

AWM4
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Artillery

Item number: 13/24/7

Title: Headquarters, 19th Brigade, Royal
Horse Artillery, Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps Mounted
Division

May 1918



AWM4-13/24/7

S. of E. & I.

Ref.
composite
map
ES SALT
A.6.b.3.6.

- 1918
May
20. Notts. R.H.A. moved after dark into their ~~new~~ new positions in WADI AUJAH (H3.Y.26.& 27.)
21. 19th Bde. H.Q. moved into WADI AUJAH (H 3 Y 25 & 26) during morning. A/H.A.C. relieves A. Batty. 301 F.A. Bde. in right group of AUJAH Defences, and one section of B/H.A.C. relieved 2 guns of B Bty 301 F.A. Bde. after dusk. Bde. H.Q. B/H.A.C. Notts. R.H.A. coming under orders of Major Carter commanding Left Group of AUJAH Defences, together with C. Bty. 301 F.A. Bde. (? Howitzers) No. 11 Mountain Battery (3.7 Howitzers) and Hong Kong & Singapore Bty. (2.75).
22. Other section of B/H.A.C. relieved other 3 guns of B/301 F.A. Bde.
23. 19th Bde. Batteries registered.
25. In evening enemy shelled AUJAH WADI with 77 mm. shell.
26. Lt.-Col. Hon. R. M. Preston, D.S.O., rejoined this H.Q. from furlough to U.K., taking over command of Bde. from Mjr. R. H. Allen, M.C., and AUJAH Defences, Left Group, from Major E. G. W. Carter at 1200 on 27th inst.
27. All Btys. in Left Group fired 5 rounds per gun on Green & Brown Hills in hope of making enemy disclose his gun position by replying, but with no success.
29. & 30. Lt.-Col. Hon. R. M. Preston to R.A. H.Q., AUJAH Defences, to temporarily take over duties of C.R.A. in absence of Lt.-Col. V. M. Ferguson, D.S.O., Major W. A. Moore taking command of Left Group.
- 31st Lt.-Col. Hon. R. M. Preston returned and assumed command of Left Group.
Intelligence Summary Appx. III. attached.

W 17
6

APPENDIX I.

Confidential.

Ref. Composite Map
ES SALT
2nd Edition.

Report on loss of 9 guns of 19th Bde.
R.H.A.

Position at 0500
1/5/18.

1. On the night 30-1 the 4th A.L.H. Bde. took up a position roughly semi-circular facing West on the circumference of a semi-circle 1000 yds. radius, centre of which ^{was} about A.6.b.3.6. Artillery was disposed as follows:-
19th Bde. R.H.A. H.Q. A.6.b.3.6.
A/H.A.C. Arc of fire 270°-360°, A.6.b.0.5.
Notts. R.H.A. Rt. Section Arc 250°-340° A.6.b.2.5.
Lt. Section " 250°-340° A.6.d.5.5.
B.H. A.C. Position of readiness. A.18.c.
One squadron 1st A.L.H. Bde. was on Red Hill about C.7.a. and one squadron 4th A.L.H. Bde. on their immediate right. I asked for and obtained one squadron which was placed at A.18.a. to protect B/H.A.C.

Intentions.

2. G.O.C. 4th Bde. informed me that if he was attacked he intended to fall back in a southerly direction with his right about A.18.a. and his left on Red Hill.
My intention was to afford as much covering fire for the movement as possible, and my first pre-occupation was to ensure that the Notts. and A/H.A.C. could withdraw as far as this line. I placed B/H.A.C. South of this line and gave the O.C. instructions to come into action facing North or West accordingly as any attack might develop.
I did not place B/H.A.C. in action owing to the difficulty of changing front in this very difficult country and I considered it quite possible that an attack might start from HAFID IOZELE in an Easterly direction.

Ammunition.

3. On the night 30-1 I received 912 rounds of 18 pdr. ammunition. I had only expended some 100 rds. on the day previous and I did not ask for any more as I should have had no vehicles with which to move it. This ammunition I ordered to be dumped at A/H.A.C. and Notts.

19 Bde
May '18

Ammunition.

3. On the night 30-1 I received 315 rounds of 18 pdr. dumped at A/H.V.C. and Notts. to move it. This ammunition I ordered to be more as I should have had no vehicles with which on the day previous and I did not ask for any ammunition. I had only expended some 100 rds.

an easterly direction.

that an attack might start from HAKID LOXLEY in cult country and I considered it quite possible difficulty of changing front in this very difficult I did not place B/H.V.C. in action owing to the developed.

North or West accordingly as any attack might O.C. instructions to come into action facing the placed B/H.V.C. South of this line and gave the A/H.V.C. could withdraw as far as this line. I occupation was to ensure that the Notts. and for the movement as possible, and my first decision intention was to afford as much covering fire Red Hill.

Intentions.

5.

G.O.C. 4th Bde. informed me that if he was attacked he intended to fall back in a southerly direction with his right about A.18.s. and his left on G.O.C. 4th Bde. informed me that if he was attacked

feet B/H.V.C.

one squadron which was placed at A.18.s. to protect their immediate right. I asked for and obtained about C.V.s. and one squadron 4th A.L.H. Bde. on One squadron 1st A.L.H. Bde. was on Red Hill

R.H.V.C. Position of readiness. A.18.c. Lt. Section " 2500-3400 A.6.p.5.2. Notts. R.H.V.C. Rt. Section " 2500-3400 A.6.p.5.2. A/H.V.C. Arc of fire 2700-3600 A.6.p.0.2. 1st Bde. R.H.V.C. H.6. A.6.p.3.6. disposed as follows:-

centre of which about A.6.p.3.6. Artillery was, circumference of a semi-circle 1000 yds. radius, position roughly semi-circular facing West on the On the night 30-1 the 4th A.L.H. Bde. took up a

Position at 0500

1.

2nd Edition.

MS SALT

Ref. Composite map

Confidential.

Report on loss of 9 Guns of 1st Bde.

R.H.V.

APPENDIX I.

W/12

down the valley with the assistance of the Yeomanry with rifles, their escort on their right and the G.O.C. 4th Bde. H.Q., which he had pushed into the line, on their left front. They had only some 20 rounds per gun left. As the attack was checked I ordered the O.C. to stop firing and to conserve his last few rounds so as to enable the G.O.C. 4th Bde. to establish his line across the valley as soon as the troops from his right moved. I then moved to join the G.O.C. 4th Bde. at A.30.a. and took the O.C. B/H.A.C. with me.

4th Phase
(8)

On arrival of the G.O.C. 4th Bde. I found the enemy again pressing in about A.34 and C.3. G.O.C. 4th Bde. had collected two troops which he pushed out towards A.35 and C.4. These two troops were hard pressed. The enemy had also reached A.35.a. and A.39 central. With the concurrence of G.O.C. 4th Bde. I ordered O.C. B/H.A.C. to move rapidly through A.36 to about C.11. On arrival there he found any possibility of a position he was to come into action, expend his last few rounds, and then move down the valley road till he reached old ? H.Q. about F(?). There I ordered him to halt, report on the place to A. Corps (?) and to ask for more communication and on receipt of same to come North again to rejoin the 4th A.L.H. Bde. If necessary he was to send his wagons right down to the bridgehead for more ammunition. Although the two troops about A.35 and C.4 were pushed back east of his line of retreat, the B/H.A.C. got his battery through with the loss of one gun under heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

5th Phase
(9)

As I saw that the line by which B/H.A.C. had got away was closed I now sent back my adjt. and orderly officer to bring on the left sections of Notts. & A/H.A.C. as far as A.30.c. and A.36.a. instead of coming into action with the right sections. ? ? I also sent instructions that the right sections back up, follow their right sections, and come into action alongside of them. The left sections of the two batteries came into action at a place indicated North A.30.c. and A/H.A.C. at A.36.c. My intention was to try and hold on here as long as possible so as to form a pivot on which the cavalry, who were coming through the hills in a Northerly direction, somewhere behind my batteries, might form and establish a junction with our troops on Red Hill. I might possibly have got the two left sections away on the road taken by B/H.A.C. had the two troops alluded to in the list ? of para. 8 been able to hold on; but as the enemy was by now in A.36.c. I did not consider this possible.

6th Phase
(10)

I now saw the left sections of Notts. and A/H.A.C. in action at A.30.c. and A.36.a. respectively, facing South West and their two right sections moving up. On arrival the horses of the right section of A/H.A.C. were mown down by machine gun fire (the Notts. horses were further back and sheltered by a small rise) the enemy were across their only line of retreat and advancing from some 200 to 300 yards away on their front and left, so I rode down to A/H.A.C. and ordered the guns to be dismantled and the men and teams to withdraw up the hills to the East. I then rode back to the Notts. who were firing their last few rounds into the enemy on 3 sides of them and a few hundred yards away and ordered the O.C. to continue as long as possible and then to withdraw in the same direction as the men and horses of A/H.A.C. I then returned to A/H.A.C. and found that my orders had been obeyed and there were only dead horses and as far as I saw, two dead men by the guns.

(11) About A.32 I found the O.C. Notts, my orderly officer, and my adjt. I ordered them to collect all teams somewhere behind the H.Q. 4th Bde., which was now established about D.1.

so that we might return for the guns in case of the possibility of a counter-attack and I myself joined the G.O.C. 4th Bde.

12. I remained with the G.O.C. 4th Bde. some time to see if there was any possibility of a counter-attack, but as the enemy had now taken Red Hill and turned his left flank he informed me there was no possibility of counter-attack but that he would have to withdraw still further.
As he also stated that he was short of S.A.A. I suggested that I should return to the telephone at F.16 and arrange for ammunition for him and also for B/H.A.C.
I met the G.O.C. ANZACS on the road and informed him of the situation. Telephoned R.A. Des. Corps. for ammunition and joined B/H.A.C.
13. As reinforcements had arrived and also ammunition I had B/H.A.C. refilled and despatched Lt. Hobbs of the 19th B.A.C. with 100,000 rounds of S.A.A. up to the 4th Bde.
General Chaytor had now taken command of the whole area so I reported myself to his G.S.O.1., (I was the senior Artillery Officer present), to act as his O.C.R.A. until the arrival of O.C. 20th Bde. R.H.A. to whom I handed over.
14. In conclusion I wish to state that I assume complete responsibility for the loss of all the guns. My orders were implicitly obeyed by all three commanders whose action, as well as that of their batteries, was in my opinion highly creditable.
When I ordered the guns to be abandoned I do not consider there was any possibility of saving them as there were none of our troops between them and the enemy, and I consider I was justified in endeavouring to prevent an unnecessary sacrifice of the lives of the personnel.

(Signed) A. H. Allen.

Major.
Commanding 19th Bde., R.H.A.

3/5/18.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages
will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
at Camp. 1/2 E. S. 4. 1 to mile A 6. 4. 2. 6	1		B/HAC arrived during night 30-1 + we intended to move in with 400 yards S of B's HQ to look for position after dawn. During night BAC weapons arrived with 912 rounds which were dumped by the Batteries (A/HAC + NOTTS). At 0700 the Tanks detached for JERUSALEM for attack on our position. (For particulars see APPENDIX I attached)	JAC
	2		During morning collected details and stragglers of the B's + went into bivouac 1 1/2 miles W of GHORANIYEH	JAC
	4		During afternoon this HQ moved back to former position as before the operation, Batteries to their former Brigade group areas. Brigade, after tea, Camp Reserve.	JAC
	7		Camps bombed in early morning by 7 enemy planes. No casualties in Brigade.	JAC
	9		1st HQ, 2nd HQ, 3rd HQ and 52 men sent to LODD to find 6 guns to bring and 5000 yds pick up 3 guns at JERUSALEM on return journey. Brigade supplied 250 men to work in front line digging + working at night.	JAC
	10		100 men supplied by Brigade to work in front line during night.	JAC
	11		50	JAC
	13		50	JAC
	15		B/HAC left in aft to where A Bty 302nd FA Brigade at GHORANIYEH 320000 HRS	JAC
	16		Recommenced position in WADI AVIA for battery operations	JAC
	17		Recommenced WADI CL 0 2000 for daily work by 1st Bty. Batteries could move for work at night if called out	JAC
	18		1st Bty. Batteries to be sent also for work in WADI AVIA	JAC

19th Bde R.A.A.

May 18

WAR DIARY

OR

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II, and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
Ref. Complete Map ES 5 MET N 6 6 3 6	20		14th Bn HQ moved after dark into their new position in WADI AVTAH (N 6 Y 2 6 4 + 1)	
	21		14th Bn HQ moved into WADI AVTAH (N 6 Y 2 6 4 + 1) during morning. A/HQ relieved A Bty 201 FA Bn in right group of AVTAH Defences & one section of B/HQ relieved 2 guns of B Bty 201 FA Bn after dark. Bn HQ B/HQ 14th Bn moved into area of Major CARTER's command. 2nd left group of AVTAH Defences, together with C Bty 201 FA Bn (4 4 Hrs. 14th Bn). Wadi Avtah Defences (3-7 Hrs. 14th Bn) and Hong Kong Singapore (2 75).	See
	22		Other section of B/HQ relieved 2 guns of B Bty & a 3rd	See
	23		14th Bn Batteries repositioned	See
	24		In evening enemy shelled AVTAH WADI with 77 mm shell	See
	26		Lt Col Hon R M PRESTON DSO rejoined this HQ after forgoing to UK, taking over command of Brigade from Major R H ALLEN MC and AVTAH Defences left group from Major CARTER at 1200 on 27th met on 28th at 2 50 Hrs. 14th Bn	See
	27	0345	All Btys in left group fired 5 rounds per gun in hope of making enemy displace his gun positions by replying, but with no success.	See
	29		Lt Col Hon R M PRESTON to RANG AVTAH Defences to become temporarily sole new duties of CCA in (see also note of 28th Hrs. 14th Bn)	See
	30		(see also note of 28th Hrs. 14th Bn) Lt Col Hon R M PRESTON DSO, Major W A MOORE taking command of Left group	See
	31		Lt Col Hon R M PRESTON returned & resumed command of Left group for Intelligence Summary App. III attached	See

Penetration 6/11/44
from 192 Hrs. RHA

19th Bde. R.I. & A

May 18.

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.
(In pads of 100.)
No. of Message... 2 out

Prefix.....	Code.....	Words.....	Charge.....	This message is on a/c of:	Read. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.					
War Diary		Sent		APPENDIX Service.	Date.....
		At.....m.			
		To.....			
		By.....			
		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		From.....	By.....

TO {	2
------	---

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* 0111			

and carried out night firing on
back to W BARR from 2000-2100 a.a.
"C" Small enemy movement throughout
day to W 26 a. a.a. 1700 One man
approached MG emplacement on T16 b.

From	PC	LEFT GROUP
Place		
Time	1148	

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.	(Z)	O.E. Barnett Lieut
Censor.	Signature of Addressee or person authorised to telegraph in his name.	

* This line should be erased if not required.
(3796.) Wt. W 492/M1647. 650,000 Pads. 5/17. H. W. & V., Ltd. (B. 1187.)

"A" Form.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

Army Form C. 2121.
(In pads of 100.)
No. of Message.....

Prefix.....	Code.....	Words.....	Charge.....	This message is on a/c of:	Read. at.....m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.					
NOA		Sent		APPENDIX Service.	Date.....
		At.....m.			
		To.....			
		By.....			
		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")		From.....	By.....

TO {	C17A	AUJAH	DFN.
------	------	-------	------

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	AAA
* 0111	30/5/18		

Intelligence report ending 1000
30/5/18 a.a. 'A' 1430 7700 Gun
fired 5 HE from about V31 on MUSALLABAN
1545 4 guns fired 2 salves at
MUSALLABAN 0700 7700 fired on
MUSALLABAN sound hearing 30° to 35° from
W 35° 35' a.a. 0730 to 1000 slight
shelling from guns V31 + R17
MUSALLABAN a.a. 0945-1000 20 Rds
in 434. 30° from V15 to cont 'B'
1070 No 11 fired 19 rds on R 36 a 7-8 and
17 Rds on T17 cont at 0830 a.a.
HKS fired 17 HE at enemy movement
GREEN Hill + Brown also 4 HE on
Brown Hill at 0915 a.a. No 11 registered
possible MG position in W 21 b 1305
also registered danger on GREEN Hill 1915

From		
Place		
Time		

The above may be forwarded as now corrected.	(Z)	
Censor.	Signature of Addressee or person authorised to telegraph in his name.	

* This line should be erased if not required.
(3796.) Wt. W 492/M1647. 650,000 Pads. 5/17. H. W. & V., Ltd. (B. 1187.)

APPENDIX I

Report on loss of 9 June of 1918 R.H.A.

W/1/6

Confidential
Ref. Composite Map
CG SALT
2nd Edition

Position at 0500
11/5/18

① On the night 30-1 the 4th A.L.H. Bty took up a position roughly semicircular facing West in the circumference of a semicircle 1000 yards radius, centre of which about A.C.B. 3.6. Artillery was disposed as follows.

1st Bty R.H.A. H.Q.

A.C.B. 3.6.

A/H.A.C.

Line of fire 270°-360°

A.C.B. 0.5.

Norths R.H.A. Bty. In line. H.Q.

250°-340°

A.C.B. 2.5.

Left Section

250°-340°

A.C.B. 2.5.

B.H.A.C. Position of readiness

A.H.C.

One squadron 1st A.L.H. Bty was on RED HILL about C. 7. a. and one squadron 4th A.L.H. Bty on their immediate right.

I asked for and obtained one squadron which was placed at A. 18. a. to protect B/H.A.C.

Intentions

②

G.O.C. 4th Bty informed me that if he was attacked he intended to fall back in a southerly direction with his right about A. 18. a. and his left on RED HILL.

My intention was to afford as much covering fire for the movement as possible, and my first presumption was to ensure that the Norths and A/H.A.C. could withdraw as far as the line.

I placed B/H.A.C. south of this line and gave the A.C. instructions to come into action facing North or West according as any attack might develop.

I did not place B/H.A.C. in action owing to the difficulty of changing front in this very difficult country and I considered it quite possible that on attack might start from H.A.F. 102 ELE in an easterly direction.

Ammunition.

③

On the night 30-1 I received 912 rounds of 7.5 in ammunition. I had only expended some 100 rounds in the day previous and I did not ask for any more as I should have had no vehicles with which to move it.

This ammunition I ordered to be dumped by B/H.A.C. and Norths.

19th Bde RHA

May '18

so that they would fire this ammunition in the first instance and then move with full vehicles.

1st Phase of Hostile Attack.

(6) About 0800 the enemy detached from TISH GO DANIEH bridgehead and attacked in an Easterly and South Easterly direction.

A further attack developed from the Wades to the North and North West of an line, and at some period later, I cannot say exactly when, a further wave moved due South and due East from NAVID TOZELE.

Total enemy strength I estimate as 4000.

Action of 19th B^{de}

(5) Notts & A/H.A.C. immediately opened fire and I ordered A/H.A.C. to run forward their right section and turn their fire on the attack moving South East as I considered it most important to try and check this movement in order to enable our cavalry to withdraw to the prearranged line.

B/H.A.C. immediately came into action about A.18.0. facing due West.

2nd Phase

(6) About 0900 G.O.C. 4th B^{de} informed me he was commencing to withdraw so I ordered the right sections of A/H.A.C. and Notts to move to positions, Notts in the vicinity of B/H.A.C. and A/H.A.C. 1000 yards further to the South. I further ordered the two Battery commanders to withdraw their left sections as soon as their right sections were in action.

I considered that this would bring all my 3 batteries into action behind the prearranged line.

This movement was successfully carried out, but as I shall explain later, the left sections of both batteries were moved further South.

3rd Phase

(7)

G.O.C. 4th B^{de} had moved his H.Q. at 0900 to a position some 2000 yards South of B/H.A.C. about A.30.0.

As soon as I had seen both Right sections of Notts & A.H.A.C. successfully on the way I moved my H.Q. to join the G.O.C. 4th B^{de} and personally went to B/H.A.C.

I found, on arrival, that they had checked the hostile attack about 200 yards West of the main track running

down the valley with the assistance of the ^{W17} gunners
with rifles, their exert on their right, and the C.O.C. 4th
B^{de} H.Q. which he had pushed into the line on their
^{left} front.

They had only one or two rounds per gun left.
As the attack was checked I ordered the C.O. to stop firing
and conserve his last few rounds so as to meet the C.O.C.
4th B^{de} to establish his line across the valley as soon as the
troops from his right moved.
I then moved to join the C.O.C. 4th B^{de} at A.30.0 and took
the C.O.C. C/M.A.C. with me.

4th Phase.

- (2) On arrival at C.O.C. 4th B^{de} I found the enemy again
pressing on about A.34.0 and C.3.
C.O.C. 4th B^{de} had alerted two troops which he pushed out
towards A.35.0 and C.4. These two troops were hard pressed.
The enemy had also reached A.35.0 and A.39.0 untried.
With the concurrence of C.O.C. 4th B^{de} I asked C.O. C/M.A.C. to
move rapidly through A.36.0 about C.11. On arrival
there if he found any possibility of a position to use to come
into action, expend his last few rounds and then move
down the valley road till he reached old Australian H.Q. about P.
There I ordered him to halt, report on the phone to Colonel H.Q.
to ask for more ammunition and on receipt of same to move
back again to rejoin the 4th A.C.H. B^{de}.
If necessary he was to send his engine right down to the
hedgehead for more ammunition.
Although the two troops about A.35.0 and C.4. were pushed
back East of his line of retreat C.O. C/M.A.C. got his battery
through with the loss of one gun under a heavy rifle and
machine gun fire.

5th Phase.

- (3) As I saw that the line by which B.H.A.C. had got away
was closed I now sent back my adjutant and orderly
officer to bring in the left sections of A.35.0 A/M.A.C.
so far as A.30.0 and A.36.0 instead of coming into
action with their right sections. I also sent G.D. (para 6)
I also sent instructions that the right sections were to hold
up, follow their left sections and come into action.

19th Bde RHA

May '18

alongside of them.

Witzg

4

The left sections of the two batteries came into action at the places indicated. At 10.30 a.m. and 11.14 a.m. at 11.36 a.m. The intention was to try and hold on here as long as possible to as to form a pivot on which the cavalry, who were moving through the hills in a southerly direction somewhere between my batteries might form and establish a junction with our troops on RED HILL.

I might possibly have got the two left sections away on the north bank by 11.40 a.m. but the two troops attached to in the last 3 of Para 8. I am not to hold on. but as the enemy were by now in 11.36 a.m. I did not consider this feasible.

6th Phase

(10) I now had the left sections of Mott's 2 A.H.A.C. in action at 11.30 a.m. & 11.36 a.m. respectively, facing South West and then two right sections moving up.

On arrival the horses of the right section of A/H.A.C. were mown down by machine gun fire (the North horses were further back and sheltered by a small rise) the enemy were across their line of retreat and advancing from some 200 to 300 yards away on their front and left so I rode down to A.H.A.C. and ordered the guns to be dismantled and the men and teams to withdraw up the hills to the East.

I then rode back to the Mott's who were firing their last few rounds with the enemy on 3 sides of them and a few hundred yards away and ordered the A.C. to continue as long as possible and then to withdraw in the same direction as the men and horses of A/H.A.C.

I then returned to A/H.A.C. and found that my orders had been obeyed and there were only dead horses and as far as I saw no dead men by the guns.

(11) About 6.22 I found the O.C. Mott's my adjutant officer and my adjutant. I advised them to collect all teams remaining behind the H.B. 4th Bde which was now established about 01. so that we might return for the guns in case of the possibility of a counter attack and I myself joined the 6th Bde 4th Bde.

19th Bde R.H.S.

May '18

W1710 ③

(12) I remained with the G.O.C. 4th B^{de} for some time to see if there was any possibility of a counter attack, but as the enemy had now taken RED HILL and turned his left flank he informed me there was no possibility of counter attack but that he would have to withdraw still further.

As he also stated that he was short of S.A.A. I suggested that I should return to the telephone at F.16 and arrange for ammunition for him and also for C/H.A.C.

I met the G.O.C. Briggs on the road informed him of the situation telephoned P.A. Bertraps for ammunition and joined C/H.A.C.

(13) As reinforcements had arrived and also ammunition. I had C/H.A.C. refilled and despatched eight bottles of the 19th B.A.C. with 100,000 rounds of S.A.A. up to the 4th B^{de}.

General Clayton had now taken command of the whole area so I reported myself to his G.S.O.1. (I was the Senior Artillery Officer present) to act as his G.C.P.A. until the arrival of G.O.C. 20th B^{de} S.A.A. to whom I handed over.

(14) In conclusion I wish to state that I assume complete responsibility for the loss of all the guns. My actions were completely dictated by all those battery commanders whose action, as well as that of their batteries, was in my opinion highly creditable.

When I ordered the guns to be abandoned I do not consider there was any possibility of saving them as there was none of our troops between them and the enemy; and I consider I was justified in endeavouring to prevent an unnecessary sacrifice of the lives of the personnel.

A.H. Allen Esq.

3/5/16

Commanding 19th B^{de} S.A.A.

19 Bde R H A.

May '18