

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit
war diaries, 1914-18 War

Light Horse

Item number: 10/3/4

Title: 3rd Australian Light Horse
Brigade

June 1915

H.Q. 3rd A.I. Brigade

Date. Place and Time

Remarks or References
to Appendices &c.,
attached.

1/6/15 WALKER'S HILL

Preparing Shelters for B.H.Q.
Walker's Hill. Conference
with C.O. and 2nd. re Sortie
Turk Trenches. 8th.L.H. 2 men
wounded 9th, 1 man wounded.
2 killed, 1 missing.

(Original of above written on same
sheet as entries for end of previous
month and filed with volume for that
month.)

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
2. 6. 1915	L. H. Gully.	Inspected trenches 3 am: stand to arms daily at this hour: " all available sites for 10 th L.H. Rivulet: Majors Love and Todd called B.H.Q. Sniping becoming serious on beach.	
3-6-1915 4-6-15: 6 "	" "	3 police to H.A. #24 section: Signal Troop to duty Walker Hill. 8 th + 9 th nil - 10 th 1 wounded Careful inspection of trenches before (4 am) and after breakfast in view of proposed attack. 100 men of 10 th back to Brigade; General display 10 p.m. (Kings Birthday).	Section orders.
		Lieut + Staff. McMaster (10 th L.H.) reported with 12 men 8 th Lt. 13. 9 th L.H.: 20 of 10 th L.H. 4 th Reinforcements: 9 th L.H. relieved by Auckland MR: Casualties 8 th - 1 Wounded; 9 th - 1 Wounded. Letter to H. Q. A.I.N.Z. Cairo re reinforcements be sent on B.M. 33. Letter to Col. Brajor do. do. B.M. 34. Memo re regulations standing to Arms' B.M. 30.	See also B.M. 29.
5-6-1915. 5-15	"	Attack on Quinn's Post: all sections cooperating: 7 th 2 Saboteurs Auckland M.A. relieved 9 th L.H. in trenches 8 th L.H. 1 Wounded: 9 th 1 Wounded: 3 am. Bombs and general attack to divert fire from Quinn's Post	

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
5. 6. 15	No 2 Sub-Section - No 4 Sec th	1pm which was retaken but lost again owing to cross machine gun fire after daylight: one man ^{machine gun} killed with Shrapnel in our trenches. Very hot fire was drawn	
6. 6. 15	Walkers Shell Gallipoli.	3am attempted at 3 am to induce Turks to expend more ammunition: some 10 men from 9 th L.H. went out and threw bombs: 17 of the fire, + maxims etc but no response: Instruction of officers in letters: State today with A.P. reinforcement 8 th 25 officers 470 others: 9 th 22 officers 460 others: 10 th 17 officers 470 others: Signal 1 officer 34 others: H.Q. 5 officers. 2nd others: F.A. 5 off. 70: Train 2 off. 230 others: 1 Sq ^d Wellington M.R. willing to strengthen post at night Interpreter Adolph Pearlman to N.Z. + A. D.W.H. Q	h ^o 4. Sec Orders memo-
C.11066.		8 th - 1 Wounded. 9 th - 1 Wounded.	

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
7. 6. 15	N ^o 4 Sec N ^o 2 S. Sec ⁿ	8 th L.H.: 1 man wounded: 9 th + 10 th nil: Wellington MR relieved	N ^o 4 Sec order Para 140.
8. 6. 15	Walkers / Hill	8 th L.H. 1 man wounded: 9 th L.H. Lt. Niell and 4 men wounded S. 1 st P. 1 man wounded made careful inspection of trenches to strengthen Trenches Enemy strenuously strengthening positions to immediate front and left: Whelan has not fired 2 days - apparently moved. Howitzer at B.H.Q. from new position shelled Turk gun moving behind T trenches S: Bombs thrown in our trenches at night. Issued Instructions re maintenance of lines which are very strict Lt. Collins & 6 men (10 th L.H.) returned to Cairo: wrote again Col. Braeger re Hanger + cars re fer. to Collins: 15 th Reg. to Wellington	Lt. Col. Macanay comd Auckland MR Lt. Col. Meldrum Wellington, MR. B.M. 42 B.M. 43
9. 6. 15	"	9 th L.H.: 1 man wounded in bivouac:	

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
10.5.15	"	Working parties under Major Todd improving communication trenches. Second memo to C.O. re irregularities in trenches.	BM 47.
		Garling bomb thrower issued for use: 12 specially selected Snipers sent out on left of No 3 Post for reconnaissance.	
		Heavy firing heard HELMAS: W. Turk gun after 5 days Silence shelled ANZAC: our guns unable to silence or locate.	
11.6.15	"	Gen ^l Birdwood, Godley & Walker inspected our trenches. Preparing pit for Garling Bomb gun: 2 officers & 50 men for destroying observation Post (Turk) at NEBRUNESI PT under Cap ^t JAFFRAY of 10" L.H.	
12. "	"	10" L.H. 1 man wounded: 2 Turk guns (M) AMAFARTA raked Beach resulting in several casualties. our gun cannot locate.	BM 52: BM. M. 4: 464.

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
13. 6. 15	"	9 th LH: Major Cook wounded and 2 men: 1 man wounded also 5 men N. 3, 3 Indians & several mules & heavily bombarded by enemy's guns for some hours.	
14 "	"	Per telegraph J ^r A. Smith (278) 8 th LH and T ^r Locke (400) 9 th L.H. died after admission to Hosp. Early morning heavy bombardment (continuous) 3 men hit in Hospital (N.S.). Lt Col Mill & Smith (ad) 9 th returned from MUDROS.	MR 14/6/15 CASUALTIES TO DATE Killed <u>of</u> <u>others</u> 1 12 Wounded 11 102 Missing - 2
15 "	"	10 th L.H. Lieut Cadden and 1 man wounded: 7 men Auckland wounded in Trenches by shell fire - Tanks appear to have new gun position a little E of Salt Lake: Heavy Shelling 5pm - 1 Sqd 12 others 10 LH perm. for Sap work	Died of WOUNDS (2) 12 - 116 Returned to Duty (approx) - 30

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(N.B) N°4. Sec: comprises 3. L.H. Bde (8th, 9th, 10th Regts): Wellington; Auckland M.R. Otago & Canterbury (N.Z) Regts: — N°1 S/Secⁿ 3 L.H. Bde Wellington & Auckland M.R.

Date.	Place and Time.	N°4 Sect ⁿ B ^r Gen Russell. N.Z. Bde. / 4. Mount ⁿ Guns. " 1 S/Sec ⁿ Col. F.G. Hughes. // 7 Machine. 1 Howitzer.	Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
16-6-15	WALKERS HILL GABA - TEPE N°4 SEC. 2 S/SEC.	9 th L.H. 2 Killed 3 wounded: 10 th L.H. 2 wounded also 3 of Auckland wounded by shell from AMAFARTA. Turk gun-Heavy bombardment at HELLES all night. Brig took over Kemp's Com ^d of N°3 Sect ⁿ via Col ^l Chauvel & Johnston sick Bombed Turk trenches with Gasling bombs.	
17 "	2 S/SEC.	8 th L.H. 9 th 1 wounded: visited N°3. Sec ⁿ see Brig?	
18 "	- GALLIPOLI -	9 th relieve Auckland in trenches: By shrapnel yest ^y 8 L.H. 4 wounded: 9 th L.H. 1. 10 th L.H. 1 Killed sapping asked for inquiry.	
		Shell fire 14.00 10 th L.H. 6 men wounded.	B.M. 69.
			State of Bde officers 62-1339=1401 vide back for particulars

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— slate to date —

Date.	Place and Time.	Officers	Other Ranks	Total	Casualties to 18.6.15				Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.		
					Killed	Wounded	Sick	Total less Sick	Reinforcements		
								Officers	Others	Total	
								- to 18.6.15 -			
20.5.15	B.H.Q.	5	22	27	.	1	3	1	.	.	.
(Date of Landing)	8 th L.H.	24	470	494	3	22	48	25	1	41	42
	9 "	26	476	502	9	37	81	45	.	43	43
	10 "	25	500	525	6	58	10	65	1	41	42
	Signal TP	1	33	34	.	1	1	1	.	.	.
	F.A.	5	66	71	.	.	6
	B. Train	2	23	25	.	.	3
		88	1590	1678	18	119	176	137	2	125	127
Casualties		= 137	Total landed =		1815				Transfers -		
Sick		= 176	Losses		= 318				3 Interpreters to A.H.Q.		
Transfers		= 5	Effective		= 1497				Paymaster to Cairo		
Total		= 318	less T + FA		= 96				Rev ^o McGrath " "		
			Fighting St ^a		= 1401				} 3		

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
19. 6. 15	"	9 th LH to Trenches vice AUCKLAND: 8 th L.H. 1 wounded, 10 th L.H. 5 wounded. Brig ^d sick to Hospital Ship - Went to Helles to visit Trenches - Stayed with A.H.Q. Gen' Hunter Weston: Called on M. Gen' De Lisle Comdq 29 th Div: Lieu ^t Hughes wounded	
20. 6. 15	"	Visited Trenches 29 th Div ⁿ - Heavy Shelling from Asia - on A.H.Q. destroyed 2 Planes (French). 8 th LH to Trenches: 8 th L.H. 2 wounded: 9 th L.H. 1 killed.	
21. 6. 15	"	Ret ⁿ to ANZAC: Brig ^d still away - Visited him Hosp ^t Ship.	
22. 6. 15	"	8 th LH 1 wounded: Shelling of Trenches very heavy - Heavy Bombardment Helles for 2 days.	
23. "	"	8 th L.H. 1 killed, 4 wounded (2 by bombs during night): 9 th " 3 killed; 4 wounded (6 by shell fire): Brig ^d + O ^r Officer returned to Duty from Hospital - Heavy Shelling in trenches in evening -	

C.11056.

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
24. 6. 15		Casualties 8 th L.H. 2 Killed 6 wounded, including Cap ^t Mitchell: 9 th L.H. 2 wounded: letter to D.H.Q. reference to absence continued of sick 237 from May 20 th asking for action: 14 men shelled on Beach by "AMAFART" (self-inflicted)	B.M. 88 of 23/6
25 "		9 th L.H. 1 wounded: 10 th L.H. 1 wounded: Turks now using a mechanical Bomb Thrower against us. Brig ^{er} returned to Hospital Ship - Resumed duty as C.O. N ^o 1 st Sec: General demonstration ANZAC. v. Turk Trenches 9.30 pm Later to N.Z. & A asking authority B.M. proceed Cairo to adjust B ^{at} matters - return of absent men to duty: 10 men, including man sent to Alex for Stomach Boils ret ^{ed} to duty: 10 men reported Sick. Stomach troubles becoming serious. Lime juice issues very difficult to get: Water 1/2 gal per man	

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
26-6.	Anzac	8 th LH 3 wounded - 3 officers 63 others F.A. to MUDROS - 10. L.H. to No 3 1/2 Trenches. J. Her from S.M. Holswick saying returned to Australia invalided:	
27. "	"	Heavy and furious bombardment of our Trenches with Rifle fire at 5am. Several guns, 2 Howitzers + 75.C. included. Some 500 shells fell in Com th + 7th Trenches in less than 2 hours; Howitzers did much damage - some men buried were dug out: no safety from H. shells - ^{of 8th LH.} Lt Col White wounded Major Grogan 2 nd Lt; Capt Crook killed by shell, also 3 others of same Regt and 16 wounded by shell - * 3 and hand MR also wounded * 4 wounded 9 th LH. Col. N. M. White V.C. entrusted by NZ RA to take over temp ^l Com ^d of B ^{de} during absence on sick leave of Col. F. G. Hughes : (Col White called): Attended funeral of above.	= 8 th 5 Killed 16 wounded 3 rd LH 4 wounded Auckland 3 - 28 N.Z.A 383 of 25 th

C.11066.

Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
28. 6		<p>8th H: 1 killed 2 wounded: 9th LH. 2 K^o 4 W^d: 10th 2 W^d</p> <p>Heavy Bombardment Helles all day - Several trenches taken by British also some by 1st A. D. at Anzac. Turks asleep. Large reinforcements seen moving across front to Helles: Two demonstrations 9.30 pm + 11.30 pm on Anzac front to retain Turks in this sphere: Turks shelling continues every day with good results, the casualties becoming regular: Accurate and skilful: our guns do not appear to be able to locate or silence: Two Howitzers and a 75 employed against us: Atmaratta gun has now continued unobstructed for 6 weeks. Mac doing excellently but numbers thinning - It is very galling. Victorious order by G.O.C re work of 3 LH B^o</p>	<p>Casualties to date Officers 3 K - 14 W Others 30 K - 170 X</p> <p>Total = 217</p> <p>X Includes 14 returned to duty.</p> <p>Total ineffective killed = 454 exclusive of 7th A and Trani.</p>

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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
29-6-15		8th LH. 1 ^K 2 ^W 9th LH 1 ^W	
30-6-15			
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Date.	Place and Time.		Remarks or References to Appendices, &c., attached.
30.6.15	H2/5/5 " 4. Sec ² Waker Ridge extreme left of British lines.	<p>States by prisoners that ENVER BEY was personally present and ordered the position to be taken. Turks had no chance and attacked very heartily. They had water & food for 2 days and Trenching Tools. A lot of Arms and ammunition taken. Casualties B.M. L.H. 6th 12th W. 9th L.H. 1st 7th W. Men behaved excellently in their first serious fight and were very cool doing excellent work - Fire was reversed until the last - Machine guns did nothing, positions being unfavourably placed and we got no assistance whatever all night from any of our own Artillery: Regts are very depleted and hard worked.</p>	<p> <i>Gen. Antill M. Col.</i> <i>B.M. 3. L.H. B²</i> <i>Anzac.</i> <i>30.6.1915</i> <i>To 3rd Echelon</i> <i>Alexandria</i> </p>

C.11066.

Instructions for the guidance of all Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Posts and Trenches.

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1. To see that the proper number of lookout men are in position throughout the day and that they are instructed in the intelligent use of periscopes.
2. To see that an ample supply of periscopes are in the Post.
3. To see that an ample supply of bombs are in the Post.
4. To see that an ample supply of periscopic rifles are in the Post.
5. To see that iron loopholes are fitted in the Post, in places suitable for sharpshooters, and that they are put in slantingwise, so as not to present a target for the enemy.
6. To see that sharpshooters are employed throughout the day in pairs, one shooting, and the other spotting for him, and that this duty is so arranged that there are reliefs of sharpshooters all day, so that firing can be continuous from them all day.
7. To ensure that Company Officers live throughout the day and night in the trenches.
8. To ensure that the men selected as sharpshooters are really sharpshooters, and not men detailed for this duty as for a fatigue.
9. To ensure that arrangements are made for the night for guides to show supports, if required, their way into the trenches.
10. To ensure that each man of a Company knows the position he is to take up in the trenches, in case of attack, whether by day or by night.
11. To ensure that during the day the supports are practised at least once in getting into the trenches.
12. To ensure that Platoon Commanders have a definite section of the fire trench, and of the support trench, allotted to them, and that it is occupied by their own men.
13. To ensure that picked men are trained in the use of the periscopic rifle, and that they use them, in addition to the sharpshooters using ordinary rifles through loopholes.
14. To ensure that the hand grenades are distributed all along the trenches, and that they are easily accessible for throwing.
15. To ensure that a number of men are selected as bomb throwers, and that these men are specially trained in throwing the hand grenades.
16. To ensure that all men know what to do in the event of bombs and hand grenades falling into the trenches. If it is a burning grenade, they should have coats ready to throw over it, and throw themselves on the ground - if it is not burning, it should be thrown back out of the trench.

17. To ensure that all men not actually on duty in the trenches are employed at some useful work on the Post throughout the day. There is much work to be done still, in rectifying the trenches, and securing the safety of their occupants:-

- (a) Rebuilding parapets - Removing spoil which has fallen into the trenches and communication trenches.
- (b) Deepening and facilitating the rapid advance of reinforcements through the approach trenches.

18. The provision of bomb proof regimental aid posts: the sanitation of the Post - care of latrines, etc., - ample supply of disinfectant.

19. To ensure that the trenches are kept clear of kits. No blankets are to be taken into either fire or support trenches.

20. To ensure that improvised racks or stands (which can easily be made of a little bit of wood, or something of the kind) are made for the rifles of men in the trenches, instead of their being stood in them, to be knocked over, which is usually the case.

21. To ensure that every man in the fire trench has his bayonet fixed.

22. To ensure that regimental and company commanders understand that it is their duty to visit their trenches during the night.

23. To ensure that men understand that single and unarmed Turks coming in are to be made prisoners and not shot.

24. To ensure that these orders are read and explained to every Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, and man in the Post.

(Sgd) W.G. BRAITHEWAITE,
Lieut-Col.
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. DIVISION.

1st June, 1915.

The following notes, in amplification of those published in Special Divisional Order of 28th. May N.Z.G. 750), are issued for information of all concerned :

1. When taking over trenches, Platoon Commanders must see for themselves that each man takes up his fire position and makes it comfortable for himself before they attend to anything else.
2. Trenches must not be too deep for the men to fire from.
3. Loopholes should usually be made slantwise, and not to fire straight to the front, otherwise they are easily located by the enemy.
4. At night, all firing should be over the parapet and not through loopholes.
5. Officers are not to fire, but to direct the fire of the men.
6. An observer must always be in the trenches and should be provided with glasses and keep a written record of what he sees.
7. Be on the lookout for snipers continuously. Never let the men walk about exposed.
8. Picked men of initiative who are reliable shots, must be sent forward each night in front of, if the ground permits, behind, our trench line to lie in wait for the Turkish snipers and pick them off as soon as they open fire. These men should not be employed for other duties, but during the day, should study carefully the ground on which they are to work and the possible lines of approach of the enemy. They should usually fire obliquely and not straight to their front. Their night positions must be made known to the men in the neighbouring trenches and should be changed frequently. Any Turk snipers known to be killed, either in front of, or behind our lines, will be reported to Divisional Headquarters together with the names of the men who killed them.
9. Improve cover and communication trenches continually.
10. See that a proportion of men in each trench have been trained in bomb throwing and that a supply of bombs is available.
11. See that a sufficient reserve of ammunition is always maintained in the trenches and that loose ammunition is not allowed to accumulate in other places than the proper ones.
12. See that proper rest hours by day are observed by the men and that quiet is maintained. Sleep is essential.
13. Constant observation of the enemy is the whole secret of success in the present form of attack, and an efficient organization of observing parties, who should always be provided with glasses, will allow our trenches during the day-time to be held with a minimum of rifles, and so release a large proportion of the men for improvement of the trenches and communications. One double lookout for every troop or platoon section of trench, with 4 or 5 men within kicking distance of the sentries, is usually ample to hold a well organised line under ordinary circumstances, the remainder of the garrison, being, of course, always ready for action at short notice.
14. All Commanders are responsible that men not on duty do not waste time and energy in walking about, or loafing about the trenches. They must be made to lie down and care must be taken that the rest of those who can sleep is not disturbed by those who cannot.
15. The Turks must be made to feel that better men and finer soldi-

than themselves are against them, and are going to drive them from position after position until they give up the struggle.

16. It is reported that the machine guns have been withdrawn from many of the Turkish units and handed over to Germans. It is of the utmost importance that we should prove to the Turk the truth of our capability of beating the German, who has drawn him into this war, here as much as in Flanders, and it lies in the hands of our Machine Gunners to effect this. Our Machine Gunners, like our Field Gunners, must be constantly on the look out for fresh positions from which to open, when the time comes, effective fire, which should come as a surprise to the enemy. Several alternative positions for each gun must be prepared. A most effective position, in many localities, can be obtained by tunnelling underneath the parapet and making an emplacement in front so that the gun can fire from the ground level obliquely to either flank, as required.
17. Every Company Commander in front line trenches, besides notifying at once anything unusual observed, should send in a report twice daily, giving a short account of everything observed since the last report. All items of importance on these reports will be sent in at daylight and at 3 p.m. from the front line.
18. Reports from Company Officers must be accompanied, when they first take over the trenches, by a sketch showing not only the position of their own trenches and those of the enemy on their front and flanks, but also particularly the trenches of neighbouring units on each side. Ranges and cross bearings should be taken, and from these, their positions on the map located as nearly as possible and stated in their reports. Bearings and dimensions of their own trenches should be taken and an accurate plan made when possible. Measurements may be taken by means of a piece of string or cord, when pacing is not practicable.
19. The importance of sanitation as part and parcel of our operations must be impressed on all ranks. No section of trenches is properly organised unless, in addition to having observation, command and communication posts, and cooking places, there are proper places made for urinals and latrines which can be reached at all times under cover and which are kept scrupulously in a sanitary condition. Strict discipline in this matter is essential.

June 1st 1915

(Signed)

W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

SOME NOTES FOR OFFICERS.

1. - When taking over trenches, Platoon Commanders must see for themselves that each man takes up his fire position and makes it comfortable for himself before they attend to anything else.
 2. - Trenches must not be too deep for the men to fire from.
 3. - Loopholes should usually be slantwise, and not to fire straight from the front, otherwise they are easily located by the enemy.
 4. - At night, all firing should be over the parapet, and not through loopholes.
 5. - Officers are not to fire, but direct the fire of the men.
 6. - An observer must always be in the trenches, and should be provided with glasses, and keep a written record of what he sees.
 7. - Be on the lookout for snipers continuously. Never let the men walk about exposed.
 8. - Select men who are picked shots and have initiative to go forward and lie up for snipers every night. They should fire to a flank. They should not be employed on other duties. It may be found useful for these men to connect themselves back to the trenches with a piece of cord or wire.
 9. - Improve cover and communication trenches continuously.
 - 10.- When attacking, it will often be useful for a proportion of the men to carry sandbags, to assist in forming cover rapidly.
 - 11.- See that a proportion of men in each trench have been trained in bomb throwing, and that a supply of bombs is available.
 - 12.- See that a sufficient reserve of ammunition is always maintained in the trenches, and that loose ammunition is not allowed to accumulate in other places than the proper ones.
 - 13.- Ascertain the means of communication with their next superior and the artillery, and see that it is in sufficient working order at all times.
 - 14.- Platoon Commanders must send in sketches of their own trenches and of those of Platoons on their right and left.
 - 15.- Company and Battalion Commanders must send in the same to their next superiors.
 - 16.- Send in reports twice daily, at daybreak and at 3 p.m. - the latter to enable artillery arrangements to be made before dark.
 - 17.- Locate their own trenches and those of their enemy on the map by means of ranges and cross bearings.
 - 18.- See that proper rest hours by day are observed by the men, and that quiet is maintained.
 - 19.- Attend to cooking places and sanitation, and maintain strict discipline with regard to these matters.
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NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G. 927

Divisional Headquarters

Anzac Cove, 2nd. June 1915.

Issued to : Brigadiers (with spare copies)

C.R.A.

C.R.E.

A.D.M.S.

MEMORANDUM

We have become so accustomed to the enemy's inactivity by day that there is a danger of men not being found ready in the case of a sudden attack during daylight.

There need be no denser manning of ^{fire} trenches, but a common whistle signal is to be used on hearing which all fighting troops are to leave the work they are engaged on and move at once to their position in fire trenches, support trenches, or battalion alarm posts as the case may be.

This signal is to be the Alarm Blast (I.T. Para 95.1) a succession of alternate long and short blasts.

This arrangement, if not already being practised, is to be taken into use at once and the troops instructed accordingly at three successive roll-calls and at each handing over of posts or trenches.

(Signed)

W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

9th Lt. H. Reel

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NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.O. 928

Divisional Headquarters

Anzac Cove, 2nd June 1915

Issued to : Brigadiers (with spare copies)
 C.R.A.
 C.R.B.
 A.D.M.S.

MEMORANDUM

As the moon is on the wane, all posts which are close to the enemy's trenches, or in situations where the enemy are able to gather close up to assault, are to be supplied with flares. Arrangements are in progress to obtain Marine blue lights but meanwhile 50 tow and oil flares are to be placed before 4 p.m. on 3rd instant in each post requiring them. These tows are to be made of oakum tied in fairly loose balls at the end of a stick, soaked in oil and are to be lit and thrown when an attack is developed.

Oakum and oil can be obtained by applying to the D.A.Q.M.G. N.Z. & A. Division.

2. All must be warned not to use these or any flares until an attack is coming in or they will merely give away our positions to patrols and snipers. When thrown they should be thrown as far forward as possible, so as to get the light behind the attackers as it is impossible to see through the light thrown by flares. And care must be taken to throw them into open patches in preference to clumps of bushes, partly to avoid starting bush fires which may inconvenience the defence, and partly because the enemy are more likely to be in the open than struggling through the bush.

H.Q. 3rd A.L.H.Bde

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

H

G.A. 123

Anzac Cove,

2nd June, 1915.

From : Brig- General,
General Staff,
A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

To: N.Z. & A. Division.

MEMORANDUM

1. When relief of a post is carried out, all stores and equipment of all kinds which it is intended to leave must be duly handed over to the incoming garrison. All equipment surplus to the actual needs of the post, or of the relieving garrison is not, however to be handed over but is to be taken away.

When, as may happen, dead are in the post, and their removal for burial to within our lines presents serious difficulties, they are to be buried by the relieved garrison before it hands over.

2. Should a withdrawal be ordered or if one becomes necessary, all surplus rifles, ammunition and equipment are to be removed and on no account left to fall into the hands of the enemy.

3. It is known that the enemy are urgently in need of arms, ammunition and equipment. To prevent the Turks recovering arms from the fallen, men should be sent out after dark to secure the rifles, ammunition and bombs of any Turks who have fallen in front of our trenches. This should be done whenever the volume of the enemy's fire slackens sufficiently as to give a reasonable chance of recovering the rifles without casualties.

4. It has been noticed that rifles are being damaged by shell and rifle fire because they are left lying about in the open. This happens chiefly among troops in reserve or resting, where the men shelter in shallow or narrow dug-outs and leave most of their kit outside.

Arrangements must be made to have rifles properly protected at all times when not actually being used.

(Sgd.) A. Skeen Lieut. Colonel
for Brig.- General,
General Staff,
A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

Co. 8th A.M.S. To.
9th Coy. 3rd A.L. H Bde
10th Coy. 5/6/15.
Hq. Troop NZG 923.

Action Returns for information & communication
to all concerned.

J. A. B. L.
2.6.15
Hq.

Bellomineau Capt
G.S.
NZ A Div

2/6/15

2/1/12

2/1/12

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NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters
Anzac Cove, 7th June 1915.

N.Z.G. No. 16

TO :

H.Q. 3rd A.L.H. Bde

MEMORANDUM

It has been observed that full value is not got out of our hand grenades owing to their being made over to untrained men to throw.

Every Battalion (or regiment of Light Horse) not in the fire or support trenches will train 10 men per company or squadron as bomb throwers without delay. The course is to consist of

1. Practice at throwing bombs over known distance, into marked areas which are to be rectangles of not more than 3' width facing the thrower and of any depth desired; to represent enemy trenches. To be practised from trenches and in the open.
2. Practice at lighting bombs, with the object of accustoming the thrower to the flash of the fuze and to the time taken to ignite and explode.
3. Practice in bomb throwing drill on the lines indicated in Memorandum on Bomb-throwing issued on 7/5/15.

The training is to be carried out under as practical and realistic conditions as possible.

2. Dummy bombs for the above purposes have been prepared and will be issued at the rate of 50 throwing bombs per Section. But as these are specially prepared with fuze lengths and a small powder charge to give practice in lighting and judging the time to throw, they should only be used for this; and to practise the actual swing and force necessary for throwing, stones of equal weight should be used in throwing practice. Men should be proficient at this before using dummy bombs.

Not more than 3 fuzed bombs per thrower trained are to be used and the tins must be returned as soon as fired to be made up into live bombs.

A few dummy Lotbiniere bombs are also available and should be drawn and used; to accustom the throwers to the shape and weight of these.

3. In order to keep a check on the expenditure of bombs, and to ensure that demands for their replenishment are made systematically, one officer or senior N.C.O. per company will be detailed to be in charge of bomb-throwers; he will supervise the training outlined above under the orders of his battalion commander; and he will organize and co-ordinate the work of his bomb-throwers when in action. He will be responsible that no wasteful use of bombs is permitted, and for calling on Section Reserves to replenish the supply in the trenches in which he is employed.

4. At least 4 crews per brigade should be trained in the use of the Garland Bomb Thrower. When the theory of the gun has been explained to the crews, practice in firing it should be carried out using the enemy's trenches as marks.

Unless, however, this firing is done with a definite tactical object, not more than 3 bombs per crew are to be fired in such practice.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G.NO.26Divisional Headquarters
Anzac Cove, 7th June 1915.BOMBS AND HAND GRENADES IN TRENCH WARFARE

The following notes compiled from a circular memorandum by G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, are reproduced for guidance.

In the attack it is doubtful if hand grenades would be of much use till the first trenches are captured. If held up, e.g. by wires, near the hostile trenches, it is possible that a hand grenade party might be of use to pitch grenades into the enemy's trenches, but is unlikely that grenades would be up at that period of the action.

The time when they will be of most use in an attack on opposing trenches will be when the front trenches are gained. Hand grenades should then be sent up each of the communication trenches and along the fire trench. In either case, the best position to take up would be in the fire trench behind a traverse or bend, from which cover grenades would be thrown at any of the enemy approaching.

2. To organize a grenade party, the following is suggested :-
Squad to consist of 2 men (with rifles and bayonets) 2 men for throwing (rifles slung) and two men to carry basket of grenades (trained as throwers to replace casualties) and 1 N.C.O. in charge of squad.
3. The party would move off up the trench in the following order :-
Man with rifle and bayonet - ready for use.
Bomb throwers with grenades.
Carrier with basket of grenades.
N.C.O.
Second thrower.
Second Carrier.
Spare man.

As soon as the first basket of grenades is finished, it should be passed back for a further supply, and the full basket of the 2nd carrier passed to the No. 1 Carrier.

4. The grenade squad should act on the offensive, bombing the enemy wherever found, and then passing on to bomb the next section between traverses, for if they remain stationary when the enemy is approaching they will be located, and probably themselves bombed.
5. When an enemy's fire trench has been captured, it will be necessary to make a second advance, usually from the communication trenches, after which the next trench will have to be tackled, the bombing squad being split in two, and turned outwards so as to avoid being taken in rear.
6. In the defence, grenade squads are probably best in the support trenches, ready to advance up communication trenches to meet the enemy should he take the fire trench and try to advance.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G.No. 27Divisional Headquarters,
Anzac Cove, 7th June 1915.MEMORANDUM.

Cases have recently occurred in both Sections in which the rifles and ammunition of dead and wounded men have not been brought back to our trenches even though casualties have occurred almost immediately in front of them.

It is absolutely essential that all should fully realise that the supply of rifles and ammunition is of vital importance to the enemy, and it therefore behoves us to do all we possibly can to prevent any of our own arms falling into their hands, and to deprive them of any of theirs which we can at any time capture.

If, as on some recent occasions, it is decided to withdraw from a trench or position which we may be holding, the Officer commanding is responsible that before withdrawal, all rifles, ammunition, and equipment from the dead or badly wounded, either of our own men or of the enemy, and all entrenching tools are first sent off to our own position before any withdrawal is commenced. If very hard pressed by overwhelming numbers, this of course may not be possible, but as a rule it is, and the commander must use his wits, and think of such things before he withdraws his men, as he will be held responsible for weapons which may be used against us and cause us heavy loss later on, if left behind to fall into the enemy's hands. The mere fact of leaving them behind allows the enemy to suppose that we have retired disorganised and demoralised and gives him an opportunity of regaining his morale which he has at present most certainly lost.

Should by any chance arms or ammunition be abandoned close to our line, the Section Commander concerned should consider what can be done to recover these on the first possible occasion.

Reports are to be sent in whenever our own rifles are thus lost, and information should also be given to Divisional Headquarters of the capture of any Turkish rifles or ammunition.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

3rd A.L.H. Bde

HEADQUARTERS,

N. Z. & A. DIVISION,

ANZAC COVE.

June 7th 1915.

3/L.H. Bdr.

Herewith Turkish signals used in the field: these are continually altered, and are different for different forces, but this list may possibly be of use to units.

C. Shaw Major.

General Staff.

N. Z. & A. Div^y

TURKISH SIGNALS USED IN THE FIELD-----
Signal Pistols.

A. One white signal - for keeping up communications e.g., if a detachment has got some distance away and wishes to show its own unit which way it is going, or if one detachment wishes to show another where it is.

B. A second white signal - tells that a detachment which has gone forward has reached the place to which it was ordered to go.

N.B. When a signal consists of two flashes, the shots should be fired as quickly as possible one after the other.

C. One red signal - to inform that one is in touch with the enemy.

D. Two red signals - the enemy is advancing.

E. One green signal - a detachment or reconnoitring party that has gone forward has returned.

Other signals will be decided upon for particular occasions.

Signals for the attack.

Red rocket - That the infantry were half way across the intervening ground between the trenches.

White rocket - That they were close up to the trenches.

Green rocket - That they were in the trenches.

Star shell pistols will be in charge of an Officer in the front lines. The signals are the following -

A red light repeated - Artillery fire should be directed more to the front.

A white light repeated - Enemy's front line has been taken.

A green light repeated - Enemy's main position has been entered.

... repeated three times from front to rear - We are ready to attack.

Ditto from rear to front - Begin attack

... Go back.

... repeated three times from front to rear - Ammunition needed.

ditto from rear to front - Ammunition coming.

General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

June 9th, 1915.

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENCE AGAINST
ASPHYXIATING GAS.**

1. The employment of gas in offence is only effective when it results in panic amongst the defenders.
2. The following instructions, if complied with, will prevent panic and enable the defenders to remain in their trenches unharmed, though in some cases men will even then feel deadly sick.
3. All men in firing and support trenches should be provided with a respirator, chemically prepared, to neutralise asphyxiating gas, which is chiefly composed of Chlorine. This is a heavy gas which settles in all hollows, trenches, and dugouts, even after the gas cloud has passed, carried away by the wind. It is therefore dangerous to lie down in a trench or to remain in hollows, if it is possible to climb on to higher ground.
4. Gas can only be used when a gentle wind is blowing from the enemy towards the defenders. When these conditions prevail, Battalion Commanders are responsible that masks are inspected.
5. Respirators covering the mouth and nostrils, render the men immune from the effects of the gas. If, however, the respirator is not large enough to cover the nostrils, wire clips should be prepared—see diagram attached?—so that breath cannot be inhaled except through the pad.
6. Respirators should only be slightly moistened; they must not be soaked in water, and wrung out, otherwise the chemicals may be removed. In case of emergency however, respirators may be used dry. If exposure to gas is prolonged, tie or hold a second respirator over the first one applied. After each exposure to gas, replace both respirator and helmet by fresh ones.

[The instructions in this paragraph amend those contained in paragraph 2 of the Pamphlet of Instructions for use of Respirators, enclosed with each respirator. Authority W.O. 10621.—2-6-15.]

7. The natural inclination on meeting poisoned gas is to run away from it; to do so is fatal. The gas travels as fast as a man can run, and he remains in the cloud instead of it passing over him. Moreover, when running the man finds he cannot breathe through the pad and so removes it, with fatal results.
8. The best defence on seeing the thick yellowish cloud coming is to put on the mask. If no mask is available, urine on a handkerchief or sponge has proved equally effective. Equal parts of Scrubb's, or other, Ammonia and water, if kept in a small bottle, and sprinkled on the mask is a strong stimulant and preventative of nausea. All men must stand up in trenches and keep up a rapid fire over the parapet to disperse the cloud and prevent the enemy advancing. To retire or lie down is fatal. If for any reason men are unable to tolerate the gas it is better to fix bayonets and charge the enemy, as by advancing the gas cloud is left behind. The effect of the gas passes over a trench in a quarter of an hour, but for some time after this the heavy gas remains in trenches and hollows and men must be kept standing. To lie down is just as fatal as to retire. The masks should not be removed even when men feel sick and unable to breathe.

With these precautions, although some men—especially heavy smokers—feel deadly sick, the results are not fatal and pass off after an hour or two.

Should any man find himself without a mask, a puttee or sponge damped with water, or better with urine, and held to the mouth and nostrils, is of great assistance, but it is not as effective as a mask chemically prepared.

9. When tying on a respirator the pad should be held in the teeth and the ends tied tight behind the head. This ensures the mouth being open and the nostrils closed.

*



Printing Section, M.E.F.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.N.Z.G.No. 78Divisional Headquarters,
11th June 1915.

TO :

MEMORANDUM3rd ALH Brigade

It has been noticed that in some parts of the line the periscope rifle is used, and to judge from enquiries, is found to be useful in keeping down the enemy's fire.

In other places, however, the rifles are lying about unused and as a rule uncared for, the reason given being, generally, that they are no good.

2. This difference of opinion may be due to difference in local conditions, or it may be due to indifference. In any case, the rifles if not being used should be returned to the beach, and redrawn for use in places where they can be used; but before this is done, section commanders are requested to assure themselves that local conditions are the reason for the rifles not being used, and to report how, if at all, difficulties in way of their use can be overcome by alterations.

(A Mark III. fitting is now being made up, which will not alter the personal appearance of the firer).

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G. No. 106

Divisional Headquarters,

ANZAC COVE, 14th June 1915.

TO : *Headquarters*
3rd A.C.H. Bde

MEMORANDUM

It often happens that information is gained by observers in one part of our line which affects distant Sections or Posts; or that action is being taken by part of the line in which other parts may be able to co-operate.

Sections and Posts will please ensure that any part of the line under their control is in a position to communicate with Sections or Posts on its right or left, as well as with its own Section Headquarters; and that all understand that important and urgent information or requests are to be sent not only to Section Headquarters for action, but along the line to right and left for information and warning.

Copy sent to
89 10
12 pm
14/6/15

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division..

19/6/15

Dear Colonel Braitwaite,

I think you will find everything going on very satisfactorily. There is one point that I have not been able to satisfy myself about, and that is the question of putting up a machine gun on the left flank of QUINN'S POST which is easily rushed by the Turks and on which not very much fire can be brought if a sudden rush occurs. It has not got a very extensive field of fire and is in my opinion in a cramped and unsatisfactory situation. The drawback is, should the Turks succeed, they could immediately train it on and attack our POPE'S HILL right hand gun with serious effect.

I have not been able to go into the pros and cons but I would very much like you to take the matter up before the gun is finally placed in position.

I regret very much giving you all this trouble, but I hope to be back in a couple of days.

Freer and more frequent communication is necessary between the bomb-proof shelter and the firing trench.

I am,

Yours faithfully

F. G. HUGHES, Cpl.

per.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONN.Z.G. No. 300Headquarters,
Anzac Cove, 28th June
1915.O.C. Sections.
Brigade S
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
Signals.

1. The following extracts from Force Order No. 20, dated 26th June 1915, and from ANZAC Memo No. G a 20, dated 27th June 1915, are forwarded for the information of all ranks.

2. "The General Commanding wishes all ranks to realize that there is nothing to be feared from gas as a weapon of offence, so long as the respirators provided are kept ready for use and the instructions thoroughly understood and observed. The most dangerous course is retirement, since to follow the direction of the gas cloud necessarily involves remaining subject to the possibility of ill effects for the longest time. Further, if a gas attack should be made, there is no probability of the troops being subjected simultaneously to an attack by the enemy's infantry. The enemy might launch an attack closely following the gas cloud, but his infantry will be unable to undertake a vigorous offensive in the gas cloud itself."

"In reviewing the series of attacks which have been successfully undertaken since the landing on the GALLIPOLI Peninsula, one of the most noticeable features is the comparative immunity from loss of those units which have rushed the enemy's trenches without hesitation as soon as the preparatory bombardment has ceased. There have been opportunities for direct comparison between bodies of troops acting in this way and others whose attack has been launched in a less wholehearted manner. In such cases the losses of the latter have always far exceeded those of the former from the very outset; and this disproportion has invariably been eventually increased owing to the more prolonged operations rendered necessary for the attainment of the objective.

It is to be impressed on all ranks that infantry which is to deliver an assault must drive home its blow boldly and without hesitation. In so doing not only will it gain its objective - and that in the shortest possible time - but it will also suffer far

"less loss than troops who hesitate and waste themselves in spasmodic and, therefore, costly efforts."

3. "While there are obvious reasons why respirators should not be distributed to individuals, yet all should understand their use, and to ensure this all ranks are to be given systematic instruction in handling and fixing respirators. At the same time the advice contained in para 2 of ^{this} ~~Force~~ Order ~~No. 20~~ is to be impressed on the troops."

4. Officers commanding Sections of Defence and the O.C. Reserve Brigade will report not later than midday 30th June to what extent respirators have been distributed in their Sections (or Brigade), and whether they are satisfied that the arrangements they have made allow of rapid distribution to the troops.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

wee

3rd LHBde

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

N.Z.G. No. 315

Anzac Cove, 28th June 1915.

From : General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.

To : H.A. 3.L.H. Bde

MEMORANDUM

It is still noticeable that Infantry and Mounted Rifles in the trenches are not aware of the best manner of pointing out targets to the guns, or even of the need for it. There is scarcely any part of the country within range which cannot be engaged by some or other of the guns of the two Divisions, and it is a great pity if good targets are left alone for want of a prompt report. In this broken country it is quite impossible for a limited number of artillery observers, however well-chosen their positions, to command a view of the whole of it.

To take a case in point : At 0500 or thereabouts to-day two guns on SCRUBBY KNOLL opened fire on WALKER'S RIDGE. It happened that, while no artillery officer saw them, they were seen by a machine gun detachment on WALKER'S RIDGE. These guns could have been engaged by the guns of at least two Batteries without any difficulty whatever had they been reported at the time. As it was, they were not reported until about 0800 when an Artillery Officer on WALKER'S RIDGE was informed of what had been seen, and when they had long ceased firing.

The proper action to be taken by anyone observing a good artillery target, particularly if it happens to be guns in action, is to report the fact in such a way as to describe the nature of the target, and its position, to any Artillery Officer in the trenches, or to the Headquarters of whichever Section he happens to be in.

The above is to be promulgated & carefully explained to all ranks. Periscopes are to be fully used, during the time the enemy's guns are at work and information passed to the nearest Artillery officer & H.Q. immediately.

(Sgd.) W.G. Braithwaite Lieut. Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division.

SPECIAL ARMY CORPS ORDER.

Army Corps Headquarters,

30th, June, 1915.

Last night, the Turks were evidently much upset in their minds after the action of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade and the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade on the afternoon before.

They evidently anticipated we might be making a big attack from our right, or it may be that they were trying to take us in by making us suppose they themselves were going to attack our right heavily before they brought in an attack against our left.

In any case, about 9-10, they commenced a very heavy rifle and machine gun attack from their trenches opposite our right front. This continued for about a couple of hours, during which they must have expended an enormous amount of ammunition without drawing any response from us at all.

Then their real attack began on our left and left front against the New Zealand and Australian Division. After a heavy bombardment and rifle attack, the Turks advanced out of their trenches against the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. Nine Turks actually got into our trenches where they were immediately bayoneted. A large force then advanced and tried to work round our left flank, evidently being quite unaware of an excellent secret sap, which had been thrown out by General Russell, and which completely guards our left flank. The Turks came up against this with fixed bayonets, and were at once met with a heavy fire, losing about 250 men. Finding they could make no headway, they retired to their trenches completely beaten.

About the same time, they advanced to attack Pope's Hill, which was held by Colonel Rowell and the 1st Light Horse Brigade. Here, too, they were at once beaten back leaving some twenty dead in front of our trenches. Another party of Turks tried to break down a gully between the New Zealand right and Pope's Hill, when two troops of Light Horse went out to meet and disperse them.

The Turks, who had prepared their advance by a heavy artillery bombardment, evidently meant and hoped to push their attack home, as it is said that Enver Pasha was with them, and told them they must drive us out, while the troops engaged in the attack consisted of three new battalions who have just been brought up against us.

The General Officer Commanding wishes to convey his thanks and congratulations to the troops for their excellent work on this occasion.

Aske Lieut-Colonel,
for Brig-General,
General Staff,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Report on action at ANZAC, GALLIPOLI, 30th June 1915.

1. General situation. The period immediately prior to the 30th June 1915 was not marked by any unusual activity on either side.

The secret sap had been completed to the edge of the cliff and communication trenches constructed as shown on Sketch "A". The sap had not been used as a fire trench and had only a few posts in it. There was nothing to indicate that an hostile attack was imminent.

2. Distribution of troops. "A" Squadron (Capt. BLEECHMORE) was on the right; "B" Squadron (Major PARSONS) on the left; "C" Squadron (Capt. SCOTT) in reserve; and the M.G. Section (Lieut. HUTCHINSON) was posted at Turks Point. Lieut. Col. MIELL was temporarily commanding the whole of RUSSELL'S TOP and the Regiment was therefore under Major REYNELL.

3. The Action. At about 12.15 a.m. the enemy opened a heavy fire with 77 mm guns against our position but very little damage was done and no casualties were caused.

At 1 a.m. a considerable volume of rifle and machine gun fire was noticed & appeared to come from trenches on BABY 700.

At 1.30 a.m. a report was received from the 8th Light Horse that the enemy infantry was leaving his front line trench.

At this stage 15-20 men of "A" Squadron moved to the right and occupied several fire bays in the 8th L.H. area - from here they were able to bring fire to bear along the front of the Secret Sap. This sap had been dug through the low scrub and was screened by a low rise about 25-30 in front.

Very shortly after 1.30 a.m. "A" Squadron reported that the Turks had captured the Secret Sap as far up as point "Z" and that one of our men (HOPPING) was missing. Major REYNELL promptly organised & led a counter-attack down Sap "P" and after an exchange of rifle and revolver fire retook the Sap without loss. The Turks had been in possession for about 15 minutes. The garrison of the Secret Sap was at once increased to (45) forty five. As will be seen later some 40 Turks had already crossed the Secret Sap & were then in our territory.

The infantry action has lasted for 20 minutes and the Turkish attack ceased.

At 2 a.m. a party of 40 Turks appeared in front of the M.G. positions at TURKS POINT and were promptly engaged with conspicuous success. Heavy casualties were caused and the party dispersed. It is certain that the enemy was not aware of the position of these 2 guns until they opened fire. As it was not quite clear how many of the enemy were in this vicinity it was thought necessary to reinforce TURKS POINT by 2 troops of "C" Squadron - By 2.10 a.m. these troops were in position.

At 2.10 a.m. the Cossack post in LATRINE GULLY reported that the post had captured a TURK & that others were in the vicinity; almost simultaneously a report was received that several of the enemy were at point Y. The Adjutant (Capt. WIECK) sent (4) four men to reinforce the Cossack Post, placed two sections at point X; and placed composite parties (consisting of Reg. H.Q. personnel) at points V & W to guard the approaches to the 6" Howitzer. The Turks made no further effort in this locality and it is believed that practically all who crossed the Secret Sap had become casualties.

At about 2.30 a.m. the enemy attacked again and found our troops alert and eager for the encounter. Our men in the SECRET SAP and those who were enfilading the approaches maintained a very accurate rapid fire and the attack was completely crushed. The M.G. Section obtained a good sky line target on what the Turks evidently believed to be dead ground and daylight revealed 45 bodies.

At daylight the Turks were detected using dummies for the purpose of drawing our fire.


During the 24 hours after the action finished the enemy was extremely quiet and it is thought this was done to enable us to recover the wounded.

4. Casualties &c. It is certain that not less than 200 Turkish dead were to the credit of the fire of this Regiment alone and, in addition, over 100 rifles were secured.

Our casualties amounted to 9 other ranks (including Pte. HOPPING who was killed).

All ranks behaved splendidly and the fire discipline of the Regiment was all that could be desired.


SKETCH "A" shows the details of the action as well as the distribution of the troops.



Major.

late Adjt., 9th Light Horse.

The foregoing report is compiled from data in my possession and is intended to replace the report contained in the Regimental War Diary for the period. The War Diary concerned has been lost and neither original nor duplicate can be found.



Major.

General Staff. A.I.F.


21st January 1918.

Approx. True

SKETCH 'A'

(Northern end of RUSSELL'S TOP, ANZAC.)

30-6-1915



Con. Signs.

- Cossack Posts.
- Track of 40 Turks who crossed out line.
- ⦿ Maxim Gun.

Scale - Approx. 80' to 1"

Geo. S. ...