

AWM4
Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries,
1914-18 War

Formation Headquarters

Item number: 1/8/6 Part 2

Title: Intelligence, General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

October 1916



AWM4-1/8/6PART2

A

Inspector General of Communications.

War Office sanction has now been received to the following establishments of clerks for your Headquarters and the Headquarters of the General Officers Commanding DELTA and ALEXANDRIA Districts:-

Detail.	W.O's.	Other Ranks.	Total.	Remarks.
<u>Headquarters Inspector General of Communications.</u>				
I. G. C.	1	1	2	(a) Includes
A.A.G's Branch.	1	13(a)	14	1 S.Q.M.S. &
A.Q.M.G's Branch.	1	9(b)	10	2 Sergts.
Central Registry.	1	5	6	(b) Includes
District Barrack Officer.	1	5(c)	6	1 Sergt.
A.P.M.	-	1	1	2 Corpls. &
				1 L/Corpl.
Total I.G.C. H.Q.	5	34	39	(c) Includes 1 Sgt. & 1 Cpl
<u>Headquarters Delta District and L. of C. Defences.</u>				
General Staff.	-	2	2	
'A' & 'Q' Branches.	1	12	13	
A.D.O.S.	-	2	2	
A.D.M.S.	-	4(d)	4	(d) Includes
A.P.M.	-	1	1	1 Staff Sergt
Compensation Officer.	-	1	1	or Sergt.
Total DELTA Dist: H.Q.	1	22	23	
<u>Headquarters Alexandria District.</u>				
General Staff.	-	2(d)	2	
'A' & 'Q' Branches.	1	5(e)	6	(e) Includes
A.D.M.S.	-	4(d)	4	2 Staff Sgts.
A.D.O.S.	-	2(d)	2	or Sergts.
A.P.M.	-	1	1	
Compensation Officer.	-	1	1	
Central Registry.	-	3(d)	3	
O.C. Reinforcements.	-	2(d)	2	
Total ALEXANDRIA District H.Q.	1	20	21	


(Authority - W.O. Cable 14871 (S.D.2) dated 30/9/16).

It is presumed that the Alexandria District Establishment may be reduced by the 2 clerks allowed for O.C. Reinforcements from the date on which that appointment was abolished.

(Sgd) A. Lynden-Bell,

G. H. Q.
2/10/16.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.



3rd October 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Sections,
Western Frontier Force.

A

The following points regarding the artillery units under your command are forwarded for information and necessary action :-

1. Some doubt appears to exist as to whether in the squared map ^{scale} $\frac{1}{40,000}$, the red lines represent true or magnetic North and South. These lines are true bearings.
2. Attention is called to the pamphlet "Co-operation between Aircraft and Ships and Batteries", to which an amendment, entitled "Artillery Co-operation", was issued. On page 3 of this latter a note states that "ground signals should be in the vicinity of W/T Station, and not at the battery". These instructions must be closely adhered to.
3. Attention is called to the orders issued regarding the protection of ammunition during hot weather. (vide G.R.O. No.991 of 19th March 1916). These are not, in all cases, being strictly adhered to.
4. No 18-pdr. guns selected for use as emergency Anti-aircraft guns should be treated as purely for Anti-aircraft defence; they should, in all cases, be considered as available for their normal work, and should be allocated to defence work with this end in view.

(Sgd.) A.B. Robertson,
Lt.-Col., G.S.

For Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

4th October 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 3. Section.

1. On the formation of the new Headquarters, Eastern Frontier Force, the signal personnel required will be found from the G.H.Q. Signal Company, and that unit will be placed at the disposal of the Eastern Frontier Force (with certain reservations) and retain its present title.

2. The G.H.Q. Signal Company is at present composed of:-

Headquarters, including Motor Cyclists and
Cable Sections - Pigeons.
NA, NB, NN*

Airline Cable Sections :- N.14. (on Railway Telegraphs).
N.15.
N.23.
N.24.

* Temporarily raised
to air line establish-
ment + working
for No. 3 Section

Wireless Sections London (Pack) W.T.
Northern (Wagon) W.T. (now with
No. 1. Section.
Southern (Motor) W.T. (now with
No. 1. Section.

3. Since the G.H.Q. Signal Company serves for EGYPT as the Director of Army Signals reserve, from which personnel is drawn for special signal work as occasion arises, Headquarters Eastern Frontier Force will be required, when circumstances necessitate, to provide complete sections, or other details, from this Company for special duties at very short notice.

4. The units which should be considered specially liable for such work are :-

1. Air Line Section
1. Cable Section
1. Pack W/T Section
1. Motor W/T Section

Copies to A
D.A.S.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell,

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

5th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
No.3 Section.

Reference your O/27/80 of 17th September, sanction is given for the establishment of a yeomanry regiment machine gun section, when forming part of divisional cavalry of a division equipped with Camel transport, as forwarded therein. The issue of two extra pack saddles per section necessitated will be made.

Since it has now become desirable to print this and other recently sanctioned amendments to mobile establishments, please forward as soon as possible details.

- (a) of the load of the camel carrying water testing equipment with Headquarters of a Field Company R.E.
- (b) of the loads of the 9 camels now sanctioned for the well units of a section, Field Company R.E.

(Sgd.) A.B.Robertson. Lieut-Colonel, G.S.

for Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

S E C R E T.

5

A

From: Chief, LONDON.

To: Chief, EGYPFORCE.

23572 Cipher.

5/10/16
6/10/16

Desp: 2350
Recd: 0900
Decd : 0915

My 23507 Oct. 4th. See High Commissioner's
844 Oct. 4th.

Proposal to place Sirdar in charge of
arrangements with Sherif was made as it appeared
most convenient because any personnel must be found
by him and it relieves you when you may be busy with
other affairs this winter. If it is more convenient for
you to have charge this can be arranged. Wire me your
views. War Committee has decided not to send additional
troops to RABEGH, but a mountain battery from the
SOUDAN is to be prepared for despatch at the same time
as the French batteries if situation demands it. If
battery goes you will have to replace it.

The Secretary,

War Office, LONDON. S.W.

6th October 1916.

Sir,

1. With reference to my telegram A.M. 452, dated 27th April 1916, and War Establishment of a Camel Transport Company dated 1st July 1916, I have the honour to request that certain increases may now be made in the establishment of the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.

2. I recommend that the following increases be made:-
(a) Two extra Deputy Inspectors with rank not below that of Major.
(b) One extra officer per section, or 5 officers per company
(c) One additional British N.C.O. per section, and with the rank of either sergeant or Corporal (50% of each).

3. These recommendations are made in view of the following facts:-
(a) At the date when my telegram referred to above was sent to the War Office, the Camel Transport Corps consisted of 9 companies and 2 depots. Since that date, I have found it necessary to give instructions for the number of companies to be raised eventually to 20. It is therefore necessary, in the interests of efficiency, that one extra Deputy Inspector be appointed to act as subordinate to, and to work in the office of, the Inspector, Camel Transport Corps. At the present moment the Inspector of Camel Transport Corps is never able to leave his office for more than a day or two at a time, since there is no one to whom he can delegate his office work. I consider it most important that he should be able to free himself from the calls of office work for longer periods for the purpose of reviewing the work of companies actually in the field.

A second Deputy Inspector is required in No 3 Section. There are in that section at present 6 Egyptian Companies and 3 Indian. The work of general supervision is, therefore, too heavy to be adequately carried out by an officer in command of a company.

(b) The result of 9 months' experience has been to show that the British personnel in the Camel Transport Companies is insufficient. A section consists of 400 camels, and under for these camels, their equipment, pay of drivers, etc., with only two British N.C.O's to assist him, one being fully occupied in keeping section accounts and drawing supplies, and the other superintending outside work. The burden of work falling upon a Section Commander is, therefore, continuous and extremely heavy with no possibility of relief, and I therefore consider that, although the work of the companies in the field has up to the present been extremely satisfactory, the addition of one officer per section is highly necessary to increase the efficiency of the corps.

(c) The present allowance of British N.C.O's, namely, two per section, has been found to be too small a margin to work on when companies are scattered, as they are on the Western Frontier, or when they are employed on active operations in the Eastern Desert. For this reason I strongly recommend the increase mentioned in para 2(c).

G.S. 2/58/11.

6th October,

General Officer Commanding,
No.2 Section.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has approved of the proposed operation to carry out an attack on the enemy's detachment at MAGHARA with the troops mentioned in appendix II, case 4, of your memorandum G.Z./116, dated 2nd October, but with the addition of one section of the Hong Kong & Singapore Battery, R.G.A. This section will be railed to NEGILIAI and will come under your orders on its arrival there on the 10th inst.

2. The Commander-in-Chief wishes the Commander of the force to have clear orders that, should he find the position held by the enemy stronger than anticipated, the operation will be turned into a reconnaissance in force, with a view to a further operation in greater strength being undertaken as a result of the information gained.

In Sir Archibald's opinion, the operation, as at present planned, should not be pressed if immediate success is not obtained, and if slow, dismounted action against entrenched positions has to be undertaken.

The Commander-in-Chief has no intention of transferring responsibility from his shoulders to yours, or of hampering you in your operations; he merely wishes to impress upon you that it is useless to throw away valuable lives in attempting to capture strongly held entrenchments with mounted troops when later on, if necessary, we could bring up infantry and attack the entrenchments with a practical certainty of success.

3. The Commander-in-Chief further considers it essential that the approaches to MAGHARA be most carefully

/reconnitred

reconnoitred and studied by officers' patrols before the advance of the column. To assist in the collection of local knowledge, the Intelligence Branch at G.H.Q., is endeavouring to obtain the services of reliable, native guides and these will be handed over to you when found.

4. As regards the plan of attack, the Commander-in-Chief does not approve of the column being divided into two parts. He is of opinion that the chances of successful co-operation between the two portions under the conditions obtaining would be so small that the risk would not be justifiable. He therefore favours the attack being delivered by one column.

Sir Archibald also desires that you will draw the Column Commander's attention to the necessity of making very careful arrangements for the advance during the second evening. The danger of detached groups colliding with each other in the dark must be guarded against.

5. The following decisions have been given on the detailed proposals submitted in your covering letter of the 2nd instant :-

- (a) The Bikanir Camel Company will remain at your disposal until the operations are concluded.
- (b) The instructions contained in G.S.Z/52/9 of 30/9/16, to remain in abeyance during the operation, but on its termination, and without undue delay to be brought into force on a date to be fixed by you and General Dobell, and notified to G.H.Q.
- (c) The City of London Yeomanry to remain under your command until the break up of the Mobile Column.
- (d) 1,300 transport camels from No. 3. Section to be made available for the operation and to be handed over at a place and date to be mutually arranged between you and General Dobell.
- (e) 3,300 fanatis to be collected at NEGILIAT forthwith and held at your disposal.

6. The proposal that NEGILIAT be used as the base of supply for the Column is approved. All detailed arrangements

/with

with reference to this to be concluded between you and General Dobell in personal consultation.

7. The precise date on which the operation is to be carried out is left to you. It is hoped, however, that you will find it possible to take advantage of the present moon, and every effort will be made to concentrate all your requirements outside your own resources at NEGILIAI by Monday, 9th instant.

8. Will you please come and see me on Monday, the 9th inst., and discuss your plans further.

(Sgd.) A. Lynden-Bell,

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.

From:- Egypforce,
To Troopers,

A.M.1120 cipher

7/10/16

Desp.2000.

Your 21158 and 23226 Cipher(A.O.1). Weekly returns R.F.C

(a) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 31.
20th Reserve Wing. 14.
X Aircraft Depot nil.

SALONIKA. 35.
EAST AFRICA. 10.
MESOPOTAMIA. 17.

(b) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 5.
20th Reserve Wing 5.
X Aircraft Depot nil.

SALONIKA. 3.
EAST AFRICA. 5.
MESOPOTAMIA. 4.

(c) Service- Unser- Not Er-
able. viceable. ected,
=====

EGYPT:

5th Wing.
B.E.2.C. 12. 19. 8.
Bristol Scouts 5. 2. nil.
Martinsyde 2. 2. 1.
De Havilland nil. 4. nil.

20th Reserve Wing.
B.E.2.C. 5. 3. 1.
Maurice Farman 4. 1. 5.
Bristol Scouts nil. nil. 1.
Avro. 4. 3. 4.
Curtiss nil. nil. 4.
Caudron 3. nil. 3.
Martinsyde nil. nil. 1.

X Aircraft Depot.
B.E.2.C. nil. nil. 4.
Martinsyde nil. nil. 1.
Avro. nil. nil. 2.

SALONIKA.
B.E.2.C. 12. 1. 5.
Bristol Scouts 3. nil. nil.
De Havilland 1. nil. nil.

EAST AFRICA.
B.E.2.C. 3. 3. nil.
Steel Henri Farman 4. nil. 3.

MESOPOTAMIA.
B.E.2-C 15. 3. 6.
Voisins 1. 1. nil.
M. Farman 1. 3. nil.
H. Farman 4. nil. 1.
Martinsyde nil. nil. 6.

From Chief, Egyptforce.

To Chief, LONDON.

A¹¹

A.M. 1124 cipher.

8/10/16.

Desp. 1920.

QANTARA is now assuming greatly increased importance, not only as a base for stores and materiel brought from ~~xxxxx~~ oversea which have to be sorted and forwarded to the front, but as one of the termini of the EL ARISH line where co-ordination of administrative work is most necessary.

I am therefore of opinion that the appointment of an Administrative Commandant, graded as A.A.G., at QANTARA with a staff of one D.A.Q.M.G. and one Staff Captain, is essential. If this proposal is approved, an increased expenditure of £1700 would be incurred, but against this I propose to send home and abolish the appointments of Generals Bland and Young, the Chief Engineers of Nos. 1 and 2 Sections, thus saving £2000.

Kindly wire whether these proposals are approved.

Copies to :-

O.
O.(b).
C.-in-C.
C.G.S.
A.
Q.
A.M.S.
D.A.S.
E.-in-C.

Filed G.S. 290.

" G.S. Cables.

W.D.

ajm.



SECRET.

G.S. Z/58.

h
B

To The Vice-Admiral,
Naval Commander-in-Chief,
EAST INDIES AND EGYPT.

8th October, 1916.

Sir,

The general situation on my eastern front indicates that I shall be in a position to occupy EL ARISH as soon as the railway reaches that place, which should be about the end of this year, if the anticipated rate of progress is maintained.

Although the occupation of EL ARISH can be undertaken by land, once it is occupied, the maintenance and supply of the Force by a long single line of railway open to interruption along its length by enemy raids presents difficulties; also any operations east of EL ARISH would be seriously hampered if the whole burden of maintaining the Force at EL ARISH were borne by the railway.

In these circumstances I should be grateful if you would consider as to how far it would be possible to supply EL ARISH from the sea.

I am well aware of the difficulties attending a constant landing of stores on such a coast, and that if it is to be made possible it may be necessary to construct extensive harbour works.

It is for this reason that I am asking you now to be good enough to advise me as to the extent of such harbour works you may consider necessary, and your opinion as to whether they are possible to construct.

In coming to your conclusions, I would ask you to take into consideration that my future plans by no means end with the occupation of EL ARISH, and that these plans would be severely hampered if no additional supply route by sea is possible. It would therefore be worth while to undertake works which would take six months or more to complete should these be necessary and offer any prospect of success.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. Lynden-Bell,
M.G.,
C.G.S.

for General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

A

From: General Smuts, DAR ES SALAAM,

To: EGYPFORCE.

G.O.F.1277. Cipher.

10/10/16

Desp:1745

Recd:2056

Distribution R.F.C. Oct.7th.

7th Naval Wing Headquarters.

Aircraft Park.

Military Wing Headquarters
and "A" Flight.

"B" Flight.

"C" Flight.

and Advanced Aircraft Park.

Advanced Aircraft Park.

Aircraft Park.

KILOSSA.

DAR ES SALAAM.

MOROGORO.

TULO.

DAR ES SALAAM.

KOROGWE. preparing move to
DAR ES SALAAM.

MBUYANI.

S E C R E T.

14
B

From : Westforce.

To : G.H.Q.

Telephone
Message.

10/10/16.

Recd. 1830.

Following telegram from Lieut-Colonel Russell,
SHUSHA, begins :-

Some reliable information from men who left
BAHARIA Oasis on 7th inst. states that SAYED AHMED
and his whole force are about to leave for SIWA at
once. The ABEIDAH Tabur left on the 6th, the
BARASA Tabur on the 7th, the SIWIA Tabur on the 9th.
MOHAMMED SALEH and coastguards with two machine guns
will act as rearguard. AHMED EL SHERIF was
expected to leave FARAFRA on the 8th inst. Remainder
of dates uncertain. Taburs all less than half
original strength, and moral bad. Ends.

Western Frontier Force say that a further message
is expected from Colonel Russell.

SECRET

15
C
10th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.



1. With reference to your prospective operations, in view of recent reports regarding the increase in strength of the enemy force occupying the oasis, it has been decided to place temporarily at your disposal the following additional units :-

- (a) Nos. 7, 9, 14 and 15 Companies, Imperial Camel Corps.
- (b) The Hong-Kong & Singapore Mountain Battery complete (6 guns).
- (c) Additional Camel Transport to the extent of 3,000 camels (in excess of the 2,800 camels already allotted for the operation).

2. As regards the Camel Corps, it has been decided, for the purpose of the operation, to form the ⁷companies available into a single battalion, and instructions regarding the formation of battalion headquarters and the appointment of a commander have already been issued.

3. You should therefore reconsider your original plan in the light of the larger force thus made available, and you should forward your revised scheme for the occupation of the oasis to General Headquarters as early as possible, stating the extent to which the additional camel transport placed at your disposal will enable you to increase the force of dismounted yeomanry allotted to the column. You should also inform General Headquarters as regards the dates by which you will require the units referred to in para. 1 to reach SHUSHA Base Camp in order to take part in the operation.

/4.

7
D

G.S. Z/28/8.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.

1. The attached copy of instructions, issued by the Italian Military Authorities to the Officer Commanding BARDIA, with reference to Article 3 of the Anglo-Italian Agreement regarding joint operations carried out against the Senussi in EGYPT and CYRENAICA, is forwarded for your information and for communication to the General Officer Commanding Coastal Section.

2. In connection therewith, the following general instructions should be issued to the General Officer Commanding Coastal Section for his guidance:-

(a) Such protective reconnaissance as may be necessary for the efficient defence of SOLLUM may be carried out without regard to frontier.

(b) Similar freedom of action will be permitted to Italian troops in respect of the defence of BARDIA.

(c) The General Officer Commanding Coastal Section is authorised to co-operate with, or to invite the co-operation of, Italian troops in such minor operations as may be necessary or desirable.

(d) He may also accede, at his discretion, to any request on the part of the Italian Commander at BARDIA to act independently in Italian territory, or he may himself request the Italians to take similar independent action within British territory.

(e) No joint operation of more than minor importance should be undertaken without reference, through General Officer Commanding Western Frontier Force, to General Headquarters.

(f) No permanent field works or defensive posts will be constructed by British troops in what is clearly Italian territory, nor by Italian troops in British territory.

(g) Information of mutual interest should be freely interchanged with the Officer Commanding BARDIA.

(h) It must be thoroughly understood that any joint operations carried out in the neighbourhood of the frontier, or any operations conducted by British Troops in Italian territory, or by Italian troops in British territory, will be without prejudice to future settlement as regards delimitation of boundary between EGYPT and CYRENAICA.

3. In the interpretation of these instructions reasonable latitude may be allowed to the General Officer Commanding Coastal Section, but he should clearly realise that it is his duty to do all in his power to maintain and develop the cordial relations existing between ourselves and our Italian Allies.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

10/10/16.

18

INSTRUCTIONS BY THE ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITY TO O.C. BARDIA
WITH REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 3 OF THE ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT
REGARDING THE SENUSSI.

=====

I. Co-operation between British and Italian troops, at SOLLUM and BARDIA respectively, shall be more especially concerned with Police and reconnaissance work, in the zone adjoining and on both sides of our Eastern frontier: i.e., raids on small bodies or camps of the enemy (when this is compatible with a fair measure of success), the capture of arms and ammunition and protective reconnaissances.

II. The co-operation of our post at BARDIA, in order to effect the objects referred to above, will normally consist in supplying small units, in ordinary or armoured cars with or without machine guns. Within such limits the O.C. BARDIA is authorised to participate on his own initiative in such operations as may be agreed upon by the two commands of ~~SOLLUM~~ and BARDIA and SOLLUM. He must, however, on each occasion make previous arrangements with the O.C. SOLLUM, and, except in very urgent cases, he must previously inform by telegram the Government of CYRENAICA and the O.C. TOBRUK Zone.

III. If all or almost all the forces that can be spared without prejudice of the defence should be required for the combined operation, a previous authorization shall be demanded from the Government of Cyrenaica.

IV. The following points should be clearly settled when the arrangements are made; number and details of the troops and number and kind of cars participating in the operations:- Objective, route and particulars of the operation.

V. British troops alone should not carry out operations in our own territory without Italian participation, or at least the presence of some Italian Officers, whether politically or specially qualified.

VI Mutual support between BARDIA and SOLLUM posts is authorised, should either or both of the garrisons be threatened. This support may be effected by displacing by land or sea such troops as can be spared from BARDIA without prejudicing its defence. Previous authorisation must, in any case, be demanded from the CYRENAICA Government through the O.C. TOBRUK Zone.

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A¹⁹
G.S. 375.

General Officer Commanding,
No. 3. Section.

With reference to your O/147 of October 7th in reply to this office letter G.S./375 of the 4th instant, the signalling arrangements outlined in the letter are governed wholly by consideration of the resources at our disposal.

Should necessity at any time arise to withdraw any part of this signal organisation, either permanently or temporarily, from the control of the Eastern Force, the effect of such a withdrawal would, in each case, be the subject of careful consideration by General Headquarters in the light of the particular situation from which such necessity may arise.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell,

G.H.Q., E.E.F.
11/10/16.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

70
A

G.S.Z/61.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
War Office,
LONDON. S.W.

13th October, 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information a list showing the quantity of War Stores that have been supplied to the Sherif of Mecca from this country, up to the 11th October, 1916.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell. Major-General. C.G.S.

for, General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,

SUPPLIES TO SHERIF. (up to 11th October, 1916).
=====

ORDNANCE.

Rifles.	32,650
(Including 5 Colts Maxim Guns. (sent from ENGLAND.	22
5 inch Howitzers.	4
(Six of these went to (Sirdar to replace six 10-pounder guns (2.95 guns which he had (sent.	8
2.95 guns. (from Armoured Train).	2
(1 returned owing (to shortage of Turkish Mountain Guns. (ammunition.	2
Revolvers.	7

AMMUNITION.

Jap and Mark VI.	18,432,220 rounds
German Mausers.	413,550 "
For Colt Machine-Guns.	200,000 "
Martini Henry. (of which 102,600 rounds are at (Arab Bureau's disposal at SUEZ)	450,000 "
5-inch Howitzer.	1,200
10-pounder.	4,300
Turkish Mountain.	384
2.95.	687
Revolver.	350
Hand Grenades.	1,004
Picks.	1,000
Shovels.	1,000
Barbed wire coils (with posts, tools, etc)	3,200

EXPLOSIVES.

Gelignite.lbs. (with detonators, etc)	2,100
Gun cotton, wetslabs. (with detonators, etc).	500

TENTS.

-----	314
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VEHICLES.

Wagons Ambulance.	6
" G.S.	2
Carts.	2
Water Carts.	2
Wheeled stretchers.	2

MISCELLANEOUS.

Equipment for 400 men.	
" " 32 officers.	
Telephones and Equipment.	7
Stores for Special Field Ambulance.	
Equipment for two operating theatres.	
Ground sheets.	200
Lubricating Oil, G.S.drums.	117
Boots.	100
Bleaching powder in 4 oz. tins.	100
Vaseline drums.	6
Verry Pistols.	20
" Cartridges.	500

D.M.S.

500 anti-plague sera.	
500 anti-cholera sera.	
1 cholera set.	
6,000 pott.pem. intestinal pills.	
1,600 hypertonic saline tablôids.	

D.S.T.

Rice.	3,892,365 lbs.
Flour. (Atta).	3,296,979, "
Coffee.	71,024 "
Sugar.	116,206 "
Barley.	420,000 "
Condensed Milk Cases.	12
Oil, mineral burning drums.	2

73

D. of R.

Horses.	28
Mules.	10

D.V.S.

Veterinary stores chest.	1
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SECRET.
=====

MA

From:- Eypforce.

To :- Troopers

A.M.1147 cipher

14/10/16

Desp. 1800.

Your 21158 and 25226 cipher (A.O.1). Weekly returns R.F.C.

(a)	<u>EGYPT.</u>	5th Wing	32.
		20th Reserve Wing	17.
		X Aircraft Depot	nil.
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>		36. (inclu: 5 balloon pilots)
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>		10.
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>		16.

(b)	<u>EGYPT.</u>	5th Wing	4.
		20th Reserve Wing	4.
		X Aircraft Depot	nil.
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>		6.
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>		5.
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>		3.

(c)		<u>Service- able.</u>	<u>Unser- viceable.</u>	<u>Not Brethed.</u>
	<u>EGYPT:</u>			
	5th Wing.	14	16	9
	B.E.2.C.	4	3	nil
	Bristol Scouts	3	1	1
	Martinsyde	nil	4	nil
	De Havilland			
	20th Reserve Wing	nil	nil	1
	Martinsyde	5	3	1
	B.E.2.C.	4	3	3
	Maurice Farman	nil	nil	1
	Bristol Scout	5	4	4
	Avro	nil	nil	4
	Curtiss	nil	3	2
	Caudron			
	X Aircraft Depot.	nil	nil	4
	B.E.2.C.	nil	nil	1
	Martinsyde			
	<u>SALONIKA.</u>	10	5	2
	B.E.2.C.	3	nil	nil
	Bristol Scout	1	nil	nil
	De Havilland	8	2	10
	Armstrong W.			
	<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>	3	3	nil
	B.E.2.C.	4	nil	3
	Henri Farman			
	<u>MESOPOTAMIA.</u>	14	5	4
	B.E.2-C.	1	1	nil
	Voisins	3	1	1
	H. Farman	1	nil	nil
	M. Farman	nil	nil	6
	Martinsyde			

G.S.386.

h
TB

Secretary,
War Office,
LONDON. S.W.

14th October 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the attached proposed War Establishment for a Camel Remount Depot for 500 camels, and to request that sanction may be given for the maintenance of two such depots in EGYPT.

Hitherto there has only been a make-shift means of dealing with all camels, but owing to the increasing importance of the Imperial Camel Corps and the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps, it has been found desirable that the Depots should be regularised. I have therefore given provisional sanction to the establishment of two Camel Remount Depots, on the scale proposed in the attached table, and beg to request that War Office approval for this may be sent by telegram.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell,
M-G.,
C.G.S.

for General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

A CAMEL REMOUNT DEPOT, EGYPT.

(For 500 Camels.)

76
number in red.
as amended by
W.O. telegram
17033 2/11/16
Encl. 9-A.

DETAIL.	Officers.	W.O.'s Class 2.	S. Serjts. & Serjts.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	REMARKS.
<u>EUROPEAN PERSONNEL.</u>							
Officer Commanding. (Field Officer).	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Adj. & Qr. Master	1.	-	-	-	-	1	
Subalterns	3(1)	-	-	-	-	3(1)	
Squadron Sgt. Major	-	1	-	-	-	1	
Squad: Q.M. Serjts.	-	-	1	-	-	1	
Serjts.	-	-	1	-	-	1	
Corporals	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Privates	-	-	-	-	22(a)	22	(a) includes 2 L/Cpls.
Clerks	-	-	-	-	2(1)	2(1)	
Batmen	-	-	-	-	5(3)	5(3)	
TOTAL European Personnel.	5(3)	1	2	-	31(28)	39(34)	
<u>Egyptian Personnel.</u>							
Medical Officer	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Veterinary Officer	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Medical Orderlies	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Veterinary Orderlies	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Saddlers	-	-	-	2	-	2	
Bash Reis	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Reis	-	-	-	-	5(4)	5(4)	
Drivers	-	-	-	-	150(121)	150(124)	
Total Egyptian Personnel.	2	-	-	2	160 (133)	164 (137)	

15th October, 1916. 7
A

General Officer Commanding,

Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Sections.

The control of the Engineer Services in Sections of Canal Defences has now been placed, as far as possible, directly under the General Officers Commanding. They have been provided with senior Engineer Officers to advise them, and have been allotted a staff of Field Engineers and Assistant Field Engineers, Army Troops Companies R.E., and Egyptian Labour to supplement the Field Companies R.E.

No definite rules can be laid down as to what work shall be undertaken by the Field Companies R.E. and what work shall be done by Army Troops Companies, or by Egyptian Labour. The guiding principle to be observed is that the Field Companies R.E. should be kept available to move at short notice. They should therefore not be employed in such a manner that their removal will disorganise the permanent water supply services, or the maintenance of the means of ~~possible~~ communication; subject to this limitation the fullest possible use should be made of all the Engineer Troops.

The provision of stores and materials for work of all kinds including Defences and of Egyptian Labour must to a large extent be subject to control from G.H.Q. because it is increasingly difficult to meet all demands.

It is not the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to fix any definite financial limit to expenditure on work which General Officers may order within their commands, as cases may arise when work must be initiated and carried out under conditions when it is impossible to estimate the cost of the material and labour which will be expended and where delay in obtaining sanction to commence work would hamper military operations.

On the other hand the Commander-in-Chief does not wish new work involving expenditure of material and labour to the value of over £200 undertaken without his previous approval if it is not of urgent military necessity.

Further, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to be kept fully informed by means of weekly reports of the progress of all defences and engineer works which have been approved, and of all new work which is being undertaken.

The Commander-in-Chief desires me to again impress upon you the great national importance of the strictest economy. All materials, especially timber, are daily

becoming/

28

becoming more costly and scarce, and the provision of stores required for the Army in all theatres of operations is causing grave anxiety.

The Commander-in-Chief trust that you will make every effort compatible with military efficiency to keep down expenditure of materials and labour on Engineer works.

(Sgd-) A. Lynden Bell.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,

15th October 1916.

G.S. 227/8.

O/27/118.

General Officer Commanding,

No 3 Section.

As a result of the conference held at G.H.Q., October 10th, the following amendments to the Provisional Establishments of a Division with Camel Transport in the case of the Divisional Engineers have been sanctioned :-

1. Headquarters, Divisional R.E. One additional camel to reduce the loads of the other three and to carry a small supply of office stationery.
2. Headquarters, Field Company, Page 16. The six camels at present allowed for wire, sandbags, etc, i.e. Nos. 3 - 8 to be reduced to two, and will carry miscellaneous loads of wire, sandbags, etc., in accordance with local requirements.
3. Field Company, each section. One additional camel to reduce the loads carried by the other 14 camels.
4. It ~~is~~ ^{was} decided that the **loads** throughout should be somewhat reduced and that the nett weight carried by each camel should not exceed 320 lbs. It will there fore be necessary to amend the load tables. Will you please take up this question of redistribution, and submit to this office in due course an amended local table.
5. In addition to the above, the riding horses allowed for the Field Company are amended as follows :-

Headquarters	6)	for distribution see
4 Sections, each	2)	attached copy of W.E.
6. A copy of the Provisional Establishment of a Division with Camel Transport, embodying the alteration entailed by the above decisions, is forwarded herewith.
7. As regards the reduction mentioned in para. 2, the question of providing for these stores will form the subject of a separate communication.

(sgd) A.B. Robertson, Lt. Col.
for Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

A³⁰

S E C R E T.
- - - - -

From: No.2 Section, Advanced H.Q.

To : C.G.S. G.H.Q.

M.50 Cipher.

15/10/16
16/10/16

Desp:2100
Recd:0930
Decd:1040

Though left flank attack unable to scale heights east of WADI SAFATHAMEED owing to difficulties of ground, which was precipitous, the whole of Hill 1121 was taken, also the lower slopes east of WADI ELAAMEID. 12 unwounded and 3 wounded Turkish prisoners were taken. Also 4 Bedouins and some camels. A number of Turks killed. Many enemy in position along main ridge points 1581, 1841, 1781, and also in gorge immediately west of 1841, where he collected his machine guns. Troops did excellently, but I felt I would be exceeding my instructions if I forced the main gorge. I think it could have been taken, but there would probably have been heavy casualties, and retirement from the heights would have been difficult with wounded. Sand very heavy and difficult between GEBEL-EL-RAKWA and Hill 1121, and did not deem it wise to contemplate sending transport of camels through it. For these reasons ordered retirement. Our casualties for day 1 killed, and 3 wounded.

B

From: No.2 Section.

To: G.H.Q.

G.T.588

16/10/16

Desp:0640
Recd:0650

Following from Advanced H.Q. No.2 Section dated 15th begins :- "Operations finished. Returning Z tomorrow. The whole of Hill 1121 was taken and lower slopes east of WADI EL HAMIED. We then withdrew. Got ~~one~~¹² unwounded and 3 wounded Turkish prisoners, 4 Bedouins, and some camels. Enemy's casualties numerous. Our casualties 1 killed and 3 wounded.

Correction received.

37
18th October, 1916. A

General Officer Commanding,
No. 2 Section.

1. With regard to the slight misunderstanding regarding the direct communication between you and the General Officer Commanding Anzac Mounted Division in connection with the preliminary arrangements for forming camelry from the double dismounted squadrons under your command, it is regretted that this was due to the fact that although the matter was arranged verbally at General Headquarters no record of the transaction appears to have been kept in this office.
2. The re-organisation of the three double dismounted squadrons should be proceeded with forthwith, and the following units formed :-
 - (a) One regiment (4th Australian Camel Regiment).
 - (b) One Squadron (3rd Australian Camel Regiment).
 - (c) The balance of the personnel will be formed into a unit on the same lines as Light Horse Training Regiment (Australian Camel Training Unit).
3. As regards the above para. 2, (a) and (b) will proceed to ABBASSIA on or about November 1st, provided sufficient camels are available by that date. If not, (b) will remain in the section under your command, attached to (c) until further notice.
4. In connection with the above, will you please communicate direct with the General Officer Commanding Anzac Mounted Division in making your arrangements, and report progress to this office.

(Sgd) A. B. ROBERTSON,
Lt-Colonel G.S.
for Major-General,
C.G.S. E.E.F.

33
B

18th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Anzac Mounted Division.

With reference to your 131/18 dated 15th October.

1. It is regretted that a misunderstanding should have arisen regarding the preliminary arrangements for the formation of camel regiments. This was probably due to the fact that no record was made in this office of the verbal arrangement for direct communication between you and the General Officer Commanding No.2 Section. This matter will, as requested, be explained to the General Officer Commanding No.2 Section.
2. As the provision of a sufficient number of camels for the purpose is now in sight, it has been decided that the formation of the Australian Camel Regiments should be proceeded with forthwith.
3. Would you please, in conjunction with General Officer Commanding No.2 Section, proceed with the formation of (a) 4th Australian Camel Regiment, (b) the third squadron necessary for the completion of the 3rd Australian Camel Regiment.
4. It is hoped that, on or about November 1st, sufficient camels will be available for (a) and (b) of the above para. 3. to commence their training at ABBASSIA. In the event of there only being sufficient camels for (a), (b) will remain with No.2 Section in accordance with the suggestion set forth in your letter para. 5.a.(i).
5. As regards para 5a (iii) of your letter, this suggestion is approved.
6. Instructions in the above sense are being communicated to no,2 section.

(Sgd) A.B.Robertson. Lt-Colonel. G.S.

For, Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

FORCE ORDER No. 22.

by

GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.
 Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

18th October, 1916.

1. General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force will be established at the Savoy Hotel, CAIRO, from 12 noon, Monday, October 23rd.
2. From the same hour and date the Eastern Force will be constituted, with Headquarters at ISMAILIA.
3. The area of command of the Eastern Force will comprise the Canal Zone, the province of SINAI and the SHARQIA province (hitherto the SHARQIA Sub-section, L. of G. Defences), including the ports of PORT SAID and SUEZ except in respect of shipping (embarkations and disembarkations) which will be under the control of D.C.M.G. General Headquarters. All troops within this area will be under the direct command of General Officer Commanding, Eastern Force, but Main Supply Depots, Ordnance Depots, Advanced Parks R.E., Remount Depots, Veterinary Hospitals, Camel Transport Depots, Inland Water Transport, Motor Boat Company, and Advanced Mechanical Transport Depots in the area will be departmentally controlled by the Head of the Administrative Service or Department concerned.
4. Lieutenant-General Sir C.M. Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., is appointed to command the Eastern Force from October 23rd inclusive.
5. On the establishment of General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, in CAIRO, (a) the appointment of Inspector General of Communications will cease to exist, (b) the following forces will come directly under the command of General Headquarters :-
 - (i) Eastern Force (as constituted in para.3 above).
 - (ii) Western Force (as at present constituted).
 - (iii) Delta District and L. of G. Defences (as at present constituted less Sharqia Sub-section transferred to Eastern Force).
 - (iv) Alexandria District (as at present constituted).
6. On the constitution of Eastern Force, the appointment of Chief Engineer, No.1 Section, and Chief Engineer, No.2 Section, will cease to exist, and the C.R.E's, 54th and 53rd Divisions will advise the General Officers Commanding, Nos. 1 and 2 Sections respectively on all technical matters connected with Engineer works.

7. Major-General W.A. Watson, C.B., C.I.E., is appointed to command the Western Force from 4th October, 1916, inclusive.

8. Brigadier-General H.G. Casson, C.M.G., is appointed to command the Delta District and L. of C. Defences from 4th October, 1916.

9. The 1st Dismounted Brigade ceases to exist with effect from 17th October, 1916, units being disposed of as follows :-

1/1st, 1/2nd and 1/3rd Scottish Horse to form 15th (Scottish Horse) Battalion, Black Watch Royal Highlanders, allotted to Salonica Army.

Ayr Yeomanry and Lanark Yeomanry become part of the 2nd Dismounted Brigade to replace 1/1st and 1/2nd Lovat's Scouts withdrawn to form 10th (Lovat's Scouts) Battalion, Cameron Highlanders, allotted to Salonica Army.

Alfred Bell

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Copies issued to :-

Copy No.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. C.-in-C. | 18. D.A.I.S. |
| 2. C.G.S. | 19. Principal Chaplain. |
| 3. "O". | 20. D.A.G., 3rd Echelon. |
| 4. "I". | 21. G.O.C., No.1 Section, Canal Defences. |
| 5. A.M.S. | 22. " No.2 " " " |
| 6. "A". | 23. " No.3 " " " |
| 7. "Q". | 24. " Eastern Force. |
| 8. D.S.T. | 25. " Western Force. |
| 9. D.O.S. | 26. " Middle East Bde., R.F.C. |
| 10. D.M.S. | 27. I.G.C. |
| 11. M.G.R.A. | 28. G.C.C., Delta District & L. of C. Defences. |
| 12. E.-in-C. | 29. Administrative Commandant, ISMAILIA. |
| 13. D. of W. | 30. " " ALEXANDRIA. |
| 14. Commd. Paymr. | 31. C.C., Imperial Camel Corps |
| 15. D.A.S. | 32. Commandant, Imperial School of Instruction. |
| 16. D.R. | 33. " A. & N.Z. Training Centre. |
| 17. D.V.S. | 34. Vice-Admiral, East Indies and Egypt. |
| | 35. War Diary. |
| | 36. O.C., Bikanir Camel Corps. |

S E C R E T.

36
A

From: General Smuts, DARESSALAM.

To: EGYPFORCE.

G.O.F.1307(decode)

20/10/16

Desp:1240
Recd:1355

Distribution of Flying Corps:-

R.N.A.S.	Headquarters,	KILOSSA.
	Aircraft Park,	DARESALAM.
Military Wing,	"A"Flight)	Morogoro.
	$\frac{1}{2}$ "B"Flight)	
	$\frac{1}{2}$ "B"Flight	TULO.
	Flight "C" and details Aircraft Park,	DARESALAM.
	Advanced Aircraft Park	KOROGWE. to be moved MOROGORO.
	Aircraft Park,	MBUYUNI.

Above should be dated 14th October.

SECRET

G.S. 7/28/16 ³⁷

20th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Frontier Force.

B

The military situation on the Eastern front is developing so rapidly that very shortly it will be necessary to transfer the troops, enumerated in Appendix "B" from the Western Frontier Force to the Eastern theatre.

It is with great reluctance that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself compelled to reduce the number of troops under your command. He, however, is confident you will support his decision, and still be able to fulfil your role under the new conditions by a judicious re-adjustment of the forces remaining at your disposal.

In order to assist you in this matter, Appendices "A" and "B" are attached. These present the situation as viewed from General Headquarters, and show where it is thought possible to reduce garrisons without detriment to the efficiency of the troops.

The Commander-in-Chief desires you to give early consideration to the problem, and to submit your proposals to General Headquarters, specifying a date when the release of the troops could commence, together with any comments you may care to put forward.

(Sgd.) A. Lynden-Bell.

Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REDUCTION IN TROOPS ALLOTTED TO WESTERN FORCE.
=====

1. Details of the proposed reduction in Western Force

are best shown in the accompanying tables marked "A".

2. The scheme envisages an immediate reduction of:-

1. Dismounted Yeomanry Brigade (2nd or 4th).
1. Mounted Brigade (6th or 22nd)
2. R.H.A. Batteries (Berks and Notts).
1. R.F.A. Battery ('B' Battery, 267th Brigade).
1. Field Company R.E. (1/1st Cheshire).

and an ultimate further reduction, on the Bikanir Camel Corps becoming available, of an additional Mounted Brigade, and of 2 Companies Imperial Camel Corps.

3. It is proposed that these reductions should be effected as follows:-

- (a) Coastal Section to embrace MOGHARA and WADI NATRUN, with nett reduction in garrison at present allotted to that section of 1 Battery, R.H.A.; Wadi NATRUN garrison will be withdrawn except 1 squadron Westminster Dragoons and light A.C. Patrol to protect Salt and Soda Coy's Works.
- (b) FAYUM garrison to be reduced by 1 dismounted yeomanry Regiment, 2 Mounted Regiments and 1 Battery R.H.A., 1 company (less 1 section) Imperial Camel Corps (from BAHARIA) being added.
- (c) BAHARIA section to be reduced by 1 Mounted Regiment and half Field Company, R.E.
- (d) KHARGA Section to be reduced by 3 dismounted Yeomanry Regiments and half Field Company R.E.

4. The principal factor in determining the force to be left at the disposal of General Officer Commanding Western Force must be the wide extent of frontier to be policed (approximately 1,000 miles), and in view of this it is considered that any further reduction than that suggested would throw upon the troops allotted to this front a greater strain than could be borne, without serious detriment to the efficiency of the troops so employed.

AREA.	PRESENT DISTRIBUTION.	REDUCTION.	ADDITION.	AVAILABLE FOR EASTERN FRONT. 39
FAYUM.	22nd Mounted Bde. 1 Dismtd. Yeomanry Regt. 17th Motor M.G. Battery. 1 Section, Camel Coy. Berks Battery R.H.A.	22nd Mounted Bde. 1 Dismtd. Yeomanry Regt. Berks Battery R.H.A.	1 Regt. 6th Mounted Bde. 1 Coy. I.C.C. (less sect.) from BAHARIA.	22nd Mounted Bde. 4 Dismounted Yeomanry Regts. 1 Field Coy. R.E. Berks Batty. R.H.A. 'B' Batty. 267th Bde.
BAHARIA. (incl: MINIA)	4th Dismtd. Bde. (less 3 Regts.) 6th Mounted Bde. (less 1 Regt.) 2 Coys. I.C.C. (less 1 Sect.) Light Arm'd Car Patrols. 11th & 12th Arm'd Motor Batty's. 1 Field Company R.E. 'B' Batty. 267th Bde. R.F.A.	1 Regt. 6th Mtd: Bde. $\frac{1}{2}$ Field Coy. R.E. 'B' Batty. 267th Bde. 1 Coy. I.C.C. (less section) for FAYUM.	N I L.	
Southern Section. (incl: KHARGA)	2nd Dismounted Bde. 1 Regt. 6th Mounted Bde. 1 Field Coy. R.E. 2 Coys. I.C.C. 1st Cheshire Garrison Bn. Light Car Patrol. 1 Flight R.F.C. 3 15-pdr. guns. 1 Armoured Train.	2nd Dismounted Bde. 1 Field Coy. R.E.	3 Regts. 4th Dismtd: Bde. $\frac{1}{2}$ Field Coy. (from BAHARIA)	
SOLLUM.	Headquarters, Coastal Section. 3 Dismounted Regiments. 1 Camel Company. Sect: Notts Battery. 2 15-pdr. guns. 1 4-inch gun. $\frac{1}{2}$ Kent Field Coy. R.E. Det: Armoured Cars.	1 Section, Notts R.H.A.	N I L	
MATRUH.	2 Dismounted Regiments. Sect: Notts Batty. 2 9-pdr. guns. 1 4-inch gun. Detachment R.E. Light Armoured Car Brigade.	1 Dismounted Regt. Sect: Notts Batty.	N I L	Notts Batty. R.H.A. 2 Dismtd: Yeo. Regts.
EL DABAA.	1 Dismounted Regt. 1 Light Car Patrol. 1 Squadron Yeomanry.	1 Squad: Yeomanry. (to WADI NATRUN)	$\frac{1}{2}$ Camel Coy. (from WADI NATRUN)	
MOGHARA.	1 Dismounted Regt. $\frac{1}{2}$ Camel Company. 2 15-pdrs. 1 Light Car Patrol.	N I L	N I L	
WADI NATRUN.	1 Dismounted Regt. $\frac{1}{2}$ Camel Company. 1 Light Car Patrol.	1 Dismounted Regt. $\frac{1}{2}$ Camel Coy. (to EL DABAA)	Squadron Yeo: (from DABAA)	
<p>Total. 1 Dismtd: Bde. (2nd or 4th). 1 Mtd: Bde. (6th or 22nd). 2 R.H.A. Batty's. (Notts & Berks) 1 R.F.A. Batty. ('B', 267th Bde.) 1 Fd: Co. R.E. (1/1st Cheshire).</p>				

SECRET.

40

A

From:- Eypforce.

To :- Troopers.

A.M.1169 cipher

21/10/16

Desp. 1950.

Your 21158 and 23226 cipher A.O.1. Weekly return R.F.C.

(a) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 32.
20th Reserve Wing 15.
X Aircraft Depot nil.
SALONIKA 39. (inclu: 5 balloon pilots)
EAST AFRICA 22.
MESOPOTAMIA 19.

(b) EGYPT 5th Wing 4.
20th Reserve Wing 5.
X Aircraft Depot nil.
SALONIKA 9.
EAST AFRICA 5.
MESOPOTAMIA 1.

(c) EGYPT. Serviceable Unserviceable Not.
Erected.

5th Wing.
B.E.2.C. 18. 10. 8.
Bristol Scouts 4. 3. nil.
Martinsyde 2. 3. nil.
De Havilland nil. 4. nil.

20th Reserve Wing.
B.E.2.C. 6. 2. 1.
M. Farman 4. 5. 1.
Bristol Scouts nil. 1. nil.
Avro 7. 4. 2.
Curtiss 3. nil. 1.
Caudron 1. 3. 1.
Martinsyde nil. nil. 1.

X Aircraft Depot.
B.E.2.C. nil. 1. 6.
Martinsyde nil. nil. 1.

SALONIKA.
B.E.2.C. 14. 2. 1.
Bristol Scouts 3. nil. nil.
De Havilland 1. nil. nil.
A. Whitworth 10. 8. 2.

EAST AFRICA.
B.E.2.C. 5. 1. nil.
H. Farman 4. nil. 3.

MESOPOTAMIA.
B.E.2.C. 13. 10. nil.
Voisins 1. 1. nil.
H. Farmans 3. 2. nil.
Martinsyde Scout nil. 6. nil.

From: General Smuts, DAR, ES, SALAAM.

To: EGYPFORCE.

G.O.F. 1310 Decode.

22/10/16

41
A
Desp: 1220
Recd: 1611

Distribution of Royal Flying Corps -

H.Q. of Royal Naval Air Service.

KILOSSA.

Aircraft Park.

DAR-ES-SALAAM.

Advanced Base under preparation.

IRINGA.

Military Wing Headquarters,)
"A" Flight, $\frac{1}{2}$ "B" Flight,)
and advanced Aircraft Park.)

MOROGORO.

$\frac{1}{2}$ "B" Flight.

JULO.

"C" Flight and Details Aircraft Park.

DAR-ES-SALAAM.

22nd October 1916. 42

General Officer Commanding,
 No. 3. Section.

B

With reference to your O/27/112, dated Oct.13th.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, having carefully considered your proposals for the re-organisation of the artillery, observes that, generally speaking, the proposed scheme, if put into effect, would involve the formation of new mixed units which would lose touch with their parent brigades. Moreover, while possibly facilitating the rendering of local returns, would cause very considerable difficulties in the Administrative work of the 3rd Echelon, the Pay and Ordnance Departments, and the Royal Artillery Records at Woolwich.
2. In view of the above considerations, the Commander-in-Chief has decided that the scheme, as set forth in your letter above-quoted, should not be carried into effect; and wishes the following system to be adopted in both divisions.
 3. (a) The mobile Artillery of each Division will consist of two groups.
 - (b) Each group should consist of two 18-pdr batteries, one 4.5 inch Howitzer battery with Brigade Headquarters.
 - (c) The two 18-pdr batteries should both come from the same brigade, thus leaving the third brigade intact.
4. This will leave the following to be dealt with:-
 - (a) The two single batteries left out of the brigades forming the two groups.
 - (b) The balance, a small one, of men and horses of the group headquarters and mobile batteries.
 - (c) The balance of the Brigade Ammunition Columns supernumerary to the mobile Divisional Ammunition Column.
 - (d) All spare vehicles.
5. The two batteries mentioned in para. 4(a) above, will then become the Depot batteries for their groups, and all spares of these groups (including the howitzer brigade) to be attached to them, the whole being commanded by the Lieut-Colonel and Headquarters of the Howitzer brigade.
6. In deciding on the location of this unit, the advisability of keeping the two batteries stationed more or less together in the same area should be borne in mind.
7. As regards the matter of returns, mobile groups will render such returns as are required with reference to their provisional establishment, shewing their batteries separately, and the Lieut-Colonel of the depot batteries will convert these into the form required with reference to their permanent war establishment.
8. The Commander-in-Chief, while realising that the above organisation will involve changes in units now selected as mobile batteries, considers that the advantages are sufficient to order their gradual replacement by other units in conformity with this scheme.

(Sgd) A. Lynden Bell.
 Major-General,
 Chief of the General Staff,
 Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.S.Z/33/1.

43
A



Egyptian

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
War Office, London, S.W.

23rd
~~21st~~ October 1916.

Sir,

With reference to your secret letter No. 01/45/151
of the 4th instant. I have the honour to forward herewith
an appreciation of the present situation in this theatre.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Edw. J. Murray

General
Commander-in-Chief
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
War Office, LONDON, S.W.

1. Having carefully considered the instructions contained in your letter No. 01/45/151 of October 4th as regards future military policy in EGYPT, I think it is advisable to explain, in some detail, my proposals for the coming cool season, having full regard to the actual military situation which obtains, and especially to such information regarding the enemy as is at present available.
2. As regards operations on the Eastern front, your memorandum above quoted clearly lays down that policy in regard to this country must remain in the immediate future, strategically at least, defensive, although, subject to this limitation, it is agreed that the occupation of EL ARISH should, if possible, be effected, on account of the influence which this operation may be expected to exert upon malcontents in SYRIA as well as upon the operations of the Sherif of MEGGA.
3. The policy so outlined, an active defensive embracing the occupation of EL ARISH, is practically identical with the views put forward in my appreciation (G.S. Z/33) of February, 1915, in which I expressed myself of opinion that the true basis of an active defence of EGYPT should rest upon the occupation of EL ARISH, and making of that place a pivot for further offensive operations in Eastern SINAI and PALESTINE. This opinion I have in no way modified.

4. In my original appreciation, however, I estimated that, in order adequately to defend EGYPT from the east, and at the same time to occupy EL ARISH, it would be necessary to have available in EGYPT five divisions, approximately at war strength, as well as four mounted brigades. At the present time there are available on the Eastern front only four divisions (6,000 under full strength), but the proportion of mounted troops is higher, six mounted brigades being at present in the Canal Zone. The question arises, therefore, whether the operation contemplated in my memorandum of 15th February, 1942, can, in existing circumstances, be carried out, and if so, what modification, if any, in the original scheme will be necessary.

5. With the force actually at my disposal at present, it is clear that such a policy cannot be carried out so effectively as would be possible if an additional division could be made available. If the problem were one solely of the security of EGYPT, I am of opinion that our present position at EL ABD constitutes the limit of our necessary advance on the northern SINAI route. We are now so placed that the whole of the important water-bearing area of the QATIA basin is in our effective possession. On any part of our front the enemy must now attack us carrying his water on camels, and the advantages of this position, indicated in para. III (6) of my appreciation of 15th February, are already on our side.

6. Against this, however, I feel strongly that our role in this theatre demands something more than purely the defence of EGYPT, and that it is incumbent on us to do all in our power to assist in the general plan of operations, at least by preventing any withdrawal of enemy troops from SYRIA and SINAI to other theatres, and by threatening communications with the

/HEDJAZ

HEDJAZ, even if we are unable to induce him to reinforce this theatre at the expense of other fronts. In view of these urgent considerations, therefore, I am of opinion that although I have at present only four divisions, instead of five, our movement on EL ARISH should be continued unless, or until, the military situation materially alters, or unless the force at my disposal is materially reduced.

The re-occupation of this Egyptian town and the opportunity of thus inflicting a defeat upon a minor Turkish force, does not appear to be outside the limits of the strategic defensive indicated in your memorandum, and I consider that the material and moral advantages, that should accrue, fully justify such an operation.

7. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that circumstances may arise in which it may be necessary to re-consider this intention. For instance, (a) should the Turks be able to concentrate in SINAI large reinforcements from the CAUCASUS or from any other theatre, or (b) were our present force still further reduced (a possibility indicated in para. 5 of your memorandum), it is probable, in either of these eventualities, that we should be compelled to draw back on the northern SINAI road to one or other of our prepared positions in rear, say, at SALMANA or EL ABD. (see para. 11).

8. As regards the possibility of enemy reinforcements in this theatre, no considerable accession of strength appears likely at present.

Since last February the military situation has materially altered. The Turks have been subjected to strong and continuous pressure in all quarters, and have been obliged to despatch part of their army for operations in MACEDONIA and GALICIA. They have also been obliged to set apart

/considerable

considerable forces, which may have to be increased, for an attempt to suppress the insurrection of the Sherif of MECCA. They have already attempted, on a small scale, to carry out their threat of an invasion of EGYPT across SINAI, and in that attempt they have been very heavily defeated. They are, therefore, until the winter puts an end to operations in the CAUCASUS, almost bound to find great difficulty in providing any considerable force for a renewed attempt against EGYPT, and their experience of the difficulties of operations in SINAI should act as an effective deterrent.

9. Nevertheless, it is with the extreme limit of the numbers that the enemy could concentrate against us that we are mainly concerned, and, in formulating our plan, it is this maximum figure that we must attempt to fix.

Opposed to us at present in SINAI and PALESTINE are the 3rd Turkish and 27th Arab Divisions, estimated respectively at about 6,000 and 10,000 effective rifles. In addition to these there are in SYRIA the 41st, 43rd and 44th Divisions, but of these it may be assumed that the 43rd must remain, as at present, in garrisons in the LEBANON, while at least one other must be retained in the ALEXANDRETTA district. Thus it appears that one division is the most that might be made available for employment in southern SYRIA, which would bring the forces in that area up to an outside total of 25,000 men.

Beyond this, any further increase can only be effected by the withdrawal of troops from other theatres. In the HEDJAZ, the Turkish forces south of MECCA are cut off, and those in the neighbourhood of MEDINA are fully engaged; in PERSIA and in MESOPOTAMIA any considerable reduction appears most improbable in existing circumstances; and of the troops recently committed to action in Europe it is unlikely that any can be made available without immediate replacement. In

/the

the CAUCASUS, however, with the advent of snow (about the first week in December) operations will necessarily be to some extent relaxed, and it is at least conceivable, therefore, that on that front some reduction in Turkish troops might be effected. It is, in fact, reported from Russian sources that rumours are even now current to the effect that the 3rd Corps (1st, 14th and 53rd Divisions) is about to be withdrawn for the winter to KHARPUT. Should this prove to be the case, and should the withdrawal of this corps to KHARPUT be a prelude to its despatch to SYRIA, careful examination shows that, with the means of transport available, the move to southern SYRIA might be carried out, and concentration in that area completed, in 38 days from the time that the first units leave KHARPUT.

At present the 3rd Corps is reported to be reduced to about 12,000 rifles, but provided that drafts can be found to bring units up to their full strength, we might have to reckon with the addition of a corps of 30,000 men.

Thus we might conceivably be called upon early in 1917 to meet a force of approximately 55,000 men, though this is no doubt an outside estimate; and, moreover, it is not easy to see how any considerable concentration on this front can take place without our becoming early aware of the fact.

10. Meanwhile, our advance is proceeding. Our leading division is already within forty miles of EL ARISH, and, as soon as our ability to water the troops renders it possible, a further advance to the neighbourhood of MAZAR will be made. When that place is in our occupation, it is probable that the enemy will be obliged to show his hand. There appear to be three courses open to him -

- (a) To strengthen his forces at EL ARISH, with a view to barring our further progress either by offensive or defensive action.

/(b)

- (b) To initiate an advance in considerable strength, on the Central SINAI route, towards ISMAILIA, in the hope of obliging us to conform.
- (c) To evacuate SINAI altogether.

At the present juncture it is only possible to guess which of the above alternatives he is most likely to adopt; but, assuming that, by the time HAZAR is in our hands, the enemy can place at EL ARISH no more than the 15,000/20,000 troops at present located in SINAI and Southern SYRIA, I anticipate that we should be able to continue our advance, and to drive him out of EL ARISH with the force at present available for this operation, supported by heavy artillery and with the co-operation of the Navy.

11. In order to be prepared, however, for any eventuality should the enemy's forces in Northern SINAI be strengthened to any considerable extent, the preparation of a series of defensive positions is being carried out step by step with the advance.

The ROMANI - MAHEMDIYA - DUEIDAR position is already available. Between EL APEIN and BIR EL ABD a second position has been selected, and work upon it is about to commence. Further, a third position is being reconnoitred about five miles east of SALMANA, roughly on the line BARDAWIL LAGOON - BIR EL GARADIL, and this position will be fully and strongly prepared for defence as soon as possible.

The work of constructing these positions has been hitherto, and will continue to be, carried out exclusively by the Egyptian Labour Corps.

12. As regards para. 4 of your memorandum of October 4th, the situation on the Western frontier at the present time appears favourable.

/The

The result of our effective blockade, (as apart from that of the Italians) and the activity of our Armoured Car Patrols, have so far reduced the Senoussi as to oblige the remnant of his forces, from sheer want, to withdraw to SIWA.

I do not intend to try and follow the Senoussi to SIWA, for, as I informed you in my cable No. A.M. 1155 of 17th October, I consider that the attempt to occupy SIWA, until the coast railway is extended to that place, would be a difficult, expensive, and dangerous undertaking. Nevertheless, in view of the enemy's evident exhaustion through lack of supplies and material of every kind, and of his rapidly increasing loss of moral, I feel fully justified in making a considerable reduction on this front forthwith, in order to strengthen to the utmost extent the force available for my main operation in the Eastern Desert.

13. It is, of course, true that the situation on the Western front may, in the future, be less favourable than at present, owing to the wholly ineffective nature of the Italian blockade, in which case the Western Force will have to be reinforced, as circumstances may demand, from the troops then available. I do not, however, anticipate that such a situation is likely to arise.

14. In the meantime, I propose immediately to reorganise the Western Front on the basis of the absolute minimum requirements for the effective policing of my 1,000-mile line. To do this, I propose to restrict the area of actual occupation to the coastal belt (SOLLUM, MERSA MATRUH and DABAA), and to the oases of MUGHARA, BAHARIA and KHARGA, with considerably reduced detachments at WADI NATRUH and in the FAYUM, thus effectively closing all the main desert approaches to the DESERT and the NILE Valley from the west.

15. By this means I shall be able immediately to reduce the forces allotted to the Western front by -

- 1 Dismounted Yeomanry Brigade.
- 1 Mounted Brigade.
- 2 Batteries, R.H.A.
- 1 Battery, R.F.A.
- 1 Field Company, R.E.

and, as more camelry becomes available, I hope by December to be in a position to make a further reduction of a second Mounted Brigade.

The troops so relieved I intend to bring over to the Eastern front, where the majority will be employed in holding the Lines of Communication of the force advancing to EL ARISH.

16. To sum up, my present intention is to continue my advance on EL ARISH with all the troops I can collect after arranging to hold Nos. 1 and 2 Sections of the Canal Defences, and the Western front as lightly as possible. My object in doing this is that, although the actual defence of EGYPT, pure and simple, is assured if my troops remain in their present positions, I consider that in order to assist the general plan of operations of the Allies and the Sherif, I ought to secure EL ARISH as a base for offensive action against the Turks in Southern SYRIA and ~~the~~ SINAI, and thus prevent Turkish troops being withdrawn to other theatres. This plan I am prepared to carry out with the troops at present at my disposal, but I may have to reconsider it, either if the Turks are being heavily reinforced, which I do not anticipate, or if my force is materially reduced for any length of time.

Ray. H. J. Murray

G.H.Q., E.E.F.,
21st October, 1918.

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

From :- Troopers.

To :- Eypforce, repeated Salonica.

24165 cipher.M.R.2.

23/10/16.
24/10/16.

Recd. 2240.
Decd. 0750.

52
A
JL

On account of the great difficulty now experienced in co-ordinating and fulfilling demands for various theatres of War for material and personnel for railway, water and other transport services, it has been found necessary to investigate specially future requirements in various theatres. This has been done in FRANCE and it is proposed to send experienced officer with short (?) staff of experts to consult with you and your officers on the subject and it is desired that in consultation with him you should formulate for the information of Army Council full statements of demands to be supplied on your transport services as far in advance as this can be foreseen, and an estimate of quantity of material and personnel etc., required to meet the demands. The officer will be leaving at once. The actual date will be telegraphed later.

Copies to :- Q.
C.G.S.
C-in-C.
O.
O(a).
O(b).
A.
E-in-C.

Filed Q. Cables.

SECRET.

G.S. Z/58

53

A

To the Naval Commander-in-Chief,
EAST INDIES AND EGYPT.

26th October, 1916.

Sir,

I beg to thank you for your letters of 18th
October and No. 1182 of 19th October.

It is quite evident from your remarks that the
question of building piers or harbour works at EL ARISH
cannot be finally settled until that town is occupied, and
at the best some months must then elapse before anything
could be constructed which would enable supply ships
to unload with any speed.

In the meanwhile it appears to me that your
suggestion of the use of seagoing native craft offers
great possibilities. They could commence work soon after
EL ARISH was occupied, and if sufficient numbers could be
obtained, the amount of stores they could land during fine
weather would materially ease the congestion of the
railway. I should therefore be very glad if you would
be good enough to obtain information as to the numbers
of these craft that could be collected and made available
at short notice, and to make the necessary arrangements
for collecting them when required.

I should also be grateful for any suggestions
you may have as to the provision of gang planks or trestles
which would facilitate the unloading of the craft on the
beach.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A.B. Robertson,
Lt.-Col., G.S.

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
(Absent on duty)

PRIORITY.

S E C R E T.
- - - - -

50
B

From: EGYPFORCE.

To: TROOPERS.

A.M. 1178 Cipher.

26/10/16

Desp: 1130

(1) Reference move of 8th Mounted Brigade to SALONIKA. Is this to be sent equipped on SALONIKA "4" establishment?. If so, please wire urgent any amendments to provisional copy of this establishment, dated July 1916.

(2) Presume Signal Troop, Field Troop, Field Ambulance and Mobile Veterinary Section will accompany, though SALONIKA "4" establishment shows neither Field Troop nor Mobile Veterinary Section.

(3) Please say if Mounted Brigade Supply Column and S.A.A. Column are to be formed, as I anticipate some difficulty in finding requisite personnel, mules and horses.

(4) Is Sanitary Squad to accompany?.

G.S.327/12.

26th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force.

1. With reference to No.0/27/123 of 21st October from General Officer Commanding No.3 Section, suggesting certain amendments to the mobile establishment of Divisional Headquarters, the amendments therein proposed are sanctioned, and will appear in a reprint of the pamphlet.

2. With regard, however, to paragraph 2 (a)(ii) of the above letter and the attached table, it is not proposed to show the officer under instruction as included in the Headquarters, but a footnote will appear to the following effect:-

"When an officer is attached to Divisional Headquarters for instructional purposes, an addition of 1 groom, 1 batman and 2 horses will be allowed for his use" The totals shown in the table to the letter from No.3 Section will be amended accordingly, one officer, 1 batman, 1 groom, and 2 horses being deducted.

3. With regard to paragraph 2 (a)(v) it is presumed that the Intelligence Officer is intended to be a regimental officer specially detailed for that purpose, similar to the Intelligence Officer whose attachment to Headquarters of a Brigade was recently sanctioned, and not an increase in the establishment of Divisional Headquarters.

(Sgd) A.B.Robertson. Lieut-Colonel.
G.S.

for, Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.

G.S. Z/58/1

Vice-Admiral,
Naval Commander-in-Chief,
EAST INDIES AND EGYPT.

26th October, 1916.

Sir;

In continuation of my G.S. Z/58 of this date, later information indicates the possibility of an immediate evacuation of EL ARISH by the enemy. In this event it will be necessary to place a force of all arms in occupation of EL ARISH as rapidly as possible without awaiting the completion of the railway, upon which the maintenance of EL ARISH will ultimately have mainly to depend. In the meantime, such a force would be entirely dependent upon maintenance and supply by sea, and arrangements may therefore be required at a very early date for sea transport of supplies to EL ARISH on the scale of approximately 1000 tons per week, i.e. for a force of two infantry brigades and two mounted brigades with 1st line transport.

In addition to the above, transport would be required for approximately 120 tons of ammunition in order to form an ammunition reserve.

In view of this development, I would request that the question of the provision of an adequate number of suitable native craft may be treated as one of great urgency.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) A.B. Robertson,
Lt.-Col. G.S.

for General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

(Absent on duty).

SECRET.

56
G.S.Z/28.

27th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Western Force.

With reference to your S.R. 31/2 of the 21st October, your proposals for the redistribution of the force under your command are noted and are generally approved, subject to the following minor modifications :-

(a) The 22nd Mounted Brigade and Berks Battery R.H.A. will be left temporary in the FAYUM, as suggested; but this brigade must be regarded as earmarked for the Eastern side, and, should the situation on that front develop more rapidly than is at present anticipated, it may at any time be necessary to order its withdrawal at comparatively short notice. It is hoped, however, that it may be possible to leave this Brigade at your disposal until a proportion at least of the Bikanir Camel Corps can be made available to replace it in the FAYUM.

(b) It is intended to retain the whole of the Hong Kong & Singapore Mountain Battery, concentrated at ABBASSIA, as General Headquarters troops. Although it is not proposed, therefore, to allot a section of this unit specifically to your command, one or more sections would, if available, be placed temporarily at your disposal for any particular operation for which they might be required

/(c)

57

(c) The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that a small garrison should be retained at the WADI NATRUN for the protection of the Salt & Soda Company's Works in that oasis. For this purpose it is considered that one company of a garrison battalion, in addition to the Light Car Patrol already there, should prove sufficient.

(Sgd.) A.B. Robertson,
Lieut.-Colonel,

G.H.Q.,
27/10/16.

for Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

G.S.327/11.

27th October, 1916.

58
B

General Officer Commanding,
A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.

With reference to this office No.G.S.327 of 30th September to General Officer Commanding No.3 Section a copy of which is enclosed, it is to be observed that this increase in the numbers of a Brigade Signal Troop with a Mounted Division, though sanctioned partly with a view to determining the mobile establishment of a Mounted Division, is, in fact, an increase of the permanent war establishment. In order, therefore, to regularize matters of reinforcement, pay and promotion, you will probably consider it desirable to obtain the sanction of the Australian and New Zealand Governments for this increase, since the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division is alone affected thereby.

(Sgd) A.B.Robertson. Lieut-Colonel
G.S.

for, Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

SECRET.

A⁵⁹

From: EGYPFORCE.

To: TROOPERS.

AM 1185 Cipher.

28/10/16

Desp: 1940

Your 21158 and 23226 cipher A.O.1. Weekly return R.F.C.

(A) EGYPT. 5th Wing 31
20th Reserve Wing. 18
X Aircraft Depot. nil.

SALONIKA. 40 (including 5 Balloon pilots)
EAST AFRICA. 12
MESOPOTAMIA. information not received.

(B) EGYPT. 5th Wing. 5
20th Reserve Wing. 5
X Aircraft Depot. nil.

SALONIKA. 8
EAST AFRICA. 5
MESOPOTAMIA. information not received.

(C) EGYPT. Serviceable. Unserviceable. Erected. Not

	Serviceable.	Unserviceable.	Erected.	Not
<u>5th Wing.</u>				
B.E.2c.	18	10	6	
Bristol Scouts.	3	4	2	
Martinsyde.	3	3	nil.	
De Havilland.	nil.	4	nil.	

<u>20th Reserve Wing.</u>				
Maurice Farman.	4	2	6	
Bristol Scouts.	nil.	nil.	1	
Curtiss.	2	1	1	
Caudron.	nil.	4	1	
Martinsyde.	nil.	nil.	1	
B.E.2c.	6	1	1	
Avro.	8	2	4	

<u>X Aircraft Depot.</u>				
B.E.2c.	nil.	2	4	
Avro.	nil.	nil.	2	
Bristol Scouts.	nil.	nil.	10	

<u>SALONIKA.</u>				
B.E.2c.	12	4	1	
	(1 Spencer Balloon available)			
Bristol Scouts.	2	1	nil.	
De Havilland.	nil.	1	nil.	
B.E.12.	nil.	1	5	
Armstrong Whit.	11	6	1	

<u>EAST AFRICA.</u>				
B.E.2c.	5	1	nil.	
Henri Farman.	4	nil.	3	

MESOPOTAMIA. Information not yet received.

60

G.S.290

General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force.

B

Two copies of the approved War Establishment of Headquarters, No.3 Section, Canal Defences, are forwarded herewith for your information and communication to those concerned.

(Sgd) G.F.Perkins. Major. G.S.

G.H.Q.
28/10/16.

for, Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

61

HEADQUARTERS No. 3 SECTION, CANAL DEFENCES.

WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

(i) Personnel and Horses.

Detail.	Personnel.						Riding Horses	Remarks.
	Officers	Clerks	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Artificers	Rank and File.	Total.		
Commander.	1	-	-	-	-	1	3	
<u>STAFF.</u>								
<u>G.S. Branch -</u>								
Gen. Staff Officer 1st Gde.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
Gen. Staff Officer 2nd "	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
Gen. Staff Officer 3rd "	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
<u>A.Q.M.G.'S Branch.-</u>								
A.A. & Q.M.G.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
D.A.A.G.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
D.A.Q.M.G.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
<u>ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND DEPARTMENTS.</u>								
<u>Medical Service. -</u>								
D.D.M.S.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	
A.D.M.S. (Sanitation)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Medical Officer.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	
<u>Ordnance. -</u>								
A.D.O.S.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	
<u>Postal Service-</u>								
A.D.A.P.S.	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	
Army Postal Service(a)	-	-	1	-	2	3	-	(a) Branch Field P.O.
<u>SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS.</u>								
Assistant Provost Marshal.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	
Camp Commandant.	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	
<u>PERSONAL APPOINTMENTS.</u>								
As.D.C. to Commander.	2	-	-	-	-	2	4	
Military Mounted Police.	-	-	1	-	6	7	7	
Clerks to General Staff-Superintending Clerk.	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	
Clerks.	-	5	-	-	-	5	-	
Clerks to A. & Q Branches.	-	5	-	-	-	5	-	
Clerks to A.D.O.S.	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	(b) 1 Sergt.
Clerks to D.D.M.S.	-	3 (b)	-	-	-	3	-	1 Corpl.
Farrrier.	-	-	-	1 (c)	-	1	1	1 L/Cpl.
Shoeing Smith.	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	(c) A Sergeant.
Acting Q.M. Sergeant.	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	
Electrician R.E.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	
Cook.	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	
Orderly to M.O.	-	-	-	-	2 (d)	2	-	(d) One a Corpl.
Orderlies for water duties.	-	-	-	-	38	38	-	
Batmen.	-	-	-	-	12	12	-	
Drivers A.S.C. (M.T.)	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	
Interpreter.	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	
	17	17	3	2	64	103	37	

62

Detail	Personnel.						Riding Horses.	Remarks
	Officers.	Clerks.	S. Sergts. & Sergts.	Artificers.	Rank and File.	Total.		
ATTACHED TO HEADQUARTERS. ^{Bro' for'd}	17	17	3	2	64	103	37	
Brig-Gen; R. Artillery. (e)	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	(e) Acts as technical
Staff Officer to B.G.R.A.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	adviser in
A.D.C. to B.G.R.A.	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	artillery
Clerks to B.G.R.A.	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	matters.
Chief Engineer (Brig-Gen) (g)	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	(f) Graded as
Staff Officer to C.E. (h)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	D.A.A.G.
Field Engineer (Major)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	(g) Acts as
Asst. Field Engineers,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	technical
(1 Captain and 1 Lieut)	2	-	-	-	-	2	1	adviser in Engr
Clerks.	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	matters.
								(h) One Asst. Fld. Engineer acts as Staff Officer.
Total Headquarters.	24	21	3	2	64	114	47	

(ii) Transport.

Detail.	Vehicles	Drivers	Remarks.
Motor Cars.	7 (j)	7 (k)	(j) Includes 1 for Chief Engineer and 1 for A.D.A.P.S.
Motor Lorry for electric lighting apparatus.	1	2 (k)	(k) Provided by A.S.C.
Motor Vans, for Medical Equipment, baggage, etc. (m).	2	4 (k)	(m) Should be capable of carrying a load of 2 tons.
	10	13	

63
A

From: Troopers, LONDON.

To: G.H.Q. EGYPFORCE.

(? 24401)

14401.S.D.2.

29/10/16

Desp:
Recd:2027
Decd:2140

Notification has been received that New Zealand Government approve formation of machine gun squadron of New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. Reinforcements will be despatched to EGYPT about and after middle of December at rate of 6% per month. No objection to formation of a unit but additional machine guns and horses cannot at present be provided and must therefore be found from those now at your disposal.

64
B

29th October, 1916.

General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force.

1. Will you kindly submit, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, a return of camels employed on permanent or semi-permanent station work in each section of your command.

2- The Commander-in-Chief also wishes you to consider whether any substantial economy in camels could be effected by the substitution of M.T. or other mechanical means for this service, and if so, to what extent.

3- In this connection it has been represented to the Commander-in-Chief that a considerable saving in camels might be effected by the construction of a Decauville railway in No.1 Section to supply BIR MABEIUK. In your reply to para 2 above, will you please include your views on this proposal.

(Sgd) A.B.Robertson. Lieut-Colonel.
G.S.

for, Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

65
A

From: General Basra.

To: EGYPFORCE.

178 Cipher.

29/10/16
30/19/16

Desp: 1810
Recd: 0440
Decd: 0600

No change during past fortnight. Our aeroplanes have had several successful bombing raids and attacks with machine guns. On October 27th hostile Arabs raided Camels at SHEIK SAAD. They were followed up and attacked with Lewis Guns by two of our aeroplanes flying low, and compelled to abandon camels which were recaptured by our cavalry. Subsequently, aeroplanes and cavalry pursued Arabs and inflicted further casualties. NASIRIYAH railway has reached 87 miles. 45 miles AMARAH line completed.

S E C R E T.
- - - - -

66
B

From:- EGYPFORCE.

To:- TROOPERS.

A.M.1189 Cipher.

30/10/16

Desp: 1905

Reference your 21158 and 23226 cipher A.O.1. Following is R.F.C. return for MESOPOTAMIA not included in our A.M.1185 of 28th instant.

(A) 16.

(B) 4.

(C)	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>	<u>Not Erected.</u>
B.E.2.c.	20	1	10
Voisin.	Nil.	1	nil.
Henri Farman.	4	nil.	1
Martinsydes.	nil.	nil.	6

67 C
G.S. 409.

General Officer Commanding,
Eastern Force.
Western Force.

The attached proposal to enable the communication of written messages to aeroplanes when no landing ground is available, together with instructions for the employment of this device, is forwarded for your information and for communication to all concerned.

(Sgd) A. B. ROBERTSON,
Lieut-Colonel, G.S.

G.H.Q.
30/10/16.

for Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Confidential

68

HEADQUARTERS,
MIDDLE EAST BRIGADE,
ROYAL FLYING CORPS.

Instructions for communicating written messages
to Aircraft, when no landing grounds are available,
for the information of the General Staff.

1. This method of co-operation is never to be used except in cases of urgency, and then only by specially authorised officers.
2. Two signal poles, 10 yards apart, are planted in the ground. Guys are not to be used.
If the ground is hard, the poles may be planted in boxes as shown.
In case of necessity or great urgency, each pole may be held up by a man. This method is dangerous owing to the weight at the end of the aerial.
3. A cord to which a message is attached, arranged as in accompanying sketch, is loosely laid on the poles as shown.
4. The alignment of the signal poles must be at right angles to the direction of the wind. This is most important.
5. No trees, or other obstacles, should be in the vicinity, the flatter the place the better. If, however, the country is broken up with sand dunes, the poles should be placed on the top of the highest sand dune in the neighbourhood.
6. When the poles are erected and the message, duly addressed, is attached, then, and only then, is the following ground signal to be placed on the ground between the poles.



This signal consists of three strips of white cloth, each 15 feet by 3 feet, placed in the form of a triangle with one strip 15 feet by 3 feet laid across the triangle and parallel to the alignment of the poles. The apex of the triangle must point into the direction from which the wind is blowing.

7. Once the signal is on the ground, officers and other ranks should stand clear fully 100 yards to a flank and never in the line of flight of the aeroplane, which will be up wind.

EGYPT:
25/10/18.

B. 65. 69

WIRE TO AERIAL.

MESSAGE STRING.

ORDINARY
SIGNAL POLES
INSERTED INTO
PETROL CASES
FILLED
WITH SAND.

MESSAGE.

NAILS WITH HEADS CUT OFF
ABOUT $\frac{1}{2}$ INCH ABOVE HEAD OF POLE.

POLES 12 FEET HIGH
AND ABOUT 30 FEET APART.

