

**AWM4**  
**Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,**  
**1914-18 War**

Formation Headquarters

**Item number:** 1/42/33 Part 2

**Title:** General Staff, Headquarters 1st  
Australian Division

October 1917



AWM4-1/42/33PART2



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APPENDIX<sup>no 35</sup>  
Appendix XXXV.

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- FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OCTOBER 4/5th. 1917.

PRELIMINARY. 1.

The first intimation of the proposed operation was received about the 24th Septr, prior to the attack by the 4th and 5th Divisions on the 26th Septr, and a warning order was sent out to all concerned on the 25th Septr.

Further instructions, issued on the 29th Septr, allotted objectives and boundaries to Brigades and gave an outline of the proposed Artillery support.

These instructions were supplemented, before the day of attack, by various more detailed instructions dealing with special subjects.

RECONNAISSANCE. 2. Reconnaissance was commenced on the 27th, both on the actual ground and, after the 30th Septr, on the model at BUSSEBOOM. By the day of attack practically all Officers had reconnoitred the ground both within and in front of the Divisional Sector. The facilities for the reconnaissance of the latter, as far forward as the top of the main ridge, (just short of the final objective) were excellent, both from the ANZAC Ridge and the vicinity of our then front line.

OUTLINE OF THE  
PLAN OF ATTACK. 3.

(a) Two objectives were allotted to the Division, as shown marked in red and blue on the attached Map "A".

(b) For the attack of these objectives two Brigades were put into the line and one in Divisional Reserve.

The attacking Brigades were allotted as follows;-

(i) On the right the 1st. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
Commander. Brig-Genl. W.B. LESSLIE. C.M.G.

(ii) On the left the 2nd. Aust. Inf. Brigade.  
Commander. Brig-Genl. J. HEANE. DSO.

(iii) The 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigade. Brig-Genl. H.G. BENNETT.  
C.M.G. was in Divisional Reserve during the attack.

(c) After careful observation during the days prior to the attack it was decided to adhere to the method of forming up used on the occasion of the previous attack in order to avoid the hostile barrage as far as possible. Arrangements were made to form up the attacking troops in as little depth as possible partly in front of and partly behind the front line.

(d) Each of the attacking Brigades was ordered to attack its 1st objective with one Battalion and the final objective with two battalions, battalions detailed for the final objective passing through the leading battalion after the capture of the first objective. To enable this to be done a pause by the barrage of about one hour on the protective line in front of the 1st Objective was allowed.

(e) Arrangements were made for parties to meet parties from neighbouring units on the flanks of each objective.

PRELIMINARY MOVES. 4. On the night Septr 30th/Octr 1st. A composite Brigade consisting of the 3rd Brigade (less 11th and 12th Aus Bns) with the 2nd and 5th Aus Bns., took over the new Divisional front line J.4.d.3.7. - J.4.b.2.7. - D.28.c.7.7. from the 12th



Aust. Inf. Bde. The 2nd and 5th Aust Bns were placed in the front line on the Right and Left respectively.

The 10th and 9th Aus Bns were disposed on ANZAC Ridge on the R and L respectively.

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On the following night the 12th and 11th Aus Bns on the right and left respectively relieved the 48th and 47th Aus Bns on WESTHORN RIDGE.

On the night 2/3rd Octr the 1st and 2nd Aust Inf Bdes relieved the 3rd Brigade in the line, the dispositions on completion of the relief being as follows:-

H.Q.	WESTHORN RIDGE.	1st. A.M.G. Coy.
1st. Bn.	WESTHORN RIDGE.	2 Secs Battle Line.
2nd. Bn.	BATTLE LINE.	2 Secs Attached to
3rd. Bn.	ANZAC RIDGE.	attacking Battalions.
4th. Bn.	WESTHORN RIDGE.	1st. A.L.T.M. Bty attached
		to attacking Battalions.

#### 2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

H.Q.	WESTHORN RIDGE.
5th. Bn.	BATTLE LINE.
6th. Bn.	WESTHORN RIDGE.
7th. Bn.	WESTHORN RIDGE.
8th. Bn.	ANZAC RIDGE.
2nd. A.M.G. Coy.	2 Secs BATTLE LINE.
	2 Secs attached to 6th and 7th Battalions
	respectively.
2nd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	2 Subsections attached 8th Battalion.
	2 Subsections attached 6th and 7th Battalions
	respectively.

#### 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde.

H.Q.	HALFWAY HO.
9th. Bn.	HALFWAY HO.
10th. Bn.	HALFWAY HO.
11th. Bn.	ZILLEBEKE AREA.
12th. Bn.	" " " "
3rd. A.M.G. Coy.	Battle Line (Barrage group)
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	HALFWAY HO.

#### ARRANGEMENTS

FOR ASSEMBLY. 5. As a result of previous careful observation of the enemy's barrage methods it was decided to form up in mass in as shallow a formation as possible with one battalion of each attacking Brigade between the front line and our line of posts, and the remaining two attacking Battalions of each Brigade in line behind our front line; depth between 150 and 200 yards. The assembly positions were carefully taped beforehand by Staff Officers from the respective Brigade H.Q. Careful arrangements for co-ordination being made between the two attacking Brigades and with flanking Brigades. The troops (night 3/4th Octr) formed up approximately as shown on Map "A" attached. The reserve Battalion of each of the attacking Brigades remained in the old front line.

#### MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO ZERO HOUR.

6. (a) The attacking Battalions moved forward from ANZAC and WESTHORN RIDGES to their position of assembly during the night 3/4th Octr, and were all duly formed up at 5.30. a.m. in accordance with instructions to be formed up half an hour before zero. (See Map "A").

(b) A separate track for each of the attacking Bdes had previously been prepared and marked for this movement and careful arrangements had been made for guides (stationed at



intervals along the track) to prevent loss of direction. (see Map "8" attached).

(c) No hitch occurred during the process of forming up half an hour before zero hour, which had been fixed for 6 a.m. 4th Octr, the Division was disposed as follows:-  
 1st and 2nd Aust. Inf. Brigades Assembly position.  
 3rd. Aust. Inf. Brigades. H.Q. HALFWAY HOUSE.

At 0530 a.m. the enemy put down a barrage on our front line and immediate in rear of it. This caused a number of casualties among the attacking Battalions, especially those in rear. The Troops behaved magnificiently although formed up practically in the open with little or no cover and subjected to a shelling by guns of all calibres, they remained perfectly steady awaiting the zero hour.

#### THE ATTACK. 7. - Of the 1st. Objective.

At 0600 our barrage commenced and the enemy's artillery noticeably decreased. The 3rd and 8th Aust Bns immediately advanced and shook out into attack formation. The formation adopted by the 8th. Aust. Bn was two Companies in the line two in support. The leading Companies threw out two lines of skirmishers in extended order. The remainder of the Battalions was in artillery formation of sections. The rear Battalions shook out into Artillery formation of sections.

The right Battalion, the 3rd Aust Bn, first met opposition from J.4.b.8.3. - J.4.b.8.7. Here the enemy put up considerable opposition but were rushed by our troops who were following the barrage up closely. After these block houses had fallen the enemy retreated hastily, followed by our men who went past the RED LINE and through our barrage. The men were brought back and consolidation was commenced on the RED LINE. Touch was gained with the 8th DEVONS on the Right and the 8th Aus Bn on the left. The position consolidated by the Bn is shown on Map "C" attached.

The left battalion (the 8th. Aust. Bn) had a more difficult task. Both ROMULUS and REMUS WOODS were very marshy and difficult for troops to advance through and also were wired. The attack was diverted around the flanks of these woods, after which the men had to reform their line to cover the whole front.

As soon as the advance commenced the troops suffered from M.G. fire from their right flank.

A nest of "Pill Boxes" at J.4.b.4.9. put up a stubborn resistance with M.G.'s and bombs. These was finally outflanked and rushed. Nearly all the pill boxes were occupied by the enemy, so that the two leading Companies were temporarily held up. The men of these Companies converged on to the occupied Pill Boxes. This resulted in the two leading Companies moving to their flanks and leaving a gap in the centre of the Brigade front. The two supporting Companies moved into this gap and the attack went forward on to the objective with 4 Companies in the line. In order to obtain better observation, the 8th Bn when the barrage lifted, advanced and consolidated on a line 100 yard in front of the RED LINE. While consolidating a hostile battery (4 guns) of 77's was in position on the BEGELAERE - BROODSEINDE ROAD. An Officer and a few men attacked the gun crews and escorts and after a hot fight succeeded in capturing the four guns and the survivors of the teams, including 3 Officers.

Touch on both flanks was immediately established. Line consolidated by Bn is shown on Map "C" attached.

#### THE ATTACK. 8. - On the 2nd Objective.

RIGHT BRIGADE. The 1st. Aust. Bn, which had suffered a considerable number of casualties when forming



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up, with the 4th Aust. Bn moved up behind the 3rd Aust. Bn. These Bns re-organised as they went forward, so that at 0810 when the barrage went forward from the 1st Objective they were completely re-organised and in touch with 2nd GORDONS on right and 6th Aust. Bn on left. Meanwhile the 1st and 4th Aust. Bn. Headquarters had been established at J.4.b.7.2. and J.5.a.2.5. respectively. On the advance being resumed it was found that the companies worked over to the left considerably, this being due to:-

- (1) Compass not being sufficiently used.
- (2) The natural desire to climb straight up the hill.
- (3) The breaking up of formations whilst passing through the numerous hedges and pill boxes.
- (4) The fact that J.5.central was swept by a considerable amount of M.G. fire which undoubtedly forced the 2nd GORDONS to the left.

Although aware of this deflection the C.O.'s of Battalions decided to let the Companies establish themselves and prepare to meet any immediate counter attacks, leaving the question of its re-adjustment to a latter date.

At 0900 the second objective was gained and the work of consolidation commenced. At 1100 the position was well secured. The position consolidated shown on Map "C".

LEFT BRIGADE. During the halt of the barrage on RED LINE the 6th and 7th Bns formed up under it in attack formation. On the barrage lifting the advance commenced. Owing to the Officer and party told off to lay the central tape line becoming casualties, the tape was not laid. This resulted in the 6th Bn losing direction slightly and crowding into the 7th Bn. Touch was however maintained with both flanks throughout.

Considerable opposition was met with along the ridge especially at the crater at D.29.c.60.65. from the BLOCK HOUSES and Artillery O.P.'s where the enemy put up a desperate resistance, both sides using bombs, and bayonets freely. Rifle Grenades were found of great assistance in dislodging the enemy and on two occasions the Trench Mortars rendered valuable assistance.

At this time the barrage became very ragged and difficult to follow. Some casualties were caused in consequence of this.

Once the ridge was gained, no great trouble was encountered except on the extreme left where heavy rifle and M.G. fire was met with from a position behind a hedge at the farm at D.29.b.1.4. This post was rushed, 15 enemy being killed and 10 taken prisoners. On the BLUE LINE being captured consolidation was immediately commenced. Patrols were pushed out and posts established 75 yards in front of the line. Touch was obtained with the flanking Brigades on the BLUE LINE. Line consolidated shown on Map "C" attached.

AFTER THE ATTACK. 9. Throughout the day and during the following night the enemy's shelling continued to be very severe over the whole of the captured area. On several occasions the enemy was seen massing for counter attack, at 1200 at DAME HO and CELTIC WOOD, at 1300 and again at 1430 in large numbers at FLINT COPSE FARM and twice near KEILBERG in E.25.b. On each occasion the Artillery was informed and opening rapidly dispersed the enemy. No actual counter attack eventuated.

RELIEF OF ATTACKING TROOPS. 10. During the evening of the 5th October the 3rd. Aus. Brigade relieved the 1st and 2nd Aust Brigades in the captured positions.



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APPENDICES ATTACHED. 11.

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1. Report on work of Engineers.
2. " " " " Machine Gun Company.
3. " " " " Artillery.
4. Order of Battle.
5. Casualties during operations and Trophies.
6. Maps;-
  - A. Objectives and forming up Area.
  - B. Tracks.
  - C. Line Consolidated.

*Genl J H B Walker*

Major-General.  
Commanding 1st. Australian Division.



## ( FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX I.REPORT ON WORK OF ENGINEERS.1. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS.

Acting on Instructions No. 8 issued with Divisional Order No. 39 the Field Companies were given the following instructions:-

Prior to the operations the 1st and 2nd Field Companies were engaged on various works on WESTHORN RIDGE, constructing an Advanced Dressing Station, providing accommodation etc.

At 10. p.m. on night of 2nd. October the 3rd. Field Company relieved the 1st. and 2nd. Field Companies to enable the latter to obtain a days rest.

The 1st. Field Company and attached Infantry were told off to work in Right Brigade Sector with 1st. Infantry Brigade to construct strong points at.

J.5.b.15.15.	Post A.
J.5.b.00.70.	Post B.
D.29.d.10.00	Post C.
J.5.a.55.65.	Post G.

The 2nd. Field Company with attached Infantry were told off to work in Left Brigade Area with 2nd. Infantry Brigade and to construct strong points at.

D.29.c.95.40.	Post D.
D.29.a.85.10.	Post E.
D.29.a.45.40.	Post F.
D.29.c.40.95.	Post H.

3rd. Field Company were held in reserve with orders to be prepared to relieve the 1st and 2nd Field Companies after dark on attack night.

The 1st. Pioneer Bn. was made responsible for the maintenance and extension of all communication, including Tramways, Mule tracks, and communication Trenches and to establish two main routes:-

(i) From WESTHORN RIDGE at J.8.c.1.9. to G Strong Point at J.5.a.55.65. to be known as JABBER TRACK.

(ii) From WESTHORN RIDGE at J.7.b.9.3. to Strong Point H at D.29.c.40.95. to be known as HELLES TRACK.

## 2.

Previous to Zero hour on 4th. October the 1st Field Company was at I. 12.a.6.0. 2nd Field Company on WESTHORN RIDGE, and 3rd. Field Company at billets.

As before the Engineers and Pioneers followed closely on the Infantry and work was commenced on their various tasks as soon as they were reached, and the work was well in hand three hours after zero and work was being done at all points.

At 5.P.M. the 3rd Field Company was sent up to relieve the 1st. and 2nd Field Companies, the relief being complete by 9. p.m. the latter returning to their billets for a much needed rest.

The 1st. Field Company relieved the 3rd. Field. Company at 9.p.m. on 5th October and as strong points needed little further attention all efforts were concentrated on JABBER and HELLES Track to get them duckboarded on account of the sloppy state of the ground.

On 6th October owing to the necessity for getting the tracks put in order the 2nd. Field Company were sent up to work on HELLES Track while the 1st. worked on JABBER TRACK, and 200 infantry were obtained to assist in carrying the duckboards. In the afternoon permission was given for the whole work to be concentrated on HELLES TRACK and both Companies and Infantry parties were put on.

The work was continued on 8th. and 9th. October and the track was extended to within 20 yards of strong point H.



On 6th. October the 3rd. Field Coy were put on to extend and maintain the tramway from WESTHOEK forwards and they remained on this job even after the Division was relieved on 9th Instant.

The 1st. Field Company was commanded by Major R.J. DYER DSO.  
The 2nd. Field Company was commanded by Major L.F.S. MATHER. DSO.  
The 3rd. Field Company was commanded by Major P.J. SAVAGE. DSO.  
The 1st. Pioneer Bn was commanded by Lieut-Colonel. W.A. HENDERSON  
with Major C. SPECKMAN MC. as second in command.



APPENDIX II.REPORT ON WORK OF MACHINE GUN COMPANY.

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1. Preparatory. Positions were previously carefully reconnoitred.

All required ammunition was taken to positions, zero pegs placed in position. Shell slits dug and gun positions completed and the whole well camouflaged 24 hours before zero.

12 hours before zero an Officer with two signallers proceeded to H.Q. of O/C Barrage Group and ran wires to CABLE HEAD, with exception of one break of 2 hours telephone communication was maintained throughout. This was most useful and on occasions when G.S.O. 1 asked D.M.G.O. to concentrate fire on any spot in range, he (D.M.G.O.) got into instant touch with O/C Barrage Group and in less than 5 minutes fire was switched as desired.

All safety precautions were observed as laid down in Inf. M.G.Coy. Training Text Book (1917) and regulation clearances calculated for firing over our own troops.

2. Creeping Barrage. Was wired to time table and without any difficulty Base plates were most useful accurate elevation being maintained without difficulty.

At Zero plus 4 hours 50 minutes these guns ceased firing having expended 212,000 rounds.

In order to fire on a S.O.S. Line 400 yards in front of our most advanced positions. The 18 guns doing creeping barrage work were rushed forward 4/500 yards - guns were at once laid on S.O.S. Line and positions dug.

Positions completed by 1600 on 4th October and at 1800 a S.O.S. Signal was observed on our direct front, all guns were firing at their S.O.S. rate in 20 seconds. S.A.A. expended 40,000 rounds. During period these S.O.S. guns were in the line five S.O.S. Signals were answered involving a total expenditure of 173,000 rounds S.A.A. The rapidity with which these guns answered any S.O.S. Signals was much appreciated by our Infantry. Ammunition was well kept up by pack mules.

On 9th October in order to provide direct overhead covering fire assisting the 2nd.Aust.Div. in their attack, 12 guns were positioned on the BROODSEINDE RIDGE, made up of 4 from S.O.S. Group 5 from 2nd.Aust.M.G.Coy. and 3 from 1st.Aust.M.G.Coy. These guns fired for three hours without any casualties and were fortunate enough to put one German Machine Gun out of action inflicting visible casualties on the team.

Owing to thus thinning the S.O.S. Group 4 guns were brought up from reserve and were kept for 24 hours when the 4 guns forward were withdrawn to the original S.O.S. positions.

The C/O Group, Capt MULHOLLAND displayed exceptional zeal in reconnoitring and carried out his duties in the most praiseworthy manner.

3. Mobile Guns. In these operations were the 1st and 2nd.Aust.M.G.Coys and were under the control of their respective Brigadiers.

Their casualties were heavy both as regards personnel and material. Captured German Guns were used for direct fire and the loss of fire power due to loss of several of our guns was thus minimised.

The Officers Commanding these Companies, Capt. J.W. RICHARDS 1st. Aust.M.G.Coy. and Capt. J.M. HOGG. 2nd.Aust.M.G.Coy. carried out their difficult tasks with marked ability and disregard of personal danger. All their Officers and men were imbued in the highest degree with that spirit of self sacrifice and courage which is looked for in Machine Gunners.

4. Lessons Learnt and Suggestions. It is recommended, that,

(a) In view of the action taken by our aircraft in allowing enemy aircraft to fly at extremely low altitudes over our lines, and thus direct their artillery on to our Infantry and gun positions, more Machine Guns should be detailed for anti-aircraft work.

(b) That Battalion Lewis Gunners be instructed in firing German



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guns and remedying ordinary stoppages. All personnel of M.G. Companies are instructed in use of German guns but have quite sufficient to do regarding their own arm in an action than working captured guns. In one Brigade M. Gunners acted as Instructors to Battalion men in firing german guns.

(c) In these last operations the necessity of the telephone was again vividly brought out. More Signallers are required in M.G. Companies.

(d) 32 men ex Battalions should be attached to a Company a week at least before an operation as the carrying up of material and S.A.A. prior to a big attack comes very hard on the gunners who will be participating.



## APPENDIX III.

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## REPORT ON WORK OF ARTILLERY.

The Artillery covering the 1st Australian Division for this operation was under the command of Brig. General W.A. COXEN, DSO. C.R.A. 1st Australian Division.

It consisted of five Brigades of Field Artillery made up of the 3rd Aust. Div. Arty., and the 3rd, 6th and 12th Army Field Artillery Brigades.

These were organised in two Groups. "A" and "B" Groups, "A" Group being on the right and "B" Group on the left. "A" Group consisted of the 3rd, 6th and 12th Army Field Artillery Brigades and was commanded by Lt. Col. H.E. COHEN, DSO, with Headquarters at HALFWAY HOUSE. "B" Group consisted of the 7th and 8th Brigades of the 3rd Aust. Div. Arty., and was commanded by Lt. Col. W.G. ALLSOP, with Headquarters at LILLE GATE. "A" Group covered the 2nd Aust. Inf. Brigade and "B" Group the 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. The 3rd Army F.A. Brigade of "A" Group was superimposed in the barrage and was at the disposal of the G.O.C. 1st Aust. Div. is required.

Lieut-Col. G.I. STEVENSON, CMG, acted as Liaison Officer with 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde and Lt. Col. H.D.K. MACARTNEY with 3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. One subaltern Officer was also provided as liaison Officer with each of the four battalions attacking the final objective.

Zero hour was at 5.40. a.m.

The barrage came down well together at zero hour and crept at an average rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes up to a line 200 yards in front of the BLUE LINE. This was reached at Zero plus 136.

The first line of 18-pdrs again remained on this line as a protective barrage while the rest of the barrage searched the ground in front.

At zero plus 253 the whole barrage again moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes up to a line 200 yards in front of the GREEN LINE, which was reached at Zero plus 277. The first line of 18-pdrs and the second line of 18-pdrs and 4.5" Hows. mixed, remained on this line as a protective barrage while the remainder of the barrage searched backwards and forwards over the ground in front. This continued until zero plus 488 when the barrage died away.

All objectives were taken up to time and the programme was not interfered with in any way.

Throughout the day reports were received from aeroplanes and from Liaison Officers and F.O.O.'s. of hostile massings of troops in different places. These were engaged on every occasion and, from reports received, with most effective results, the troops being dispersed in each case before the counter-attack developed.

Hostile retaliation on our battery positions was very light. Not a round was received until 11.30. a.m. when light shelling with 4.2's. was reported.

Our final S.O.S. line arranged in consultation with the G.O.C's of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades ran as follows:-

J.16.c.3.8. - J.16.a.25.83. - J.9.d.90.45. - J.9.d.75.95. - J.9.b.9.4. J.10.a.1.8.

At 7.30. p.m. an S.O.S. signal was received when all guns opened fire. Fire continued until a report was received from the 3rd. Inf. Bde. that the counter attack had been smashed, when our fire was gradually slowed down and ceased about 8.15. p.m. A quiet night followed.

The casualties for the day were very light consisting of 1 Officer and 16 other ranks in the Divisional Artillery Group. From 6.p.m. 19/9/17 until 6.p.m. 29/9/17. 48,575 rounds of 18 pdr. and 11,687 rounds of 4.5" How. ammunition were fired.



# FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## APPENDIX IV.

### ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATIONS ON S DAY.

Objective.	Serial No.	Troops allotted for capture of various objectives.				Remarks.
		<u>Left half of Division Sector.</u>		<u>Right half of Division Sector.</u>		
	1.	2nd. Aust. Inf. Bde. Commdr. Brig-Genl. J. HEANE. DSO. CMG.		1st. Aust. Inf. Bde. Commdr. Brig-Genl. W.B. LESSLIE. CMG.		
RED Line.	2.	8th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. W. MITCHELL.		3rd. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. D.T. MOORE. DSO.		
BLUE Line.	3.	Left half of 2nd. Bde. Sect. 6th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. C.W.D. DALY. DSO.	Right half of 2nd. Bde. Sect. 7th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. E.E. HERROD.	Left half of 1st. Bde. Sect. 1st. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. B.V. STACY. DSO.	Right half of 1st. Bde. Sect. 4th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. I.G. MACKAY. DSO.	
Reserve & Holding Original Line.	4.	5th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. D.A. LUXTON. DSO.		2nd. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. S.L. MILLIGAN. DSO.		
As allotted by Brigade Head- Quarters.	5.	2nd. Aust. M.G. Coy. Commdr. Capt. J.M. HOGG.		1st. Aust. M.G. Coy. Commdr. Captain. J.W. RICHARDS.		
" "	6.	2nd. A.L.T.M. Bty. Commdr. Capt. J.D. JOHNSON.		1st. A.L.T.M. Bty. Commdr. Capt. F.E. PAGE.		

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Appendix IV. 35



# FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATIONS ON S DAY. ( Continued ).

Location.	Serial No.	Troops allotted as Divisional Reserve.		Remarks.
	1.	3rd. Aust. Inf. Bde. Commander. Brig-Genl. H.G. BENNETT. CMG.		
ANZAC RIDGE.	2.	Left Sector. 9th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. L.M. MULLEN. DSO.	Right Sector. 10th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Major. C. RUMBALL. MC.	
WESTHOEK RIDGE.	3.	11th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Major. A. STEELE. DSO. 12th. Aust. Battalion. Commdr. Lt-Col. C.H. ELLIOTT. DSO.		
As allotted by Bde H.Q.	4.	3rd. Aust. A.L.T.M. Battery. Comdr. Capt. A. NEWLANDS.		

Appendix No. 35



FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

APPENDIX. V.

CASUALTIES AND TROPHIES.

CASUALTIES.

UNIT.	Kld.	OFFICERS.		OTHER RANKS.			TOTAL.
		Wnded.	Missing.	Kld.	Wnded.	Msg.	
1st.A.I.Brigade.	15	24	4	134	605	86.	868.
2nd.A.I.Brigade.	21	31	1	135	238	551.	978.
TOTAL.	36.	55.	5.	269.	843.	637.	1846.


TROPHIES.

Field Guns. 4.  
T. M. 4.  
M.G.'s. 44.  
Flammerwerfer 2.  
Bomb Machines. 2.

Total number of Prisoners through Cage and Ambulances.

1 Officer, 290. O.R.'s.







MAPS for 4th October Operations


4th Oct



*Track Map to accompany Report on Operations of 1st Aus. Div*








Battery Positions (indicated by small circles)  
Probably Timber or Camouflage  
Probably Concrete  
Organized Shell Holes

Scale 1:10,000  
Yards 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000







## FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon.....1917

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks
	Off.	O. R.	Total	Off.	O. R.	Total	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	34	358	392	14	289	303	
DIV. ARTL.	79	2388	2467	3	25	28	
DIV. ENGINEERS	27	669	696	1	310*	311	* Inf attached.
Div. Signal Coy.	9	290	299	3	75	78	
PIONEER BATTALION	39	951	990	1	11	12	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	7	21	28	6	22	28	
1st Battalion	31	626	657	1	1	2	
2nd Battalion	26	732	758	-	-	-	
3rd Battalion	32	616	648	-	2	2	
4th Battalion	28	704	732	-	1	1	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery	4	46	50	-	16	16	
1st A.M.G. Coy.	8	147	155	-	-	-	
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	21	24	6	52	58	
5th Battalion	44	733	777	2	8	10	
6th Battalion	43	996	1039	2	5	7	
7th Battalion	55	954	1007	2	23	25	
8th Battalion	49	970	1019	2	8	10	
2nd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	5	69	74	-	-	-	
2nd. A.M.G. Coy.	12	157	169	-	34	34	
3rd. INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	9	12	3	73	76	
9th. Battalion	27	632	659	1	8	9	
10th. Battalion	28	498	526	1	6	7	
11th. Battalion	24	601	625	2	10	12	
12th. Battalion	30	589	619	2	11	13	
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	2	58	60	-	-	-	
3rd. A.M.G. Coy.	12	152	164	-	2	2	
DIVNL. TRAIN	22	395	417	2	54	56	
1st. Field Amb.	9	237	246	2	165	167	
2nd. Field Amb.	10	216	226	2	39	41	
3rd. Field Amb.	10	236	246	3	19	22	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	61	62	-	62	62	
Mob. Vety. Sect.	1	22	23	1	18	19	
1st. A.M.G. Coy.	12	153	165	-	2	2	
2nd. Aust. Sanitary Sect.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTALS.							



## FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Daily Strength as at Noon...30./10./17...1917

UNITS.	On Establishment.			Attached.			Remarks
	Off.	O. R.	Total	Off.	O. R.	Total	
DIV. HEADQUARTERS.	20	69	89	16	302	318	
DIV. ARTL.	71	2062	2133	3	26	29	
DIV. ENGINEERS	20	603	623	1	239	240	
Div. Signal Coy.	10	283	293	3	78	81	
PIONEER BATTALION	34	1004	1038	1	7	8	
1st INF. BDE. H.Q.	7	22	29	5	22	27	
1st Battalion	22	467	489	1	1	2	
2nd Battalion	26	639	665	-	-	-	
3rd Battalion	26	539	565	-	1	1	
4th Battalion	25	578	603	-	1	1	
1st A.L.T.M. Battery	2	27	29	-	15	15	
1st A.M.G. Coy.	8	185	193	-	-	-	
2nd INF. BDE. H.Q.	3	23	26	6	46	52	
5th Battalion	43	714	757	2	7	9	
6th Battalion	32	792	824	2	4	6	
7th Battalion	42	752	794	2	22	24	
8th Battalion	42	813	855	2	8	10	
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	5	63	68	-	1	1	
2nd. A.M.G. Coy.	14	182	196	-	2	2	
3rd. INF BDE. H.Q.	3	9	12	3	71	74	
9th. Battalion	21	555	576	1	5	6	
10th. Battalion	27	558	585	1	6	7	
11th. Battalion	24	670	694	2	10	12	
12th. Battalion	28	679	707	2	10	12	
3rd. A.L.T.M. Bty.	2	56	58	-	-	-	
3rd. A.M.G. Coy.	15	208	223	-	2	2	
DIVNL. TRAIN	25	398	423	2	66	68	
1st. Field Amb.	10	250	260	-	4	4	
2nd. Field Amb.	10	226	236	2	41	43	
3rd. Field Amb.	10	247	257	2	17	19	
Div. Salvage Coy.	1	62	63	-	44	44	
Mob. Vety. Sect.	1	24	25	1	11	12	
1st. A.M.G. Coy.	9	165	174	-	2	2	
4th. Aust. Sanitary Sect.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTALS.							



## APPENDIX. XXIX.

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FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.Casualty Report.From 1st. October. to 31st. October. 1917.

<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Missing.</u>
<u>Off. O.R's.</u>	<u>Off. O.R's.</u>	<u>Off. O.R's.</u>
59    512.	119.   2532.	6.    234.

Sick Wastage.From 1st. October to 31st. October. 1917.

<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.R.'s.</u>
29	1195.

Number of Officers and Other Ranks received by the Division  
during the month of October. 1917.

<u>Officers.</u>	<u>Other Ranks.</u>
95.	1200.



## FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

## OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS SENT TO SCHOOLS

OCTOBER, 1917.

School.	Nature of Course.	Duration.	Number sent			Remarks.	
			Off.	N.C.Os.	O.R.		
<u>G.H.Q. Small Arms School.</u>							
Lewis Gun Branch, Le TOUQUET.	"A" Course for instruction of Coy.Comdrs. in use of Lewis Gun.	1 week.	4	-	-	Covers 3 Courses.	
	"B" Course for training Officers and N.C.O's for Battalions and Instructors for Schools.	15 days.	2	7	3	Covers 2 Courses.	
Vickers M.G.Branch, CAMIERS.	For advanced training of Officers and other ranks of M.G.Companies.	18 days.	1	4	-		
School of Farriery ABBEVILLE.		2 months.	-	2	-	Covers 2 Courses.	
1st ANZAC Corps School, Gough Huts, AVELUY.	General Training.	Stokes Mortar Bombing. Intelligence. Lewis Gun. Cookery.  Infantry.	12 days. 12 days. 3 weeks. 12 days. 21 days. 1 Month.	2 7 4 4 - 20	18 26 8 26 - 45	- - - - 16 -	Covers 2 Courses. Covers 2 Courses. Covers 2 Courses. Covers 2 Courses. Covers 2 Courses. Covers 2 Courses.

Appendix No. 39



School.	Nature of Course.	Duration.	Number sent			Remarks.
			Off.	N.C.Os.	O.R.	
2nd Army Cookery School, HAZEBROUCK.	For training men who show aptitude for Officers, N.C.Os and mens cooks.	About 3 weeks	-	-	10	Covers 2 Courses.
Courses of Instruction at Veterinary Hospitals.	Instruction for Transport Officers and N.C.Os.	10 days.	1	3	-	
2nd Army Scouting, Observation and Sniping School, MONT DES CATS.	For training officers and other ranks in the use of telescopic rifle, etc.	About 17 days.	1	-	4	
2nd Army Signalling School, ZUYTPEENE.	"A" Course for Officers. "B" Course for N.C.Os and men "C" Course Wireless for Officers and N.C.Os.	About 3 weeks.	1	-	13	
Divisional Gas School, BUSSEBOOM.	Instruction for Gas N.C.Os.	4 days.	-	44	-	
4th Army Signalling School, Le QUESNOY.	Signal Instruction.	6 weeks.	1	1	-	
Battalion Musketry Instruc- tors Course. HAYLING ISLAND.	Training of N.C.O's for Musketry Instructors.	4 weeks.	-	1	-	
Corps Armourers Course. CORPS WORKSHOPS.	Instruction for Armourers and Armourers Assistants.	1 Month.	-	-	2	