic Rifles	13
Hotchkiss Rifles	1
Lewis Gun	1

	147

Wireless Sets.	2
Railway engines.	11
Railway Trucks and carriages.	108
Vehicles.	142

Immense quantities of shell, S.A.A., and other material.

A large number of motor lorries were abandoned by the enemy after being rendered useless.

OUR CASUALTIES.

	Offs.	O/Rs.
Killed.	3	24
Wounded.	10	95
Missing.		7

TOTAL.	13	126

Of the wounded officers two subsequently died of wounds.