

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/50/2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 5th  
Australian Division

April 1916



AWM4-1/50/2

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	1/4/16.		3rd Night, Pioneer Bn & details left TEL EL KEBIR and arrived at MAHSAMA.	
<p>(Original of above written on same sheet as entries for end of previous month &amp; filed with volume for that month).</p>				



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	1.4.16		Reinforcements for 8 <sup>th</sup> - 14 <sup>th</sup> - & 15 <sup>th</sup> Bdes arrived from CAIRO. Letter received from GOC 3 <sup>rd</sup> A.L.H. Bde, SERAPEUM, giving his proposals with regard to the L.H. Regt here sending to this Subsection. 2 sqdns. at Railhead and a half sqdn. on each flank.	
	2.4.16		3 <sup>rd</sup> Light arrived at MORSAR in good order. Arrangements made to relieve Wellington Mtd Rifle at railhead by a Regiment (8 <sup>th</sup> ) from 3 <sup>rd</sup> A.L.H. Bde at SERAPEUM. 2 Ausae forwarded a translation of a letter from the Captain of the 'REQUIN' (fuel battleship in LAKE TIMSAH), and their reply, in connection with their observation post at BENCH MARK and the role of the ships - 2 Ausae ask us for a list of our helio stations	
	3.4.16		Artillery personnel and a few guns arrived from TEL EL KEFIR. 14 <sup>th</sup> F. Art. Bde sent to FERRY POST. Remainder camped at MORSAR. The guns of 2 Ausae Div (2 Bdes) were handed over at FERRY POST by N.Z. Div. G.O.C. & G.S.O./2 attended a review of the N.Z. Division, at MORSAR CAMP, by the C-in-C. General Sir H. Murray. A very good turn out.	
	4.4.16	0730	Wellington Mtd Rifle Regiment left railhead and proceeded to SERAPEUM by march route. Advance parties of 8 <sup>th</sup> L.H. Regiment arrived at railhead this day from SERAPEUM.	
		1100	G.O.C. & G.S.O. attended a conference at G.H.Q. on training & other matters.	

1577 Wt. W10791/1773 500,000 1/15 D.D. & L. A.D.S.S./Forms/C. 2118.



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	5.4.16		<p>G.O.C and G.S.O.I went out to railhead to see 8<sup>th</sup> Bde Outpost line.                      Training Memorandum No. 1 issued.                      C.O.S. forwards a report on the water supply as it would be during heavy fighting.                      We reply to letter from 2<sup>nd</sup> Ausac dated 2/4/16 and say that we have no helio stations established. We will arrange to ration the French Observation post at BENCH MARK should they find it necessary to use it.</p>	
	6.4.16		<p>Arrangements made this day with C.O.S. for continuing the work on the BRIDGE Head defences. We ask 8<sup>th</sup> Bde to direct 3<sup>rd</sup> L.H. to have the whole ground in advance and 2 miles in rear of the front line defences, reconnoitred in order to know accurately the nature of the 'going' in order to frame plans for taking the offensive if any enemy columns approach the Canal.</p>	
	8.4.16		<p>Maj. Gen. Sir H. Godley &amp; Staff visited FERRY POST and rode round with the G.O.C. from 11.30pm until about 1.0pm. We arranged to-day to dig some deep trenches near 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> Bde Camps for instruction purposes in grenade work.</p>	
	9.4.16		<p>4<sup>th</sup> Aust. Div notify us by letter of the column they are sending out to attack JIFJAFFA on 13<sup>th</sup> instant. This raid was very successful and we had only 1 man killed. And took several prisoners including an Australian Premier Subaltern.</p>	



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	9.4.16		General Manash 4th Inf Bde., Genl Aubin 3rd L. H. Bde., and Genl Gwynne of the Army Corps came and had tea with us this afternoon -	
	10.4.16		G.O.C. sends in a report to 2/Auzae dealing with his inspection of our front line trenches and recommends the policy of holding 'strong points' of which 7 are named. We ask Genl Tway 8th Inf Bde to dispose his M.G.'s so as to get more flanking instead of frontal fire.	
	12.4.16		2/Auzae answer our letter of 10th inst in detail.	
	13.4.16		Having now obtained a clear understanding of the situation and policy we issue a SECRET MEMORANDUM (G6/2194) to Brigades and Div. Units giving a brief resume of the factors governing the situation and also a distribution of troops.	
			It was pretty rough weather last night and it blew hard. Early this morning it was quite calm although cloudy. About 1100 a regular dust storm sprang up blowing from S to SW direction. At 1.0 pm. the force was increasing and the sand stung sharply on the face & neck. The ferns gave a lot of trouble. LAKE TINSAN has quite rough and little waves on the shore - most unusual.	



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	13.4.16.		Lord Hardinge ex Viceroy of India was expected to pass through the Canal to-day but failed to probably owing to the weather. A sunken boat has been obstructing the ferry to-day	
	15.4.16		G.S.O 2. went out to the cross roads at 0700 to-day and saw 8th Inf Bde march in on being relieved in the front line by 15th Inf. Bde. Marching was fair but too many stragglers and badly loaded transport.	
		0930	Ser A. Solly of Anzac & Gen Davis 9th Corps went out to see "HOGS BACK" in our front line.	
	16.4.16.		Sunday. a fine day. Lt Colonel C.M. Macnaghten C.M.G. of 4th Battalion arrived here from Hospital to see the S.O.C.	
	17.4.16.		We forwarded to 2 of Anzac fresh proposals for works on the Bridge Head defences and ask for approval in making (a) the re-entrance in the line by throwing back the defences through Tloc 2 and 3 re-entrants S of the road and (b) the readjustment of the line about Tloc 7 re-entrant N of the road.	
	18.4.16		General Sir A. Murray C.M.C. with staff including A. R. St. The Prince of Wales rode round the Camp at FERRY POST and saw 8th and 14th Brigades at their training - C.M.C. did not say much beyond remarking that the horses	

1577 Wt. W10791/1773 500,000 1/15 D. L. & L. A.D.S.S./Forms/C. 2118.



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	10.4.16		and harness required attention.	
	11.4.16		2 Auger approved four proposals sent on 17 <sup>th</sup> inst but suggest we select a position for Section guns on WEST bank of Canal to protect our left flank in a close attack.	
		0700	As many Officers as could be spared attended a demonstration at the Machine Gun School, ISMAILIA under Major N. K. CHARTERIS. The Royal Sect. was sawnd undrest fire by day & night and also the difference between Maxim & Lewis Guns was explained. It was a most instructive and interesting demonstration and impressed us with the power of Machine Guns properly handled.	
	20.4.16	0500	ES02 inspected 8 <sup>th</sup> Inf Bde NCO's in Musketry and other training. The results were very good showing sound training for which Major C. Davies Bde Major is largely responsible. He was Musketry Instructor at DUNTRON COLLEGE, AUSTRALIA.	
		1545	G.O.C. inspected a Co. of AAASC transport. Not very good.	
	21.4.16		Good Friday. Church parade and holiday.	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	22/4/16	0700	Inspection of 54 <sup>th</sup> Bn. NCO's in Musketry - Results only fair. L. H. Squadron inspected by E.O.C.	
	23/4/16		We heard rumours to-day of an enemy attack North, about KATHIA. Yeomany reported to have been surprised - many killed and several prisoners. We send a wire to 15 <sup>th</sup> Luf. Bde on our front line asking them to direct 8 <sup>th</sup> L. H. to arrange to turn out if required, 2 sqdns at very short notice to-morrow. They should be fit for a 20 mile march. 100 camels with 200 fantasses of water must also be ready together with an escort from the BIKANIR CAMEL CORPS.	
	24.4.16		2 of Auzac wires to-day that "Extreme vigilance should be maintained throughout the line" as no no aeroplane reconnaissance was possible since they were required elsewhere - We let 15 <sup>th</sup> Luf Bde on our front line know this.	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	24/4/16	1600	<p>We sent General Elliott 15<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde, in the front line some further details of the KATIA fighting and ask him to warn Lt Col Maygar re 8<sup>th</sup> L.H. to be ready to move if required -</p> <p>G.O.C. inspected another Company of the Div. Train and found a great improvement.</p>	
	25/4/16		<p>ANZAC DAY. General Godley attended Church service with G.O.C. &amp; Staff at the 14<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde. After Church we rode round Sports of 8<sup>th</sup> Inf Bde. All units in the Division had sports, water carnivals, and concerts. In the afternoon most of the Divisional Staff went on board the hopper boat to 14<sup>th</sup> Inf Bde by the Navy and watched the swimming races. The Anzac men wore the red and blue ribbons on the left breast which were issued by the Division to those who had been at the landing and on the peninsula later.</p>	
	26/4/16	MORN. 1100	<p>General Godley inspected 14<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde in fitting of equipment, bayonet fighting, Grenadier work etc.</p> <p>G.O.C. inspected 2 mobile batteries improvised by General Christian for use in case of immediate need should the Turks attack us</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	27/4/16		<p>2 Augae forwarded a copy of a letter from G. H. Q in which the C-in-C remarked that "Judging from the late Raid of the Enemy on the KATIA DISTRICT it may be taken for certain that a Turco-German force can be assembled in strength within striking distance of our outposts well equipped, organized and led. 4000 troops might in this way be at the Enemy's disposal." It then went on to emphasize the importance of strong self-contained advanced posts which can hold out, if attacked, until the mobile Column can strike back.</p> <p>8th Inf. Bde were inspected this morning by Genl. Godley and he was very pleased.</p>	
	28/4/16		<p>G.O.C. inspected the Div Sig Co.</p>	
	29/4/16		<p>G.O.C. Army Corps (Genl Godley) inspected Div. L.H., Engineers, Pioneer Bn. Cyclists who then marched past in column of route. Genl Godley was pleased - especially with the Pioneer Bn.</p>	



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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	30/4/16.		<p>We hear the bad news today of Genl. Townshend's surrender at KUT EL AMARA. What a blow to our prestige. We are all very sore about it but feel he did hold out until the last moment.</p> <p>(Original of above written on same sheet as entries for beginning of subsequent month &amp; filed with volume for that month).</p>	



OPERATIONS

Secret

C/129



5<sup>th</sup> Australian Division

A column consisting of 1 Squadron Light Horse, 25 Bikanir Camel Corps, with Detachment Wireless Telegraph, R.F.C., Engineers and Medical Service will leave Railhead "A" Sub-Section No 2 Section on Tuesday 11<sup>th</sup> inst and will move via MOIYA HARAB to NIFJAF A where a small Turkish Post and 2 wells are reported.

The Post ~~will be~~ will be attacked and the wells destroyed probably on 13<sup>th</sup> inst; the Column is expected to return to Railhead in the early hours of 15<sup>th</sup> inst.

The above for your information

*J. Duncan* M.C. Es.

Scrapum

9. 4. 16

for  
 Major General  
 COMDG. 4th Australian Division

2

Ad Qrs.

8<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde

Forwarded.

Please inform all parties,

Confidentiality.

9/4/16.

5th Div. War -  
 G. S. 5<sup>th</sup> Aust Div





Headquarters, +  
5th Australian Division. ✓

Headquarters,

2nd ANZAC.

1. I have now inspected the front line of the subsection (II B) under my command. With the exception of two unwired intervals there is a wire entanglement along practically the whole front, and also a very considerable number of lengths of trench, not only on the strong points of the line, but also in a number of the intervals between them.
2. The work done appears to accord more with the original plans framed about January 1916, than with the later memos on the subject, particularly Anzac letter 41/8/1 of 9th March 1916 Corps, G.S.circular No. 1 of 23rd March 1916, which I take to indicate an intention to rely on the fortification and occupation by a part only of my Division of strong points as pivots for manoeuvre in or in front of the line by the main body of the Division, the "surplus troops" shown in G.S.circular No. 1. But this circular states in para. 5 (a) that a fire trench 4'6" deep shall be constructed along the whole front and shall be covered by entanglements. It appears to me that this entanglement if completed, and indeed much of the existing entanglement, would hamper greatly, if not altogether prevent, my "surplus troops" from effective manoeuvring.
3. My understanding of the position is that ultimately a line is to be prepared for occupation by a large force capable of stopping a strong attack, but that the immediate need is to hold the line as an outpost position and to rely on manoeuvre and counter attack as the effective mode of defence.

I therefore suggest that the immediate obligation is



to construct and maintain only the strong points and to leave the intervals free for manoeuvre, and it is for the purpose of receiving instructions on this point that this means is submitted, because it seems to me that this is the best mode of defence with the troops at my disposal.

4. I now proceed to a consideration of some of the details of the general view expressed above.

5. In the first place I would do away with a good deal of the wire now laid, and would give up all the trenches in the intervals between the strong points. In the Northern half of my subsection from Gundagi Hill to Katoomba these points are well defined and the intervals reasonably commanded. In the Southern half the strong points are not so obvious, nor are the intervals so well commanded, but a satisfactory series of points can nevertheless be indicated. In this half particularly, save for one gap, manoeuvre in and ahead of the line is practically impossible under present conditions of wire and trench.

6. I would prefer not to manoeuvre against an enemy at any distance so far ahead of the front line as to prevent any of the strong points from guarding one flank of my advance, and this apart from the problem of passing the existing wire. There is ample room for decisive action even with this limitation, and I doubt if the strong points could so protect a flank for me if manoeuvre took place "2 or 3 miles in front of the line". Of course my remarks are not meant to imply that an enemy successfully attacked would not be pursued by me.

7. Such manoeuvre in and near the front line instead of well ahead of it would also

(a) Give me the help of any heavy artillery on the Canal banks.

(b) Lessen greatly any anxieties about water.



3.

8. The strong points that I recommend are seven and this I think is an ample number. They are named from South to North.

THE SPIN~~X~~  
ROUND HILL

THE PLATEAU

KATOOMBA

AUSTRALIA HILL

KEMBLA

GUNDAGI

9. Not only the fire trenches, but also support trenches should be constructed at these points, and also a good number of M. G. emplacements to cover the intervals between them.

10. Other points which I would like to mention are:-

(a) That water storage be provided in the front line for three days supply for the largest force expected to occupy it. <sup>and manoeuvre near it</sup> There is always a risk about any pumping scheme continuing unbrokenly, and if an enemy approached, risk of the pipe lines being cut.

(b) The Decauville Railway now laid is not being used and would require much repair to be used. It will by degrees become quite useless. Now that the branch roads are completed the Decauville is not necessary. I suggest that it should be taken up and stored at railhead to be re-laid later if required.

11. I propose later to submit for advice my views as to how to deal with attacks at different points of my subsection, but postpone doing so till the questions I have raised in this minute are determined by Corps H.Q.

Ferry Post

10/4/16

(Sgd) J. H. McFar

MAJOR GENERAL

Commanding 5th Australian Division.





2nd AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.  
-----

Headquarters,

5th Australian Division.

1. With reference to your G. 5/2007 of 10th April, 1916, the Corps Commander desires me to point out that the entrenchments on the front line of your subsection were originally designed for occupation by a division with a considerable mobile force in addition as a reserve. At the time of the inception of the work it appeared possible that an attack might develop before either time or material were available to complete the works which it was intended ultimately to construct. The most immediately important work, viz., the preparation of a front line fire trench, M.G. emplacements and wire entanglements, was pressed on with.

Before even this stage of the work was completed the military situation ~~was~~ materially altered, and the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were withdrawn at short notice. Since the withdrawal of these Divisions the front line has been held merely as an outpost line by mounted troops and a certain amount of work has been done by these troops, especially in the direction of forming entanglements, to enable the outpost line to be held and watched by a comparatively small force

2. The works should therefore be looked on as an unfinished line temporarily modified to fulfil a different function from what was originally intended, but which may in the future have to be completed on the lines originally intended.

3. The present situation is transitional. The surplus





surplus troops of your Division not required for outpost duty might have to meet an attack, but the probabilities of such an attack are so slight that the ~~necessary~~ necessity of pushing on training with the least possible interruption should take first place.

Considerable notice of impending attack in force can in any case be counted on - quite sufficient to enable clearance to be made in wire entanglements to give greater liberty of action etc.

4. The Corps Commander is therefore adverse to employing troops to undo any work that has already been done unless the probabilities of attack greatly increase or until such time as it may be necessary to continue the work on lines at first contemplated.

5. To meet the immediate necessities of the case the following steps should be taken :-

- (a) Study of the ground with a view to employment of surplus troops should necessity arise including decision as to what entanglements should be removed, what trenches should be cleared and occupied etc.
- (b) The further strengthening if necessary of posts actually held by outposts but not of trenches up to which the supporting Brigade might be moved. The latter could be very considerably improved in a short time in case of emergency.
- (c) The completion of the Inner Line.

(b) and (c) are important as it is recognised that as soon as the training of your Division is sufficiently advanced it will be withdrawn and be replaced by a much smaller force.

6. To reply in detail to the points you raise:-

Para. 2. It has never been the intention to construct a





construct a continuous fire trench or entanglements along the whole front. G.S.Circular No. 1 para. 5a provided for the construction of the fire trench of works which had been designed but were not yet commenced and for the provision of entanglements to the extent originally intended. This para. chiefly referred to conditions which existed in Subsection "A".

Para. 3. It is intended ~~only~~ to construct and maintain as completed works only such points as would be held by outpost picquets.

There is perhaps some confusion as to the meaning of the term "strong points". In Col. Grants memo they *are* small works for all round defence within fortified localities. I read it that you use the expression as synonymous with the expression fortified localities.

Para. 5. No strong points, in the sense used by Col. Grant, had been commenced in the southern half of your Subsection, only the ~~fring~~ line of the fortified localities. In this portion of the line much extra wire <sup>was</sup> placed by New Zealand Mounted Rifles in connection with outpost defences. As decided by Corps Commander this could be removed should an attack in force be imminent while your Division is available for counter attack, but for the present it should remain.

Para. 6. You have a free hand in this matter.

Para. 7. The only heavy artillery now available is that of the ships allotted to your Subsection.

Paras. 8 and 9. Please reconsider in the light of the Corps Commander's decision that only works for picquets should be constructed.

Para. 10. (A) Storage of two days' water for two brigades





two brigades has already been provided I believe at camps in front. It is thought that this should suffice under existing circumstances.

The actual location of the tanks is a matter for Divisional arrangement. When first sent out they could not conveniently or with advantage be placed in works under construction.

Para 10 (B) The Decauville Railway will require ~~constant~~ attention and should be kept in ~~efficient~~ working order as it would be the chief means of bringing up supplies for supply of mobile troops, and of water in fantasses should pipe lines fail. It is considered that the maintenance and completion of the line would form good training for Pioneers and Engineers.

Brig.- General,  
General Staff,  
2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Ismailia,

12th April, 1916.



+ /  
Copy No. 2SECRET

No. G/6/2194

Headquarters,

5th Australian Division

13th April 1916

MEMORANDUM

The following notes and instructions are issued to explain the role of the 5th Australian Division while quartered in and about Ferry Post.

2. In February last an attack in force on the Canal was expected, and a large force was disposed to meet it ~~twilight~~ on the East Bank of the Canal sufficiently far from the Canal to prevent interruption of traffic.

3. A position of resistance was prepared some 6 miles East of the Canal. An intermediate position was chosen in support, and a series of bridgeheads forming an inner position was made on the bank of the Canal.

Roads, railways, and water mains were laid from the bridge heads to main rail heads near the outer line. Lateral roads, tramways, and water pipes were laid to the outer line from the railheads.

4. With the Turkish reverses in other theatres the possibility of attack has diminished. It is not anticipated that more than 40,000 men could be brought against the Canal during this spring, and during the summer only small raids are expected to be dealt with.

5. It has consequently been decided to

- (1) Hold the outer line as an outpost position, and keep up the works that have been actually prepared
- (2) Stop work on the intermediate position
- (3) Prepare the bridgeheads for occupation and defence by much smaller forces than are quartered there now. // At the same time, in view of the possibility of an attack in force next winter, the work on roads, railways and water supply, which takes time to carry out, is being pushed on under cover of the outposts.

6. The Defences are organised in 3 sections. The 2nd A. & N.Z.A.C. holds the centre section No. 2 with headquarters at ISMAILIA. In No. 2 Section there are two subsections, A held by 4th Australian Division with headquarters at SERAPEUM and B held by the 5th Australian Division with headquarters at Ferry Post.

The boundaries of B subsection of No. 2 Section are

on the SOUTH A line from a point on LAKE TMSAH 1 mile South of BIR EL FOWER running approximately East and through and including point 620.

on the NORTH A line running from the canal starting from a point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles South of EL FERDAN and running East immediately North of point 290.

7. The troops of "B" Subsection are distributed as shown on the attached table.

*References to map 1/20000*



2.

8. The G.O.C. of the brigade on outpost duty will take charge of the outpost line and the troops allotted to that line. All troops not required for outpost duty and patrols will put in all the training they can.

9. The Surplus troops will continue their training as arranged weekly. If required for operations these will be ordered by divisional headquarters

*Clive a. g. t. w.*

Lt. Colonel,  
G.S. 5th Australian Division.

*Issued to -*

G.S. nos 1-2.

Admin. Staff. 3-4.

8<sup>th</sup> Bde 5.

14<sup>th</sup> " 6.

15<sup>th</sup> " 7.

C.O.A. 8.

C.D.E. 9.

5<sup>th</sup> Div. Train. 10.

A.I.M.S. 11.

*Copies to -*

Amzac. 12.

D.H.Q. 13-15.



+  
√

"B" SUBSECTION, No.2 SECTION

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS

5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

OUTPOSTS

$\frac{1}{2}$  Squadron Light Horse

$\frac{1}{2}$  Battalion

$\frac{1}{2}$  Squadron Light Horse

$\frac{1}{2}$  Battalion

Reserve :- 1 Regiment Light Horse (less two  $\frac{1}{2}$  Squadrons)

SUPPORTS

STATION Railhead, about 6 miles out

FUNCTIONS

- (a) Furnishes relief of Outposts
- (b) Reinforces Outposts
- (c) Advanced guard of counter-attacks
- (d) Furnishes artillery to support front line
- (e) Musketry and Training

TROOPS

- (1 Brigade Artillery)
- 1 Field Co, Engineers
- 1 Inf. Brigade (less two  $\frac{1}{2}$  Battalions)
- 1 Field Ambulance
- Detachment Bikamir Camel Corps

"SURPLUS" TROOPS

STATION

FERRY POST EAST

FUNCTIONS

- (a) Find Canal patrol, bridge head and post garrisons
- (b) Available for counter attack
- (c) Training

TROOPS

- 1 Squadron Divisional Mounted Troops
- 3 Brigades Artillery
- 1 Field Co. Engineers
- 2 Infantry Brigades
- Pioneer Battalion
- Cyclist Co.
- 2 Field Ambulances
- A.S.C. and details



Special File

181

181

THE OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. Name of the person  
2. Address

3. Date of birth

4. Service number

5. Branch of service  
6. Grade or position  
7. Date of entry into service  
8. Date of discharge

9. Name of the unit  
10. Name of the command

11. Name of the organization

12. Name of the parent organization  
13. Name of the parent organization  
14. Name of the parent organization  
15. Name of the parent organization

16. Name of the parent organization  
17. Name of the parent organization  
18. Name of the parent organization  
19. Name of the parent organization

20. Name of the parent organization



in 9th 95  
J. R. [unclear]

No. of Message: 181  
Charges to Pay: £ . s. d.  
Office Stamp: YAE 14.IV.16. TELEGRAPHIC

Service Instructions

Handed in at [unclear] Office 1941 m. Received 1945 m.

TO 5th div

Sender's Number: 9th 90 Day of Month: 14th In reply to Number: AAA

Column consisting of 1 Squadron  
9th AFH and details and  
out on 11th inst attacked  
Jif Jafa morning of 13th  
Army casualties 6 Killed prisoners  
+ wounded 30 unwounded  
including 1 Austrian field of  
Engineer AAA his mounted men  
only escaped down out casualties  
Capt Monaghan 9th AFH Killed  
Commander of column Major W  
H Scott 9th AFH AAA  
Column expected railhead Serapeum 0200  
tomorrow AAA Corps Commander has  
congratulated column by wireless  
on gallant and able conduct  
of [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

FROM  
PLACE & TIME

No. of Message: [unclear]  
Charges to Pay: £ . s. d.  
Office Stamp: YAE 14.IV.16. TELEGRAPHIC

Service Instructions

Handed in at [unclear] Office [unclear] m. Received [unclear] m.

TO [unclear]

Sender's Number: [unclear] Day of Month: [unclear] In reply to Number: AAA

Common to all ranks




FROM 2nd [unclear]  
PLACE & TIME 1940



MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

No. of Message..... 15

Sm. L. 15 III ac  
Can



Office Stamp

Service Instructions

Handed in at the... Office, at... m. Received here at... m.

TO

three addrs  
yak ched 1103  
5th Aust Div 1230

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

9983 14  
Result of reconnaissance  
now received aaa left  
c at 0530 yesterday  
and proceeded to Hill  
1082 launched attack on  
enemy position at D.  
at 0900 occupied their  
camp and after a  
brush fight took prisoners  
one Austrian lieutenant of  
engineers and 33 Turks  
four of whom were  
wounded our casualties one



FROM  
PLACE  
TIME

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

No. of Message..... 12

Charges to Pay

Office Stamp



Service Instructions

Handed in at the... Office, at... m. Received here at... m.

TO

Sender's Number. Day of Month. In reply to Number. AAA

no killed enemy known  
casualties six killed aaa  
we destroyed all plant  
at well aaa two  
enemy mounted men only  
escaped aaa returning to  
B progress slow owing  
to westerly KHAMSEEN aida  
the column left B  
for A at 1000  
and should reach A  
about 1700 aalls well  
aaa

FROM  
PLACE  
TIME

4th Aust Div  
Serapeum  
1120



"A" Form.

Army Form C. 2121.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message \_\_\_\_\_

Prefix _____	Code _____	m.	Words	Charge	This message is on a/c of:  Service.	Recd. at _____	m.
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			Sent			Date _____	
			At _____	m.		From _____	
			To _____		(Signature of "Franking Officer.")	By _____	
			By _____				

TO 4<sup>th</sup> Australian Division

Sender's Number. * <u>G/2394</u>	Day of Month <u>14/4</u>	In reply to Number <u>G.I. 83.</u>	<b>AAA</b>
-------------------------------------	-----------------------------	---------------------------------------	------------

Heartly Congratulations on Success

War diary Blue

From <u>5<sup>th</sup> Aust. Division</u>	
Place <u>1615</u>	
Time	<u>Cairns</u>

The above may be forwarded as now corrected. **(Z)** Cairns

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

\* This line should be erased if not required.  
 (688-9) —McC. & Co. Ltd., London.— W 14142/641. 225,000. 4/15. Forms C 2121/10.



G/6

No. 968 G.



2nd AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.  
-----

T

Headquarters,

4th Australian Division.  
5th Australian Division.

Following is the narrative of events that have occurred in the vicinity of KATIA today.

6.30 a.m. Turks attacked DUEIDAR about 500 strong, and were heavily repulsed retiring southeast, pursued by aeroplanes one of which caused 30 casualties amongst them by bombs.

Brig.-General Wiggin <sup>with 3</sup> ~~of the 3rd Squadron~~ moved out to MAGEIBRA, but apparently found no enemy there. In the meantime another party of Turks attacked KATIA and advanced on ROMANI.

T. Thompson

Capt.,  
General Staff,  
2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

Ismailia,

23rd April, 1916.

C. O. A.

C. O. E.

8<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde.

14<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde.

15<sup>th</sup> Inf. Bde.

5<sup>th</sup> Pioneer Bn.

No 38 H.A. Section R.F.A.

Forwarded for information

King Post.

24<sup>th</sup> April 1916

G.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Force



SECRET

GG/3469.

G1/9

War Diary  
 Headquarters  
 5<sup>th</sup> Aust. Div  
 24<sup>th</sup> April 1916

To. Colonel Elliott,

Commanding outposts in Subsection "B"- Section 2.

Memorandum: References to map of Sinai Peninsula <sup>1</sup>/~~250~~000

1. Some further details have been received of the fighting in the KATIA district.

(a) One Company of the Royal Scots put up a good fight against an attack by 500 Turks at DUEIDAR. The Royal Scots were reinforced by the 5th A.L.H. and the Turks were driven off in a South East direction, leaving many casualties.

It is thought that this body of Turks may have gone to BIR EL JEFER.

(b) Three squadrons of Yeomanry (under Colonel Wiggin) were undertaking an expedition against BIR EL MAGEIBRA from KATIA at the time. This force fell back from ABU DAREM and after 24 hours wandering the bulk of them got to ROMANI.

(c) <sup>Our</sup> ~~One~~ garrison at KATIA was attacked, and fell back after 1½ hours engagement. It is not quite certain how far they have come back.

(d) The garrison at ROMANI was also attacked by, it is reported, 6000 men; but this figure is obviously incorrect.

(e) Our Aeroplanes surprised the Turks at KATIA while asleep, and inflicted 200 casualties with bombs and machine guns.

(f) The ANZAC mounted Division (2nd L.H.Bde. and N.Z.M.R.Bde.) is on its way towards KATIA and ROMANI.



2. The most probable way in which we may be called upon to co-operate will be in sending some mounted troops <sup>to or</sup> ~~on~~ towards BIR EL JEFER.
3. With that in view the following should be held ready to move at short notice.

O.C. Lt.Colonel Maygar V.C.

8th Light Horse Regt. (less 1 squadron)

Improvised Medical Unit (*see attached*)

Detmt. BIKANIR Camel Corps

100 Water Camels (*with fantassies*)

4. Lt.Colonel Maygar should make all preparations (maps - compasses - guides if possible) to move to BIR EL JAFEIR. The mounted troops would proceed at their most suitable pace, the camels following them under escort of the B.C.C., unless enemy are met with when Lt.Colonel Maygar would make his own arrangements for protecting all parts of his column.
5. It is reported that there is water at BIR MADKUR BIR EL MAHADAT, and HOD EL BADA.
6. The column should be on the look out for messages dropped from friendly aeroplanes.
7. Please convey the above <sup>information and</sup> ~~anticipatory~~ instructions to Lt.Col. Maygar, so that he may form his plans.
8. The information in para 1 above may be given to your battalion commanders.
9. All your brigade should be ready for action on the outpost line if necessary.
10. Please acknowledge ~~by~~ this by wire.

*(sgd) CMwaagstaff*

Lt. Colonel,  
G.S.5th Australian Division.

Ferry Post,  
24/4/1916.



Confidential

Composition in Detail of 1 Bearer Section

Personnel		Horses		Camels			Water	Baggage	Cook
Officers	N.C.O.s	Privates	Chargers	Riders	for transport of wounded	Riding	Santasses		
2	2	18	2	2	4 fitted for 8 lying 5 fitted for 10 sitting	9	2	2	?

Details of Baggage

- 1 Pair Field Medical Panniers about "163
- 1 Medical Companion & Water Bottle "12½
- 1 Surgical Haversack & Water Bottle "7
- 6 stretchers "48

(Sgd) G.H.W.M. Hardy  
 A.D.M.S.  
 5th Aust Div.





