

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Machine Guns

Item number: 24/2/8

Title: 2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion

October 1918



AWM4-24/2/8

CONFIDENTIAL.

ORIGINAL.
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Australian Imperial Force.

WAR DIARY



OF

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

FOR

OCTOBER

1918

Signature of Officer compiling

[Handwritten signature]

Lieut.

Signature of Officer Commanding

[Handwritten signature]

Lieut.Col.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
LONGAVESNES TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD	Oct. 1st.		<p>Order No.222 received from Division. The Division will move to assembly areas on 1st.Oct. Battalion Order No.51a issued. The 5th.A.M.G.Coy. will move with the 5th.A.I.Bde. Group to vicinity HARGICOURT. The 6th.A.M.G.Coy. will move with the 6th.A.I.Bde. Group to S.W. VILLERET. The 2nd.A.M.G.Bn.(less 5th. and 6th.Coys.) will move with the 7th.A.I.Bde. Group to vicinity TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD. Ref. Map 62C N.E. 1/20,000 -</p> <p>Battalion H.Q. closed at LONGAVESNES at 10 a.m. and re-opened at TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD at 1/30 p.m.</p> <p>Order No.223 received from Division. The Division (less artillery) will relieve the 5th. Australian Division in that portion of the front between JONCOURT (inclusive) and MINT COPSE B.19.c.0.3. (inclusive) on night 1st./2nd. Oct. Map Ref. Sheet 62C N.E. and 62B N.W. 1/20,000.</p> <p>5th. A.M.G.Coy. will pass to the command of G.O.C. 5th.A.I.Bde. and relieve the 8th. and 15th. Brigade M.G. Groups.</p>	Appx.I.
BELLICOURT	2nd.		<p>Weather. Rain during the night clearing up at sunrise. Day. Fine.</p> <p>Battalion H.Q. closed at TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD at 1 p.m. and moved to vicinity of BELLICOURT G.16.a.8.5. (Map Ref. Sheet 62B N.W.) re-opening at same hour.</p> <p>Order No.224 received from Division. The 2nd.Aust.Divn. will attack the enemy on a date and hour to be notified. Boundaries and objectives shown on a map attached to Divl. Order.</p>	
	3rd. noon.		<p>Battalion Order No.52 issued. The 5th.A.M.G.Coy. will operate under orders of 6th.A.I. Bde. The 7th.A.M.G.Coy. will operate under orders of 7th.A.I.Bde. The 22nd.A.M.G.Coy. will act under orders of the C.O. Tasks of guns have been detailed to Os.C. Coys. C.O. will act as Group Commander with 5th.A.I.Bde. Major L.F.S. Hore M.C. will act as Group Comdr. with 7th.A.I.Bde. Zero hour. 6.5. a.m. on morning of 3rd.October.</p> <p>Weather. Fine during the day. Cloudy after 3 p.m., drizzling showers setting in at sunset.</p> <p>6.5. a.m. Attack was launched by 5th. and 7th. A.I.Brigades.</p> <p>O.C. 22nd.Coy. reported:- " Have been held up by M.G., rifle and shell fire, in vicinity of ESTREES. Moved off 1 hour after Zero as arranged but was stopped by M.G. fire in main street. Have three sections and they are pushing out as things seem clearer. Should get in touch with 4th. section any time. As far as I can gather 5th.Bde. have been hung up, but 7th.Bde. seem to be going O.K. Casualties:- 12 O.Rs. wounded. 3 O.Rs. missing."</p> <p>5th.Coy. report, "Situation a little obscure. A lot of resistance being experienced from a house B.27.c.20.40. and has not been overcome. No.1 Section moving forward from H.1.a.6.3. 4 guns. No.2 section. 4 guns in sunken road H.3.a.40.25. No.3 Section 2 guns in Sunken road - B.27.c.10.15. No.4 Section. 4 guns vicinity of B.21.c.2.8.</p>	Appx.II.

WAR DIARY

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~~INTELLIGENCE~~-SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BELLICOURT.	Oct. 3rd.	6pm.	<p>Casualties. Killed 6 O.Rs. Wounded Lieut. J.V. Wright and 2 O.Rs. There are 3 O.R. believed wounded but not officially reported."</p>	
		7pm.	<p>6th. A.I.Bde. Group moved through in support of 5th. and 7th. A.I.Bdes, and achieved the general line, LORMISSET - BEAURE - XOIR MILL in B.15.b. - Copse in B.23.c. - to MONTBREHAIN. 5th. and 22nd.Coys. conformed to this line.</p>	
			<p>Orders received from Division for relief of the portion of the 7th. and 5th.A.I.Bdes. north of TORRENS CANAL by 25th. Division. 7th.A.I.Bde. Group including 7th.A.M.G.Coy. is concentrating in G.9.10.11. (ref. Map Sheet 62B. N.W.) 7th.A.M.G.Coy. is concentrating in G.9.a. 5th. and 22nd. Coys. are remaining in present locations until to-morrow.</p>	
			<p>Weather:- Fine. Slight Westerly breeze. Observation good.</p>	
		4th.	<p>2nd.Lieut. E.S. Stephens M.M. and S.H. Overy wounded.</p> <p>7th. A.M.G.Coy. with 7th.A.I.Bde. Group were relieved during the night by 7th. British Inf. Brigade. 5th.A.M.G.Coy. report:- "Engaged good targets in sunken road B.16.a. to B.10.c. with enfilade fire. Heavy casualties were observed. 1500 rounds of ammunition expended. Enemy shelling very heavy from 0430 to 0730 but since eased off. Fair amount of heavy shelling on rear areas."</p>	
			<p>Orders received from Division that 6th.A.I.Bde. would take over from 139th.Bde., front from present right boundary to line H.17.central - I.3.central. 6th. Bde. will attack and capture MONTBREHAIN to-morrow. 22nd.A.M.G.Coy. have allotted 2 sections for relief of M.G. Coys. in the new sector.</p>	
		2359	<p>Warning order received from Division. The Second Aust. Divn. (less artillery) will be relieved in the line on 5th./6th. October by the 30th. American Division. 117th.American Inf. Regt. and 114th. American M.G. Battalion will relieve the 7th.A.I.Bde. Group. On relief the 7th.A.I.Bde. Group will move by route march to area recently vacated by them West of HARGICOURT. On night 5th./6th. 6th. A.I.Bde. Group will be relieved in the line by 118th. American Inf. Regt. and 114th. American M.G.Bn. On relief the 6th.A.I.Bde. Group will move to area vacated by these American formations.</p>	
			<p>On morning of Oct. 6th. Bde. groups will move by route march to HERVILLY area and Divn. H.Q. will move to DOINGT. On morning 7th. Oct. 2nd.Aust.Divn. will entrain at ROISEL and move by rail to YZEUX area.</p>	
		5th.	<p>Weather:- Cloudy and mild. Breeze - North-Westerly.</p> <p>6th.A.I.Bde. attacked and captured village of MONTBREHAIN this morning. Reports from the 6th.A.M.G.Coy. who went over with the attacking infantry are given in appended Summary of Operations.</p>	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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-INTELLIGENCE-SUMMARY-

(Erase heading not required.)

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
BELVICOURT.	Oct. 5th.	1400	Warning Order F/349 issued. Relief will take place during night 5th./6th.Oct. C.O. of 114th. American M.G.Bn. called on C.O. and made arrangements for the relief and officers of the American unit were taken by guides to our Coys. in the line.	Appx.III.
		1800	Order No.225 received from Division confirming Warning Order for relief. Battalion Order No.53 issued. "B" Coy. of 114th. American M.G.Bn. will relieve the 6th. A.M.G.Coy. "C" Coy. of same unit will relieve 5th.A.M.G Coy. "D" Coy. will relieve the 22nd.A.M.G.Coy. On relief Coys. will concentrate at their rear camp in vicinity of BELVICOURT and will move by route march to HERVILLY area on the 6th. instant.	Appx.IV.
			Weather:- Fine. Westerly Breeze. Strength:- 45 offs. 785 O.Rs. Casualties:- Killed 1 off. 8 O.Rs. Wounded:- 4 Offs. 52 O.Rs. Died of Sickness. @ 1 O.R. To Hospital 10 O.Rs. 2nd.Lieut. F.G.D. Hamilton M.M. & Bar killed. Lieut. E.F. Armit M.C., D.C.M. wounded. 2nd.Lieut. G.E. Rennie killed. Lieuts. T.F. Turnbull and N.F. Wilkibson wounded.	
HESBECOURT.	6th.	0100	Relief complete.	
		0930	Battalion H.Q. closed at G.16.a.8.5. and moved per road to L.14.a.7.2. near HESBECOURT. Map Ref. Sheet 62C N.E. 1/20,000. Coys. camped in same areas.	
		1400	Move complete.	
		2130	Order No.226 received from Division, with instructions for entraining. Battalion Order No.54 issued. 2nd.A.M.G.Bn. will form part of 5th.A.I.Bde. Group for entraining purposes and instructions are given for the move of transport.	Appx.V.
			Weather:- Dull. Westerly breeze. Light rain at sunset.	
	7th.	0200	Battalion Order No.55 issued. Instructions for move and entraining - time given for personnel.	Appx.VI.
		0900	Battalion moved from HESBECOURT by route march for TINCOURT and entrained there for ST.ROCH at 1315.	
		1910	Battalion detrained at ST.ROCH and proceeded per route march to ST.LEGER(REF. Map Sheet VIGNACOURT)	
ST.LEGER.	8th.	0300	Weather:- Fine but cloudy. Slight showers at sunset. Breeze Westerly. Battalion billeted in ST.LEGER. Weather dull and cloudy. Lieut. H.P. French rejoined unit from M.G. Training Depot. 36 O.Rs. from Hospital.	
	9th.		"B.A.B. Code Books checked and reported correct to Division.	
		1500	Battalion Transport arrived at St.LEGER from HESBECOURT area. Weather dull and cloudy.	
	10th.		Coys. shekced and overhauled gun-gear and equipment. Weather dull and cloudy.	
	11th.		Lieut. M.W. Yelverton evacuated to Hospital.	

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
ST. LEGER.	Oct.		Strength. 43 officers 786 O.Rs. Casualties:- Killed 1 Officer. Wounded 2 Officers &	
	12th.		29 O.Rs. To Hospital 10 O.Rs. Lieut. E.T. Towner M.C. rejoined unit from hospital.	
	13th.		Syllabus of Training drawn up and issued to Coys. Battalion attended Church Parade.	
	14th.		Weather. Dull and cloudy, clearing up in the evening.	
	17th.		Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus.	
	19th.		Lieut. M.J. O'Brien M.C. and Lieut. G.D. Cadden and 2nd.Lieut. E.S. Stephens M.M. rejoined	
	20th.		unit from hospital. 19 O.Rs. rejoined unit from hospital.	
	21st.		Strength. 46 Officers. 795 O.Rs. Casualties. To Hospital 1 Off. 9 O.Rs.	
	23rd.		Weather for week, cloudy misty and overcast with light showers.	
	25th.		Battalion attended Church Parade.	
	26th.		Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus. Weather continues dull and cloudy.	
	27th.		Occasional light showers.	
	28th.		Capt. J.H. Drummond M.C. evacuated to hospital.	
	29th.		Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus. Weather. Sky overcast. Light showers	
	30th.		fell during afternoon.	
	31st.		Battalion Sports. Heats were run off during the morning. A start was made on the	
			main events at 1330. Sports completed about 1745 in failing light. Some fine finishes were	
			witnessed. 6th.Coy. retained shield. Weather. Dull and cold towards sunset.	
			Strength. 46 Officers. 789 O.Rs. Casualties. To hospital 7 O.Rs. Lieut. A.J.	
			Johnson rejoined unit from hospital.	
			Battalion attended Church Parade. Weather. Fine.	
			Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus. Weather. Fine.	
			Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus. 2nd.A.M.G.Bn. Concert Party gave its	
			first performance at the Cinema Hall, ST.LEGER. Weather. Fine.	
			Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus.	
			Football. Battalion "B" Soccer Team V 28th. Bn. Played at BERTEAUCOURT. Won by	
			28th.Bn. 2 goals to nil. Battalion Australian Rules Team V 26th. Bn. played on our own	
			ground and won by 2nd.A.M.G.Bn. 10 goals 17 behinds to 3 goals 5 behinds.	
			During the evening the 2nd. Pioneer Bn. Band gave a performance in Cinema Hall.	
			Weather. Fine with light Easterly breeze. Light showers had fallen early in the	
			morning(before dawn).	
			Coys. carried out Training according to Syllabus. Concert Party's second performance.	
			Weather. Fine. Easterly winds. Light showers fell before dawn.	

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WAR DIARY

OF

APPENDIX

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

FOR

OCTOBER

1918

LIST OF APPENDICES.

No.	Subject.
I	Battalion Order 51A.
II	Battalion Order 52.
III	Warning Order. F/349.
IV.	Battalion Order 53.
V.	Battalion Order 54.
VI.	Battalion Order 55.

57 A

SECRET.

Copy No. 1/2

Headquarters,
1st. October, 1918.

Reference Map. - Sheet 62C N.E. 1/20,000.

1. The Division will move to assembly areas on the 1st. October, 1918.
2. The 5th. Coy., with the 5th. A.I. Brigade Group will move from LONGAVESNES via VILLERS-FAUCON, - TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD - to vicinity MARGICOURT, to clear VILLERS-FAUCON by 10.15 a.m.
The 6th. Coy., with the 6th. A.I. Brigade Group will move from HAMEL via ROISEL HERVILLE - HESBECOURT to L.15.a.7.8. through L.16. central to S.W. VILLERET, to clear HAMEL by 10 a.m.
The 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion, less 5th. and 6th. Coys., will move with the 7th. A.I. Brigade Group, 7th. Coy. leading, to assembly areas in vicinity of TEMPLEUX-le-GERARD via ROISEL, clearing cross roads at E.25.d.6.7. at 11.5 a.m.
3. Coys. will move complete with Mobile Echelon.
4. Normal distances will be maintained. Where possible dry weather tracks alongside main road will be used.
5. Coys. will report arrival and locations to Battalion H.Q.
6. Advance parties will meet Major Berriman at L.2.e.6.4. at 9 a.m.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. B. Ballister
.....Lieut.
for Adj. 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion.

Distribution issued through

Signals at 10 a.m., 1. 10. 18

- Copy No.
1. 5th. Coy.
 2. 6th. Coy.
 3. 7th. Coy.
 4. 22nd. Coy.
 5. 2nd. Aust. Divn.
 6. 5th. A.I. Bde.
 7. 6th. A.I. Bde.
 8. 7th. A.I. Bde.
 9. Second-in-Command.
 10. Q.M.
 11. Sig. Officer.
 - ✓ 12. File.
 - 13/15. War Diary.
 16. Spare.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION, ORDER No. 52. S E C R E T.

Copy No. 15

Headquarters, 2nd. October, 1918.

Reference Map. WIANCOURT 1/20,000.

1. The 2nd. Australian Division is attacking the enemy on the morning 2nd./3rd. October, with objectives as follows:-
B.30.e.7.9. - along road to approx. B.24.e.3.4. - thence B.12.e.4.5. including POUCHAUX thence B.4.d.1.2. thence B.4.e.1.5. - T.27.central - T.26.central.
2. 6th. A.I. Brigade to be in Divisional support.
3. Divisional and Brigade boundaries are as follows:- Southern Div. Boundary JONCOURT (exclusive) to B.30.a.5.4., Northern Div. Boundary MASHIERES - BEAUREVOIR - LINE to T.26.central. Inter-Brigade Boundary, line running from B.25.b.6.0. - B.4.e.0.8.
4. The 5th. A.M.G. Coy. will operate under the orders of the G.O.C. 5th. A.I. Bde.
The 7th. A.M.G. Coy. will operate under orders of G.O.C. 7th. A.I. Bde.
The 6th. A.M.G. Coy. will operate under orders of G.O.C. 6th. A.I. Bde.
The 22nd. A.M.G. Coy. will act under orders of G.O. 2nd. A.M.G. Bn.
5. The 5th. A.M.G. Coy. will move guns to approx. the following localities:-
2 at B.5.a.8.9. 2 at B.30.e.7.9. 2 at Sunken Road B.4.c.9.3
2 at B.23.b.9.9. 1 at B.23.a.1.3. 2 in reserve at Coy H.Q.
1 at B.23.a.3.0.
2 at B.11.e.6.8.
2 at B.9.b.4.5.
4 at B.15.b.central.
Tasks of these guns as detailed to O2C. 5th. Coy., and locations are approx. only.
6. The 22nd. A.M.G. Coy. will move guns as follows:-
4 to hedge in B.22.d.
4 to B.22.b.
4 to Lamp Signal station in B.21.e.
4 to B.27.d.0.4.
These guns will carry out tasks as detailed to G.O. 22nd. Coy. by G.O. 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion, and locations are approx. only.
22nd. A.M.G. Coy. will move from its assembly position 1 hour after Zero.
7. Action of 7th. A.M.G. Coy. will be detailed later.
8. 6th. A.M.G. Coy. will remain in present position until further orders.
9. Advanced Battalion H.Q. will be at 5th. A.I. Bde. H.Q.
G.O. 2nd. A.M.G. Bn. will act as Group Commander with 5th. A.I. Bde.
Second-in-Command, Major L.F.S. Here H.C., will act as Group Commander with 7th. A.I. Bde.
10. Reports will be rendered by Coys. to Group Commanders.
11. Zero Hour will be notified later.
12. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Ch. Field Capt.
Adj. 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion.

(Distribution overleaf)

8

Distribution issued through

Signals at 8th Div. 8.10.18

- Copy No. 1. 5th.Coy.
- 2. 6th.Coy.
- 3. 7th.Coy.
- 4. 22nd.Coy.
- 5. 2nd.Aust.Divn.
- 6. 5th.A.I.Bde.
- 7. 6th.A.I.Bde.
- 8. 7th.A.I.Bde.
- 9. Second-in-Command.
- 10. Sig.Officer.
- 11. File.
- 12/14. War Diary.
- ✓ 15. Spare.
- 16. "

2nd A.I. Bde. 2nd Aust. Divn.
2nd A.I. Bde. 2nd Aust. Divn.
2nd A.I. Bde. 2nd Aust. Divn.

Adj. Supt. A.I. Bde. 2nd Aust. Divn.

(Distribution overleaf)

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

APPENDIX III 9

WARNING ORDER

Copy No.....

Headquarters,
5th. October, 1918.

1. The Division is being relieved in the line by 30th. American Division on night 5/6th. inst.
2. Brigade Groups are moving to HERVILLY area on 6th. October and entraining at ROISEL on 7th. October for YZEUZ Area.
3. Arrangements for obtaining packs and blankets from kit store, PERONNE, will be communicated.
4. All companies must leave the forward area as complete as possible, and individual men will be held responsible for shortages in equipment.
5. Mobile Echelon must be complete and a quantity of S.A.A. for practice purposes taken out as there will be difficulty in obtaining it in the rear area.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

C. Rosdell
.....Capt.
Adj. Gen. A.M.G. Battalion.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.	1.	5th. Coy.
	2.	6th. "
	3.	7th. "
	4.	22nd. "
	✓ 5.	Second in Command.
	6.	Q. M.
	7.	File
	8/10.	War Diary.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION ORDER No. 53. S E C R E T.

Copy No.

Headquarters,
5th. October, 1918.

1. The Battalion will be relieved by 114th. American M.G. Battalion on night 5th./6th. October, 1918.
2. "B" Coy. 114th. American M.G. Battalion will relieve 6th. Aust. M.G. Coy. in positions:-
 - 2 in front of MONTEBREHAIN (no location).
 - 4 at B.50.e.8.2.
 - 4 at H.12.b.1.9.
 - 2 at H.12.d.8.9. (approx.)
 - H.Q. H.10.a.15.30.
3. "C" Coy. 114th. American M.G. Battalion will relieve 5th. Aust. M.G. Coy. in positions:-
 - 4 at B.23.a.5.0.
 - 4 at B.20.d.5.9.
 22nd. Aust. M.G. Coy. in positions:-
 - 2 at B.21.e.0.5.
 - 2 at B.21.e.5.9.
 - H.Q. at G.6.d.2.8.
4. "D" Coy. 114th. American M.G. Battalion will relieve 22nd. Aust. M.G. Coy. in positions:-
 - 4 at B.27.e.5.9.
 - 2 at H.5.d.2.4.
 - 2 at H.17.b.8.8.
 5th. Aust. M.G. Coy. in positions:-
 - 2 at B.27.d.1.3.
 - H.Q. at H.1.d.3.3.
 * This Coy. is emplacing 2 guns in vicinity of H.3.b.8.8.
5. Arrangements as to guides and details of relief will be made between Coy. Commanders concerned.
6. Guns not relieved will withdraw.
7. On relief, companies will concentrate at their Rear Camps, and will move out to HERVILLY area on 6th. October.
8. The Division will entrain for YZEUX area on 7th. instant.
9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Chas. A. ...
..... Capt.
Adjt. 2nd. A. M. G. Battalion.

Distribution issued through

Signals at 1000

Copy No. 1. 5th. Coy.
2. 6th. Coy.
3. 7th. Coy.
4. 22nd. Coy.
5. 114th. M.G. Bn.
6. 2nd. Aust. Divn.
7. 5th. A. I. Bde.

Copy No. 8. 6th. A. I. Bde.
9. 7th. A. I. Bde.
10. File.
✓ 11/13. War Diary.
14. Spare.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION ORDER No. 54. S E C R E T

Copy No.....

Headquarters,
6th. October, 1918.

1. The Division is entraining for YZEUX area on 7th. instant. 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion will be part of 5th. A.I. Bde. Group for the move entraining at TINCOURT. Times of trains will be notified later (first personnel train leaves at about 10.00).
2. TRANSPORT.
Transport will move by road in 5th. A.I. Bde. Group and will pass starting point at 06.00 in order, 5th., 6th. 7th. and 22nd. Coys. Lieut. Blenkarn will be in charge of Battalion Transport column. Starting point K.23.a.2.5. (620 N.E.)
Transport will move to GAPPY area on 1st. day.
3. The following transport will move by train:-
1 Cooker per Coy.
5th. Coy. Water Cart.
Headquarters Mess Cart.
1 G.S. Wagon. (supply).
1 riding horse per Coy.

O.C. 5th. Coy. will detail 1 officer to take charge of transport on Omnibus Train.
4. PERSONNEL.
Train timings will be notified later also details of entrainment.
5. TENTS ETC.
All tents and trench shelters on charge will be returned to Area Commandant HERVILLY prior to leaving the area and copies of receipts rendered to Bn. H.Q.
6. Further details will be notified later.
7. Attention is directed to Administrative Memo No. 229.
8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Chas. Smith
.....Capt.
Adjt. 2nd. A.M.G. Battalion.

Distribution.

- Copy No. 1. 5th. Coy.
2. 6th. Coy.
3. 7th. Coy.
4. 22nd. Coy.
5. 2nd. Aust. Divn.
6. 5th. A.I. Bde.
7. 6th. A.I. Bde.
8. 7th. A.I. Bde.
9. Q.M.
10. Sig. Officer.
11. Second-in-Command.
12. File.
13/15. War Diary.
16. Spare.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION ORDER No.55. S E C R E T .

Copy No.....

Headquarters,
6th. October, 1918.

1. 2nd.A.M.G.Battalion will entrain at TINCOURT as part of 5th.A.I.Bde. Group at 11.00.
2. Transport as detailed in Order No.54 for Omnibus Train will report to Capt. Busby at railway station TINCOURT at 08.30.
Route:- ROISEL - MARQUAIX - HAMEL.
Detraining station for Omnibus Train, VIGNACOURT.
3. Lieut. Everett will report to Lieut. J.G. Edmondson, Bde. Entraining Officer by 10.00.
4. March to Entraining station - Personnel.

Units in order of march.	Time of passing starting point. (620 - K.16.d.6.3.)
Bn. H.Q.	09.00
5th.Coy.	"
6th.Coy.	"
7th.Coy.	"
22nd.Coy.	"
5. Detraining Station - ST.ROCH. On arrival at detraining station the Battalion will march to ST.OURN area and billet as part of 7th.A.I.Bde. Group. Lieut. Callister R.C. has gone forward to arrange billets.
6. TRANSPORT. Time of passing starting point (K.23.a.2.5.) is 06.51 and not as stated in Order No.54. Lieut. Blenkarn will send a representative N.C.O. to report to Capt. McNabb, 5th. Bde. Transport Officer at 06.00 at starting point as billeting party.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Chas. D. ...
.....Capt.
Adj. 2nd.A.M.G.Battalion.

Distribution.

- Copy No. 1. 5th.Coy.
2. 6th.Coy.
3. 7th.Coy.
4. 22nd.Coy.
5. 2nd.Aust.Divn.
6. 5th.A.I.Bde.
7. 6th.A.I.Bde.
8. 7th.A.I.Bde.
9. Q.M.
10. Sig.Officer.
11. Second-in-Command.
12. File.
13/15. War Diary.
16. Spare.

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.Summary of Operations 3rd to 6th October 1918.No. *27/269.*
Date.....1. DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES.

On 5th A.I.Bde. taking over the Divisional front in relief of 5th Aust. Divn. the 5th A.M.G.Coy. was allotted for defence. Orders were received for advance on morning of 3rd Oct. with the objectives of BEAUREVOIR and PONCHAUX. The 5th Coy. was detailed to accompany the 5th A.I.Bde. and 7th Coy. to accompany 7th A.I.Bde. while the 22nd Coy. was to occupy positions in the vicinity of the BEAUREVOIR LINE in commanding positions in groups of four guns.

2. ACTION.

Owing to the final objective not being reached, a curtailment and alteration of the original programme was necessitated, and all efforts were made to keep in close touch with the Infantry commanders, orders being given to the M.G.Coy. commanders to place their guns in accordance with the situation which could only be properly appreciated on the spot.

On the afternoon of the 3rd Oct. the 6th A.I.Bde. moved through the 5th A.I.Bde. and became the line Brigade. The 5th and 22nd M.G. Coys. remained in the line under the orders of the G.O.C. 6th A.I.Bde. the 6th M.G.Coy. being kept in reserve for forthcoming operations.

The 6th A.I.Bde. attacked the village of MONTBRUNSHAIN on the morning of 5th Oct. 6th M.G.Coy. plus one section of 7th M.G.Coy. being allotted for this purpose. Details of the operation are contained in the appended reports from Company and Section Commanders.

3. OBSERVATIONS.

The chief difficulty experienced was as usual, that of communication, and though companies were in telephonic communication the Brigade lines were extremely busy and very often messages took hours to arrive.

Casualties were heavy, considering the short period in the line. The 6th M.G.Coy. were unfortunate in losing five officers.

	Officers		O/Ranks.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
5th Coy.	-	1	6	21
6th "	2	3	1	18
7th "	-	1	2	25
22nd "	-	1	-	18
	<u>2.</u>	<u>6.</u>	<u>9.</u>	<u>82.</u>

Owing to the thin Infantry line M.G.'s. in this instance were pushed forward as much as possible into the front line and were largely used as Lewis Guns. In the main, no barrage work was done owing to the impossibility of obtaining precise information as to the location of line, direct fire both flanking and overhead was much used and proved very successful.

Communication generally was unsatisfactory. We were working through Brigade to Bde. Forward Centre, thence to Companies, and though Companies kept their lines to Bde. Forward Centres in order, the line "Bde. to Bde. Forward" was in continual use for priority messages.

L. F. S. Hore

.....Major
Acting C./O. 2nd A.M.G.Btn.

FIFTH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COY.Report on Operations 3rd to 6th Oct. 1918.

Reference Map.
"WIANDORST", 1/20,000

Orders relating to forthcoming operations on the 3rd. inst. were sent to Section Officers, the last being despatched at 2000 on the 2nd inst.

At 0100 3rd Oct. one mule per gun was despatched to sections moving forward in the operations at 0600 on the 3rd Oct.

No word was received from sections until 1000, when O.C. Nos. 2 and 3 sections reported that the Infantry had been held up by machine gun fire from houses in B 27 central, and that their guns were in action together in sunken road in H.3.a. Word was sent to these sections to keep in close touch with Infantry Commanders and conform to their advance until final positions were reached.

No.4 section reported their position at 1200 as B.30.e.6.0.approx

No word was received from No.1. section until 1600, when the O.C. reported that they were in position in B.28.d. and B.29.e.

Coy.H.Q.moved at 1630 to G.6.d.3.6. having first established communication with Brigade and Battalion H.Q. from new Headquarters.

4th Oct.

Morning reports from Section Commanders showed that No.4 section was in same position, but No.3 section (2 guns) and No.2 section (4 guns) had moved up to positions in the BEAUNEVOIR support line at B.27.d. during the previous afternoon reaching their position at 1900, and that No.2. Section Commander had reconnoitred his final positions having advanced with the second wave of Infantry in the early morning, and was sending back for his guns.

No.1.section, owing to its weak state had withdrawn with the 17th Btn. to H.d.central. This section was now reduced to 1 Officer and 10 O/Benks.

At 1000 I received instructions from the C.O.Btn. to move 2 guns from No.3.section to B.30.e.7.9. I visited No.3 section and gave the O.C. these instructions, sending him ahead to reconnoitre, I then visited No.2 section finding them at B.25.a.1.2.approx. 4 guns were emplaced here with excellent fields of fire and were obtaining good targets. While approaching this position I noticed that the enemy had attacked and retaken BEAUNEVOIR. Our guns in B.25.were getting good targets in enfilade in the above village and inflicting heavy casualties.

I returned to No.3 section and suggested to an officer of the 22nd M.G.Coy. who had 6 guns in the same trench that he move 2 of his guns to about B.27.e.central to cover the valley around LAROTTE FARM in the event of a further advance by the enemy from BEAUNEVOIR.

At 1500 I received at Coy.H.Q. a message from O.C. No.3 section stating that he had reconnoitred the proposed positions in B.30.e. and found that it was beyond our front line and was off our sector. I then ordered him to remain where he was and help No.2 section by supplying them with as much ammunition as could be spared while I arranged for more to be sent up that night.

Oct. 5th.

At 0830 I received a warning order from the 6th A.I. Bde. re relief by 114th American M.G.Btn. I therefore sent a warning order to sections and ordered guides. At 1700 the O.C. "C" Coy. 114th American M.G.Btn. visited me and made arrangements about the relief of No. 2 and 3 sections.

An Officer of the same Btn. from "D" Coy. had reconnoitred No.3 sections positions earlier in the afternoon and no guides were necessary. No.1.section and the reserve guns were withdrawn at 1800. The relief was complete at 2200 and the Company concentrated at old Coy.H.Q. and transport lines at G.16.b.2.3.

Communication during the operation was very poor, chiefly owing to the sections being on the move, and the scarcity of men as runners. The use of pack mules for the advance proved very efficient saving time and manhandling, only one mule was hit though they were often brought

under machine gun and heavy shell fire. Very little information regarding the situation on the flanks could be obtained during the operations.

Signed.

R.A.P. Hamilton. Capt.
O.C. 5th A.M.G. Coy.

Report on Operations 3rd-5th Oct. No.1. Section.
5th A.M.G. Coy.

No.1. Section was attached to 17th Btn. for the operations. At 2130 on the 2nd the C.O. 17th Btn. called a meeting of Company Commanders and myself to receive orders.

My orders were to line up in rear of the right flank of the 17th Btn. and advance in rear of the Btn. in artillery formation. My duty was to watch the right flank where it joined the 32nd Div. on the right.

2 guns were to get into position in approx B.29. central and 2 guns at H.5.b. All guns to cover the right flank in case of being held up. On the objectives being gained all guns were to move up to the vicinity of the objective and assist in consolidation.

At 2250, 2nd inst. I received 5th M.G. Coy. orders by Capt. Hamilton, from these orders I was to place 2 guns in position at H.5.a.2.9. arc of fire, 350 degrees - 85 degree grid, and 2 guns at B.30.c.7.9. arc of fire 40 deg. - 100 deg. grid. Four pack mules were to carry ammunition. The locality of the section till 0400, 3rd inst was H.14.b.9.5. From 2500, 2nd, till 0530, 3rd the village of JONGCOURT and squares H.8. H.14. and H.1. were heavily bombed with gas.

At 0145, 3rd. I moved the section to position behind the 17th Btn. in sunken road H.9.a.2.4. The 17th Btn and No.1. section at 530 moved up to 70 yds. in rear of the 18th. Btn. which was on the jumping off line. At 0530 I received an order from C.O. 5th M.G. Coy. but was unable to read it. The C.O. 17th. Btn. had read the message and informed me it did not affect my movements. Later on I found this message contained orders to take up a position near BEAUREVOIR.

The 19th Btn. took the BEAUREVOIR line and the 17th Btn. passed through them. 2 guns under Sgt. White passed on the Right of WIANCOURT and the other 2 guns on the Left. An enemy M.G. in position H.4. a.8.9. held up the attack on the Left of WIANCOURT and I had a gun in position to engage it when a tank put the enemy gun out of action. Very little opposition was encountered after this. The 17th Btn. advanced to B.29.a. and c. but owing to the Left and Right flanks being out of touch they withdrew and took up position B.28.d.2.8. to B.28.d.3.3. to B.29.e.3.7. to B.29.e.6.3.

At 77 m.m. batteries were firing over open sights from B.29. e. and b. 1 gun in position at H.4.b.6.9. engaged these guns but owing to being unable to get observation, ceased fire. Later the artillery opened on these enemy guns and they withdrew. 1 gun was placed in position at B.28.d.1.6. to fire 330 deg. 360 deg. grid to protect the Left flank which was still out of touch. 1 gun at B.28, d.3.3. to fire in front of WIANCOURT to H.5. till the Right flank joined up, and then it covered the gap between the two Infantry Coys. 1 gun at B.29.e.4.5. to work in conjunction with Lewis guns for defending the post. These 4 guns remained in these positions till 0330, 4th. when the 23rd Battalion took over the sector.

At about midnight 3rd. I received a message from O.C. 5th Coy. stating that I should be in action in the vicinity of BEAUREVOIR. This was still in the enemies hands, and the 17th Btn. withdrew to JONGCOURT at 0400, 4th. I withdrew with them and put the section at H.9.a.2.6. I then reported to O.C. 5th Coy. who ordered me to remain where the section was, as the section was suffering from effects of the gas bombardment of night 2nd/3rd. Fourteen men were evacuated owing to gas. Casualties, 3 wounded. The section remained in this position till pulled out at 1930, 5th inst when it removed to G.10 central.

During the operations close touch was maintained with the Infantry Coy. Commanders, and my guns were worked in conjunction with Lewis guns.

Signed. L.J. Dickinson. Lt.
O.C. No.1. Section. 5th A.M.G. Coy.

Report on Operations 3rd.- 6th October 1918
 No. 2. Section. 5th A.M.P.CO.

On evening of 2nd inst. Lieut. V.J. Wright who was acting as Section Commander received orders from our Coy. Commander that an advance was to be made on the morning of the 3rd and to place 2 of his guns at B.23.b.9.9. and 2 at B.23.a.1.2. and B.23.a.3.0. respectively. Section H.Q. were then at B.18.d.9.9.

The Section was to be attached to the 18th Btn. and Lt. Wright and I went across to Btn.H.Q. in order to arrange with Btn.C.O. as to move etc. He informed us that zero was 0605, and suggested that we move forward soon after midnight, but as the men under Lt. Wright's command had had no sleep or rest during the previous night, and would be required to carry heavy loads while on the move Lt. Wright decided to move off at 0530, which would give us ample time to reach the attacking infantry before zero. In addition to the above, the mules which were to carry our ammunition would have been kept standing while loaded, if we had moved off at midnight.

At 0530 the section moved forward along the road as far as Southern edge of BEAUFORT, where the men were halted, while Lt. Wright and I reconnoitred the route around East of the village. While on the reconnaissance Lt. Wright was wounded, so I took charge of the section, and eventually reached sunken road about H.2.d.5.8. I then halted the men and went forward with a runner as far as sunken road about H.3.a.3.8. Some of the men of the 17th and 18th Bns. were falling back on this road, and they informed me they had received orders to withdraw to that position. I then sent my runner back with orders to bring up the section, but to unload pack mules and bring gear up by hand, as I deemed it unwise to bring mules any farther forward owing to heavy shelling and machine gun fire which we had met during the last 1500 yards of our journey. I then prepared the guns for action in this sunken road, as it appeared the Infantry were being held up by the enemy on ridge ahead and it looked as if they would have to withdraw.

As soon as I got into position here I sent word back to my C.O. informing him of the state of affairs. In addition to Lt. Wright the section had suffered another casualty. From here I opened fire onto building at B.27.c.7.8. where it was reported the enemy had several ~~several~~ machine guns which were hindering the progress of the Infantry. I was unable to observe whether I caused any casualties here. About 0930, in company with men of 17th and 18th Bns. I moved forward to right of the building above mentioned in hopes of bringing fire to bear from the flank but just about this time the fire from building ceased and then I learned the enemy had been mopped up around here. I then took up a position in trench about B.27.d.0.8. which position offered a good field of fire. The Infantry had moved forward a further 200 yards where I observed them digging in. My casualties now amounted to 5 in all, including one dead, the last three being caused by machine gun fire. About 1500 that day my Officer of the 18th Btn. informed me he intended to move forward to LANGRIS VALLEY in B.23.d. and I told him I would stay where I was for the time being, as from there I could support him should he again move forward, and did not see that I could better my position.

Just before dusk that evening the 6th Inf. Bde. advanced as far as ridge through B.23.c. and d. but I could obtain no definite information as to how position stood, so decided to remain where I was till morning. About 2300 I received orders from my C.O. to take up the positions originally appointed me as early as possible, so just before daylight on morning of 4th I took a runner as far as ridge to which 6th Inf. Bde. had advanced, in order to reconnoitre, and reached Infantry just as they were making a further advance.

I then sent runner back to bring up guns as quickly as possible and when they arrived about 0700 I mounted them in trench about B.22.b.9.1. to B.22.d.8.2., from which position I could command ground from West of BEAUFORT to ridge through B.24.c.. The ground ahead was being heavily shelled and enemy machine guns were also very active so I decided not to try to take up my appointed positions with 2 of the guns at road in B.23. until after dark.

So far each time I had to make a stand I sent a report to my C.O. explaining the position. About 1100 that day I received orders from my C.O.

C.O.

Report. No.2. Section. 5th. Coy. Contd.

O.C. to effect that in the event of any Infantry moving through my positions during the night I was to stay where I was.

Shortly after mid-day my O.C. visited me and decided that I should move my right gun further East in order to cover hollow ground running through B.23.a. and B.17.c. which I did. At intervals during the 4th and 5th, I had some good targets, and observed a number of casualties.

These targets included a party estimated at between 100 and 150 in railway cutting in B.9.d. . A party of about 50 crossing open and moving towards PONCHAUX from about B.11.a. central, a number of this party remained lying on the ground for the rest of the day and were apparently killed.

Parties numbering anything up to 30 moving to and from BEAUNEVOIR through B.10.b. and d. . Small parties around trenches in B.11.c. . Small parties at B.11.a. central. Small parties moving to and from Bridge at B.17.a.7.1. . Motor waggon moving up road about C.7.a.4.1. also small parties moving up and down this road between BRONX FARM and CROSS ROADS, at B.12.d.3.1. . I also succeeded in silencing a machine gun at bridge at B.17.a.7.1. .

On afternoon of 5th I received word from my O.C. that I would be relieved by American troops that night, which relief was effected at 2200.

During the 4th and 5th I was in constant communication with a Staff company of the 5th Inf. Bde. at about B.22.d.8.6. .

During the two days I was at B.22.b. I observed a number of artillery targets, mainly enemy transport and guns moving along roads South and West of BRAIN, and it appeared to me there were not sufficient P.O. officers to report same to their batteries.

Communication.

Communication generally appeared bad as it was impossible to obtain any definite information from Infantry Companies concerned as to how positions stood while they were engaged in the advance and owing to this fact I consider many a machine gun target was missed.

The employment of pack mules for carriage of ammunition etc, proved a big advantage, as the men were thus saved a deal of fatigue and many more belts were able to be got forward ready for immediate use.

Signed. A. Langworthy . Lieut.
No.2. Sect. 5th. A.M.C. Coy.

Report. No.3. Section. 5th. A.M.C. Coy. Operations 3rd to 6th Oct. 18.

Reference Map. WANSOURT. 1/20,000.

1. On the 3rd Oct. I was in position with 4 guns in H.7.a.7.7.
2. At 7 p.m. I received instructions from my O.C. that I was to take part in the operations of the following day 3rd Oct. Instructions were that I was to take up positions in B.4.c.8.0. with 2 guns as soon as the Infantry had gained their objectives.
3. I was also instructed to arrange times of moves etc. with C.O. of the 19th Btn. with whom I was to work during the operations.
4. I saw the C.O. 19th Btn. and arranged with him to have my gun teams and pack mules at Btn. H.Q. in H.2.c.2.3. about ten minutes before zero. I was then to report to him for further instructions.
5. I reported as arranged and was instructed by C.O. 19th Btn. thirty five minutes after the barrage had gone down to move forward to my positions allotted me .
6. After making a reconnaissance I found that the Infantry were held up at the wire on enemy front line.
7. I then proceeded forward under cover of the houses in the village of ESTREES and brought my guns into action about B.27.c. to B.27.d. .
8. A few minutes after I had taken up my position at above reference an Officer of the 19th Btn. with about 15 men withdrew to my position

Report No. 3, Section, 5th A.M.G. Coy. contd.

9. After a consultation with this Officer I arranged to stay with him and hold this position until we could get some communication with our flanks.
10. My guns were engaged on targets from these positions for two hours and heavy casualties were seen to be inflicted.
11. Whilst in this position I sent a message to the 12th. Stn. H.Q. through Brigade to my O.C. asking to have another of my guns which were in reserve in B.7.a.7.7. sent up to my present position.
12. At about 2130 the enemy in front of my position surrendered, I then moved forward with the Infantry and took positions in B.27. c.9.4. and 9.7. respectively, and commanding LAMOTTE VALLEY and ridge in B.28.
13. The Infantry again went forward about /300 yards and after several minutes again came back to my positions.
14. No information could be obtained as to how things stood on either flank, so I stayed in these positions and engaged targets consisting of small parties of the enemy and some machine gun posts which I observed.
15. I despatched a runner from this position to my O.C. and informed him of my position.
16. Whilst in this position I salvaged a Lewis gun and three German guns that had been captured and brought them into action against the enemy, thus saving my own ammunition for any situation that may develop.
17. On the morning of the 4th Oct. my O.C. visited my position and instructed me re the movement of two of my guns to positions forward in B.30.c.7.9. .
18. After making a reconnaissance I found this position was in front of SHENWOOD FORESTERS front line and about 1000 yards right of 6th Bde. sector, and could not be occupied. I then sent a runner back to my O.C. at Coy. H.Q. and informed him of same. I received a return message to remain in my present position which I did until the 29 night 5/6th when I was relieved by Americans.
19. Remarks. Throughout the whole of the operations communication with the Infantry was very bad.
20. Whilst in my position I observed many targets out of range of my guns but good for Artillery. These targets included columns of enemy transport. I also observed the enemy massing for a counter attack on the village of BEAUREVOIR but there were no F.O's. to report them to. There was also no communication by telephone to rear.
21. Lessons Learnt. I found that my pack mules were of great service to me in getting ammunition up to my position, as I was able to take them under cover of houses and banks where it was not possible to take a limbered wagon.

Signed.

M. I. Ryan Lieut.

O.C. No. 3, Section .

5th A.M.G. Coy.

4. Report on Operations 3rd- 6th October 1918. from No.4. Section
5th A.M.G. Coy.

1. Orders Received.

On the night of the 2nd I received orders from the C.C. Coy. that an operation would be carried out on the morning of the 3rd and that my section would be attached to the 20th Btn., that I was to arrange with C.O. Btn. the most suitable time to move. On the objective being reached I was to take my guns to positions as follows:- 2 guns B.11.c.6.8. 2 guns B.9.b.4.5. .

2. Moves. Time and Method.

I commenced my move half an hour after zero, this being the time considered most suitable. I had four mules each carrying eight belt boxes, and my method of moving was in diamond formation, gun teams leading with an average interval of 50 yards between teams, and I rested the teams whenever the ground offered suitable cover.

3. Action when unable to reach Objective assigned.

On reaching HOBINHOON QUARRY I was 200 yards behind the Infantry and I observed that the 20th Btn. on attempting to advance towards BEAUREVOIR HILL from the sunken road in B.21.a. and b. were forced to fall back again on the road on account of heavy M.G. fire from the direction of BEAUREVOIR. As these M.G. could not be located, I was informed by an Officer in the Btn. that they had decided to remain in the sunken road until a tank which had been sent out had silenced the guns. In the meantime I decided to get my guns into position where they might possibly be able to render assistance in covering the Infantry should they again go forward. After reconnoitring I decided that the most suitable field of fire could be obtained from the vicinity of B.20.d.4.8. and here I moved my guns under cover of sunken road and trench in B.20.d.. I kept in touch with the Btn. and was informed that the tank had been blown out and for the time being the Battalion Front would be along the sunken road from B.21.a.0.5. to B.21.b.3.9. .

4. Liaison with Infantry. By getting in touch personally.

5. Targets Engaged. Observation and Effects of Fire.

As no targets were visible on the day of the 3rd no ammunition was expended. On the afternoon of the 4th about 200 of the enemy were observed to come out from behind BRONK FARM in G.7.cent. but as they did not come within range could not be engaged by my guns. Several other targets were observed in vicinity of BEAUREVOIR HILL between the 3rd and 6th inst. but owing to position not being known to me, or whether the targets consisted of hostile or friendly troops, they were not engaged.

Observation. All movement leading up valley towards PONCHAK and KUKRI VALLEY could be observed from my position .

6. Difficulties Experienced. None.

7. Lessons Learned.

I found that the pack mules were of great assistance, enabling me to keep close up to the Infantry which would have been almost impossible had the gear been man-handled.

Signed.

A.E. Gridland Lieut.
 C.C. No.4. Section
 5th A.M.G. Coy.

SIXTH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COY.
Report on Operations 6th October 1918.

At 1300 I received verbal orders from C.O. Bn. to report to 6th A.I. Brigade, which I did forthwith. The Brig. General explained the scheme of attack to me, and attached 2 guns to each of the three attacking Battalions, remaining 10 guns to be in reserve.

The Officers in charge of the attacking Sections interviewed the Battalion Commanders, and were told exactly what to do.

The attached reports from Section H.C.O's. give the operation in detail. There is no report from the half section which remained in support at H.10.d.4.8. throughout the operation.

Company H.Q. were at H.10.a.1.3. with the three Battalions operating.

<u>Officers.</u>		<u>O/Ranks.</u>	
<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>	<u>Killed.</u>	<u>Wounded.</u>
<u>2.</u>	<u>3.</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>18.</u>

The Americans relieved us by 0030 on 7th Oct.

Signed. J.H. Drummond. Capt.
O.C. 6th A.M.G. Coy.

Report on Operations 6th Oct. No.1. Section (2 guns) 6th A.M.G. Coy.

1. We had orders to attack with the 21st Bn., advancing round to the right of MONTBREHAIN and to establish ourselves somewhere near G.25.d.9.7.

2. We left NAUROY at 1730 on the 4th, reached H.10.d.4.8. at 1930. At 0430, 5th inst. we moved forward to the jumping off tape at H.12.a.8.2. man-handling gear, reaching position at 0525.

3. On jumping off the Officer and all men except myself and two others were wounded. I could not go forward with the gear, so I mounted the 2 guns at H.12.a.8.2. from where I commanded all ground South East of the village. I then sent a message to the O.C. 6th A.M.G. Coy., telling him what I had done. Receiving no reply, I again sent a message at 1530. At 1800 I was ordered to withdraw to reserve positions at H.10.d.4.8..

Signed. J. Hodge. Sgt.

Report on Operations 6th Oct. No.1. Section. Nos.3 and 4 guns. 6th Coy.

1. Before moving off from the camp at G.16.b.40.40. the Section Officer explained to the H.C.O's. the operation.

2. The gun teams moved out at 1730 on the 4th inst. and marched to trench at H.10.b.35.60., guns, ammunition, rations, etc. being carried on limbers. At this trench section removed gear from limbers and remained there till 0400 on the 5th, when they moved forward to a sunken road in rear of jumping off tape. At 0545 guns took up a position on J.O.T. at H.5.b.40.10.. On barrage lifting guns moved off with first wave of Infantry to sunken road at H.5.b.90.50. where they remained six minutes to allow Infantry to move on. They then moved on about 150 yards behind Infantry to B.30.c.50.40. where shelter was taken in shell holes from fierce H.Q. fire. On fire easing off No.3. gun dug in at B.30.c.60.20. and No.4. gun moved on and occupied the trench at B.30.c.70.35. at 0900 suffering no casualties. Teams moved to objective in single file at 25 to 30 paces interval and made use of available cover.

3. Objective was successfully reached. Liaison was well kept with Infantry throughout. No.4. gun occupying trench with Infantry.

4. No.3 gun did no shooting, acting as a covering gun to No.4 and Infantry. No.4 engaged small parties of enemy moving towards West MONTBREHAIN at sunken road in B.25.b. very successfully, fire being 1000 to 1200 yards and controlled by an Infantry Officer with field glasses.

APPENDIX

No.1. Section, Nos. 3 and 4 Guns. Contd.

4. The position was good, observation ranging to 5000 yards. The fire was seen to be effective and stopped enemy counter attack. Difficulties experienced, practically nil.

5. Lessons Learnt.

Advantage of moving off with Infantry first wave for some hundred yards to escape enemy barrage and then falling back to one hundred to two hundred yards in rear of Infantry and covering them. Great advantage of every Sgt. and Cpl. having a map., this was marked as Section Officer and Sgt. were casualties, and Cpl. by having a map was able to notify positions etc.

Signed.

H.J. Bennett. Cpl.

Report from 2 guns of No.2. Section 6th A.M.G. Coy.

1. Two guns of my section were ordered to attack with the Pioneer Battalion and cover the Right flank of the main attack, to reach NEVELLS CROSS or thereabouts and help in the consolidation.

2. We left NAUROY at about 1730 on the 4th inst, reaching trenches at H.10.d.4.8. at 1930. At 2100 we went forward with the Pioneers and took over the front line at H.6.b.611.

At 0445 on the 5th we withdrew about 300 yards with the Pioneers and went forward again with the Pioneers at B610. At 0640 we reached NEVELLS CROSS having put out of action fourteen enemy M.G.'s. at I.7.a.7.4. and I.7.a.4.3. Objective was reached without difficulty.

3. Liaison with Infantry. Easily kept with Pioneers and remained with them.

4. Targets Engaged. Fourteen machine guns and teams put out of action along railway at I.7.a.4.3. We came across these suddenly and enfiladed them. About 100 Germans tried to get away from here of whom we killed about 30 and wounded about 50. We fired four belts at them at ranges from 200 to 300 yards. Many wounded were later carried in. Our guns also came into action on our Right flank causing heavy casualties to the enemy who was massing there.

Signed.

J.P. Adams. Sgt.

Report from No.3. Section. ~~6th A.M.G. Coy.~~ 6th A.M.G. Coy.

1. About 0300 on the 5th inst. we moved from NAUROY to JONGCOURT reaching village at 0500. The Section Commander had orders (verbal) at 0100 to proceed with 4 guns to the North of MONTBREHAIN and cover the ground to the North and North East of the village, as the enemy was expected to counter attack.

2. At 1015 we moved from JONGCOURT men handling all gear. At 1330 we had the 4 guns in position at B.30.c.4.7. B.30.c.9.4. B.30.d.3.1. Positions were reached without difficulty.

3. Liaison with Infantry. One post of Pioneers at B.30.c.4.7. with 2 guns, and a post of 24th Btn. men with each of the other teams.

Signed. A.E. Forster Sgt.

Report on Operations 6th October, No.4.Section 6th A.M.C.Coy.

1. No. 4 Section moved off from rear camp at 0300 under orders to occupy positions in reserve in H.10.b. Verbal orders from O.C. Coy. were there received to move forward and take up positions on Right of village of MONTBRUNHAIN to give additional protection to Infantry.
2. Guns were moved forward at 0630 and went Left of RAMECOURT to H.5.d.10.10. and then through the village taking shelter from heavy enemy barrage in Railway Cutting H.6.c.5.4.
3. Section Officer reported to 21st Bn.H.Q. as to situation forward and decided to move guns to H.12.b.9.9. in Railway Cutting. Crews of two guns became casualties, so only 2 guns could be moved to the position with the 21st Bn.
4. From this position scattered groups of retiring enemy were engaged along ridge and roads through I.1.d. and I.7.b. two belts were fired and refilled. Actual effect of fire was to cause the enemy to attempt to dig in and then retire behind rising ground. At 1430 a gun was mounted in conjunction with a Lewis gun of the 18th Bn. in I.1.d.8.3.
5. Owing to Infantry withdrawing from ridge and uncertainty whether enemy occupied gap North of MONTBRUNHAIN difficulty was experienced in selecting positions to strengthen Infantry consolidating.
6. Reserve guns are liable to suffer more casualties moving forward from the rear to occupy positions in the new line, than if they were in position to move forward soon after the Infantry.

Signed.

No. 843. W.Garrick. Sgt.
No 4 Section. 6th A.M.C.Coy.

SEVENTH AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY
Report on Operations End - 6th October - 1918.

1. 2/10/1918.

Orders received from 7th A.I. Brigade at 1410, for all C.O.'s. to meet the C.O.C. at Bde. H.Q. G.3.c.9.2. at 1500.

2. At this meeting orders were received to allot 4 guns to each of the 26th, 27th, and 28th Bns.. 4 guns were to be held in reserve at A.9.b.3.3.

3. Orders were given to Section Officers to report to Battalions as under.

No.1. Section	---	Lieut. Yelverton	---	28th Btn.
No.3	:	Lieut. Watson	---	27th
No.4	:	2/ Lt. Overy	---	26th

Sections moved off at 1800 with guns on limbers to report to C.O. Bns. C.O.C. ordered C.O. to move to Brigade H.Q. H.Q. was established at G.3.c.9.9.

4. 3/10/18.

Orders were received at 1900 that the 7th A.I. Brigade were to be relieved by the 7th British Inf. Bde.

5. 4/10/18.

About 0045 "B" Coy. of the 100th M.G. Btn. reported to Bde. H.Q. to relieve the 7th and 5th A.M.G. Coys. As this company was taking part in an attack they decided to send No.2 section to relieve No.3 section. At 0145 these sections with guides from No.3 section left Bde. H.Q.

6. No.3. section reported back to Brigade H.Q. at 1200 . Nos.1 and 4 sections reported back at 2330.

7. 5/10/18.

Orders were received over the telephone to have a section ready to move to support the 6th A.I. Bde. who were attacking MONTBENE-HAIN . Further orders were received to report to the 6th A.I. Bde. to receive order as to what section this section had to take in the operation. Instructions were received from S.M. of 6th A.I. Bde. to attach 2 guns to 21st and Pioneer Bns. Orders were given to Section Officers accordingly.

8. Orders were received from 7th A.I. Bde. at 1700 to move back to L.9.a. Company less No.2 Section moved back at 1800. Move was completed at 2000

Signed.

R.G. Webb, Capt.
 C.O. 7th A.M.G. Coy.

Report on Operations from No.1. Section. 7th A.M.G. Coy.

1. Strength of Section; :- 4 gun crews of 6 men each. 1 runner per sub-section. 1 Sergeant.
2. Each gun carried the following gear;- 1 gun, 1 tripod, 1 condenser outfit, 1 first aid case, 8 belts in boxes, 2 tins water.
3. Reported to C.O. 28th Btn. on evening of 2nd inst. and section bivouaced with 28th Btn. on night 2/3rd inst in trenches C.5.b.
4. No.1 and 2 guns moved forward with "B" company under section Sgt. and No.3 and 4 guns under Section Officer with "C" company.
5. Nos 3 and 4 guns following in rear of Nos.1 and 2 guns took up positions at B.8.c.0.5. One gun firing in direction of GUISSANCOURT FARM and the other covering Southern slopes of PROSPECT HILL.
6. The ROYAL INNHISKILLINGS passing through the 28th Btn. took up a position on crest of PROSPECT HILL. No. 1 and 2 guns with 28th Btn. then moved forward to approx B.2.b.70.00. The enemy commenced firing on the English on PROSPECT HILL with a 77 cm gun from approx B.3.d. The English fell back and our flank being in the air, Nos 1 and 2 guns falling back with 28th Btn. took up positions at B.2.c.2.3. covering all ground between GUISSANCOURT FARM and PROSPECT HILL. Guns were mounted in positions mentioned, and withdrawn on night 4/5th inst. Total casualties. 8 O/Ranks mostly caused by shell fire about 1000 yds from jumping off position.

Signed.

H.W. Yelverton. Lieut.

Report on Operations from No.2. Section. 7th A.M.G. Coy.Orders.

I received orders to report to 21st and Pioneer Bns. 2 guns to be allotted to each.

Moves.

The section moved from rear of BELLICOURT at 1300 and reported to 21st Btn. at H.10.a.2.3.. The C.O. 21st Btn ordered me to bring indirect fire to bear on C.19 and C.25 where the enemy were massing and much movement seen. I moved with limbers to sunken road in B.28.c. Keeping limbers here the guns were carried to B.28.c.50.50. and fire opened on target. Observation of fire. Nil.

No difficulties were experienced. A few 4.2.H.E. fell round sunken road about 1900. 5000 rounds were expended, also 1000 rounds on hostile aircraft.

At 2030 C.O. 21st Btn. gave me orders to withdraw, which I did. The section moved to West of HARGICOURT.

Guns were used as a 4 gun battery and laid off MONTBERRAIN CHURCH and were in action at 1530.

Signed.

H.O.C. Hunter Lieut.

Report on Operations from No.3. Section 7th A.M.G.Coy.

1. Strength of section going into action:- 1 Officer, 27 O/R's Made up as follows:- 4 gun teams of 6 men per gun. 1 runner per sub-section, 1 Sergeant .
2. The following gear was carried forward by each team. Tripod and spare parts wallet. Gun, 8 belts, 2 tins water, rations.
3. Reported to 27th Btn.H.Q. with section on evening of 2nd inst. and acting under C.O.'s. instructions placed 2 guns under Sgt. Wakely with "C" Company and took the remaining 2 to "D" Coy. myself.
4. Subsections bivouaced with their respective companies for the night in trench system running through G.11.b. and moved to jumping off line 0430 on morning of 3rd inst.
5. At zero hour No.9. and 10 guns moved forward with "D" Coy. on left flank of 27th Btn. and reached their objective, CANAL in A.24.b. without suffering casualties. Nos. 11 and 12 guns at the same time moved forward with "C" Coy. on the Btns. Right flank, suffering no casualties on their way to the objective, from enemy barrage. These 2 guns consolidated in sunken road in B.30.a.90.30. remaining there until relieved on evening of 4th inst. 2 tripods and a gun were destroyed by shell fire.
At 1000 Nos 9 and 10 guns were moved from CANAL in A.24b. and took up positions in trench at B.13.b. 40.30. . Whilst mounted in these positions guns were fired on by an enemy battery over open sights , two casualties being inflicted on the crews. At 1200 under instructions from the C.O. of the Btn. these 2 guns moved to trench running through B.14.c. where they remained until relieved on morning of 4th inst.
6. During the period of these operations none of the guns in the section were favoured with machine gun targets .
7. The use of German machine guns against aircraft and for sniping purposes enabled us to keep our own belts intact for use on more favorable targets if presented.
8. Observation.
I found the system of attaching sections to Battalions satisfactory. The Btn. to whom I was attached giving me every assistance at all times.
9. Casualties.
4 O/Ranks wounded.

The following gear was destroyed or lost in action:-
1 gun. 2 tripods. 2 spare parts wallets (complete)
15 belt boxes. 1 spare barrel.

Signed.

H.R. Watson Lieut.

O.C. No.3. Section. 7th A.M.G. Coy.

Report No.4. Section. 7th A.M.G. Coy.

No 4 Section had orders to report to the 26th Btn. on 2nd inst. We reported the same evening to Btn H.Q. at G.17.d.90.80. and remained in the trench there until 0430 on 3rd inst. During the evening Lt Overy who was in charge of the section had a parade of the H.C.O's. and informed us that we were attacking that morning and would support the 26th Btn as follows. Nos 13 and 14 guns would be with Lt. Overy attached to "B" Coy. on the left flank of the Btn. Nos 15 and 16 guns were attached to "A" Coy. on the Right flank. No 16 Gun Commander was given orders to co-operate with No.1. Platoon and to carry out work required of it by that Platoon Commander. No 15 gun was likewise attached to No.3. Platoon to support the Right flank of the Btn. .

These 2 right guns were to be under my charge when the objective was reached, but I was given orders to go over with the Right flank gun. We moved off at 0430 and were at the jumping off tape at 0605. We informed teams as far as possible what was required of them each

each crew were to send a runner to Lt. Overy when our objectives On reaching the jumping off position I immediately placed my two crews as stated and had barely done so when our barrage opened and the order was passed along to advance. We kept good order all along the line, my crews marching in single file in rear of the Infantry. Good progress was made in spite of intense machine gun fire and casualties were light. When we reached the outskirts of BELLVUE FARM we were met with strong resistance also the troops on our Right had failed to connect up.

I had a discussion with the Officer Commanding "A" Coy and decided to put out a defence flank until the troops on the Right came up, in the meantime the Infantry were to attack the FARM. I brought my gun into action at B.S.d.90.60, thereby covering the Right flank in cooperation with a Lewis gun on my Right, after some time, no connection having been made, I left the gun in charge of a Corporal and proceeded to reconnoitre the ground on the Right of the FARM.

I spent half an hour on this ground but failed to find any of our troops. This ground was infested with machine guns, also the enemy were bringing a large enfilade fire with H.G. from the village of BRAUREVOIR and BRAUREVOIR MILL. I could see the enemy concentrating troops in the village as if preparing for a counter attack. This movement was also seen by the Infantry round the FARM and the order to withdraw was passed along.

I immediately brought my gun into action at B.S.c.30.40, and silenced the H.G. firing from the MILL and dispersed troops debouching from the village and advancing towards the FARM.

On a further interview with the Officer I left the gun in that position and went forward to the Left to get in touch with the other guns, after much difficulty I came in touch with Sgt. Ford on the Left flank of the 26th Btn. and found that Lt. Overy had become a casualty, also that the gun had been put out of action by the enemy's trench mortars, his crew was also seriously depleted by casualties.

On further reconnoitring I found that the 2 centre guns were out of action, also the greater part of the crews were casualties. I collected all the gun gear possible, this was very difficult as the enemy had machine guns sweeping the area with direct fire.

Using various parts of the three guns we got into action at approx B.S.b.20.70, where the Left flank of the 26th Btn. was situated.

This was the situation when we were ordered to withdraw, 2 guns one on each flank of the Battalion.

Difficulties Experienced.

The chief difficulty experienced during the attack was getting the gun into action complete after a long advance, especially if men have to carry gun and ammunition some distance before jumping off. The difficulty in keeping connected through thickly wired country.

Lessons Learnt.

In such attacks it is advisable to get a carrying party from the Infantry, to assist gunners with the ammunition so as to assure that the gun is got into action complete and full complement of ammunition. It is advisable when advancing through thickly wired country, to tell off a man to move forward with the Infantry and find the openings in the wire thereby saving the guns a good deal of carrying, also saving time getting the guns into action.

Signed.

T. Wilson Sgt.
7th A.M.G. Coy.

TWENTY SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANY.
Report on Operations 3rd - 6th October 1918.

1. Orders Received.

To be in assembly position in the vicinity of G.10.d. at Zero and to move Coy. into position leaving assembly point one hour after zero. Positions were to be taken up approx. as follows:-
 One section at B.31.c.2.6. 2 guns. To fire down KUKNI VALLEY and 2 guns towards BEAUREVOIR.
 One section at B.22.b.2.2. 2 guns to fire towards B.16.central and 2 guns towards PONCHAUX.
 One section at B.22.d.5.5. 2 guns to fire towards B.17.central and 2 guns towards B.30 central.
 One section at B.27.d.0.3. 2 guns to fire in the direction LANOTTE FARM and 2 guns towards B.28.central.

On 4th inst. at 2015 orders were received that two sections were to pick up guide at H.9.b.1.8. and move to positions to be taken over from 40th Divn.

Got in touch with sections at H.Q. 20th A.I.Btn. and tried to cover as much as possible the gap in the line. Gave instructions to Section Officers to look out for more gaps and push forward with the original idea when the Infantry went forward.

Liaison with the Infantry was difficult as we did not have any information as to who were the attacking battalions or where their H.Q. were located.

Difficulty of getting in touch with sections quickly when our objective was not reached. Shortage of personnel.

Too much information cannot be given as to units making the attack, their boundaries and probable H.Q. More training is required in working under semi open warfare conditions.

Sections moved off well separated. Limbers followed tracks and roads and personnel moved in artillery formation, assisting passage of limbers where necessary filling in trenches and cutting wire.

Section Officers reports are attached.

Signed.

H. Thomas. Capt.

O.C. 22nd A.M.G. Coy.

Report No.1.Section. 22nd A.M.G.Coy.1.Orders Received.

To move from assembly point, BELLICOURT, at 0700 on morning of the 3rd inst, with limbers to B.22.d.80.50. approx. and mount guns in best available positions for close defence work, also await further orders.

2. Moves Times and Method.

The section with Lt. Stephens in charge moved from assembly point with limbers at 0700 across country to the left of NAUROY and then onto the main road to ESTREES just beyond the Sugar Factory, and continued on the road to ESTREES. No casualties or difficulties were met with until the outskirts of ESTREES were reached.

Here we were informed it was impossible to advance through the village owing to hostile M.G. fire so Lt. Stephens ordered the limbers to be unloaded and the men to take cover in a trench.

While in the trench the section suffered six casualties, including Lt. Stephens, from shell fire. I then took charge of the section and reported to Lt. Burcher and he advised me to remain where we were with the section while a runner went back to Coy. H.Q. with a report.

Later on Capt. Thomas came along and told me to reconnoitre forward and find a suitable position to take up as it was impossible to proceed to our original objective. Eventually I arrived with the section in a position at H.3.b.60.40. and reported to Lt. McDougall who sent a runner to Coy. H.Q. Lt. Byatt arrived and took charge of the section about 1600 on the 3rd inst.

Signed. G.S. Barlow Sgt.

I was sent to take charge of No.1. section after Lt. Stephens became a casualty and found them in position H.3.b.6.4. at 1600.

The guns were mounted in the old German trench system and had a good field of fire. Owing to Infantry being held up it was impossible to get machine guns into position according to programme in B.22.d.

Orders.

On the night 4/5th Oct. I received orders at 2115 to meet a guide in H.9.b.7.1. at 2200. Meeting guide I proceeded to the H.Q. of the 46th M.G. (Imperial) Btn. in H.11.20.99. After reporting to the O.C. I made a reconnaissance of the gun positions I had to take over. Rejoining my section I moved forward to new positions in H.5.d.2.4. and changed over about 0300 on the 5th inst. I held these positions till 2045 the same night when I was relieved by the 114th American M.G. Btn.

Signed. L. Byatt. Lt.

No.1. Section. 22nd A.M.G. Co.

Report No.2. Section.

On morning of the 3rd inst No 2 section arrived at assembly point near BELLICOURT at 0530. Moved forward one hour after zero 0705. My orders were to take up positions in reserve B.22.b. cent.

Section and fighting limbers moved forward round Northern edge of NAUROY, and then along tract through G.12.c and d. to Sugar Factory.,

Main Road to ESTREES not being shelled, I took this route and got limbers as far as ESTREES, where, owing to heavy shelling of the village and M.G. fire from pill box; B.27.c.5.8. had to unload and abandon same. Moved section into trench H.2.a. as enemy began shelling.

I and a Sgt. then went forward and reconnoitred, finding enemy resistance in main trench system through B.27.a. and c. overcome, went back and brought the section forward along trench and Northern edge of ESTREES to position B.27.c.50.80.. Again went forward to reconnoitre and got in touch with 5th Bde. Infantry in trench system B.27. central.

Little information could be gained as to the whereabouts of the front line here, they were not sure if there were any Infantry in front of them. After reconnaissance moved section up in small parties to B.27.a.9.2. in sunken road, but in doing so was fired on by enemy M.G. from direction of B.28. central. On finding there was no friendly troops near, except those in rear, and being reserve guns I decided to withdraw to rear positions B.27.c.50.80., time being 1030. Sent a report to Coy. H.Q. casualties to date being 2 men wounded by M.G. fire.

The 6th A.I. Bde. attacked from my position at 1630 objective being about 700 yards in front. Again on morning of 4th they attacked reaching B.17.d. central by 1000. After reconnaissance of position B.22.b. central decided to move forward, but before doing so had orders to remain in present position until further orders in case of counter

attack from direction of BEAUREVOIR. This position was very heavily shelled with H.F. and gas throughout 4/5th and at night was heavily bombed.

Being in reserve did not get many targets. Was relieved by 114th American M.G.Btn. at 2030 on 5th inst.

Signed. F.W. Burcher Lieut.
22nd A.M.G.Coy.

Report. No.3. Section. 22nd A.M.G.Coy.

I moved to point of assembly at G.10.d. at 0600 on 3rd.

Instructions.

I was instructed to move my section one hour after zero to take up position in B.27.d.2.4. where I had to remain in reserve. My right sub section covering ground E. left subsection H.

Moves etc.

I moved from assembly point at 0700 through NAUROY along WATLING STREET to ESTREES. On arriving at ESTREES central I was fired on by enemy M.G. from B.26.d.8.3. At 0830 I moved back and placed guns in position at H.1.d.2.0. I then started to make a personal reconnaissance moving along trench from H.8.b. On arriving at H.9.a.5.4. I came under M.G. and rifle fire from buildings in B.27.c. Infantry were held up along sunken road. I brought my guns forward along trench H.b.2.3. in gun crews 50 yds interval and took up position B.3.a.3.2. at 1000. Enemy fire had then stopped and Infantry moved forward taking a number of prisoners. I placed guns in position H.3.a. then reconnoitred forward. I moved to my allotted position at 1130. Got in touch with No 3 section on left and Infantry on right along trenches B.27.d.

Received instructions to meet guides from 46th M.G.Btn. at 2200 4th at point H.9.b.7.1. I took up position at 0200 at H.17b.7.5. At 0300 I moved forward 50 yds to more suitable position. I was relieved by 114th American M.G.Btn. Reported to Coy.H.Q. at 0200 on 6th inst relief complete. Signed.

A.A. McDougall. 2/Lt.
22nd A.M.G.Coy.

Report No.4. Section. 22nd A.M.G.Coy.

Orders Received.

To move from assembly point, BELLICOURT, on morning of 3rd at 0700 to vicinity of small quarry B.21.c. and mount guns in position for close defence.

MOVES Times and Methods.

Moved with limbers round West of ~~NAUROY~~ NAUROY to ESTREES entering at South end where I was held up by M.G. fire. 0830 unloaded limbers, spread out men West of ESTREES and moved in direction of cemetery H.2.a.2.8. here I had 2 casualties and 2 men missing took cover and reconnoitred. 1010 attempted to move forward but was held up by shell and cross M.G. fire at B.25.d.8.2. 1315 reconnoitred with Sgt. at B.26.central. Sgt. was wounded, being unable to get guns forward I reported to C.O. 20th Btn. He told me he had no Infantry in valley running B.26.b. through B.20.d. and ordered me to get guns forward to assist in that direction. I made four attempts to move up but was delayed by heavy shell and M.G. fire at 1645. I got into position at B.21c.5.0. I got in touch with Infantry on right flank, who were withdrawing. I immediately opened fire with 4 guns on enemy going up slope B.15.c.6.30. 1900 the 7th A.I.Bde. were attacking on my right flank towards HILL. B.15.b.3.3. and I assisted with fire for a short period. I was relieved at 2200 on 5th by 114th American M.G.Btn. While holding the position I could have rendered more assistance had I any definite information as to the position in BEAUREVOIR.

Signed. R.F. Bowkley 2/Lt.
22nd A.M.G.Coy.

WAR DIARY. Quartermaster's Notes for October, 1918.

Comforts Fund.

The following stores were received from Capt. H. Norris - Comforts Fund representative for 2nd. Aust. Divn:-

Cocoa & Milk 2 lb. tins.	72
Cocoa & Milk 1 lb. tins.	432
Biscuits, asstd. pkts.	144
Custard Powder lbs.	56
Fruit, tins	72
Wallets writing	432
Cigarettes, tins.	150
Tobacco, plugs.	352
Playing Cards, packs	180
Boxing Gloves, sets	1

Rations.

Up to standard as regards quality. Fresh vegetables at times in light supply but the issue was extensively supplemented by local purchases.

Forage.

Satisfactory as a whole. An issue of rock salt for horses and mules would be more helpful than the coarse salt issued for animals.

Repairs.

Boots. 313 pairs of boots were repaired by Battalion H.Q. shoemakers.

Bicycles. 7 bicycles have been repaired for this unit at D.A.D.O.S. armourer's shop.

Wagons. Repairs and renovations have been carried out by the Bn. wheelwrights. With the exception of a travelling kitchen the condition of the Battalion Transport may be considered good. Arrangements have been made to replace the kitchen in question.

Guns. These have regular attention from the Armourer Sergt. and Coy. Artificers. All guns etc. destroyed or rendered u/s through enemy shell fire have been made good by D.A.D.O.S. All guns, tripods and accessories are in good condition.

Respirators.

18 Respirators S.B. and 13 containers S.B. have been exchanged for others rendered u/s through fair wear and tear.

Fat etc.

The following was returned during the month, to Railhead:-

Fat lbs.	188	Paper lbs.	133
Cardboard lbs.	78	Cartons	632

Clothing.

The following schedule shows receipts from and returns (u/s) to, D.A.D.O.S:-

<u>Receipts.</u>		<u>Returns.</u>
Jackets	69	31
Trousers D.S.	60	22
Pants M.S.	53	34
Puttees prs.	150	34
Hats	31	13
Boots	101	52
Greatcoats	2	-
Braces prs.	120	12
Towels hand	60	-

Clothing Repairs etc.

During the month the cleaning, pressing, repair and alteration of 50 tunics and breeches has been carried

SECOND AUSTRALIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

WAR DIARY. Quartermaster's Notes for October, 1918. contd.

Clothing Repairs etc. contd.

out by the Regimental Tailor.

General.

Purchases of fresh vegetables as shown were made ex Battalion Trust A/C. The men were given a good variety in their meals as a consequence, and no complaints as regards the messing arrangements were received:-

Potatoes.	lb.	3300	Cabbages	315
Carrots	lbs.	605	Flour lbs.	315
Turnips	lbs.	3300		

Cigarettes to the number of 14,500 were purchased ex Trust A/C. and distributed to the men while in the line.

100 Football jerseys and 100 Football shorts were also purchased for Sports purposes.

Palmer
Capt.
 Quartermaster 2nd.A.M.G.Battalion.

APPENDIX