


AWM4
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/46/24 Part 2

Title: General Staff, Headquarters 3rd
Australian Division

October 1918



AWM4-1/46/24PART2

RW.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Disposition of Units as at 12 midnight, 30th Septr.-1st Octbr.1918.Map ref: Sheet 62c, 1/40,000.

Divisional Command Post	...	F.26.c.80.80
Divisional Headquarters	...	ROISEL
Divisional Engineer H.Q.	...	F.26.c.80.80
9th Field Coy.	...	F.16.a.80.50
10th do.	...	F.16.c.0.70
11th do.	...	F.27.d.00.70
Divisional Signal Coy.	F.26.c.80.80
9th Aust. Inf. Bde H.Q.	...	F.17.a.30.10
33rd Bn.	...	A.20.c.50.50
34th Bn.	...	F.29.b.70.80
35th Bn.	...	A.26.b.40.20
9th A.L.T.M.Bty	...	F.23.a.80.80
10th Aust. Inf. Bde H.Q.	...	F.17.d.70.40
37th Bn.	...	F.17.d.70.20
38th Bn.	...	F.3.c.40.50
39th Bn.	...	F.18.a.70.20
40th Bn.	...	F.18.a.70.50
10th A.L.T.M.Bty	...	E.24.b.80.30
11th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	...	F.27.d.00.70
41st Bn.	...	F.29.b.70.80
42nd Bn.	...	F.28.c.30.70
43rd Bn.	...	F.29.a.90.70
44th Bn.	...	A.27.b.70.10
11th A.L.T.M.Bty	...	F.27.d.00.70
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn. H.Q.	...	F.26.c.10.10
9th A.M.G. Coy	...	F.27.d.00.70
10th do.	...	F.17.d.70.40
11th do.	...	E.18.a.30.70
23rd do.	...	F.17.a.70.20
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. H.Q.	...	F.15.b.30.00
A.D.M.S.	...	F.26.c.80.80
9th Field Ambulance	...	ST. EMILIE
10th do.	...	LONGAVESNES
11th do.	...	ST. EMILIE
D.A.D.V.S.	...	K.10.b.40.40
3rd Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	...	E.28.b.20.30
3rd Aust. Div. Train H.Q.	...	K.10.d.20.80
22nd Coy.	...	K.22.central
23rd Coy.	...	J.17.d.50.40
24th Coy.	...	J.18.a.20.70
25th Coy.	...	J.18.d.30.20
3rd Aust. M.T. Coy.	...	I.22.b.70.10
Ammunition Section	...	do.
Supply Section	...	do.
Workshops	...	I.32.a.00.90

P.T.O.

D.A.D.O.S.	K.10.d.2.8.	
3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	...	AIZECOURT-le-Bas.	
Divisional Musketry Officer.	...	F.26.c.8.8.	
Divisional Gas Officer.	F.26.c.8.8.	
Divisional Paymaster.	...	ROISEL.	
D.A.F.M.	F.27.c.3.8.	
RAILHEAD.	TINCOURT.	
Divisional Reinforcement Wing.	...	Vicinity LA CHAPELLETTE.	
P.O.W. Cage.	...	F.27.c.3.8.	
Divisional Artillery H.Q.	...	F.26.c.8.8.	
7th. A.F.A. Bde. H.Q.	F.17.c.7.4.	
8th. do.	F.27.d.0.5.	
D.A.C. H.Q.	...	E.22.d.1.2.	
No. 1 Section.	E.21.d.8.8.	
No. 2 Section.	E.22.c.5.5.	
S.A.A. Section.	E.27.b.3.8.	
D.T.M.O.	E.22.d.1.2.	
3rd. Army Bde. A.F.A. H.Q.	F.17.a.3.1.	Attached.
3rd. B.A.C.	E.24.a.9.8.	"
290th. Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	F.21.a.95.65.	"
291st. do.	F.21.d.4.4.	"
110th. Army Bde. A.F.A. H.Q.	F.29.a.9.9.	"
104th. Army Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	A.28.a.3.8.	"
86th. Army Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	F.28.a.3.8.	"
112th. Army Bde. R.F.A.	Divl. Mobile Reserve.	
38th. D.A.C.	D.2.central.	Attached.
Squadron, 13th. A.L.H. Regt.	J.11.central.	Attached.
16th. Tank Battalion H.Q.	J.23. - W. of BOUCLY.	

Amendments to be immediately notified to D.H.Q.
1st. Oct. 1918.

Disposition of Units as at 6.0 a.m. 2nd. October, 1918.Map Ref: Sheet 62.G. 1/40,000.

Divisional Command Post. Divisional Headquarters.	F.26.c.80.80. ROISEL.
Divisional Engineer. H.Q.	F.26.c.80.80.
9th. Field Coy.	F.21.b.40.30.
10th. -do-	F.16.c.00.70.
11th. -do-	F.29.a.90.70.
Divisional Signal Coy.	F.26.c.80.80.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	F.17.a.30.10.
33rd. Bn.	A.15.a.90.20.
34th. Bn.	F.29.b.70.80.
35th. Bn.	A. 9.c.00.40. 10 a.m.
9th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	F.23.a.80.80.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	F.17.d.70.40.
37th. Bn.	A.15.a.00.90.
38th. Bn.	A.13.d.95.35.
39th. Bn.	A.15. a.00.90.
40th. Bn.	A.15.b.40.70.
-do-	A. 9.c.80.30. 9.0 a.m.
10th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	E.24.b.80.30.
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	F.29.a.90.70.
-do- C.P.	A.15.a.90.20.
41st. Bn.	F.29.b.70.80.
42nd. Bn.	A.27.a.40.40.
43rd. Bn.	A.15.c.70.00.
44th. Bn.	A.27.a.40.40.
11th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	F.27.d.0.7.
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.	F.26.c.10.10.
9th. A.M.G. Coy.	F.27.d.00.70.
10th. -do-	F.17.d.70.40.
11th. -do-	E.18.a.30.70.
23rd. -do-	F.17.b. 10.0 a.m.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn. H.Q.	F.15.b.30.00.
"A" Coy.	F.15.d.80.80.
"B" Coy.	F.22.b.70.20.
"C" Coy.	F.16.d.80.70.
"D" Coy.	F.22.b.10.50.
A. D. M. S.	F.26.c.80.80.
9th. Field Ambulance.	ST. EMILIE.
10th. -do-	VILLERS FANCON.
11th. -do-	ST. EMILIE.
D. A. D. V. S.	K.10.b.40.40.
3rd. Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	B.28.b.20.30.
3rd. Aust. Div. Train. H.Q.	K.10.d.20. 80.
22nd. Coy.	K.22.central.
23rd. Coy.	J.17.d.50.40.
24th. Coy.	J.18.a.20.70.
25th. Coy.	J.18.d.30.20.

3rd. Aust. M.T. Coy.	I.22.b.70.10.	
Ammunition Section.	-do-	
Supply Section.	-do-	
Workshops.	I.32.a.00.90.	
D. A. D. O. S.	K.10.d.20.80.	
3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	AIZECOURT-le-Bas.	
Divisional Musketry Officer.	F.26.c.80.80.	
Divisional Gas Officer.	F.26.c.80.80.	
Divisional Paymaster.	ROISEL.	
D.A.P.M.	F.27.c.30.80.	
RAILHEAD.	TINCOURT.	
Divsnl. Reinforcement Wing.	Vicinity LA CHAPLLETTE.	
P.O.W. Gags.	F.27.c.30.80.	
Divisional Artillery H.Q.	F.26.c.80.80.	
7th. A.F.A. Bde. H.Q.	F.17.c.70.40.	
8th. -do-	F.29.a.90.70.	
D.A.C. H.Q.	E.22.d.10.20.	
No.1 Section.	E.21.d.80.80.	
No.2 "	E.22.c.50.50.	
S.A.A. Section.	E.27.b.30.80.	
D.T.M.O.	L.22.d.10.20.	
3rd. Army Bde A.F.A. H.Q.	F.17.a.30.10.	Attached.
3rd. B.A.C.	E.24.a.90.80.	-do-
290th Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	F.21.a.95.65.	-do-
291st. -do- "	F.21.d.40.40.	-do-
110th. Army Bde. A.F.A. H.Q.	F.29.a.90.90.	-do-
104th. Army Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	A.28.a.30.80.	-do-
68th. Army Bde. R.F.A. H.Q.	F.28.a.30.80.	-do-
112th. Army Bde. R.F.A.	Divsnl. Mobile Reserve.	
28th. D.A.C.	D.2.central.	Attached.
"A" Squadron 13th. A.L.H. Regt.	F.26.c.80.80.	
-do-	J.11.central.	12.30 p.m.
16th. Tank Battalion. H.Q.	J.23. - W. of BOUCLY.	

Amendments to be immediately notified to Divsnl. Headquarters.

2nd. October, 1918.

No. 122

R.F.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

SECRET.

Disposition of Units as at 6 a.m., 4th October 1918.

Map Ref: Sheet 62.c. 1/40,000.

Divisional Headquarters	...	DOINGT.
Divisional Engineer H.Q.	...	I.30.b.70.80
9th Field Coy.	...	D.15.a.90.50
10th do.	...	D.10.c.70.60
11th do.	...	D.27.b.20.70
Divisional Signal Coy.	...	I.24.c.20.30
9th Aust. Inf. Bde H.Q.	...	D.15.d.30.30
33rd Bn.	...	D.15.a.00.30
34th Bn.	...	D.14.b.80.80
35th Bn.	...	D.15.d.50.50
9th A.L.T.M. Bty	...	D.15.d.20.30
10th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	...	D.22.d.50.95
37th Bn.	...	D.16.b.60.80
38th Bn.	...	B.17.d.00.10
39th Bn.	...	D.22.b.50.90
40th Bn.	...	D.17.d.00.10
10th A.L.T.M. Bty	...	D.24.a.10.10
11th Aust. Inf. Bde H.Q.	...	J.3.d.90.00.
41st Bn.	...	D.26.a.90.20
42nd Bn.	...	J.3.c.70.00
43rd Bn.	...	J.2.d.20.70
44th Bn.	...	D.26.d.30.80
11th A.L.T.M. Bty	...	J.3.b.50.00
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.	J.28.a.40.00	
9th A.M.G. Coy	...	J.28.b.20.70
10th do.	...	J.28.a.30.00
11th do.	...	J.28.a.30.00
23rd do.	...	J.28.a.30.00
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. H.Q.	...	VILLERS FANCON.
A.D.M.S.	...	DOINGT.
9th Field Ambulance	...	D.15.c.30.30
10th do.	...	D.10.d.20.20
11th do.	...	ST. EMILIE.
D.A.D.V.S.	...	DOINGT.
3rd Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	...	E.28.b.20.30
3rd Aust. Div. Train H.Q.	...	I.24.c.60.40
22nd. Coy.	...	F.27.c.20.50
23rd. Coy.	...	J.17.d.50.40
24th. Coy.	...	COURCELLES.
25th. Coy.	...	J.18.d.30.20
3rd Aust. M.T. Coy.	...	I.22.b.70.10
Ammunition Section	...	do.
Supply Section	...	do.
Workshops.	...	I.32.a.00.90

D.A.D.O.S.	... I.24.c.60.50	
3rd Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	AIZL COURT-le-Bas.	
Divisional Musketry Officer	DOINGT	
Divisional Gas Officer ...	DOINGT	
Divisional Paymaster ...	DOINGT	
D.A.F.M.	PERONNE	
RAILHEAD.	TINCOURT.	
Div. Reinforcement Wing.	Vicinity LA CHAPILLETTE	
Divisional Artillery H.Q.	F.26.c.80.80	
7th A.F.A. Bde H.Q. ...	F.17.c.70.40	
8th do. ...	A.21.a.85.80	
D.A.C. H.Q. ...	E.22.d.10.20	
No.1 Section ...	K.21.d.80.80	
No.2 do. ...	E.22.c.50.50	
S.A.A. Section ...	J.31.c.40.70	
D.T.M.O. ...	E.22.d.10.20	
3rd Army Bde. A.F.A. H.Q.	F.17.a.30.10	Attchd. to Div. Arty.
3rd B.A.C. ...	E.24.a.90.60	do. do.
290th Bde R.F.A. H.Q. ...	A.20.b.10.80	do. do.
291st do. do. ...	A.27.a.50.00	do. do.
110th Army Bde. A.F.A. H.Q.	F.29.a.90.90	do. do.
38th D.A.C. ...	D.2.central	do. do.

Amendments to be immediately notified to Divnl. Headquarters.

4th October 1918.

ROBERT
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Disposition of Units as at 6.0 a.m., 8th October 1918.

Map Reference : Sheet VIGNACOURT. 1/100,000.

Divisional Headquarters	...	HALLENCOURT.
Divisional Engineer H.Q.	...	HALLENCOURT.
9th Field Coy.	...	CAPPY (Sheet 62.C).
10th do.	...	LIMOUX.
11th do.	...	LALOU.
Divisional Signal Coy.	...	HALLENCOURT.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	...	YONVILLE
33rd Bn.	...	CITERNE.
34th Bn.	...	FROUCOURT.
35th Bn.	...	MERCESSART.
9th A.L.T.M. Bty	...	FORCEVILLE.
10th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	...	ERONDELLE
37th Bn.	...	WANEL & SOREL
38th Bn.	...	BAILLEUL.
39th Bn.	...	HOCQUINCOURT.
40th Bn.	...	ERONDELLE.
10th A.L.T.M. Bty.	...	BAILLEUL.
11th Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	...	HEUCOURT.
41st Bn.	...	WARLUS.
42nd Bn.	...	VERGIES.
43rd Bn.	...	METIGNY & LAIEU
44th Bn.	...	HEUCOURT.
11th A.L.T.M. Bty.	...	WARLUS.
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.	...	AIRAINES
9th A.M.G. Coy.	...	LE QUESNOY.
10th do.	...	do.
11th do.	...	do.
23rd do.	...	do.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. H.Q.	...	LIERCOURT.
A.D.M.S.	...	HALLENCOURT.
9th Field Ambulance	...	NEUVILLE.
10th do.	...	BRAY
11th do.	...	TAILLY
D.A.D.V.S.	...	HALLENCOURT.
3rd Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	..	ALLERY
3rd Aust. Div. Train H.Q.	...	ALLERY
22nd Coy.	...	detached with Arty.
23rd Coy.	...	SOREL
24th Coy.	...	ALLERY
25th Coy.	...	METIGNY
3rd Aust. M.T. Coy.	...	AIRAINES
Supply Section	...	do.
S.A.A. Section D.A.C.	...	ALLERY.

D. A. D. O. S.	..	ALLERY.
3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	..	HALLENCOURT.
Divisional Musketry Officer.	..	HALLENCOURT.
Divisional Gas Officer.	..	HALLENCOURT.
Divisional Paymaster.	..	HALLENCOURT.
D. A. P. M.	..	HALLENCOURT.
Divisional Baths Officer.	..	HALLENCOURT.
RAILHEAD.	..	LONGPRE-les-Corps-Saints.
Divsnl. Reinforcement Wing.	..	BETTENCOURT.
Divisional Artillery.	..	Detached.

NOTE. AMENDMENTS TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED TO
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

7th. October, 1918.

3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.
Divisional Musketry Officer.
Divisional Gas Officer.
Divisional Paymaster.
D. A. P. M.
Divisional Baths Officer.
RAILHEAD.
Divsnl. Reinforcement Wing.
Divisional Artillery.

7th. October, 1918.

Disposition of Units as at 6.0 a.m. 10th. October, 1918.

Unit.	Village.	Map Ref.	Sheet.
Divisional Headquarters.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.cent.	57.E.
Divisional Engineer. H.Q.	WOIREL. (mid-day)		X.
9th. Field Coy.	GAPPY.		62.C.
10th. -do-	FONTAINE-LE-SEC.		X.
11th. -do-	WOIREL.		X.
Divisional Signal Coy.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.b.20.10.	57.E.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	YONVILLE.		X.
33rd. Bn.	CIBERNE.		X.
34th. Bn.	FRUCOURT.	X.20.	57.F.
35th. Bn.	MARELESSART.		X.
9th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	PORCEVILLE.		X.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	BRONDELLA.	M.20.d.40.10.	57.M.
37th. Bn.	SOREL.	S.17.a.40.60.	57.B.
38th. Bn.	BAILLIOL.	X.5.b.80.60.	57.F.
39th. Bn.	HOUQUENCOURT.	X.23.d.70.30.	57.F.
40th. Bn.	BRONDELLA.	M.21.a.10.70.	57.B.
10th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	BAILLIFONTAINE.	M.31.d.60.20.	57.B.
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	HEUCOURT.	G. 8.c.80.40.	62.E.
41st. Bn.	WARLUS.	H.13.d.80.10.	62.E.
42nd. Bn.	VERGIES.		X.
43rd. Bn.	MENGEY & LALLEU	G.6.b.50.20.	62.E.
44th. Bn.	HEUCOURT.	G.14.b.70.90.	62.E.
11th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	WARLUS.	H.13.d.60.30.	62.E.
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.	AIRAINES.	B.19.b.00.60.	62.B.
9th. A.M.G. Coy.	LE QUESNOY.	B.29.a.70.80.	62.E.
10th. do.	do.	B.23.d.20.10.	62.E.
11th. do.	do.	B.29.b.20.50.	62.E.
23rd. do.	do.	B.29.h.20.10.	62.E.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	LIERCOURT.	M.28.d.60.20.	57.B.
A. D. M. S.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.a.80.20.	57.B.
9th. Field Ambulance.	NEUVILLE Au Bois. Chateau.		X.
10th. do.	BRAY.	R.17.d.90.10.	57.F.
11th. do.	TAILLY. Chateau.		62.E.
D. A. D. V. S.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.a.75.25.	57.E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sect.	ALLERY.		62.E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Train. H.Q.	ALLERY.	A.22.a.90.80.	62.E.
22nd. Coy.	Detached with Divsnl. Artillery.		
23rd. Coy.	WANDEL.	S.23.a.50.50.	57.E.
24th. Coy.	ALLERY.	A.22.a.80.80.	62.E.
25th. Coy.	ALLERY.	A.22.b.20.40.	62.E.
3rd. Aust. M.T. Coy.	AIRAINES.		62.E.
Supply Section.	do		62.E.
3.A.A. Section. D.A.C.	ALLERY.		62.E.

(1).

P.T.O.

APPENDIX

2

<u>U n i t.</u>	<u>Village.</u>	<u>Map Ref.</u>	<u>Sheet.</u>
D. A. D. O. S.	ALLERY.		62. E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
Divisional Musketry Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
Divisional Gas Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
Divisional Paymaster.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
D. A. P. M.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
Divisional Baths Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57. E.
RAILHEAD.	LONGPRE-les-Corps-Saints.		57. E.
Divisional Reinforcement Wing.	BATTENCOURT.		57. E.
Divisional Artillery.		Detached.	

NOTE.

Above locations may be found on Sheet
VIGNACOURT. 1/100,000.

Locations shown X. Refnce. Sheet VIGNACOURT.

(Squared Map not available).

AMENDMENTS TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED TO
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

10th October, 1918.

War Di 122

Disposition of Units as at 6.0 a.m. 24th. October, 1918.

Unit.	Village.	Map Ref.	Sheet.
Divisional Headquarters.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.Cent.	57.E.
Divisional Engineer. H.Q.	WOIRAL.		X.
9th. Field Coy.	WIRY-au-MONT.		X.
10th. do.	FONTAINE-LE-SEC.		X.
11th. do.	FORCEVILLE.		X.
Divisional Signal Coy.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.b.20.10.	57.E.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	YONVILLE.		X.
33rd. Bn.	CITERNE.		X.
34th. Bn.	FRUCOURT.	X.20.	57.F.
35th. Bn.	MERLESSART.		X.
9th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	FORCEVILLE.		X.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	BRONDEILLE.	M.20.d.40.10.	57.E.
38th. Bn.	SOREL & WANEL. H.Q.	S.17.a.50.30.	57.E.
39th. Bn.	HOCQUINCOURT.	X.23.d.70.30.	57.F.
40th. Bn.	BRONDEILLE.	M.21.a.10.70.	57.E.
10th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	BELLIFONTAINE.	M.31.d.60.20.	57.E.
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q.	HEUCOURT.	G.8.c.80.40.	62.E.
41st. Bn.	WARLUS & AVELASGES.	H.13.d.8.1.	
		H.19.c.	62.E.
43rd. Bn.	VERGIES.		X.
44th. Bn.	HEUCOURT & CROQUOISON.	G.14.b.70.90.	62.E.
		G.20.b.	62.E.
11th. A.L.T.M. Bty.	METIGNY.	G. 6.b.	62.E.
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.	HORNOY.	Chateau.	62.E.
9th. A.M.G. Coy.	HORNOY.		
10th. do.			
11th. do.			
23rd. do.			
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.	LIERCOURT.	M.28.d.60.20.	57.E.
A. D. M. S.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.a.80.20.	57.E.
9th. Field Ambulance.	NEUVILLE Au Bois.	Chateau.	X.
10th. do.	BRAY.	R.17.d.90.10.	57.F.
11th. do.	TAILLY.	Chateau.	62.E.
D. A. D. V. S.	HALLENCOURT.	S.26.a.75.25.	57.E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Mob. Vet. Sec.	ALLERY.		62.E.

P.T.O.

<u>U n i t.</u>	<u>Village.</u>	<u>Map Ref.</u>	<u>Sheet.</u>
3rd. Aust. Div. Train.	ALLERY.	A.22.a.90.80.	62.E.
22nd. Coy.	Detached with Divsnl. Artillery.		
23rd. Coy.	WANDEL.	S.23.a.50.50.	57.E.
24th. Coy.	ALLERY.	A.22.a.80.80.	62.E.
25th. Coy.	ALLERY.	A.22.b.20.40.	62.E.
3rd. Aust. M.T. Coy.	AIRAINES.		62.E.
Supply Section.	do.		62.E.
S. A. A. Section. D.A.C.	ALLERY.		62.E.
D. A. D. O. S.	ALLERY.		62.E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Salvage Coy.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
Divisional Musketry Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
Divisional Gas Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
Divisional Paymaster.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
D. A. P. M.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
Divisional Baths Officer.	HALLENCOURT.		57.E.
RAILHEAD.	LONGPRE-les-Corps-Saints.		57.E.
Divisional Reinforcement Wing.	LONGPRE-les-Corps-Saints.		57.E.
Divisional Artillery.	Detached.		

NOTE.

Above locations may be found on Sheet
VIGNACOURT. L/100,000.

Locations shown X. Refnce Sheet VIGNACOURT.
(Squared Map not available).

AMENDMENTS TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED TO
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS.


23rd. October, 1918.

SECRET MAP 3.

THIRD AUSTR. DIV
DISPOSITIONS

11. 10. 18

Ref. Sheet VIGNACOURT.



APPENDIX 2

War Diary

122

APPENDIX



GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 90A.

TRAINING.

1. General.

During the present period out of the line, the Division will re-organize and train under Brigade arrangements.

The entire success of the training will depend on previous preparation by instructors; thus, alone, can wastage of time on non-essentials be avoided and the men kept interested.

The training should be based on the assumption of a continuation of open or semi-open warfare conditions.

Elementary training (except where obviously required) should be eliminated and each week's work should contain a progressive series of instruction culminating in an exercise, by a higher formation.

A programme of work up to the end of October should be drawn up showing detailed hours and subjects and, where applicable, paragraphs of the training publications. A copy of these programmes should be scanned by Brigades and forwarded to D.H.Q. When alterations are necessary, early information will be sent to higher formations, for information.

Programmes are useful but, without final reports, afford neither criterion of the work nor suggestions for subsequent improvement. Notes on each day's work will simplify the above reports and enable repetition tasks to be set where necessary.

All employed n.c.os. and men should attend at least one training parade daily.

As far as possible, instruction should take the form of competitions; publication of results in Orders will stimulate competition.

A Demonstration Platoon will be selected in each Battalion. Should another platoon excel the Demonstration Platoon, the two will change places; in order to encourage competition, such change will be noted in Battalion and Brigade Orders.

2. - TRAINING.

The training should comprise exercises to improve the initiative of individuals, the collection and passing of information, patrol work, judging distance, indication of targets, fire control, and fire discipline and co-operation between sections, platoons and higher formations.

Each week, route marches will form part of the training and, at least once, a composite battalion at full war strength will be formed in each brigade for a route march.

A Brigade tactical exercise will be carried out weekly during which Machine Gun, Trench Mortar and, if desired and available, Artillery and Engineer Officers will be present. In addition to tactical problems requiring immediate solution, signal matters and administrative details: e.g. supply of rations and stores, evacuation of casualties, etc., should be discussed.

It will assist if, for this, a Battalion at full war strength is formed to operate against a skeleton enemy comprised of the remainder of the Brigade.

For the present, exercises with troops will not go beyond schemes for the employment of one Battalion.

(1).

P. T. O.

3. - MUSKETRY.

Rapid loading and aiming are to be practised and tested. A 300 yards range is in process of construction in a central position in each brigade area. There is no objection to the erection of 30 yard ranges for battalion use, provided all safety precautions are observed, both in the siting and use.

4. - GAS.

The Divisional Gas Officer has in hand the erection of gas chambers for the testing of Box Respirators.

5. - LECTURES.

Thrice weekly, outside Parade Hours, Officers will attend lectures dealing with tactical and administrative subjects. For preference, these lectures should deal with work to be performed subsequently with troops. All should be invited to take part in the discussion.

6. - SCHOOLS.

Brigade Schools will be formed for instruction of :

- (a) Signal personnel of battalions up to the standard of the Corps and Army Schools entrance examinations.
- (b) Intelligence personnel.
- (c) Junior officers and n.c.o.s. to improve their technical knowledge and inculcate confidence and power of command.
- (d) Battalion scouts.

7. - ENGINEERS, PIONEERS and MACHINE GUN BATTALION are training under separate arrangements.

8. - HIGHER TRAINING.

If the Division is out of the line at the end of October, a series of higher exercises will be undertaken.

W. J. M. Blair
 Lieut.-Colonel.
 General Staff.

9th. October, 1918.

DISTRIBUTION.

- A. Q.
- C.R.A.
- C.P.E.
- 3rd. Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
- 9th. Aust. Inf. Bds.
- 10th. -do-
- 11th. -do-
- 3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.
- 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
- A. D. M. S.
- 3rd. Aust. Divisional Train.
- D. M. O.
- D. G. O.
- War Diary (3).

A.H.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR NO. 91.A.

TRAINING.

No. G. 28/734.

1. - In order to gain uniformity in working hours throughout the Division during the present training period, the Divisional Commander wishes all programmes of work to be formulated on a day of $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours net work, exclusive of organized games.

Smoke and rest periods will be additional to the above $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

2.- Schools and tactical exercises which may require longer hours of work than $3\frac{1}{2}$ are not referred to in para 1.

15th October, 1918.

Handwritten signature
Lieut-Colonel.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION.

A.Q.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
3rd Aust. Div. Signal Coy.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th -do-
11th -do-
3rd Aust. M.G. Bn.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A.D.M.S.
3rd Aust. Div. Train.
D.M.O.
D.G.O.
War Diary. (3).

War Diary

Australian Corps.



Since the Australian Corps joined the Fourth Army on the 8th April, 1918, they have passed through a period of hard and uniformly successful fighting of which all ranks have every right to feel proud.

Now that it has been possible to give the Australian Corps a well-earned period of rest I wish to express to them my gratitude for all that they have done. I have watched with the greatest interest and admiration the various stages through which they have passed from the hard times of FLERS and POZIERES to their culminating victories at MONT ST. QUENTIN and the great Hindenburg System at BONY, BELLICOURT Tunnel and MONTBREHAIN.

During the Summer of 1918 the safety of AMIENS has been principally due to their determination, tenacity and valour.

The story of what they have accomplished as a fighting Army Corps, of the diligence, gallantry and skill which they have exhibited, and of the scientific methods which they have so thoroughly learned and so successfully applied, has gained for all Australians a place of honour amongst nations and amongst the English speaking races in particular.

It has been my privilege to lead the Australian Corps in the Fourth Army during the decisive battles since August 8th which bid fair to bring the war to a successful conclusion at no distant date.

No one realises more than I do the very prominent part that they have played, for I have watched from day to day every detail of their fighting, and learned to value beyond measure the prowess and determination of all ranks.

In once more congratulating the Corps on a series of successes unsurpassed in this great war I feel that no mere words of mine can adequately express the renown that they have won for themselves and the position they have established for the Australian nation not only in France but throughout the world.

I wish every officer, N.C.O. and man all possible good fortune in the future and a speedy and safe return to their beloved Australia.

H. Paulsen

H.Q., Fourth Army.
14th October, 1918.

General,
Commanding Fourth Army.

A.H.

A.Q.

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

3rd. Aust. M. G. Bn.

3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.

D. G. O.

D. M. O.

Camp Commandant.



1. Brigadier-General GUGGISBERG, C.M.G., D.S.O., Inspector-General of Training Directorate, G.H.Q., will hold a Conference at Divisional Headquarters on 30th. October.

2. The following will attend :-

Representatives of the Division; of each Infantry Brigade; all Battalion Commanders and all Company Commanders.

3. The object of the Conference is to inform those attending fully as to the latest views of the Training Inspectorate in regard to training, and to enable the Training Inspectorate to get in touch with the latest methods actually employed in battle.

4. The 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. will detail a Demonstration Platoon of one officer, one sergeant and 28 other ranks, organised as 4 sections each of 7 men; two of the sections will be Lewis gun sections. This platoon will give a series of demonstrations under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel LEVEY, Gordon Highlanders, who will have the platoon at his disposal prior to the Conference.

This platoon will be billeted in HALLEN COURT from 23rd. to 30th. October. Billets will be obtained on application to "A.Q." Branch.

5. The following is the programme of the Conference :-

10.00 to 10.45	...	Training and Organisation.
11.00 to 11.30	...	Battle Tactics of the Platoon and Company.
11.30 to 11.45	...	Platoon Training.
11.45 to 12.30	...	Demonstration of Method of Training.
12.30 to 14.00	...	Lunch.
14.00 to 15.00	...	Demonstration of Method of Training.
15.15 to -	...	Discussion.

6. All officers attending the Conference on 30th. October will attend a preliminary Conference to be held at Divisional Headquarters at 14.30 on 27th. October, where views can be put forward and speakers selected to represent these views at the Conference on 30th. October.

Transport arrangements will be notified later.

7. Owing to the large number attending, it is regretted that lunch on 30th. October cannot be provided; officers should therefore make their own arrangements for lunch.

William Levey
Maj.
General Staff.

21st. October

NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD AT
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS on 30th. October, 1918.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL GUGGISBERG, C.M.G., D.S.O.
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF TRAINING DIRECTORATE. G.H.Q.

By General Guggisberg. I think it would interest you to know about this new training staff started by G.H.Q. All of you have experienced the extraordinary difficulties we have had with training in this war. You have come out, on the few occasions you have been allowed out of the line, and found training areas badly organised, bad billeting accommodation, insufficient rifle ranges, etc., etc. The Commander-in-Chief got 'fed up' with this sort of thing and about last July he decided he would have a training staff to go around the Armies. Our duties are first of all to see that training is carried out on satisfactory lines and on a uniform system throughout the British Army. Secondly, to help Commanders of all formations with their training, for instance : if your Divisional Commander wanted an officer to help him with training and he telephoned up to our office my staff officer and I would come down and attach ourselves to the staff for a week or so and help him to train the Division. We do not come down like the old fashioned Inspectors just to inspect and 'crib' things and then go away and write a report. We do not have any written reports in our staff. We do go in for a certain amount of training literature and put it out for you to use as you please. In forming this staff the Commander-in-Chief decided on the principle that you have in a Club. The members of the staff have all been in the trenches right up to the time that the staff was formed. We want to help you. These leaflets we produce and send out are all written by fellows on our staff; not one but by the whole lot. Our ideas are those we have collected by going around amongst the troops. We have an officer who collates them and puts them into a leaflet. Anything used has been issued by men who know something about it. Another thing is to get the lessons learnt from the latest fighting. We are also rather good robbers. In one way, whenever we go round a

Division and see a good idea we steal it in the most barefaced manner and pass it on to the other people. The thing that we are most concerned about is knocking on the head the old fashioned systems of training. You all know that when a Recruit joins the Army he is put through a long Recruit's training. He has got to learn his job - got to learn how to form fours, slope arms, and so on. He is put through long training - long hours of the same subject. An Instructor stands in front of him and spins out miles of detail, which he has learnt out of a book. You all know the sort of detail I mean - On the word 'one' move the right foot - and so on. That is fairly necessary for a Recruit. I do not think that is a system of educating a Recruit which could be improved upon. You must give him detail to begin with. But it is a system which is irksome to the Trained Soldier - to the Soldier that you have out here - a Soldier who has done his Recruit's Training, possibly done one or more courses of training out of the line, who is tired, who has come out of the trenches and out of action tired, and you want to give him some training out here. The old system is absolutely wrong, and we have to knock it on the head. We have to substitute for it something else. We have got to evolve a system of training suitable for the trained soldier who comes out of the trenches, to make the training simple and interesting; above all we have got to treat a man as a human being and not as a machine. Well, gentlemen, to conclude the description of our Training Staff, we are "Missionaries" in this field. We are waging a war against the old dull monotonous systems of training. We have a little "Bible" which we base all our training on. That is a book called "Platoon Training". It's official No. is S.S.143. It was issued last January to you by G.H.Q. As soon as we came into existence we took it and pulled it to pieces and have re-written it. The first edition will be out probably next month. It has been written by an extraordinarily gifted Officer who happens also to be a Soldier, and I think you will find it of the greatest value - anyway that is our "Bible" This is one of our Tracts, viz., this one - we call it the "Brown Book". It was written by a General

MAXSE

MAGRAY, who Commanded the 18th Corps. It was the new system of training - short interesting lessons appealing to human nature. We also have other tracts which we distribute. We do not force them on you., but we hand you a Training Leaflet. Here is Training Leaflet No.1 "An Example of a Day's Training for a Company". Here is Training Leaflet No.3 - "A Battalion Commander's Conference". I just want to say a word about that Leaflet. First of all it is written by a Battalion Commander - one of the best Battalion Commanders', and one of the best Infantry Brigade Commanders' we have had in this War. There are four fairly valuable pages there, and when a Battalion Commander gets hold of this he will probably look at it rather horrified. You get such an enormous lot of literature to read that I am not surprised you do not feel inclined to read the whole of it. But the object of writing a thing like this is: we know from experience that when you come out of the trenches after a long spell that you are tired, - your brains are tired and do not work as actively as they do after having been out for a week's training; consequently we put out Leaflet No.3 - "Battalion Commanders' Conferences" - which will freshen up your mind, remind you of lots of little things which you have forgotten, freshen up your ideas again, and then when you hold your first Battalion Commanders' Conference you will get all the points that you want; perhaps a/ lot you do not want. The next Leaflet No.4 about "Normal formations in Battle" is for training. The same thing - just to freshen your ideas and so on. We do not force these leaflets on you. You can always have them if you write for them. I have a packet here about 300 of these "Brown Books". If you want them come up and get them. Any Company Commander can take away five. Now, generally, about training and organisation, the two run absolutely hand in hand. You cannot train unless organised. I am going to make five points. They are these : -

- (1) You must carry out all the training you possibly can within the platoon
- (2) For you to do that your platoon must be permanently organised
- (3) You must have platoon and section commanders who are capable of training.
- (4) Your methods of training must be simple and

interesting. (5) The method of training that we advocate does not require big areas and piles of training material. With regard to the first point. Of course there are exceptions to this. Generally speaking, you should adopt a principle of carrying out all training inside the platoon. We want to base all our training on the fact of a man being a man and not a machine. A platoon is a military organisation of a certain number of men. Let us make that platoon into a Club, or team, or family. Let everything we do in training and in organisation tend to make the platoon a family. The platoon will think a great deal better of itself if it feels it has made itself into a good platoon and not that the battalion instructor has made it into a good platoon. You increase the spirit of that platoon considerably. We must foster a desire in the man to make his platoon the best in the company; even the best in the Army. We must keep that principle at the back of our minds, and guide us in everything we do. Then, if you keep the training within the Platoon you appeal to another side of a man - you appeal to that competitive spirit - to that sporting spirit, that is so prominent a characteristic of all of us Britishers throughout the whole British Empire. We have got it at the bottom of us & all this sporting spirit - and if we, by means of competitions between Platoons increase, or rather, get at the sporting spirit of the men we are making our training far easier; so in everything we do we ought to try and introduce the spirit of competition wherever possible. We are never going to do this in our Platoons if we are continually bringing in the Battalion Instructor - the P.& B.T. type - to come and take them in Physical Training - the Musketry Instructor - the Drill Instructor; we shall never get the Platoon spirit developed if we are going to have these Instructors in. They have an entirely different job to perform - have to instruct the Section Commanders, have to keep up-to-date with the latest methods in our Branches - have to hold little Battalion Classes, and bring Section Commanders up-to-date. I know that in the minds of a lot of you, especially at present, you have the thought - what is the good of me him telling us all that when we are continually coming out of

action and losing all our Section Commanders.- No, I am not preaching the principle at you. If you have exceptional circumstances like heavy casualties you have to meet them with exceptional measures to get back to the principle as soon as you possibly can - to get back to the principle of carrying out all instructions within the platoon. The next point I make is obviously common-sense - that you are never going to create this Platoon spirit and carry out your training in the Platoon unless you have a permanent Platoon permanently organised. Now, On going around the Army and inspecting Battalions one finds the most extraordinary things everywhere. I am not talking about Battalions at the moment that are very low in strength. I am talking about Battalions between 800 and 900 strong. When you go round the Army one finds some of these Battalions composed of 12 Platoons, in others 11, in others 10, and, in one Battalion, I found no Platoons at all. The Battalion Commander did not approve of Platoons, he liked Companies, and he used to tell off his Companies into Platoons every morning according to the number of Officers he had. It was a bad Battalion, and proved a bad Battalion in the fight. I am only voicing this argument to you to show the bad state of organisation likely to exist if every Battalion Commander did exactly what he pleased without consulting anybody else. Now the Commander-in-Chief has laid down that every Army in the British Armies shall consist of 16 Platoons, and that every Platoon shall consist of 4 Sections, viz., 2 Rifle and 2 Lewis Gun Sections. He has laid down that every battalion shall never be less than 900 other ranks and on that basis he introduces this organisation of 16 platoons of 4 sections. With 900 other ranks, occasionally after an action dropping to 700, and getting drafts in within a few days, that organisation is simple to carry out, providing you have the men. He has also stated that in training if you have exceptional circumstances you have to take exceptional measures to deal with them. If your battalions happen to be more or less permanently at a strength of 500 or 600 other ranks it does not follow you will be able to keep up this organisation of 16 platoons, in which case it is for the

Commander of the Division to decide what organisation shall be adopted within his division. The Commander-in-Chief allows that latitude. At the same time if you have to adopt a different organisation because you are permanently short of men there are certain principles you should stick to in doing it. The thing that guides you in all these principles is maintaining the platoon in the platoon spirit. If you have not enough means to have 4 platoons in the coy. as for example, it is decided to reduce that company to three platoons one platoon disappears for the time being, but the members of that platoon should be ear-marked for bringing out when drafts arrive for reforming the old platoon. Otherwise, if you do not do that you will lose a very valuable asset i.e. tradition. You know examples of gallant actions done by particular platoons or sections. That action of that section should not be lost sight of. It should be kept as a permanent tradition. Similarly any gallant action of a platoon should always be treasured up. You are not going to do that if you take a platoon, or the remains of it, chuck it into another platoon as though you are finished with it and reform the platoons with drafts that arrive. Then there is another thing in organisation that is extremely important, and that is the question of the orderly sergeant. The orderly sergeant and orderly corporal are the worst enemies of organisation in the whole of the Army. And why? Because unless they are kept absolutely under control they will go and destroy companies, platoons, and sections by detailing men out of them for working parties, fatigues, etc., without the Platoon Commander's knowledge. That is especially the case if you have the old Army custom. You know at some of the Schools, and I have heard them lecturing on their Orderly Sergeants' duties. I have heard an Instructor there telling men that the Orderly Sergeant must always have an alphabetical roll. An alphabetical roll in the hands of an Orderly Sergeant is worse than a Mills Bomb in the hands of a Nursemaid - bound to destroy something. For example, an Orderly Sergeant is ordered to find 60 men for fatigues. The Orderly Sergeant looks up his alphabetical roll, looks at names "A" "B" "C" and "D". Those

fellows were all told off the last time working parties were required. So he looks at names "E" "F" "G" and "H", counts them up, marks off 60 and tells all these fellows off by name. Next morning they are at their various jobs. You look round for the purpose of having some good training and find that half your Sections Commanders have been wafted away during the night. Now, gentlemen, there is only one system of organisation - I hope you have it in your Battalions and Brigades; and that is - a Battalion on duty - "A" Company on duty, so that supposing the Battalion on duty to-morrow is told to find 80 men for fatigue the Company that is for duty on that day in that Battalion will probably be eaten up, and a certain number of "B" company will be eaten up, but "C" and "D" will be available for a full day's training. In the same way every company ought to have a Platoon for duty. In the example I have just given you, all Platoons of "A" Company are eaten up, but a number of "C" and "D" Platoons are still left for training. If you look round and find an alphabetical roll in the possession of your Orderly Sergeant or Orderly Corporal destroy it right away. The last point I desire to make about Organisation is this:- No matter how you may organise, no matter how well you may do it, no Organisation is any good whatever unless every Battalion Commander and every Company Commander makes a point of seeing that his Platoon Commanders have their Platoons to themselves for Training, for at least two hours every day - an average of 2 hours every day; and that is a point which is very often lost sight of. Very often the excuse put forward for it is: "My Platoon Commander, that fellow Lieut. DUBD" No. 3 Platoon, he cannot train, it is no good giving it to him". What are you going to do? Are you going to stick to Lieut. DUBD or are you going to try and make Lieut. DUBD into a Trainer? There is only two alternatives. You either have to chuck Lieut. DUBD out of the Army - chuck him out of the Army altogether, do not pass him on to someone else. You must either chuck him out of the Army altogether or else you must make him into a Trainer. Do not go and take that very weak course - that perfectly indecisive course of saying "I will not permit Lieut. DUBD to train the Pla-

toon; I will let him lead them into action, but I will not let him train the Platoon." I am afraid that a good very many Officers adopt that weak course - the line of least resistance, so to speak. That has brought me on to the third point about the platoon and section commander. There is one little point about the platoon commander. All of you know what it is like when you first started to train a platoon. You have been through that experience. Give the platoon and section commanders a chance. Let them have their platoons or sections to train. Let them make a mess of it. Watch them. Do not interfere. But you can afterwards advise them and pick out the good from the bad. Chuck out the duds. Advise those who are in need of it. You ought to see that your platoon commanders handle their sections if for only a few minutes every day. The very facts that they have their sections to handle will improve them. All of us who are connected with troops know that the more we train them the more we will improve ourselves. And it is up to the Battalions and Company Commanders to see that ~~they~~ platoon commander is training his platoon on the right lines. The fourth point is the training of the platoon. I mentioned just now about the old and dull systems of training. There are officers who will, when they get their men out of the trenches put them through the recruits' training again. That is wrong. No man is going to train properly if he is discontented. There is nothing that makes men more discontented when they come out of the trenches than to have some instructor in front of them spinning out long words of detail of exactly what they have to do. Do what the cricketer does at the end of the winter when he is going to play in the coming season. Take the case of a batsman. His object is to make some runs that summer. As the winter drawsto an end, he goes to the nets to improve his eye and muscles. He bats for half an hour, bowls for half an hour and fields for half an hour. He has learned to be a cricketer. He is possibly going to learn a few new strokes and improve his strokes, but he chiefly goes to improve his eye and muscles. What does a Platoon do when it comes out of the trenches?

The trenches have been their Winter. The main thing is how to put the Soldiers through a course of training, learn how to slope arms etc.; you have to give them net practice when they come out of the trenches so as to improve their eye, bring into play the action of the muscles they have forgotten how to use - the muscles they have used for rapid loading. What does a Cricketer do? He goes to the net for two hours; he goes and has about 20 minutes batting, then bowls, then does a bit of fielding. That is exactly what we want to do with our Platoons - 20 minutes of this - 20 minutes of that - 20 minutes of something else - short exercises - short snappy exercises. That is the first principle. Now, in selecting those exercises for training the main thing is this.- You have got to be simple. One simple exercise properly carried out is worth half a dozen sloppily carried out. Colonel LEVEY, this morning, will show you examples of a few exercises which we suggest are useful for net practice. It is not so much the exercises themselves that you want to look at when Colonel LEVEY is showing them to you, but it is his system of working. Particularly do I desire and ask you to look at the system he adopts and advocates - a simple, interesting and pleasant system. You know yourselves that when you first joined the Army you were keen on becoming good soldiers as quickly as possible with one object in view, and that was to beat the Hun so that we could all get home again. Now you teach a man how to manoeuvre; how to kill the Boche; how to ^{do/} anything much quicker if you will give him the reason why you do things first. Give him the reason. You are going to, say, carry out a certain exercise. We will call it exercise "A" You have your men round you. Tell them the reason why you are going to do that exercise. It may be an exercise on Sentry Drill. You have the men round you. Tell them you are going to form a Guard, and that Guard has to be the finest Guard in the Battalion, and that you are going to make that Guard out of the Platoon. Colonel LEVEY will give you an example of that this morning. Increase the Platoon spirit. Then

having told the men the reason why in a few words you then show them how you want it done. Explain to their ears. Demonstrate to them by getting the- a man or two out so as to do the explanation by the eye. Your eye always remembers much more than your ear does. Then having done the demonstration, do it for two or three minutes - NOT for an hour - do it for 2 or 3 or 5 minutes. Tone out any mistakes; ask questions, then go and do it again. Let the Section Commanders do it for 5 minutes or 10 minutes. Then look at your watch. Time is up. You have had 20 minutes at that exercise. Stop. Get them all in. Look at your little paper in your hand which you have written down the night before. Select another exercise and start them off on that. Never do ~~me~~ one exercise for more than 15 or 20 minutes. There is one point I want to make about this method of training. In training his men the platoon commander has to look out for two things. First of all, during his training, he has to acquire command over the will of his men. The other thing he has to do is to develop their initiative and intelligence. One of the best ways of securing the command over your men's will is by close order drill, etc. Exact words of command, no talking, smartness; that is all combined under the word 'discipline'. He must keep them rigidly under his command. That is acquiring 'will power'. To develop initiative. Give them attack exercises, bayonet fighting, tactical schemes, and so on where you do not have to detail exact positions. For instance in the tactical exercises, if you want to get your platoon from here to that building over there. Do not let them give the command "slope arms" give the order platoon - form up and then off you go. Replace words of command by clear instructions. That is what we recommend. While you are doing drill insist upon absolute discipline. On the other hand be more open never mix up the two. The last point about training is the preparation that is necessary before-hand. 75% to 80% of the work we have to do in any particular battle is carried out before the battle itself. The battle is lost or won up to certain limits by the arrangements made before-hand. We know that from personal experience. Observe the same thing in training. 75% in the training is done by the preparations made before hand

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and the most important part is the preparation of a programme. You go out for training. The Corps Commander has noticed certain points about the Division. He mentions that to the Divisional Commander. The Divisional Commander has noticed certain points. He mentions it to the Brigade Commander. The Brigade Commander passes it on to the Battalion Commander. There is the Battalion Commander. He has already had three or four complaints brought to his notice. He calls a Conference of his Company Commanders; says "We are going to do some Training". The Corps Commander, The Divisional Commander, the Brigadier, have noticed so and so." There are some five points for you now. You have to draw up your programmes - draw up your exercises, that is, we are going to improve those five points, and any of the other exercises I will leave to you to bring in, and so it goes on to the Company and Platoon Commanders. That is the start of the programme. Now there is a custom crept in chiefly because we have got such a great proportion of Lieut. DUDD'S. In our Platoon System it has crept in for the Company Commanders' to draw up the Programme for the Company - write it down to the lowest detail. You will never develop the ^{responsibility} ~~responsibility~~ of training for the Platoon Commanders unless you make them draw up their own programmes. If you are going to draw up a Programme for the Company, by all means put in what you want it to do for the two hours, but the two hours you give to the Platoon Commanders, make them draw up a Programme for those two hours. Make them draw it up. Now then, come down to the Platoon Commander. He has two hours to draw up a programme for. He starts on the principle - no exercises more than five minutes. In the last forty minutes, we will say, he is going to draw up a Platoon Attack and he must divide up the rest of the time between short snappy exercises. He selects the exercises, and he must think ~~it~~ out carefully what he is going to do next day - how am I going to explain this? - how must I demonstrate that? -. Those are the ideas which come before his mind. What points must I draw their attention to. He remembers the men were shifting their heads when sloping arms. He wants to draw their attention to that. He thinks that all out.

You can do it on a quarter scale or one fifth scale. Place your two leading sections 25 yards apart the other two sections 25 yards further back. Tell the men that the distance is only 20 yards but actually represents 150 yards and so on. Do the attack on a small scale in order to get the idea and principles of the platoon attack; and then, at the first possible opportunity, go out and do the same thing exactly on a larger ~~see~~ sized piece of ground. I will not say anything about the material required, and so on, because Colonel LEVY has something to say about that in his demonstration. Well, gentlemen, that is all I have to say about Training and Organisation.

 Adjournment for quarter of an hour.

For ^{this} ~~this~~ part of the Conference I would like the assistance of 10 Officers - 10 Company Commanders - to come out and give me some assistance.

Officers took up positions thus:-

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I would like to have your ideas about this part of the Conference in the discussion this afternoon. It involves the principles of tactics, and the reason why I am doing it is because we want to get at some good solid principle which we can use as a basis for our tactics - our Battalion, Platoon and Company tactics in battle, - not a rigid formation but some sort of principle on which we can base our training for battle. As you will know, of course, in the old Field Service Regulations and in books written hundreds of years before that, it was always laid down that the best way of attacking an enemy was to hold him in front, and attack him in the flank, or from the rear. Well, in this War, we all started off with those tactical notions in our minds, but in a very short time it developed so that one flank was on the

sea, and one flank in SWITZERLAND, and the result was that we began to lose sight of this principle of attacking on flanks. You know the result of those blows that we had in 1916. The SOMME in 1916 was a great frontal attack everywhere; also YPRES in 1917, with the result that heavy casualties resulted from a frontal attack, no matter what means you may introduce. The Boche, or the French, first of all started a theory which you all know about; the theory of the "soft spot" which they penetrate. Then the Boche came along last March and introduced practically the same thing - the "Soft Spot"; created the "soft spot" in our front, drove his troops and penetrated through it. The last three months fighting we have been applying those principles, some of us very well, others of us very badly. After going up and down the line for the last three months, members of our Staff came to the conclusion that though the Army was getting in the right direction with regard to tactics there was no very clear principle laid down on which we could base our training. The performances of the AUSTRALIAN Corps in August, particularly, contain an extraordinarily large number of very useful lessons in what some people call the "new system of tactics". It is not really new. It is the system we advocate. We have followed your views very carefully, and have taken out of it as many lessons as we can, and we now put before you a principle in tactics, and this one we would like you to criticise very freely afterwards. Now take as an example a Battalion attacking. This is purely diagrammatically, and merely an example. Let these Officers represent Platoons. "A" Coy. on the Right, "B" on the Left. 2 Platoons to each Coy. The Support ~~xxxx~~Plth. behind No.9 Reserve Platoon, a little bit in rear of No.9 is No.13 Platoon - 14, 15, 16. The job allotted to this Battalion, we will imagine is a 1,000 yards front from this wall to that wall. Each Platoon is getting 250 yards of front. That is the Sector in which it has got to attack - 250 yards, finishing on objective. The 2 Platoons of the same "A" Coy . occupying 500 yards. behind them we have the Supporting Platoons about 100 yards in rear. Then there is the

Support Coy. about 100 or 200 yards behind the Platoon - Reserve Company 100 to 200 or 300 behind the Support Coy. We suggest now that we should allot to this leading Platoon the job of ~~fighting~~^{finding} the "soft spot" - of making it ^{the} Boche general line. We will allot to these Supporting Platoons the job of supporting the Platoons in front of them - No.3 to Support No.1, No.4 to Support No.2. Our reason for suggesting that is this- that we want a certain weight in our blow at the Boche line so as to find the weak spot. We suggest that the leading platoons are not strong enough to do that themselves. We allot to the support coy. the duty of supporting both 'A' and 'B', but here is an important point. If "A" Coy. happens to be held up after making every effort to advance, and "B" Coy. has succeeded in making progress and is going on well, then "C" Coy's first duty is to support "B" and not reinforce "A". "D" Coy we suggest as a reserve under the battalion commander's hands ready to meet the unforeseen which always occurs in every battle. That is the duties allotted to these platoons. Let us take an example to bring out the principle. Imagine a certain advance is made. The leading platoon is held up by certain opposition - may be machine gun fire, wire or anything you like. On the other hand, No.2 platoon has managed to manoeuvre through its opposition in front and is supported by No.4 ; still going on manoeuvring, fighting, probably supported by No.4. No.5 has succeeded in advancing a bit but the whole of "B" Coy. is being held up by strong opposition here. "B" is unable to get forward. In the old days "B" Coy. Commander and probably "A" would sent out their reinforcements. What happens. Generally speaking what is enough to hold up one company is quite sufficient to hold up two companies. These fellows come up and get the same casualties as Nos. 5 and 6 platoons. They take their objective but will have casualties - probably heavy - both in leaders and men. Similarly with No.3. He might be brought up alongside and get the same casualties. The system suggested is this. No.3's duty is to support No.1; but he can support him far better if he can get round on the flank. He notices that the platoon on the left has made progress. He manoeuvres to the back door or flank and comes in that way if possible.

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"C" Coy., whose commander is well up in front of it, keeping in touch, with the two leading companies, is going to support the men who are winning the battle. So he manoeuvres his platoons thus - platoon by platoon following up. 'B' Coy. Commander, is rather slow in siezing up the situation, discovers that the progress is being made here (illustrates) so he sends off for one or both platoons (thus) and covering round comes in to cover flank attack. 'D' Coy comes in as a reserve (illustrates). That is the principle we suggest should be adopted in attack training. One is the principle of supporting where you are making progress. The question arises here. Supposing this Coy, manoeuvre as it likes, does not succeed in wiping out opposition in front of it. The question is should 'C' Coy. be utilised to clear that opposition away. In deciding on that point I think one has to bear two things in mind. The first is: this Company Commander ~~Firstly: this Company Commander~~ should have clearly in his mind that the most important thing he has got to do is to support these companies; these platoons to get along here and press on (illustrates) after them because possibly he may have to take the place of these platoons by sending up a platoon in front; in any case you have to have this small force well supported because this platoon may have become well absorbed in that one (illustrates) and we must have depth to resist a Bosche counter-attack from the flank. This is the first principle. But, at the same time, we suggest that he should be left a free hand to employ a certain portion of his company in assisting to remove the obstruction. - possibly by lewis gun fire only. Naturally, the result of this system will result in a good deal of confusion. I think that rather happens. These people (illustrates) after collecting their prisoners and those people (illustrates) and so on they have to resume the advance. Possibly a danger may arise in these fellows getting too far ahead while those fellows are clearing up opposition. If so, how do we replace these platoons here. We suggest that the advance may be conducted by bounds to such a depth as will permit of a whole battalion co-ordinating its efforts say: on a

certain line on the ridge - a momentary pause and then push on.

But, in any case, in this system Company Commanders have to be very wide-awake and be prepared to replace platoons in the leading line; collect those behind, form into supports and reserves and so on.

(Coy. Commanders resumed their original positions on floor for demonstration purposes).

That is the point I want your ideas on this afternoon. It is practically very much the system you have adopted in your own fights.

With regard to attack training. The next point is what principles should we adopt for the training of platoon attacks. I am taking here an example of a platoon of four sections ~~each~~ of two rifles and two Lewis gun sections. We have a front of 250 yards from wall to wall. I have sections 100 yards behind. 100 yards behind them I have supports. These are the points we suggest should be observed in the training of the platoon for the attack. First of all we have our advanced formation which you are not going to move until we are compelled to break up the Bosche in front of us. (illustration). Most Australian Divisions I have been to say they must have plenty of practice in keeping direction with compass bearings. The great point arises how many compasses have you available in the battalion. I would very much like to have an idea of that afterwards so that we may if possible have the supply increased. With regard to keeping direction. It is necessary that every platoon commander must maintain his direction independently of the party told off for that purpose. The platoon commander when he is on the forming up line has to use his compass and select some point on the country ahead which is going to be somewhere on his platoon front. If there is no conspicuous land-mark there let him select one to the right or the left which he calculates will be on the front of the left or right platoon. He says to his Section Commanders "Our proper place will be about 400 yards on the left of that hay stack you see over there" or to the right as the case may be. Then they know where they are going. Have some simple little way of telling like that. All Section

Comanders understand it. They tell their men. Everybody knows where he will be when he gets to that Ridge. Then when you get to that Ridge you have to pick up your bearings again to the point in the next Ridge. You have had experience of it and know that there is a good deal of smoke and fog about the battlefield, and as we are going next year, there will be a good deal more smoke as the value of smoke is being a great deal recognised. So probably our Operations next year will be conducted generally to a large extent in a great deal of smoke like a fog, or a mist; so, in that case, do not forget to pick up some prominent object well behind you, and get your back area so that you can pick up your position, when you get to that ridge, by a back area. That is the Compass bearing. Then the next point in training the Platoon is that we must impress on them that we must continue our advance for as long as possible in this kind of formation (indicates). By the way, you may like the diamond formation, but I am taking this block formation as an example. We must continue our advance in this formation for the simple reason that these block formations are the only formations in which the Platoon Commander can retain control of his Platoon. The tendency now is just the same as in the past. The tendency is, as soon as fire is encountered for the Platoon to get out and remain in extended order. What is the first thing which should be impressed on the men. That is the only time they get extended order, viz., when they want to develop fire-power, or put in a bayonet charge. It is very seldom it is necessary. Of course, it is necessary to get into extended order to avoid fire, but those are the two main reasons for extended order, and if they have to get into extended order to avoid or deliver fire, the moment the opportunity permits them to get into a Valley, or undulating ground, they should at once resume their block formation. The next point about it is the question of the scouts or skirmishers.; the distance they should be sent ahead and the number of them. I have noticed that this varies a good deal in the various formations. Sometimes the idea is to break up the two leading sections into scouts all along the front. In places it has been found successful to send out a party of men from each

sections as scouts, moving well on ahead, the remainder of the section pushing on up to the scouts and the scouts pushing on again and so on. I suggest we are inclined to break up these sections into too many scouts. If it is in open country a pair of scouts can cover the whole of your front. The closer the country the more scouts you want. What should be the action

of the platoons when it bumps up against opposition.

Again and again I go out to see units training. In 80 per cent of the cases the moment opposition is encountered the whole platoon breaks up into extended order. What we suggest is that the principle of all platoon attacks should be something like this. We will imagine that opposition has been encountered. Fire is being opened on all the leading sections. Then they come to a halt b

hind a little bit of cover. Assume that all the ground is swept by fire. The platoon commander comes up and siezes up the situation. He signals to his section commanders, and they all come up alongside him and lying down he makes up their plans. He makes them up something like this. He makes up his mind rapidly and sees a bit of cover. He says to No.1 rifle section commander "I want you to get around and come in by the back door"- To No.2 he says "You get your Lewis gun in action on that mound and cover the advance " He says to No.3 to do likewise. He keeps No.4 in reserve. After the Show, if all goes well, they will all be up at the copse or cover. That is their manœuvre. If they are held up we suggest it is their job to keep the Bosche under fire until the support platoon comes on and tries to do an outflanking movement. The idea is to sieze the situation rapidly, taking all platoon and section commanders into his confidence and then sending them out to act. That is the general idea. My last point about the attack training is this. Do not aim too high. Wherever one goes one finds Brigades, Battalions and Companies doing good schemes, but doing good schemes is not everything; they must be carried out in a proper manner. One finds that Platoon Commanders do not know how to handle their Platoons. They have not

had sufficient Platoon practice. One sees that again and again. We wish to make your Platoon perfect. Your Company will automatically become perfect if each Platoon Commander knows how to handle his Platoon, and similarly your Battalion will become automatically perfect. We have been particularly struck with most of the Battles fought by the AUSTRALIAN Corps - by the action of certain Platoons in certain places, and there is no doubt that the action of some of these Platoons has won the show for the whole side. They were well handled Platoons. We have had letters from Divisional Commanders, Brigade Commanders - from Divisions up North - who have told us that they attribute their success - in most cases where they were successful - to the fact that they have adopted the system of giving their Platoon Commanders their Platoons every day for two hours to train, and insisting that some of the two hours each day should contain some little Platoon Scheme which was well done by the Platoon under the Platoon Commander, the Company Commander looking on as a Director. They say they attribute the whole success of their subsequent Operations to the good handling of the Platoon by the Platoon Commander. Make the Platoon perfect first, and in the Platoon training the Platoon Commander must do one thing. He must train his Section Commanders separately from their men, that is to say, when he draws up a Platoon Scheme he must take his four Section Commanders out beforehand. He may do it the evening before, or on the morning just before he makes the Platoon Attack, leaving the men to do half an hour's drill under the Platoon Sergeant. He takes his four Section Commanders out and goes through a little attack with them. That is the time he is training them, and then up comes the Platoon, and they carry out the attack with the men. That is the training of the men. In the same way, the Company Exercises should always be carried out, first of all by Company Commander, then by Platoon and Section Commanders. You can practice your Coy. Am-

munition supply. A Battalion Scheme should be carried out at Battalion Headquarters and Company Headquarters, practising supply, attack - getting out the Transport Officer and the Quartermaster, and seeing that everything is properly done. Brigades should do it the same way. Finally, at the end of your training ~~to~~ carry out your schemes with your troops, and we suggest a golden rule, i.e., that when you do a scheme with the troops never have more troops than you have situations for. As an example of what I mean.- The other day I went down to see a Battalion Attack. It was an excellent attack, well carried out, but for four hours in the rain the Supports and Reserves were kept standing about, and did nothing, and finally went away wet through and probably feeling "fed up" with the War. We say this,- Do not have any more troops than you have situations for. Supposing you were going to do that Battalion attack I showed you just now, you only have situations for two of the Support Platoons. Only have these two out. Represent the other two Platoons by a Runner with a red flag, or in some way like that. If you have any doubt about requiring the use of a Reserve Company do not have it out. The last point about training is this. I mentioned you ought to do all your schemes with as few troops as possible. I make one exception. When the leading platoon gets out all by itself they have open flanks on each side of them and the men are rather likely to halt and wait for the other people to come on. The reason for that is they do not understand how they are being supported. Give your men some idea of where the battalion is. I saw it extremely well done the other day. Make careful arrangements beforehand. For the instance quoted about the other ~~other~~ day, careful arrangements were made beforehand; and a gentle sloping valley where he could distribute his whole battalion on a 800 yards front to a depth of about 1000 yards was selected by the battalion commander. When the men were going over the slopes of the valley they should all look round and see what the formation of the battalion for the attack looked like. He then conducted the whole demonstration. The battalion and company

Commanders explained everything to the men. Then a man looking behind could see a support battalion coming along and from where it was coming. He then got confidence.; it also permitted of every man knowing the actual formation. That is the end of my talk.

11.55 a.m.

Lieut.-Colonel LEVEY of the GORDON HIGHLANDERS gave a demonstration with a platoon of 33rd. Bn. showing correct and incorrect methods of training. Drill, rifle exercises, marching, lewis gun work, etc.

General GUGGISBERG 3.40 p.m.

Well, Gentlemen, you have seen and heard the little programmes we have had to put out to-day. I apologise if anything is old. We hope to give you some ideas in order to bring others out in your minds. Let us have a good discussion on any thing that any one wants to talk about. We have not the power to settle anything. We do interpret the Commander-in-Chief's instructions and views of certain things. We have access to G.H.Q. without using pen or pencil, and we might be able to bring to notice some things you might like inquired into. Has anyone anything to ask about organisation as laid down for an Infantry Battalion.

General CANNAN: I recommend that on platoon headquarters there should be a platoon observer to watch the movements of men, and what is happening in a battle. Personally, I think that the use of batmen or runners for this job is inadvisable as they are not as a rule sufficiently intelligent to do the work.

General GUGGISBERG. That is a great trouble; even getting an extra man on headquarters. The battalions are all very low in strength and it means taking another fighting man out of the section. The platoon commander and sergeant can do all that is necessary. There are many things we would like to have; but every man we take out for a special job means another fighting man less.

General CANNAN. When we consider the platoon, do we look on every platoon man on headquarters as being out of the fight. I think we might dismiss that point.

General GUGGISBERG. I don't think that. The local Commander has the fighting Units to manoeuvre with, and he has got to weigh the value between having a Section of so many men, against a Section of one man less in order to get an Observer.

General GELLIBRAND. Can you - anybody - illustrate the way in which Organisation has affected Training? I am sure there are a number of Battalions whose work has been affected that way - the Organisation providing so many men in the various Units, and casualties reducing them until it has in turn affected Training. I should like General GUGGISBERG to explain briefly how we stand in that matter. Can somebody give a practical illustration of that? The whole Training is based on Platoons of 4 Sections. Surely there must be one Platoon in the Division that has not got four decent sized Sections. Can anybody swear to that? All I want is just the bare facts of the present state of one of these Platoons we are training on lines similar to the Platoon we have just seen.

General GUGGISBERG. Let us have a concrete case of a very weak Platoon.

Major WHELAN, 34th Bn. There was an instance yesterday where we had a very weak Company owing to men being absorbed in finding duties. Certain men were away and, in that case, we made rather a large Platoon of it. There was a difficulty in this respect that there were so many Section Commanders who did not have the opportunity of working and controlling their Sections.

General GUGGISBERG. You refer to yesterday when you had a lot of men away on duty. I do not take that as a typical case because you expect to have the extra duty Company's training interfered with. Take the case of an ordinary Company not for duty or fighting, or any fatigues..

Major WHELAN. We have not experienced that on account of working on a 2-Company basis for instructional purposes.

General GUGGISBERG. There is a point. A weak battalion for example. Suppose a battalion is strong enough to have 16 platoons in it. Each platoon composed of four sections of about 3 other

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ranks each. What are the difficulties that you experienced in training these 16 platoons because they are at a very low strength.

Major WHELAN. We can overcome the difficulty by the amalgamation of the 4 companies into 2 for training purposes.

If you have 4 sections in each platoon with an average of 3 other ranks in each section. Amalgamate two half companies into one company for normal training purposes. Our establishment of n.c.os. is not up to war establishment at the present time.

General GUGGISBERG. You advocate in the example just mentioned of making 2 Coys. of 4 full Platoons each.

General CANNAN. For training purposes, and for Administration why not have a Nucleus of these Sections really for drafts coming in; ready to remain in their old Sections, or old Platoon; billet separately, and mess separately, but on Parades to be formed into two Companies?

General GUGGISBERG. There, gentlemen, I would like to criticise that. One has to look at it from two points of view. First of all the Battalion is at that strength I have just mentioned. You have to consider: "Are you going to get reinforcements, or are you not? If you are not going to get reinforcements, and you are going to remain permanently at that weak strength of 3 men per Section - 16 Platoons per Battalion, - next time you go into action you lose a certain number of casualties, and you have to reorganise and cut down Platoons and Companies. Therefore, it seems to me that it is up to the Commander of the formation to authorise that Battalion to be formed into a lesser number of Companies, or a lesser number of Platoons per Company; to retain 4 Companies and form each of four Platoons, or to have 3 Companies of 3 Platoons. Something like that. There is no definite thing that one can lay down, but I only suggest that course, that if you are going to be permanently weak, practically what it comes to is this: that that organisation for 16 Platoons is laid down for an Establishment of 900 other Ranks. If you are never to get any more Reinforcements. and permanently remain at 600 other ranks, you

must adopt a new Organisation. But if you are going to receive reinforcements, maintain your organisation even during Training - even if you are only going to have 3 men per section. If you are going to maintain 16 platoons, that is 64 Sections, during Training, you are going to train the 64 Section Commanders, and 16 Platoon Commanders; that is the time for training them.

You mentioned the difficulty just now under your Establishment of N.C.Os.

Major WHELAN. The n.c.Os. are not required for training. The only time they are required is on parades or demonstrations.

Major (44th Bn) We have the required number of n.c.Os. under the organisation for training purposes. We are under establishment, but for the two-coy. establishment there are sufficient n.c.Os. for training purposes.

General GUGGISBERG. You can always keep up the full establishment of n.c.Os. can you not? As soon as a man becomes a casualty you can promote someone else.

Major WHELAN. If you only have two companies there are sufficient n.c.Os.

~~General GUGGISBERG~~ (?) If you are carrying on with the 16 platoons each section of only three other ranks is much better than re-organising but can a section commander have sufficient training with three men?

General GUGGISBERG. Yes. With two. He does not get much experience with training two men to shoulder arms, but in carrying out the tactics and schemes he can work with two men and carry out his movements just the same way as he can carry it out with six. I think that is the idea to aim at. You do not quite agree with that?

Capt. ??? No, sir, I do not.

General GUGGISBERG. Say why you do not.

Capt. ??? I do not agree, sir, from the man's point of view. If a Section of 3 men is working, and if they are called upon to carry out their work as a Section, I do not think they get the proper idea of a Section's work. I would much prefer to reorganise and have a decent sized Section. Then a man knows what his job is, and the Section Commander knows what work to carry out with the Section.

General GELLIBRAND. Does it not turn on the head of Reinforcements?

General GUGGISBERG. All my remarks on maintaining a Section of 3 men turn on the point: Are you expecting Reinforcements or not? If you are not, naturally the Commander of the formation is going to authorise within his Formation a different organisation. I hope that point is clear. Look at it from another point of view. Supposing you had Battalions of 900 other ranks - good full Battalions - do you agree with the organisation laid down there, i.e., that you have 16 Platoons permanently, and 4 sections of 6 or 7 men in each Platoon, and not allowing any transfers except as a promotion, preserve each Platoon intact. Do you agree with that?

Answer. We do.

General GUGGISBERG. If you are suddenly reduced to a permanent Establishment of 600 - very well, -reorganise. according to the instructions of your Commander, so you determine to reorganise into 3 Companies in the Battalion, organise each Company on those principles - a permanent Platoon, and a permanent Section. If you are very low, and have to organise 2 Companies, very well, organise on those principles. It is the principles we want to get at. Principles of making platoons into little families.

General GELLIBRAND. The principles so far as we are concerned are to maintain 4 companies until the last. If a platoon consisting normally of 4 sections is so weak it becomes practically a section and is attached to another one; the section disappears before the platoon and the platoon before the company.

General GUGGISBERG. I would certainly say tactically that companies should be the last to go.

General GELLIBRAND. It was a point that was raised in the Corps and it was considered best to maintain company organisation. The difficulty about training seems that the whole thing is based on the platoon being cut down to such weak numbers.

General GUGGISBERG. Even after reorganising.

General GELLIBRAND. The other day in the 40th. Battalion, I think it I saw not more than 300 men on parade. This was ~~the~~ without

(27).

signallers and Lewis gunners, and that comprised the whole of the 40th. Battalion.

General GUGGISBERG. How long does a Platoon Commander last. Is he not constantly changing one way and another. Is it not surprising if you make up a monthly list of Officers ^{to} find the same man in command day after day?

Col. LORD. The great difficulty in maintaining that system lies in the fact that Officers are absent on Leave, and attending classes at Schools, etc.

General GELLIBRAND. Really what it amounts to is to get the general principles to be followed, and get to that as near as we can. It means the greatest possible uniformity of instruction right through the Battalion; I might say right through the Division.

General CANNAN. I expect it might come under the heading of "Difficulties of Organisation". During a training period as at present many Leaders are absent attending Schools. We would advocate particularly in the AUSTRALIAN Corps recommending that all Corps Schools should be abandoned while the Division is out of the line, then the Company Commander would be with his Platoon or Section. That is the school of training, and he is with his men.

General GELLIBRAND. Schools practically mean that 60 Officers are continually away from the Division.

General GUGGISBERG. I agree with that. In several Corps I know the Corps Commander has allotted vacancies for Divisions out of the line. The time to send Officers to Schools is when the Division is in the line, but when a Battalion is training nobody ought to be away from the Courses - from that Battalion. A Battalion is the finest School of instruction in the World, and during its training time everyone should be with it.

Major HARRISON. Would it be possible if the Corps schools are shut down to have the Corps schools' staffs sent round to assist divisions with the training in the latest ideas.

General CANNAN. It might be said that as we are an exceptional Corps with all divisions together we might arrange that.

General GELLIBRAND. Of course we have a higher establishment of

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officers in order that we may send them to schools and arrange things like that. I think the trouble has been that the organisation has been based on an establishment which has never been reached. For instance, there was a maximum and a minimum. We touched the minimum at one period and then the thing collapsed.

General GUGGISBERG. Is there any other points about Organisation and Training?

Major HARRISON. There are two or three things in connection with ~~things~~ ^{schools} I desire to put forward. Schools, at the present moment, appear to give most of our Candidates the impression that they cover the same ground, whether they are Corps, Army, or G.H.Q. Schools. The result is that there is a certain amount of monotony. The next thing about the Schools is that they seem to fill a man up with a lot of knowledge, but they hardly seem to touch the question of cultivating the capacity for Instruction, i.e., enabling a man who has undergone a Course to impart that knowledge which he has acquired to others. I think it would be a good thing if they could do a little more in that respect.

General GUGGISBERG. As a matter of fact, gentlemen, all the Army, Corps and G.H.Q. Schools are now under reorganisation. We have a big plan in hand, and we hope that by Christmas there will be a tremendous improvement in these Schools, and by next Autumn we ought to have them going very well. We are going to introduce "How to Teach" as a subject.

Major HARRISON. The standard of Schools could be toned up a lot.

General GUGGISBERG. About tactics. Let us have a criticism of our suggestions this morning. We call it the theory of penetration - backing up the troops that are making progress. That demonstration I gave you was a more or less open warfare illustration - semi-open to open warfare - without a barrage. Does anyone think that that system is suitable to following a barrage. Have you any improvements you would like to suggest on it? Has any Officer made use of that system in the recent fighting. Will someone please give us an example?

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Colonel LORD.

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I think that system has been used fairly uniformly throughout the recent operations.

General GUGGISBERG. There was an officer yesterday who put up a proposition which you might like to criticise. (illustration of way of working platoons in advance given)

Is there any criticism?

(Officer unknown) If the Company Commander has his own reserves, then he can exploit the whole front quickly whereas if the reserve were in the hands of the Battalion Commander perhaps the latter takes some time to find out how things are and before he moves the supports or reserves up the opportunity may be lost..

General GUGGISBERG. I do not think I would keep that company under my own hands. I should keep my reserve company under my own hands but would give the support company commander a free hand with the support company. Do battalion commanders agree with this?

Colonel LORD. I think the handling of the support company is a very difficult thing to get there in time., and I think it more desirable to have the two platoons - one in support and one in reserve - under the battalion commander's hands.

General CANNAN. I think the Battalion Commander looks out for possibilities of every emergency. He provides for things like that.

General GUGGISBERG. Of course, one principle that we ought to bear in mind always is that we should not commit too large a number of our Units to the fight. If you are going to put 3 Coys. up in the front line, even though you distribute them in depth you are ~~putting~~ ^{committing} them to the fight. They are out of hand and become involved. I suggest to put 2 Coys. up and have a Support and Reserve Company; thus you are only committing half your Battalion to the fight and have the others in hand.

General CANNAN. I agree with that. Fighting in semi-open warfare, we have not been able to carry it out in practice. I am afraid the strength of the Units have prevented us carrying that out.

General GUGGISBERG. Of course really we are trying to get the perfect thing. When we get down in strength as your Division is - as all the Divisions in the British Army are - they have no drafts coming in - if we get down to a very low strength, then it is up to the Corps Commander to allot the Division a lesser task.

General CANNAN. I think in these big advances that the great thing is allotting to each Platoon a certain sector of advance, which begins at the forming-up line and ends at the Objective. They have to use their Compasses, and have to get back into their particular frontage. Certain Platoons in the Battalion leading Platoons should be the Platoons to stick to their frontage, but the other broken Platoons - the Supporting Platoons and Supporting Companies - have a system of manoeuvre to assist those leading Platoons to keep their sectors. It seems to me that in a general advance of that description there must be some definite system of keeping direction. You say in your training leaflet No.4 that there should always be a n.c.o. in each platoon responsible for keeping direction. We say that is not feasible. If you make an n.c.o. responsible he may become a casualty. Who is then to do the work.

General GUGGISBERG. I think that is badly worded and that it should read "at least one n.c.o." I think the whole platoon should know the direction by picking out any prominent landmarks. What is the solution.?

General CANNAN. I think it is a case that when the platoon leader goes off the course everybody does the same thing, because they do not use their initiative.

General GUGGISBERG. By giving one section the duty of keeping direction you possibly hamper their manoeuvre. If everyone knows the direction the platoon eventually gets there. The general maintenance of direction is kept by the platoon commander with the compass; picking up those visible landmarks in succession. As a matter of fact there are a dozen ways of doing it, and the directing section is as good a one as any.

There was a general officer the other day who put up the question why should we not make the two forward sections always keep direction. That was the thing he put up. Most of the others were there thought that it made the platoon too rigid. It is one way of doing it of course.

Captain PRIOR. With regard to the point about keeping direction with compasses there is no issue of compasses to battalions in the Australian forces. Where there is a barrage in operation the compass is practically no use at all. There is so much metal flying around that it makes the compass defective. The box respirator, tin hat, and wire on the ground will throw the compass out.

General GUGGISBERG. The tin hat does not deflect it much more than a degree or two. The box respirator, I know, throws it out about twenty degrees. I have never heard about the metal doing it though.

General CANNAN. Of course one of the wonders of the whole world is how companies get on the jumping off line at the dead of night at the right time and get off.

General GUGGISBERG. Of course if the troops can find their way there they should be able to find their way and keep direction in a battle. They have a start line to get on to and an objective.

Col. WOOLCOCK. You very often have time for the reconnaissance of approach routes for your jumping off line.

General GUGGISBERG. Have you any particular tips that anybody uses in preserving direction?

Colonel CLARKE. Only by the Sun, as on 29th September last when we marched 10 degrees North.

General GUGGISBERG. That gave you a good landmark to go by?

Colonel CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Capt. PRIOR. There is the case of a Vickers barrage; if you know the sound you can pick it up.

Major HARRISON. Thermit shell as a guide is very useful for direction.

General GUGGISBERG. In order to mark some particular spot along the track?

Major HARRISON. Yes.

General GUGGISBERG. Just like the old Star Shell?

General CANNAN. I advocate in certain parts of the Corps front certain beacon light fires. If you knew the points to get to you can pick up your bearings and lead to various positions.

General GUGGISBERG. That is much on the same system as one used to fire coloured VERY Lights back in the Reserve Lines. &

Capt. ROSS. In smoke or fog is there any substitute for the Compass?

General GUGGISBERG. No. I think you have to do a night march with the compass then. Of course there again you want a locality compass to be any good. I think the compass is the only thing in smoke or a fog. There again, we had the experience of one of your Divisions given us that keeps its direction during a fog by extending the leading Platoons into a wave. Have you tried that?

General CANNAN. Our people, as a matter of fact, are opposed to that because it is considered more likely to lose direction in a wave than in files. It might be a good thing if we got an issue of leather megaphones.

General GUGGISBERG. Have any Officers had experience of megaphones? worn on the wrist?

General GELLIBRAND. We used them on GALLIPOLI, but I do not think they were used after the first day.

General CANNAN. I think the reason for that was because it became stationary warfare.

General GUGGISBERG. Do the officers think the little leather megaphones would be useful?

Coy. Commander. 44th. Bn. I think they would be useful. I have had occasion to sing out at the top of my voice under fire when a small megaphone would have been of great assistance to me.

General GUGGISBERG. If you had come out of a fight and had no further use for the megaphone would what would become of it? Do you not think it would become lost.

Coy. Commander. 44th. Bn. No. I would make sure of keeping mine.

Coy. Commander. ?. I think when going over in a barge, that a megaphone would not make any difference. If you had no barrage it would be alright.

Major HARRISON. were
They are used a great deal before the War. They were used by this Corps during the early days of the War. If needed, I think they can be bought from any leather merchant but nobody buys them.

General GUGGISBERG. Now, Gentlemen, have you any general subjects for discussion. - anything at all ?.

Major HARRISON. The question of training. We have found the German machine gun very useful on account of its being already in position with a supply of ammunition at hand. Do you think we could get a supply of these guns for training when out of the line. Most people can fire it, but cannot remedy a stoppage.

General GUGGISBERG. Is your Corps trying to get any ?

Major HARRISON. Yes. We asked for them about three weeks ago.

General CANNAN. It has been published that several times touch has been lost during operations. None of our books lay down the method of keeping touch. In fact, rather the contrary. Could something come out from the Training Directorate about it.

General GUGGISBERG. Let us have some ideas of keeping touch with the Bosche when he is retiring.

Major HARRISON. Push on with the troops facing him at the moment. Picquet him, and when those troops of ours are tired relieve them with fresh troops and continue on. Never allow him to get away. Keep him picqueted all the time.

General GUGGISBERG. We would be glad to get instances of how touch was kept with the Bosche .

Colonel CLARK. Extensive use of light horse patrols was found good. We had a squadron of light horse attached to the brigade. I had about a troop with me. They were very useful and very successful.

General GUGGISBERG. That is an argument for the Divisional squadron being restored.

General GUGGISBERG. One way in which a Division has told me ~~they~~ it kept touch with the Boche is: There were a certain number of Brigades in the line, and each Battalion was holding about 1,500 to 2,000 yards front. It used 2 Companies to hold the line. It used 2 Companies for exploitation purposes. Each Company had a front of about 1,000 yards allotted to which to work on. The Divisional Commander laid down certain points that were to be attempted every day, but those points were not to limit the initiative of Company Commanders. We will take one of the two Companies that is told off to exploit. The way it did it was this. It sent one Platoon forward; the other 3 Platoons held 3 localities. One Platoon went forward. It sent a Section well on in advance. That Section threw out, or had with it, a couple of the Battalion or Company Scouts. It threw out Scouts. These Scouts scoured the ground in front ~~at the points~~ ^{by bounds}, reinforced by the remainder of the Section. As the Scouts went on, the remainder of that Platoon then came up behind them, took the place of the leading Section which went on following the Scouts, and in that way they managed to keep touch. It is a Cavalry idea. When they got forward a certain number of bounds, then the other 3 Platoons moved forward and formed three more Platoon localities further forward. Then on a certain day when they had scoured enough ground, and those leading Companies had kept near the main line of resistance; the main line of resistance was pushed forward and in that way they kept touch with the Boche. This particular Division happened to be in a part of the line where the orders were to keep in touch with the Boche, and not press him too vigorously. That was the way they did it.

General GELLIBRAND. One of our particular difficulties has been to get the Heavy Artillery programme on the front concerned, and we have great difficulty in trying to get any alterations made. The Artillery get their programmes, and it takes a great deal to get them to alter it.

General GUGGISBERG. Have there been any experiences of the use of the No. 27 Rifle Smoke Grenades. Have you had any of it?

Major HARRISON. Yes, a fair proportion of it.

Colonel CLARKE. One of my Companies used the No.27 Grenade on the 29th September, but we could not do much good as it was too local. At 5 p.m. we asked for Artillery smoke. It came down but was too high. We had no Artillery Liaison Officer with us so could get no more smoke.

General GUGGISBERG. One or two Divisions made use of them and found them very useful for manoeuvring. They found that 8 or 10 Grenades for each man was very useful.

Major HARRISON. I have one other Training question. The Physical Training Instructors seem to be very keen. They have a cadence entirely their own. Their words of Command are their own, and they do nearly everything at the double. We put in a quarter of an hour's Physical Training in the middle of some Infantry work, and it leads to confusion. Can we check them a little bit in their enthusiasm. That leads up to another point. Are we training by the book, or are we training according to CHELSEA or the Schools?

General GUGGISBERG. In what way?

Major HARRISON. In rather minor things. Handling of Arms for instance, fixing of bayonets, words of command, etc.

General GUGGISBERG. The Chelsea book, I believe, was published in an official form some time last year, but it was not authorised for the use of the Army until some time this year, and, as far as I know, it is the only official publication on how to do drill which exists at the present moment.

Major HARRISON. It has cancelled "Infantry Training" then, sir?

General GUGGISBERG. I would not like to say that. I am afraid I cannot give you a direct answer on that. I have noticed in some particular Brigades that they have adopted the Chelsea method; in others they are sticking to the old methods. You think there ought to be one system?

Major HARRISON. I think so, sir. I think if the "Infantry Training" is wrong it should be amended.

General GUGGISBERG. That is a point I will make a note of - that there ought to be an Official Publication of some sort.
(Turning to Divisional Commander). I think, sir,

that this concludes our programme. Might I thank you, sir, and your Officers for the very keen way in which you and they have listened and borne with us to-day, and I do hope that our little visit here to-day has been of mutual benefit. What we would like is to bind the Forces of the British Empire in such a way that we will have our Armies in such a state throughout the whole British Empire that we will have a uniformly trained Army.

General GELLIBRAND. I think we have to thank you for a very illustrative series of Lectures, and for the illustrations given by Colonel LEVEY. I feel sure that when we next have a visit from the Training Inspectorate that we shall show that we have picked up some of the wrinkles given to us to-day

taken by S/Sgt. CRICHTON and Corporal HOPPER.

A.H.



The following decisions were arrived at at a Divisional Conference held on Sunday, 20/10/18.

1. - Brigade training policies should be issued in sufficient time to enable units to arrange their work for the ensuing week, and to discuss this work with Company Commanders.
2. - Battalion proposals for the week's training should be reviewed by Brigades and a copy forwarded to reach Divisional Headquarters by Friday of each week.
3. - The day's work in purely military subjects is to consist of not less than 3½ hours excluding rests; to occupy this time fully with interesting work needs careful preparation before-hand in order that Instructors may be clear in their minds what work has been done, where it is to be done and how it is to be done. Company Commanders, if absolutely required for instructional work, need not be sent to schools, and will not be sent, provided Brigades are furnished the necessary statement.
4. - The need for at least one "strongest possible" parade for battalion drill was stressed.
5. - In order that staff arrangements for Brigade marches should be tried, a weekly brigade route march should be undertaken.
6. - Too much time is not to be spent on one subject, in order that the men may be kept alert and interested. Attention was again called to slackness in checking errors.
7. - A competitive element in training was discussed and advocated.
8. - During cold weather it is inadvisable to carry out sedentary work in the open. As far as accommodation permits, such subjects, as can be taught indoors: e.g. Lewis gun, should be done in billets.
9. - In order that Commanding Officers and Adjutants may supervise the training, routine work and billet inspections should not be carried out during hours of parade.

(1).

P.T.O.

APPENDIX

11. - N.C.Os. are to be given as much instructional work as they are fitted for, to obviate the practice of standing about unoccupied.
12. - While units are working on broken ground, greater attention is to be paid to dressing; there should be no need to "call off" a party on every occasion during the morning's work, men should be accustomed to fall in in their proper places.
For Company drill, frontages should be equalised if necessary by making the whole or a part of a platoon drill in single rank.
13. - The length of rushes in open warfare was discussed and the opinion, subject to variations of ground, is that rushes should not exceed ten seconds. The competitive element should be introduced by making one section represent the enemy; while the other section advances by rushes, the 'enemy' section endeavouring to fire at as rapid a rate as aimed fire will permit.
14. - Attention must be paid during an advance to "direction"; casualties and supply of ammunition should be practised.
15. - In order that barrages may be marked on the ground, it was laid down that signal flags, if used, will indicate the point at which the shell would burst "on graze".
16. - Umpiring should be practised and skeleton exercises drawn up and discussed prior to the scheme being carried out with troops.
17. - Exercises in writing reports and orders and in the correct transmission of verbal orders need practice.
18. - In order that other units may obtain hints from an exercise, observers from those units should be present.
19. - Additional notice boards are required around billets; a board on which a local map is displayed should be erected at least at each battalion headquarters. Local names should be given to unnamed features and landmarks; such local names should be reported to Divisional Headquarters for issue where necessary.
20. - Slackness in marching parties for any duty must be checked, and the Commander of a party should be judged by the control he exhibits in this work.

P.T.O.

- 3 -

21. - Attention was drawn to the number of apparent stragglers during each forenoon. Sick parades should be arranged in order that men may be absent from parade for as short a time as possible; those not on parade are to be in possession of a pass stating the reason for their absence.

22. - It was pointed out that considerable slackness in saluting still exists throughout the Division and that guards and sentries do not appear to know the proper salutes.

23. - The Commanding Officer alone is to carry a stick on a battalion parade; dismounted officers are to wear putties.

24. - Equipment and scabbards are to be cleaned.

25. - A "Ruling Book" is to be kept in branches of the staff in Divisional and at Brigade Headquarters.

26. - The Divisional Commander expressed a wish that battalion messes should be instituted as far as possible.

27. - During range practices, the unit using the range is responsible that all safety precautions, including the warning of inhabitants and quieting of roads in the danger zone, are carried out.

28. - Arrangements are to be made for a Divisional Sports meeting and Divisional inter-unit football competition.

W. H. W. W.
Major.
General Staff.

Distribution.

"A.Q."
C. R. E.
3rd. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A. D. M. S.
War Diary.

A.H. War Diary
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APPENDIX
ANNEX 8

CONFIDENTIAL.

C. R. E.
A. D. M. S.
C.O., 3rd. Aust. Div. Train.



In order to define more clearly the position held by you with regard to the units of the A.E., A.A.S.C. and A.A.M.C. under your command, the Divisional Commander holds that the following points are to be observed :-

1. The full functions of regimental command are vested in the C.R.E. &c. respectively, and are delegated to the extent required by the nature of duties, location &c. to Commanders of Field Companies &c. In active operations, each such unit becomes automatically a detachment whose C.O. is vested with full powers of command.

The position of C.R.E. &c. in respect of command thus varies between that of an officer in immediate command of a Unit and that of an officer in command of a formation.

Routine as well as Operation Orders &c. are therefore to be issued as required.

2. The administration of field companies &c. is in a similar manner delegated to Company Commanders, whose responsibility for equipment &c. is defined by Regulation.

3. For the training and efficiency of Field Companies &c. the C.R.E. &c. is directly responsible to the Divisional Commander and it is the former's province to lay down the general lines and policy of training whilst leaving full scope for initiative to Company/Commanders.

Maurison
Major.
General Staff.

24th. October, 1918.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
TACTICAL EXERCISE.



1. In order that schemes set by Units of this Division may be on similar lines, the attached exercise is issued,

This forms simply a skeleton on to which exercises by Brigades &c and lower formations may be hung.

2. Machine Gun Battalion Officers will be made available for reconnaissances and conferences if desired by Brigade Commanders for purposes of this exercise.

3. 3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn. will be attached to 10th. A.I. Bde. Group for this exercise.

Hawson

25th. October, 1918.

Major.
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION,

"A.Q."
C. R. B.
3rd. Aust. Div. Sig. Coy.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th. do.
11th. do.
3rd. Aust. M.G. Bn.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.
A. D. M. S.
3rd. Aust. Div. Train.
D. G. O.
War Diary.

OUTLINE OF EXERCISES.

1. Instructions for evacuating the inhabitants and their concentration under the civil authorities at AIRAINES (9th. Bde); HALLENCOURT (10th. Bde); AVLESNES (11th. Bde).
2. Close billeting scheme for "C" Day (Units at War Strength).
3. Road reconnaissance for March on "C" Day.
4. Orders for the March and for Adv. Gd. on "C" Day.
5. Orders for bivouac on "C" Day.
6. Selection of and orders for outposts.
7. Selection and report on Defensive System
RIVILLE - SORLE - GRANDSAR - LIMLUX.
8. Proposals for Defence of SORLE, WALL, GRANDSAR,
BOIS DE RIVILLE, HALLENCOURT.
9. Reconnaissance of Brigade areas.
10. Requisitioning Scheme for removal of local supplies
to D.R.P. at AVLESNES.
11. Detail of Supply and Ammunition Dumps for Unit.
12. Detail of Medical Arrangements.
13. Arrangements for Divisional F.O.V. Cages at
HALLENCOURT.
14. Signal Service arrangements as planned on "C" Day.

NARRATIVE.

1. The low ground running from MARLUIL via BRAY - DUACQ - LILROCOURT to LONGPHEL and the Valley thence to RIVILLRE forms the N. coast of SOUTHLAND. The whole coast is watched by coastguards whilst SOUTHERN Field Troops are being moved into the district as a precaution against a threatened landing from a NORTHLAND Port about 10 hours steam to the N.W.

2. The population of SOUTHLAND is of doubtful loyalty and in this district there are a number of sympathisers with NORTHLAND.

3. Armament and moral of both sides are equal and neither possesses a numerous or efficient air service.

4. On "A" Day the 3rd. Division (less Artillery) moved Brigade Groups from the South to THULULLOY L'ABBAYE area (11th. Bde); HORNNOY area (10th. Bde); LICHLER area (9th. Bde). The same day the coast was bombarded and a feint landing made by a NORTHLAND Expedition about 30 miles W. of MARLUIL and orders were issued to evacuate all civilians within 5 miles of the Coast.

5. On "B" Day orders were issued at 20.00 for close billets :-

11th. Bde Group to ALLERY - MERTIGNY.

10th. Bde Group to CITERNE - PRUCOURT.

9th. Bde Group to VERGELS - HAUCOURT.

D.H.Q. " to AUMETRE.

6. On "C" Day the Division continues the March with 11th. Bde to WANEL; 10th. Bde to BOIS de PREVILLE; 9th. Bde (Reserve) and D.H.Q. remain unaltered. - Outposts on the line SCHEL - GRANDSART; Brigade Boundary BOIS DUBOIS; Divisional Boundaries - Lines bearing N.W. through LIMMIX and WANEL.

NOTE.

1. The general situation is that of the TURKS on GALLIPOLI early in April, 1915, and the intention is to work out the general action to be taken under these circumstances up to the actual landing.

2. This will involve work by Brigade staffs, &c., as well as by Units, for it is as desirable that schemes should be set by means of tactical orders &c. as that they should be solved by orders and reports in strict service fashion.

3. The more this preliminary work is done as it would be on service e.g. keeping war diary, working out every detail of communication, supply, questions of time and space - the better will be the basis on which to work out the tactical details after the landing has taken place.

4. All necessary assumptions will be made either in setting or solving each problem, subject to the condition that the assumptions fit in with the general tenor of this scheme.

5. Unless there are special reasons to the contrary, each scheme should be carried out by one Syndicate of not less than 3 officers and / or other ranks under a selected head, who will sub-allot the work, as required. The time allotted for the work should rarely exceed six hours and typing is not permitted except for Brigade or Battalion orders. Reports must be concise and, if possible, should be written on the face of the sketch or map. Information is not to be duplicated.

6. Every opportunity should be taken to instruct and test officers with reference to acting in a higher capacity e.g. normally : Senior Captain will act as Battalion Commander; Adjutants as Brigade Major or Staff Captain &c.

7. Remarks by Bn. H.Q. &c. will be attached to the papers of each scheme and, after being endorsed by Brigade H.Q., will be returned to the Units to ~~use~~, before being dealt with at Bn. &c. Conferences.

122

10

MAP. A.

LEGEND

SECRET.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION DISPOSITIONS

AFTER RELIEF NIGHT 2nd/3rd/10/18.
EDITION 1.

9th Bde. Grp = Green

10th " " = Red


11th " " = Blue

MAP. 1.

SHEET 62^c

84,000 m W

42,760 m S.



APPENDIX 10


THIRD AUSTR DIVⁿ DISPOSITIONS

3-10-18

MAP 2
SECRET.

MAP. B.


EDITION 1.



SECRET

122

THIRD AUS^T DIV.
DISPOSITIONS
11-10-18
Ref Sheet "VIGNACOURT"




10

MAD 5
SECRET.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
DISPOSITION
11.10.18

Ref. Sheet



122

A.H.

Copy for War Diary.

G.26/739.

Appx II

Headquarters,
Australian Corps.

In compliance with your 188/1/1274, a summary of Training to be carried out during the week commencing 21st. October is attached.

In addition to the work shown, which is carried out in the forenoons, organized games and lectures are arranged for the afternoons.

A copy of this office Circulars 90.A. and 91.A. is also forwarded.

(signed) J. GELLIBRAND.

Major-General.
Commanding Third Aust. Div.

19th. October, 1918.

APPENDIX II

UNIT.	MON.	TUES.	WED.	THURS.	FRIDAY.	SATURDAY.
33rd. Bn.	Platoon Tactical Exercise.	Platoon Tactical Exercise (1 Coy). Coy. Tactical Exercise. (1 Coy).	Coy. Exer- cise. (1 Coy). Route March (1 Coy).	Route March (1 Coy).	Elementary Musketry & Lewis Gun.	Battalion Tactical Exercise.
34th. Bn.	Platoon in Attack.	Coy. in Attack.	Route March.	Coy. as Advd. Guard.	Musketry	Platoon as Battle Patrol.
35th. Bn.	Platoon in Attack.	Coy. in Attack.	Coy. in Attack.	Coy. in Attack.	Battalion in Attack.	Battalion in Attack.

UNIT.	MON.	TUES.	WED.	THURS.	FRIDAY.	SATURDAY.
38th. Bn.	Bn. Route March.	2 Coys. Mus- ketry. X 2 Coys. "Coy. as Advd. Guard."	"Coy. in Attack".	Brigade Route March.	2 Coys. on Range. 2 Coys. "Coy. as Advd. Guard."	Coy. as Outpost Coy.
39th. Bn.	Gas Tests &c.	Bn. Route March.	"Coy. as Advanced Guard."	Brigade Route March.	"Coy. in Attack".	Musketry on Range.
40th. Bn.	Coy. in Adv. Guard.	Bn. Route March.	Musketry on Range.	Brigade Route March.	Coy. in Attack.	Coy. as Outpost Coy.

11th. AUST. INF. BRIGADE.

UNIT.	MON.	TUES.	WED.	THURSDAY.	FRIDAY.	SATURDAY.
41st. Bn.		(Follows Later).				
43rd. Bn.	Extended Order. Co-operation with Lewis Guns. Use of Smoke Grenades.	Clearing Trenches. Intense digging. Smoke Grenades.	Musketry on Range.	Musketry on Range.	Battalion Route March.	As for Monday.
44th. Bn.	Musketry. Coy. on Range. Fire and Movement.	Platoon in attack. Fire and Movement.	Battalion Route March.	1 Coy. Patrolling 1 Platoon in attack.	Coy. in Attack & Musketry.	Musketry and Coy. in Attack.

APPENDIX

//

A.H. Copy for War Diary.

G.26/739.

appx 11

Headquarters,
AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

In compliance with your 188/1/1274, a summary of Training to be carried out during the week commencing 28th. October, 1918, is attached.

In addition to the work shown, which is carried out in the forenoons, organised games and lectures are arranged for the afternoons.

(signed) J. GELLIBRAND.

Major-General.

Commanding Third Australian Division.

26th. October, 1918.

APPENDIX/1

Copy for War Diary.

9th. AUST. INF. BRIGADE.

122

Unit.	Monday.	Tuesday.	Wednesday.	Thursday.	Friday.	Saturday.
33rd Bn.	General Training (Elementary)	Musketry (Range practice) 2 Coys Coy. tactical scheme (2 Coys)	Bn. Tactical exercise.	Bde Tactical exercise.	Platoon and Coy tactical exer- cises (2 Coys) Musketry Range practices (2 Coys)	Musketry (Range practices).
34th. Bn.	Musketry (Range practice 2 Coys). Section Train- ing - 2 Coys.	As for Monday; (Coys change over).	Musketry (Field firing).	Bde Tactical exercise.	Platoon Tactical schemes.	Bn. Tactical exercises.
35th. Bn.	Platoon & Coy. Tactical exer- cises.	Musketry (Range practices).	Bn. Tactical scheme.	Bde Tactical exercises.	Musketry (Range practice).	Musketry (Range practice).

APPENDIX //

10th. AUST. INF. BRIGADE.

122

Unit.	Monday.	Tuesday.	Wednesday.	Thursday.	Friday.	Saturday.
38th. Bn.	Bn. Route march.	Musketry (2 Coys on range). Coy. Tactical scheme (2 Coys. Adv. Gd).	Coy. Tactical scheme (Coys. in attack).	Bde Route march.	Coy. Tactical scheme (2 Coys Adv. Gd). Musketry (2 Coys. on range).	Coy. Tactical scheme (Coy. as Outpost).
39th. Bn.	Musketry (Range practice).	Bn. route march.	Coy. Tactical Scheme (Outposts).	do.	Coy. Tactical Scheme (Coy. in attack).	Musketry (range practice)
40th. Bn.	Coy. Tactical scheme (Outposts).	Bn. route march.	Musketry (Range practices).	do.	Coy. Tactical scheme (Coy. in attack).	Coy. Tactical scheme (Outposts)

Cancelled

APPENDIX 11

Copy for War Diary.

11th. AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE.

122

Unit.	Monday.	Tuesday.	Wednesday.	Thursday.	Friday.	Saturday.
41st. Bn.	Musketry Range practice - 2 Coy.s. 2 Coys. Close Order drill & Sectional Training.	As for Monday (Coys change over)	Battalion Drill and Sectional Training.	As for Wednesday.	Bde. Tactical schemes.	Coy. Tactical scheme (Coy. in attack).
43rd. Bn.	Sectional Training and Extended Order drill.	Platoon Tactical Scheme.	Musketry (Range practice).	Coy. Tactical scheme.	Bde. Tactical scheme.	Section Training & Close Order drill.
44th. Bn.	Specialist Training.	Section Training.	Coy. Tactical scheme (Coy. in attack).	Gas & Specialist Training.	Bde. Tactical scheme.	Musketry (Range practice).

APPENDIX II