AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/12/19
EAST & MIDDLE EAST UNITS

AIF Headquarters Ceylon General Branch

March 1942



1/12/19-0012

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SECRET
Army Form C. 2118

Unit HQ.AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE.
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF(CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
BEIT JIRJA CAMP	5 Mar		In accordance with telephoned instructions, Brig.A.J. Boase, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. departed by car from BEIT JIRJA Camp, PALESTINE, and arrived in CAIRO about 2330 hrs. preparatory to reporting to G.O.C.,A.I.F. (M.E.) on morning of 6 Mar.	
CAIRO	do	2330		
CAIRO	6 Mar	0945	Brig. Boase reported to Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey, G.O.C., A.I.F. (M.E.) at G.H.Q. Middle East, was informed that the Australian Government had offered two Bde. Gps. and certain ancillary troops for temporary garrison duty in CEYLON until such time as they could be relieved by British troops. G.O.C., A.I.F. stated he had nominated 16 & 17 Aust. Bde. Gps. and certain ancillary units of 6 Aust. Div. still in M.E. Force to be commanded by Brig. Boase (with temporary rank of Maj.-Gen.) and staff to be found from balance of H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. not yet embarked, Lt.-Col. R.G. Pollard (at present in India) and such others as might be required to be drawn from units comprising the force. G.O.C. approved of the following appointments, subject to the Australian Government's acceptance of his recommendations re composition and command of force:-	
			G.S.O.I - Lt.-Col. R.G. Pollard (who would report at COLOMBO as soon as his release from present duties in India could be effected)	
			G.S.O.II - Capt. J.G.S.Moffatt - (with rank of T/Major)	
			G.S.O.III - Capt. A.J.S. Cotter - G.S.O.3 (CW) 6 Aust. Div.	

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Commanding Officer MAJOR GENERAL A.J.BOASE
COMD. AIF. (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
CAIRO	6 Mar	(Ctd)	A.A. & Q.M.G. - Maj. C. Bowser - D.A.Q.M.G. 6Aust.Div. (with rank of T/Lt.-Col.) D.A.A.G. - Capt. W.N.Lees - D.A.A.G.(L) 6 Aust. Div. D.A.Q.M.G - Capt.I.S. McKenzie - D.A.Q.M.G.(L) 9 Aust. Div. (with rank of T/Maj.) (2/2 Bn) D.A.D.M.S. - Maj. C.H. Selby - D.A.D.M.S. 6 Aust. Div. D.A.D.O.S. - Lt.-Col. B.H. Walter - D.A.D.O.S. 6 Aust. Div. L.S.O. - Capt. H.A.Solomon - 6 Aust.Cav.Regt.(temp.doing duty as L.S.O. 6 Aust. Div.) and Maj. H. Cochrane - Permanent President of Courts-Martial.	
do	do	1145	Maj.Gen. Sir L.J.Morshead, Comd. 9 Aust. Div., arrived and the question of command of 16 Aust.Inf.Bde. and release of Capt. I.S. McKenzie from present appointment were discussed. G.O.C. A.I.F. after discussion decided to appoint Lt.-Col.J.Lloyd (C.O.2/28 Bn) to Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. temporarily with temp. rank of Brigadier and confirmed proposed allottment of Capt. I.S.McKenzie for duty as D.A.Q.M.G. of Force. Brig. Boase stated he considered inclusion of Anti-Tank Unit and M.G. Bn.in the force essential, but G.O.C. A.I.F. stated G.H.Q. India had not asked for these units and they would not be sent unless their inclusion was requested by India. It was decided that provisional arrangements should be made in anticipation of Aust.approving recommendations of G.O.C.A.I.F. for Brig. Boase and two members of Staff to fly to COLOMBO, leaving TIBERIAS on or as soon as possible after 11 Mar. and and for Lt.-Col. Lloyd and Capt. McKenzie to take up their new appointments.	

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)
MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF. (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
CAIRO	7 Mar	0700	Brig. Boase accompanied Maj.-Gen. Sir L.J.Morshead to flying boat base, CAIRO, to witness departure by air of G.O.C. A.I.F. (L.E.) for Australia.	
			Brig. Boase spent morning and afternoon with Col. E. Woodward, C.B.E., A/D.A. & Q.M.G., H.Q. AIF . arranging details. During afternoon Lt.-Col.J.E. Lloyd, D.S.O. M.C., reported from M.E. and was given his instructions personally .	
do	8 Mar		Brig. Boase saw Col. Woodward in the morning; the latter stated that cable MC.5377 dated 7 Mar. approving in toto of recommendations of G.O.C. A.I.F. had been received the previous night.	
			Brig. Boase proceeded with Lt.-Col.Lloyd to H.Q. A.I.F. and finalised arrangements for departure. He saw Col.Woodward again in evening and was informed that H.Q. A.I.F. had cabled Australia.	

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MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF. (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
CAIRO	8 Mar. (Ctd.)		(AD. 4575 dated " Mar.) requesting that T/Maj.Gen.Boase should be granted powers similar to those given Maj.Gen.Bennett in Malaya.	
CAIRO	9 Mar.	0800	Maj. Gen. Boase left Cairo by car for SUEZ, picking up T/Brig. Lloyd en route. Met P.M.(Maj.L.E.Dawson) and C.C.(Capt.L.Darcey) and Lt.-Col. J.Stevenson D.S.O., O.C.2/3 Bn, at transit camp, SUEZ, and was informed that 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. was at GENEIFA Camp and the first line M.T.at the V.M.P. SUEZ. Met Brig.M.Moten, Comd. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. and Col. Gee, A.A.C.S. at Suez Club and put the former in the picture as to what was happening. Arranged to introduce T/Brig. Lloyd to other C.Os of16 Aust.Inf. Bde. at GENEIFA Camp where party lunched at H.Q. 16 Aust.Inf.Bde.	
		1245	Capt. Silverman, M.C. Staff at SUEZ, reported to H.Q.16 Aust.Inf. Bde/ and requested that O.C.Tps. and Ship's Staff for Orontes should proceed immediately to SUEZ and take over duties. This was arranged forthwith at C.Os. Conference.	
GAZA		1400 2130	T/Maj-Gen. Boase resumed his journey to GAZA, arriving there at 2130 hrs.	
	10 Mar.		T/Maj-Gen. Boase conferred with Comd. AIF (M.E.) Base Area, Brig. J.A. Chapman D.S.O. who stated that BOAC Flying-boat departure from TIBERIAS had been postponed until 12 Mar.	

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Unit HQ. AIF (CEYLON)
MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
NEW DELHI INDIA	10 Mar		Cipher message received at G.H.Q. ARMINDIA, New Delhi that Lt-Col. Pollard, AIF to report to COLOMBO by the 14/15 Mar. as G.S.O.I H.Q. AIF (CEYLON)	
GAZA	11 Mar	1145	T/Maj-Gen.Boase departed Gaza.	
TIBERIAS		1545	T/Maj-Gen. Boase arrived TIBERIAS, meeting T/Lt-Col.Bowser and T/Maj. Moffatt at latter place at 1600 hrs.	
	12 Mar	0700	Notified that departure of flying boat was postoned a further 24 hours.	
		2000	B.O.A.C. representative notified intending passengers that flying boat's departure had again been postponed and it would not leave until 14 Mar.	
JERUSALEM	13 Mar		T/Maj-Gen. Boase spent day in JERUSALEM endeavouring to purchase additional kit.	
COLOMBO	do	1515	GI arrived COLOMBO.	
TIBERIAS	14 Mar		Departure of flying boat "Coorong" delayed CAIRO. Eventually left TIBERIAS about 1100 hrs.	
BASRA	do	1800	Arrived BASRA. Col. BOUCHER, Brig. i/c Adm. IRAQ joined flying boat at HABANIYAH.	
COLOMBO	do		GI reported to Gen.Pownall G.O.C. Ceylon and given rough outline of plan for defence of Island.	

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Unit HQ. AIF (CEYLON).

MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF (CEYLON).

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
BASRA	15 Mar	0545	Flying boat dep. BASRA 0545 hrs.	
SHARJAH	do	1100	" " arr. SHARJAH 1100 hrs. Night was spent at latter place as it was uncertain if flying boat could reach KARACHI in daylight.	
COLOMBO	do		Under instructions from 'GENERAL KANDY' GI reconnoitred KALUTARA area for a Div. HQ. site in the morning. In the afternoon GI interviewed B.G.S., Brig.i/c Adm., D.A.Q.M.G.(M) with view to obtaining some "G" instructions and ensuring arrangements satisfactory for reception of AIF. Was informed that matters in hand but information not yet available. Question of temporary accomodation and provision of M.T. for G.O.C. AIF(CEYLON) and staff also taken up.	
SHARJAH	16 Mar	0800	Flying boat left SHARJAH 0800 hrs.	
KARACHI	do	1500	" " arr. KARACHI about 1500 hrs. E.S.O. KARACHI stated he had no notification of party's arrival, nor had any arrangements been made for the onward move to COLOMBO by TATA Airways. After some pressure had been brought on the latter they agreed to provide seats for three as far as Bombay and for two as far as Colombo on the plane leaving KARACHI on 17 Mar, the remaining officer to be given a passage on the plane leaving BOMBAY on 18 Mar. No hotel accommodation was available in KARACHI for other than through passengers on B.O.A.C. aircraft and it was only through the good offices of Col.BOUCHER that the 6 Aust Div. party eventually obtained accommodation for the night.	

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Unit H.Q. AIF (CEYLON)
MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOWSE
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
KARACHI	16 Mar. (Ctd)		Lt-Col. C.H. Harrison O.B.E. R.I.A.S.C. was also most helpful and through him it was arranged to notify COLOMBO by wire on 17 Mar. of the date of departure of the party from KARACHI, but this message was not received at COLOMBO H.Q. up to 21 Mar.	
COLOMBO	do		GI visited C.C. 12 AGH re temporary accommodation personnel 4 AGH and site for 4 AGH. Interviewed D.D.M.S. Force re above.	
KARACHI	17 Mar.	0630	T/Maj-Gen. Bowse and party left KARACHI by TATA airways 0630 hrs. and arrived BOMBAY 1330 hrs. Maj. Moffatt left plane to stay night in Bombay and was requested to send a message notifying time of arrival of T/Maj-Gen Bowse and T/Lt-Col. Bowser at COLOMBO. (This message was subsequently received twenty-four hours after time of arrival of the party concerned in COLOMBO.)	
HYDERABAD	do	1645	Maj-Gen. Bowse & Lt-Col. Bowser arrived HYDERABAD about 1645 hrs. and spent the night there.	
COLOMBO	do		GI interviewed A.Q. Force. A.Q. Genkandy, D.A.Q.M.G., S.O. Fortress, G.I. Force, D.D.M.S. Force. Notified by A.Q. Genkandy that owing to M.T. and tents not being with personnel all instructions prepared have to be altered and tps. will have to remain on board pending receipt of such stores and tpt., and until permanent fixtures erected in camp sites. Received from GI. Force, copy of map of CEYLON showing outlines of dispositions of all tps. for defence of CEYLON, also initial issue of maps for distribution.	

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)
MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Commanding Officer COMD. AIF (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
HYDERABAD	13 Mar.	0630	Maj-Gen. Boase and Lt-Col. [illegible] left HYDERABAD 0630 hrs. and arrived COLOMBO 1445 hrs. Met by Lt-Col. R.G. POLLARD, G.S.O.I AIF (CEYLON) and Major F.J. PHILLY, Australian Military Liaison Officer (Ceylon) Proceeded to Military H.Q. and met C.G. 12 AGH, (Col. G.C. MACARTNEY D.S.O.) Arranged to report to G.O.C.-in-C. Ceylon (Lt-Gen. POWNALL) at 1930 hrs. prior to his departure on tour. Invited attention of Lt-Gen. Pownall to non-inclusion of Div. Cav. Regt, A/Tk.Regt. and M.G.Bn. HQ. R.A.A. 6 Aust.Div. and affiliated sub-units. He agreed that these units would be very acceptable and sent a most immediate signal (copy attached) to G.H.Q.India. G.O.C.-in-C. stated he had only arrived in country about a fortnight earlier and was endevouring to build up a staff. Maj-Gen. Boase studied position of AIF as regards reception and outline disposition and role. He disagreed with (a) the siting of HQ AIF. at KALUTARA SOUTH (on coast rd.with nearest tps.at least two miles away (b) a Bde.Gp. (less three Bns.) being sited on the coast approx. four miles away from nearest Bn. (c) the disposition of Bde.Gp. responsible for coast watching and protection of aerodromes. All Bns.were sited along coast. distances between Bns.from North to South being approx. forty-eight miles and twelve miles. It was considered that a better distribution would be for KATAKURUNDA to be made the responsibility of Bde. stationed at HORANA.	Appendix 1.

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Commanding Officer MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE COMD. AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	19 Mar.		Morning in the office with G.S.O.I and A.Q. Discussed arrangements with [illegible].G.S. (Lt-Col.GREAVES, R.I.A.S.C.) Force HQ. CEYLON. and C.E. Practically no arrangements made for reception of AIF beyond recce of possible camp sites. No tents available as those demanded had gone astray in India. No work yet commenced on conservancy arrangements at camp sites. Shortage of labour and strikes, lack of facilities for unloading at ports, shortage of M.T. stated to be holding up preparations. Local Staff appears to be fully occupied in dealing with arrangements for reception of East African Inf. Bde. who are in process of disembarkation. It is also stated that three artillery regiments arrived for disembarkation at COLOMBO without any prior notice. General impression is that peace time methods are still prevalent to a considerable extent and that discipline of troops and sailors in COLOMBO who comprise many different nationalities, is not what it should be. Saluting by troops in public is generally conspicuous by its absence and among British units, whose morale is generally reflected by their smartness on and off parade, this appears somewhat disquieting. The organization of intelligence and security duties on a comprehensive scale has just been commenced. In the afternoon Comd., G.S.O. and M.L.O. visited area HOLMA-HORAWALA- ALUTGAMA-KALUTARA allotted to 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp. and had general look at proposed camp sites which are among coconut and rubber plantations for most part where tents will have to be dotted about among trees.	

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD. AIF (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	19 Mar.		Reports on recce. of camp sites carried out previously by M.L.O. as a member of a board appointed by CEYLON H.Q. are contained in	Appendix 2
	20 Mar.		Comd., G.S.O.I and A.A.L.O. reconnoitred the route COLOMBO-KALUTARA-GALLE-KOGGALA-WELIGAMA-AKURESSA-MADAMPE-PELMADULLA-RATNAPURA-HORANA-COLOMBO and visited old fort at GALLE where one Coy. of 9/8 Punjab Regt. is stationed, and the H.Q. of 9/8 Punjab Regt. at KOGGALA. The C.O. (Lt.-Col. GODDARD) handed the Comd. AIF (CEYLON) one copy of an Appreciation of Situation in connection with the defence of KOGGALA area. With the exception of the upland area where the hill tea plantations are situated, the route led through practically continuous plantations of coconut palms or rubber trees with numerous villages, bungalows, etc. fairly close together. In the upland area S.E. of RATNAPURA the clearings for the numerous tea plantations permit general observation over a wide extent, but still provide considerable low cover. The coastal road is generally good, though narrow, but under existing conditions individual motor vehicles will not normally average more than 25-28 m.i.h.- convoys proportionately less. The inland route via AKURESSA-MADAMPE-RATNAPURA is extremely narrow and tortuous, with steep gradients and hairpin bends which would make it particularly dangerous for convoy work at night. In the section south of MADAMPE its use is restricted to vehicles of a tare of 30 cwt. or less. In its present state it is practically unusable by convoys and the journey from WELIGAMA to RATNAPURA (approx. 100 miles) by car took 5½ hours. However, if communication by the coastal route is interrupted it may be necessary to use this road or the one from RATNAPURA via BALANGODA, which it is understood is somewhat better, to maintain 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.	Appendix 3

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Unit H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

MAJOR GENERAL A.J.BOWSER

Commanding Officer CO.D. A.I.F. (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
Colombo	21 Mar	a.m.	'Otranto' arrived with bulk of personnel of 17 Aust.Inf.Bde.Gp. (excl.2/7Bn. which is on another ship) and details of H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. A.A. & Q.M.G. (Lt-Col. Bowser) proceeded to ship with E.S.O.	
do	do	1230	Comd. AIF (CEYLON) had interview with Lt.-Gen. Powell (G.O.C.-in-C) and invited attention to unsatisfactory locations proposed for H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON) (KALUTARA SOUTH) and for 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. (less Bns. at GALLE and KOGALLA areas respectively) at BUSSA. Comd. A.I.F.(CEYLON) also suggested that Bn. for duty at aerodrome K.G.KURUNDA might more suitably be provided from the northern (16 Aust. Inf. Bde.Gp.) G.O.C.-in-C. stated that the dispositions criticised were not intended tactically and authorised their alteration at discretion of G.O.C. A.I.F. (CEYLON). The latter also invited attention to the importance of the area east of KATUKURUNDA, in which the foci of roads from BATTICALOA and POTTUVIL in the east and from KALUTARA, AMBALANTOTA, MATARA and WELIGAMA were situated. G.O.C-in-C. agreed that in the event of a landing at any of these places the holding of the focal areas indicated would immediately assume great importance and might necessitate the transfer of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.Gp.(less KATAKURUNDA garrison) to those areas. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. also enquired as to A.Tk. resources available and mentioned the necessity for ample stocks of A.Tk. mines, 68 and 73 grenades etc. being made available in the absence of adequate A.Tk. guns. G.O.C-C. stated he was enquiring into position and also undertook to arrange to obtain the services of some officers from 100 Ind.Inf.Bde. to A.I.F. in training for jungle warfare	

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Unit H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON)
MAJOR GENERAL A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer COMD. A.I.F. (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	21 Mar.(Ctd)		He emphasised the necessity for getting troops used to moving through the wooded areas and getting to know the various routes in their localities. G.O.C.-in-C. also asked that adequate arrangements for piquetting COLOMBO be made when leave for A.I.F. personnel was granted, as neither Australians or Indian tps. were popular with local inhabitants. Comd. lunched with G.O.C.-in-C. at Colombo Club.	
do	do	1630	Comd. G.S.O.I, A.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon) accompanied A.Q. Force (Lt.-Col. Wemyss) and D.A.Q.M.G.(M) (Lt.-Col. Williams) aboard 'ORANTO' Comd. described general situation and proposed dispositions to Comd. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. (Brig. MOTEN) and C.O. 2/2 Fd. Regt. (Lt.-Col. CREMOR) and arranged for Comd. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. and recce parties from Bde. H.Q., 2/2 Fd. Regt. 2/3 Fd. Coy., 2/5 and 2/6 Bns., 2/2 Fd. Amb. to proceed to the area allotted to the 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp. to reconnoitre camp sites including one of Bde. H.Q. and balance of Gp. not allotted as garrisons for GALLE and KOGGALA, leaving COLOMBO as soon as possible after 0700 hrs. 22 Mar.	
do	22 Mar		Nucleus H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON) opened at MUSAEUS COLLEGE, BARNES PLACE, COLOMBO.	

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Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)
Major General A.J.BOASE
Commanding Officer Comd. AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year March 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	23 Mar		G1 visited Command HQ this afternoon and raised many questions on G matters generally. Report on conference with BGS is attached .	Appx.4
	24 Mar		G1 again visited Comd. HQ and raised questions re sig. comns. Report is attached.	Appx.5
	25 Mar		Arrival of 'ORONTES' and 'WESTERNLAND'. G.O.C. and members of staff went on board.	
	26 Mar		CRE visited CE and held conference on various eng. matters. Detailed report attached.	Appx 6
	26 Mar		O.C.Sigs. AIF (CEYLON) attended a conference today with C.S.O. and raised certain questions relating to sig. matters. Questions raised by O.C. Sigs. are attached.	Appx 7
	26 Mar		G.O.C. and G1 dined on board 'WESTERNLAND' this evening.	
	26 Mar		Arrangements were made by G111(o) to have photographs taken of HQ personnel and Div. tps. in accordance with instructions from HQ CEYLON Command. The photographs are required for Identification Passes which are to be issued to all offrs. in the CEYLON Command. Photographer: CHITRAFOTO, Lake House, COLOMBO.	
	27 Mar		O.C.Sigs. A.I.F. (CEYLON) again interviewd C.S.O. on the matters raised at their conference yesterday.	Detailed questions answers are attached to Diary for 26 Mar42

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SECRET

Army Form C. 2118

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. I. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Erase heading not required)

Month and Year March 1942

Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Commanding Officer Major-General A.J. BOASE. Comd. AIF (CEYLON)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	27 Mar		G.O.C. (AIF) interviewed Lt-Gen. Pownall.	Notes on interview appended - appx 8
	27 Mar		G.O.C. in company of G.O.C. CEYLON called on C-in-C.	Appx 8
	27 Mar		G.O.C. attended a "Meeting of Comds." called by C-in-C,	Agenda attached. Appx 9
	27 Mar		A.I.F. invited to attach or send an LO to Naval Offr.i/c Intelligence.	
	27 Mar		G.O.C. explained to G.O.C.(CEYLON) the difficulty being experienced in obtaining information and facilities (eg.lack of telephonic comms at HQ A.I.F. (CEYLON) for efficient performance of role.	
	27 Mar		Three telephones were connected before 2100 hrs. Telephone number COLOMBO 9583.	
	27 Mar		Report on interview by G111(o) with G111 Security HQ CEYLON Command attached.	Appx. 10
	27 Mar		Report on visit of Capt. F.C. WALKER to Surveyor General's office in connection with 1" maps attached.	Appx.11

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SECRET

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WAR DIARY
or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Erase heading not required)

Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)
Major-General A.S. BOASE
Commanding Officer Comd. AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	28 Mar		Location Statement of A.I.F. units in CEYLON issued as at 2359 hrs. 27 Mar. 42.	Appx 12
	28 Mar		B.G.S. Ceylon Command visited HQ today at 1530 hrs. as result of telephone communication with G1 concerning the non-delivery of copies of a cable re movement of A.I.F. tps. G1 report on the visit attached.	Appx 13
	28 Mar		G.O.C. A.I.F. called G.O.C. CEYLON and reported inability to (a) obtain necessary information or correct information (b) to get in touch with duty offr. on Comd. HQ between 1947 and 2107 hrs. 27 Mar. 42 and also again at 0700 hrs. today.	
	28 Mar		G.O.C. visited HORANA and KATUKURUNDA areas in afternoon.	
	28 Mar		Report on visit of Capt. F.C. WALKER (G111 (o) L) to Surveyor General's Office in connection with maps is attached.	Appx 14
	28 Mar		Report on visit by LO (Major COCHRANE) to HQ Ceylon Command.	
	28 Mar		Report on visit by LO to HQ Ceylon Command attached.	Appx 15

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WAR DIARY
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SECRET

Army Form C. 2118

Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Major-General A.J.BOASE

Commanding Officer Comd. AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year March 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	28 Mar		Copies of messages sent ARMINDIA seeking approval for the disembarkation of the following units ~~at~~ :- HQ RAA DIV. CAV. REGT. with Sig.Sec. and LAD Coy. AIF (CEYLON) Sigs. MG. Bn. A/Tk REGT. with Sig Sec. and LAD were received from HQ CEYLON Command today. ✓	Appx 16 See Appx.1
	29 Mar		LO. Lieut. AYRTON 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn. reported for duty together with draughtsman, one clerk and two orderlies.	
	29 Mar		Large supply of maps of various areas and scales received.	
	29 Mar		Details of interviews by G111(o) with G11 (I) attached appx	Appx 17
	30 Mar		G1 today discussed with BGS whether it was necessary for A.I.F. to supply personnel for manning Command A/Tk. Btys. In view of projected arrival of 1 A/Tk. Regt. an offer was made to Command of one bty. from Regt. to perform duties whilst the Eng. and Ind. personnel were being trained. BGS stated he would see GOC-in-C and inform this HQ of decision.	
	30 Mar		G11 and D.A.Q.M.G. carried out a recce in the area of TEBUWANA, MEEGODA, MATUGAMA, HORAWALA and DODANGODA for a camp site for 1 Aust. ~~A~~/Tk. Regt. Suitable locations were found at HORAWALA and DODANGODA.	

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WAR DIARY
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Erase heading not required)

SECRET

Army Form C. 2118

Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)
Major-General A.J. BOASE
Commanding Officer Comd. AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year MARCH 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	30 Mar		G11 and A.Q.M.G. visited 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. whilst on this reece and discussed questions raised by them. Matters discussed included the provision of telephones for Bde. HQ, arranging for DR to call at HORANA on his return run from GALLE and whether it was proposed to establish an "X" list for personnel evacuated from units on medical grounds.	
	30 Mar		Major LOVELL - 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.- reported for duty with ~~Bde~~. HQ AIF (CEYLON) as an LO.	
	30 Mar		LO Major COCHRANE visited Command HQ and obtained further information on A/Tk.Btys. and was advised personnel required to man 6 pr. guns and that course would probably commence on 4 or 6 Apr.	
	30 Mar		CRE visited CE today and raised the usual large number of questions and received the usual answer of "stocks are on order from INDIA". Attached is summary of visit.	Appx 18
	31 Mar		G.O.C's message to all ranks issued today. Copy attached.	Appx 19
	31 Mar		Advice received today that Government Boys' School at MATUGAMA not now available but that this HQ had been given Government Girls'School instead.	
	31 Mar		Advice received that 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. would be arriving tomorrow.	

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WAR DIARY
or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C. 118

Unit HQ AIF (CEYLON)

Commanding Officer Major-General A.J.BOASE Comd AIF (CEYLON)

Month and Year March 1942

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices
COLOMBO	31		LO (Major LOVELL) visited 16 and 17 Aust.Inf.Bde this afternoon in an endeavour to obtain Offrs and OR's to complete HQ.WE.AIF.(CEYLON). CRE again visited CE to-day and raised further questions.	

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COPY.

To: ARMINDIA

From: GENCOM COLOMBO 14092/18

General Boase Comd 6 (6) Aust Div arrived. He is very anxious that following NOT now detailed to disembark here should however do so. H.Q.R.A.A. Div Div C A V Regt with Signal Sec and L A D Det Coy 6 (6) Aust Div Sigs M.G. Bn A.T Regt with Sig Sec and L A D. These were not detailed to disembark here because not asked for and he believes if representations made to Australia that permission would be given to unload here. Strongly support his view and request that representations be made. All personnel above units except Anti Tank are in West Point. Correction after L A D Detachment read Coy.

(2)

To: Gencom Colombo. rptd Troopers

From: Armindia

x 21

Most Immediate

Your 14092/18 dated 18/3.

Approval has been obtained for retention of troops in Ceylon as recommended by General Boase Authority Army Melbourne 5829 (5529)? of 21/3.

Necessary action should now be taken by you.

T.O.O. 1401/21

(3)

C?R?C?A?C? G/1

HQ AIF Ceylon.

Forwarded for information.

Ceylon Comd
28 Mar 42

Lieut General
G.O.C. Ceylon Command

SECRET 2

Report of a Recce.carried out on 12th,13th,
and 14th March,1942,by:-

Col.G.W.MacCarthy	12 A.G.H.
Major F.J.Perry	A.M.L.O.
Major W.A.Hopkins	I.M.S.
Capt. L.J.King	Staff Captain
Capt. B.O.Bostock	R.E.

OBJECT:-

1. To select a Bn.site at KATAKURUNDA
2. " " " " " KOGGALA
3. " " " " in the GALLE area.
4. To select a Bde Gp in the HORANA area.
5. To select a Div H.Q. site at (a) BADDEGAMA
   or
   (b) AMBALANGODA
   or
   (c) ELPITIYA.

Ref. Maps:- 1 inch to 1 mile sheets.

HORANA.

ALUTGAMA.

AMBALANGODA.

GALLE CENTRALISED.

DISTRIBUTION:-

G. (2 copies)
A.Q. (2 ")
M. (
A.M.L.O.(2 Copies)

SECR

1. KATUKARUNDA. (Inf. Bn) 16 Punjab is in occupation of a site on high ground to SOUTH of road in vicinity of (812236). This area is not sufficient for complete Bn.,and Bn.Comd has selected detached sites for 2 Coys,nearer Aerodrome at:-

(a) SCHOOL to SOUTH of road,(7922) or

(b) WEST of tract (794232).

Wells exist at all sites and could be easily augmented by the digging of additional wells which would not need to be of great depth. The 3 Wells in the main camp are sufficient for the supply of drinking water - troops bathe in a neighbouring stream.

Bn. Comd pointed out a site in PEMBROKE Estate (8223) to serve as an alternative to the main camp site (812236). This alternative scheme allows of extra dispersion and of visual communication with Aerodromes.

2. KOGGALA. (Inf.Bn) Bn.Comd 8 Punjab has selected sites:-

(a) for 1 Coy between KOGGALA LAKE and Coast between M.S. 82 and 83 (2352) and

(b) for remainder of Bn.in high ground to WEST of road running NORTH through (2555) and (2556)

This latter site was chosen after detailed recce.of the entire area.The road adjoining the site requires improvement and Bn. Comd has discussed the matter with local P.W.D.

3/-

3. GALLE AREA. (Inf Bn)

(a) To SOUTH of road GALLE - UDUGAMA
between M.S. 3 and 4 (0963, 1063)

(b) Astride road running NORTH (0961, 0963).

Both these sites are within easy distance of GALLE to which they are connected by a series of alternative roads.

The BRIDGE (0961) would require strengthening if heavy M.T. is used.

Houses in the vicinity could be utilised as offices etc.

Water supply would involve the digging of additional wells.

4. HORANA. (Bde. Group) The areas to the WEST and NORTH-WEST of HORANA are low lying and/or do not provide cover.

The ground to SOUTH of road HORANA - RATNAPURA in vicinity of M.S. 3 is suitable for a portion of the Bde. Group. This area is "in rubber" and a petrol Sta. is in close proximity.

Additional space for the remainder of the Bde. Group exists in the WERAWATTA Rubber Estate between approx. M.S. 2 and 4 on road HORANA-KALUTARA-9236.etc.

In each case the water supply from existing wells would need augmentation from newly dug wells.

Roofed accomodation is available in both areas.

5. (a) /BADDEGAMA

5. DIV.H.Qs

(a) BADDEGAMA. This area is extremely low lying and subject to floods which often rise to about 3 feet above the main road BADDEGAMA-HIKKADUWA.

The BRIDGE (0275) is an essential connecting link with N.W. and S.W. and its destruction would cut off all communications in those directions.

The above factors were considered as rendering BADDEGAMA unsuitable as Div.H.Q.

(b) AMBALANGODA. This area is thickly populated and is situated on a congested bottle-neck on the main COLOMBO--GALLE coastal road.

It was thought that these disadvantages outweighed other considerations which might indicate this place as a suitable Div.H.Q.

(c) ELPITIYA. Suitable roofed accommodation bordering road AMBALANGODA-ELPITIYA were in a very prominent positions and it was thought that the ST.LEONARDS-ON-SEA Rubber Estate (9887) would be a more suitable site.

Included in the area is a Factory and Estate Bungalow.

As in all other areas mentioned in this report the existing water supply from wells needs supplementing by the digging of additional wells.

(d) GENERAL. A recce of the KALUTARA area for the siting of Div.H.Q. was subsequently made (see separate report).

APPRECIATION SECRET 3

of the defence of GALLE and KOGGALA AIR PORT with one Bn. Ind. Inf. det 67 Fd. Coy; det Bde Sig Sec.and det Fd. Amb.

PLACE. KOGGALA

DATE. 12 Mar. 42.

Ref. Map "GALLE Centralised Sheet" Scale 1 inch - 1 mile

1.OBJECT.(a) To prevent a hostile landing at GALLE.
(b) Defence of the sea plane base and landing ground at KOGGALA, so as to enable our air forces to continue to operate from the aerodrome, but to deny its use to the enemy.

2.FACTORS.(a)GALLE. Town and harbour is approximately 8/9 miles from my present Bn.H.Q. at KOGGALA.

The original plan was for one Coy Inf to DELAY any enemy action in the vicinity of GALLE until such time as the Air Base at KOGGALA have been destroyed and the aircraft evacuated. The GALLE and KOGGALA Dets were thrn to make a get away as best they could.

The present order to "prevent a hostile landing at GALLE " is a very different proposition.

There are,I understand,seventeen pillboxes situated round GALLE and the Harbour. Suppose these are manned by three men each,51 men are locked up. Take away another ten for permanent camp duty; allow for 4 line Sick and 55 men are left (provided the Coy is at full strength) as a mobile reserve.

The idea of preventing a hostile landing with such a small force is fantastic - it would be surrounded and mopped up within a very few hours. The scheme will not even work on paper, let alone in the face of an experienced and determined enemy.

Could the suggestion of calling in all available Royal Marines plus any spare men from BOOSA and putting them,plus one coy 8 Punjab,under one Comd for this task,please be examined.

In case of an attack on one or both places which I now have to defend,mutual assistance would be impossible.

Deduction. With the small force available,it is considered essential to decide on the defence of either GALLE or KOGGALA air port.

Having worked in close co-operation with the R.A.F. here for the past few days and reconnoitred the surrounding country; roads;bridges etc,the remainder of this appreciation will deal with the defence of KOGGALA air port with one Inf.Bn.(less 1 Rifle Coy)and the dets S&M,Sig Sec and Fd.Amb.

(b)KOGGALA LAKE.features.

The KOGGALA LAKE is about 3 miles long by 1 mile wide, with a broken and uneven coast line.The shores,in most places, aretthickly wooded. Concealed pens for aircraft should not present much difficulty. There is also ample room for dispersion of aircraft but the difficulty will be in guarding them,if widely dispersed.

The only solution at the moment would appear to be for the actual personnel to look after their own aircraft whilst in its pen by using the existing armament on the aircraft.

Continued on Page 2.....

(c) INNER DEFENDED LOCALITY.

It is the intention to house all R.A.F. personnel, installations, buildings etc on the strip of land from about the Sill 230530 to the point where the arm of the Lake approaches the road near M.S.S. The runway would also be on this land which, for easy reference will be known as the INNER DEFENDED LOCALITY.

(d) DEFENCE OF INNER DEFENDED LOCALITY.

TROOPS. The maximum force which can be spared for the inner defence of the aerodrome, runway, installations etc is one rifle Coy and No.4 Pl(6 M.M.G's) 8 Punjab supported by and trained in close co-operation with, the R.A.F. personnel under the R.A.F. Defence Offfcer. These R.A.F. personnel would probably consist of all aircraft hands (A.C.H's) who could be spared in an emergency to handle a rifleoor L.M.G. All available men are now doing weapon training. It is estimated that about 50 will be available. Their primary role will be the upward and inward defence of the inner defended locality.

M.M.G. posts are being sited so as to cover most of the water surface of the lake-they will be on fixed lines at night so as not to hit dispersed aircraft in the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ dark.

A kucha road is being made round the South bank of the lake to implement speed and accessibility to aircraft in pens.

(e) BEACH DEFENCE.

Between the road and beach (average strip of ground 60 yds) the ground slopes upward and there are numerous palces for camouflaged defensive posts in case of an attempted landing on this beach. This is considered unlikely in view of the fact that there are many, and better beaches in the vicinity which are not defended. Slit trenches and 2 M.MG. posts are however being prepared. I do NOT consider Pillboxes necessary. The whole beach must however be wired, the wire being erected on the existing palm trees and in the undergrowth.

(f) OUTER DEFENDED LOCALITY.

From just E of the 83 M.S. on the South main road to the 11½ M.S. on the North Main Road. Thence along North main Road to 8 M.S. Thence South to just East of 80 M.S.

(g) PROHIBITED AREA.

This will be area inside what is known as the INNER CIRCLE ROAD i.e. from just East of 83 M.S. North to 253570, thence West to 204583 thence South to vicinity 80 M.S. The lake and all ground inside the Inner Circle Road must be cleared of all inhabitants. This matter has been discussed with the Govt.Agent GALLE and it presents no difficulty.

Given this prohibited area, it will be possible to dig or build defensive positions and still maintain a considerable degree of secrecy and camouflage of the actual and dummy positions.

The widening of the Inner Circle Road, strengthening of bridges, provision of passing places etc with extensions up to the main road on th North of the Lake has been undertaken by the R.A.F. as a priority task. These roads are of VITAL IMPORTANCE to the defense of KOGGALA.

Continued on Page 3.....

(h) TERRAIN IN GENERAL.

The country between the North and South main roads is intersected with numerous unmetalled roads which are narrow and liable to flood. There are numerous narrow and kachchha bridges. The other general features are jungle and paddy fields. Ideal country for Infantry who are not afraid of getting their feet wet, but on the other hand, it is practically tank proof except for main roads.

The preparation and manning of strong points on the two main roads at the four corners of the KOGGALA LAKE area will be essential and it is being considered. Road blocks which can be put into effect at short notice must be prepared and held in readiness.

(i) DEMOLITIONS.

So far the Det Fd.Coy S & M have not arrived but the preparation for demolition of the road and Rly bridges in the vicinity of the Sill 230580 and the siting and the preparation of road blocks mentioned in the para will be discussed and arranged.

(j) SILL.

The sill at 230580 which controls the level of the lake is NOT as important as it may first of all appear. If it were damaged by 5th Columnists with a view to lowering the water level in the lake, it could be repaired in about 6 hours wheras it would take about 3 days for the breached outlet to the sea to make any appreciable difference to the level of the lake.

(k) DISPERSION.

The R.A.F. personnel, installations, aircraft etc will be dispersed as much as possible inside the Inner Defended Locality, but it is appreciated that this area will come in for the majority of the heavy stuff and dive bombing.

In order to avoid this concentration by bombing and to ensure having a proportion of steady troops with which to strike, the remainder of the Bn. must be located outside the Inner Defended Area but if possible inside the Innar Circle. A suitable place appears to be in the N.E. corner of the Inner Circle, where high ground, cover and water exists.

There is ample space. This position appears to be very suitable in all respects provided the Inner Circle Road is widened etc as per para 2(g).

(l) BATTLE HDQRS.

The question of the location of Battle H.Qrs has been considered, and although there are advantages of having them inside the Inner Defended Locality and near those of the R.A.F. it is considered that the Battle H.Qrs. of the Inf.Bn. would be better on the site proposed for the Bn.Camp, i.e. in the N.E. corner of the prohibited area.

The position is more simple, striking forces can operate from there with more speed and, with luck, the dive bombing would not be as severe as might be expected on the Inner Defended Locality. It is requested that a board be assembled to examine the site, decide on how much land to acquire, and what buildings etc are necessary.

(m) LIAISON OFFICERS.

One reliable Infantry Officer at R.A.F. Battle H.Q. and one R.A.F Officer at Inf.Bn.Battle H.Q. essential.

Continued on Page 4.....

(n) COY DEFENDED AREAS

It is proposed to give one rifle Coy the task of preparing and manning defensive positions, road blocks etc. on the four corners of thearea of the two main roads. No. 5 Pl.(Pioneers) and Sec. S & M would be attached to this Coy.

This leaves, for the defence of the main Camp and as a Reserve,(potential striking force) only one Rifle Coy, A.A. and Mortar Bl.

(o) TIME AND SPACE

The distance round the Outer Defended locality excluding the strip of Inner Defended locality is approximately 13 miles. With a good road all round, the whole distance could be covered in hakf an hour in trucks or carriers. Intermediate localities could be reinforced by Inf in carriers or trucks in abiut the same time.

The vital necessity of carriers is obvious.

(p) HEAVY A.A. AND BOFORS

The provision of these guns and their siting is a job for specialists.

The importance of alternative positions and necessity of ground protection for them,is however pointed out.

(q) BN. WEAPONS

Apart from the complete absence of carriers this Bn. is deficient of 27 L.M.Gs, 22 A/Tk.rifles. We have no A.A. mountings for the six M.M.Gs.

These must be provided as soon as possible. No one can oppose a cannon with a pea-shooter.

(r) BICYCLES

Experience in this area (intersected with Kachchha Roads) has shown that bicycles would be invaluable for :-

Inter Communication within Coys.
Quick and silent movement of L.M.G or Sec. of tps.
Quick and silent movement of A/Tk. Rifles.
Quick and silent evacuation of casualties by tying a stretcher to three bicycles.
50 extra have been asked for.

(s) The provision of some form of motor boat for inter-communication and/or transport across the lake should be considered.

(t) INTER COMMUNICATION

The R.A.F. are giving close co-operation in this matter and it is hoped to have 4 T.R.9 Sets operating, supplemented by the Beetle system using ordinary wireless sets, tuned and locked, ready for immediate use in an emergency.

This inter-communication plan is in addition to the normal inter Bn.communications, i.e. det. Bde. Sec; Telephone, MC/DR. visual and runner.

(u) MEDICAL

A scheme for making the best use of the Bn.M.O., Stretcher bearers, and the Det. Fd. Amb. is being implemented.

Continued on Page 5.....

(v) RESERVE AMMUNITION.)
RATIONS.) All under consideration.
ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT.)

COURSES OPEN TO THE ENEMY. We may have to deal with enemy attack in any of the following forms.

(a) Heavy scale dive bombing and M.G. attacks on GALLE Harbour or on the Aerodrome, buildings etc. Gas spray may be used.
(b) Landing by Parachute Tps, equipped with automatic weapons, mortars etc. This sort of landing may be made anywhere in the vicinity of GALLE or outside the Aerodrome, or possibly combined with a landing on the Aerodrome.
(c) A combined air and land attack supported by shelling from Warships, Light tank, automatic weapons plus 5th column sabotage.
(d) Whichever course or combination of courses the enemy may adopt, we can be sure that their plans will be based on Surprise and speed of action.
Picked troops armed with special weapons, organised and rehearsed in detail.
Flexibility in execution and rapid exploitation of any success.
Extensive use of roads and out flanking movements.

4. COURSES OPEN TO US.
(a) Maintain the closest liaison and co-operation with the R.A.F.
(b) We cannot possibly be strong everywhere. We must therefore hold the strongest possible mobile Reserve ready to strike immediately in any direction (within limits) in the hope of being able to destroy the advanced elements in an attempted landing or destroy Paratroops before they have time to organise themselves.
(c) This Mobile Reserve to be ready to counter attack and restore a situation. Speed and surprise essential.
(d) Get to know every inch of our area thoroughly.
(e) We must rely on camouflage of localities and actual positions. Also make full use of dummy positions to draw fire and disclose enemy positions.
(f) Locate the majority of the Bn in an area which is not likely to be heavily dive bombed at the commencement of hostilities.
(g) All main roads must be effectively blocked and covered by fire.
(h) Extensive digging and wiring.
(i) We must NOT be drawn too far afield and risk being surrounded and cut off.

5. PLAN.
(1) Establish Battle H.Q. on the Site in the N.E. Corner of the Inner Circle Road. Get land acquired and sanctions for buildings etc immediately.
(2) Build strong defensive areas and road blocks on all four corners of the area on the main roads.

Continued on Page 6.....

PLAN (Contd)

3. Prepare intermediate mutually supporting Sec Posts around the Inner Circle Road, which must be patrolled day and night.
4. Site and prepare defensive positions for the defence of the Inner Defended locality according to the lay out plan of installations and also dispersal pens for aircraft in close co-operation with the R.A.F.
5. Dig, wire and camouflage with all possible speed.
6. Carry out schemes inside and outside the defended areas with the object of getting to know it and being prepared to counter attack in any direction.
7. Establish and try out all methods of inter communication.
8. Throughout this appreciation, the deduction which stands OUT MOST PROMINENTLY is the need for more troops, more weapons, and carriers.

Lt:Col.
Commandant.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No. 1 & 2 for Defence Board on 14.3.42
3 - 7 R.A.F.
8 - 14 8 Punjab.
15 - 16 H.Q. Ind.Bde. CBO.
17 Mily H.Q. Kandy.
18 - 19 War Diary.
20 File.

SECRET

No. 20 / 1 / J.
8 Punjab Regiment,
C/o Field Post Office,
Colombo. 17 March 42.

Subject :- DEFENCE OF KOGGALA AIR PORT.

1. BOFORS. Enclosed is a tracing showing the proposed sites for eight Bofors as finally recommended by the Board on 14 Mar. 42.
It will be remembered that eight Bofors were allotted to this Air Port for the defence of "Cats" only. Now that the strip has materialised, the Board was of unanimous opinion that twelve Bofors (one complete Bty.) are essential. They also strongly recommend 4 heavy A.A.guns in addition.
The strip is now the most important feature of the aerodrome.

2. WATER CRAFT. The Board was of opinion that two motor launches, or other suitable craft, are essential for use by Gunners and Infantry.

3. WARNING SYSTEM. Requires immediate investigation and improvement.

4. INFANTRY. In my appreciation, only one Coy. was allotted to the Inner Defensive Locality.
In view of the expansion of the Camp, the vital importance of the runway, and the fact that R.A.F. personnel are, so far, untrained and unarmed for ground defence, I have had to allot two rifle Coys to this Role.

5. M.M.Gs. 2 Secs.M.M.Gs are sited to defend the strip from Paratroops or troop landing aircraft. It is essential that my 3 Secs. of M.M.Gs be provided with A.A. mountings immediately.

6. 3" MORTARS. It will be noticed that two Dets. have been sited on each side of the runway. Chief task will be to support a counter attack by the Reserve Pl. on any M.M.G., Bofors, or other position which may have been rushed.

7. 18 PDRS. These have a dual role.
(a) A/Tk defence on the coast road at either end of the Inner Defended Locality.
(b) They will be mobile and prepared to shoot up anything which lands on the strip.

8. BICYCLES. Will be invaluable for various tasks both on the Inner and Outer Defensive Localities and it is requested that the 50 bicycles asked for from Inf.Bde.HQ. be expedited.

9. The allotment of 2 rifle Coys. for the Inner Defensive Locality has necessitated my leaving the North road unprotected. The extremeties of the Camp however, on the South road are more strongly held.
Defensive positions have been prepared on the North main road about the 8 & 11½ M.S. but troops to cover them with fire are not available. The idea of manning one of these positions with my Pioneer Pl. is receiving consideration depending on the degree of support it could expect from my striking force which is now reduced to :-

1 Bn. less 3 Rifle Coys.
" 4 Pl.
" 4 Dets. No.3 Pl.

Suggestions for the defence of the Inner Defended Locality, reconnoitred and submitted by my 2 I/c and R.A.F. Defence Officer, are attached.

SECRET

10. BN. HQ. Until the road on the Eastern flank of the Inner Defended Locality has been widened and put in a serviceable condition, I propose leaving my Bn.Hqrs. where they are, i.e. in the vicinity of 81 M.S. The proposed eventual site in the N.E. corner of the Inner Circle Road is being surveyed and existing buildings marked etc.

11. DET. S & M. The O.C. was here yesterday and promised to send the Det. S & M allotted to this Bn. here at once. He suggested concrete Cones, dannert wire and mines for the road, rail and beach blocks and promised to get all available material, mines etc at once. I consider the effective blocking of the coast road is of vital importance and should be treated as IMMEDIATE.

12. All positions marked are approximate. Alternative positions have not been shown but will be numerous.

Sgd. Lt.Col.
Comd. 8 Punjab.

DISTRIBUTION.

Mily H.Q.	KND	2.
BDE H.Q.	CBO	1.
H.Q. R.A.F.	KGA	2.
O.C. S & M.	CBO	1.
War Diary.		2.
File.		2.

SECRET

8 PUNJAB.

Plan.

(1) At present only 1 rifle coy., with 4 L.M.G's(and no Anti tank rifles or 2" Mortars) is allotted to the static defence of Koggala aerodrome. To this has been added the M.G.Pl.of H.Q. Coy to cover the runway until such time as the R.A.F. are capable of manning these M.G.Posts. In order to enable this Coy.to recapture any position over-run by the enemy, two 3" Mortar detachments are also allotted.

This Coy.has an impossible task. It has :-

(i) To prevent infiltration from outside.
(ii) To clear up any pockets of enemy who have established themselves within the aerodrome.

This is over an area of over 2 miles long with an average depth of 1000 yds.

The only possible method if any, open to the Coy, would be by placing one Pl.each on either side of the strip and the third Pl.either (a) At the Eastern end of the area to guard the Catalinas or (b) in Section Posts at the Sill and at the Western edge of the area. As can be seen this is impossible to implement.

(2) It is suggested that 2 Coys.be given the task of static defence of the aerodrome, one on either side of the strip which remains an R.A.F. task.

I would suggest that the Coys.be distributed as follows:-

(A) COY WEST OF STRIP.

(i) One Pl.on Road and Rail Block (GALLE RD) with 1 x 18 Pdr.Gun (Mobile).
(ii) One Pl.in Bomb Store area.
(iii) One Coy.(less 2 Pls.) with 2 detachments 3" Mortars mobile with cycles and trucks.

(B) COY EAST OF STRIP.

(i) One Pl.at Road and Ry.Bridge area (Sill) with 1 x 18 Pdr. Gun(Mobile).
(ii) One Pl.in hangar area.
(iii) 1 Coy.(less 2 Pls.) with 2 detachments 3" Mortars, mobile in trucks.

This Coy.can be got by withdrawing the two road blocks on the GALLE-AKURESSA Rd.

This still leaves only 1 Rifle Coy.with H.Q.Coy.(less M.G.Pl. and 4 Det. Mortars and A.A. Pl.which would be guarding "B" Echelon) to go out and delay or defeat an emeny of possibly 2 Inf.Bdes.

Sgd. Major.

8 Punjab.

SECRET 4

H.Q. A.I.F. Ceylon
24 March 1942.

REPORT OF VISIT OF G.S.I TO COMMAND HEADQUARTERS CEYLON on 23 March, 1942.

The following matters were raised with Command H.Q. Ceylon on Monday 23 Mar.42:

(1) Wire netting over Carriers.	B.G.S. stated that he did not think there would be much hope of obtaining netting for this purpose the Chief Engineer. C.R.E. stated it was not possible to supply netting as there was none available in the Island.
(2) Bicycles, supply of additional to establishment.	B.G.S. required a definite recommendation to be made togethe with details of numbers required and reasons - to be submitted in writing.
(3) Supply of Periscopes.	B.G.S. was under the impression that no periscopes were available but on being informed that we h[illegible] information to the effect that there were limited stocks, he instructed me to give him the numbers required. He was told that they would be required on the scale of one per infantry section. It is considered necessary that this be confirmed in writing.
(4) Material for Road Blocks and other obstacles.	B.G.S. instructed that the matt[illegible] be referred to the C.E.
(5) Anti-tank Mines, Demolitions provision of and arrangements for.	B.G.S. stated that a limited number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were available and would be issued when details of numbers and purpose for which required were received. He stressed the importance of plotting a minefield as laid so that they can be readily lifted when necessary.
(6) Ammunition Reserves, increased scale of 68 and 73 (anti-tank) grenades and mines in the absence of anti-tank guns, desirability for.	B.G.S. stated that first and second line ammunition would be placed in unit areas. There are no 68 or 73 grenades in the Island but he will ascertain whether it is possible for them to be supplied. He further stated that the Anti-Tank Coy. personnel to be supplied by A.I. for training would come under the direct command of Command H.Q. and would not necessarily be employed in the area of our responsibility.
(7) Camouflage Materials.	Instructions were issued for me to get in touch with G.III Camouflage. Unfortunately this officer was not available and no progress could be made in this matter.

SECRET

(8) Provision of Cutting Tools for jungle use.	B.G.S. stated that such tools had been obtained for the 34 Ind.Div. but unfortunately all had been issued to them. He would make inquiries on our behalf for a supply of these tools but we could not hope to receive our issue under three or four weeks. He is going to endeavour to withdraw a certain number from the 34 Ind.Div. for supply to the AIF.
(9) (a) Signal Cables. (b) Long range W/T for use between Div.H.Q. and Bde.H.Q. and Bde.H.Q. and Bns.	B.G.S. was not conversant with the situation regarding W/T on the Island, but he was under the impression that there were no such sets available. It was not possible to take the matter up with the C.S.O. as he was away sick and only a clerk was on duty in this office.
(10) Motorboat for KOGALLA LAKE.	B.G.S. thought there would be no difficulty about the provision and stated that he would take action to endeavour to obtain one. He asked that the request be confirmed in writing.
(11) Question of Liaison Officers including R.A.F. to Bde. and Bns. responsible for aerodrome defences.	B.G.S. considered that this could be best arranged mutually between the Commanders concerned and the R.A.F. on the spot. He stated further that Marines and any other soldiers in our area would be under the orders of the Area Commander. This of course does not include R.A.F. personnel.
(12) Provision of Interpreters and Guides.	The matter was referred to G.II (I), who stated that the I.-G.Police Ceylon had issued instructions to the local Police to assist Bdes. and Bns. in this regard as far as possible. G.II(I) intends taking the matter up in order that definite personnel will be allotted to Bns. and Bdes. if possible.
(13) Particulars of Coast watching organisation communications and Control.	Arrangements were made with the G.II (I) for details of these to be supplied to H.Q. A.I.F. within 48 hours.
(14) Civil Authorities through whom Bdes. and Units may require to work in Intelligence for (a) local security; (b) local labour requirements; (c) local health and (d) communications.	B.G.S. and G.II(I) both stated that the best method would be for the local Commanders to liaise direct with the Police, Government Agent or Assistant Government Agent if available.
(15) Supply of Defence Schemes for Island of Ceylon.	B.G.S. stated that there is no information available for any defence schemes which would be of the slightest use to us in this regard.

(16)/

SECRET

(16) Provision of Wire, Piquets etc. (80,000 yards per Bde Group).

B.G.S. stated that wire was like gold but that we should furnish our minimum requirements in tons stating exactly what the wire is required for. He was not at all optimistic about any wire being provided but added that we could not possibly hope for more than one hundred tons.

(17) Improvement to roads NEBODA-DODANGODA and DODANGODA-PATYAGALANTH.

This matter was taken up with the C.E. who stated that he thought action could be taken in this matter and that as the P.W.D. people were fully occupied the work would have to be carried out by Engineer Sections or Pioneer Bns. provided by Command H.Q.

(18) Supply of copy of map of CEYLON showing reefs, likely landing places etc.

B.G.S. referred the matter to G.2 (I). It was arranged that we should supply an officer to make a tracing of the only map existing which was held at Command H.Q.

(19) Armoured Train, what involved.

The question was raised as to why the armoured train should be under operation and administrative control of H.Q. A.I.F. in view of the fact that more than half the line over which it was to be employed was outside the A.I.F. area of responsibility. B.G.S. stated that the train would only be under our control whilst being used in our sector. It was not intended to use it on the other lines available. However, should that become necessary it would be taken under the control of Command H.Q. The crew comprises mainly officers of the last war most of whom are over 50 years of age, and generally are tea and rubber plantation owners or managers. It is desired that they receive as much consideration as possible as regards demands on their time owing to the fact that already in order to release other managers for active service three plantations are being supervised by one person thus releasing two for service overseas.

(20) Telephones for H.Q. A.I.F.

If necessary B.G.S. is prepared to take action to ensure the immediate provision of telephones. He was told it was not considered necessary for him to take action at this stage.

.....R.G. Pollard Lt.-Col.

G.S.O.I H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon)

SECRET

H.Q. A.I.F.(CEYLON)
24 March, 1942

REPORT OF C.S.O. - VISIT TO COMMAND H.Q. CEYLON 24 MARCH, 1942.

(1) Provision of telephones for H.Q. A.I.F.(Ceylon). Signal Requirements.

(a) Can we use civil resources? 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. wants to use exclusively (i) line AKURESSA to GALLE via MATARA (metallic pair) (two pairs exist) (ii) line AKURESSA to GALLE single earth return circuit (stated by P.O. GALLE to be spare); (iii) line GALLE to BUSSA one metallic pair (two exist).

(b) Required five civilian telephone instruments pending arrival of H.T. ships.

(c) Who is to do mtce. of civil lines taken over - Bde.Sig.Sec. has NOT the trained personnel.

(d) Authority required for Bde.Sig.O. to demand information of diagrams etc. from Civil P.Os.

(e) Wireless: Required six No.9 sets for long distance comm. Our sets range due to blanketing in thick timber is reduced to
"2 to 5" miles R/T
"4 to 8" " W/T

(f) What other sig. equipment can be released by Sigs. CBO to Bde?

C.S.O. was not in his office. His Staff Officer stated that the priority of telephones was decided by the Chief Signals Officer on the staff of the C.-in-C. and that he was in possession of the file asking for telephones for H.Q. A.I.F. Apparently owing to the shortage of telephone equipment and instruments and the urgency of other requirements it was not possible at this stage to connect H.Q. A.I.F. by telephone.
It was pointed out to the staff officer that on the military side there were three main H.Q. on this Island viz. Command H.Q., H.Q. 34 Ind Div. and H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon) and that it was imperative that a telephone should be installed forthwith. Further, it was hard to understand how it would not be possible for a telephone to be connected not tomorrow but this afternoon and he was asked to place this view before the C.S.O. as if this service was not forthcoming G.O.C. A.I.F. would be compelled to take action personally.

B.G.S. when informed we were still without telephonic communication stated that he would take action personally and see the telephone was connected forthwith.

It was requested that in the event of telephone communication not being possible immediately the matter be put in writing and forwarded to this H.Q.

(2) Plan of civil communications within the Island.

Staff Officer of C.S.O. was informed that H.Q. A.I.F (Ceylon) would probably be moving to Matugama area in the matter of a few days and that telephonic communication to each Bde. Grp. would be required from that H.Q. G.O.C.-in-C. had agreed to the transfer of the H.Q. from Kalutara south to Matugama. Staff officer stated that he would endeavour to obtain copies of plans of both telephone and telegraph communications existing in the Island.

(3) What wireless restrictions, if any.

The Staff Officer stated that there was no wireless silence imposed and once frequencies had been allotted units were free to operate sets provided they complied with the necessary security instructions viz. correct use of call signs, etc. The question was raised as to whether they would not enable the enemy to pinpoint all our dispositions on the Island long before ever attempting any invasion. It was decided the

matter/

	matter would be taken up with the C.S.O. and instructions issued in due course.
(4) Provision of M.G. Bn., H.Q. R.A.A. etc. - Signal re.	B.G.S. stated no reply yet received to the signal. Instructions issued for copy of the signal to be forwarded to H.Q. A.I.F.
(5) H.Q. R.A.E.	C.E. informed that it was believed that the C.R.E. would be accompanying H.Q. R.A.E.
25 Mar. 42	C.S.O. called during the morning regarding telephones for H.Q. A.I.F. and stated that immediate action would be taken for their provision. Further, he promised that instructions would be issued to 34 Ind. Div. for them to supply two No.9 or equivalent sets and two D.Rs. for use of 17 Inf. Bde. pending arrival of A.I.F. signal equipment and motorcycles.

.....R.G.Pollard.....Lt.-Col

G.S.I

COLOMBO
25 Mar.42

HQ AIF CEYLON.
27 Mar. 42.

REPORT ON VISIT OF CRE TO CE CEYLON COMMAND 1500 HRS 26 MAR. 42.

Ref Map: Motor Map of CEYLON (6 Miles to 1 in)

Present: CE, DCE and CRE 6 AUST. DIV.

CE outlined sapper problems, treating the operational roles first and giving priority to:

1: BRIDGING AND FERRYING: Selected sites were at ANGURUWATOTA and UDAGAHA with alternative site PITIGALA. The CE was concerned at the lack of bridging stores in the Island and was relieved to know that 22 Fd. Pk. were landing and had the Div. bridging equipment. CRE pointed out that this was sufficient only for 160' in bridge but would be very useful for ferrying.

CE stated that he was negotiating for native river craft and had prepared plans for pontoon bridges of these. Other bridging equiptment and boats had been demanded from INDIA.

2: NEW ROAD CONNECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENT. CE stated that a connecting road between RADUPALIA and KALAWANA was desired by Command and a further connection between NEBODA and the coast road should be considered.

An endeavour was being made to have the PWD put through the KALAWANA road but that body were not keen owing to the difficult country.

CE requested CRE to have recces made for both projects and reports submitted

3: AERODROME DEFENCE. CE suggested that the Eng. works required would depend on the policy of the GOC concerned.

If concrete favoured cement and reinforcing steel were available in sufficient quantities.

4: PREPARATION OF DEMOLITIONS. CE stated that Command had issued in Op. Instn. No. 4 of 19 Mar an order of priority for and preparation of bridge demolitions and allotted responsibility for these.

CE wished AIF (CEYLON) ~~6 Aust. Div.~~ to assume responsibility for ~~xxxx~~ this area covering BENTOTA and would communicate details later.

CRE AIF (CEYLON) ~~6 AUST DIV~~ would prefer to take over responsibility for all demolitic in ~~6 Aust Div~~ AIF (CEYLON) area.

SECRET

5. ACCOMODATION. This was in the hands of CRE Works South and C RE 6 Aust. Div. was to contact him on 27 Mar. 42.

CRE 6 Aust Div asked for information concerning Eng Stores as under;-

Question.	By Whom.	Answer.
What is the Eng. Stores position in the island?	CRE 6 Aust. Div.	Not good but demands had been made on INDIA.
What wire is available?	CRE	100 tons immediately available for 6 Aust. Div. 250 tons island reserve. 2000 tons on demand from INDIA.
What tools are available?	CRE.	Approx 2000 only picks and shovel all out on iss ue. Also demanded from INDIA.
What local tools available in lieu of picks and shovels?	CRE	Quantity unknown but tools similar to Palestinian shovel-hoe probably available in large quantities.
What explosives are available?	CRE	50 tons only in Army stock. Approx. 90 tons civilian sources.
Any A/Tk. mines available?	CRE	None. Have been demanded and a bakelite firing device for use with G/C or gelignite being produced locally.
What timber is available?	CRE	Limited stock and all local out controlled and reserved for ME. Fair stocks in bazar but controll CRE as king for removal of ME control.
What is the position re other building materials?	CRE	Gal. corr. iron stocks small. Ample stocks cement and reinforcement structural steel strictly controlled. Nails, bolts, ample stocks held.
What organization exists or is proposed for obtaining Eng. Stores?	CRE	Two Corps dumps will be establishe in present 6 Div. Area - one just South of COLOMBO one in vicinity of AMBALANGODA. Two dumps in view of possible future 2 Div Area. Suggest indents for Eng. Stores to be held by 22 Fd. Pk. be 14 days' requirements.

Lt-Col.
CRE HQ A IF(CEYLON).

Questions raised by R.C.O Sigs. to ~~Comd~~ Div at conference with C.S.O - 26 March

SECRET 7

DATE	QUESTION	BY WHOM	TO WHOM	ANSWER
27 MAR 42	1. It is requested that one telephone line (exclusively military) be made available between each of the following (a) COLOMBO to MATUGAMA (b) MATUGAMA to KATAKURUNDA (c) MATUGAMA to HORANA (d) MATUGAMA to ANURESSA so that telegraph can be superposed.	CO Sigs	CSO CEYLON Command	One line from COLOMBO to MATUGAMA will be made available. This will be solely a military line on which a teleprinter circuit will be superposed. Until reconnaissances are completed and new lines built, the only line circuits immediately available on all the other routes consist of military telephone connections to the civil system.
	2. Are any lateral communications (line or wireless) available between HQ AIF(CEYLON) and HQ 34 IND. DIV?	"	"	NO lines are or will be available except through Command HQ COLOMBO. Wireless communication may be arranged mutually.
	3. Is any recce report (PWG or military) on all civil line routes in area of responsibility of HQ AIF available?	"	"	NO. Military recces are in progress now.
	4. Who will be responsible for the maintenance of civil lines which are to be allotted to AIF?	"	"	PWG.
	5. Will AIF have priority on civil lines?	"	"	Yes. Priority calls may be made but must be kept to a minimum.
	6. Have any Signal technical instructions yet been issued?	"	"	NO.
	7. Will any be issued?	"	"	Yes. Later.
	8. What instructions have been issued regarding procedure, eg. Call sign system?	"	"	One instruction only setting out the main principles of the system. Code call books are still awaited from INDIA.
	9. What system is being used pending the receipt of details from INDIA?	"	"	Old code names are still being used.
	10. When will the new system, i.e. Call sign system be brought into operation?	"	"	NO definite date can be given.

DATE	QUESTION	BY WHOM	TO WHOM	ANSWER
27 MAR 42	11. Frequencies for wireless sets are required. On what scale is the issue being made?	CO Sigs	CSO CEYLON Command	The wireless officer will call on CO Sigs. HQ AIF (CEYLON) at 1000 hrs. on 28 MAR, 42. Details may be arranged direct with him.
	12. Is any visual equipment available?	"	"	Do NOT know. Will make enquiries. A Signal Park Unit is being formed, and when this unit is completed, a list of signal stores available will be known in detail.
	13. Are any spare parts available for maintenance of Australian pattern wireless sets?	"	"	Do NOT know details, but a few spares are available.
	14. What is the position regarding cable?	"	"	Cable will be supplied. You should retain your G1098 cable as a reserve and your requirements, including those for lines to Bns, should be given to me and the cable will be supplied.
	15. In the event of a line being required urgently, it is suggested that our G1098 cable be used for the purpose and that the cable expended be reimbursed from CSOs dump.	"	"	Agreed, but projects requiring more than (say) 30 miles of cable, should be notified to this HQ as early as possible.
	16. What is the position regarding the availability of telephones?	"	"	Very bad. Telephones, both civil and military patterns, are very scarce.
	17. Will further supplies be forthcoming?	"	"	That depends on what is received from INDIA.

8 ✓

NOTES FOR WAR DIARY BY GOC

27 MAR 42

GOC AIF (CEYLON) Saw Lt-Gen. POWNALL; mentioned failure of various branches of his staff to implement promises made in connection with the reception in camp of AIF units arriving CEYLON.

Also referred to "peace time atmosphere" prevalent in many quarters and as illustration left copies of questionnaires and replies obtained by CI on his visits to Command HQ on 23 and 24 Mar.

At 1030 hrs GOC AIF (CEYLON) proceeded with Gen. POWNALL to meet C-in-C Admiral Sir G. LAYTON at his HQ and upon his return wrote the following for inclusion in the War Diary:

"The latter (Admiral LAYTON) immediately proceeded to warn me that the reputation of the AIF in CEYLON was bad and stated that some members of drafts which passed through COLOMBO on various occasions previously had been notorious for filthy language, for creating disturbances and for abusing hospitality in private houses. He concluded his tirade by saying: 'If the Australians set out to make their name stink in COLOMBO, by God they have succeeded!'".

"I replied appropriately, pointing out that misbehaviour was not confined to Australian troops, that in every Army there was bound to be a bad element which created trouble, that this minority was no larger in the Australian forces than in others, and that the character of the force as a whole should not be judged by that of a small minority. Further, since my arrival in CEYLON, I had myself witnessed disturbances in the Galle Face Hotel created not only by soldiers and sailors but also by naval officers when no Australians had been in the hotel. The very great majority of Australians if they received reasonable treatment would behave reasonably, but there was liable to be trouble if any attempt was made to exploit them."

"I then drew attention to the fact that mischievous rumours were being circulated in COLOMBO to the effect that

(A) General BENNETT had left SINGAPORE the day before the surrender.

(B) That during the evacuation, parties of Australians had forced their way out to ships at the point of Tommy guns.

I requested the C-in-C to take steps to see that a stop was put to the dissemination of such rumours, pointing out that if such statements were made in the hearing of members of the AIF there was bound to be trouble and disharmony."

The C-in-C accepted these points and promised to deal drastically with anybody found circulating such rumours. He then invited me to attend the bi-weekly conference of the Services chiefs viz:- Admiral ARBUTHNOT, Lt-Gen. POWNALL and Air Vice Marshal D'ALBIAC."

Telephone installed at HQ AIF (CEYLON) after repeated applications over period of nine days.

23 MAR 42

GOC visited and informed GOC-in-C Lt-Gen. POWNALL that:

Matters were not proceeding as smoothly as they should.

Of 700 tents promised for delivery to camps on 27 Mar only 242 had been provided after repeated representations of AQ AIF (CEYLON).

Similarly no latrine pans had been provided at HORANA camp (16 Aust. Inf Bde).

Further this Hq had endeavoured to get in touch with Duty Staff Officer at Comd. HQ last night but could not locate him for 1 hr. and 20 mins. while this morning the switch board operator at 0700 hrs. was unaware of the duty SO's switch number.

Finally we were still awaiting copies of important telegrams which had been requested for days - 11 days in one instance.

GOC-in-C promised to take steps and as a result this HQ was visited for the first time by the BGS, Brig. I/C Admin and sundry other representatives of Comd. HQ.

1200 hrs. approx. Brig. LLOYD, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde, his HM and one or two other officers called.

1430 hrs. GOC proceeded with Brig. LLOYD and ADC to visit KATUKURUNDA and HORANA Camps.

They Saw Lt-Col. WHITE, 2/1 Bn, whose unit is guarding aerodrome KATUKURUNDA with two Coys, the balance of 2/1 Bn. being held in reserve on high ground about 2 mls. distant.

GOC proceeded to aerodrome where Lt-Col. WHITE indicated general dispositions of garrison. Lt-Col. WHITE was told to finalise layout and notify AGA of clearing required for tactical purposes and also area to be proclaimed as a defence area so that the AGA could take necessary steps to get inhabitants out and complete compensation.

GOC visited res. posn. later. Tps making themselves comfortable under trees in plantation, constructing bivouacs out of palm fronds, hessian etc, in the absence of tents - appeared happy.

After dropping Lt-Col. WHITE at his temporary HQ, GOC continued his visit to 2/2 and 2/3 Bns. at HORANA where it commenced to rain heavily just as the party arrived.

Both Bns. were short of tents but thatched huts at the rate of 5 per day are being rapidly constructed under local contract, and units had no worries.

Necessity for providing fields of fire around camp area was pointed out and also for getting natives out of houses on edge of camp.

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF COMMANDERS — SECRET

27 MARCH 42

9

Item 1. Proposed distribution of Air Forces in Ceylon (222G/S/380 dated 24 March)

(a) Can we manage with fewer aerodromes?

(b) Can we find aerodrome sites inland?

(c) Is it essential to develope 1. PUTTALAM 2. JAFFNA 3. BATTICALOA?

(Items 2 and 3. Recommendations of Air Defence Committee Meeting dated March 24.)

Item 2. FIGHTER ZONES

(a) It was decided that it was not practicable under existing conditions to lay down Fighter and Gun Zones in Ceylon.

(b) It was recommended that the system in use in U.K. was adopted here. That is the Fighter Controller will order "STOP" to guns. Guns will not fire where it is obvious from direct observation that the Fighters are about to attack. Ships' guns however will not be restricted when the ship is being attacked by enemy aircraft.

(c) It was proposed that orders to put this system into effect be drawn up by Air Defence and A.A. Commanders.

Item 3. OPERATION ROOMS

(a) COLOMBO

It was recommended that provided the required signal equipment could be made available, the Main Fighter Operations Room should be installed in Bishop College alongside the new G.O.R. and that the premises taken over at the junction of Ward Place and Kinsey Road originally taken over as Fighter Operations Room should be converted for use as an emergency Fighter Operations Room and G.O.R. in case the Main Operations Room were destroyed by enemy action.

Arguments for. It would provide the first step towards close co-operation between Fighters and Guns. This is essential in Ceylon where lack of early warning system makes every second of value. In addition to this operations room the Fighter Controller must have an emergency control point so that if the combined ops. room was hit the Fighters could still function.

Arguments against. It means putting everything into one basket but the nerve centre is the signal centre which is in the centre of the town. Lack of signal equipment would hinder progress.

(b) TRINCOMALEE

The above recommendations also apply to Trincomalee. In this area this combined operations room should be in th immediate vicinity of the Fortress Commander's HQ.

Item 4. Intelligence Organisation - the following has been arranged:-

(a) Main centre of Service Intelligence to be DELHI and Naval representation there will be strengthened by attaching Captain Harkness and certain other officers.

(b) Naval "Y" and Special Intelligence will remain at COLOMBO.

Combined Operations Intelligence Centre CEYLON primarily for Naval Intelligence but will also serve Commander-in-Chief CEYLON. Military and Air Force officers will be attached to the organisation.

(c) Security Bureau will be separate from Combined Intelligence Centre.

Report on visit by Capt.A.J.S.COTTER to Capt JAMIESON (G111 Security CEYLON Command)

28 Mar 42

	QUESTION	ANSWER
1.	Are passes to be issued to natives employed on Army construction?	NO. Units must implement means of security.
2.	Are any personnel from HQ CEYLON Command to be attached to Aust. Army Base Post Office?	Yes. As soon as practicable an NCO will be attached for certain periods.
3.	Could arrangements be made to photograph officers for Identification Passes at their units?	Yes. Messrs CHITRAFOTO will be instructed to take photographs at arranged places and dates.
4.	What are the Blackout restrictions?	Complete "Blackout" has been ordered by Ceylonese Government.

// SECRET

Report on visit by Capt.P.C.WALKER to Surveyor General's Office.

27 Mar 42

	QUESTION	BY WHOM	ANSWER
1.	Maps - CEYLON	G11	Telephoned Asst.Map Publisher at 1200 hrs.re 1" maps of CEYLON. These will not be ready until 1200 hrs. 28 Mar.42.

War Diary SECRET 12

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

MOST SECRET

Copy No: 26

File No: S /G/16

AIF (CEYLON) - LOCATION STATEMENT

(as at 2359 hrs - 27 Mar 42)

UNIT	LOCATION	REMARKS
HQ		
HQ AIF (CEYLON)	Museaus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO	Telephone COLOMB O 95 8?
ARTY		
2/1 AUST FD REGT (less one bty)	HORANA	
"E" SEC SIGS 6 AUS T DIV	HORANA	
13 AUS T LAD	HORANA	
One bty 2/1 AUS T FD REGT	KATUKURUNDA	
2/2 AUST FD REGT (less two btys)	BUSSA	
"F" SEC SIGS 6 AUST DIV	BUSSA	
10 AUST LAD	BUSSA	
One bty 2/2 AUST FD REGT	KOGGALA	
One bty 2/2 AUST FD REGT	GALLE	
ENG:		
HQ RAE 6 AUST DIV	Museaus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO.	Telephone COLOMB O 9583
2/1 AUST FD COY (less one sec)	HORANA	
One sec 2/1 AUST FD COY	KATUKURUNDA	
2/3 AUS T FD COY (less two secs)	BUSSA	
One sec 2/3 AUST FD COY	KOGGALA	
One sec 2/3 AUST FD COY	GALLE	
22 AUST FD PK COY	HORANA	
80 AUST LAD	HORANA	

6 AUST DIV CAM TNG UNIT	Musaeus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO	Telephone COLOMBO 9583

SIGS

HQ SIGS 6 AUST DIV	Musaeus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO	Telephone COLOMBO 9583
1 COY SIGS 6 AUST DIV	HORANA	
HQ 2 COY SIGS 6 AUST DIV	HORANA	
12 AUST LAD	(with HQ SIGS)	

INF:

HQ 16 AUST INF BDE	HORANA	
"J" SEC SIGS 6 AUST DIV	HORANA	
15 AUST LAD	HORANA	
7 PL AUST HQ GD BN	HORANA	
2/1 AUST INF BN	KATUKURUNDA	
2/2 AUST INF BN	HORANA	
2/3 AUST INF BN	HORANA	
HQ 17 AUST INF BDE	BUSSA	Telephone GALLE 81.
"K" SEC SIGS 6 AUST DIV	BUSSA	
16 AUST LAD	BUSSA	
5 PL AUST HQ GD BN	BUSSA	
2/5 AUST INF BN	GALLE	
2/6 AUST INF BN	KOGGALA	
2/7 AUST INF BN	BUSSA	

AASC:

No 1 COY AASC	HORANA	
No 2 COY AASC	BUSSA	

ORD:

2/2 AUST A FD WORKSHOP	HORANA	
"D" DIV SECT AUST ORD FD PX	HORANA	
"E" DIV SEC 1 AUST ORD FD PX	HORANA	
"F" DIV SEC 1 AUST ORD FD PX	HORANA	

SECRET

MEDICAL:

1 AGH	St Peter's College, COLOMBO	Telephone COLOMBO 8231
12 AGH	KANDY	Telephone KANDY 501
2/1 AUST FD AMB	HORANA	
2/2 AUST FD AMB	BUSSA	
2 AUST ANTI MALARIAL CONTROL UNIT	HORANA	
2/3 AUST FD HYG SEC	BUSSA	
2 AUST DENTAL UNIT	BUSSA	
6 AUST DENTAL UNIT	HORANA	

MISC:

6 AUST DIV PRO COY (less two sec)	Musaeus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO	Telephone COLOMBO 9533
One SEC 6 AUST DIV PRO COY	HORANA	with HQ 16 AUST INF BDE
One SEC 6 AUST DIV PRO COY	KEGALLA	with HQ 17 AUST INF BDE
6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT	BUSSA	
No 3 AUST BASE POST OFFICE	Musaeus College, Barnes Place, COLOMBO	
DET AIF KIT STORE	do	
DET AIF FINANCE & AUDIT SEC	do	
DET 2 ECHELON AIF	do	
AUST MILITARY LIAISON OFFR	Military HQ, Slave Island, COLOMBO	

Lt.Col Major.
GS (I) AIF (CEYLON)

MOST SECRET

13

REPORT ON VISIT OF B.G.S. CEYLON COMD.

TO G.I., H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON).

At 1530 hrs. on 28 Mar.42, B.G.S. called in connection with lack of receipt of copies of cables forwarded and received in connection with a request for M.G. Bn, H.Q. R.A.A., 6 Div.Cav. Regt. and A.Tk. Regt. together with respective Sig.Secs. and L.A.Ds. being diverted to CEYLON. Copies were brought by B.G.S. although he stated that copies had previously been sent, and showed a signature acknowledging receipt. On examination the receipt was from the D.R. Command H.Q. The matter was satisfactorily concluded. Explanation of the absence of the Duty Officer at Comd. H.Q. was made and full details regarding times at which this H.Q. endeavoured to communicate with him were given to the B.G.S. by D.A.Q.M.G. H.Q. A.I.F. It was admitted that owing to a mistake at the part of the Duty Officer there was no officer on duty at Comd.H.Q. for twenty minutes, viz. 2010 to 2030 hrs. on 27 Mar.42.

1. Armoured Train: The following points were discussed with the B.G.S. with results shown:-

(a) May two additional Brens or M.M.Gs. be supplied for use on the Armoured Train ~~for use on land side of armoured train~~ in order to provide all-round defence?	Action will be taken immediately to obtain weapons for this purpose although it may be some time before the necessary weapons can be supplied.
(b) May additional ammunition be supplied for M.Gs. and A.A.guns on the train?	The requirements for the train would be so small in relation to the total quantity available in the Island that the B.G.S. will issue instructions forthwith that whatever ammunition is asked for is to be supplied.
(c) May night firing be carried out during an exercise for the armoured train to be run between the 11th and 15th April?	Machine guns may fire but it would not be advisable for the naval gun to be fired. Of course, care will have to be taken to ensure that fisherman are not injured in the practice.
(d) If a letter is sent in to Comd.H.Q. will action be taken by you to ensure that all concerned are warned?	If only M.Gs. are fired it is hardly necessary to take any such action but in any case send in a letter and appropriate action will be taken.
(e) Could a target be anchored offshore overnight so that the naval gun could engage it in the early hours of the morning?	Let us know what you want and we will see what can be done.

R.G. Pollard ....Lt.-Col.
(R.G. POLLARD)

COLOMBO
29 Mar.42.

SECRET

REPORT ON VISIT OF CAPT. F.C. WALKER TO SURVEYOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ON 28 MAR. 42.

Reference: MAPS

Question	By Whom	Answer	Action
2. Maps CEYLON	GII	Maps CEYLON 1" (gridded) and CEYLON 4" to 1 mile which were to be available for collection at 1300 hrs, were finally collected at 1700 hrs.	These maps are now being sorted and checked.

Capt.

15 SECRET

VISIT BY LO TO HQ CEYLON COMMAND - 28 MAR 42.

1. GI AIF requires copies of signals about additional tps.

G2 SD - I will have them for you at 1500 hrs.

2. What maps are to be collected today?

G3 Maps -
30 1" for Div HQ H.Q. A.I.F. (CEYLON)
90 1" for 16 Bde.

SECRET

COPY

16

IMMEDIATE

To: Goncom
(R) C-in-C E.I.
Army Melbourne No 6914 (6914)/G dated 24/3

From: Armindia

X.21

S.D.5 move of Australian Corps. Continuation our 6637 (6637)/G of 22/3.

First. Understand West Point carrying H.Q.R.A.2A. and 6 (6) Aust. Cav. not calling Colombo. Vehicles and equipment above HQ and Cav Unit will not repeat not therefore be unloaded Ceylon if their M.T. and store ships call Colombo.

Second. Personnel 1 Aust A/tank sailing Bombay in Lacomia and will be transhipped CO Ceylon. Certain vehs. and guns this unit in SS Kaimata Mideast Mov 1/75294 of 23/3 refers. As this ship discharging considerable number vehicles etc in Colombo equipment 1 Aust A/Tank Regt should also be unloaded.

Third. No details of ships in which remainder equipment 1 Aust A/Tank Regt sailing. If MT and stores ships carrying this equipment call Colombo they should not be unloaded unless they are due to discharge bulk of cargo at Colombo in any case.

Fourth. Army Melbourne only. Your M.C. 5538 of 23/3 refers

Distribution

H.Q.C.C.	1
C in C E.I.	1
Log	1

Log No. 610/25

T.O.O. 1435/24/3/42
AEC

SECRET

TO GENERAL KANDY
EMBARKATION COLOMBO
AUSTOOL COLOMBO

FROM EMBARKATION
BOMBAY

G.17

Under instructions Armindia 2/1 Australian anti tank regiment and 49 light aid detachments will disembark from from Devonshire at Colombo strength of units officers 32 W.O's 6 sergeants 66 O.R's 521. Full details of arrivals of convoy follow

T.O.O. 0535/26/3/42

DISTRIBUTION

3 HQ CEYLON COMMAND (Please pass to other addressee)

Log No 726/26

EE

SECRET

17

INTERVIEW WITH GII(I) CEYLON COMMAND - 29 MAR.42.

Question (GIII(O))	Answer
1. Are Intelligence Summaries as issued by HQ CEYLON Comd. to be issued to Bde. Gps?	Yes. Bde. Gps. can reproduce in their own summaries.
2. Certain natives employed on Army constructional work are NOT in possession of passes or means of identification.	NOT practicable to issue passes to all natives in this country. Bde. Gps. and Div. Tps. to devise means of security.
3. Do you require notification of change of units?	Yes. Notification is required immediately of any change no matter how small the unit.

Notes of CRE's interview with CE CEYLON Command at 1630 hours 30/3/42.

SECRET

QUESTION.	By Whom.	ANSWER.
(1) Is there any improvement yet in the Eng. Stores position particularly in digging and cutting tools?	CRE.	CE. A further 3000 each of picks and shovels and 600 assorted cutting tools. CRE made advanced demand for 2000 each picks and shovels 400 cutters to be consigned half to BOUSSA and half to PANADURA.
(2) Is Bamboo a controlled store?	CRE	Don't know but think not. CE will endeavour to lay in stocks
(3) Are there any spikes ground Anti-personnel available?	CRE	CE did not know the item but would endeavour to obtain if in INDIA.
(4) Are there any stocks of steel rails available in the Island?	CRE	No. In order to get rails for a new siding for Army use the Railway authorities had to take up existing track.
(5) Would the CE give assistance in widening culverts, bridges and road bends, and strengthening bridges?	CRE	If CRE would submit reports and recommendations the CE would endeavour to have the PWD assi
(6) The country lends itself to the use of Flame Fougasse. Are the materials available?	CRE	CE and Staff have had no experience of the Fougasse, but would endeavour to obtain materials described by CRE, or substitutes for trial.
(7) Are there any powered craft available for ferrying and towing on flooded rivers and roads?	CRE	Two powered boats had been ordered from INDIA and an endeavour was being made to obtain more.
(8) Were there any stocks of SW rope available for ferrying?	CRE	Yes. Several lengths of 1800 ft. each had been obtained and were available.
(9) Was there any light pile - driving plant on the Island?	CRE	To the best of CE's knowledge-none. Enquiries would be made in INDIA.
(10) What mechanical excavating equipment was available?	CRE	Five graders from Army sources - all in use by RAF. Five more U.S. in Civil hands but these also reserved for RAF.

Lt Col.
CRE AIF (CEYLON).

/C/ SECRET

Headquarters
A.I.F.(Ceylon)
29 March,1942.

To ALL RANKS, A.I.F. (CEYLON).

No doubt you were somewhat disappointed to find your return to Australia postponed, but I am sure you will accept the situation in a soldierly spirit - particularly when you realise the importance of the task ahead.

Within the last few days JAPAN has occupied the ANDAMAN ISLANDS, which are only eight hundred miles from here, possibly with the object of making use of those Islands as a base for operations against CEYLON.

TRINCOMALEE on the N.E. coast of CEYLON is the only remaining British major naval base in the Indian Ocean. Possession of this base would enable the Japanese not only to threaten the security of INDIA but also the important sea communications between Australia, Britain, the Middle East and India upon which Australia is dependent. Consequently, the successful defence of CEYLON will have a very material influence on the defence of AUSTRALIA and the British possessions bordering the Indian Ocean.

Knowing this, I have not the slightest doubt that every member of the A.I.F. in Ceylon will exert himself to the utmost to carry out his allotted task with unremitting energy and determination and with a fixed resolve that <u>there will be no repetition of the Singapore debacle</u>.

It is only since the fall of Singapore that Ceylon has again become so strategically important and for this reason preparations for its defence have to be pushed on with all speed. Many things will have to be improvised; there are bound to be some hitches, inconveniences and a general lack of amenities until affairs can be put on a proper basis. During this period I rely on all ranks to accept any temporary discomfort cheerfully, and to exercise patience and restraint in their dealings with members of the other services and the civilian population so that all may work harmoniously and efficiently toward the common end - the defeat of any attempted invasion.

Remember that the good name of Australia depends on our behaviour here. There have been, in the past, disturbances in which Australian troops passing through Colombo were concerned, and as a result the reputation of Australians among the local population has suffered. It is up to us to build up that reputation to its proper standard. All that is required is that we behave in public as we would do at home in the presence of our own womenfolk. Briefly,

DON'T use filthy language,

DON'T experiment with native, or other unaccustomed liquors when beer is unobtainable, and

DON'T become too familiar with or maltreat natives or attempt to interfere with native women or property.

SECRET

REMEMBER that the Japanese have had very close business relations with this Island over a long period during which they have had ample opportunity to organise espionage and possibly 'Fifth Column' activities, therefore,

DON'T DISCUSS MILITARY MATTERS IN THE HEARING OF STRANGERS, and

DON'T CIRCULATE RUMOURS.

And now a word about our job. We have been allotted a large sector of the Island to defend against invasion. The country closely resembles that in MALAYA; consequently we must be prepared to counter the tactics used by the Japanese in the latter country. Copies of an excellent pamphlet entitled "Tactical Methods - Characteristics of Japanese Operations - South-West Pacific Zone" have been issued to all combatant units. This pamphlet deals with the lessons which are to be learned from the Malayan Campaign and the best methods of countering the tactics of the Japanese.

Their tactics are somewhat stereotyped in attack and defence as well as being unorthodox according to European ideas.

The Japanese employ every available means to increase their mobility along highways, railways, through jungles and water areas, never failing to take advantage of local civilian, military and naval transport which they may capture. They depend primarily on speed, infiltration, camouflage (even to the extent of using our uniforms or native clothing), and on bold outflanking attacks by even a few men.

All possible means are utilized to obtain surprise and every endeavour is made to undermine morale by the volume of noise produced. They depend largely on quick and accurate fire from their mortars for support rather than on their artillery which is difficult to employ effectively in densely wooded country. They frequently use tanks to attack along roads and where possible give close air support to their attacking troops.

Owing to landings being possible in fair weather at almost any point along the coast of Ceylon, we cannot possibly be certain of preventing an enemy landing at some place where troops are not already in position. Our strategy, therefore, is to garrison only vital points with the minimum troops necessary, and to employ the balance of the force to counter-attack enemy columns threatening those vital areas.

In defence there are certain essentials which must be observed, viz:-

(a) Positions must be organised in much greater depth than is necessary in open warfare.

(b) Every defended locality must be organised for all-round defence with mutually supporting posts. <u>In each locality there must be suitably placed a mobile reserve of the maximum practicable strength ready to counter-attack when the time is ripe.</u>

(c) Every section post in a defended locality must be prepared for all-round defence. Each must be provided with sufficient reserve rations, water and ammunition (including A.Tk. grenades or improvised substitutes) to enable it to hold out for ten days in the event of enemy infiltration. The defenders must be resolved to fight to the last man and the last round.

(d) Active and sustained patrolling must be carried out to prevent surprise.

IF WE HOLD OUT AND PREVENT THE ENEMY REPLENISHING HIS AMMUNITION WE CANNOT FAIL TO DEFEAT HIM.

Once his infiltrating troops are deprived of their ammunition supply, it only remains to mop them up. We must, therefore, ensure that the enemy is prevented from using existing roads and tracks, railways and waterways passing through the vital areas. This implies the construction of road- and railway-blocks and their defence by fire, and the removal or destruction of any local means of transport e.g. M.T., carts, bicycles, boats, etc. in the locality, which might otherwise fall into the enemy's hands.

The answer to bombardment by mortars, artillery, and aircraft is to dig in, to camouflage positions, and to engage the enemy with suitable weapons. The Great War proved that resolute infantry could hold out indefinitely in properly constructed trenches against sustained artillery and mortar bombardment of infinitely greater intensity than the Jap, can possibly bring against us.

The campaigns in GREECE and LIBYA proved that dive-bombing is much less effective than sustained artillery fire over a similar period and that casualties so caused are comparatively few provided that the troops are in even shallow trenches, the effect being moral rather than material.

To achieve success against determined troops any bombardment, whether aerial, artillery or mortar, must be followedby an infantry attack - possibly in conjunction with A.F.Vs. Such bombardments must cease for safety reasons when the attacking troops are at a distance of 200 yards or more from the position being attacked. Consequently, so long as the defenders can observe the advance of the enemy infantry, they have ample time in which to bring their weapons into action against the attackers before the latter can get within assaulting distance. Troops who can shoot reasonably straight will have no difficulty in breaking up a hostile attack over the last 200 yards.

In order to ensure that observation will be possible without excessive casualties, even during the heaviest bombardment, arrangements are being made to obtain and issue periscopes on a scale of one per section.

Any attempt by hostile tanks to circumvent road- or rail-blocks will, in almost any defended area, necessitate their passage through plantations, jungle or other unfavourable ground which will restrict vision and slow up the movement of tanks to such an extent that they will be "easy meat" for troops provided with A.Tk. grenades or other longer range effective A.Tk. weapons. Troops in slit trenches have littleto fear from tanks, so long as they have some form of A.Tk. weapon which can be used to prevent the tank "rocking" back and forth over the trench to break down the sides and crush the occupants.

In the Great War the Germans never succeeded in capturing a prepared defensive position held by Australians. The Second A.I.F. will not allow the Japs to do so in Ceylon.

When the Jap. is stopped decisively his morale will deteriorate and then is the time for our counter-offensive which will catch him short of men and ammunition after his previous efforts. Let our motto be

"FIRST STOP YOUR JAP. THEN GIVE HIM A CRACK."

R.J. Boase

.....Maj.-Gen.
(R.J. BOASE)
G.O.C., A.I.F. (CEYLON)