AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/12/26 EAST & MIDDLE EAST UNITS

AIF Cadre Battalion Military Mission China

January - June 1942



1/12/26-0010

AWM 52
1/2/26
A.I.F. Cadre Battalion Military Mission China

Enclosure to war diary
Part II Orders No. 11
21 May 1942

AWM file 94/2084 ff 39-46 relate

Copy supplied by
Lieut. Colonel D. C. McDougal

Inserted by
Louise Burmester
Curator, Official Records

with sighted authority from
A. M. Roe
Supervisor, History Research Section, Central Army Records Office
3 May, 1996

Subject:- [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS,
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION,
CHUNGKING,

Ref:- M.402/2B.

21st May 1942.

THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON. (2 copies)
O.C., 2ND ECHELON, NEW DELHI. (2 ")
O.C., BURMA CONTINGENT, KIYANG. (1 " which please circulate)
O.C., A.I.F. CONTINGENT, KIYANG. (1 ")

Herewith copies of British Military Mission, CHUNGKING, Part II Orders, as noted above.

J. H. Wedderburn. Capt
for General Officer Commanding,
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.

ISSUED BY

MAJOR GENERAL J.G. FRUCE, D.S.O., M.C.
COMMANDING BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA

21st MAY 1942 SERIAL NO:9.

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90 DEPARTURES. Lieut-Colonel A. SILCOCK, left by air for CALCUTTA a.m. 8/5/42. Struck off strength w.e.f. this date.

U.D.C. Clerk BHARAT RAM, left by air for CALCUTT a.m. 8/5/42. Returned to INDIA on medical grounds. Struck off strength w.e.f. this date.

A/L/U/L-Cpl A.C. ROGERS, T/131428 R.A.S.C., and Dvr R.W. GRAHAM, T/123027, R.A.S.C., left by air for CALCUTTA a.m. 13/5/42. Struck off the strength w.e.f. this date.

Colonel W.A. LOVAT FRASER, left for KWEIYANG p.m. 20th May 1942 on duty.

91 LEAVE. Corporal D.G. MATTHEWS, S/34919, R.A.S.C. left by road for CHENGTU, SZECHUAN, 14th May 1942.

92 PROMOTIONS. Acting Captain, Local Major D.C. MacDOUGAL to be Acting Lieut-Colonel, and assume command of A.I. Cadre Battalion to fill establishment vice Lt-Colonel Count A. BENTINCK, D.S.O., w.e.f. 17/2/42.

Lieutenant, Local Captain R.J.H. MOFFAT, 4/12th F.F.R. to be acting Captain, Local Major w.e.f. 17/2/42 to fill establishment.

VX 27806 W.O. Class I. JOHN MAURICE SANDELL 2/9th FIELD AMBULANCE, 8th Australian Div., to be Lieutenant, Local Captain, w.e.f. 17/2/42 to fill establishment.

Dvr R. MacALLISTER, T/119480, R.A.S.C. promoted to L/U/A/Cpl w.e.f. 13/5/42.

93 ARRIVALS Captain MALCOLM DOBSON, G.S.I, Section, HQ DELHI, arrived by air from CALCUTTA 12/5/42.

S/106103, Sgt L.H.S. JONES, R.A.S.C arrived by road from KUNMING 10/5/42.

J.D. Wedderburn
Captain,
D.A.A.&Q.M.G.,
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA,
CHUNGKING.

21st May 1942.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
OR
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-21[illegible]

A.I.F. Cadre Battalion.

January 1942

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices
Maymyo. Burma. 1st - 10th Jan.	This period was spent in drawing stores etc. up to Equipment Table G1006 as far as possible but there's still a lot of stuff which has to be drawn from Rangoon. Continued to build Blast Wall round Orderly Room. All men issued with 50 rds- 70 Ann Brens ready for immediate A.A. defence. More trucks arrive from Rangoon, the body work is the worst I have ever seen. Had a test Mobilisation which was very successful. The contingent was packed and ready to move in 1½ hrs from the start time. We men have most of our stores, there only remain some small things such as rope, tools, and bits of extra equipment.	
11th Jan.	Gen Dennys visits schools, told the whole School that we would move into China, first contg leaving 21st Jan. 42 We are going to a guerilla School somewhere in Central China. All ranks are very pleased as we are getting fed up with Maymyo, Burma, generally.	
16th Jan.	Lieut N.F.H. Wolfe 5 R.G.R.(FF) left for Chungking by plane with 3 other Officers. He is going into our area to establish an intelligence system and help Col. Bentinck. Had a letter from the C.O. in which he said that the area was excellent and the local Chinese very co-operative, which is a good sign.	
15th - 20th Jan.	More stores drawn and now have all that is available. We have a lot of first class stuff and hope that we can use it. We have been issued with 4 Brens 11 13 Ms which is good for 50 men. Ann a bit short unfortunately but more is supposed to be arriving.	
21st Jan.	Movement order issued. No 4 Area will move with us. The convoy is under Command of O.C., A.I.F., Capt D.C. MacDougall. Burma contingent left 0700 hrs.	Appendix 'A'
22nd - 24th Jan.	Spent in final organisation. Each section drawn its own share of explosives and other stores and each have labelled their own. All tents camouflaged. Loading commenced 0700 hrs. Lt G.C. Bossett 6th G.R. left with them to prepare the way for us and make any necessary arrangements for us at railhead. The lads wanted to have a party to farewell the Staff of the B.M.S., particularly Capt Calvert, so it was sanctioned and it was a great success.	

M.P. & M.B.W. 317/C 637-4-8-41-1,80,000 Pads.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
OR
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

A.I.F. Cadre Battalion.

January 1942

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-2118.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
25 th Jan.	Left Bush Warfare School at 0930 hrs with the following Officers, men Transport and Stores. Officers:- Capt. D.C. MacDonald 2/20th Bn 5 Div. A.I.F. " F.[illegible] Braund 2/19 Bn. " " " " D.[illegible] Godfrey " " " " 2/ Lt R.J.[illegible] Moffat 11/19th Frontier Force Regt. " L.Handley. Derry (G.S.) No 4 Area. " J.J.Tite " " " " J. Mactregor " " " Dr Hau ex I.[illegible] attached. (b) Other Ranks: Forty seven (Incl 5 Chinese). (c) Transport. Thirteen 3 ton Chevriolet (all steel). (d) Stores. Approx. 20 tons of Stores and equipment.	
Burma - China 26th Jan - 17th Feb.	This period is the time taken to move the contingent plus 6 months supplies, collected in Lashio, for the Mission, to reach the School in Kiyang. The men during the whole trip behaved splendidly and we were particularly well received wherever we stayed. The Red Cross in Kweiyang under General R.Lim were very good to us and gave us an excellent welcome. Capt Hemmingway who travelled with the Convoy from Kunming to Hochi was very helpful owing to his knowledge of the people and the language.	
South Western College Staff Training. Kiyang. 17th Feb.	Arrived at Li Chaping at 1900 hrs and were met and taken to the Camp by Col. Johnson, when we arrived we were given an address of welcome. Capt Volle who was supposed to be in the Area was also there, also Lt Col. Bentinck.	
18th - 25th	This period was spent in unpacking and storing all supplies and generally settling. Also revision training was carried out for work to start on 26th. A welcome dinner was given by Gen Li Mo Am and was attended by all ranks. After there was a concert in which we were asked to participate, we did and it was appreciated. The usual calls were carried out to opposite Officers and generally a lot of time was wasted with Teas and Dinners, all too much formality and not enough straightforwardness, which I hope we will get used to but never	

M.P. & M.B.W. 317/C 637-4-8-41-1,00,000 Pads.

Army Form C-2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
OR
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
(Erase heading not required.)

A.I.F.Cadre Battalion.
February 1942.

Hour. Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
	understand.	
26 Feb Kiyang	Training started. The A.I.F.contingent is now known as No 5 Bn and A.I.F.Cadre Bat A.I.F.Cadre Battalion. We are training 5 squads of 12 men per squad. 3 squads from No 5 Bn, one from No 1 Bn and one from No 2 Bn. making a total of 60 men in all. We have attached to each Cadre Coy and to Bn H.Q. one Chinese interpreter. These interpreters are quite good and very interested in their work. The Squads are quite interested and are very keen when there is a bang, unfortunately some of them cannot write which makes the teaching of formula impracticable. Our men seem very pleased to help in every way possible and are learning Mandarin as fast as they can.	Appendix 'D'.
28 Feb	Training continuing as per programme. Rain for the last few days has made it almost impossible for outside work as the Chinese have no coats.	

A.I.F. CONTINGENT. SECRET

OPERATION ORDER NO.2

REFERENCE MAP: "SHELL" MAP ROADS OF CHINA. COPY NO. 10

DATE: 21st. January 1942.

OBJECT: To move to Henyang via Burma- China Road.

INFORMATION: No enemy action expected. Aircraft activity possible. Own troops approximately 50 Officers and O.Rs. strong. Arms: Automatic weapons and rifles. Convoy strength from Maymyo to Lashio 13 vehicles, from Lashio to Kunming, 35 vehicles, from Kunming to Henyang 13 vehicl

INTENTION: To move in convoy to Henyang in four stages:

Stage 1. Maymyo to Lashio
" 2. Lashio to Kunming
" 3. Kunming to Kweiyang
" 4. Kweiyang to Henyang

METHOD: Stage 1. Maymyo to Lashio. Leave Maymyo 0730 hrs. 25th. Jan 1942.

2. Lashio to Kunming. Leave Lashio 0730hrs.25th Jan42.
3. Kunming to Kweiyang. To be decided
4. Kweiyang to Henyang. To be decided.

The Contingent (9 vehicles) and No. 4 area (4 vehicles),under command of O.C. A.I.F. Vehicles, Lt. Handley-Derry O.C. all vehicles Mr. Tite O.C. No. 4 area vehicles.

STAGE 1. This move will be completed as soon as possible in order to allow final administration arrangements to be carried out with Lt. Whitamore 13 vehicles (Mission 204) and 9 vehicles (R.A.F.) for Kunming to be handed over to Lt.Hemingway at Kunming. The convoy will move in four sub-sections.

1. Headquarters and No. 4 area.
2. No. 1 Squad
3. No. 2 Squad.
4. No. 3 Squad.

Intervals between sections approx. 1½ miles. Intervals between vehicles 200 yds. Speed 20 M.I.H.. Vehicles will rendezvous at Barracks Road junction at entrance to Lashio where instructions re quarters will be given. Lt.Handley-Derry to arrange conferences with Lt. Whitamore as early as practicable on 25th. January 1942.

STAGE 2. This stage as subsequent stages will be carried out as safely as possible, aiming to reach Kunming by the evening of the 1st. February. During this stage care will be taken that all trucks keep moving and that no pilfering of stores is allowed.

Order to move:

H.Q. & No. 4 Area		5 vehicles
No. 1 Squad.	3	
Mission 204	4	
R.A.F.	3	10 vehicles
No. 2 Squad	2	
Mission 204	5	
R.A.F.	3	10 "
No. 3 Squad	3	
Mission 204	4	
R.A.F.	3	10 "
	Total	35 vehicles

One contingent truck will be at each end of its sub-section to ensure that drivers only stop when at 2 hourly halts. On arrival at Kunming, Capt. Braund will ensure that convoy is broken into three parts for parking purposes. It is hoped that there will be 36 hours rest at Kunming. Speed 15 mlsP.H intervals approx. same as for Stage 1.

STAGE 3. Movement as safe as possible at 15 M.I.H., all precautions
STAGE 4 being taken as for stage 1.

GENERAL During the whole of this movement strict discipline will be observed throughout, drivers being particularly careful that all correct road signals are used, correct embussing and debussing will be carried out at all times and correct dre will be worn. In the event of an air raid the convoy will

pull off the road if possible and take all the cover that is available. Drivers will ensure that personnel trucks and stores vehicles are not parked together. If caught on some difficult part of the road where it is impossible to pull off the road, man all guns and carry on. Rifles will be loaded with 3 rounds, Bren guns will be ready for instant action.

Administration: (a) Dress: Full web, haversack on back, rifles, bayonets, felt hats, respirators, steel helmets slung, boots, puttee battle dress blouse where possible.

(b) Stores and Equipment: Drawn by Squads as per G1098 and all amendments and additions.

(c) Rations: To be drawn for 8 days to cover as far as Kunming by C.Q.M.S. and issued to Squads, contingent H.Q. and No. 4 Area forming the 4th. section. Cooking will be carried out by sections. After Kunming supplies will be purchased locally on a contingent basis.

(d) Accomodation: Capt. Braund will arrange all accomodation. If circumstances permit available tentage will be used After the last every afternoon Capt. Braund will move forward and try to find a suitable camping site along the roads, or arrange for billets in towns. When encamped vehicals will be under section protection, O.C. Squads making sure that all trucks are well picket The general idea of camp each night will be a perimeter as far as possible with about 100 yds. between section H.Q.

(e) P.O.L. 1 Petrol: Petrol en route to Kunming will be drawn at Hsipaw, Lashio, Kutkai, and Wanting if it is necessary. Each sub-section O.C. will draw signed vouchers from O.C. A.I.F.. Capt. Godfrey and Mr. Tite will draw 900 and 600 gals. respectively at Lashio, to last between Kunming and Henyang. If any of this supply is used before reaching Kunming it will be replaced there from A.P.C. dump.

2. Lubricants. Capt. Godfrey and Mr. Tite will ensure that sufficient oil etc. is drawn, in proportion to the amount of petrol to cover the journey from Kunming to Henyang.

(f) L.A.D. will be under Capt. Godfrey with 2 or 3 mechanics and one truck he will move in rear of the enemy convoy.

(g) Transport Drivers: Chinese drivers will be picked up in Lashio, ratio one per truck. They are engaged to take their vehicals to Henyang only. They will supply their own food, but must understand that they stop when the convoy stops and not at every eating house on the China Road.

(h) Medical: 1. In Burma From R.A.F. hospital, Lashio and B.F.F. hospital Kyuhksk.

2. In China at Mission hospitals along the road.

3. First aid will be carried out by the Squad Medical Orderlies.

4. D.M.S. sending a doctor with the convoy as far Henyang (Dr. Hsu.)

(i) Hygiene: Special attention will be paid to hygiene particularly when in camp, care will be taken to bury or burn any refuse.

(j) Intercommmnications: At each 2 hourly halt and at meal times.

Signed

O.C. A.I.F.

Distribution

O.C. A.I.F.	1
Squad Commanders	2,3,4.
Mr. Handley Derry	5.6.7.
Capt. Calvert	8
War Diary	9. 10

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION.

"B"

ROAD - DIARY.

MAYMYO? BURMA - to - KIYANG?- HUNAN

1. TOTAL DISTANCE. Approximately 3445 kilometres (2153 Miles).

2. Travelling by Road 2520 Kilometres. 1575 Mls. Travelling by train 925 Kils. 578 Mls.

3. DATE OF DEPARTURE: 0730 hours 25th January 1942 (a)

4. DATE OF ARRIVAL at/HOCHI Railhead, 14th February 1942 (b) Kiyang 17th February 1942

5. TRANSPORT: Stage 1. Maymyo - Lashio.
(a) A.I.F. Contingent, Nine 3 Ton Chevrolet all steel trucks.
(b) No. 4 Area, Four 3 Ton Chevrolet all steel trucks.

Stage 2. Lashio - Kumming
(a) and (b) as above
(c) Commercial vehicles - Two Dodge 3 Ton truck
(d) Chinese Army Transport- Twenty four Chevrolet all steel 3 Ton trucks.

Stage 4. Chin Ching Chung - Kiyang.
(a) A.I.F. - Two Chevrolet Trucks
(b) No. 4 Area - Four Chevrolet Trucks

Losses: A.I.F. One Chevrolet Truck turned over seven miles from Lashio by Chinese Driver. Later burnt out Big End near PaoShan and had to be abandoned.
No. 4 Area - Nil. (Lt. Hemmingway collecting)
Commercial Trucks. One Dodge broke sump on top of Salween Gorge and had to be left. All store saved - Chinese Driver.
Chinese Army Trucks: Six Chevrolets.
(a) One turned over six miles from PaoShan loaded with petrol. All saved.
(b) One ran into an embankment near Pingyi loaded with Detonators, Limpets, Delays and Fuses. Stores saved.
(c) One overturned after a collision near Huang Kui Sin loaded with bulk explosive. All saved.
(d) Two crack cylinder heads after total freezing at Kweiyang, both loaded with petrol which was dumped.
(e) One near Laonghi. Head on collision with 5th. Army Truck. Loaded with Bully beef, Biscuits and Jam. All saved.

Petrol (1) The arrangement that all Commercial trucks should supply their own P.O.L. made in Lashio was not promulgamated to drivers before leaving and the Mission supplied all petrol for the whole trip.
(2) Dumps: Dumps were made at (a) Paoshien (b) Kweiyang
In all 72 dumps- drums were dumped for return trip of surplus trucks from Railhead.

Maintenance: was carried out daily. Full servicing and greesing was carried out at Paoshan, Kumming Kweiyang by A.I.F. Contingent mechanics.

Drivers: Commercial drivers enlisted at Lashio were absolutely unsatisfactory and were only given a small test drive as they were unused to left hand drive vehicles. Arrangements about pay etc. for these drivers and also for those driving to the Commercial Trucks was not clearly told to them before leaving Lashio, and for this reason all drivers were of particular annoyance.

6. PERSONNEL: 1. OFFICERS (a) A.I.F. Capt. D.C.MacDougal
F.W.B. Braund

Capt. D.D.H. Godfrey
Lieut. R.J.H. Moffat
(b) No. 4 Area Lieut Handley Derry
Lieut C.J. Tite
" J. Macgregor

Attached Dr. Hsu.
Lieut. G.C. GROSSETT joined the Contingent at Hochi
Lieut Hemmingway joined the Convoy at Kunming and left it at Chin Ching Chung

2. Other Ranks: (a) A.I.F.- Forty three
(b) No. 4 Area - Five

7. DAILY STAGES

January	25th.	Maymyo- Lashio.	139 miles	camped R.A.F. Barracks
	26th.	Lashio-103 M.P.	103 "	" on Road
	27th.	103 M.P.- 591 M.P.	77 Miles	camped on Road
	28th.	391 M.P.- Paoshan	120 "	" F.C.M. Hostel
	29th.	Paoshan		" " "
	30th.	Paoshan - 356 M.P.	115 "	" on Road
	31st.	356 M.P.- 269 M.P.	87 "	" " "
February	1st.	269 M.P.- 94 M.P.	175 "	" " "
	2nd.	94 M.P.- Kunming	94 "	" F.C.M. Hostel
	3rd.	Kunming		" " "
	4th.	"		" " "
	5th.	Kunming-117 M.P.	117 "	" on Road
	6th.	117 M.P. - Panshien	79 "	" " "
	7th.	Panshien- 100 M.P.	116 "	" " "
	8th.	100 M.P. - Kweiyang	100 "	"Red Cross Hospital
	9th.	Kweiyang		" " " "
	10th.	"		" " " "
	11th.	Kweiyang-Laonghi	19 "	" at Hotel
	12th.	Laonghi - Tuyun	86 "	" " "
	13th.	Tuyun - Luitsai	81 "	" " "
	14th.	Luitsai- Hochi	69 "	" " "
	15th.	Entrained		
	16th.	On train		
	17th.	Arrived Li Cha Ping		

8. TRAIN CARRIAGES. Two personnel cars. (sleepers)
Two 40 Ton Wagons
Seven Flat Cars

9. Road Lashio-Kunming: Very windy and treacherous in parts and surface generally not good
Kunming - Hochi: Surface on the whole quite good

10. WEATHER Lashio - Kweiyang - Fine and mild generally
Kweiyang-Hochi, Bitterly cold and sleet and ice covered road
Chin Ching Chung - Li Cha Ping, Fine and mild.

"C"

(COPY)

KIYANG,

February 8th. 1942.

To all Ranks of the British Contingents
From Lieut. General Li Mo An, Kiyang

Brothers in arms,

Your coming to take part in the training and operation of our Surprising Battalions is an historical event in the war against the Axis Nations .

It is also a factor which will materially strengthen our forces in ridding this country of China of the savage and cruel Japanese aggressors. By doing so, we shall also be playing our part in aiding the democratic nations against the Axis tyrants who are seeking to crush and o oppress so many people who are peaceful in so many parts of the world.

Our fight for the maintenance of world peace and human justice will receive fresh impetus and strength from your coming.

We are glad and very much encouraged to have you with us and wish all of you the best of health as well as the final victories of the Democracies.

Li Mo An
(Lieut. General)

"D"

TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NO. 3 SURPRISE BATTALION FOR THREE WEEKS ENDING THURSDAY 19th. March 1942

Thursday 26th. Feb.	0900-1000	Introduction- Lecture- Theory of Explosives. Major MacDougal
No. 1 Coy.	1015-1100	Fuses
	1115-1215	Detonators
	1400-1500	Primers
	1515-1600	Electrical Equipment
Friday 27th. Feb.	0900-1215	Guncotton
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Guncotton Eletrical
Saturday 28th. Feb.	0900-1215	Ammonal Charges
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Ammonal Eletrical
Monday 2nd. March	0900-1215	Nobel 808 Charges
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Nobel Electrical
Tuesday 3rd. March	0900-1215	P.H.E. Charges
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	P.H.E. Electrical
Wednesday 4th. March	0900-1215	Missiles
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Missiles
Thursday 5th. March	0900-1215	Demonstration - Burma Contingent
	1400-1600	Spare Period
Friday 6th. March	0900-1215	Portable Charges
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Electrical Methods
Saturday 7yh. March	0900-1215	Timber Charges
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Road Charges
Monday 9th. March	0900-1215	Steel Work Charges
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Masonary Charges
Tuesday 10th. March	0900-1215	Reinforced concrete Charges
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Rock and Misc. Charges
Wednesday 11th. March	0900-1215	Recce. Reports
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Spare Periods
Thursday 12th. March	0900-1215	Traps and Mechanisms
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Incendaries
Friday 13th. March	0900-1215	Electrical Booby Traps
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Sabotage
Saturday 14th. March	0900-1215	Spare Day-Revision
Monday 16th. March	0900-1215	Placing of Charges
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Revision
Tuesday 17th. March	0900-1215	Demonstration
	1400-1600	Recce.
Wednesday 18th. March	0900-1215	Combined Exercise
Thursday 19th. March	1400-1600	Examination

NX 12551 Maj. to Lt Col
Major
F.N.B. Braund
2/4 Bn
Regt Dut
2/4 Bn

VX 27806 Lieut (Flight) M (nN)
Sandell
Adjt Int Corps
ATIS

SWPA GHQ

NX12551 Major F.N.B. Braund,
Regt Dut.
2/4 Aust Inf Bn. AIF.

VX27806 T/Capt J. M. Sandell,
Adjt ATIS Int Corps
SWPA. GHQ.

Oct 42 Orig
Dec 42 "
Aug 42 "
July 42 "
Jan 42 }
Feb }

EXTRACTS FROM PRIVATE DIARY

Major F. Braund, 2/4 Bn, Late Commander AIF Cadre Bn Operating in China 1942.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Troops drawn from:-

2/18 Bn
2/19 Bn
2/20 Bn
2/9 Fd Amb
2/10 Fd Coy
2/10 Fd Arty
8 Div Sigs

1941

July 27 Sailed from Singapore - called Penang.

Aug 2 Arrived Rangoon a.m.
3 " Maymyo 1800 hrs.

1942

Jan 25 Left Maymyo. Arrived Lashio.
26 Kutkai - then near Wanting at 105 peg.
27 Mangshih (Wanting 1215 hrs).
28 Paoshan.
29 Paoshan.
30 Yangping.
31 Hsiakwan.

Feb 1 Qrouniong.
2 Kunming.
3 Kunming.
4 Kunming.
5 Chii Ching.
6 Panhsien.
7
8 Kweiyang.
9 Kweiyang.
10 Kweiyang.
11
12
13
14 Hochi - Chinese New Year's Eve.
15 Chin Cheng King - railhead.
16 Luichow 0600.
17 Li Chin Ping. railhead. Kiyang. 2100.

At 0730 hrs on Sunday 25 Jan 42 AIF Contingent (No. 4 Area travelling with us) set out as part of Mission 204 for China. The convoy to Lashio consisted of 13 trucks. Arriving Lashio in the evening troops quartered with RAF and officers in RAF officers mess. Here we picked up 17 vehicles loaded with six months rations, benzine for the trip and HE fuses, etc, - the drivers were Chinese and regular civilian Burma Road drivers.

Hundreds of trucks were collected about this part. Not long after crossing the border was it before we met the real horrors and hazards of this much spoken of road. Mountains thousands of feet high seemed never ending; the highest point reached on the road was 8350 ft. just before Yang Pi in Yunnan. Also in the province of Yunnan some idea of the hairpin bends in the road can

be gathered when it is realised that one drops some 4000 ft. to cross a river. Road surface is dirt and no great width necessitating some degree of skill on part of a driver. In most places on the road there is scarcely sufficient room for two trucks; hence when climbing or going down a mountain, blind corners and the narrow road keep up the daily toll on trucks which either roll or are pushed over the edge in course of an argument. All along the road trucks can be seen in various stages of wreckage.

We moved early mornings and camped towards dusk sleeping in two men Alpine tents adjacent to the road and picqueting the trucks.

Nearing ~~Nearing~~ Kunming - capital of Yunnan - the country became less mountainous. On crossing a ridge this town of about 2,000,000 people lay with a lake on the right giving perhaps the best scene yet encountered in China. Here we stayed three nights at a hostel while we serviced our own trucks and took on 24 Chinese Army trucks into which we reloaded the contents of the 17 commercial vehicles.

From Kutsing we were travelling in heavily infested bandit country which kept the picquets, armed with Tommy guns, on their toes at night.

At Qrouniong where we stayed the night in a hostel we met 35 Naval personnel who had escaped from Hong Kong in the MTB's. Again near Hochi we encountered another two who had got away from the prisoners internment camp on the water where about 6000 are held.

At Kweiyang our quarters were in the Red Cross Depot run by General Lim. This is a large concern built up by him out of nothing. The Red Cross gave us an excellent afternoon tea party after which we visited (the officers) Dr. Bargers bungalow for drinks which were orange wine - pure spirit and worse by taste - and coffee liqueur - quite fair.

Hochi was reached early afternoon on China's New Year Eve.

Chin Cheng King. 15 Feb - next day - we loaded our stores and seven trucks, which included four from No. 4 Area, on the train which started about 2000 hrs that day. About 0600 the following day we changed cars after a cold uncomfortable night and were soon established at breakfast in the dining portion of our sleeper.

The journey by rail from Chin Cheng King to a town near Kiyang occupied from 15 to 17 Feb arriving 1900 hrs on latter date. By truck to the cleverly concealed school at Kiyang.

So we settled into our quarters set in the midst of padi in a large Chinese house which, like the remainder of the school, could never be found from the air. We had travelled 2100 miles over 25 days through the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi into Hunan, for the total loss of four trucks. It was a remarkable experience but one I hope never has to be experienced again.

Our second night at the school we were guests of General Li Mo An. We shall work with the 5th Bn after teaching their specialist squads demolition work. The 20 Feb was a big welcome feast attended by all British troops and many Chinese troops; dishes were never ending and included lashings of pork fat - most upsetting to the stomach - and sea slugs from Australia and Thursday Is. Afterwards there followed a concert by the Surprise Bns ourselves and a troupe of Chinese actors and singers.

It is recorded that originally we were trained to act independently as small forces of guerillas within certain areas in China - ours being in and about Canton, originally outside Shanghai. The thought was that we were to be pushed in immediately Japan entered the war against the Allies so that by our activities we should pep up local Chinese guerilla forces to a greater activity thereby forcing the Japanese to contain their alleged 32 divisions already employed in China. In point of fact there are now believed to be 26 divisions here, not up to strength, one Bn being removed from many regiments to train with and take part in troops preparing for attacks in Malaya, Java and Borneo. Due to bloody awful staff work (this Mission commenced Jan 41 and in Mar Derek Gill-Davies arrived Burma) we were not ready to go in when hostilities opened about 7/8 Dec. From Oct on stores and supplies were extremely difficult to obtain and as we use (to act to best possible results) certain special secret traps and gadgets, our entry was delayed. Even now we are without Tommy gun ammo. and have not such a hell of a lot of PHE, Mobels 808 or Guncotton or Ammonal, the only four kinds of explosives brought in by us.

Now we are to operate in the Changsha, Hankow, Nanchang area, a triangle formed by the Yangtse River on two sides, behind the Jap lines. With the news of an attack by ten divisions, (six ready and four more divs being brought up) on Changsha, the area will be a jumpy one and we shall doubtless have to be constantly on the move. This time it is certain the Japs won't make the mistake - already made in the three Changsha battles - of leaving the mountains untouched, where troops were previously lodged to come down on their rear and flank. There are five specially selected and trained Bns of Chinese - AIF works with 5 Bn.

In moments of thought on what this Mission should have been, one gets very depressed; however there is now a good chance that we shall do some very useful work.

Our equipment is worth a mention on account of the tremendous fire power we possess, also because I still grieve because our .45 Colt Automatics did not reach us. The squad conprising 1 major, 1 captain, 1 WOI, 1 sgt, 1 cpl, 10 ORs, own 1 Bren of Czecho Slovakian make firing 7.9 ammo (rimless) and 3 Tommy guns in addition to rifles and bayonets, Nos. 36 and 69 hand grenades. The load per man will be great unless we can operate from nearby bases.

REVIEW OF MISSION 204

BY

MAJOR F.N.B. BRAUND. A.I.F.

At the outset I give brief particulars of my personal history prior to the outbreak of War in September 1939.

For three years prior to such time I was a practicing solicitor, one month later a Private Soldier. These two facts are set down that the habit and necessity for logical and independent thought or reasoning may be deemed to have been part of me at some time in the past, if not in the present.

The following text is intended as a brief review of the Mission concerning A.I.F. Contingent down to its present condition.

2. Type of Troops.

The majority of the Contingent was drawn from twenty-two (22) Inf. Bde. in Malaya, reputed to be at that time the best trained and disciplined Bde. to leave Australia, both last War and present. Among the O.Rs. of this contingent are men who in civil life were of independent means, owners and part owners of sheep Stations, Solicitors, Company Secretaries, Bank Clerks, and so on down to a "Bagman"(tramp). In all cases education has been good, in the main, advanced.

3. Physical:

(a) Malaya: Good - stationed there six months. Before leaving selected men underwent a medical examination by three Doctors who pronounced them in excellent condition. This examination was the most thorough I have yet seen carried out in the Army.

(b) CHINA: Bad - In Burma were left four men; one dead, (typhus fever), one with eyesight effected by entry of a piece of a detonator, and two medically unfit. At Kiyang three men were left, one unfit as result of an accident. During the move one man was admitted to hospital at Changsha and is alledged to be proceeding to rejoin the Unit. T'ungku found many more men in an exhausted condition due to diarrhoea; these men have failed to regain their strength. Present sick left or to be left behind number fifteen, (one dangerously ill, Fever N.Y.D.). Of those to go forward it cannot be said that they are 100% fit. Records show that out of the remaining forty officers and men for the period of 6 - 30 June two hundred men and 1 - 14th. July one hundred and forty-eight men were attendances on sick parades.

4. Morale:

It is not possible to judge morale or discipline of A.I.F. troop by strict Barrack room neatness of Kit or personal smartness: personal hygiene, appearance, clean and tidy quarters rule.
(a) Malaya very high.

(b) Burma Good, but suffered on arrival at Bush Warfare School, because Camp was unprepared, poor administration and monetary loss despite an ambiguous promise that "nobody would lose". A late promise of increase in the men's pay has so far failed to materialise. Training apart from Demolitions did little to encourage enthusiasm. Since July 1941 all aspects of infantry work have been covered more than once. Instead of Instructors, Officers inexperience in Guerilla warfare and conditions to be encountered had to struggle through a six months period with the men's interest steadily failing. With Japan's entry into the War our spirits were high but again seemingly due to poor administration we were not ready to move until seven weeks later when again all became apathotic.

(c) China: Poor: due to lack of accustomed entertainment, the fact that another four months elapsed before moving towards a war area, and the low standard of training of the Chinese Battalions to whom we are attached.

It must be clearly understood that all ranks volunteered with immediate prospects of doing something active in the prosecution of the

War, and knew nothing of the place or nature of the task. Twelve months elapsed before they had hopes of a task. Although morale and health are now low, there is no indication, whatever that the men will ever give in to their circumstances.

5. Object of Mission:

(a) Political: To bolster up Empire relations with China.

(b) Military: To contain Japanese troops in China by "pepping up" the activity of local Querillas, thereby preventing Japanese withdrawals for use in other countrys.

6. Method of Attainment of Object:

(a) Political: A gesture of Empire support by providing troops trained in Demolitions and guerilla warfare.
(b) Military: To send British troops to five separate areas in the China to stir up greater activity among local troops.

7. Results achieved:

(a) Political Doubtful. We constitute more of a hindrance and embarrassment rather than aid. Feeling has been roused by our "arrogant presence" and efforts to help in combined tactical training with the Chinese Battalions. The officers politely listen but rarely if ever, accept proferred advice.

There can be little mutual confidence at Chungking if General Bruce tells us we are to operate in Chekiang Province and the Chinese fail to ratify the decision, resulting in the "border regions".

(b) Military: Defeated. Before leaving Burma this object had lapsed on account of withdrawal of Contingents M.E.1 and M.E.2 and Burma 2, (fifty per cent of our force) to operate there, and a possible realization that white troops would never be permitted to operate in any area in China on their own. Furthermore, Japanese Battalions had already been withdrawn from China to form a nucleus force for attacks on Malaya etc., We descended to a gesture of little or no military value, and the three remaining Contingents were to operate together in the "border regions" area, which has been static for some considerable time and of no great military significance. Finally notice was taken of reports concerning this area and it was agreed we should not go there. Despite this, other assurances and the Chinese we reached this area.

8. Prospects of Mission:

(a) A.I.F. present strength.	Officers and men		29
Original strength.	"	"	46
Strength decrease. Burma;	1 deceased		
	1 unfit further service		
	2 medically unfit.		
China;	1 dangerously ill		
	1 unfit for six months.		
	13 medically unfit		19
	Balance		29

Of these twenty nine, eleven only are pronounced as fit for active service. Other Contingents are in similar condition.

(b) Local Conditions.

1. Food difficult to secure to supplement rations. Native population either cannot supply or unwilling to say they can supply the latter caused by Chinese army commandeering without payment.

2. Quarters never good for health of men.

3. Disease already caused one death in Malaya.

Contingent at Tungku, with a near second in A.I.F. Doubtless will

make the men uneasy but should have no apparent effect.

4. Relations between the War Area Commander and our Chinese Regimental Commander if not good will lead us into a lot of difficulties, actively by false intelligence, passively by obstruction or non co-operation.

5. Medical services cannot hope to function efficiently.

(c) Attitude of Chinese. Disinterested.

1. Non co-operation throughout movement from Miyang to T'ungku..
2. Permission to find out finally for ourselves the difficulty of of operating in and living on the country which difficulty has now proved itself almost an impossibility. To quote a Chinese Colonel at T'ungku " It was criminal to send you here ". It is hard enough for the Chinese who are used to conditions you will meet. You won't last a month ".

(d) Security. It is impossible for white people to move without their whereabouts being made known for great distances. The Chinese is not a patriot but a "self-preservation" individual who lives to buy and sell. Information is worth money and white troops marketable.

9. Conclusions:

(a) The mission was conceived on a knowledge of the Chinese people as well as of local conditions which events have shown to be disastrously insufficient and erroneous.

(b) Assistence to China should not have taken the form of troops to be used as Guerilla forces.

(c) Inability to operate efficiently with Chinese troops, of which much has already been reported by other members of the Mission, has been shown in combined training.

(d) Our sick presence has added more weight to the belief held in certain Chinese quarters that we are not "tough". We cannot fight the conditions before we get into action.

(e) Complete failure to appreciate reports by Chinese speaking officers, both in Burma and in China, in addition to not seeking their advice or recommendations by conferences.

(f) Necessity for immediate finish to an expensive and outrun failure by withdrawal of all ranks from China.

(g) Replacement of the Mission by R.A.F.. This does not refer to No. 4 area the personnel of which I believe are doing excellent work.

10. Observations:

Withdrawal of all ranks would not, I consider, be regarded unfavourably by the Chinese who have shown that we are not desired. Moreover I do not think that this action would influence the possibility of China concluding a separate peace with Japan - my reasons are unnecessary for this review and in any event insignificant.
A promise to supply R.A.F. Fighters and subsequent fulfilment thereof would be the answer to China's needs, and the continuance of our good relations. No great difficulty should arise over health because, unlike ourselves, good living conditions would be possible as in the case with A.V.G. - - Petrol supply probably difficult.
As regards the after war period it is expected that China will endeavour to get the foreigner out of her country, so, any assistance given now or possibly adverse action unless momentous will have no effect later on foreign capital.

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F.N.BRAUND. MAJOR.

NX 12551. A.I.F.

Field. 15 Jul 1942.

SUPPLEMENTAL.

This review was intended to be brief; many facts and opinions which support my conclusions have been omitted in order that it might be so. The following facts relating to the attitude of the Chinese should have formed part. Additionally, one dangerously ill in the Review is now deceased.

Our journey along the Burma Road, through China to Railhead (near Kochi) was organised for us, that is, we were advised where to stop. Whenever we encountered a "hostel", a rest house partly under Army control we received every attention, courtesy and respect. From Railhead to Kiyang it was the same, everyone doing the utmost to assist.

Whilst at Kiyang the Mission in its dealings with the Chinese wes submissive, eager to please in a subserviently humble manner, tolerant of insult, with both feet held on the soft pedal. The condition lasted until late April, approximately ten weeks. Attached is copy of a letter by Capt. V.V.W.Fretwell, General List, Australian by birth, who has been in China for a number of years.

F/ N. Braund. Major.

18 Jul 42.

1942 Aug. 24 This is written in the first person for easier recording of impressions.

At 1240 hrs. message received to report to H.Q. immediately. At 1300 hrs. Col. Johnson ordered self to proceed with No. 5 Chinese Bn. on operations, suggesting taking Capt. Grossett and two C.R's plus one medical orderly. Only information given was that one Coy. would be going North, the other two Coys. in direction of Ching An - Mortars remaining behind at C.C.K. - object being to stir up Japs by activity of Bn. thereby preventing withdrawal for concentration at (say Hankow) for push on Changsha. Duration of operations unknown - only information given. Returned to billets and told W.O.1 Campbell and Pte. Groton to prepare. L/Cpl. Rossiter reported from hospital as medical orderly. Went to Col. Chen for information - none was obtained except that six coolies allotted us as follows: 2 Explosives, 2 Rations, 2 Kits - coolie loads not to exceed 40 catties, this weight being less than usual army coolie load. Said this was insufficient. Explosives and manner of use or quantity could not be ascertained. Despite enquiries of Col. Chen. When told that we could lift scarcely any explosives with 2 coolies we obtained 5 more, resulting in this allotment, 4 explosives, 3 Rations and 5 Kit - chairs for sick could not be taken as path too narrow - this we later found to be incorrect. 5 kit coolies appears to be a lot but a valise was considered to be a 2 coolie despite weight, certainly not more than 30 catties. Chinese officers never carry any equipment and told us to give ours to coolies, which we did not do. They travel in comfort with a good bed-roll and small retinue of orderlies. Rations taken were 10 days full scale hard. There were no written orders about the move nor were we asked to attend when orders (if any) for the move were issued. On asking, Col. Chen said "move at 1630 hrs." Start time was put back to 1900 hrs. Coolies for gear arrived very late but party ready to move before 1900 hrs. Actual start time was 2000 hrs. when 2 civilians led the Bn., turning right by the hospital through the hills beyond C.C.K. Prior to starting there was a grave misunderstanding when interpreter Wong stated that the Col. was giving his orders to his trusted men, leading me to assume wrongfully that I was not one of them. 4 Bn. sentry got a fright when we moved on him - unaware of our move. Moving through the hills wearing boots was extremely noisy as well as being treacherously slippery on stone tracks. That night we travelled 20-25 li to Shang Wa. Despite an advance party allotment of billets did not proceed smoothly - we reached ours at 0130 hrs. The Bn. moved very slowly at some rate in the vicinity of 5 li per hour (not li <u>in</u> the hour). Halts were irregular and infrequent; once beyond C.C.K. where civilians were dismissed, again some time later when we rested for half and hour. On arrival at Billets sigs ran out lines to Coys. from Bn H.Q. Prior to departure Col. wanted Capt. Grossett and another to proceed with 3 Coy. and to split our rations - this I said was impossible. These last minute requests are annoying. My impression is that the Col. does everything personally and that there is no delegation of authority.

Aug. 25 We were all asked to eat with Col. Chen at 0930 hrs.. The Coy 2 i/c's reported back from their respective reconnaissances dressed as civilians of coolie type with Mauser piston carried at rear under shirt tail, hung from the neck by cord. We were advised that the Bn. would move at 1430 hrs. Fed at 1500 hrs. and got started at 1600 hrs. Truly again time is no object Reached Hsi to 25 li at 2000 hrs. having travelled across mountainous country. We have discarded our boots for black cloth Chinese slippers which are the suitable footwear we find. Hsi To is Gen. Kang Sze Ling's advance H.Q.: he commands the 2 P.T. guerillas. With the Col. we paid our call. On the road again at 2115 hrs., believing, as we were told, to billet here for the night. It is in my opinion that the Col. missed the billets so decided to push on to his base. Travelling was flat and easy but still the pace is very slow. Approximately 8 li out from Hsi To , a soldier who had been sent back by the Bn. 2 i/c to act as a guide, lost his way thereby delaying us for ½ hour.

Passed through Kao Hu despite the fact of a statement that the inhabitants were untrustworthy and same should be skirted. Kao Hu is15-20 li from Hsi To. Here another guide picked us up leading us out to the base at Shang T'ang Yuan in the hills about 10 li from Kao Hu. Arrived 0230 hrs. The 2 i/c was here but evidently had done little or nothing about billeting arrangements as the Col. took a long time to get the Coys. off to their billets - we reached ours at 0315 hrs.. Our kits did not arrive until 1½ hours later, the coolies resting in Kao Hu. I hate Chinese duplicity. We were told that the slow pace was in consideration for us, whereas we had frequently told the Col. to go much faster if he wished. The fact that the coolies had rested was sufficient proof for me. This day we travelled some 50 li in 10½ hrs. The slow rate of progress is very tiring, halts being most irregular and at intervals varying between 1½-2½ hours. Administration as known to me is almost nil. During conversation with Gen. Kang he stated that there was little or no food to be brought around Hsi To and none further on.

I learned today that the Bn. and Coy. 2/i/cs do all the dirty work such as carrying our recces. or any other work likely to prove dangerous. Crossing the bridge, base side of Kao Hu, we were treated to a show by the Col. when a mule would not take the bridge. In approved Chinese Army manner he stood on the bank shouting orders until the entire township of Kao Hu must have been aware of the direction of our travel to our base. Our feet were tender as a result of using the cloth slippers, but travelling was found much easier.

Aug. 26 Everyone slept late until 0930 hrs. - first meal was at 1030 hrs.. We still eat with the Col. - Chinese food twice a day. Food consists of rice and three or four plates of vegetables. One needs to acquire speed to be in the event since they shovel and noisily suck in the rice at an astonishing pace. The Col. gave his outline plan as an accepted fact without even saying "there it is - what do you think of it?": this out of courtesy as I am allegedly his adviser, I thought he might do. Briefly plan party involved sending 1 Pl. of 1 Coy to vicinity of Yung Hsin as recce/ and flank protection - 3 Coy proceeds to West of Miso Chiang Kai (object could not be ascertained) - 2 Coy and 1 Coy. less 1 Pl. to area near Chang Kung To and 20 plainclothes men to vicinity of Yung Hsin to stir up trouble there hoping to lure the Japs out of Chang Kung To, when 2 Coy and 1 Coy. less 1 Pl. would come into operation against them. The road running south from Chang Kung To to Ani was to be mined in the hope of blowing up a tank and when this explosion was heard, a soldier dressed in white (civilians dressed thus rush in to warn Japs of Chinese approach) was to go on to the pontoon bridge across Hsiu river at Chang Kung To, and destroy same so as to cut off Japs in addition to preventing reinforcements crossing Hsiu river. This plan assumed numerous actions or rather anticipated Jap reactions so that these fitted the plan. We did not point out many obvious weaknesses in tactical side but did so from demolition angle saying, bridge could not be destroyed by dropping hand grenades into pontoons and even if civilian clothed soldier managed to drop charges into two pontoons, he would almost certainly be killed before he got any further, in which case two pontoons would not destroy bridge and could quickly be replaced. Mining the road for a tank, we explained that anyone walking on the mined strip would set it off; this overcome by Col. saying all civilians would be warned off area. Did not like my suggestion that this idea would be a boomerang in that it would certainly be told to the Japs. who would avoid mine. Said this would only blow tracks off tank and finally Col. considered advisability of having party nearby to finish off tank, but would not commit himself by agreeing Interpretation, using my best interpreter Wong, involved a very long discussion before even a rough knowledge of the plan was grasped. Many questions had to be asked on account of extraordinarily vague statements. Col. then appeared upset by so many questions, but explained difficulties of interpretation. I put forward a suggestion that before the Col. attemps to explain any plan to me, he tells interpreter beforehand and be in a better position to interpret. Further if his plan and orders were written they could be translated. These

These suggestions were accepted when time would permit. If quick decisions had to be made, language difficulty would be insuperable. Our calf muscles to-day are very stiff as a result of wearing slippers yesterday. A request made for 6 M.L. flares. We were not told how, when or where these were to be used nor were we asked for advice on these, [illegible]. I insisted on being told their use to which they would be put, then instructed the soldier on their use, should he have an opportunity of burning a petrol or ammunition dump. Finally ascertained that the flares were required for dropping into pill-boxes in the hope that the Japs would be scared out and so captured. There is a reward for Jap soldiers. The soldier who was instructed was one from 1 Coy.1 Pl. which we were told was going to the vicinity of Ch'ao Yuan. It is already becoming evident that we are merely travelling companions to the Col. carrying with us stores which will be handed out on request without any information being given or advice asked. It is, in any case, almost an impossibility to get past dogs and wire to use flares in this manner.

Aug. 27 Breakfast 1000 hrs. H.Q. moved a distance of 1 li into a larger house. Second meal about 1700 hrs. We find it necessary to supplement meals sometimes at mid-day with our rations, but am endeavouring to get all accustomed to the change in living. In the evening there was a conference of Officers about which I have never been informed. The Pl. from 1 Coy. previously mentioned, left this night 27/28 under the Coy. 2 i/c.

Aug. 26 By asking questions I am able to obtain information. Heard the Japs believed that there were 20,000 troops at C.C.K. resulting in "strict precautions" being taken on the Chang Kung To - Ani road - what the quote means many questions failed to produce any better information. Again by dint of questioning I ascertained that the outline plan seems to be altered with the despatch to-day of 1 Pl. to Jen Hsiu Kai. Later in the day I found out that this Pl. was mythical and that O.C. 1 Coy., also plainclothes men had left this day for the same place to recce. Also learned by questioning that 3 Coy. had left the Bn. at Shang Wu for Yung Chu Shan - their orders I could not ascertain. Am more fed up with our treatment, more particularly with my own position, alledged to be Bn. adviser, which I now find to be a mere paper proposition. I am not even given any information without having to ask questions to put myself in a position to give advice should such ever by any stretch of the bounds of possibility be asked. Drafted a letter to the Col. for translation by interpreter. Otherwise we were treated generously as proud possessions of the Col., ornaments or simply travelling companions.

Aug. 29. Had my letter to Col. Chen translated into Chinese by interpreter, which after three translations back into English seemed to convey my meaning. I personally handed the Col. my letter. Lt-Col. Gill-Davies and party arrived this morning. Conference arranged for 1400 hrs. between G-D and Col. At this conference I did not attend believing G-D wanted information for his own purpose but a request came from the Col. to attend. He explained his plan of defence here should the Japs move out against him, which plan gave him not the slightest control over the Bn. - also gave the enemy dispositions. He then went on to give his two plans of action, either (a) involving Chung Kung To bridge, mining road which has already been explained herein (B) sending a few troops dressed as Militia to feign attack on Yung Hsin whilst one Coy. stationed North on Chang Kung To - Ani road, other two Coys. South on same road to ambush reinforcements coming from these two places to assistance of Yung Hsin. Gill-Davies asked for his own particular information. During the course of this, information was given concerning Pei Cha Shan, Ma Shan, Hua Yuan and Lac To Shan. I then endeavoured to persuade the Col. to send some troops to this area to make a demonstration, then move up to Jen Hsiu Kai area, do the same and so on in different areas in the hope of causing the Japs. to move troops from one area to another. The Col. would not entertain the idea and evinced not the slightest interest. Never before has the Col. been so expansively informative. Twice more this day he called (1) to come into his office to listen to

a report by a plainclothes man just returned from a recce. (2) to say Japs. had concentrated within Nanchang following capture of Lin Tang South by Chinese. Once more the plans handed to me this day were done without any discussion with me nor was any comment on them asked. Pleased. G-D. is here to obtain first hand knowledge of my position. Two more M.L. flares were requested by a soldier sent back by 1 Pl. 1. Coy.. When told that this Pl. had already been handed 6 we were told that some had been given to 3 Coy.. How or when this could have happened since this Coy. left Bn. at Shang Wu, I can't imagine. Once more we were given no information of how or where these 2 flares would be used but on enquiring were told that 2 time pencils were also required: another question elicited the time of delay wanted. Chinese duplicity, vagueness and inaccuracy are maddening. Anyway the 2 flares were given out with full instructions for use for burning dumps, such being intended use. Later 2 No. 36 grenades were asked for - intended use as weapons for personal protection. These were not handed out as we explained that, if relied upon, the person using same without cover would certainly be killed. This was despite my feeling that the sooner all our stores are used the better for all concerned. Was asked for poison to poison wells and said that we did not carry any nor could same be used under International Law. Laughter.

Aug. 30 — Gill-Davies and party, dressed in Chinese Army clothes set off with Bn. 2 i/c to recce. - a more laughable sight I have yet to see in this country. This evening a wireless message was received which proved to be indecipherable. Message from Gen. Chou to Col.Chen that if any reliefs being carried out Jen Hsiu, Ani or Sung Fu or withdrawals therefrom, this Bn. should attack these areas when a suitable opportunity occurred. Pl. from 1 Coy. and 2 Coy. less 1 Pl. under O.C. 2 Coy. sent out to Wan Chia near Ch'ing An to recce. and attack if opportunity favourable. O.C. 1. Coy. and his party already at Kan Chou. Always in orders occurs this damned phrase "if opportunity favourable," thereby giving all concerned the opportunity of doing nothing under this loophole.

Aug. 31 — Spoke G-D. at Ch'ing An on phone advising him fighting had broken out in Jen Hsiu area - this he contradicted, saying that he had been observing the place yesterday. G-D. reported movement of enemy transport along Jen Hsiu - Ani road. Advised Col. Chen of this and he agreed to send out recce party to investigate G-D's report that this transport appeared an easy proposition. Agreed to allow me to accompany this recce. group but would not say when it would be sent. Col. further stated these three Bns. were important troops and this Bn's plans were now dependent on the Nanchang situation. A message received last night from Gen.Chou was translated for us this morning - text was to recce. Chang Kung To and Yung Hsiu areas then attack if a favourable opportunity occured. I then asked if he intended moving these parts of the Bn. up to Yung Chu Shan in order to be near the locality in the event of this favourable opportunity presenting itself. He said "NO", but he had ordered 3 Coy. to recce. those positions. Then came the patter about these troops being important and our task being dependent on the Nanchang situation. Rossiter, our medical orderly down with fever. By this it can be seen that plans still come out without discussion beforehand.

At operation base Shang T'ao Yuan — We ourselves have nothing to do. Still endeavouring to stir Col. Chen into activity.

2. " — Nothing to note.

3. " — A few men returned from Ku Kang Shan, West of Chang Kung To. They reported an encounter with a small party of Japanese, five of whom were killed and two wounded. Two old rifles, one cap and cloth bandoliers captured. One Chinese wounded in left arm just above elbow by grenade splinter. It appears Chinese dressed as civilians about a Pl. in strength were out protecting civilians while they were harvesting rice. A small party of Japs. came out and the Chinese lay in wait for them. The chinese doctor endeavoured to extract the grenade splinter with rusty forceps and knitting needle. Medical supplies rarely reach the troops being either sold by higher commanders and the money kept by them or else a

grant of money in lieu of supplies is obtained for the purchase of such supplies and this is misappropriated to their own uses.

3.C.C.K. Informed that Lt-Col. MacDougal arrived Chungking and expects to fly to India on 6th. Lt-Col. Gill-Davies back from front and gives very disheartening (but expected) report of work being done by 5th. Bn.

4. Front. Endeavoured to get a more detailed description of yesterdays encounter but found it impossible to overcome Chinese vagueness. The Chinese doctor requested us to give him certain drugs, but unable to do so as we only had sufficient for our party of five.

5. Front. A civilian was brought in from Chang Kung To area accused of dealing with the Japs. Unable to find out what these dealings were but presume they must be serious as Chinese openly deal with Japs. Enquired if found guilty would be shot, but told he would be handed over to civilian authorities. Punishment of treacherous Chinese is not sufficient deterrent to their dealings with Japs. Lt-Col. Millar telephoned that O.R's should be sent back if of no use. Gen. Chou had spoken to Col.Chen on the telephone just prior to the conversation with Millar. Following this Chen said he wanted a talk. Operations were discussed during the course of which Col.Chen seemed very perturbed. He referred to his original orders to come into this area and be active. Said that short of artillery his forces could not attack the enemy strong points and that they should be true guerillas and not in name only by harrassing the enemy with a series of small scattered demonstrations against various strong points causing them to waste ammunition, loss of sleep by having to stand to and generally to get them on edge. By day to detail men to snipe at anyone entering or leaving the strong points. This would make the enemy's life miserable until forced to send out parties to clear the nuisance. When this happened the enemy could be ambushed and fought on ground of our own choosing. This would more than carry out orders and should prove effective. The discussion was long and favourable, Col. Chen listening well; hopeful of getting some

6. Front activity by the Bn.
Col.Chen handed me a written order for operations by 1 & 3 Coys. These translated, then a discussion was held thereon. Copy translated as finally agreed upon - Appendix 2. Certain additions were made to the orders. Col. Chen was pleased with the result and so were we. It was pointed out that these tactics would result in larger actions when Japs. decided to clear surrounding country. The Col. fails to realise completely that his Bn. is supposed to be a guerilla force, despite its training as regular troops at Kiyang. Unfortunately that training was most inappropriate. To-day's discussion was the most favourable that has ever taken place. Six plainclothes men returned and gave their recce. report standing around the Col. in a circle, all talking their hardest and loudest at once. How anything can come out of these reports is difficult to imagine. 1 Coy. left to carry out orders. 3 Coy. advised by phone of orders.

6. C.C.K. Report by major Braund on activities at front to hand - Appendix (copy also with August War Diary) No information of expected movebeen here since 26 Jul., will we ever receive these anticipatedorders?

7. C.C.K. Rifle shoot against Burma A.I.F. won by narrow margin. 2 men in hospital (no diarrhoea. only occasional mild fever).

7. Front Spoke to Col. Chen re assembly areas should either Coy. be scattered by Jap action. Said we worried a lot over plans but he was very pleased. Feel that we are gaining more of his confidence.

8. Front. Nothing to note.

9. C.C.K. Maj.MacIver arrived with medical supplies from Chungking, to take over hospital from Maj. Brown.

10. Front. Left Base 1030 hrs. travelled to Shang Wu (55 li) arriving 1800 hr. Maj.Braund, W.O.1. Campbell and escort from Special Squad. Interpreter Kuo accompanied the party; he is practically useless. Orderly prepared Chinese food. Billeted in village house. Squad mounted guard. Ambush reported - for details see Appendix 3.

11. Maj.Braund. Left Shang Wu 0530 hrs. arrived C.C.K. (25 li) 0815 hrs. Had long interview with Col. Johnson to give personal report also on present condition of Mission. At operation base, great

difficulty being experienced in carrying rice, no carriers being available and 2 Coy. being used for carrying for 1 & 3 Coys. on operations. Col. Chen was anxious to give Capt. Grossett and Maj. Braund credit for operational plans, but he was informed all credit was due to him and more particularly to O.C. and 2 i/c 1 Coy. Reported 300 yen captured and distributed among 1 Coy. Message received fromGen. Chou that there was not sufficient rice at T'an Pu or Kau Hu operational dumps; that all rice would have to be sent from C.C.K. and not to move Bn. Base until arrangement for supply and carrying of rice could be made. Officers of 2 Coy. requested their Coy. beallowed to go out and operate, as 1 & 3 Coys. doing all work and getting all credit.

12. C.C.K. Rifle shooting against Burma, won by Burma. Maj.Braund had further discussion with Col. Johnson wherein it was decided he should return to Bn. on operations and await reply from War Office re withdrawal of Mission. Later called on Gen. Chou informing him of operations when he suggested operations which appeared impossible ones. Telegram from Chungking received re appointment of J.M.Sandel to rank of Lieut. on 26 Feb 42. G.C.M. Grossett to A/Capt. LocalMajor and F.N.B. Braund to A/Major, Local Lt-Col. At operationBase 2 Coy officers left to recce. Jen Hsiu area and Jen Hsiu - Ani road. Further ambush reported of which see Appendix 4.

13. C.C.K. Medical supplies obtained from our hospital to take back to 5th Bn.

14. C.C.K. Lt-Col.Braund and W.O.1. Campbell prepared to leave C.C.K. for base but found out their coolies had been ordered to return.

15. C.C.K. Coolies borrowed from 4 Bn. Lt.Col.Braund and W.O.1 Campbell left C.C.K. 1500 hrs. for front arrived Shang Wu 1800 hrs. At operation base reported that all civilians were being fired on by Jap posts in form of reprisals.

16. C.C.K. Party of evacuees (sick) to leave C.C.K. on 18th. and another party on 21st. 4 men from A.I.F. Bn.; Pte Weber M.F.M. Pte. Smart D.G. Sgmn.Thompson D.W. (R.C.S.) and Pte. Scott J.C. (R.A.M.C.) both attached to A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

16. Front Left Shang Wu 0800 hrs. arrived base 1500 hrs. Medical supplies and some 69 grenades handed to Col. Chen. Request that Medical supplies be used for troops and not sold as appeared to be the custom. Col. Chen said he would make sure of this.

17. Front. 2 i/c 1 Coy. returned sick. Reported on difficulty of getting at Chang Kung To road owing to barbed wire and heavy undergrowth, that Japs. now have to live on two meals a day off the country instead of receiving tinned rations every four days as well as their own rice, and no longer have any cigarette ration. Uniforms were dilapidated and Puppet troops very poorly clad and armed. Report that Pl. Commanders and small plainclothes party burned grainary at T'su Cha, a small village South West of Ani by using 3 M.L.flares with hay. 2 Coy. left as their officers reported damage could be done in that area.

18. Front. Telegram from advance H.Q. that British Govt. had decided to withdraw contingents to India.

19. Front. Demonstrated and explained use of 36 and 69 grenades, also Thompson Sub-Machine Gun to Special Squad of 5 Bn. Wireless received 1300 hrs. for party to return to C.C.K.. Col. Chen informed of message arrangements made to leave 20th. and reply wirelessed. Col. Chen later received wireless message to return to C.C.K.

20. Front. Lt-Col. Braund, Major Grossett, W.O.1 Campbell, Cpl. Rossiter (R.A.M.C.) and Pte. Groton left base 0900 hrs.with all stores taken up. Coolies could not keep up despite slow pace. Party arrived Shang Wu, 55 li, 1800hrs., coolies arrived 2000 hrs. Very cold night. Started 0545 hrs.reached C.C.K. 0815 hrs. Escorting squad straggled very badly. Feet badly bruised by cobble paths. Despite this, Chinese slippers are much preferred to issue boots, the latter being too heavy for the mountains and too slippery on the stones. Even wearing boots feet get bruised. Pte. Weber A.I.F. and Sgnm. Thompson R.C.S. attached to A.I.F. evacuated from C.C.K. with sick personnel to Kiyang.

22 C.C.K. Report received from Col. Chen. O.C. 5 Surprise Bn. that 20 Japs. killed by ambush by 3 Coy.

23 C.C.K. 5 Surprise Bn. returned to C.C.K. Capt. Callum R.A.M.C. took back Ptes. Sinclair and Potts with sick personnel to Kiyang. Col. Johnson advised wireless message had been sent to India to concentrate any A.I.F. evacuees at one station.

24.C.C.K. Gen.Chou gave feast alledged to honour a Chinese Moon Festival but really was in farewell. Contingent and Chinese Bn Commanders present.

26.C.C.K. Orders issued for move to Kiyang.(For copy see Appendix 5)

28.C.C.K. Malay contingent moved off for Kiyang.

29.C.C.K. One O.R sent back by Malaya Contingent with dysentery. Range practice held. Increase in shooting efficiency with rifle has been 33% within 3 weeks. Thompson Sub-Machine gun records have not been kept, but shooting has been good.

30.C.C.K. Col. Chen and Officers of 5 Bn. gave us a feast in the morning. We gave them a return farewell feast in the afternoon. Burma Contingent moved off for Kiyang.
The original strength of A.I.F. Contingent was 48 all ranks, present strength in this forward area is 24 all ranks.

.....Lt-Col.
O.C. A.I.F. Contingent.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

No.152/9/W.D.

G.H.Q. India 2nd Echelon,
Jhansi, the 14 February 1943.

SIMLA	1	13

To

G.H.Q. India, M.T.8(War Diaries), SIMLA.

Subject:- WAR DIARIES - B.M.M. CHUNGKING

War diaries of B.M.M. Chungking, as shown below, are forwarded herewith.

Duplicate

H.Q. B.M.M.	August to December 1942.
Adv. H.Q. B.M.M.	August to October 1942.
Adv.Base Depot Kiyang	29th Jan to 16th Dec 1942.
Burma Cadre Bn	July to October 1942.
No.3 Cadre Bn	August to October 1942.
No.4 Cadre Bn	Dec '41 to August 1942.

Triplicate

A.I.F. Cadre Bn	August to October 1942.

Checked for Indexing

Kindly acknowledge receipt.

Copy to:-

Australian Army H.Q., Melbourne, Australia.

In continuation of this H.Q. No.142/1/W.D., dated 30-9-42.

Original war diary in respect of A.I.F. Cadre Bn for the period January, February and July to October 1942 is forwarded herewith.

Kindly acknowledge receipt.

P.A.
23/3/43

C.G.S.M.I.
17 MAR 1943
RECEIVED

Officer i/c 2nd Echelon G.H.Q. India.

File No.142/W.D.

RECEIVED
29 APR A.M.
A[illegible] Registry

ARMY
274 | 1 | 109

No.139/42/W.D.,
G.H.Q. India 2nd Echelon,
Jhansi, the 1 March 1943.

To

Australian Army H.Q.,
Melbourne, AUSTRALIA.

Subject:- WAR DIARIES - H.M.I.M. CHUNGKING

Reference this HQ Letter No.152/9/W.D., dated 19.2.43 addressed to G.H.Q. India, G.S.Branch, M.T.S(W.D.), SIMLA and copy to your Headquarters.

2. Please confirm whether you have received the diaries sent to you under the above mentioned No.

J.R.Wallis Lt.Col.
for Officer i/c 2nd Echelon G.H.Q.(I).

VP/
1/3

Mil Hist Sec 1/5
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TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NO. 5 SURPRISE BATTALION FOR THREE WEEKS ENDING THURSDAY 19th. March 1942.

A

Thursday 26th. Feb.	0900-1000	Introduction- Lecture - Theory of Explosives. Major MacDougal.
No. 1 Coy.	1015- 1100	Fuses.
	1115-1215	Detonators.
	1400-1500	Primers.
	1515-1600	Electrical Equipment.
Friday 27th. Feb.	0900-1215	Guncotton.
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Guncotton Electrical.
Saturday 28th. Feb.	0900-1215	Ammonal Charges.
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Ammonal Electrical.
Monday 2nd. March	0900-1215	Nobel 808 Charges.
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Nobel 808 Electrical.
Tuesday 3rd. March	0900-1215	P.H.E. Charges.
No.2 Coy.	1400-1600	P.H.E. Electrical.
Wednesday 4th. March	0900-1215	Missiles.
No.3 Coy.	1400-1600	Missiles.
Thursday 5th. March	0900-1215	Demonstration- Burma Contingent.
	1400-1600	Spare period.
Friday 6th. March	0900-1215	Portable Charges.
No. 1 Coy.	1400-1600	Electrical Methods.
Saturday 7th. March	0900-1215	Timber Charges.
No.2 Coy.	1400-1600	Road Charges.
Monday 9th. March	0900-1215	Steel Work Charges.
No.3 Coy.	1400-1600	Masonry Charges.
Tuesday 10th. March	0900 -1215	Reinforced concrete charges.
No.1 Coy.	1400-1600	Rock and Misc. Charges.
Wednesday 11th.March	0900.1215	Recce. Reports.
No.2 Coy.	1400-1600	Spare period.
Thursday 12th. March	0900-1215	Traps and Mechanisms.
No. 3 Coy.	1400-1600	Incendaries.
Friday 13th. March	0900-1215	Electrical Booby traps.
No.1 Coy.	1400-1600	Sabotage.
Saturday 14th.March	0900-1600	Spare Day- Revision.
Monday 16th. March	0900-1215	Placing of Charges.
No. 2 Coy.	1400-1600	Revision.
Tuesday 17th. March	0900-1215	Demonstration.
	1400-1600	Recce.
Wednesday 18th. March	0900-1600	Combined Exercise.
Thursday 19th. March	0900- 1215	Examination.

2

A. I. F. BATTALION.

Demolitions Examination Results No 1 Bn. 2o Mar 42.

B

N A M E	MARKS	REMARKS.
Chiang Chieh Hsun	62	Fair
Ho Ping Ong	53	Just Fair.
Tsao Ping Yen	81	Very good.
Huan Chin Chang	78	Very good.
Li K'ai Hsiu	79	Very good
Wu Cho Chen	57	Fair.
T'o Hui Lung	52	Just fair.
Wu Ni Ching	78	Very good.
Cheng Yeng Fei	70	Good.
Li Pao Ch'ang	87	Excellent.
Chao Tze Chung	60	Fair.

A. I. F. BATTALION.

Demolitions Examination Results No 2 Bn. 20 Mar 42. B

N A M E	MARKS	R E M A R K S.
Wang - Pa Fei	78	Very good.
Ch'i- Shao Ta	76	Very good.
Ch'i -Yu Lia	56	Fair
Hu - Lim Yuan	55	Fair
Hsu - Pin Sheng	95	Most excellent.Top marks.
Liu - Shen nin	67	Vey fair.
Chen - Hsiao Lin	61	Fair
Liu - Hsiu Min	61	Fair
Tso - Ching San	80	Very good

A. I. F. BATTALION

Demolitions Examination Results No 5 Bn. 20 Mar 42.

B

N A M E	Marks	R E M A R K S.
Wang-Kwang Li	87	Excellent.
Hsu -Tse Yu	67	Very fair.
Tien - Ming Tsen	74	Good.
Chow - Ching Yen	45	Failure.
Chia -Lu Cha	52	Fair.
Yu -Chen Ya	81	Very Good.
Chang Yu Hung	78	Very good.
Ten - Lung	79	Very good.
Noh -Wen Fu	54	Fair.
Fu -Tsung An	82	Very good.
Yen -Ke Ming	67	Very fair.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible].
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible].
Li - SSu Chuan	90	Excellent.
Wang -Chen Ching	74	Good.
Pei -Wei K8ai	62	Fair
Yen Ken Ch'iang	87	Excellent.
T'ien - Ch'ang Kwei	59	Fair.
Hen - Chuin Ch'i	67	Very fair.
Kwei - Choa Shen	72	Good.
Hou - Chin Hsing	70	Good.
Wang - Shen	84	Very good.
Tiao - Fu Kuei	79	Very good.
Wang -Yun Fu	82	Very good.
Nang - Chin T'ien	72	Good.
Yeh - Yueh Fa	82	Very good.
Wang - chia Shu	81	Very good.
Chang - Chin	81	Very good.
Chow -Tin T'in	77	Very good.
Wang - Tai Piao	77	Very good
Hsia - Yun Peng	78	Very good.
Kuo - T'ai Nin	87	Excellent
Sung - Fu Hsiang	77	Very good.

C.

CHINESE EXERCISE No. 2.

25th. March 1942.

NARRATIVE.:

Strong Japanese Forces are holding the Town of Kiyang and another force of two sections are holding Me An Lin covering road between Kiyang bridge and the Ferry.
We are the Guerilla platoon in the San Chuang area.

INTENTION: (1) To blow Kiyang bridge.
(2) Wipe out the enemy on Me An Lin.

METHOD: To move from San Chuang to Wang Chia when Nos. 1 and 2 Sections will attack and wipe outthe enemy on Me An Lin while No. 3 Sectionwith demolition party moves to bridge.
The Section will cover the demolition workfrom behind the town of Sing Chiao Jan

---

Above is the Chinese exercise referred to also the English translation.

POINTS REGARDING THE SCHEME.

(1) I pointed out that this exercise with Kiyang strongly held would be a Battalion exercise.
(2) That the Section covering the demolition partycould not see the bridge as there was scrub and a village in between.
(3) That the covering party was on the wrong side of the river.
(4) That two Sections could not possibly attack Me An Lin and it would probably take two platoons as the ground is very open.

The Battalion Commander agrees on all these points and stated that he had not seen the exercise before it had been sent to us, and then he asked us to produce a scheme which we did and which was a great success.

Duncan Dougal
Maj

The sketch-map near Wang-ly mountain chain for allotment of a raid of one infantry Platoon & demolition Party.

國要署部參製此許特

日六十

繪製五大 made by 5 Bn.



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LECTURES GIVEN TO OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION AT KIYANG BY THE STAFF OF THE SOUTH WEST STAFF TRAINING COLLEGE

2nd. March	Gen. Han,	Special methods of fighting used by the Japanese.
4th. "	Col. Kao	Japanese and the use of Gas.
6th. "	" "	A. R. P. Protection.
9th, "	Gen. Han	Japanese mopping up tactics.
11th. "	" "	Criticism of Chinese Army by Japanese.
13th. "	Gen Liu	Operations in the Border Regions.
16th. "	Gen. Han	Defence of Japanese L.of C..
18th. "	Gen. Chow	Organisation and defence of Strong Points.
20th. "	Lt. Col. Chiu	General notes on Guerillas in the Border Regions.
23rd. "	Gen. Han.	Review of the War situation in the Pacific.

E

Lieut. Colonel H.H.Johnson

Commanding British Wing

Guerilla School

KIYANG

March 25th 1942

Subject: Notes on the Surprise Battalions.

Attached is a summary of the present situation with ourselves and Chinese Battalions as I see it. Also a summary on the same subject by Capt. N.G.H.Wolfe formerly A.P.C. China.

D.C.MacDougal
Major
Commanding A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

E

Notes on the Surprise Battalions.

General: Since the co-operation of the British and Chinese Battalions, all the Officers of this unit have been wondering what our final role will be. Although we have had no indication from any authorities we have carried on with our Bns. on a course of Infantry Training. During this period we have noticed several points. The main ones are:

1) Our Bns. are not training for Guerilla Warfare
2) In view of this, what is our role?

1) A guerilla Bn. in my mind should be a unit detached from any "Red Tape" control from a Regimental H.Q. It should be a unit in which the Bn. Commander is given a job to do and the method of doing it should be left entirely in his hands. Similarly Company Commander and to a lesser extent Platoon, & Section Commanders. It should be the aim of a Platoon Commander to train his men as individuals who can rely on themselves against any eventuality, to train them to be able to take orders make their own appreciations and to carry it out orders by themselves as well as in conjunction with others; to train them to make intelligent reconnaissances, which can be readily understood by their superiors and to be able to give their frank opinion of a tactical problem to their Section or Platoon Commander if required. In other words to teach every man to think for himself.

In no way have our opposite Bns. attempted as far as we have seen, to teach any individuality whatsoever. I have had talks with our Bn. Comdr. and I feel certain that he understands the importance of "individualism" but all the time he seems to have his hands tied by political and other workers. He is told exactly what to do and how he is to do it, and he is told to carry out the same ideas on his Company Commanders and lower commanders. When we get into action the time will come when a Section, Platoon or Company Commander is killed and the Coy, Pln. or Sect. will not function. At the moment the troops are learning a very antiquated form of Infantry tactics in which everything is laid down and everyone knows exactly what to do. The question of use of ground and cover and individual concealment from fire has not been studied, or if so they are not practiced. The use of formations and the necessity for dispersal is not carried out in any form and they have an amazing tendency to run when in open ground. In the last exercise that was carried out, the platoon concerned was made to double for the last 500 yds., they went straight up and over hills without making any use of the many gullies that were there. There was excellent cover from fire and view right up to within 200 yds. of the enemy post, where a Platoon could have moved without doubling more than 50 yds. The result was that when they reached the objective they could not possibly have fired accurately and some even were too exhausted to fire at all. This, of course, is ridiculous and it means that either the Officers or N.C.O.s or both have not had proper infantry training. I have made several unsatisfactory attempts to discuss whether the present infantry training that the Bns. are doing is purely revision or whether it is their guerilla training. I feel that if it is the latter, we are simply wasting our time staying here. If the former I think we can do a great deal to help, when the present fiasco is finished.

The Surprise Bns. as far as I have seen are bodies of regulars, collected together under regular officers, with a smattering

of actual guerillas amongst them. The guerilla Officers, that are there, are controlled by political Headquarters and probably 70% of their usefulness is lost. In conclusion I would like to say that in our Bns. we are welcome, but as a force we cannot combat political Army intrigue.

2) Regarding the second problem there are many courses open, these might be roughly be classified into 3 different parts.

a) Operate detached purely as guerillas
b) Operate as guerillas but in close cooperation with the Chinese Regular Army
c) Act as Assault troops or Commandos.

Before discussing these I will give a picture of the situation as it appears to me.

The Chinese have been fighting against the Japanese for over 4½ years and during the last 2 years no important progress has been made by either side. Both sides seem quite satisfied to wait for something to happen. The question is, are the Chinese going to drive the Japanese out or are they going to wait until Great Britain, U.S.A. and Russia destroy the German armies and finish off Japan. I think that there is every reason to believe that China will wait. She needs a rest to recover from the first 4 years of war and now is a good time, when Japan is occupied elsewhere. Also, trade is good, men in the army are being paid, whilst otherwise many would be starving, "everyone is used to war, so why worry to hurry it up, the Japanese will be defeated in the end". Also China is doing her part to aid the Allies in Burma so why should not the rest of China "Rest"? She is fulfilling her obligations to the A.B.C.D. Powers.

If this is the state things have reached and I believe they have, our operational role will be the simplest and yet the one which sounds to us the most inviting; that is No.2 which in words provides great scope but anyone looking at a map can see that the scheme is very ambitious to say the least. We are being pushed into an area which now keeps occupied 6 Chinese Divisions and our areas are widely separated. Does this mean that we are not required to do much damage? Would it not have been better if the Chinese really wanted to defeat Japan in China, to concentrate us and use us as Commandos and prepare the way to capturing Kaying and cutting Japanese river communications with Kukiang and everything above it and if held could force the Japanese to withdraw from Central China? Do they want this at the present time?

Or alternatively, if the Chinese really want us why cannot we release the Bns. that are captured in Hongkong and form a Commando, because, I feel that at the moment we have lost altogether the original idea of maintaining Japanese troops in China; in other words we have missed the bus and have got to do something and that quickly if we want to catch up.

KIYANG, March 25th 1942

D.C.MacDougal
Major

E

Copy of Letter from Capt.N.G.H.Wolfe to
Major MacDougall dated 24/5/42

Major MacDougall,

I think that sufficient time has now elapsed since arrival here for us to make an appreciation of the situation and enable us to make some concrete suggestions towards the improvement of our relations with the Chinese.

First of all to face the facts from the point of view of those of us not altogether in the "know",. It would seem that we have not been accepted in this country altogether with open arms. In fact we are rather a doubtful quantity and are not considered exactly as assets. Our poor showing in this war may have something to do with it but I personally think that even before Japan entered the war our particular Mission was not altogether desired by the Chinese Military. I think that it was only the personality of the late General Dennys that overcame the reluctance to have us in China probably evinced by General Chiang Kai Shek. When he finally did give in he did not do it 100% and he obviously made a point I note that our freedom would be restricted although he assuredly did not tell General Dennys of this.

Li Mo An was selected as the guinea pig on which to try the experiment. He was a very suitable person as although he has great ambition his area of power is at present restricted. He may not be "persona grata" with Chinese Army H.Q. and it may have been felt that his ambitious nature should receive a check. His being forced to accept us has forced him to check his step as we are obviously a "problem child". Any mistake now would ruin his career. Chungking has probably dictated a "go-slow" policy to him whereas we are doing everything possible to force him to "go-fast". Naturally he does not like us very much although there may be moments when he feels that he has gained tremendous "face" by acquiring us. He may be feeling at the present time that our Mission is liable to die on his hands. This would be a dreadful thing for him if by any mischance our death could be attributed to himself and under the circumstances he may take steps for us to commit suicide. In other words he will do everything possible to force us to put the noose around our necks without implicating himself.

We are all very "browned-off" with the present state of affairs as even the most unobservant of us can feel the rumblings under the surface. It is, however, very difficult for any of us to point an accusing finger at the actual cause for our lack of confidence. We too feel that unless we step warily our Mission is doomed to failure. In true Chinese fashion, however, our Chinese collaborators have given us no real evidence which they could not break down with a charge of impetuosity and lack of understanding on our part of Chinese methods.

If the Mission does come to an end early and we certainly do not wish to be blamed for its failure and here lies the object of this memo.

We feel and quite naturally that we can run rings around the Chinese in almost any branch of warfare. The Chinese, however, in the light of recent events are not quite so sure that we can and quite possibly in their opinion the boot is on the other foot. Our main job right now is therefore to exercise TOLERANCE. I think that the Chinese battalion to which we are attached are genuinely anxious to cooperate with us. It is not their fault that General Li Mo An is not making things easy for them and in fact on practically every occasion on which we have had to cooperate with them so far some slip-up has occurred. Li Mo An tells them one thing and then through our

E

Copy of Letter from Capt.N.G.H. Wolfe to
Major Macfougal dated 24/3/42

interpreters we are told something else. Naturally things get and the seeds of mistrust and antagonism are planted. We foster by being too critical and by expressing ourselves too strongly particularly in front of our interpreters.

I am a little suspicious of all our interpreters. T all understand more English than we think and much that we inadvertently say is passed on and another black mark is chalked up against us and another link is forged in the rope which Li Mo An hopes to we will ultimately hang ourselves.

We must not be too critical of Chinese schemes although an occasional suggestion is a good thing to show that we are genuine interested in what is going on. Derogatory remarks among ourselves in front of Chinese are to be deprecated. Furthermore our men should be told not to discuss China or the Chinese among themselves in front of any Chinese except flatteringly. Only today some of our men were being clever at the expense of a boatman. The remarks were hardly of the kind to cause goodwill and unfortunately it was overlooked at the time that two of our interpreters were in the boat.

On another occasion an officer was heard to vent his disappointment at some small but irritating lack of cooperation on the part of his Chinese opposite number. He probably used more force in his remarks than he intended and although he spoke in an undertone to a brother officer it is more than likely that he was overheard by the interpreters nearby. In any case his look of exasperation was sufficient to convey to even the non-English speaking Chinese that he was displeased.

These sort of things are happening all the time and are liable, to be the direct causes of discord.

Personally I think that we should go in for frequent conferences with our battalion commanders. For instance in regard to next Saturday's scheme it would be an excellent idea if we could go over the ground with our opposite numbers and discuss our and their role thoroughly so that when the scheme comes off it will be a success. This passing back and fro of chits and the sending of verbal messages by interpreters will never result in complete cooperation. I also think that at first we ought to fall in with Chinese schemes as submitted by them although the situations may be completely contrary to our Military training. Gradually we can advance counter-suggestions but we must not be in too great a hurry about this. As I have said before we must be tolerant. If we are to make a success of this mission we must be prepared to meet the Chinese more than half-way. This policy will also bear fruit if the mission should be liquidated due to it finally being decided that we have no common ground as a basis on which to make a go of it. If the thing must be a failure let us not contribute to its failure.

KIYANG, March 24th 1942.

N.G.H. Wolfe.
Captain.

A.I.F. Cadre Batallion. WAR DIARY Month March 42

Place, Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
S.W.S.C. Kujang 1st–31st Mar Organisation	I explained what was ~~in~~ the subject of the talks between Gen. Dennys & the Generalissimo & what Gen Dennys had told us what we were to do. Col Chen was very pleased when I told him & immediately asked for more co-operation. From his general attitude it was certain that Gen Li Mo An had told him absolutely nothing. On returning I received a report from Capt. N.G.H. Wolfe (6th G.R.) (ex A.P.C.) & after a short conference wrote a report to Lt-Col H. Johnson on the general subject. During the whole period from the 17th Feb–31st Mar to my certain knowledge Col Johnson has been hammering at Gen Li Mo An for information & Co-operation, but absolutely none was forthcoming. Up to the 26th Mar. the whole Mission seemed to have a cloud over it with the Chinese H.Q. almost refusing to co-operate & putting us off by promises & excuses.	Appendix E
28th March	Conference. Lt-Col Johnson, Lt-Col Gill-Davis Maj. MacDougal. — Gen. Li Mo An, Gen Chow, Gen Lou, Maj-Gen Fou. We immediately got down to facts & asked Gen Li Mo An where we stood, he replied by trying to talk round the question so Col Johnson asked him if he wanted us to help or if he did not, as the time had come when we could wait no longer. The reply was that he would have to talk & then he would let us know.	
29th Mar	Conference again with Gen. Li Mo. An when he ~~promised~~ said that we could now assume our advisory capacity & have a fairly free hand in the training & also the preparations of Schemes. Our Bn. & Coy Advisers to start 30th Inst.	
30th Mar.	Visited the 5 Ens. starting at 0530 hrs & ending at 1600 hrs. Saw all phases of their training, from P.T. to Battl drill. I think that it is a great shame that	D MacDougal.

A.A.F. Cadre BATALLION — WAR DIARY — Month March 43

Place, Date.	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
S.W.J.C. Kiyang. 1st-31st March Training	Demolition training of the 5 Bn. Technical Squads was carried out and completed on the 19th Inst. On which date an oral examination was held. The standard was very Good. During this period (1-31 Mar.) Combined exercises were carried out, but unfortunately all schemes up to the 20th inst. had been previously rehearsed and they were carried out on ground well known to both officers & men. We all got the impression that these schemes were really demonstrations. On the 23rd Inst. a scheme was sent across for our perusal but was so badly set out that, I called on the Bn. Comdr. & finally he asked me to prepare a scheme which was carried out very satisfactorily. From then on to the end of the month we were asked advice on many different matters, in spite of attempts by Gen. Li Mo Lin H.Q. attempting to control everything. Our CO. Lt-Col. Chen Ying Sum is a very excellent man & has had a lot of guerilla experience particularly in the Border Region. He is I think the only one who is has sufficient confidence in what he is doing to "stand up" against General Li Mo Lin.	Appendix "A." Appendix "B" Appendix "C"
	During this period also we were given a series of very interesting lectures by the staff of the School. Our own training during this time has consisted of Chinese & recapitulation of Demolitions but mainly physical training & Route Marches were carried out.	Appendix "D"
Organisation:	The organisation of the combined Sino-British Bn. did not come into operation until the 29th Inst. Up to that date the Bn. Comdr. thought that we were purely Demolition Experts and not advisers for General tactics. After a conference on the 28th with the Bn. in which	

Place Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
Kiyang 1st-30th April Training	everything had been arranged it was decided to let the exercise stay as it was. The following day we made a recce. of the area and discussed the exercise as it stood & returned to camp. That completed the training for the month.	
Administration.		
12th Apr.	Warning order (verbal) was issued to be ready to move to the Border Region by the 26th Apr. Lt. Col Millar would be arriving in Kiyang about the 19th with details. Packing was started, great care being taken to get the exact coolie weights. All explosives were repacked & weighed & everything was put into baskets.	
18th Apr.	Information received that we are moving not to the Border Region but to Burma. However as ~~things~~ packing had proceeded so far it was decided to wait until Lt. Col. Millar arrived until any alterations were made.	
20th Apr.	Lt. Col Millar arrived from Chungking & an operation order was issued. It was impossible to prepare an effective operation Order from this as the information contained in it was quite inadequate. L/Maj. D.C. MacDougal was promoted A/Lt. Col & put in Command of the Contingent. W.O. Sandell J.W. was recommended for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant. The remainder of the month was spent in repacking certain explosives & making crates for baskets. Three Official Dinners were held for the Chinese & ourselves which from a political point of view were successful. Sickness during the month was rather heavy but all men are fit for the journey to Burma.	Verbal Orders were given regarding the move, as no definite date could be given by the Chin

D. MacDougal
Lt. Col

Place Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
Kujang 1st–30th April Training	The combined training was much interfered with during the month as on the 12th Inst we were given a warning order to prepare to move. After conferences with the Bn & Coy Commanders were over, which occupied the first week, a long range Recce was made by the C.O. & Capt. Wolfe, the idea being to get the Chinese away from their own ground. The ground was chosen and a scheme was set covering two days. Part (a) was a Covered Recce in enemy territory by the Coy. R. Group with the view to ambushing the enemy. Part b. Was the approach march & the actual Ambush. The whole scheme was a failure because the Coy Cmdr. did not make a proper Recce. of the area allotted & the area he chose for the ambush was too small for the purpose. However many useful lessons were brought out and a very good discussion followed. Later I wrote a letter to him criticising his Coy. Cmdr. Unfortunately it rained for the next 4 days & it was impossible to try out the other two Coys.	
10/4	Called to a conference at Hi Mo Ri's H.Q. where a 3 day Regimental Exercise was being discussed. The whole thing was in my mind far too ambitious, for untrained troops & the time laid down was impossibly short. The thing they forgot when compiling the exercise was that they had 3 Recce. Squads from each Contingent & they had not given them any task whatsoever. However as	

A.I.F. Cadre Battalion. WAR DIARY Month March 42

Place, Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
S.W.T.C. Kujang 1st-31st Mar	They have not got better instructors for their tactical work, as they are extremely keen & work very hard & their discipline is good.	
31st Mar	Visited Bn H.Q. with Col advisers & interpreters & found that still Gen Li Mo An had not told them anything so we could not assume our role officially until the 1st Apl. During the month health has not been good as at the 31st they were 6 in hospital. Generally men & officers have been pretty fed up but have not had any trouble as far as discipline goes. Preparations have also gone ahead for our move to the Mian Area & this has kept them in good heart.	

C. MacDougal.

A.I.F. Cadre Batallion — WAR DIARY — Month May 42

Place Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
Kiyang Move 1st 4th May	On the 1st Moved all Stores down to the Railway Station at Li Cha Ping where they were loaded on to a Motor Railwaggon. One Lunch also loaded on to train. 4th & 6th Chinese Contingents left. Rise early on the 2nd marched to Railway Station. During this march the fact that Chinese cannot march was brought out. Officers' Families & Cook were strung out far behind the main body. On arriving at Li Cha Ping we were informed that Gen Li Mo Chu wished to see the Bn Cmdr. The result was a banquet, while the troops were trying to get themselves out into waggons in the pouring Rain. It was an act typical of the Chinese command. We finally left the Station 2½ hrs late but nevertheless to the gratification of all ranks. The train consisted of one Small Sleeping car for the sick & H.Q. One Motor Steel waggon for the Officers. One Motor Steel waggon for each British contingent and 1 Motor Steel waggon for stores for the three contingents. Although things were cramped we were worried as everyone was glad to be on the move out of the country. Feeding & washing arrangements were simple as boiling water & washing water could be obtained at each Station. At 1030 hrs on the 3rd there was a conference with Gen Mo, 2 i.c. of Regiment & the Contg Cmdrs. when he told us that the Generalissimo had ordered us back to Kiyang. The troops were held & everyone was very disappointed but fortunately accepted it in the main as another Chinese Riddle. Arrived back in camp on the 4th leaving all Stores at Li Cha Ping Store House. After singing Chungking we discovered that they knew nothing of our recall, & were naturally surprised.	
6th–9th Scheme	Four day Exercise on Demolition of a Road and rail bridge. Many good lessons brought out during the Exercise.	

[illegible]

A.I.F. Cadre Batallion

WAR DIARY

Month May 42

Place Date	Summary of Events & Information	Remarks & Appendicies
Kiyang May 10-22nd	Training was proceeded with each Company keeping out of camp as much as possible. Route Marches, Swimming & all other games were kept going as well as Demolition revision work. Everyone during this time was very anxious to know what was going to happen to us & all Pbs. Comedies asked if we could be taken out of China. But on the 23rd	
23rd	we received the news that we were to stay in China. Naturally everyone was absolutely feed up but finally settled down to the idea without any trouble.	
25th	Got Information that we are to move North Shortly, so a certain amount of Stores had to be repacked into correct Coolie loads & everything got ready.	
	Sickness during the month has be negligable and the whole Pn. is very fit.	

[signature]

WAR DIARY -MOVE Li-Cha-ping to Liuyang
6th. June 1942 - June 1942

6th. June 1942 Kiyang- Li-Cha-Ping- Hengyang.

MOVE- Hiyang- Li-Cha-Ping. Battalion Transport with all kit.
Li-Cha-Ping - Hengyang. Railwaytrain with 3 Cadre Bns.
HengYang - Liuyang. River Boats. 3Cadre Bns. Under command O.C.O.Burma Cadre Bn.



Battalion moved off from S.W.S.T.C. Kiyang at 0830hrs. with all stores and personnel's kit to Railway Station AT Li-Cha-Ping, where we loaded onto a trooptrain. With the three Bns. was a Chinese Liason Officer named Lt-Col. Ding of the 3rd. Surprise Bn. This Officer was Supposed to arrange matters such as , boats, coolies, supplies for same, payment for all locally enlisted personnel, and general liason between the three Bns, and local Chinese troops.
Coolies amounting to 60 for each Battalion were supposed to join the train at Li-Cha-Ping but they never arrived and the train left without them at 1330 hrs.
Arrived at Hengyang at 1730 hrs. The train went down a siding to the river where we found after some time 21,7metric ton boats waiting for us.
Loading started at1900 hrs. by Bns. and it was completely finished at 0300hrs. The Chinese provided us with about 60 Army Coolies who worked very well indeed. 2for personnel 4 The Bn. was given 6 boats for personnel and stores/,-3-for stores----each-purpose. The personnel boats were very crowded and men had to sleep in relays.

7th. June 1942 Hengyang to ?

Left Hengyang at 0430hrs. in pouring rain which did not add pleasantly to the situation, as everything got saturated.
Moved up the river at a very slow speed towed in 2 sections of 9 boats in each by 2 river steamers . (Shang Ho)

8th. June 1942 to Changsha

Moved on down stream and had the opertunity of drying all our kit and cleaned the arms and had a look at the stores which seemed to be all right.
Arrived at Changsha at 1700hrs. Contacted the local Commander and found that we had to change our personnel boats and take on three smallerboats which all round gave us more room.

9th. June 1942 Changsha to

Unloaded personnel and kit onto smaller boats and at 0530hrs. moved off up a tributary of the Siang Ho (Siao-Pu-Kuan Ho.)
Moved in Convoy in the following order,
1st. BURMA CADRE Bn. under Command of Lt.-Col. D.G.Gill-Davis who also Commands the Convoy.
2nd. MALAYA CADRE Bn. under command of Lt.-Col.N.Campbell-Baldwin.
3rd. A.I.F. CADRE Bn. under Command of Lt.-Col. D.C.MacDougall.
Progress very slow owing to the currant and the loads on the boats. Lt.-Col. Ding who was supposed to meet us at the night halt never arrived and as he was bringing the coolies whom were supposed tp come with us from Kiyang, the matter was very serious.

10th. June1942 the boatmen----

Lt.Col. Ding arrived with 28 coolies for each Bn. The Bn. is responsible for giving these coolies work and $1 per day. A lot of time was wasted owing to the fact that Col.Ding was supposed to pay them $ 5 per man per day and he had not, up to that time, given them anything. This caused one ~~boatmen~~ Bn's boatsmen to refuse to move unless they were paid , this was combatted by taking over the boats. Finally it was deemed advisable to give the boatman a grant to carry on.

11th. June1942 Moved up some very steep rapids and spent most of the day hauling the heavy Demolition boats over them, the coolies having deserted to a man owing to the fact that Col. Ding had not given them rice or money to buy it although Lt.-Col.Gill-Davies had given him $ 1400 for any contingencies. All along we have been experiencing this difficulty of lack co-operation between the Liason Officer and the coolies and boatmen.

12th. June1942 During the course of the day we crossed the steepest set of rapids we have come tom to date. One Demolition boat was too heavily laden and we could not get it across one of these rapids, so No.3 Coy. returned to unload some of the stores so as to lighten the load. The remainder of the convoy proceeded on to Po Chia Shan where we join up with H.Q. Before reaching this town we had to cross 4 rapids in quick succession and the only reason we were able to get over them was the fact that we

12th. June 1942 Po Chih Shan to Shiao Fu Kong (continued)

were able to attach the boats to a large junk that had a capstan which pulled our whole convoy across. Col. Ding arrived for the first time in almost 4 days and he was asked to explain what he had been doing, where the coolies were,and what had happened to the $1400 that had been given to him by Lt.Col. Gill-Davies.These things he failed to explain satisfactorily and just stated that it was not his fault.He wasxasked to supply us with smaller boats which he said he could'nt do ,sothe local Magistrate was contacted and he immediately made the neccessary arrangements.

13th.June 1942

The first question of the morning was the payment of the boatmen.Col. Ding said that he had paid the boatmen $80 per boat. On interrogation it was discovered that some had been paid $60 and some $40 per boat, under pressure he finally paid these boatmen the extra amounts. Left at about 1000hrs. having waited for Burma Bn. to get well in front. We lost one stores bnat on a rapid as it could not get up so No. 3 Coy. went back and took over some of the stores onto that boat.

14th.June 1942 to Teng To Shih 15th.June 1942 Teng To Shih TO 16th June 1942 to Tsuan To 17thJune 1942 Tsuan To to

During this period nothing in particular happened and the Convoy travelled on up some very bad rapids andn the men had hardly any time to themselves,as,from morning at 0400hrs. until 1830 hrs they were p.lling the boats up these rapids. Lt.-Col. Ding did not appear during this period. Met Lt.Col. Gill-Davies at about 1630hrs. and he handed over 6 small boats to us.These boats carry about 1500 chin (1360 lbs.) which is ½ the carrying capacity of the boats we had up to that time.By the time the boats had been unloaded it was time to stop for the night.

18th June 1942 to Luiyang.

Set off at 0530hrs move up a very difficult stretch of river and arrived at Luiyang at ~~1698~~ 1745hrs.The whole convoy did not come in as it was too dark and they stopped on the other side of the city.

19th.June 1942 Luiyang

11 small boats as described above were handed over and all stores were transferred into them. As soon as this had been done the Bn. moved upthe River about 2 miles and camped for the night.

20th.June 1942 near Luiyang

Moved off at 0900hrs having waited for Burma And Malaya Bns. to pass.Were able to go about 3 miles and then had to stop as the River had risen so much that it was impossible for the boatmen to make any headway.

21st.June 1942 22nd. " " 23rd " " 24th " " 25th " "

Remained at this spot as the River rose too much and no headway could be made.It rained continuously the whole time. Started off again but the progress was very slow and we were held up on two occasions by the River suddenly rising for short periods.Were Everything in the boats had by this time become saturated and most of the men did not have a dry blanket on which to sleep;as a result of this also cpuppled with the increasing difficulty to buy food,particularly vegitables(we are the last Bn.)the men began to get sick and there were some quite bad cases of fever.

26th.June 1942 Kuantu

Arrived at Kuantu,at 0830hrs.Received Orders to leave by foot for Tungku on the 28th.As will be seen by the orders we now have attached a Carrier Platoon of 52 in strength 42 of which should be actual Carriers.Unfortunately only 15 of these arrived on the 27th. for identification,the others we were told had deserted.After explaining the rates of pay etc. to the Platoon the Pl.Comdr. stated that he could not be responsible for desertions as he said,quite openly,that he did not expect to have all these men in another 3 or 4 days time.This was discussed in a loud voice with Capt. Wolfe in front of the men of the Platoon.Arrangements were made through the O.C. Dump Lt.Col.Ding and the local coolie contracter to have 100 coolies at the storehouse,where all the stores had been dumped,by 0530 hrs. on the 28th.,this was promised and everything was arranged accordingly. The remainder of the coolies were to be there by 1000hrs.meaning that the whole Bn. could move off by 1100hrs.At 1145hrs the first of the coolies arrived,80 in number, No.2Coy was sent off immediately leaveing the Dump at

Appendix 'A'

27th.June1942 Kuantu

28th.June 1942 Kuantu

Move Li-Cha-Ping to Luiyang and Tunglu.

28th.June 1942 Kuantu — 1245hrs.with orders to proceed to Chang Fung a diatance of 14 miles. At 1300hrs another batch of 77 coolies arrived,these left at 1400hrs also with orders to proceed to Chang Fung.No other coolies arrived that day although the Bn. was short of 93 coolies plus another 17 which had been promised to increase the strength of the Carrier Platoon.As a result of this coolie shortage No. 3 Coy. had to stay another night on the boats. The weather during the time that was spent in Kuantu was bad with continuous rain.

29th June 1942 Kuantu to Pa Shia Chiao (10 miles) — The coolies were again promised at 0530hrs but did not arrive until about 0900hrs.103 instead of 110 coolies came so it meant leaving 7 coolie loads on top of what had already been left.(The Kuantu Dump contains 1/3 rd. of all the Mission Stor brought by Bns. from Kiyang,this includes Rations as well.) Finally left the Dump at 1100hrs. At 1200hrs the coolies had to stop for lunch,and seeing that it was pouring with rain it took them 1½ hrs. before they finally got dry wood and finished their meal. No.1Coy. was overtaken at 1600 hrs.,although they had left on the 28th, because 3 coolies had absconded and it was almost impossible to get men from the district as it had already been drained by the 3 Surprise Bns. which had just passed through.The Magistrate had promised them coolies so No.3 Coy. carried on to Pa Shia Chiao where good billets were found.

30th.June 1942 Pa Shia Chiao to Shang Fung (14 miles) — Start held up by coolies who wanted to get stronger polls for h their 2-men loads.Left at)0900 hrs.,arrived at Chang Fung at 1030 hrs.where No.2 Coy were as they had lost 7 coolies,the Coy.was instructed to come on and leave an Interpreter with the stores that were left.Arrived at Shang Fung ay 1600 hrs. 2 Coys. were billeted in the town while one was put into a large house about 3 li outside the town.The rain during the day was steady and except for a few short breaks.of fine weather.

Food:The purchase of food up to Luiyang was fairly easy.Each morning at about 0400 hrs the men were sent off with an Interpreter or sometimes without,to shop.The difficulty at first was to get the countyy people to sell,because previously the Chinese troops merely took the food without paying for it and naturally the replies to our requests in the first instances were always that they had nothing to sell,but after giving or showing them money the matter was simple.Chickens,Eggs,Fruit,were plentiful Pork,Goat and Cucumbers could also be got but it was more difficult,there was a total lacking of all other vegitables except in very small quantities.The purchase of food after Luiyang was difficult and after Kuantu almost impossible;sometimes it was difficult to get Eggs and Firewood.

Medical:As will be seen from the Bn. Medical Officers report, the health of the troops is bad.In the report it is pointed out how the sick parades have steadly got larger since the Bn.left the boats at Kuantu.It can be pointed out that the attendances for sick parade for the Bn. for the month was200 and for a sister Bn. they were 298,mostly for the same complaints as Dr.Webb has pointed out, it can therefore be understood that the bad health of the troops is general.The extremely bad weather between Luiyang and Kuantu undoubtedly caused a large percentage ofthe sickness and also the lack of any efficient hygenic facilities.

Appendix "B" Medical Report by Capt. J. Welch. I.M.S.

Lt.Col.

A.I.F. Cadre Battalion
Medical Report for June 1942
by Capt J. Webb M.O. A.I.F. Bn.

SECRET 2 "B"
Copy No....

To-D.A.D.M.S.
B.M.M. TO China

(1) Travelling Conditions: The Bn. spent from the 7th. to the 27th travelling in boats from Hengyang to Kuantu. Apart from 2 days when the boats were towed from Hengyang to Changsha, the journey involved continual work both in and out of the water pulling boats through Rapids and going barefooted in the water and the mud. Sleeping in close quarters on the boats the Bn. was reminded to enforce the use of Mos quito Nets and to avoid cut and septic feet, footwear was ordered to be warn except on the boats. From the 28th. to the 30th. we were marching over mountain passes in the rain, but in short stages. The first Anopheles Mosquito was seen near Liuyang and from there mosquitoes increased all the way.

(2) Food: There was no shortage of chickens, eggs, pork and cucumber. Plums and peaches were abundant on the river. Owing to the absence of potatoes and and bread, starches were almost absent from the diet. I recommended that more rice or noodles should be provided to balance the diet.

(3) Health of the Troops: During the first three weeks of the month the health of the troops was quite good. The prevelant maladies were:
(a) Diarrhoea-due to insanitary conditions and bad water surrounding the boats or consumption of ripe fruit.
(b) Tinea, feet and crutch: due to walking in mud and water continuously.
(c) Otitis Externa: (ear) " " bathing " " " " "
(d) In the last week of the month most of the Bn. have Diarrhoea, some with symtoms of gastritis and fever as well.
There has been no Dysentry amongst Europeans.

(4) Sick Parades: Attendences have numbered nearly 200 in all, including 28 attendances for Diarrhoea. There were 3 cases of V.D. amongst Chinese personnel and all were dismissed at Kuantu as being unfit for service inthe Bn. Cpl. Merchant J. developed acute Gastroenteritis at Changsha and was left at the Yale in China Hospital, Changsha. Pte. Green R. developed Malaria on the 11th. and was very weak for some time following. Pte. Sinclair developedan irregular fever on the 24th. which did not respond to Quinine treatment and on the 29th developed Granuloma Inguinale (V.D.) which could account for the fever.

(5) Medical Supplies: I have used all my Bismith Salicylate and half of my Mist. pro. Diarrhoea. Itherefore urgently require ~~urgent~~ further supplies of medicine for Diarrhoea.

John L. Webb Capt.
R.A.M.C. A.I.F. Cadre Bn.

Tungku, China 30th. June 1942

Distribution:
D.A.D.M.S. 1,
War Diary 2-3,
File 4.

SECRET.

"A"

PROVISIONAL OPERATION ORDER NO. 1.
Move of C. Bns. from Kuantu to Tungku.

INFORMATION:

1. The enemy are not in a position to threaten the move by land action and no Bandit activity has been reported en route durig the last year.

2. O.C. C.Bns. with Gen. Chou and the Chinese Bns. are believed to have arrived at the concentration area.

INTENTION: 3. Cadre Bns. will proceed independently from Kuantu to Tungku by road.

METHOD:

ORDER OF MARCH:

4. 5 C. Bn. will leave on Z day.
3 " " " " " Z plus 1 day-
4 " " " " " Z " 2 days.

Carrier Pls. and Coolies will march under the orders of their C. Bns.

ITINERARY. (Daily Stages)

5. Kuantu to Chang Fang 14 miles.
Chang Fang to Pai pu 10 miles.
Pai Pu to Tungku 17 miles.

Note; all distances in this and future Orders are approximate.

ADVANCED PARTIES.

6. The second-in-command, who will be in charge of the move until arrival in the concentration area, Capt. Fretwell and one (1) Chinese Interpreter to be detailed by O.C. 5 C.Bn. will proceed in advance of 5 C.Bn. on Z day. The second-in-command will proceed through to Tungku in two stages and will meet 5 C.Bn. on arrival. Capt. Fretwell assisted by the Chinese Interpreter will allot billets for troops and the Carrier Pl. at Chang Fang and Pai Pu, and he will proceed in advance of 5 C.Bn. to meet the second-in-command at Tungku on Z plus 2 day. Os. C. 5 & 3 C.Bns. will leave a Chinese Interpreter at Chang Fang and Pai Pu to meet the C. Bn. following and guide it to its billets. C.Bns. must be met before they enter these towns.

PROTECTION.

7. Every effort will be made to avoid ~~obstruction~~ observation by hostile aircraft. Fire will not be opened unless attacked at low level.

8. Os.C. C.Bns. will provide a guard over the coolies on the line of marchand they are responsible that munitions and stores are adequately protected in billets etc.

The above orders are of routine nature and will not be repeated in future.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Stores and Munitions.

9. Approximately one-third of all munitions and stores will be left at Kuangtu. The remainder will be taken to Tungku where half will be left and the other half taken on to the concentration area. Exact quantities will depend on the number of coolies actually provided who, in addition to the above stores, will be carrying local r~~e~~ rations(see para. 11). Capt. Gunn will remain in charge of the dump at Kuangtu . Separate instructions have been issued to this Officer.

All stores and munitions will be unloaded from boats on arrival at Kuangtu and stacked in the building set aside as a dump. Rooms to be used will be allotted by Capt. Gunn.

All stores will be separated by each C.Bn. into the following dumps:-

(a) Stores etc. to be taken to Tungku.
(b) Stores " to be left at Kuangtu
(c) Stores etc. which appear to have been so damaged as to be unserviceable . These will be left at Kuangtu.

Personal belongings left at Kuantu must be marked with owner's name and his C.Bn.

A complete list of all personal belongings and stores left at Kuantu will be handed to Capt. Gunn by Os.C. C. Bns. before leavig Kuantu. A duplicate list will be handed to the second-in-command at Tungku. Damaged stores will be shown separately.

O.C. 4 C.Bn. will store one-third of the reserve rations to be left at Kuantu , in the dump. The remaining two-thirds will be

distributed equally amongst the three C. Bns.

Accomodation - Kuantu.

10. Personnel will be accomodated on the boats. Os.C. C.Bns. will be accomodated in the building set aside as a dump.

Rations- local.

11. 500 Chin (catties) of flour ~~bough~~ brought from Liuyang will be distributed equally to C.Bns. under the orders of O.C. 4 C.Bn., and will be carried to the concentration area. Flour may be used en route for British personne Scale- .3 chin per day per man. Future supplies of flour are doubtful.

12. 140 chin of salt will be issued by Capt. Fretwell to C.Bns. (one bag per Bn.) and will be used en route and on arrival at the concentration area. This salt requires thorough washing before use as it contains a high percentage of sand and other foreign matter. Scale - 8 liang per man per month, Chinese and British. 16 liang equals 1 chin.

13- Rice will be drawn at Kuantu by Capt . Fretwell and distributed to C.Bns. to cover the period at Kuantu and the journey to Chang Fang where a further issue will be made to cover the march to Tungku.

Scale- British 8 liang (½ chin) per man per day.
Chinese 24 liang (1½ chin) per man per day.

Note.- 1 chin equals approximately ½ kilo.
1 day's ration per contingent incl. att. Chinese personnel is approximately 48 chin.

The above details do not include rations for the Carrier Coy. which will be drawn by their own Officers, neither do they include rations for the coolies which are not our responsibility.

14. Personnel of H.Q. C.Bns. including Chinese Orderlies will be attached to 3 C.Bn. for rations until further notice.

Coolies;

15. The following number of coolies per C.Bn. has been promised for the journey to Tungku:-

Z.Day ..... 280 (incl. 30 for Hsu Ling Pu.)
Z plus 1 day... 250
Z plus 2 day... 250.

In addition each Cadre Bn. will have its carrier Pl. of approximately 60 carriers (of these only 42 will be available to carry our stores).

Appointments.

16. Subject to the approval of the O.C. C.Bns. , Capt. Fretwell will perform the duties of Adjt. and Q.M. until after the arrival of the C. Bns. in the concentration area, when he will be relieved.

Carrier Platoons.

17. One carrier Pl. will be placed under the orders of each C.Bn. on arrival of the C. Bns. at Kuantu. These Pls. will remain permanently attached to each C.Bn.. Separate instructions have been issued regarding their administration.

INTERCOMMUNICATION:

18. H.Q. will be in the building allotted as a dump at Kuantu until 0500 hrs. Z day when it will move to Chang Fang, half way between Kuantu and Tungku H.Q. will open at Tungku p.m. Z plus 1 day and will remain there until arrival of C. Bns. The Chinese supply organization has telephones at Kuantu and Tungku. There are no telephones or telegraphs en route.

Issued at Kuantu hrs..
June25th.

Lt. Col.
2nd. in command C.Bns. (K.E.F. Millar)

Distribution. - Copy No. 1 3 C.Bn.
2 4 C.Bn.
3 5 C.Bn.
4 File.

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION.
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.
CHINA.

Copy No.....

DAILY ORDERS. PART 11

by

LT. COL. D.C.MACDOUGAL.

6

KIYANG. Monday 15th. June 1942 No. 6

DETACHED:(addenda.)

V.X. 31493 Spr. Gilmour W. 2/10th. Fd. Coy. A.I.F. — To remain in Base Hospital Kiyang, as from 6th. June 1942.

V.X. 43909 Pte. Potts A.J. 2/9th. Fd. Amb. A.I.F. — To remain in Base Hospital Kiyang, as from 6th. June 1942.

D.C.Macdougal Lt. Col.

Commanding A.I.F. Cadre Battalion.

A.I.F. CADRE BATTALION.
BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.
CHUNGKING.

DAILY ORDERS PART II

by

LT. COL. D.C.MACDOUGAL.

Kiyang Monday 15th. June 1942 No. 6.

DETACHED:

V.X. 6588 Warrant Officer Class 1 T.D.Binnie, 2/10th. Fd. Regt. — To be attached to the Instructional Staff S.W.S.T.C. Kiyang w.e.f. 6th. June 1942.

PROMOTIONS.

N.X. 20081 Sgt. Moore J.N. 2/20th.Bn. — To be Acting Warrant Officer Class 1 w.e.f. 6-6-42
To be Acting Warrant Officer Class 1 w.e.f. 6-6-42 to fill Establishment.

N.X. 31696 L/Cpl. Martin C. 2/20th. Bn. — To be Acting Corporal w.e.f. 6-6-42.
To be Acting Sergeant w.e.f. 6-6-42 to fill Establishment.

PUNISHMENTS:

V.X. 38305 Pte. Poddie V.G. — Charged that being a soldier whilst on Active Service he did dispose of articles of clothing on issue to him. A.A. Section 24.Award, Admonished 4-6-42.

V.X. 41995 Pte. McDonald K.A.T. — Charged that being a soldier whilst on Active Service he did sell articles of clothing on issue to him. A.A.Section 24. Award, Fined 2 days pay. 4-6-42.

V.X. 47434 Pte. Robinson B.A. — Charged that being a soldier whilst on Active Service he did sell articles of clothing on issue to him. A.A.Section 24. Award, Fined 10 days pay. 4-6-42.

V.X. 27069 Pte. Keenan W.J. — Charged that being a soldier whilst on Active Service he did sell articles of clothing on issue to him. A.A.Section 24. Award, Fined 14 days pay. 4-6-42.

Lt. Col.

Commanding A.I.F. Cadre Battalion.