

AWM52


Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/14/25

AIR LIAISON

19 and 39 Australian
Squadron Air Liaison Section
(19 & 39 Aust Sqn AL Sec)

April - August 1945



1/14/25-0011

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

Unit 10 & 30 Aust Sqn AI Sec

Date and Time.—From 3 Apr 45

To 30 Apr 45

No 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOBTAI	3 April		<p>C.O.'s of both sections attended meeting at HQ. A.I. Sq to obtain group policy and postings. 19 Sqn Sec posted to 307 Bomb Sq (A) 371 and 372 Bomb Sq (A). 39 Sqn Sec posted to 370 and 104 Bomb Sqns (A). Previously these were only billeted with the 307 Bomb Sq. A single office for both sections was set up in 307 Bomb Sq intelligence and normal operational duties started. Arrangements were made with 307 Bomb Sq photo lab to supply 1st AUST CORPS with strike photos. This arrangement was unofficial but will permit CORPS to obtain photos which, as the negatives are in the area for only 24 hrs, they would NOT otherwise see.</p>	<i>man</i>
"	4 April		<p>18 Bomb or Comd refused to allow these sections to pass mission reports to Comd. C.O. 1 Aust AI Sq was informed for action. Clerk for 39 Sec and driver for 19 Sec arrived from MOBTAI.</p>	<i>man</i>
"	5 April		<p>Compile & target information from aerial photos on MOBTAI and passed it to 311 (Air) 1 Aust Corps for information.</p>	<i>man</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

Unit 19 & 30 Aust Cqn AL Sqads

Date and Time.—From 5 Apr 45

To 30 Apr 45

SI 7453

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	6 April		Normal operational duties.	<i>Misc</i>
"	7 April		C.O. 1 Aust AL Sq advised sections that mission reports may be now sent. These are about 24 hrs old when dispatched due to Air Force procedure.	
"	8 April		C.O. 19 Cqn Sec visited 77 Wing R.A.A.F for familiarisation for Air observing.	<i>Misc</i>
"	9 April		C.O. 30 Cqn Sec flew with 307 Bomb Sq on bombing mission to SOLO ISLAND for familiarisation of terrain and vegetation. First mission report submitted to 1st Aust Corps.	<i>Misc</i>
"	9 April		C.O. 19 Cqn Sec flew on bombing mission to vicinity S.A.D. (SOLO) to check visibility from C-47 (Liberator) for use as platform for an Air Observer. Found to be satisfactory, reports submitted to A.C. AL Sq.	<i>Misc</i>
"	10 April		Comms. Issued daily to all Sqns of 307 Bomb Sq a summary of Aust Army operations.	<i>Misc</i>
"	11 April		Normal operational duties.	<i>Misc</i>
"	12 April		C.O. 19 Cqn Sec attended meeting of S.A.C's at 82 Wing H.Q. R.M.A.	<i>Misc</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form **C. 2118**
(adapted.)

Unit 1st 889 Aust Sqn AL Area

Date and Time.—From 2 Apr 45

To 30 Apr 45

SI 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ROSTAL	13 April		Normal Operational Duties.	<i>Mem</i>
"	14 April		" " "	<i>Mem</i>
"	15 April		C.O. 18 Sqn Sec attended briefing for mission over TIRANAN for S.A.O practice.	<i>Mem</i>
"	16 April		111 (A. Ir) 1 Aust Corps visited 307 Bomb Gp to meet C.O.'s and I.O.'s. C.O. 10 Sqn Sec flew with 1818 on mission over TIRANAN.	<i>Mem</i>
"	17 April		C.O. 18 Sqn Sec narrated rail on TIRANAN to 9 Aust Div Hq.	<i>Mem</i>
"	18 April		Normal Operational Duties.	<i>Mem</i>
"	19 April		C.O. 18 Sqn Sec attended AL Gp HQ for interrogation on TIRANAN for Airframe Construction Wing.	<i>Mem</i>
"	20 April		3 OR's billeted on 307 Bomb Gp moved to Transit Camp. CO AL Gp visited 307 Bg to meet C.O.'s and I.O.'s.	<i>Mem</i>
"	21 April		Normal Operational Duties.	<i>Mem</i>
"	22 April		Driver 19 Sqn Sec evacuated to 273 AGH for reclassification.	<i>Mem</i>

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
Revised Jan., 1943
1945 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 7/4/1945 39 AVIATION SQ. AL SEC (Unit)

W.E. 11, 30, 1 OFFRS. 1 O.R.'s 2 + OFFRS. O.R.'s ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.					
1	2	3	4	5					
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.	DETAIL					
				Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs. Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	1	/					

DETAIL	A.I.P.	G.M.P.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.P.	**	TOTAL
A.										
B.(1)										
B.(2)										

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.E. Forces

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194

ARMY No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
			/

39 AVIATION SQ. AL SEC Unit

Army Form W.3004
(Adapted) (Page 2)
Revised Jan., 1943
1945 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 7/4/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
LICIT	SX 794	McMILLAN	CW	ALO	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

7 APR 45
Date of Despatch
Track-7/45.

McMillan
Signature of Commentator

MESSAGE FORM

APPENDIX "B"
 Register No.

Call

Ser. No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM

Originator

Date—Time of Origin

Office Date Stamp

(4)

ALO at TARAKAN

(COPY ONLY)

For Action

TO

(w) For Information (INFO.)

Message Instructions—GR—

ORIGINATOR'S No.

Strike by B21's on feature 105 18 May devastating. our
 troops occupied feature without difficulty. Flash report target
 area shambles. detailed report being obtained will forward.

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN
 by any means { except }

Wireless

Signed

If liable to be intercepted or fall into
 enemy hands, this message must be
 sent IN CIPHER

Signed

Originator's Instructions
 Degree of Priority

Time	System	Op
THI or TOR		

Time Cleared

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form **CS2118**,
(Adj. ed.)

Unit 19 & 39 Aust Sqn A L Secs Date and Time.—From 1 May 45 To 9 May 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	1 May 45	0748/1-0953/1	22 B24's (LIBERATORS) of 307 BOMB GP (HV) 13 U.S.A.A.F. dropped 41 tons of bombs in preparatory bombing prior to the operations of CECE 1. The bombs fell in a concentrated pattern that was outstanding for its accuracy and coverage of the areas where enemy opposition may have commanded or repelled our landing forces. G 1 (AIR) ADV LEQ flew on the strike as an observer.	See appx "A" (Monthly Operations 307 B.G.). R.W. Saunders Capt.
		1230/1-1630/1	O.C. 19 AUST SQN A L SEC flew as S.A.C. over CECE 1 in B24 82 WING RAAF.	
	2 May 45	1000/1	S.A.C.'s visited 9 AUST DIV for interrogation on sightings over CECE 1.	R.W. Saunders Capt.
	3 May 45		Normal operational duties.	R.W. Saunders Capt.
	4 May 45	1400/1	Briefing of S.A.C.'s 82 WING RAAF for 5 May.	R.W. Saunders Capt.
	5 May 45	0700/1-1130/1	O.C. 19 SEC as S.A.C. over CECE 1.	
		1000/1	Arranged for one B24 to observe effectiveness of fluorescent panels displayed in 1 AUST CORPS camp area. Panels visible for 4 miles from and 10,000' above.	R.W. Saunders Capt.
	6 May 45	1130/1-1530/1	O.C. 19 SEC as S.A.C. over CECE 1.	R.W. Saunders Capt.
	7 May 45		Arranged for fluorescent panels to be displayed to all crews in 307 BOMB GP (HV).	R.W.S.
	8 May 45		Complete BOMB GP mission reports being sent to higher formation.	R.W.S.
	9 May 45		Normal operational duties.	R.W.S.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form 0-2118.
(Adapted)

Unit 19 and 39 AUST SQN A L SECS Date and Time.—From * 10 MAY 45 To 21 May 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	10 May 45		C.O.'s, 19 and 39 SECS attended meeting 1 AUST A.L. GP ref administration and outline future operations.	P.V.S.
	11-14 May 45		Normal operational duties.	P.V.S.
	15 May 45	1004/1-1005/1	11 B24's of the 307 BOMB GP dropped 17 tons of bombs in support of ground operations CBCE 1 4766 JHI. about 75% of the bombs fell in the assigned target area and ground troops reported the excellent coverage. Arrangements were made with C.O. 307 BOMB GROUP (AV) for an A.D.C. or G (AIR) to accompany close support missions until formation leaders became acquainted with the operational area. In accordance with this C.O. 39 SEC flew on the strike.	P.V.S.
	16-17 May 45		Normal operational duties.	P.V.S.
	18 May 45	1236/1-1235/1	13 B24's of the 307 BG dropped 35 tons of bombs in support of OBCE 1 at map ref 4268 A HILL 105. A.S.P. reported excellent coverage of target. C.O. 39 SEC flew as an observer on this strike.	See attached appendix "B". P.V.S.
	19 May 45	1437/1-1453/1	6 B24's of the 307 BG dropped 9 1/2 tons of bombs in support of OBCE 1 at map ref 4268 BC. A.S.P. reported all bombs were in the target area. 3 11 (AIR) ADV LRG flew as an observer on this strike.	P.V.S.
	20 May 45		Normal operational duties.	P.V.S.
	21 May 45	1214/1-1227/1	6 B24's of the 307 BG dropped 13 1/2 tons of bombs in support of OBCE 1 at map ref 4469 W and 4469U. A.S.P. reported coverage of target as excellent. G 1 (AIR) ADV LRG flew as an observer on this strike.	P.V.S.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form 00118,
(Adapted.)

Unit 19 and 32 ACFT S.N. A 1 SEC Date and Time, -From 22 May 45 To 27 May 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORCETI	22 May 45	1108/1-1146/1	14 B24's of the 307 BG dropped 7 1/2 tons of bombs and 330 x 100 lb MAFALM bombs in support of OBOE 1 at map ref 4363 U. A.S.P. reported bombing as excellent. C.O. 19 SEC flew as an observer on this strike.	RWS.
		1230/1-	3 B24's of the 307 BG dropped 6 1/2 tons of bombs on DJOEATA VILLAGE as directed by A.S.P. because of weather.	
	23 May 45		17 B24's of the 307 BG were unable to support OBOE 1 due to weather so TANG (DORNE) was bombed. C.O. 39 SEC flew on this strike as an observer. Requested through G (AIR) 1 AUST CORPS that weather forecast accompany requests for support.	RWS. RWS.
	24 May 45		6 B24's of 307 BG were unable to support OBOE 1 due to weather so TANG was bombed. C.O. 20 SEC flew as an observer on this strike.	RWS.
	25 May 45	0830/1-0900/1	6 B24's of 307 BG dropped 12 1/2 tons of bombs in support of OBOE 1 at 4360 A. The A.S.P. reported 100% coverage of the hill feature, G 111 (AIR) 1 AUST CORPS flew as an observer on this strike.	RWS.
	26 May 45	0900/1- 1459/1-1550/1	S.A.C. conference aboard USS ROCKY MOUNT and at 1 AUST A L GP attended. 24 B24's of 307 BG in support of OBOE 1 dropped 70 tons of bombs on map ref 4171 HLEM. About 30% of the bombs fell in the target area causing one fire and an explosion. C.O. 39 SEC flew on this strike as an observer.	RWS.
	27 May 45	0935/1-1015/1	11 B24's of 307 BG in support of OBOE 1 dropped 34 tons of bombs on map ref 4170 T. A.S.P. reported 75% of the bombs fell in the target area with good coverage. C.O. 40 SEC flew as an observer on this strike.	RWS.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form 2118.
(Asep ed.)

Unit 19 and 39 AUST Sqn A L Sec Date and Time.—From 28 May 45 To 31 May 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MBROTAI	28 May 45	1830/1	G 111 (AIR) 7 AUST DIV and O.C. det AAFLW 7 AUST DIV visited 307 BG in reference to strike photos.	<i>RWS.</i>
	29 May 45		Normal operational duties.	<i>RWS.</i>
	30 May 45	0900/1	15 B24's of 307 BG were unable to support OBOE 1 due to weather and bombed TAWAO instead. Lecture on escape procedure for S.A.C.'s. at 82 WING RAAF.	<i>RWS.</i>
	31 May 45	0300/1	13 B24's of 307 BG dropped 54 tons of bombs in support of OBOE 1 at map ref 4268 LG, bombing was excellent. Suggestion by C.O. 307 BG to use 24 hour delay bombs on future operations passed on to G 11 (AIR) 1 AUST CC&S, G 111 (AIR) 7 AUST DIV and C.O. 1 AUST AIR GP for action if necessary.	<i>RWS.</i>
			<i>R.W. Saunders Capt.</i>	
			19 and 39 Aust Sqn A L Secs.	

SS/19/74

19 Aust Sqn A L Sec
307 Bomb Gp (H)
1 June 45

Subject: OPERATIONS 307 BOMB GP (H) MAY 45

1. SUMMARY OF MONTHS OPERATIONS

Operations of the 307 Bomb Gp (H) this month covered a wide range of missions, including; convoy cover, Radar Photo/A, Air Support, Shipping searches and strikes, Strategic bombing, cover for rescue ops, Photo/A and Weather/A. For details of missions see appendix "A". Direct support of ground operations on TARAKAN occupied 142 sorties which dropped 300 1/2 tons of W bombs and 330 x 100 lb NAPALM bombs on the following targets: Ref map TARAKAN ISLAND NORTH and SOUTH (SPECIAL) 1 : 25000.

TARGET	SORTIES	TONS DROPPED
"P" Day softening up	22	42
4766 GHI	11	17
4268 A	18	35
4268 ABC	5	9 1/2
4469 W	2	4 1/2
4469 U	4	9
4368 OU	14	7 1/2
3678 JN)		{ 330 x 100 NAPALM
3778 A }	3	
4368 A	6	6 1/2
4171 HDMN	24	12 1/2
4170 T	11	70
4268 LG	18	34
Weather Rocce	4	54
TARAKAN - TAWI TAWI		-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>300 1/2</u>

2. AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT

Due to the extra weight and drag of RADAR equipment on certain of the Gp a/c it has been found necessary to reduce the total bomb load of radar a/c by 3 x 1000 lbs bombs when other a/c are carrying 8 x 1000 lbs bombs.

This month over BALIKPAPAN a/c of this Group have been employing a device to confuse the enemy radar. This article is known as "window" and is widely scattered in large numbers over targets where intense radar controlled A/A is anticipated. Each "window" consists of a length of foil which gives the same "blip" on the radar screen as a 24.

3. AIR SUPPORT METHODS

a. TARGET INDICATION

In all cases the targets were indicated by smoke and crews had some difficulty, especially when low scattered clouds were present over the target area. In one instance a bomb-aimer apparently mistook a cooking fire for the mortar smoke and dropped short. The use of coloured smoke would undoubtedly eliminate all chances of errors of this type. If at times the smoke drifted or became dispersed the ground forces renewed smoke on request from the a/c. On windy days when the wind velocity is about 6 - 8 knots or faster the smoke drifts rapidly and crews suggest that in such instances one round smoke about every 25 seconds would assist them greatly. The ideal for bomb-aimers on windy days would be one round on "turn onto bombing run" and another about 25 seconds before "bombs away". On still days too much smoke has a tendency to blanket the target. In each strike the formation made one dry run with bomb bay doors closed to permit bomb-aimers to orient themselves.

b. PANELS

As arranged fluorescent panels were used for front line markings and were visible up to 6000' and assisted crews in orienting themselves. In some cases panels were difficult to see and where possible 2 panels end on end are desirable, if one end is slightly raised it permits the crews to pick them out when approaching. In some instances "T" panels were used to indicate direction of attack in conjunction with the bearings given in the requests. These panels were normal CCBPS and inverted fluorescent panels. Care is necessary in laying these panels to see that the area selected does NOT contain white objects to distract attention, such as tents, sheet iron and washing. Roads, tops of oil tanks and clear grass areas were very good display areas.

c. BOMB LINES

Owing to the nature of the terrain the selection and identification of bomblines was very difficult and in many instances the crews estimated a safe distance from our FDL's rather than try to identify the bomb line.

d. BOMBING

Although air support is normally carried out by medium and low level bombers this Group proved that high level bombing of great accuracy can be used in close support. Own troops at times were as close as 1000' and even when 1000 lbs GP bombs were used no ill affects were reported by the ground troops. In each instance the ASF reported the bombing to be "excellent bombing with good coverage of the target". Bomb loads were NOT maximum as a/c had to carry one bomb bay tank, and varied considerably, bomb load per plane being varied as follows:-

30 x 100 lb Napalm
 30 x 100 lb Frag clusters
 30 x 100 lb GP bombs
 15 x 250 lb GP bombs
 15 x 250 lb Frag bombs
 9 x 500 lb GP bombs
 6 x 1000 lb GP bombs.

On one mission on which 1000 lb GP bombs were carried bomb-aimers carried spare 15 seconds delay tail fuses in case clouds forced them to bomb from an altitude which would endanger the a/c. On all missions bomb bay doors and bomb switches were tested over the sea prior to bomb run to guard against possible mishap over own troops.

e. COMMUNICATIONS

All contact with the ground was made by R/T, two frequencies always being available, although communications could NOT be classed as good no failures or delays were caused. It was the Group policy to have the formation leader arrive over the area 30 minutes prior to attack time so that communications could be established and changes of target etc notified to save "time over target" of main striking force. The prompt reporting of strike results by the ASF to the a/c was greatly appreciated by the crews.

f. BRIEFING

Due to the distance of the base from the target area missions were always of 10 hrs or more duration and to allow crews to obtain maximum rest before "take off" briefings were held at 1830 hrs the day before. Alterations in requests after 1830 hrs meant another briefing and several times the target was altered again when a/c came "on station".

To alleviate confusion and dissatisfaction caused by this the following suggestion was forwarded to 3 Ccmd A L Sec for action. Where strikes are definite and NO change will be made requests to be normal, if changes are likely a/c to be requested to come on air alert at definite time and be briefed by ASP.

All briefings are done with the aid of an balopticon which permits the maps and diagrams to be enlarged for clarity.

3. ARMY REPRESENTATIVES ON SUPPORT MISSIONS.

As ALO's and G's (Air) have a clear picture of the ground situation and can often assist the formation leader in deciding what action to take under certain circumstances it was considered advisable for one officer to fly in the lead ship on support missions until the formation leaders were acquainted with the operational area. The C.O. of the Group concurred.

h. GENERAL

Because of inaccuracies of maps it was suggested that the altitude of the target be included in the request for air support as this information is vital to bomb-aimers.

4. ITEMS OF INTEREST

a. PANELS

Following advice from 1 Aust Corps that a red fluorescent panel was on display at that HQ one B24 (L) from this Group was scheduled to make observations from varying altitudes. Up to four miles from and 10000' above, this panel was plainly visible.

b. JAPANESE SUICIDE BOATS

Following a strike on TARAKAN the Group had briefed 2 a/c to proceed to the TAWAO area to search for the above boats reported to be in the MERUTAI RIVER. The area was searched for an hour and photos taken with a negative result.

c. WEATHER

The Group Met. Officer advised that because of the particular cloud formations over TARAKAN it was NOT advisable for a/c to drop NAPALM bombs which would cause fires prior to a medium or high level attack as the resultant heat created caused the cumulus in the area to build up at an amazing rate. Due to weather 41 sorties were unable to hit targets on TARAKAN.

R. Saunders. Capt
19 Aust Sqn A L Sec

DISTRIBUTION

3 Aust Ccmd A L Sec
39 Aust Sqn A L Sec
file

Attached is appendix "A"

APPENDIX "A"
to 19 Aust. Gen. A. L. Sec. May Report

<u>AREA</u>	<u>TONS DROPPED</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TARGET AND REMARKS</u>
<u>BORNEO</u>			
TARAKAN	300 $\frac{1}{2}$	138	Personnel areas and defensive positions.
TAWAO	330 x 100 Napalm		A/D and personnel areas.
TARAKAN	140	50	Weather Recce between TALAMAN and TAWI TAWI.
		4	A/D and personnel areas.
MANGGAR	30	15	A/D.
SEPINGGAN	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	19	Shipyards.
SAMARINDA	7	6	A/D and Photo/R.
TOBANIO	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	A/D and Photo/R.
OELIN	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	
	350 x 100 Napalm		
ASA		1	Photo/R.
MELAK	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	A/D and Photo/R.
KOTABOROE	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	Docks and warehouses.
SOUTH BAHITOE	10	9	Shipyards.
BALAKPAPAN	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	Shipping.
	33	22	A/A positions.
		1	Photo/R.
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>760$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>368</u>	
	680 x 100 Napalm		
<u>CELEBES</u>			
BINGKABAPA	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	A/D and Photo/R.
BOELOEDOANG	18	7	A/D and Photo/R.
MANDAI	101	31	A/D.
MASAMBA	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	A/D.
LIMBOENG	59	18	A/D.
MAPANGET	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	A/D.
BIRA	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	Shipyards.
SIDATE	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	A/D.
	30 x 100 Napalm		
MAKASSAR	16	13	Shipping
	19	19	Shipyards
	36 x 55 Napalm		
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>294</u>	<u>120</u>	
	30 x 100 Napalm		
	36 x 55		
<u>SHIPPING SEARCHES</u>			
MAKASSAR STRAITS	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	39	
SOUTH CELEBES	12 x 55 Napalm	2	
<u>FRENCH INDO CHINA</u>			
SAIGON and TOURANE		2	Radar Photo/R.
<u>AIR COVER</u>			
TOGIAN IS		3	Rescue operations.
CONVOY COVER		70	
<u>TOTAL ALL MISSIONS</u>	<u>1069 tons</u>	<u>604 sorties</u>	
	48 x 55 Napalm		
	710 x 100 Napalm		

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 5/5/1945 19th Air Sqn (Unit)

W.E. 11/34/1 OFFRS. 1 O.R.'s 2 + OFFRS. O.R.'s ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1 W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED				2 ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.						3	
Reinfs. Required	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength	DETAIL		Arm or Corps	Posted Strength	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfs. Required	
				W.Os., Class I							
				W.Os., Class II							
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.							
				Staff Sergeants							
				Sergeants							
				Corporals							
1	1		1	Troopers, Privates, etc.							
				Civilians counting as O.R.							
1	1		1	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.							

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g. 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached

Part D. Description of O.R.'s. Whose Return To... (Unit) is Particularly Requested. / / 194..

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

19th Air Sqn Al Sec

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 5/5/1945.

Details of Tradesmen GROUP I				Details of Tradesmen GROUP I (cont.)				Details of Tradesmen GROUP II (cont.)				Details of Tradesmen GROUP III (cont.)			
W.E.	Posted Strength	Reinfs. Required		W.E.	Posted Strength	Reinfs. Required		W.E.	Posted Strength	Reinfs. Required		W.E.	Posted Strength	Reinfs. Required	
				Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Fitters' Mates			
				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				Gun Layers			
				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator Keyboard				G.P.O. Assistants			
				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Hammermen			
				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Leather Stitchers			
				Turners				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing			
				Watchmakers				Operator, Wireless				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
				Welders				Opticians				Plate Layers			
								Painters				Rangefinders			
								Panel Beaters				Riveters			
								Photographer Dry Plate				Roughriders			
								Predictor Numbers				Saddlers			
								Printers				Saddletree makers			
								Radiographers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
								Riggers				Stevadores			
								Sawyers				Stokers, Staty. Eng.			
								Signallers				Storemen, Technical			
								Signwriters				Tailors			
								Telephone Identif. Numbers				Textile Refitters			
								Well Borers				Tinsmiths			
								Wheelers				Vulcanizers			
								Winchman				Wagon Erectors			
								Wireman				Whitesmiths			
								Woolturners							

DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN
CPL CLEAK 1 1
DYR BATMAN 1 1

ATTACHED BY W.E.

Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A, respectively. 2 1 1

NOTES—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorized trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of "Reinfs. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

5 MAY 45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
...../...../..... (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 5/5/1945 (Unit)

W.E. III. 30/1 OFFRS. 1. O.R.'s 2 OFFRS. ... O.R.'s ... ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED				DETAIL	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.								
Rein'ts Required	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength		Arm or Corps	Posted Strength	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required				
			1	Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Oifs. Civilians Counting as Oifs.									
			1										
DETAIL				A.L.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.P.	* * *	TOTAL
A				1									
E.(1)													
E.(2)													

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for completion of form will complete Part E(1) and E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Unit From	Date	CAUSE

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Unit To	Date	CAUSE

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO..... (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.....

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

1945 JAN AL SE Unit

Army Form W.3005
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
...../...../..... (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 5/5/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held	Army Number	Surname	Initials	Posting	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
T/CAPT	NR 3950	SAUNDERS	R Y	ALO	YES	-	-

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number	Name and Initials	Unit	Date of Attachment	Nature of Attachment

5 MAY 45
Date of Despatch

McCallan
Signature of Commander

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
18/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 5/5/1945 3911ST SQN ALSEC (Unit)

W.E. 111/30/1 OFFRS... 1 O.R.'s 2 OFFRS... O.R.'s... ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED				DETAIL	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.							
Rein'ts Required	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength		Arm or Corps	Posted Strength	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required			
	1		1	Lieut.-Colonels								
				Majors								
				Captains								
				Lieutenants								
				Quarter-masters								
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offs.								
				Civilians Counting as Offs.								
DETAIL				A.L.P.	C.M.P.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	TOTAL
A				1								
E.(1)												
E.(2)												

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for completion of form will complete Part E(1) and E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Unit From	Date	CAUSE

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	Unit To	Date	CAUSE

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194

Army No.	Rank	Name and Initials	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

3911ST SQN. ALSEC unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
18/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 5/5/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held	Army Number	Surname	Initials	Posting	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
LIEUT	58794	McMILLAN	CW	ALO	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number	Name and Initials	Unit	Date of Attachment	Nature of Attachment

5 MAY 45
Date of Despatch

McMillan
Signature of Commander

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit 10 AVN BATTAL (SAS) Date and Time.—From 1 JUN 45 To 10 JUN 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORDEAT	1 JUN	MORDEAT	00 15 HRS 21ST Sqn (SAS/S) flew on fuel 1/3 of formation. Major "Sullivan" on board on LADAN to study terrain in the BRUNNEN area. C121 (SAS) 7th Sqn visited this unit in a reference to air operations over MORDAT. 1st Lt. M. J. advised to 1st Sqn. See how relieved of SAC duties.	A.W.S.
	2 JUN		air support mission carried out by 307 BOMB SQDN. T121 (SAS) 7th Sqn flew with the formation. All crews were familiar with the area and indication of targets.	See 37 1st Sqn 11 Dec War diary. A.W.S.
	3 JUN		Normal Operational Duties.	A.W.S.
	4 JUN		Following advice of CG 307 BOMB SQDN on use of 24 hrs. delay bombs, particulars as to delay, penetration, fuse and sizes of bombs were forwarded to C121 (SAS) 7th Sqn for information and passing to 7th Sqn.	See Appx "11" attached. A.W.S.
	5 JUN		C121 (SAS) 7th Sqn advised that they would request use of 24 hrs. delay bombs.	A.W.S.
	6 JUN		Normal operational duties.	A.W.S.
	8 JUN		This section moved to 11th Bomber Command 19 USAAF to replace 3rd Sqn 307 BOMB SQDN, which would complete with all equipment.	A.W.S.
	9 JUN		C121 (SAS) 7th Sqn and C121 (SAS) 1st Sqn 307 BOMB SQDN visited this section to obtain information required from this section. Information to include all air operations of 19 Bomber Command and 5 USAAF to be supplied by 0700/15 hrs. and reports for following day to be advised the night before. Targets for pre-assault bombing of LADAN selected on request for A2 19 Bomber Command.	See Appx "12" attached. A.W.S.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Cross heading not required.)

Army Form C-2113.
(Adap 61.)

Unit 12 AVN BN 12 AF

Date and Time.—From 1 JULY 45

To 30 JULY 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
WAGLAH	20 JULY		GAIA (AVN) 7 AVN BN visited this section to confer on targets and discuss the situation. Status of this area is being changed sections.	R/S.
	21 "		Because of delay in receiving prints of photo requests, arrangements were made for 1 AVN CORPS and 7 AVN BN to examine low off-shore objectives which were urgently required.	R/S.
	22-23 "		Normal operational duties.	R/S.
	24 "		Following a request by GAIA (AVN) 1 AVN CORPS arrangements were made with 12 AVN BN to photograph and record possible large targets along SE coast of BAHAMAS.	R/S.
	25 "		Complaint received by this section for relay to 12 re "low-target" A/C for ground-aid gunnery range, flying over 1 AVN CORPS. Advice as to why they must make such a flying pattern was forwarded.	R/S.
	26 "		Normal operational duties.	R/S.
	27 "		Checked with 12 AVN BN re reporting in to GAIA (AVN) 12 AVN BN area.	See Appx "A" attached. R/S.
	28 "		Letter received from 12 AVN BN thanking this HQ for excellent photo coverage of BAHAMAS. Arranged transport for CO 12 AVN BN to PALM BEACH. Arranged for 12 AVN BN to interpret strike photos at this HQ.	See Appx "A" attached. R/S.
	29 "		Normal Operational duties.	R/S.
	30 "		Normal operational duties.	R/S.
	31 "		Visit by GAIA (AVN) 7 AVN BN re mission reports of strikes on BAHAMAS.	R/S.

Subject - SUMMARY OF MONTH'S OPERATIONS
JUNE 1945

19 Aust Sqn AF Sec.
XIII Bomber Command.

I. SUMMARY OF MONTH'S OPERATIONS.

Due to the need of increased air power to support CBOE TWO, 5TH AIR FORCE supplied 3 Heavy Bomb Groups to augment the 2 Heavy Bomb Groups of 13TH AIR FORCE. 310 BOMB WING based at MUNDORO supplied the 90TH and 300TH BOMB GROUPS (H) who during the support remained based there. 309 BOMB WING based at LUXON supplied the 26TH BOMB GROUP (H) who split their Squadrons, 2 at PABARAN, and 2 MOROTAI. All tasks for air units operating in support of CBOE TWO excluding F3C's and B25's based at HIAJANAN were given and co-ordinated by 13TH BOMBER COMMAND, who had received their priorities and operational instructions through normal channels.

Figures given for units under command are reasonably accurate, where as units in support are doubtful as to accuracy due to haphazardness of reports received at this HQ. During the past month the major part of the striking force of this unit has been directed against targets in the CBOE TWO objective area, or on strategical targets affecting the operation.

13TH BOMBER COMMAND with supporting air units has during the period under review flown 1015 sorties on the CBOE TWO objective area, dropping 1896½ tons of bombs, some of these sorties were flown heckling the CBOE TWO area during darkness. On strategical targets 266 sorties dropping 546½ tons on airfields supply and personnel areas.

CBOE SIX was supported by 236 sorties with 442½ tons of bombs being dropped on the objective areas. The completion of air support for CBOE ONE was done by 335 tons of bombs being dropped by 140 sorties.

Shipping searches covered the MAKASSAR STRAITS, FLORES SEA, JAVA SEA, and surrounding gulfs and bays, in all 90 sorties (about 1/3 of these hitting secondaries) were flown and 66½ tons of bombs dropped at shipping resulting in the destruction of :-

7 SUGAR DOCS
8 SCHOONERS
4 RIVER BOATS
1 COASTAL STEAMER
1 SUGAR CHALKIE
1 BARGE
2 U/I VESSELS.

Damaged were :-

21 SUGAR DOCS
24 SCHOONERS
3 RIVER BOATS
9 BARGES
1 VICTOR BAKER
1 PATROL BOAT
1 TUG
1 PROBABLE ID
2 U/I VESSELS

All being the result of missions by the 866TH BOMB SQN (H).

Convoys to and from the CBOE areas were covered by 50 sorties all of which returned the depth charges to base as NO contacts with the enemy were made. Weather searches occupied 4 sorties; these were unwarmed missions. Radar search missions to locate and bomb enemy radar installations used 2 sorties with 2½ tons of bombs being dropped.

Summary of Month's Operations (Continued)

Photo missions have been divided into 4 categories. CBCE TWO area had 29 sorties plus 16 more which were negative. Strategic targets 22 sorties with further 3 negative. CBCE SIX 2 successful sorties and 5 sorties were flown for the US Army which also had 5 bombing sorties with 30 tons of bombs dropped.

See APEX "A" for sorties and bombs by units.

See APEX "B" for sorties and bombs for 307 BOMB GROUP(H). (NOT TO ALL ADDRESSEES).

2. EQUIPMENT.

HX : - This method of bombing, although NOT new, was used for the first time this month during daylight hours. For night bombing the method has been used frequently and with reasonable results. 310 BOMB WING A/C used HX on 3 days while supporting CBCE TWO to permit them to bomb area targets while the whole area was 10/10 cloud covered. Results were NOT visible, but it is believed they were fair. The bombing was done in Squadron formation, all A/C toggling on the leader who used HX (RADAR).

24 Hr. Delay Bombs : - Following a suggestion by the C.O. 307 BOMB GROUP(H) as to the possibility of using these bombs for neutralizing vital areas, information was forwarded to 1 AUST CORPS and 7 AUST DIV for action if necessary. Delays on these bombs are governed by mean temperatures, and temperatures in these areas will reduce 24 hr delay to as low as 8 hrs. Frustration takes more factors into consideration, ie, release altitude, size of bomb and nature of soil. All GF bombs may be fused and will always turn their path, making disposal difficult. Extreme care is required in delousing because of trick fuse.

Range of B24 : - During the early part of the month 866 BOMB SQDN (H) flew from PALANAN to bomb targets in BATAVIA. The distance flown was 3,000 miles and the time airborne was 18 hrs 40 mins. This is believed to be the world's B24 record flight with bombs.

3. AIR SUPPORT.

Requests : - Requests for air support of CBCE ONE were being received at this HQ for varying numbers of B24's (up to 48) after the planes had been assigned to support CBCE SIX and CBCE TWO. It is felt that time could have been saved had the ASP been informed of air intentions and types of A/C available to them.

General :

(a) Pre-assault Bombing CBCE SIX : - The areas selected on LABUAN ISLAND for pre-assault bombing caused a certain amount of confusion which could have been easily avoided. The targets given were considered by A2 to be much too large for the attacking force and requested this section select the areas best results could be obtained from. Crews were briefed on these targets, but found on arrival over target area that the CSA did NOT know their TOE or target as briefed here; new TOE and target was then given by the CSA, and although NO error occurred, the possibility is enhanced by such changes, especially as the assault wave was ashore before some of the A/C bombed. It is suggested that targets and TOE could be arranged prior to embarkation so that all are informed and corrections in size of targets may be made.

(b) Maps and Target Photos CBCE TWO : - It was found by air crews on checking in with CSA (ADV) AFLOAT that there was NO common map being used. Air crews were in possession of TARGET DESIGNATOR MAPS which it was believed were the standard ones to be employed. Situations of this type can be avoided and resultant affect on air crews and operations is quite evident.

Some amount of confusion was met over target priorities and target photos. A degree of liaison over the preparation of priorities and targets would have saved time and misunderstandings. After some days had passed a definite system was employed however.

Page three.

(c) Checking into GSA (ADV) A/C CAT. : - Orders issued for OBOE TWO stated that all A/C approaching the objective area were required to check in with the GSA from F minus 15 onwards. This HQ was NOT notified of this and on F minus 13 this section learnt the details of such checking through G (AIR) 1 AUST CORPS. A3 was notified, and steps were taken to correct this situation before any incidents occurred. The results of NOT checking could have been serious. The lag in promulgation of orders caused this position.

(d) SAC's as Lead-In A/C : - In conjunction with the SAC's a system of leading in flights of B24, alert A/C on targets, if required, the following was arranged to be used on OBOE TWO, and was agreed to by A3/ 13 BOMBER COMMAND. SAC's would indicate the target location as accurately as possible by any means available, the flight would then make a run, the leader dropping 2 bombs at the target. SAC's would then give corrections and the flight would then bomb. The effectiveness of this method is NOT known as NO use has yet been made of it.

(e) Photo Requests : - The P.I.O of 13 BOMBER COMMAND suggests the following system would speed photo requests under circumstances such as exist in this area. Where the prints of requests have to be made at bases away from the requesting formation, but the unit flying the runs is located at the same base as the originator, a request for "test prints" will save time. An example of this is as follows; a request was passed to 38 Photo Sqn for action. The following day a set of test prints was forwarded to this HQ. 1 AUST CORPS was notified of this, and as the information thereon was urgent, a loan of the prints was obtained for them. 1 AUST CORPS did NOT receive their copies till 9 days after exposure. The practice of leading may at times cause inconvenience and is unnecessary.

(f) Strike Photos : - To save printing paper and extra work for photo labs, an arrangement was made with the P.I.O. at this HQ for AAFIU at 1 AUST CORPS to intercept strike photos at this HQ the day following the strike. If copies are then required they are obtained from the photo lab.

DISTRIBUTION

G (AIR) HQ 1 AUST CORPS	(2)
HQ 1 AUST AL GROUP	(2)
WAR DIARY	(2)
FILE	(2)
STAFF	(2)

A. W. Saunders. CAPT.
CC 19 AUST SQN AL SEC.

3 July 1945

APPENDIX 7A
 19 Army Sig AL Reg
 Monthly Operation Report.

TYPE OF MISSION	5 2- G. TH		865 B 80W		310 BW		22 DQ		26 P.S.	
	2	TH	2	TH	2	TH	2	TH	2	TH
EDGE TWO	337	505	-	-	228	412	-	-	-	-
EDGE SIX	102	205	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EDGE ONE	89	155	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
STRATEGICAL	96	199	65	83			90	236½		
SHIPPING			80	60½	(NOTE: - 23 articles listed inaccurately and are included in "Strategical")					
EDGE TWO PHOTO	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	26	16
STRATEGICAL II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	3
CONVOY	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WHEELS EDGE TWO	-	-	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
WEATHER	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RADAR TARGET	-	-	2	2½	-	-	-	-	-	-
A/S US ARMY T.T.	12	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PHOTO US ARMY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
TOTALS	637	1234	173	150½	228	412	90	236½	53	19

GRAND TOTAL

1 -

ARTICLES
TONS OF BOMBS

1200
1933

2 = Articles
 2B = Tons of bombs.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form G-2118.
(Add'l)

Unit 39 Aust Sqn & L Sec Date and Time. From 1 Jun 45 To 8 Jun 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MCROTAI	1 Jun 45	1115/I-1132/I	17 B24's (LIBERATORS) of 307 Bomb Group (H) 13 USAF dropped 25 1/2 tons of bombs on VICTORIA Town in softening up for Operation OBOE SIX. OC 45 Aust Sqn & L Sec (Tac/R) flew on strike as Observer.	<i>man</i>
		1400/I	Visit by G111(Air) 7 AUST DIV reference Mission Reports and Strike Photos for OBOE SIX.	<i>man</i>
	2 Jun 45	1025/I-1051/I	16 LIBERATORS dropped 33 1/2 tons of bombs in ground support Operations OBOE 1. Target Area 4275 Q. 80% of the bombs fell in the assigned area.	Ref Map TARAKAN ISLAND (SPECIAL NORTH & SCUTE <i>man</i> 1/25000 Target Designator.
	3 Jun 45	0939/I-0950/I	16 LIBERATORS dropped 24 tons of bombs on Warehouse and Supply area MUARA ISLAND BRUNEI BAY softening up "OBOE SIX."	<i>man</i>
	4 Jun 45	1210/I-1240/I	23 LIBERATORS dropped 34 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN and MANGGAR (OBOE TWO).	<i>man</i>
		1400/I	Details of 24 hour delay fuses submitted to 1 AUST CORPS and 7 AUST DIV.	<i>man</i>
	5 Jun 45	1156/I-1215/I	15 LIBERATORS dropped 21 tons of bombs and 19 x 55 gall Napalm bombs on LABUAN ISLAND for softening up "OBOE SIX."	<i>man</i>
	6 Jun 45	1124/I-1149/I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 65 1/2 tons of bombs LABUAN ISLAND - softening up "OBOE SIX."	<i>man</i>
	7 Jun 45	1153/I-1213/I	17 LIBERATORS dropped 28 tons of bombs on MUAPA ISLAND - softening up "OBOE SIX." OC 39 AUST SQN A L SEC T/Capt.	<i>man</i>
	8 Jun 45	1213/I-1314/I	23 LIBERATORS dropped 65 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area. Softening up "OBOE TWO."	<i>man</i>
		1400/I	19 AUST SQN A L SEC to 13 BOMBER COMMAND 13 USAF.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form **C.2118**
(Adapted)

Unit 39 Aust Sqd & L Sec

Date and Time.—From 9 Jun 45

To 17 Jun 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	9 Jun 45	1004I-1043I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 40 tons of bombs on LABUAN Island. Softening up OBOE SIX	<i>from</i>
		1800I	G1 (INT) and G11 (AIR) 1 AUST CORPS visited I.O. 307 BOMB GP (H).	
	10 Jun 45	0900I	Copies of Senior ALO - TARAKAN signals passed to C.O. 307 BOMB GP (I) for compilation of a report forwarded to AIR EVALUATION BOARD - FEAF dealing with Close Support for OBOE ONE.	
		0851I-0928I	23 LIBERATORS dropped 33 tons of bombs in direct support of 9 AUST DIV landing on LABUAN. G1 (AIR) LHQ, G11 (AIR) 1 AUST CORPS, Cc 39 AUST SQN-A L SEC and a representative from F.E.L.O.-flew on this mission.	<i>from</i>
	11 Jun 45	0951I-1023I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 71 tons of bombs on Targets 4258 EJ and 4269 L on TARAKAN. CSA reported excellent coverage of target areas. 2 1/2 1 AUST AIR LIAISON GROUP flew on this Mission	Ref. Map TARAKAN ISLAND SPECIAL NORTH & SOUTH 1/25000 <i>from</i>
	12 Jun 45	1107I-1143I	11 LIBERATORS dropped 31 tons of bombs on Target 4269 L on TARAKAN. CSA reported excellent coverage.	<i>from</i>
	13 Jun 45	1213I-1313I	23 LIBERATORS dropped 37 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area. Softening up OBOE TWO.	<i>from</i>
	14 Jun 45	1205I-1310I	14 LIBERATORS dropped 21 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>from</i>
	15 Jun 45	1159I-1227I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 76 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>from</i>
	16 Jun 45	1029I-1033I	22 LIBERATORS dropped 72 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>from</i>
	17 Jun 45	1404I-1414I	15 LIBERATORS dropped 53 tons of bombs on A/A positions BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>from</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C-2118.
(Adapted)

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit 39 Aust Sqn A L Sec Date and Time. From 18 Jun 45 To 26 Jun 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MERCTAI	18 Jun 45	1030I-1052I 1400I	16 LIBERATORS dropped 54 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. 1 AUST CORPS to examine ALL Bomb Group Strike photographs at 13th BOMBER COMMAND.	<i>mem</i>
	19 Jun 45	0959I-1026I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 92 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>mem</i>
	20 Jun 45	0948I-1040I 1100I	25 LIBERATORS dropped 57 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. 1 AUST AIR LIAISON GP contacted reference excessive number of maps and target photographs to be carried in a/c.	<i>mem</i>
	21 Jun 45	0955I-1023I 1400I 1830I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 56 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. Relief model of BALIKPAPAN obtained to assist in briefing of crews. G1 (INT) 1 AUST CORPS to briefing of crews.	<i>mem</i>
	22 Jun 45	0910I-0930I 1000I	18 LIBERATORS dropped 40 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. RAAF COMD to arrange for CSA to use Alphabetical Target Designator maps in pinpointing targets as this method proved so successful over TARAKAN.	<i>mem</i>
	23 Jun 45	1300I-1321I	23 LIBERATORS dropped 45 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>mem</i>
	24 Jun 45	1306I-1328I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 275 x 325 lb Depth Charges along beaches in BALIKPAPAN area in support of USN Underwater Demolition Teams.	<i>mem</i>
	25 Jun 45	0754I-0820I 1330I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 75 tons of bombs in the BALIKPAPAN area. G11 (AIR) LHQ to briefing of crews.	<i>mem</i>
	26 Jun 45	0744I-0800I	21 LIBERATORS dropped 68 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>mem</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form 7-2118.
(Adapted)

Unit 39 Aust Sqn A L Sec

Date and Time.—From 27 Jun 45

To 30 Jun 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	27 Jun 45	0757I-0831I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 75 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. Lt Lt LEE WARNER (RAAF) flew on this mission. This mission was in the support of US Liberators Force.	<i>men</i>
	28 Jun 45	0753I-0850I	22 LIBERATORS dropped 79 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area. This mission was in the support of US Liberators Force.	<i>men</i>
	29 Jun 45		Normal operational duties.	<i>men</i>
	30 Jun 45	0813I-0845I	24 LIBERATORS dropped 86 tons of bombs on BALIKPAPAN area.	<i>men</i>
			<i>McMillin</i> Capt OC 39 Aust Sqn A L Sec.	

88/39/83

39 Aust Sqn A L Sec
307 Bomb Group (H)
1 Jul 45

Subject: OPERATIONS 307 BOMB GP (H) JUN 45

1. SUMMARY OF MONTHS OPERATIONS

- (a) Of the 696 sorties flown by this Group during Jun approximately 91% were in close support or softening up for Operations "Obce One, Two and Six."
- (b) Direct support of ground operations on TARAKAN occupied 51 sorties which dropped 140 tons of GP bombs on the following targets (Ref Map TARAKAN ISLAND NORTH and SOUTH (Special) 1:25000

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS DROPPED</u>
4270 Q	16	38½
4268 M&J	11	33
4269 L	13	38
4269 L	11	30½

GSA reported excellent bombing on all occasions.

- (c) Softening up of BRUNEI BAY area was carried out over the following targets:-

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS DROPPED</u>
<u>LABUAN IS</u> Personnel and Warehouse areas.	97	176 19 x 55 Napalm
<u>MUARA IS</u> Personnel and supply area	33	52
<u>BROOKETON</u> Supply area	6	9½

Making a total of 136 sorties dropping 237½ tons of bombs and 19 x 55 lb Napalm bombs.

- (d) Softening up of BALIKPAPAN area.

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS DROPPED</u>
<u>BALIKPAPAN</u> A/A and C/D positions	240	606
Personnel and Stores area	36	70
Mined Beach area	75	88
		264 x 325 lbs Depth Charges
		120 x 260 lbs Frag Cluster
Beland Seaplane Base	2	1½
<u>SIPINGGAN</u> Supply areas	6	11½
A/A and C/D positions	19	47½
Mined Beach areas	1	4
A/D	19	509 x 260 Frag Clusters
<u>NANGGAR</u> Supply areas	5	10
A/A and C/D positions	7	17
Mined Beach areas	35	125
		9 x 325 lbs Depth Charges
A/D	1	30 x 260 lbs Frag Clusters.

Making a total of 446 sorties dropping 980½ tons of bombs, 273 x 325 lbs Depth Charges and 659 x 260 lbs Frag Clusters in the BALIKPAPAN area.

(c) Other missions.

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS DROPPED</u>
<u>BORNEO</u>		
<u>TANAU</u>		
Personnel area	1	2
<u>BANDJERMASIN</u>		
Shipping	4	3
<u>CELEBES</u>		
<u>SIDATE</u>		11
Personnel area	8	5 & x 55 ^{CALL} Ed ^{Map} Map
<u>LIMBOENG</u>		
A/D and Personnel area	6	11
<u>L</u>		
<u>RANGOAN</u>	2	4
<u>SHIPPING SEARCHES</u>		
Makassar Straits	6	3
<u>CONVOY COVER</u>	32	-
<u>PHOTO/R</u>		
MUARA	1	
LABUAN	1	
MINDANAO	1	
BALIKPAPAN	1	

In all a total of 696 sorties were flown on which 1392 tons of GP bombs, 273 x 325 lb depth charges, 19 x 55 gall Napalm and 659 x 260 lb Frag Clusters were dropped.

2. AIR SUPPORT METHODS

- (a) On 21 Jun when the Formation Leader was briefed to contact CSA (Afloat) of Task Force operating off BALIKPAPAN confusion was caused when the CSA gave co-ordinates without quoting the correct Map Title. Crews from this Group had become accustomed to using Alphabetical Target Designator Maps over TARAKAN and as such maps had been issued it was naturally assumed any alteration int targets by "Maggie" would be directed from this particular series. Normally aircrews are not especially trained to read small scale maps and the simpler the system of reference used the better will be the results.
- (b) The Senior ALO on TARAKAN originated a signal regarding the effectiveness of any direct support given by this Bomb Group but on NO occasion did a copy reach this HQ. These signals contained information regarding damage caused, casualties etc and would have been of great interest to the aircrews concerned. They would also be of use to the Group Intelligence Officer when submitting his report on Operations to the Air Evaluation Board - FEAF. It has been arranged with the CSA on TARAKAN to submit a report to the I.O.

(c) A relief model of BALIAPAPAN was obtained from ^{Capt} 41A(Ins) 1 Aust Corps to assist in the briefing of aircrews. It proved to be of great assistance in pinpointing the many difficult targets in that area.

3. OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST

Over BALIAPAPAN on several occasions one plane was briefed to hit A/A positions with phosphorous bombs thus screening the main formation from their fire during the breakaway. The effectiveness of these tactics is best proven by the fact that A/A previously reported "heavy, intense and accurate" ceased to function.

Macmillan
Capt
39 Aust Sqn A L Sec

**Subject - SUMMARY OF MONTH'S OPERATIONS
JULY 1945**

19 Aust Sqn AL Sec
XIII Bomber Command

1. SUMMARY OF MONTH'S OPERATIONS

Air Operations by 13th BOMBER COMMAND for the month of July were on a smaller scale due to the commencement of an intensive training period on 15 July to last for 60 days. However this did not prevent units from hitting targets as part of the training schedule, and at all times the units were available for air support on BALIKPAPAN if the RAAF were NOT capable of dealing with a target. The support of BALIKPAPAN passed to 1st TAF from this command on 12 July, prior to which date the major side of air support had been done by 13 BOMBON and attached units. 310 BOMB WING remained in support with 2 heavy groups for 'F' Day and returned under 5th AF on 2 July. 5 BOMB GROUP (H), SAMAR based, split forces after 'F' Day support and 2 Sqs returned to each PALANAN and ROTOTAI, to assume the task of keeping enemy airdromes, within range of BALIKPAPAN, U/S. This task accomplished, they returned to SAMAR on 5 July leaving 307 BOMB GROUP (H) to the task.

Air support on BALIKPAPAN occupied 225 sorties with a total of 472½ tons of bombs being dropped and 24 sorties were flown obtaining photos of SE BODEBO for use by the Army.

In keeping airdromes U/S 189 sorties unloading 397½ tons of bombs were flown and, as the BALIKPAPAN forces received only very slight air opposition, the task was well accomplished. Attacking other strategic targets were 139 sorties with 256½ tons of bombs, photo missions occupied 32 sorties. Shipping searches once again met with good results only 39 sorties being successful in locating shipping dropping 16 tons while 16 sorties were NOT fruitful and secondaries received 16 ¾ tons of bombs. Shipping included :-

	<u>SUNK</u>	<u>PROBABLY SUNK</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
SUGAR DOGS	1	1	9
SUGAR CHARLIES	1	-	1
SUGAR BAKERS	-	1	-
COASTAL STEAMERS	2	-	-
RIVER STEAMERS	-	-	1 (3 Deck)
TUGS	1	-	-
BARGES	1	1	-
OIL BARGES	2	-	-
POWER LAUNCHES	1	-	-

Air attacks on KUSOBOS IS in support of the US Army used 179 sorties and 469½ tons of bombs. Searching for lost A/C and crews of this command took 34 sorties. For details of missions flown by 310 BOMB WING, 5 BOMB GROUP (H), 868 BOMB SQN (h) and 38 PHOTO SQN SEC, see APPX 'A'. For 307 BOMB GROUP (H), see para 1 APPX 'B'. (NET ATTD TO ALL).

Grand Total for the month 884 sorties and 1622½ tons of bombs.

2. AIR FORCE ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT

Bombing Results -, As further evidence of the excellent standard of air support supplied by 13 BOMBER COMMAND to the AUST Forces operating in this area is the fact that during the month of JUNE a record was set by this HQ for precision bombing. The figures obtained are believed to be a world's record for both a Bomb Group (H) and a Bomber Command, the figures being - 307 Bomb Group circular error 289' and 13 Bomber Command 402'. This was supplied by the Command Dombadier and was checked against figures from other Air Forces.

Fire Bombs (M-13) - These bombs were used on the 19 July to destroy a large barracks area in the SW CEMEXES. The results were so excellent it is felt some mention should be made as to it's details. The bomb is the same type as used over the Japanese Mainland. For the destruction by fire, of concentrations of inflammable buildings this bomb is far ahead of GP and tank Napalm bombs. The cluster is classed in the 500 lb group, therefore a B24 with one bomb-bay tank can carry nine, and each cluster weighing 417 lbs contains 60 small fire bombs making a total of 540 fire bombs per plane. Each fire bomb is a 19 1/2" long hexagonal cylinder 2.85" wide containing 2.8 lb of Napalm, 4 streamers and the nose fuse of 3 to 5 secs delay. The case of the bomb is sufficiently strong to withstand a penetration of about 3" to 4" of concrete or, with wooden buildings, several floors. However the bomb must strike nose down for the fuse to work, so four streamers in the tail act as the fins. After the delay the Napalm is fired and ejected as from a flamethrower. The cases of the bombs have been useful to the Japs so a new type has been evolved which contains a small demolition charge plus phosphorus.

The operating procedure at 310 BOMB WING and 5 BOMB GROUP (H) may be seen in ABER's 'C' and 'D' attached.

3. AIR SUPPORT

There can be no doubt that through all the operations conducted against BORNEO by the Army the 13 AF has co-operated to the fullest. All strike requests were granted, however incomplete the request was, and the Army was at no times stinted for photos. It is felt that such co-operation warrants some reciprocation on the part of the Army, in the way of "results of strikes" reports and a little consideration as to completeness and accuracy of briefings. There is little use reiterating the errors made, either they have been mentioned in previous reports or are covered by SOP's. Failures by the ASF's are strictly an Air Force matter but it should be to the Army's benefit to see that ASF's are fully conversant with their tasks in all aspects. It is NOT sufficient to please the Army by being able to obtain support when requested, fuller co-operation can be had if consideration is made for supporting arms. This opinion is held by the Staff Officers of this HQ and NOT necessarily by the ALO, and is mentioned only as such.

W. J. ... CAPT.
OC 19 AUST SQN AL SEC.

DISTRIBUTION

- HQ 1 AUST AL GROUP
- G (AIR) HQ 1 AUST CORPS
- WAR DIARY
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APPENDIX 'A'

MISSIONS	5 BOMB GP		310 BOMB W		868 BOMB SQW		38 P SQW	TARGETS AND REMARKS
	S	TB	S	TB	S	TB	S	
OBOS 2	29	58	38	75				Air Support
STRATEGICAL	28	42						KEMAN TOWN and SAMARINDA shipyards
A/DRONES	119	248½						SINGEWANG - BOELOEWANG LIMBOENG - OELIN - TABANIO - BATU KAWA - JESSELTON - MENDAI - BELANAI - LANGGAI - TROMBOL.
NEGROS IS	179	463½						Air Support
SHIPPING					20	8½		JAVA and FLORES SEAS - METAPAN R and INDO CHINA
SHIPPING SECONDARIES					16	16-¾		LIMBOENG - SACRI - WATAPORE - BANDJERMASIN MENDAI
LOST A/C					2	-		CELEBES
HECKLE					5	6½		TABANIO - OELIN LIMBOENG - MENDAI
STRAT /P							27	CELEBES - GERAN - TOLLAN IS - HALMAHERAS - MOROPAI
TAC /P							24	SE BOBISO - SAMBUNDA BALIKPAPAN - BANDJERMASIN Area
INCOMPLETE							7	Due to weather
TOTALS	355	812	38	75	43	31½	58	

GRAND TOTAL

JULY
JUNE

SORTIES - 884 TONS OF BOMBS - 1622½

SORTIES - 1200 TONS OF BOMBS ½ 1933

S - Sorties
TB - Tons of Bombs

H. H. H.

Subject : PERIOD OF DETACHMENT TO 310 BOMB WING - BUNDORO

OC 26 Aust Sqn AL Sec.
1 Aust Air Liaison Group.
24 July, 1945

1. Period of Detachment from TARAKAN to 310 BOMB WING lasted from 27 June to 23 July, 1945.

The Groups attached to this Wing included 417th Bomb Group, 3rd Attack Group, 380 and 90 Bomb Groups (H). The latter two Groups operated on targets at BALIKPAPAN prior to and including F Day.

3. A briefing of all Intelligence Officers and Operational Officers was carried out on the 28th, covering in detail the Naval, Air, and Landing Operations and immediate objectives of land forces on BALIKPAPAN, followed by a lecture on ground operations and Air Support at TARAKAN.

4. On the 29th and 30th, ALO flew with 90 Bomb Group (H) on missions to BALIKPAPAN. Both missions by 90th Bomb Group (H) and 380 Bomb Group (H) were excellent and bomb coverage by both Groups of the assigned targets showed 90% of bombs in the areas.

5. After F Day, these Groups took no further part in BALIKPAPAN operations and a series of lectures were set up to include all Squadrons of the above Groups. The lectures embraced ground activities and Air Support on TARAKAN, and from the interest displayed by the air crews, it was evident that they knew very little of the ground operations or the result of bombing carried out by them over that period other than from their visual observations which were, as reports showed, limited by terrain.

It is understood that a detailed report was submitted covering all support missions and if a copy of this is available it would be greatly appreciated by 310 Bomb Wing together with any other reports on BRUNET, LABUAN, and BALIKPAPAN operations. (Note: - Report passed by ALO XIII Bomber Command on 26 July, 1945 to A2 310 Bomb Wing).

6. Extremely efficient briefings were carried out by all squadrons in 310 Bomb Wing, and it is felt that these added materially to the efficiency of the bombing.

7. All squadrons were in agreement that the Air Alert briefings carried out over TARAKAN were excellent and no squadron reported any difficulty in locating the Panel Indications or Marker Smoke. 310 Bomb Wing operations officer was of the opinion that bombing efficiency was stepped up 50% using this means of indication. A definite setout and laid down procedure for close support would greatly enhance this type of briefing and eliminate any mistakes or disastrous mishaps.

Pilots themselves reported extreme confidence in hitting their assigned targets if a clear and concise briefing is given. There is no difficulty in locating marker smoke and it can be clearly distinguished from any smoke put up by the enemy if an accurate briefing is carried out.

Although no further missions were carried out in Close Support missions in BALIKPAPAN after F Day, it is considered that air crew personnel benefited materially from the knowledge that their bombing had been effective, and if possible in future, if an ALO cannot be sent along to squadrons participating, some such report as suggested would be greatly appreciated.

Capt.
OC 26 Aust Sqn AL Sec.

Subject : OPERATIONAL REPORT

SS/23/15

23 Aust Sqn AL Sec
(Att) 5th Bombardment Group.
VIII Air Force.

TO : 19 AUST SQN AL SEC.

1. The 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted in OBOE TWO operations during the "softening up" phase and for a limited period after "F" Day.
2. The enthusiasm and marked efficiency of this Group is clearly evidenced by the attached appendices "A" & "B" which were worked out in conjunction with the ALO by a combined meeting of Group and Squadron S2 and S3 officers... This meeting followed after the ALO had flown a close support mission in the lead A/C and had made a few minor suggestions on method and procedure over the target. The good Lord only knows there was very little fault to be found with the strike aircraft - it was the ASP with whom we were working who left themselves open to real criticism. But that is the old story of scanty target details and incomplete briefing. However, the writer was working with a keen Air Force Unit, and they, at any rate, were out to improve their commitments in Close Air Support.
3. ASPs could well note and carefully assimilate the actual commitments and requirements of B2A crews and should make certain to include the important factors contained in the attached appendices in all "Requests" and in all "Impromptu" briefings.
4. The "Standard Operating Procedure for Air-Ground Support Bombing Missions" and the "Bombardiers Check List" are self explanatory, but it should be noted that a few extra seconds have been added to the normal time lag of "shot" to "splash" where smoke shells are concerned. This was to allow for inter-comms notification between Bombardier and Pilot. If super-charge for extreme range is used then the ASP must remember to pass on to the strike aircraft the extra time lag involved.

25 July '45.

Capt.
OC 23 Aust Sqn AL Section.

WAR DIARY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Army Form 2118.
(Adapted)

(Erase heading not required.)

19 Aust Sqn A L Sec *Unit*

Date and Time.—From 1 Aug 45

To 31 Aug 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MOROTAI	1-9 Aug		Normal operational duties	<i>R/S.</i>
	10 Aug		Due to move of XIII Bomber Command necessitating packing of equipment this section closed office and awaited reposting by HQ	<i>R/S.</i>
	15 Aug		Cpl clerk moved to 1 Aust A L Gp Rear Details camp to assist in construction.	<i>R/S.</i>
	23 Aug		OC and driver moved to 1 Aust A L Gp Rear Details camp to await reposting.	<i>R/S.</i>
			<i>R/S. Henderson</i> Capt. OC 19 Aust Sqn A L Sec.	

Subject: - MONTHLY OPERATIONAL REPORT
August 1945

SS/19/90

19 Aust Sqn A L Sec
XIII Bomber Command
Sep 45

1. SUMMARY OF MONTHS OPERATIONS

The intensive training period started on 15 Jul 45, see Monthly Operation Report Jul 45, was continued during this month and NO missions were flown in support of AMF troops. However the training schedule did NOT prevent the 307 Bomb Gp (H) from hitting the enemy while carrying out bombing practise. At the same time 5 Bomb Gp (H) continued to support the US Army in the NEGROS IS area. Orders were received by Bomber Command to prepare to move NORTH and all further operations were cancelled while the units packed. NO details of missions flown are included as all files were packed early in the month.

2. AIR FORCE ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT

NO changes.

3. AIR SUPPORT

NO support to AMF.

M Saunders, Capt
OC 19 Aust Sqn A L Sec.

DISTRIBUTION

1 Aust A L Gp
War Diary
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