AWM4

Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries, 1914-18 War

Infantry

Item number: 23/55/17

Title: 38th Infantry Battalion

October 1917



AWM4-23/55/17

Original

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Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
or
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(*Erase heading not required.*)

Army Form C. 2118.

38th Battn.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
YPRES BATTLE No 3 (Contd).	4-6/10/17		from concrete pill-boxes about Judah House and Springfield Farm – the latter yielding several M.G.s and about 150 prisoners. In almost every case opposition was overcome by working round to the rear of the pill-box and throwing in a "P" bomb or Mill's Grenade. Rifle Grenades were little used. Generally speaking our men kept so close to the barrage that they were on the enemy before he could recover from it. The Battn. objective was reached about 7.30 A.M. and consolidation began immediately. About 9.30 A.M. an enemy plane flew low over the line but apparently failed to locate it as enemy's artillery fire was at no time very accurate. At 1.30 PM a plat. of "D" Coy was sent forward to re-inforce 39th Battn. and one coy of 150 men was organised to be ready to move forward at a moments' notice to assist in a contemplated further advance. On the night of 5/6th about 9 PM. the enemy put down a heavy box-barrage which however caused comparatively few casualties. The same night we were relieved by 2/8th Manchesters and marched through YPRES to huts in the neighbourhood of VLAMERTINGHE which we reached about 6.30 AM 6th Oct. Our total casualties during these operations were. Killed W. MISSING TOTAL Officers 1 1 – 2 O. Ranks. 33 142 7 – 182. During these operations Battn. H.Q. was established at JUDAH HOUSE. – R.A.P. was at LEVI COTTAGES. Q.M. store and Transport were situated in huts near VLAMERTINGHE. All ranks not taking part in operations were quartered at MORBECQUE.	Spring box-barrage referred to & attached wire has received (at advanced Battn H.Q.) from Assistant (Light Horse) returning to leave to England.
	10/10/17.		38th Battn. marched to bivouac area at HUSSAR FARM.	
YPRES BATTLE	12/10/17.		To 38th Battn. was allotted the 3rd or final objective – a line beyond village of Passchendaele. The battn. commenced approach march at 10.45 PM. on night of 11/12th. Soon after entering "K" track we came under enemy shell fire which continued intermittently until assembly lines were reached. Our casualties during this time were considerable, particularly in the neighbourhood of the junction of "K" track with sunken road (running N. thro' D 16 b). A fair amount of gas shell was used by the enemy in the low lying ground N.E. of Judah House but owing to high wind the effect was not very marked. The battalion formed.	

Original. 6/150

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WAR DIARY
or
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~
(*Erase heading not required.*)

Army Form C. 2118.

38th Battn.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
YPRES BATTLE No 3.	12/10/17	(cont'd)	The battn formed up on its tapes about 3 AM. in the foll^g order. Two plats of A Coy (right) plus 2 plats of B. Coy (left) formed first wave, followed by "D" Coy as moppers up. The remaining plats. of A and B Coys formed 2nd wave foll^d by "C" Coy as moppers up. While waiting for Zero hr. enemy shelling was severe and many casualties resulted. When our barrage came down we advanced in rear of 40th battn but soon came under heavy machine-gun fire particularly from the sector on our left about BELLEVUE. One party under Lt MUNDAY worked its way across the RAVEBEEK and cleared three pill-boxes but was stopped by heavy rifle and M.G fire and during the next night had to rejoin main body, which in the meantime had advanced to RED line, where 38th joined remnants of 37th & 40th. Casualties had been so severe that further advance was impossible especially as the NEW ZEALAND troops on our left had failed to get forward. Consequently the senior officer present MAJOR GIBLIN (40th battn) ordered a retirement to approx. jumping off line and consolidated there at about 3 P.M. In conjunction with remainder of the brigade 38th battn held this line until relieved on night of 13/14th by 41st battn AIF, when 38th moved back to bivouac at HUSSAR FARM. During the operations Battn battle H.Q. were in pill-box in BERLIN WOOD as also was R.A.P. Q.M. store and details were camped in field on right of YPRES-ZONNEBEKE ROAD. Following Officers took part in operations:- Lt Col DAVIS DSO (in command). Capt FRASER (adjutant) Lt BOWDEN (I.O.) Lt McCOLL (carrying parties). Lt MORRISON (Sigs). A. Coy Capt TREBILCOCK, Lt MATTHEWS, Lt HEWARD. B Coy Capt LATCHFORD, Lt BAXTER, Lt McKENZIE. C Coy Lt HERRING, Lt MUNDAY, Lt MARSHALL. D Coy Lt MAXWELL, Lt GOLLAN, Lt ROBINSON. R.M.O - Capt DAVIES. BRIGADE LIAISON - MAJOR HURRY. BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE - Lt STOREY. Casualties during these operations were K. W. M. - TOTAL Officers 5 7 2 - 14 O. Ranks. 6 263 99 - 368	
	13/10/17.		38th Battn moved by motor-bus to SENLECQUES. - C & D. Coys being at LA CALICQUE.	
	31/10/17		Nil.	

A5834 Wt. W4973/M687 750,000 8/16 D. D. & L. Ltd. Forms/C.2118/13.

Officer i/c 38th Battn
a/Cv 38th Battn
31.10.17

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APPENDIX.

38th Battalion A.I.F.

reports on operation 4/5 Oct. 1917.

38 Aust Inf Bn

Oct. 1917. Ypres battle No 3 phase 4.

The assaulting troops from this Bn. marched from Vlamingh & were bivouacked E of YPRES at HUSSAR FARM on afternoon of 2°. The next day resting & completing equipment - Company & plat. Comdrs & NCOs reconnoitred approaches - Assembly tapes were laid by Capts SELLECK & ORCHARD Aden acto equipment had previously been issued but those for attack were received so late that there was no time for formal Battalion Orders. Instructions for the operation were dictated to O.Cs units at the bivouac during the afternoon. These were subsequently copied for filing reference & a copy sent to Brigade Maps had also been issued previously & the country reconnoitred as far as possible

Commands & as follows:-

H.Q. Major G. HURRY C.O.
Recit F.R.B. MARTIN Adjt
" H. ROBBINS Ass't Adjt & Intelligence
" T.A. ROOKE Signals
Capt G.V. DAVIES M.O.

A Coy Capt H. DENCH O.C.
Plat 1. Sgt A. CLARK
2 Lt R. KIRKBRIDE
3 Sgt F. TREBILCOCK
4 " E.W.H. MAJOR

B Coy Capt E.F. MOORE O.C.
Plat 5 Sgt McKINNON
6 Lt D. McKENZIE
7 " E. STOREY
8 Sgt R. J. BUCKLAND
C Coy Capt. H.F. SELLECK
Plat 9 Sgt J.S. SHILLIDAY
10 Lt G A. DUTTON
11 Sgt H.A. BAUM
12 Lt J. J. MUNDAY
D. Coy Capt W.H. ORCHARD
Plat 13 Sgt HUMPHRIES
14 " J.C. DAVIS
15. Lt W.L. ROWE
16 " L.J. BEATTIE

Carrying parties under Lt H. McCOLL were under Brigade arrangements
with the Bn was 1 subsec 10 A.L.T.M.
D & C Companies were assaulting Companies
B Coy Mopping up A Co. Reserve.

—

H.Q. moved forward was established at MITCHELL FARM about 10 p.m. Communication with Brigade & front line by runner only. Approach march commenced at 10.15 was carried out successfully. All Companies were reported in position at 2.30 am. At 7.30 am H.Q. moved forward & was established at JUDAH HOUSE about 8.30 am.

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Bde Tomore Sig Station was also established at this place. Communication with Corps was by lamp & telephone was continuously maintained throughout the operation. R.A.P. at LEVI COTTAGE

Reorganisation of Coys + digging in went on during the day on apparently objective by evening the whole line was in good order was safe & comfortable as the extremely bad weather would allow

At 1/30 pm. as plat. from ~~reserve Co (D)~~ D Coy was sent forward to reinforce 39 Bn about 4 pm. a special party (strength 150) was organised under Capt DENCH for proposed further operation but this party was not called upon.

Later on the Bn was warned to be in readiness to take over the position held by 39 consequent on the probability of that Bn having to move forward to reinforce 40 Bn owing to an expected c/attack on them. The c/attack however faded away & the move was found unnecessary.

The weather was awful from about 3 am. on morning of 4 when heavy showers commenced & continued intermittently throughout the operation but the cheerfulness of the men was remarkable no grumbling was heard. The condition of the ground was indescribable

~~Oct 4. 1917 Upper Naute. No 3 phase 4~~.

It was a sea of shellholes most of which were filled or half filled with water. Any movement except on duckboards was almost impossible & these did not come up until the second day. A morass in the middle of the position also increased the difficulties. The Bde was subjected to periodical bombardments of shell fire but few casualties occurred except in the initial advance to the position. The Bde was relieved in the night 5/6 by 2/8 Manchesters who came in under a heavy storm & a deluge of rain. We marched out by platoons thro' the mud & slush & reached wagon lines after a long weary tramp thoroughly exhausted but quite cheerful.

E. Thwaites, Major

Refer maps.

Belgium & France Sheet 28 1/40000
Havenstafel Edition 1. 1/10000
Sketch with P.I.Y. B 1024 1/5000.

"A" Form.

Army Form C. 2121.
(In pads of 100.)

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.

No. of Message .....

Prefix ..... Code ..... m. | Words | Charge

Office of Origin and Service Instructions.

Sent
At ..... m.
To .....
By .....

This message is on s/c of

..... Service.

(Signature of "Franking Officer.")

Recd. at ..... m.
Date .....
From .....
By .....

TO

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.	A A A
*			

From
Place
Time

The same may be forwarded as now corrected. (Z)

Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorised to telegraph in his name.

* This line should be erased if not required.

(11160) Wt. W 492/M1647. 55,000 Pads. 5/17. H. W. & V., Ld. (E. 1157.)

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A Coy

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Narative on the recent operation

The Coy moved from near Winnezele on the afternoon of 2nd & bivouacked on the night of 2/3rd in the fields E of Ypres. The 3rd was spent in issuing stores, grenades etc (as near Appendix I to Bde orders as circumstances allowed) while ~~some of the~~ the Platoon Commanders reconnoitered the approach route.

Fall in was called at 9.30 pm on night of 3/4th & the men were issued with their final instructions & at 10.15 pm the approach march commenced. The ~~Platoon Commanders were~~ Commanders were Capt H Deech: OC, Lt Sgt A Clark, OC 1 Platoon, Lt R. Kirkbride, 2, 2150 Sgt. F. Trebilcock No 3, & Lt E.W.H Major No 4 Plat. 3233 Sgt. Sidey O.C. acted as C.S.M. The numbers that ~~went over the top~~ actually took part in the assault were 3 off 150 O.R, ~~Offrs~~ plus 12 O.R. attached to L.T.M. Batty for carrying

Owing to the roughness of the track ~~the pace of~~ the approach march was very slow, the jump off was very poorly marked & there was a good deal of confusion, small parties of moppers up, etc, being out of place. ~~The Coy was reported~~ The enemy were shelling indiscriminately but the Coy had only one casualty (wounded) before Zero. It was in position about 1.30 am, sentries were posted & the remainder tried to get some sleep. The weather which has been threatening, now broke & continued wet during the whole operation. Heavy shelling was kept up until 5.30 am — without causing any casualties — & then heavy artillery firing broke out on the right. It gradually extended along our front but all the shots passed ofhead & fell further back. Under the fire the men on the right started to go forward and at 5.50 am some of them must have nearly reached the enemy front line. This Coy. remained fast. At 6am (Zero) our barrage opened & the men immediately pressed forward. Owing to the darkness & the ~~cut up~~ extraordinary state of the ground the advance was very confused & consisted of small groups of men all pressing forward. Some opposition was experienced from a M. G in a strong post at about S 21 a 7.7. but a party worked round its flank & silenced it with a P. bomb. Later more opposition was encountered at Judah House (D 15 d 4.0.) The 37th obtained their objective (the first) at 6.30 am, on time, but the barrage appeared to rest longer than per syllabus, apparently not lifting until 6.55 am. Opposition was encountered from a strongly held strongpoint on about D 16 a 0.3. but was overcome by NZ & Aus: working round it on our left flank. The battn reached its objective about 9.30 am & immediately started to consolidate. As soon as the battn. going further on passed thro., the Coys were re-organised & a definite line of trench marked & dug

P.T.O.

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Enemy aircraft did not appear until about 9.30am & his artillery was very quiet for the rest of the day. apparently they possessed no observation as the shells all fell in certain definite localities which were not occupied by us. (every evening night the S.O.S. signal was sent up on numerous occasions from both flanks but not from our front & no action was taken by the Coy other than to stand to.) At 4pm on 4th orders were received to ~~re~~organise 4 platns of a total of 150 to take a further objective ~~but~~ This was done but the troops were not called on. At about 8pm (4/5th) orders were received to be ready to reinforce the 39th ahead but no further action was ~~taken~~ necessary. The 5th was quiet ~~but~~ & the weather showed some little improvement. Rations & water arrived about 11am & were distributed to the men. Enemy 'planes were much more active & were repeatedly engaged by Lewis Gunners. In the afternoon word was received that the Battn would be relieved that evening. ~~The relief for the Coy arrived~~ About 6.30pm the enemy opened a heavy box barrage down both flanks of the sector & along our line but by judicious disposition casualties were avoided. The relief for the Coy arrived about 12.30pm (5/6) & the Coy started to move out about 1.15am & arrived back in billets on the Vlamantinghe - Voormezele road - after a very fatiguing march - at about 6.30am on 6th. A good hot meal was awaiting them & they then turned in and slept all day.

~~The following were conspicuous~~

There were no conspicuously gallant acts but the whole of the Coy. who went over, without exception, ~~did their duty to the utmost~~ animated by a desire to do their duty to the utmost but the following were especially conspicuous:— No 3233 Sgt. Sidey OA as A/C.S.M., No 1927 Pte Walters B.G. & No 389 Pte Seymour C.E as runners & No 2466 Pte Petherick A.E. who led an attack on, and silenced, an enemy M.G. ——

H. Leach Capt
OC A Coy 38th

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B. Company.

Narrative on recent operations.

The actual number supplied by the Company was 5 officers & 149 O.Rs. (this number included Lt. W. P. O. Murie & 2 runners attached to Brigade HQrs & Lt. H. Robbins & 1 runner attached to BHQrs).
The company was under the command of Capt. E. F. Moore & was organised into 4 platoons.
Sgt. W. S. McKinnon in charge of No 5,
Lt. D. McKenzie No 6 — Lt. E. Storey No 7
& 763 Sgt. R. J. Buchland No 8 Platoon —
with 722 C.S.M. J. H. Sharp.
The company fell in at 9.30 on night of 3/4 October & moved out from bivouac site in fields E. of Ypres at 10.30 on the approach march — conditions were quiet until the vicinity of Bremen Redoubt was reached - from there on to point of assembly the company was under shell fire but did not sustain any casualties.
The point of assembly was reached about 1.30 am on Thursday the 4th inst — Nos 5 & 6 platoons wheeled to the right & took up their allotted position behind the first wave of C. Company — Nos 7 & 8 moved to the left behind D. Coy. — the company was reported in position about 2 am.

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Conditions were generally quiet until at 5·30 am enemy artillery opened up on our right –
at zero hour the Company moved forward keeping well up to the barrage point.
Nos 5 & 6 platoons reorganised on reaching the 37th Bn objective & passed through as soon as the barrage lifted – no opposition was encountered on this sector until a point about 100 yards from the 38th Bn objective was reached – when they came under heavy M.G. fire from about D.16. a.1.3. – the advance was temporarily held up – – on the Bn. objective being reached – Nos 5 & 6 platoons were reorganised & dug in on the left of C. Company.
On the rt. sector – Nos 7 & 8 platoons moved forward with the barrage – opposition being encountered at Israel House – this was speedily overcome –
on passing through the 37th Bn – heavy M.G. fire was encountered from concrete structures at Judah House – P. bombs were used & the opposition speedily overcome – a considerable number of prisoners were captured here.
Capt. Moore was reported to have been killed about 7 a.m. & Lt Storey then took charge of the Company.
On reaching the Bn. objective touch was lost with the left half of the company owing to

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their being a wire morass in the centre of the position.
No's 7 & 8 platoons moved across this & dug in continuing the line on the right of No 6 platoon – a gap of 150 x had to be left on right of B Coy – owing to swampy condition of the ground in the valley – this was covered by L.G. posts.
B Coy's line consisted of a series of 2 or 3 shell holes linked up together – enemy planes flew over about 9.30 a.m. but apparently failed to locate the line.
Enemy artillery was quiet all day on Thursday the 4th inst – about 4 p.m. orders were received to supply 1 NCO & 30 bombers – this party was organised but were not called on.
During the night of 4/5 October – S.O.S. signals were sent up on both flanks – the company stood to but did not have to move up.
Bleak weather with squally showers prevailed during the night & made conditions very trying.
On Saturday the 5th inst – rations were received about 11 a.m. – coffee & rum & dry rations.
– the day was quiet – until about 6.30 pm the first relieving troops were apparently seen by the enemy & a heavy barrage was put up lasting until about 8.30 p.m.

The company collected a quantity of salvage & placed in our Bn. dump — also all Mills & rifle grenades.

The relieving company (Manchester Regiment) took over at about 1.30 a.m & B company marched out at 2 a.m — the Coy was called on for stretcher bearing parties & carried two cases until clearing station was reached. — The billets at 2Ctt. Stone on Vlamanhighe — Voormezeele Rd were reached at about 6.30 a.m where the men received a hot meal.

The spirit of the men was at all times excellent under trying conditions.

R Storey Lt.
O.C. B. Coy.

7/10/17.

Capt Moore was killed just outside the firing lines & Lt Storey thereafter had charge of the Coy.

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APPENDIX.

C.

4th October Stunt.

The most ticklish part of the stunt was thought to be the approach march but as luck had it it proved to be very simple indeed, the route was well picketed and everything went well. The shelling was very light and we had no casualties in the bay. The new men seemed to take the shelling very well and did not flinch, showing by this that they were the right sort.

The assembly was carried out very quickly and in fair order, for my own part things went swimmingly as I simply guided right at the light spot. The only difficulty I had was to get in touch with the N Z's but this was found out later due to the fact that they did not arrive until two and a half hours after us

The German barrage did not affect us at all as most of the shells went over our head some but very few coming close to us.

Most of the opposition happened to be on the night, the flank on which I was moving, but it was of a very light nature. The dash and vigour of our men soon persuaded Fritz that the game was not worth the candle and he was only too glad to hold his hands up. At the beginning our men didn't seem to want many prisoners but they soon tired of bagging them and began to take prisoners.

From the time of the jump off till we got to the first objective the time passed very quickly and as the opposition was weak there was very little unfortunate things to note

There was not much difficulty in finding out our line when we reached it and we got to work and dug in as soon as possible. Our men were well protected in a trench an hour. During the afternoon we were fairly heavily shelled but after that things were very quiet.

The two most important things I noted were the loss of direction and not keeping touch with the parties on either flank. Touch was kept with the N. very well but the other flank was not so well looked after. Another thing that was very noticeable also was the way men got into their barrage but I think this is always the way with barrage troops.

There were several acts of gallantry but these I have already mentioned as per the honour list. I should like to also bring to notice the way the new men behaved, they got into their stride at once and were quite the old war worn veteran by the time we dug in

James Munday Lt
O/C B Coy

Capt Selleck O.C. was wounded early & Lt Munday took charge

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D

From O.C. D Company
To 2nd in Command, 38th Bn. A.I.F.

This Company started the approach march at 10.15 p.m. on the night of the 3rd October, and by 2.30 a.m. on the following morning, we were in position on the tape, or rather at a distance of approximately 50 yards behind the tapes. On account of the very broken ground at point of assembly the task of assembling was a ~~very~~ difficult one, but everything was done quietly, quickly and well.

The approach march turned out to be an easier task than I anticipated. The track for most of the distance was well marked and where there was likely to be any trouble, guides were placed. The quick approach through I Road was due also partly to the fact that the approximate direction of the route was fairly well known by either an officer or Sergeant of each platoon.

As mentioned before, we were settled on our assembly tapes at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of the 4th October. All the men were settled on

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shell holes and everything was comparatively quiet until about 5.15 a.m. up to that time I thought that Fritz had no suspicion of an attack on him, although we were rather heavily shelled on the route up from Bremen Redoubt on, suffering no casualties. After 5.15 a.m. the enemy fire became so intense that I began to have my doubts as to whether we had been spotted or not. We had received very heavy fire from approximately 5.15 a.m. until 5.45 a.m. when I could see movement in several places in front of me. This I attempted to stop in D Company, but when I came across a major in charge of the 37th Bn. found it was by his orders that his men were moving. They were getting out in front of Fritz barrage. At about 5.50 I sent orders along to the company to crush slowly out behind the 37th and this was done, but not without casualties as Fritz's barrage was fairly heavy by this time. We remained in this latter position until our barrage opened

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at 6 a.m. to the task, by which time we were clear of enemy barrage.

At 6 a.m. our men went forward under our barrage and encountered no opposition until we came opposite two "pill boxes" right on the top of the hill. There was several, I think three, machine guns here and they did more damage in my opinion than all the rest of the action. Men seemed to me to be falling everywhere in their track. However, some worked to their flank, killed most of the gunners, and captured the guns. After this we went on swimmingly for a while, until we came to a line of fresh troops almost immediately in front of SPRINGFIELD FARM. The enemy offered a fair resistance here but they were easily subdued by a couple of men working in from the flank. One bomb did ~~[illegible]~~ the damage enough, besides about five bayonet thrusts, to make the whole of the enemy holding this position surrender.

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The only other opposition we encountered was at SPRINGFIELD FARM itself, but our Lewis Gunners did practically fine work there and we were very soon able to go on. All this was on our right flank.

In the centre and on the left there was no opposition at all.

During the whole operation enemy machine guns were emitting a flanking fire from the direction of AUGUSTUS. But the range appeared to me to be too long to be of any effect. No bombs were made. It was found that the bullets simply hit the men and fell to the ground.

The company dug in, making no general line, but consolidating shell holes.

A message was sent back by signal as soon as we reached our objective.

For some hours after this, the enemy directed his fire on a line behind the 37th, and it was not until the middle of the afternoon of the 4th that he got another range with his shells.

After that until time of relief, evening

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fire was fairly consistent and heavy, especially on our right flank.

Several S.O.S. signals were sent up by the Battalions in front of us, and as a result of one sent up about 1.30 a.m. on 6/10/17 I had to send a platoon up to report to the 39th Battalion. This platoon remained with the 39th Battalion until early in the night in which the relief took place.

The heaviest shelling we had to get under started about 10 P.M. on the night of the 5th October, when the whole of our line was heavily shrapnelled and H.E. poured off with comparatively few casualties; to my knowledge only two men being wounded one rather severely. ~~The bombardment~~ Our right was subjected to a particularly violent bombardment.

The 2nd-8 Manchesters relieved us, coming in by Companies, starting at approximately 12.15 a.m. 6/10/17, A, B, C and D Companies being relieved in that order.

The last company was relieved at

2.30 a.m. 6/10/17 and proceeded by platoons to our billets.

2Lt Humphries, Sgt Davis, 2Lt Rowe and 2Lt Beattie were in charge of Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16 platoons respectively. Unfortunately the platoon commanders of Nos 13 and 14 platoons were ~~killed~~ put out of action early in the fight; the other two coming through safely. My second Major was also put out of action before he had gone 100 yards.

The behaviour of the whole of the men of the Company was splendid. They seemed to want nobody to lead them, working almost altogether on their own initiative.

3 officers and 148 OR advanced to the attack.

D Company was on the right and was one of the assaulting companies, having a frontage of 300 yards. The Company was worked by platoons, Nos 13 and 15 platoons constructing the first and second lines of the first wave

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and moving along in extended order. No 14 and 16 platoons were the first and second lines of the second waves and they moved forward in artillery formation.

In the advance it was very heavy going, but no doubt the state of the ground was favorable to us as regard casualties, as shells were often bursting amongst parties and doing practically no harm.

Barrading the enemy barrage we had to go through, I consider the casualties were very light, but as before stated this can no doubt be attributed to a large extent to the softness of the ground.

W H Orchard
Captain
OC D Company
35th Bn AIF

1/10/17

APPENDIX

D

Carrying Parties

Major G Sturry
38th Battalion A.I.F.

Re operations on 4th & 5th Octr 1917

The approach march to the Assembly Point was successfully carried out. The discipline was good there was very little noise. After being placed in position the enemy started shelling & the Battalions in reserve moved forward & became mixed up with the Battalions in front.

As the carrying parties were to carry from the 1st objective, by the 37th Battalion, I considered it better for the parties to go over just in rear of the Reserve Company, as there was less chance of casualties than if they waited near the front of Assembly till the 37th Dump was established. Owing to the confusion at the Assembly Point, the men became disorganised in going over & a number of them went on with the Battn to the Second objective. The majority of these came back & dropped their loads when the 37th Dump should be established. When the latter failed to materialise, the 37th Battn sent men back to the Forward Brigade Dump to carry

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to their objective, & the 38th Carrying parties took the stores direct from there, & carried to the 39th Battn and to the 40th Battn requiring ammunition. When an urgent message came to the 37th Battn from the 40th through the Brigade Dump men back to the Forward Brigade Dump they carried right through to the 38th Battn. I did not establish myself at the 38th dump but stayed with the 37th Battn to make sure that the supplies went forward. The men ceased carrying when it became dark, owing to it being impossible to cross the swamps in view of the objective except at certain places, which were too difficult to locate in the dark. On the second day a Forward Brigade Dump was established in front of Springfield Tower & the 38th parties carried from this dump to the 38th & thence on to the 39th. The supply of stores on the first day was unsatisfactory owing to the 37th Battalion dump not being established early enough, but the arrangements on the second day worked well. The work of the carrying parties was very different from that of the State of the ground, & answered that the men worked finely under the circumstances. Two of the N.C.Os were wounded early but the remaining two, Sgts Runge & C'Cay

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Rec'd 'D' Coy worked well, not only Replying to enemy firing, but carrying ~~them~~ also of the wounded. The work of the stretcher bearers throughout the whole of operations was very good. I would particularly like to mention that Pte Greenwood of C Company, on 10th days going continually backwards & forwards with wounded, even though the enemy was shelling very heavily at times.

The most of the men in the line did not see, owing to my being with the 37th Batt.

F. McCall Lieut
Offr i/c Carrying Parties
38th Battn

7/10/17

Carrying

Carrying parties

Lt Colonel H. Henry 38th Bn

Signal Order

Report on Signal Operations 38th Battalion from 10 hrs 3/10/17 until 30 6/10/17.

Allotment of Personnel

1 N.C.O. 1 Sigla & 4 Runners detailed to Bde Advanced Bde Hdqrs at Mossvale Farm

Upon N.C.O. & Signallers & 5 Runners went forward & established Forward Command Post.

Following are particulars as to our advance.

Left billets at 10 hrs and following Bde on approach march reached assembly point without mishap.

At Zero hour we left with 1st wave of 38th Bn & reached 37th Bn objective safely. On barrage lifting we went forward 100 yards and established Bde Forward Stn in shell hole & sent a runner to Bde position of Bde Fwd Hdqrs and at once got into communication with company & sending messages re advance and gaining of objectives etc of 38th & 39th Bns were received & despatched to Bde Fwd Stn. As Bde Fwd Stn now established & Bde locality known, I moved to a more suitable post.

and established telephone
communication. This
communication & visual
with Coys were maintained
throughout the operation.
2 Signallers & 1 runner were
wounded at different times.
The whole of the personnel
did their duties well & ably
acted excellently throughout.
We held scene of operations
at 3 a.m. on 6/10/17.

W. Rosbe
2/Lt.

Signal boxes were left behind leading
objective on to contact, to fix lines

M.O.

38th Battn.

To CO 38th Battn. 9/7.

Re Medical arrangements in the battalion's recent operation

1. There appears to be some difference of opinion as to whose responsibility the selection of a Regimental Aid Post, before an engagement, is. I was informed by the W.A.D.M.S. it was a brigade matter + Brigade told me it was for the Battalion to decide. Would it be possible to have some available dugout or pillbox selected, which in the event of an advance could then be used as a relay station for Field Ambulance Stretcher Bearers.

2. In the battalion's recent operation, after objectives had been taken, the RMO of the 40th Battn. + myself took up Levi Cottage D21a74 as an RAP. We took 2 Field Ambulance Stretcher Bearers with us, to act as guides for more to our new position. At 2 p.m. on the 4th inst we dispatched them with a patient + a memo,

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APPENDIX.

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asking for 10 stretcher bearers, 10 stretchers, blankets + brandy. Later we again send back a memo asking for 20 stretcher bearers. 4 bearers from the ambulance reported that day + Regimental Stretcher bearers had to be put on to carrying back to the Dressing Station, although they were urgently needed in the line.

On the night of 4/5th inst we had 25 badly wounded men (including 2 officers) at the RAP all night, 15 of these spending the night in the open, without blankets + brandy &c + exposed to shell fire, which had put out primus stoves out of use. Hot drinks were consequently impossible. Several men died in shellholes in the immediate vicinity of the Aid Post during the night, owing to there being no available stretcher bearers.

At 8am on the 5th inst a party of Stretcher bearers from the 10th Field Ambulance arrived + later 8 men from the 43rd battn. These with our own Regimental Stretcher bearers eventually got our Aid Post cleared. Throughout the operation, the shortage of Regimental Stretcher bearers

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in the line was almost totally due to them having to do Field Ambulance work, in carrying back to the Dressing Stations.

My opinion is that the Field Ambulance arrangements for clearing Aid Posts + sending up supplies were absolutely inadequate + resulted in loss of life to the wounded, which might have been averted.

G. V. Davies Capt
RMO 38th Battn

7. 10. 17.

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Chaplain's Report.

Thursday (4th inst) was spent in Reading (spiritually) & administering comforts in the shape of cigarettes, coffee etc, to the wounded, evacuated through the various dis-posts & dressing stations.

On Friday morning I accompanied the Brigade Pioneers Officer (Lieut P. Harding) to the battlefield. With a small burial party, detailed from the 37th Batt., & assisted by one our battalion, we succeeded in clearing the field of most of our own dead, from 38th Batt line to rear of 38 & 40th R. A. P.

Our dead were buried in shell holes on the field - where possible a number were buried together & their graves marked. A record was kept of each man buried, & his personal effects collected. Owing to lack of assistance it was impossible to clear the field of enemy dead. We buried about 50 Germans, but this was only a tiny proportion of those lying on the field.

The members of our party worked splendidly, but their number was far too small & inadequate for the task allotted them.

The medical arrangements & work of Batt stretcher-bearers, which came under my notice, was excellent. The wounded (both our own & enemy) were quickly evacuated, despite the difficulties of bad tracks & enemy shell fire.

We left the battlefield about 3 A.m. on the morning of Saturday (6th).

To Major G. Harry,
38th Battn

H. A. Hayden, Chaplain.
38th Battn

7/10/17.

Chaplain - Chaplain

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Re BAIRNSFATHER'S RASPBERRY JAM PICTURE.

On the night Oct 5/6th the 38th Bn which had taken and consolidated the objective allotted to it had its H.Q. at Mdah House pill box which they shared with Brigade Forward Signal Office - The Adjutant of the Battalion (Captain Fraser) was away on leave - About 10 p.m. there was a violent thunderstorm - the rain came down in sheets - the enemy who had been reported massing for a counter attack had just started a solid straff and shells of all calibres were crashing all round the dugout. every second one extinguished the candle but the occupants sat tight in the comforting assurance that there was a solid wooden door at least an inch thick and hanging by at least one hinge between them and Fritz. Amid the infernal din an insistant buzz was heard - An Urgent Message ! - the signaller had hard work to take it - hastily it was passed to the decoding officer - the decoding officer cursed the candle. The decode seemed to take ages - No one spoke The message seemed full of fate - when decoded it was handed to the C.O. in an interval of intense and agonising silence.

It read as follows :-

38th Bn - Leaving Boulogne midnight. Send Mess cart to meet me.

FRASER.

TO Adj. R.W.S.

Leaving Boulogne Midnight to night please arrange transport.

From FRASER.

150

APPENDIX.

Message dated 4.10.17
from Capt. Drager - advising
his departure from Boulogne
& requesting transport

Sent to Exhibition 2/6/21

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Report on Operations 12-14th Oct. 17

The Coy. left the bivouac ground at 9.45 p.m. on the 12th inst & marched along the appointed route to K Track.

Practically as soon as K Track was reached the Coy. came under shell fire which continued spasmodically until the assembly position was reached.

Two or three shells fell right amongst the column, wounding several. There were also a number of gas shells, but owing to the high wind, they had very little effect.

We arrived at the assembly ground at about 2.30 a.m. the shell fire by this time had increased greatly, & about a dozen men were killed or wounded while we were moving along the sunken road.

There was a great deal of confusion at this point, owing to the heavy shelling, rain & mixture of troops. It was exceedingly difficult to organise on our lines, owing to the above mentioned factors but this was eventually done at about 3 a.m. Owing to the presence of wire, it was found necessary to spread the troops out of their proper sections. Rain gradually increased & the shelling increased until zero hour.

At zero hour the Coy formed on its sector leaders & moved forward in the 8th wave. There was great difficulty in controlling the troops here on account of some of the 40th Bn. waiting too long before advancing. Noticing signs of fight on the left, near the RAVEBEEK, I moved the troops in that direction & they succeeded in capturing a "pillbox". The troops here became greatly disorganised owing to machine gun fire & also through crowding around the prisoners. All four Battns. were represented here. I ordered Lt. McKENZIE to collect his parties & work along the RAVEBEEK, whilst I took charge of the remainder & went on to the 3rd objective (where the Coy had been ordered to rendezvous during the first barrage halt of 2 hours) Lt. Baxter took charge of ~~[illegible]~~

38th Battn AIF.
Operation 12/14 Oct 1917.

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~~who were still~~ the remainder & followed me. On arriving at the approx. site of the RED line I found that it was held by about 20 of the 37th Bn, 10 of the 40th, a few of our Bn. & the remainder by the 9th Bde.

Owing to the conditions prevailing at this time (N.Z. Brigade not being up & shortage of men) I placed myself & men under Major GIBLIN of the 40th Battn. after sending an NCo. (Lcpl. CAMPBELL) back to Bn. H.Q. to explain the situation. I collected a German NCo, with maps & sent him under escort to Bde. H.Q.

Acting under orders from Major Giblin the Coy. was retired on to its approx. jumping-off line, where the men took up a defensive line & consolidated.

Things remained in this condition until relieved at about 7 p.m. on the 17th by the 41st Bn. when the men were despatched in small parties to the Bn. bivouac.

14/10/17

E. Hofatchford Capt
OC B Coy

Operations of C. Coy 7/10/17

The approach march was full of incidents right from the time we got on to R tracks. The Bosch seemed to have good information as to our movements and made things unpleasant for us especially in places which were in the low lying patches where the track was so defined as to have no chance of our deviating from the duck board track. Such of are the gas was the trouble, but luckily the wind was too strong for the effect to be very noticeable, and I consider that we were lucky that he did not use shrapnel or H E instead of it.

No 11 platoon was the most unlucky of our platoons as they got a H E right in the centre of them, causing a great number of casualties and giving the rest of the company a severe shock. When we reached the sunken road again there was a great number of casualties not in our own Coy but in the B^n, and this undoubtedly would have had a great effect on any other men but those tried and fit as our men were.

There was no confusion at the exact point of assembly as our guides did their work in an efficient and thorough manner.

The enemy got busy with a heavy barrage soon after we assembled and from the number left dead had a great effect on the ~~[illegible]~~ strength of the Bn. I think I can say without fear of contradiction that the boys went into action at the time of the "Lop order" reduced by 10%.

~~From this time~~

From zero on Sept 18th of touch of the boys as I saw a position on our left that wanted mopping up, and went there to try and clear it out, that found our getting there or rather near there that it was a formidable job. We got there concrete Dugouts cleared but the main one on the ridge "Bellevue" was unapproachable. Took up a position in a dugout on the road and kept a continual observation on the M G positions and snipers hoping that I would be able to silence some of them, at least. I know we accounted for a number of snipers but the M G's we could not touch. They appeared to be in trenches or positions in rear of Bellevue and consequently out of our reach. Bellevue I think that this point was the most important point in the whole scheme, so far as I saw

its. From this point the M G's had an excellent field of fire in every direction and could play havoc with our Bn's advance on our frontage and with the M.G's on their's. In all my experience I have not seen a better position for a M G strong point.

The sniping preparation on the part of the Boche was excellent. Around the position in which I had to take cover, he accounted for at least 50 of our men, movement in the open was absolutely impossible, on the slightest movement a sniper invariably opened fire and therefore was perfect.

Communication was impossible, and I could not get word to any of the units around. I sent two runners to try and get in touch but neither returned.

I decided to stay there in the D.O during the night and evacuate in the morning just before dawn, this I did, and it was only then that I found that the front objective had been evacuated.

From the accounts one hears from the men of the Coy some got right up to the village but Capt Lakeland could give a better account of that than I can.

I should again like to mention the general good work of the older men of the Coy and particularly bring to notice the way the new men take to the work.

James Dundas Capt.
a/ O.C. Coy

D.C.M. Fdr 12

No 2209 Pte BRIGHT. Albert Allan Freeman

In his capacity as a Stretcher bearer this soldier set an example of utter fearlessness and devotion to duty to every man in the Battalion

From the commencement of the attack until the Battalion was relieved he was constantly at work under heavy fire and most trying conditions.

Although thoroughly exhausted and almost drooping from fatigue he continued his work until until the Battalion left the line on the night of the 13th inst.

See old list Odr 4.

No 12306 Pte Smith L. C. AAMC, attached 38th Battn.

While on duty at an advanced Regimental Aid Post he dressed the wounded in the open under heavy fire for two days with a total disregard for his personal safety. He continued at this work until he was himself severely wounded on the evening of the second day

A M C

APPENDIX.

16-10-17

To O/C 38th Battn

I beg to furnish the following names with a suggestion that they receive some recommendation for their services in the recent fighting.

FLETCHER,

(1) Lieut FRANK MACOBOY.

(2) T/Sergt EDGAR, STANLEY, BEARD No 29

Lieut Macoboy was in charge of the Regimental Pack transport on both occasions of the operations and displayed great skill and leadership, all the articles required for the forward dump were delivered safely under heavy fire. The transport returned with the loss of only one mule.

Sergeant Beard volunteered to deliver hot rations to the lads of the Battn in the front line on two occasions, going forward with pack mules under very bad conditions, he personally saw that the food reached its destination and reported to H.Q. "that same had been safely delivered"

Commdg 38th Bn

To C.O. 38th Battalion

I desire to bring to your notice the conduct of the undermentioned men in the recent operations.

No 1852 Pte HOLLINGWORTH. Albert.

No 485 Pte NEWELL. William James Leslie

Were employed as runners between Battalion Headquarters and Front line and did exceedingly good work in carrying messages forward from Battalion H.Q. during the most severe bombardment and also assisted greatly in carrying wounded back on their return journey.

A Hawkes Capt.
adjt 38th Bn

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B 15.10.17

O.C.
38 Bn.

I wish to bring under your notice the following members of this Coy. for their gallantry in the recent operations:-

2Lieut. Duncan McKENZIE

This officer took part in the operations on 4-6th inst & displayed great gallantry & coolness during the action. He volunteered for the operations on 12-13 inst, realising the weakness of the Coy. in officers & NCOs.

During the assembly at the jumping-off point, he acted with great coolness & promptitude & was of invaluable assistance in a time of much confusion & danger. Later, in the action he led an attack on an enemy strongpoint & succeeding in capturing it. He has at all times shown a wonderful example of coolness & daring in action, & has a reputation unequalled in the Battalion.

Recommended for the Military Cross.

150

No 515

515 Corporal Isaac Leichardt BELL.

This NCo. also took part in both operations in charge of a Coy. signalling station & by his untiring energy & devotion to duty considerably helped with the successful communication although working under very trying conditions.

In the last operations, he carried out his duties, until ordered out of the action owing to severe cramps.

He has at all times carried out his duties in a splendid unselfish manner & won praise from all concerned.

Recommended for the Military Medal.

529 Lance Corporal Gordon CAMPBELL

This NCo. also took part in both operations in charge of a section, & by his fearless actions & promptitude in dealing with awkward situations, showed a splendid example to his men & a wonderful disregard of self.

He was invaluable to me in collecting information & clearing up the situation on the "Z" inlet.

Recommended for the Military Medal.

In conclusion, I take the liberty as senior Officer of the Battn present at the time, in drawing your attention to the excellent work carried out by Lieut P.C. HERRING in the last operation. He done splendid work reorganising the lines until wounded & was actually wounded while endeavouring to stem the disorganisation of a neighbouring unit, doing so under heavy machine gun fire & shelling.

Wolfatchford Capt
O.C. B Coy.

To Adjutant
2/8th Bn
6.10.17.

Re. Honours.

I wish to submit Lt Dutton's name for a special mention.
This Officer led his Platoon against a strong Machine Gun position which was causing a lot of casualties to our Brigade while they were advancing on to the second objective.
The Machine gun was silenced and the garrison ~~thereafter~~ not killed surrendered

James Sunday Capt
a/O.C. Coy.

To C
Adjutant
8th Bn
16.10.17.

Enclosed please find lists of recommendations for Honours in order of merit.

James Sunday
a/O.C. Coy

By Runner.
2.30 Pm.

APPENDIX.

Sgt J. S. King.

I had to mention this NCO in the last stunt and again have to do so this time. By his example and coolness in action he is invaluable to the Coy. I recommend him for the D.C.M.

James Sunday Lt
a/OC B Coy

645A Sgt JAMES HENRY STEELE KING

Lt. Meredith.
35th Bn.

Lt. Meredith.
This NCO in charge of a L. Gun team was exceptionally good in his work. He got further towards the final objective than any other man in the Bn and could good work all through. He could have been mentioned last stunt as one of the first in the recommendation but was left out in anticipation of further deeds. I strongly go for this man and do expect that he should get the first chance in for the list. D. C. M.

James Sunday
a/OC B Coy

933 ~~Tpr~~ Cpl JOHN VINCENT MEREDITH

2

Pte Matheson.

This Pte is absolutely one of the best men I have met in my military career. Always and at all times he is trustworthy and dependable at all times. In the last attack and in this one he was absolutely fine. I recommend him for D.C.M.

James Munday Lt
Capt & Adjt

1670 Pte JOHN MATHESON

3

Pte Fedder.

This man I recommended last time for a M.M. I again have to recommend him and this time I should plump for him as a D.C.M.

Stretcher Bearer.

James Munday Lt
Capt & Adjt

1832 Pte FREDERICK FEDDER

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Pte's Kelmo ✓
Mullin
Rowe
Greenwood.

These four privates I recommend for the M. M. They did good work consistently all through the fight. It is impossible to pick out the particular work of any of them as the general conditions of the attack did not lend itself to individual feats of gallantry.

James Munday
a/O.C. Coy

5

Pte's McDonald J.A.
McDonald E.H.
Rodgers.
Knowles.
Binnion.

These privates I recommend for mention in despatches. They all did good and consistent work and are those that stood out above the other members of the Coy.

James Munday Lt
a/O.C. Coy

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'D'

To C.O.
38th Battn.

Re recommendations for awards in recent state operations.

I have had a meeting of the N.C.O's & there are no officers who took part here.

They state that there is no one whom they could recommend as having done anything which they could recommend on. I am of a disadvantage in not having any officers who took part with me.

L. Beatie Lt
for O.C. D Coy.

16/10/17

Approved

Approved D

D Coy
38th Battn.
16/10/17

To C.O.
38th Battn.

I desire to bring under your notice the gallant conduct of No 1797 Pte T. M. Blake.

He was No 1 of the Lewis Gun Team. He kept his team together and led it forward under heavy machine gun fire of a most demoralizing nature.

2 He carried his gun and used it effectively. His coolness was always apparent and had a great effect on his men.

3- He advanced his team within close range of a strong point and was doing excellent work when he fell fatally wounded.

L. Beatie Lt
16 Platoon
D Coy.

Mention in dispatches

5972	Corp.	RUSSELL BENEDICT	BRANCH
2112	Pte	HENRY EDWARD	MILNE
1045	"	HORACE	HULLIN
6097	"	PETER BOLACE	ROWE
886		WALTER HERBERT	GREENWOOD
948		JAMES ALEXANDER	McDONALD
942	L/Cpl	EDWIN HAROLD	McDONALD
898	"	THOMAS VIVIAN	HODGENS
922	"	EDWARD STEWART	KNOWLES
5918		FREDERICK	BINION

PASSHENDALE STUNT

10/1 12. 1917

Recommendations

150

A.C.C.

Headquarters
10th Australian Infantry Brigade.
14th October 1917.

C. O.'s Units.

Will you please forward as soon as possible your Recommendations for Awards as under for the 2 recent Operations.

In submitting Recommendations, Commanding Officers will please place names in order of merit.

It is to be understood that the numbers given are not to be recommended unless there are sufficient cases which merit the various Awards.

In the case of Operations on the 4th instant, Recommendations for Military Medal have already been submitted.

4TH OCTOBER OPERATIONS.

UNIT.	D.S.O. or M.C.	D.C.M.
37th Batt.	2	1
38th "	2	1
39th "	2	1
40th "	2	1
10th M.G.Co.	1	1
10th T.M.By.	1	1

12TH OCTOBER OPERATIONS.

UNIT.	D.S.O. or M.C.	D.C.M.	M.M.
37th Batt.	2	1	10.
38th "	2	1	10.
39th "	2	1	10.
40th "	2	1	10.
10th M.G.Co.	1	1	5.
10th T.M.By.	1	1	4.

R. Lambe Captain.
A/Brigade Major.
10th Australian Infantry Brigade.

SC/71/9.
H. &. A.

150

C.O 100

APPENDIX.

Confidential

38th Battn A.I.F.
16/10/17

To H.Q. 10th Infy Bde

With regard to recent operations by this Battalion I forward herewith recommendations for decorations of Officers, N.C.Os and men of this Battalion, and some names for mention in Despatches.

In view of your S.C/7119 of 14th inst I would point out that I have included an officer and N.C.O. on the list (namely Captain DAVIES my R.M.O and one of his staff ~~[illegible]~~ Private SMITH [Nos 6 and 10 on my list]) who are only attached to this Battalion and whose names should be, as I believe, forwarded through the A.D.M.S.

They both did fine work. Captain DAVIES is specially worthy of some recognition. I have included their names for the reason mentioned.

I would also point out that Nos 17 and 18 on my list were included in my recommendations for the M.M for the 4th October operations. I have included them again on this list as on the previous list their names were rather low down and they have done such good work on both occasions that I think it should be recognised.

I have therefore recommended 12 instead of 10 for M.Ms for the 12th October operations and if Private FEDDER and Sergeant KING are not included in your recommendations for the 4th October operations I would be glad if you would include them in your recommendations for the 12th leaving out the names of Sergeants BURKE and FRASER (Nos 19 & 20) and recommending these 2 latter men for mention in despatches.

[signature] Lieut Colonel
38th Battn A.I.F.

38th Battn.

Recommended for the D.S.O

Major GEOFFRY HURRY

This Officer was in Command of the — Battalion during the operations of the 4th October. He showed a fine example to all by his courage and fought his Battalion with great ability. At all times he has inspired those working with him by his fine courageousness and the influence of his fine spirit has been greatly felt in his Battalion. He is absolutely fearless and the manner in which he handled the Battalion during this operation, is — worthy of the highest commendation.

38th Batn

Recommended for the Military Cross

Lieut FRED. RUSSELL BEAUCHAMP MARTIN

This officer was detailed at very short notice to act as adjutant during the operations of the 4th October. In the organization of the Battalion and the oversight of the many details necessary to bring the labors of this Battalion to success he was simply invaluable. He worked unceasingly and did not spare himself in the least degree. The success of his Battalion was due in a large measure to his work. Throughout the whole operation his cheerfulness and good temper under most trying circumstances was an inspiration to all with whom he came in contact. In previous operations his work has been of a high order.

Captain ERNEST WILLIAM LATCHFORD

This officer displayed great coolness and courage during the operations of the 12th October. When severe casualties had been inflicted on his Company by his fine spirit and example he held his men together. Under heavy fire and the most trying circumstances he worked hard to assist in the reorganization of his Battalion and showed a splendid example to all. He has on previous occasions shown splendid courage and cheerfulness in the stress of battle.

Captain HAROLD DENCH

This officer was O.C. his Company in the operations of the 4th October and actively assisted in the organization of the 2nd Line

his

Captain HAROLD DENCH (cont'd) 38th Batn.

His work was admirable both in —— Reorganizing his Company and in securing to the welfare of the whole line. His Courage, ability & cheerfulness were a great example to all. When detailed to organise a Special Company for proposed further offensive he accomplished this with promptness and despatch and had everything ready for a move at short notice.

Captain GEORGE VERNON DAVIES of AAMC attached as RMO. 38th Bn.

This Medical Officer did fine work on both occasions during the operations of 4th & 7th October. Constantly under heavy shell fire, in the open, he — attended to the wounded and saw to their evacuation, working day & night for more than 2 days on the first occasion & for 2 days on the 2nd occasion in the performance of this duty. His courage and devotion ~~were~~ are beyond praise.

38th Batt.

Recommended for the D.C.M.

No 996 Sergeant JOHN STANLEY SHILLIDAY

Whilst in command of one of the assaulting platoons during the operations of the 4th October, this soldier encountered an enemy strong point the garrison of which resisted strongly. Sergeant Shilliday rushed the position by himself killing the whole of its garrison of 9 men. Although wounded he remained in charge of his platoon and assisted in the consolidation of our new position until late in the afternoon of the 4th instant when he was compelled by the O.C his Company to withdraw. On many previous occasions this N.C.O has shown great gallantry and resourcefulness.

No 2209 Private ALBERT ALLAN GREENWAY BRIGHT.

In his capacity as Stretcher-bearer this Soldier set an example of utter fearlessness and devotion to duty to everyone both in the operation of the 4th and 12th of October. During the whole of these operations, constantly, under heavy fire he tended to the wounded and assisted in their evacuation; and, especially in the operations of the 12th October, under the most trying circumstances. Never for a moment did he swerve from his duties, and by his efforts many lives of the wounded were saved.

Recommended for the MILITARY MEDAL

No 29 Sergeant EDGAR STANLEY BEARD

During the operations of both the 4th and 12th October this NCO who is Transport Sergeant in his battalion volunteered to deliver hot rations to his Battalion. The conditions were dreadful on the 12th instant the ground being almost impassable. He went forward with pack mules on both occasions and successfully saw that the rations reached their destination. His courage and determination have on all occasions during operations been worthy of the highest commendation.

No 12306 Private LANCELOT CROPLEY SMITH A.A.M.C. attached 38th Battn

During operations of both 4th and 12th October while on duty at an advanced Reg. Aid Post and constantly under heavy shell fire he dressed the wounded in the open with a total disregard for his personal safety. On the last occasion during the operations of the 12th October he carried out this work for 2 days continuously until he was himself severely wounded on the evening of the 2nd day.

No 1852 Private ALBERT HOLLINGSWORTH

No 485 Private ~~HENRY~~ WILLIAM JAMES LESLIE NEVELL

These 2 Soldiers were employed as runners between Batt H.Q. and the front line and did exceedingly good work in carrying messages forward during the most severe bombardment. On their return journeys from the front line to Batt H.Q. they assisted in carrying back the wounded. They exhibited great courage and devotion to duty.

(for M M) 38th Battn

No 515 Corporal ISAAC LEICHARDT BELL

This N.C.O was in charge of a Signalling Station and by his courage, energy and devotion to duty considerably helped with bringing about successful communication although working under very trying conditions. He has at all times carried out his duties in a splendidly unselfish manner and his courage and fortitude during the recent operations are worthy of the highest praise.

No 529 Lance Corporal GORDON CAMPBELL

This N.C.O who was in charge of a Section during the operations of both the 4th and 12th October, by his fearlessness and prompt action showed a splendid example to his men. Under very heavy fire he showed an utter disregard of self and rendered most valuable assistance to the O.C his company by collecting information and clearing up the situation during the operations of the 12th October

No 933 Corporal JOHN VINCENT MEREDITH

This N.C.O was in charge of a L.G. team and did exceptionally good work during the operations of both the 4th and 12th of October. In the operations of the 12th he showed great courage and skill leading his team forward to the most advanced position and endeavouring to keep down the enemy's fire with his gun. His coolness, courage, and determination were inspiring to his comrades.

No 1670 Private JOHN MATHESON

This soldier in the operations of both the 4th and 12th of October showed fine courage inspiring all his comrades with confidence. During the operations of the 12th October when severe casualties had been inflicted on his Battalion he stuck to his ground he had won and by his coolness, courage and devotion to duty did much to allay the confusion that arose on account of the casualties ~~that had~~ inflicted ~~arisen~~. He exhibited many fine qualities of leadership.

No 1832 Private FREDERICK FEDDER

This soldier did duty as stretcher bearer during the operations of the 12th October. He carried out his duty under heavy shell fire with great courage and devotion and through his exertions many wounded were successfully evacuated. He did similar good work during the operations of the 4th October. The conditions under which he worked were arduous in the extreme, but he continued with untiring energy and devotion.
(Recommended in last list under name of "FEDER")

No 645A Sergeant JAMES HENRY STEELE KING

This N.C.O. led his Platoon with great courage, forthrightness and ability. He set a fine example to his men under very severe shell and M G fire and inspired them all with his fine example. This was not only during the operations of 4th October but during those of the 12th. At all times he has shown the same courage and coolness and his example has been of incalculable value to his Company.
(Recommended in last list)

150 (for MM) APPENDIX. 38th Batn

No 5974 Sergeant JOHN BURKE
No 2802A Sergeant HAROLD JAMES FRASER

These two NCOs during the Operations of the 12th of October did excellent work. They led their men through heavy shell and MG fire to the most advanced position and there endeavoured to assist the advance of their Battalion by keeping down the enemy fire. By their fine example of courage and coolness their men were greatly inspired. When the advance of their Battalion was ultimately held up and they were ordered to fall back to a new position they again led their men to that position under complete control & greatly assisted their Company Commanders in the consolidation and holding of the line. Their conduct was a fine example to all and they exhibited great ability in leadership. At all times they have set a fine standard of courage and devotion to duty.

APPENDIX.

53

36th Batt

Recommended for mention in despatches for Courage and devotion to duty.

Captain HORACE Ferdinand SELLECK
Captain WILLIAM HENRY ORCHARD
Lieut PHILIP CHARLES HERRING
Lieut FRANK FLETCHER MACOBOY
Lieut JAMES JOSEPH MUNDAY
2/Lieut ELSDON STOREY.
Lieut GEORGE ARTHUR DUTTON.
405972 Corpl RUSSELL BENEDICT BRANCH.

150

APPENDIX. 17/10/17.

From C.O. 38th.Battalion. A.I.F.

To. H.Q. 10th.Aust. Inf. Bde.

Reference your J.J.C.224 of even date.

Herewith full christian names as requested for 4th ----- 12th inst.,

Major.Geoffry HURRY

Lieut.Fred Russell Beauchamp MARTIN
Capt. Ernest William LATCHFORD
Capt. Harold DENCH
Capt. George Vernon DAVIES A. A. M. C.

No. 996.Sgt. John Stanley SHILLIDAY
" 2209.Pte. Albert Allan BRIGHT

No. 389.Pte. Cecil Ernest SEYMOUR
" 1340 " Benjamin Dollas TRANTER
" 715 Cpl. Harry Bain WHITE
" 997 Pte. William Edgar STANBURY
" 1884 " Ewen McMASTER
" 851 Cpl. Frank Stanley Harrison CRAFTER
" 1927 Pte. Bernard George WALTERS
" 1815 " Peter CHALMERS
" 1816 " Thomas Main ~~CHAMERS~~ CHALMERS
" 2078 " John Gray GUTHRIDGE
" 2634 " Robert Balman SINCLAIR
" 3233 Sgt. Olaf Andrew SIDEN
1832 Pte. Frederick FEDDER
No.2469 " Albert Victor PETHERICK
" 645A Sgt. James Henry Steele KING

Sinclair Cpl Branch RB
pte Blake D

No. 29 Sgt. Edgar Stanley BEARD
"12306 Pte. Lancelot Crofley SMITH A.A.M.C.
" 1852 " Albert HOLLINGWORTH
" 485 " William James Leslie NEWELL
" 515 Cpl. Isaac Leichardt BELL
" 529 LCpl. Gordon CAMPBELL
" 933 Cpl. John Vincent MEREDITH
" 1670 Pte. John MATHESON
"1832 " Frederick FEDDER
"645A Sgt. James Henry Steele KING
"5974 " John BURKE
"2802 " Harold James FRASER

Capt. Horace Ferdinand SELLECK
Capt. William Henry ORCHARD
Lieut.Philip Charles HERRING
Lieut.Frank Fletcher MACOBOY
Lieut.James Joseph MUNDAY
Lieut.Elsdon STOREY
Lieut. George Arthur DUTTON
No.5972.Cpl. Russell Benedict BRANCH

A8k.

A806/17

16/10/17. for C.O. 38th.Bn. A.I.F.