


AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/3/12
ARMY

Second Army
Headquarters

March 1944, part2, appendices



1/3/12-0655

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C2118
(adapted.)

Unit Int Sec Second Aust Army

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information			Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
HQ SECOND AUST ARMY	1 Mar 44		GS (Int) Staff			
PARRAMATTA			Appointment	Rank	Name	
			GI	Lt-Col	R. K. Dyce	
			GII	Vacant		
			GIII (Ia)	Capt	W. E. Potts	
			GIII (Ib-c)	Capt	R. H. Smith	
			IO (Ia)	Capt	W. H. King	
			IO (It)	Lt	Vacant	
			IO (Ia)	Lt	J. W. Boyd	
			IO (Ix)	Lt	G. L. Penn	
			<u>Clerks</u>	S Sjt	J. V. Claney	
				S Sjt	A. L. Fry	
				Sjt	C. R. Candy	
				Cpl	H. Barlow	
				Cpl	C. H. Rose	
				Cpl	M. S. Macgregor	
				L cpl	C. M. McDougall	
				Pte	J. C. Parker	
			<u>Draughtsmen</u>	Pte	E. D. Moyse	
				Sjt	W. Gunn	
				Cpl	C. W. Maclean	
			<u>Orderly</u>	Cpl	R. Rice	
				Pte	R. H. Miller	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C2118
(adapted.)

Unit Int Sec Second Aust Army Date and Time.—From 1 Mar. 44 To 31 Mar. 44.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
HQ SECOND AUST ARMY	1 Mar		Capt R. H. Smith departed on 14 days rec leave	
PARRAMATTA	5 Mar		Lt G. L. Penn departed on 2 days rec leave	
	10 Mar		Owing to reorganisation the following changes are to take place forthwith:-	
			(a) GOC daily conference ceases.	
			(b) Int Bulletin distribution reduced from 37 to 6.	
			(c) Int Review distribution reduced from 132 to 42.	
	11 Mar		In view of the reorganisation of HQ Second Aust Army Lt-Col Dyce and Lt G. L. Penn conferred with LHQ WE Committee regarding establishment of Second Aust Army Int Corps Section. After discussion it was decided that the subject be referred to LHQ as general policy was involved and could not at that stage be decided by LHQ WE Committee.	
	18 Mar		Capt W. H. King visited LHQ School of Camouflage to lecture	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit Int. Sec. Second Aust Army

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
HQ SECOND AUST ARMY			on Japanese equipment, organisation, morale and tactics.	
PARRAMATTA	21 Mar	0930L	Request from G (Trg) for all available information on Rain Forest areas suitable for jungle training within an area 50 mls South of COFFS HARBOUR North to GRAFTON-SANDON BLUFFS.	
			Western boundary NOT stipulated.	
			Action taken:-	
			Extracts collated from Int records	
			Visited Forestry Commission	
			" NSW L of C Area	
			Rang WDC COFFS HARBOUR	
			" Local Resident COFFS HARBOUR	
			Combined information from above sources, transferred to map overlay and submitted to G (Trg) at 1700 hrs 21 Mar 44.	
		22 Mar	Lt-Col DYCE visited HQ 1 Aust Div regarding the training of Int personnel.	
		22 Mar	Lt-Col Dyce visited 1 Aust Para Bn regarding the training of	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit Int. Sec. Second Aust. Army.

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar. 44 To 31 Mar. 44.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
HQ SECOND AUST			Int personnel	
ARMY PARRAMATTA	24 Mar		Lt-Col Dyce conferred with Brig J. Rogers (DMI) regarding reorganisation HQ Second Aust Army.	
	25 Mar		Capt W. E. Potts departed on 2 days rec leave.	
	28 Mar		Lt Butler (41/2 Bn) attended LHQ School of Camouflage as instructor in Air Photo Interpretation.	
	29 Mar		Capt R. H. Smith departed on 2 day liaison visit to "D" F.S. Section, Newcastle.	
	30 Mar		Capt R. H. Smith returned from Newcastle.	
	31 Mar		Lt-Col Dyce and Capt W. H. King attended combined Security conference.	

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit Int Sec Second Aust Army Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44.

[illegible]

D.3125/5.39.—C 4784.

SECRET

Copy No. 54/

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 97

(Based on information received from 1800 hrs 21 Feb 44 to 1800 hrs 28 Feb 44)

1. Recipients of this document will take special care to ensure the secrecy thereof.

They will also ensure that the contents of those portions side-lined are NOT distributed lower than Lt-Cols Comd.
2. Except as specified above, recipients may promulgate the contents for the information of all units; but in so doing, they must quote HQ Second Aust Army Int Review No 97 and such sources as are acknowledged by HQ Second Aust Army.
3. A receipt for this summary is NOT required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.

CONTENTS

- Page 1. Introductory
 (a) General Resume
 (b) Enemy Strengths
- Page 3. Summary of Operations by Areas
 (a) Land
 (b) Sea
 (c) Air
- Page 7. Security and Censorship
 (a) Adding up Innocent Statements
- Page 8. PW Reports, Captured Documents etc
 (a) A Japanese Pto's Frontline Impressions of SHAGGY RIDGE.
 (b) Japanese Impressions of SAIPAN, TRUK and GUAM.
 (c) Japanese praise Allied Jungle Tactics.
- Page 10. Topography
 (a) HOLLANDIA Area.

Headquarters
Second Aust Army
29 Feb 44

Distribution

List "E"

PART I
INTRODUCTORY

(a) GENERAL RESUME

1. Land

With the exception of Allied consolidation on NISSAN (GREEN) ISLAND no major land activity has been reported since 19 Feb.

The successful occupation of the whole of the Southern portion of NISSAN and the occupation of the small island of SAU to the North may be expected to affect the passage of supplies from NEW IRELAND and NEW BRITAIN to South BOUGAINVILLE were Japanese forces were reported on 19 Feb to be organising for an offensive against the Allied beachhead at CAPE TOROKINA. The longer the enemy delays this threatened counter offensive the more his capability to stage it will be reduced. As no enemy offensive action has been attempted it is likely that his intention has been abandoned.

American forces advancing against negligible resistance along the Northern NEW BRITAIN coast have reached IBOXI PLANTATION.

The abandonment of enemy field guns and instruments and the disappearance of Japanese forces previously reported to be in the ADI RIVER area can be added to other evidence indicating that

(a) a hurried withdrawal Eastwards is in progress

(b) Japanese morale in WESTERN NEW BRITAIN has deteriorated.

Allied forces have extended their beachhead at SAIDOR and have established a bridgehead on the Western side of the HOT RIVER. Allied troops advancing in the GABUMI area have cut and possibly closed the enemy inland escape route bypassing SAIDOR. The total Jap escapees moving Westward through TARIKEMAN (12 miles SW SAIDOR) from 6 to 23 Feb was reported as 3500.

2. Sea

Allied naval craft made several "feeler" attacks by impudently bombarding KAVIENG and RABAU. They met surprisingly light coast defence opposition. They also carried out wide interception sweeps to the North of NEW HANOVER. Enemy air and naval effort in the area being completely neutralised, US forces landed on LOS NEGROS in the ADMIRALTYS on 29 Feb

and took MOMOTE airfield (late report).

(b) ENEMY STRENGTHS

3. Enemy strengths in the NE and NW sectors have come in for considerable reassessment.

The areas affected are BRITISH NEW GUINEA, North coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA, SW DUTCH NEW GUINEA, the islands in the BANDA SEA and PALAU.

The MADANG area total has fallen 2000 to 20,000 and includes approximately 10,000 of 41 Div, plus 10,000 base and L of C personnel.

Enemy strength at HANSA BAY is being considerably increased and is now 11,500 (increase 3500). There are approximately 7500 troops of 20 Div (defeated at FINSCHHAFEN) in the area. Reinforcements are believed en route for this formation.

The WEWAK - BUT total has been increased by 6000 to 15,000 and includes 4500 troops of 51 Div. There are 2000 reinforcements believed en route for 51 Div.

The HOLLANDIA - VANIMO total is 4000 (increase 1000); the increase is partly due to the arrival of constructional and L of C units.

There is an increase of 5500 - 6500 troops in enemy occupied areas of DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

On the North coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA (including MANOKWARI, BIAK ISLAND, NABIRE, SORONG, SARMI, WAKDE ISLAND) the aggregate figure is 8000. This figure includes a considerable number of airfield construction troops and possibly elements of a division ex North CHINA.

The SW coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA (including KOKAS, FAK FAK, KAUK-ENAU, KAIMANA) has been reassessed at 8000. This figure includes portion of 5 Div. There is a possibility of a yet unknown Force in DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Until further information is to hand, such Force is NOT being included in strength assessments.

Enemy bases strength in the BANDA SEA (AMBON, SAUMLAKI, TORAL, DOBO) have been reassessed. The total is now 12,000 (increase 3000) and includes units of 5 Div.

The estimated enemy strength at PALAU is 3000.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

(Reported between 1800 hrs 21 Feb 44 and 1800 hrs 23 Feb 44).

(a) LAND - SOLOMONS

4. BOUGAINVILLE

On 19 Feb 44, Allied sources reported there were indications of enemy preparations for an offensive against the TOROKINI perimeter and in support thereof 60 Japanese with 2 heavy machine guns were observed moving along ridge forward of the perimeter. So far no enemy offensive has developed.

The US forces are actively patrolling and shelling enemy positions, dumps and installations forward of the perimeter.

5. NISSAN (GREEN) ISLAND

Allied forces on the 20 Feb employed tanks against slight opposition and occupied the whole of the Southern portion of the island. They followed this action by taking possession of SAU, a small island to the North, on 24 Feb.

NEW BRITAIN

6. NORTHERN COAST

Very little enemy opposition is being encountered by American forces in their advance Eastwards along the Northern coast.

On 25 Feb the Allied spearhead had reached IBOKI PLANTATION, an advance of some 65 miles from ULTANO. Eight Japanese were captured during the advance.

7. SOUTHERN COAST:

US patrols investigating reports of enemy between the ITNI and ADI RIVERS failed to locate any Japanese but captured two 75mm mountain guns and a range finder.

In the ARANE sector the enemy is still located at ACRIC and in the vicinity of the ARANE airstrip.

On 25 Feb a US force landed West of ACRIC and immediately contacted the enemy. Three days later a machine gun was destroyed.

Active Allied patrolling proceeds in the vicinity of the airstrip. A patrol operating in the PULIE RIVER area on 24 Feb reported at least 100 Japanese disposed in defences North of MURIEN. Natives stated they were ordered by the Japanese to vacate the MURIEN and DIDMOP areas as heavy fighting was expected. So far no reports have been received of this eventuating. One US patrol gathered the information that Japanese officers had killed some of their own men to prevent spread of poor morale.

NEW GUINEA

8. SAIDOR

Since the capture of GABUMI on the Japanese escape route only 17 of the enemy have been reported as passing through TARIKMAN.

During the past week Australian and American troops have accounted for at least 250 of the enemy. A further 477 were found dead along various tracks in the area.

The US bridgehead over the HOT RIVER has been expanded. Advance forces pushed Eastwards through TETERI against slight enemy opposition on 23 Feb and occupied WARAI and BILIAU next day.

Australian troops actively patrol the area SW of GALI 2. Many dead Japanese were found in the vicinity of WADOBO, WINDILUK and HOEM.

After overcoming enemy resistance at GABUMI, American patrols moved Westward to HAIBANG and SSE towards SEIN which they occupied on 22 Feb. Further SSE the villages of SINDAHAN and ISANGAN were taken on 24 and 26 Feb.

The Japanese are evidently still suffering supply problems. Our patrols found supply parachutes North of NASI (8 miles SE of CAPE IRIS), and in open spaces between GORIONG and DAMOIN.

Many Japanese, some in a state of physical exhaustion, were observed moving Westwards between DEIN and YALAU PLANTATION (1½ miles SE and 5½ miles WNW HERWARTH POINT respectively).

9. DUMPU

Australian patrols report only minor contacts with the enemy.

ORGORUNA 1 and 2, KISA, ASAKE and KOB1 were reported clear of the enemy but MATALOI 2 is under enemy occupation.

(b) SEA - OPERATIONS

10. Allied light naval craft and PT boats continue, with little opposition, to harass enemy bases. In the SOLOMONS, between 20 and 24 Feb, PT boats attacked shore targets in the vicinity of BUKA PASSAGE and along the Western coast of BOUGAINVILLE. Fires were started as the result of these attacks.

Others of these craft shelled enemy shore installations at night on North coast NEW BRITAIN and on NEW GUINEA coast West of SAIDOR and NNE of ALEXISHAFEN. Heavy fire was met from enemy barges and shore guns on NEW BRITAIN coast, but the attacks resulted in satisfying destruction of Jap barges.

Following the successful attack by Allied destroyers against KAVIENG on 18 Feb, surface vessels again attacked at dawn on 23 Feb when fires were started, and at dawn on 25 Feb. This last attack resulted in one vessel sunk in the harbour, two others left burning, fires in the town and dock areas and the silencing of shore batteries.

On the night 24/25 Feb Allied naval units bombarded VUNAPOPE causing fires and explosions. The same units also shelled CAPE GAZELLE, MATUPI and RAPOPO causing large fires at RAPOPO.

On 22 Feb Allied surface craft sank a cargo vessel bound for PALAU and carrying aviation personnel, 60 miles WNW of CAPE SIEMENS. 73 survivors were picked up.

On the same day an old type enemy destroyer was sunk, also by Allied surface craft 33 miles SW of CAPE MATANALEM. The same Allied craft also sank a large cargo vessel and the majority of nine barges off the Southern entrance to STEFFEN STRAIT.

SIGHTINGS

11. SOLOMONS

Enemy submarines, probably with a supply running role, continue to operate in SOLOMONS waters. Two of these craft were sighted off BOUGAINVILLE on 22 and 27 Feb.

12.

NEW IRELAND

On 19 Feb an enemy convoy, comprising two destroyers, a corvette and two merchant vessels, was sighted in LAUT BAY on course WSW. Attacking Allied aircraft sank two of the escort vessels and left the two merchant vessels on fire.

Another enemy convoy sighted on 21 Feb off CAPE BOTIANGAN (SW of NEW HANOVER) and comprising two cruisers, a submarine chaser, a 9-12000 ton transport and two unidentified vessels, was on a North Westerly course apparently moving out of SWPA. Later on 21 Feb a further convoy of two destroyers, a submarine chaser and two merchant vessels was sighted 15 miles WNW of CAPE MATANALEM. Air attacks set both merchant vessels afire.

On 24 Feb a five vessel enemy convoy was sighted heading NE 70 miles NE by East of KAVIENG.

13.

NEW BRITAIN

Enemy shipping in the RABAU area remains at a low level. The enemy has apparently realised that further attempts to bring his larger vessels into the area will mean certain losses from Allied sea and air attacks. On 23 Feb eleven cargo vessels of 600-700 tons each and 235 barges were photographed in SIMPSON HARBOUR. At the same time two destroyers, an 8000 ton tanker and 135 more barges were dispersed in KRAVIA BAY. On 26 Feb fourteen 600-700 ton vessels, two damaged submarine chasers and approximately 400 barges were in SIMPSON HARBOUR and KRAVIA BAY.

Coastal movement around NEW BRITAIN is confined mainly to barge traffic although a gunboat and a merchant vessel were sighted moving SW by West, 27 miles NW of UBILI on 21 Feb.

14.

NEW GUINEA

Enemy barge activity continues between WEWAK and HANSA BAY. It appears that the enemy is now loath to bring his larger craft forward of the latter base. On 19 Feb two freighter transports of 500-1000 tons and a 5000-7000 ton merchant vessel were sighted in the WEWAK area. Three similar small freighters were in the same area on 25 Feb. Also on 25 Feb, two freighters (one of 5000-8000, one of 500-1000 tons) were in HANSA BAY.

15.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Two cargo vessels (6000 and 8000 tons) were sighted moving SE by South 125 miles MNW of HOLLANDIA BAY on 23 Feb. Three merchant vessels were in the vicinity of SOPONG on 26 Feb.

16.

NW AREA

On 25 Feb a freighter transport (2000-4500 tons) was sighted in AMBON BAY; two freighter transports (700 and 800 tons) were also present.

Long range reconnaissance sighted a convoy of four or five vessels 75 miles West by North of MAKASSAR on 23 Feb. On 26 Feb three small vessels were present in MAKASSAR HARBOUR. On the night 24/25 Feb two large auxiliary oilers were sighted off DAVAO GULF (SE PHILIPPINES).

(c) AIR - OWN OPERATIONS

17.

SOLOMONS

Allied aircraft have concentrated their attacks in support of ground troops and on enemy positions and L of C in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY and CAPE MOLTKE areas. Damaging strikes were made against

barges off MISO RIVER, in MATCHIN BAY and on a stranded sub chaser near HAWARAKA.

18. NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY GROUP

Allied aircraft during the week made over 150 sorties. Strikes against shipping at KAVIENG and adjacent sea lanes resulted in the sinking of 3 vessels (totalling 4200 tons) and damage to a 4000 ton vessel, barges and luggers. Land targets attacked on NEW IRELAND included the radar station at CAPE ST GEORGE, installations at JALU RIVER (vicinity CAPE ST GEORGE) and LABUR (vicinity NAMATANAI). Considerable damage was done.

Further attacks, though on a lighter scale, were made against LORENGAU and MOMOTE.

19. NEW BRITAIN

Allied air efforts remain on the same scale as the previous week, but 1276 of the reported 1423 sorties were made against RABAU. The main weight of the attacks fell on LAKUNAI, TOBERA, RAPOPO, VUNAKANAU and KERVAT airfields and the supply areas at VUNAPOPE causing heavy destruction on the strips, to AA positions, installations, buildings and stores.

Enemy shipping also suffered in a concentrated attack. 8 ships at least and patrol craft and barges were damaged in KERVAT BAY.

The few remaining sorties were directed against targets at TALASEA, CAPE HOSKINS, IBOKI PLANTATION and in the GASMATA area.

20. NEW GUINEA

With 714 reported sorties the Allied air effort has shown a great increase on the previous week. The heaviest attacks were against the airfields in the WEWAK area destroying grounded aircraft, AA positions, stores and damaging runways. A new target in this area was the BURUI airfield, a possible dispersal area from WEWAK. HANSA BAY and ALEXISHAFEN were both heavily attacked, particularly supply areas, AA positions, and the airfields which were all further damaged. Allied divebombers struck effectively in the SAIDOR area, around MADANG, at enemy positions in the RAMU VALLEY and at gun positions at ULIGAN HARBOUR. TADJI, another escape airfield from WEWAK, was again attacked.

Some idea of the effect of the incessant Allied air attacks is instanced by reports of no AA fire from MADANG area, that MADANG and ALEXISHAFEN No 2 airfields are unserviceable and that ALEXISHAFEN appeared deserted.

21. NW SECTOR

The main role of Allied aircraft in this sector appears to be reconnaissance. Offensive action was limited to minor attacks on villages and OPs between BENJIN and BEBOELOE RIVERS on the South coast of TIMOR, dumps and installations at TIMIKA and BANDANAIRA and an unsuccessful strike against shipping off MISOL ISLAND.

22. ENEMY OPERATIONS

The enemy has taken no offensive action during the past week. Even his fighter defence has dwindled to nothing for during the last 5 days he has made no interception to Allied raiding forces either in NEW GUINEA or over RABAU, consequently enemy losses have been small, 29 aircraft destroyed in combat and at least 30 destroyed on the ground.

The lack of enemy air activity in NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND areas is to some extent explained by the following facts:-

On 18 Feb all RABAU airfields except RAPOPO were unserviceable and the heavy raids of the last week have no doubt, despite desperate efforts at repair, kept them so, or at least inoperative for short periods.

On 23 Feb air observation over the ADMIRALTY Group for 1½ hours at low level reported nil activity.

On 20 Feb KAVIENG and PANAPAI airfields were unserviceable. PORA PORA airfield shows every indication of having been abandoned.

On 25 Feb estimated air strength in NEW BRITAIN had dropped to 76 aircraft compared with 206 on 15 Feb.

Heavy attacks on enemy airfields are not only placing a strain on Japanese manpower and resources but have enabled Allied aircraft and surface vessels to operate with comparative freedom in the NE Sector.

Enemy air strength in the NEW GUINEA area continues to rise steadily but has so far not been utilised.

SECTION XVI

SECURITY AND CENSORSHIP

23.

SECURITY - ADDING UP INNOCENT STATEMENTS.

At a school in AUSTRALIA some of the officers were discussing the fact that although strict censorship might prevent leakage of important information, equally valuable information was being disseminated by apparently innocent statements which only became important when considered with other apparently innocent statements and scraps of information.

To prove this, a competition was inaugurated in the mess, the conditions of which were that all officers would collect in 21 days whatever information they could from other than official sources, and make any deductions. A prize would be awarded to the officer producing information likely to be of most use to the enemy. Sources of information were defined e.g. conversations overheard in trams, trains, hotels etc, conversation with civilians, observation of troop and transport movements that could be seen by civilians, and other like sources. Information obtained through official channels could be included only if it were NOT "protected" and if it indirectly confirmed the competitors deductions.

After a fortnight the officer who inaugurated the competition cancelled it because he considered that the information he himself had obtained was too dangerous to mention even in the mess, and could be more dangerous still if amplified by other competitors.

His deductions enabled him to forecast with almost exact accuracy the landing of the division responsible for the LAE operations, the identity of the division and the nature of the first phase of the operations.

Some of the sources of information on which his deductions were based were:-

- (a) A statement by a neighbour of his wife that the leave of her two sons (whom he knew to be in 9 Aust Div) had been cancelled, and that they had told her in a letter that no one in the unit was being granted any leave.
- (b) A statement by a woman, whose son was an officer in 9 Aust Div, that he had sent her his FS cap to look after for him.

- (e) A statement by a man living on a line on which was a trg centre, that a lot of troop trains had gone through lately.
- (d) Knowledge that officers from 7 and 9 Aust Divs were being withdrawn from the school.
- (e) Conversation with a stranger on a tram who said he was a blood donor and had just been to give blood. He said all donors had been called up, there was a big crowd of them at the centre, and he understood large quantities were urgently required for NEW GUINEA.
- (f) A statement by a civilian that "a friend on the wharves" had said a lot of landing craft had been sent away.
- (g) Semi-official knowledge that stores essential to amphibious operations were being sent from dumps in large quantities.

SECTION XVIII

PW REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ETC

24. A JAP PTE'S FRONTLINE IMPRESSIONS AT SHAGGY RIDGE

A diary captured in the RANKIRYO area on 1 Feb 44 yielded some interesting sidelights on enemy morale. The fact that bad news eventually filters back to the troops was indicated by an entry on 5 Jan by Ldg Pte OZEKI (owner of diary) which stated that he had heard of the Allied landing at SAIDOR. This landing took place on 2 Jan 44 and the Jap habit of denying bad news apparently only slightly delayed its transmission.

The beginning of the diary expressed the delight of the owner in the news of his Coy's proposed relief. Unfortunately the relief did not materialise. Mention was made, however, that 2 Pl was taken to the rear to recuperate.

Main extracts of interest were:

5 Jan 44

"Heard that the enemy landed midway between MADANG and RAI on 30 tpt ships. Our C group DAN (may refer to a 20 Div Force) and 3 Bn are to close on them from both sides, but since our units are so weakened, I am not sure that they will be successful. At present our effectiveness is about one third and we are practically at a standstill."

12 Jan 44

"It seems that our units at HANSA BAY and WEWAK have recently been taking a terrific beating from the enemy airplanes. They say that each time hundreds of drums, ammunition, provisions, ships, medical supplies and important unassembled machinery are being turned to ashes. It must be the AMERICAN Airforce, the lords of the South Seas! They have many planes and are brave as well. They are skilful in strafing and bombing."

19 Jan 44.

"Heard a rumour that we may be relieved in about 40 days. They say that many of the US forces that landed were annihilated. Heard that 41 C and 20 C are both closing in on the enemy like a 'sandwich'. (Note: 41 C and 20 C might refer to Butais from 41 and 20 Divs which were in the FIESCHHAFEN Area).

20 Jan 44

"6 Coy fighting fiercely with the enemy on SHAGGY RIDGE. There has been much enemy activity."

21 Jan 44

"6 Coy Comd 1st Lt KATAYAMA killed. The enemy attacked the positions of 5 Coy opposite us. There is not even one soldier in the rear to support us. If the enemy advances up SHAGGY RIDGE, this position will be weakened."

22 Jan 44

"The entire personnel of 5 Coy staff were killed. Thought the enemy in front of us were rather quiet, but they were assembling in the direction of KANKIRYO and occupied an important position. Our Coy is to reassemble at KANKIRYO at 0200 hrs to engage in another battle. Bn Comd and his subordinates are prepared to fight to the death at KANKIRYO. The enemy is cutting off our rear."

End.

It will be seen that when the story of the American landing at SAIDOR gathered force, it became necessary for the Japanese Comd to institute a "morale booster" for the forward troops. The remnants of 20 Div were incapable of fighting even a "sandwich" action whilst 2 regts 41 Div were quite preoccupied with the defence of MADANG.

Possibly the diarist was a member of 5 Coy 2 Bn 78 Inf Regt as he mentions 7, 6 and 5 on various other duties. 8 Coy may have been in the EUON PENINSULA operations so it is possible that the writer may have been a member of 5 Coy 2 Bn 78 Inf Regt. The 5 Coy referred to as being attacked may have been 5 Coy 80 Inf Regt, also known to have been in the area. 6 Coy of 2 Bn had only 35 effectives at 23 Dec and the strength of 2 Bn was 300 on that date, according to a ration chart captured at KANKIRYO. The decision of the Bn Comd to fight to the death after the infiltration of our troops to his forces rear is typical of the Japanese when cornered.

25. JAPANESE IMPRESSIONS OF SAIPAN, TRUK AND GUAM

An enemy notebook recently translated contained references to TRUK, SAIPAN and GUAM - all of which have come in for torrid treatment recently. Whilst the notes have no great operational significance, they illustrate the unquenchable habit of the Jap to diarise everything of interest.

EXTRACTS - SAIPAN

There are many Japanese in SAIPAN, particularly those from the KAGOSHIMA Prefecture (45 Inf Regt 6Div). In the town, there is a garrison unit, a sugar factory and an airfield. There seems to be no shortage of provisions.

TRUK

"There is no difference between TRUK and JAPAN. There seems to be a lot of Japanese here. Stores are operated by the Japanese and the high prices of goods and food is amazing. A bottle of beer costs 2 yen 80 sen." (Note: 1 yen is approximately 2 shillings at par).

GUAM

"This was formally American territory. The roads are all concrete. Where the garrison unit is now billeted, American troops

were quartered, so that it is very good".

"On the beach, which appears to be an airbase, there are 8 gasoline or fuel tanks". (Bulletin 746).

26. JAPS PRAISE ALLIED JUNGLE TACTICS.

At SIO on 20 Jan 44 an enemy booklet was recovered entitled "Battle Instructions in BAILOKU" compiled by Navy SAMEJINA Force (TN 8th Fleet) and recopied by 8th Area Army (RABAU).

The booklet was noteworthy for the praise given to Allied jungle tactics and criticism of Japanese methods.

A few extracts were:

1. The enemy is clever in jungle warfare. It appears that they have had considerable training.
2. Our soldiers, when in combat, expose themselves, therefore there are many casualties (especially among the navy).
3. The enemy fires from behind trees in the jungle and immediately changes position. They keep low and make absolutely no noise. It appears that they command by whistling which is like the sound of the birds in the jungle (reported by 2nd Lt NAGATA).
6. Since jungle warfare is combat at close quarters, MG and hand grenades are effective. Because there are differences in the size of rifle ammunition and MG ammunition belonging to the Army and that of the Navy, there are great difficulties of supply.
10. Generally the enemy does not use less than a platoon for patrol.

SECTION XIX - TOPOGRAPHY

HOLLANDIA AREA

27. LOCATION

HOLLANDIA lies on the North coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA approximately 212 miles WNW of WEWAK.

28. TOPOGRAPHY

Coastline

HOLLANDIA BAY is situated in the West side of HUMBOLDT BAY. The coastline of the latter from CAPE DJAR (Eastern point) to the isthmus dividing HOLLANDIA BAY and JAUTEFA BAY is sandy beach, backed by mangroves and coconut trees. The Western side is rough and hilly, with short stretches of sand beach alternated with rock cliffs.

Terrain

HUMBOLDT BAY lies across the South Eastern end of the rugged ranges of the CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS. Terrain to the West and NW of HOLLANDIA is rough and mountainous; that to the South and SE is hilly, and gradually becomes lower to finally die away in the flat swamps of the LAKE SENTANI - TAMI RIVER depression.

Rivers and Lakes

No large rivers run into HUMBOLDT BAY but small streams run into the bay from the CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS. SENTANI LAKE, which lies to the WSW of HUMBOLDT BAY, is only 70 metres above sea level. It drains through the DJAFOERI RIVER which flows East and then joins the TAMI RIVER and runs into GERMANIA HOOK East of HUMBOLDT BAY. The lake was used by the Dutch as an alternate flying boat base. The lake is fresh and provides an inexhaustible supplement to supply of water from many rivers and streams flowing into it from the mountain. The country surrounding is a region of low rounded hills partly grass and partly bare soil, rising to the North to the CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS and to the South to BONGGO MOUNTAINS.

29. ROADS

The Japanese have developed an MT road PIM (JAUFETA BAY) - LAKE SENTANI - TANAHMERAH BAY. The road serves the airfields North of LAKE SENTANI. A good track which could be developed for MT runs from HOLLANDIA to PIM. Numerous trails and tracks exist but rough country West of HOLLANDIA prevents development of the roads and movement can only be made on foot.

30. ANCHORAGES

HUMBOLDT BAY with an entrance $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles in width between CAPE DJAR and CAPE SOEADJA and nearly 7 miles across inside is a splendid stretch of water. Opening to NE it is partially protected from the full force of NW Monsoon, although vessels, because of heavy swell, prefer to seek the protection of the inner harbours. JAUFETA BAY is well protected by a sand bar which prevents use except by launches and small craft. HOLLANDIA BAY is the best anchorage in this part of NEW GUINEA. Protection is afforded in all weathers. 3 or 4 cruisers and/or destroyers and vessels up to 5000 tons can be in the harbour. HOLLANDIA BAY is divided into 2 parts, IMBI BAY and CHALLENGER COVE. Heavy swell is present in NW monsoon season.

31. AIRFIELDS

The Japanese have constructed 3 airfields all of which are situated North of LAKE SENTANI.

HOLLANDIA AIRFIELD

Location:- $02^{\circ} 33' S$ $140^{\circ} 29' E$.

Construction commenced in early 1943. In late 1943 there were 2 runways 4600 feet and 6200 feet long respectively, each running approximately EW, with blast pens and dispersal areas South of the runways.

SENTANI AIRFIELD

The runway runs NW - SE and the NW end lies $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles East of the SE end of HOLLANDIA airfield. The runway is 5800 feet and is used by bombers. Dispersal areas lie on the North of the strip.

CYCLOPS AIRFIELD

The CYCLOPS airfield lies approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ mile NE of SENTANI airfield. The strip, probably developed for fighters is 3900 feet by 150 feet and runs NW - SE. Dispersal areas North and South of the strip are under construction.

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The main hub of military activity centres around the 3 airfields and HOLLANDIA provides the port facilities. Barracks and installations have all been built at the airfield sites. In the airfields area 22 heavy AA guns, 13 light AA guns and 6 S/Ls are sited.

32. MILITARY IMPORTANCE

HOLLANDIA, lying approximately 500 miles from Allied airfields in the LAE area, has been to date almost immune from Allied air attack. It is not only an important staging base for movement of aircraft to WEWAK but a funk hole to which the Japs can withdraw their aircraft from WEWAK airfields. In the event of WEWAK either falling or becoming untenable, it will provide the enemy with a good forward base and coupled with the airfields already established and being developed to the West, will present another series of strongholds to be smashed.

33. ESCAPED PRISONER OF WAR APPREHENDED

Second Aust Army Int Review No 87, para 32 of 20 Dec 43 published a request for an immediate search for Lt Edgardo SIMONI escaped Italian prisoner of war. SIMONI has now been apprehended and the case is closed.

Adye Lt-Col
GS (Int)
SECOND AUST ARMY
29 Feb 44

SECRET

Copy No.....54.....

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 98

(Based on information received from 1800 hrs 28 Feb 44 to 1800 hrs 6 Mar 44)

1. Recipients of this document will take special care to ensure the secrecy thereof.

They will also ensure that the contents of those portions sidelined are NOT distributed lower than Lt-Cols Comd.

2. Except as specified above, recipients may promulgate the contents for the information of all units; but in so doing, they must quote HQ Second Aust Army Int Review No. 98 and such sources as are acknowledged by HQ Second Aust Army.

3. A receipt for this summary is NOT required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.

CONTENTS

Page 1.	Introductory (a) General Rosumo (b) Enemy Strengths
Page 2.	Summary of Operations by Areas (a) Land (b) Sea (c) Air
Page 5.	Security and Censorship (a) Censorship (b) Souvenirs (c) Captured Documents (d) Prisoners of War (e) Japanese Classification of Information (f) Countering Rumours.
Page 7.	PW Reports, Captured Documents Etc. (a) Allied subs hamper enemy sea transport in Jap Waters (b) Despondent Note in Captured Jap Diary. (c) The training of Jap Naval Pilots (d) Propaganda - Philippines.

APPENDICES

- (a) Illustration - Japanese Landing Craft
- (b) Illustration - Japanese New Model Tank
- (c) Notes on Photographic Interpretation in NEW GUINEA.

Headquarters
Second Aust Army
7 Mar 44

Distribution

List "E"

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW CIRCULATION LIST

LIST 1

CS (Int) Adv LH	1 - 3	
CS (Int) LH MELBOURNE	4	
CS (Int) First Aust Army	5	
3 Aust Corps	6	
1 Aust Div (DRIS)	7 - 14 (inclusive)	also 133 and 134
CO 2 Aust Army Tk Bn	15	
AOIC SYDNEY (Pt Piper) (DRIS)	16	
Eastern Area RAAF	17	EDGECLIFFE
Southern Area RAAF	18	Staff Officer Intelligence
USAF Base Sec 7 SYDNEY	19	(RAAF HQ Southern Area, (Cnr St Kilda Rd & High St., MELBOURNE.
NSW L of C Area (DRIS) (including sub areas)	20 - 23	
CI Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School - SEYMOUR	24	
CI Second Aust Army Officers School - NARELLAN	25	
HQ 1 Aust Armcd Corps Trg Bde POKERUNYAL	26	
HQ 1 RAB Trg Centre WAGGA	27	
HQ Aust Central Sig Trg Depot BONEGILLA	28	
HQ 1 Aust Inf Trg Bde DUEBO	29	
HQ 2 Aust Inf Trg Bde BATHURST	30	
HQ 4 Aust Inf Trg Bde CONRA	31	
Arty Trg Centre GRETA	32	
AZEE Trg Depot INGLEBURN	33	
SYDNEY Fortress	34 - 36	PO Box 92 MANLY
KERBLA Fortress	37 - 39	PO Box 78 KERBLA
HQ VDC NSW	40	GPO Box 2595 EE SYDNEY
NEWCASTLE Fortress	41 - 43	PO Box 333 NEWCASTLE
GOC	44	
EGS	45	
"G" Branch	46	
DA & QM	47	
ERA	48	
CE	49	
CSO	50	
D/S	51	
DDME Major CROWLEY	52	
War Diary	53 - 54	
CS (Int) Ia	55	
GII	56	
GI	57	
CS (Int) Circulation	58	
Lt-Col G A K COHEN MLO SS Box 46 PO CANNERRA	59	
HQ VIC L of C	60 - 75	
incl -		
HQ Port Phillip FD		
HQ AA Defs Melbourne		
HQ No 7 Melbourne Sub area		
HQ No 8 Bullara " "		
HQ Corps VDC		
HQ AASC Trg Centre Bonegilla (Col Loveridge)	76	
SA L of C Area	77 - 106	
IO Research	107	
File	108	
Ia Air	109	
TAS L of C	110 - 121	
HAY and CONRA PW Ops	122 - 123	Address NSW L of C Area
MYRTLEFORD MURCHISON PW Camp		
Gp Tatura Internment	124 - 126	" VIC L of C Area
Loveday Internment Camp Group	127	" SA L of C Area
LH Small Arms School BONEGILLA	128	
1 Aust Parachute Bn AIF AUSTRALIA	129	
2 Aust Inf Special Trg Gp BATHURST	130	
57 AA(Comp) Regt AUSTRALIA	131	
2/8 Armcd Regt Australia	132	

PART I
INTRODUCTORY

(a) GENERAL RESUME

1. Following a naval bombardment US forces, against slight opposition, effected a landing at HYANE HARBOUR, LOS NEGROS ISLAND and subsequently occupied the MOMOTE airfield. Increasing enemy efforts, including the use of construction units, have failed to penetrate Allied defences.

Successful Allied occupation of LOS NEGROS ISLAND would provide facilities for further harassing the already precarious passage of supplies to enemy forces operating in the NE area.

2. Allied forces in the REIN BLY (NEW BRITAIN) area are continuing their Eastward advance against slight opposition. Enemy forces withdrawing from the ARRE area, are reported to be moving inland with the apparent intention of linking with Jap forces East of REIN BLY.

3. US troops supported by sea and air bombardment made an unopposed landing at YALAW PLANTATION (approximately 30 miles West of SAIDOR) on 4 Mar.

Following the capture of GABUHI, 11 miles WSW of SAIDOR, Allied offensive patrols have been operating to the NW and SE. Scattered remnants have been mopped up and enemy dead continue to be found.

4. Enemy shipping sightings in the NE area have been negligible. The fluctuation in barge and submarine sightings in RABUL HARBOUR would indicate that supplies built up at RABUL are being used and are transported to the forward areas by small craft.

5. The continued arrival of enemy shipping at HOLLANDIA suggests progress of the programme of development of a rear base at HOLLANDIA in view of the increasing vulnerability of WEWAK.

6. Strong air support has been afforded Allied forces operating in both the TOROKINI (BOUGAINVILLE) and LOS NEGROS ISLAND (ADMIRALTY GROUP).

7. Damaging strikes totalling 715 sorties were carried out against airfields, installations and shipping at RABUL.

8. In the North NEW GUINEA area Allied air effort has been mainly concentrated around HANSA BLY with an initial attack on airfields at HOLLANDIA.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTHS

9. NEW BRITAIN: There has been no change in estimated enemy strengths but the bulk of the force (3000) previously disposed West of TILASEA has now been withdrawn to the TILASEA - HOSKINS area. The total therefore in this area has been raised to 6000.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

(Reported between 1800 hrs 28 Feb 44 and 1800 hrs 6 Mar 44)

(a) LAND - NEW BRITAIN

10. NORTHERN COAST

Patrols operating in the REIN BAY area captured a heavy machine gun, ammunition and stores, and also found two barges in a serviceable condition on the beach.

On 28 Feb Allied sources reported concentration of enemy troops at MISSION house TAROBI (20 miles East MALALIA) and on 5 Mar the Jap garrison at ULAMONA (one mile SW UBILI) was reinforced by a force of 500.

11. SOUTHERN COAST

American patrols are extending NE and Eastwards from ARAWA and the area from the ITINI RIVER to as far East as the PULIE RIVER is now clear of the enemy. With the intention of cutting off enemy troops endeavouring to escape Eastwards, a US force landed 3 miles East of PULIE RIVER on 1 Mar 44 but found no enemy in the area.

A force of Japanese 100 strong withdrew from a position 3½ miles NW of MIO towards DIDROP.

On 29 Feb the main enemy force was reported to be located SW of DIDROP but information received from a reliable source indicated that all the enemy forces West of AMGORING were to withdraw along the North coast to RABAU whilst those East of AMGORING were to go to GASLATA.

12. ADMIRALTY ISLANDS - LOS NEGROS

At 0815L on 29 Feb 44 after a naval bombardment US forces landed against slight opposition on the Southern shores of HYANE HARBOUR and pressing inland captured and succeeded in establishing a perimeter around the MONOTE airfield.

Enemy resistance quickly stiffened to a strength estimated on 4 Mar to be three battalions of infantry, with machine gun companies, light artillery, mortars and tanks in support. Evidently the enemy is using every available man in an endeavour to dislodge the American force; one report stated that even labour personnel (armed with pikes) were operating in the front lines. However, all enemy counter attacks have been repulsed and the perimeter is still intact. US reinforcements have been landed and have somewhat eased the position of the holding force. Up to 4 Mar 700 enemy dead had been counted.

NEW GUINEA

13. Following the capture of GABUMI, US troops have been offensively patrolling the areas to the North, West and SE and mopping up remnants of the enemy found in these areas. The patrols are still finding dead Japanese along the various tracks but no report has been received of further enemy troop movement through TARIKINGAN. Any enemy endeavouring to pass through this village will not have an unmolested passage now as the natives at GWARAWON (5½ miles SSE TARIKINGAN) were on 2 Mar reported to be fighting the Japs.

Two enemy-employed natives captured at MAIBANG on 27 Feb reported much movement at night by road and barge to BOGADJIM. Another report was that YALAU Plantation was used as a barge point and that native carriers went from this point to MADANG.

This barge point has now been closed to the enemy by a landing by American troops on 4 Mar. The landing was made after an aerial and naval bombardment. Pilots of aircraft taking part reported that the landing was made without opposition.

US patrols have reported that the tracks ASANG to RAMBA (5 and 6 miles South of KEPLER PT) ASANG to BONEWENA (5 miles SSW KEPLER PT) show no signs of recent use.

14.

DUEPU

Patrolling continues in this sector. On 28 Feb a patrol reported enemy in strength at SAIPA 2.

(b) SEA - OPERATIONS

15.

Allied light naval units carrying out a patrol off RABAU on the night 29 Feb/1 Mar sank three of six enemy barges which were in convoy.

On the same night light naval units successfully bombarded CAPE ST. GEORGE, BORPOP RIVER and NAMATANAI in NEW IRELAND.

In the SOLOMONS, Allied PT boats made successful attacks against enemy barge traffic. While light naval units bombarded enemy positions on the Western coast of BOUGAINVILLE.

Allied light naval units gave support to the Allied landing at YALAU PLANTATION West of SAIDOR NEW GUINEA on 4 Mar.

Our surface craft also bombarded enemy gun positions on LOS NEGROS Island and the entrance to SEEDLER HARBOUR on 4 Mar. and SALAMI PLANTATION on 5 Mar.

SIGHTINGS

16.

SOLOMONS

With the exception of a possible gunboat in QUEEN CAROLA HARBOUR (North BUKA ISLAND) on 1 Mar all sightings reported from the SOLOMONS were either coastal barge or submarine traffic.

17.

NEW IRELAND

No enemy shipping was reported in KAVIENG HARBOUR on 27 Feb. On 29 Feb an unidentified vessel was sighted 50 miles ESE of KAVIENG and a large cargo vessel was observed stationary 30 miles NW of NAMATANAI. Other vessels sighted in NEW IRELAND waters were chiefly barges.

18.

NEW BRITAIN

Enemy shipping in the RABAU area remains practically unchanged. The latest ph. R on 4 Mar, revealed only twelve 600-700 ton cargo vessels and approximately 240 barges. Those figures are almost identical with those of 26 Feb. A decrease in the number of barges present may be due to incomplete coverage of KEPAVIA BAY on 4 Mar or use of those craft for coastal supply traffic.

Small merchant shipping has practically disappeared from around NEW BRITAIN, but barges and submarines are still active. Apparently these craft are furnishing supply requirements to the extent of their capacity.

19.

NEW GUINEA

Enemy barge activity along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA has been intensified during the past week, particularly between HANSA BAY and BOGADJIM. Ten to twenty of these craft were observed off BOGADJIM on 2 Mar. Other enemy shipping off the NE coast was limited to four medium vessels in WEWAK area on 24 Feb, five unidentified vessels moving West from the same base on 1 Mar and a vessel heading ENE from WEWAK on 29 Feb. A freighter of unspecified tonnage was in HANSA BAY on 26 Feb and a 6000 ton freighter off VANIMO on 4 Mar.

20.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Considerable enemy shipping activity continues in the HOLLANDIA Area. On 28 Feb 3 unidentified merchant vessels were sighted 30 miles North by East of HOLLANDIA moving West by North. On 29 Feb a five vessel convoy was sighted 40 miles West of HOLLANDIA on course NW. Four unidentified vessels, a large cargo vessel and a submarine were in HUMBOLDT BAY on 4 Mar. On 3 Mar a medium unidentified vessel and four small cargo vessels were sighted off CAPE D'URVILLE (210 miles WNW of HOLLANDIA) on a South Easterly course.

21.

NW SECTOR

Five possible 500-1000 ton "stack aft" vessels were sighted in SEMAOE STRAIT on 27 Feb. In the BANDA SEA six vessels were sighted 80 miles South of BANDA ISLAND on 29 Feb. Reconnaissance as far as MAKASSAR revealed no significant enemy shipping movement in that area.

(a)

AIR - OWN OPERATIONS

22.

SOLOMONS

Allied aircraft have again concentrated on enemy positions and troop concentrations in the areas SW of EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY carrying out 391 sorties. Sharp attacks were also made against the BUIH-FAISI area and BUKA. Barge sweeps along the West coast of BOUGAINVILLE resulted in damage to and destruction of 17 barges.

23.

NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY GROUP

The main roles of Allied aircraft in this sector were firstly "softening up" ops prior to the Allied landing on LOS NEGROS ISLAND and secondly support of ground troops after the initial landing. In all 252 sorties were made, destroying installations, stores and enemy positions. Enemy aircraft intercepted once losing 10 aircraft.

Attacks in NEW IRELAND were confined to the radar station at CAPE ST GEORGE, and BORPOP airfield. Barge sweeps on the East and West coasts resulted in the destruction of or damage to 9 barges.

24.

NEW BRITAIN

Although not on the same scale as the previous week, Allied attacks still remain heavy with the concentration of

effort in the RABAU Area.

During the week at least 713 sorties were made against LAKUNAI, TOBERA, the supply areas at VUNAPOPE, the township of RABAU, radar stations, gun positions at RALUANA POINT and shipping in KERA VIA BAY. Part of RABAU town was burnt out, over 120 buildings and warehouses were destroyed in the VUNAPOPE Area, heavy damage was caused at the airfields, 2 small ships, a small destroyer and many barges were at least damaged. The first reported use of rocket projectiles by Allied aircraft in the SWPA occurred in the raids on RABAU.

Strikes against barges and L of C around the coast resulted in the destruction of 3 barges and damage to a gunboat, 2 schooners and 7 barges or launches.

Light attacks were made on the radar station at ADLER BAY and in the GASHATA, CAPE HOSKINS and TALASEA Areas.

25. NEW GUINEA

The reported 814 sorties made by Allied aircraft show a slight increase on the previous week. Heaviest attacks were made at HANSA BAY, against supplies, personnel concentrated in the area, installations and airfields. The airfields in the HOLLANDIA area have lost their previous immunity from raids and were sharply attacked. Further harassing raids were made on TADJI, WEWAK, the ALEXISHAFEN-MADANG Area, and areas West of SAIDOR, destroying grounded Jap aircraft, supplies and inflicting casualties on enemy personnel. Close support was given to our troops at SAIPA 2 and MABELEBU on the BOGADJIM road.

26. NW SECTOR

Allied activity was on a very small scale. The only reported attacks were on WAINGAPOE, destroying buildings, and a strafing attack by Beaufighters on luggers and barges at ROTI ISLAND near KOEPANG, destroying a lugger and a boat and damaging 3 luggers and 4 barges.

27. ENEMY OPERATIONS

The enemy has taken little offensive action, his efforts being confined to two single aircraft attacks in the SOLOMONS.

Interception on a light scale took place once at each of the following places, RABAU, ADMIRALTYs and TADJI. Enemy aircraft losses were 35 aircraft including 16 destroyed on the ground.

SECTION XVI

SECURITY AND CENSORSHIP

28. CENSORSHIP

The examination of soldiers' mail by 1 Aust Fd Censorship Co during the past few months has disclosed a definite and steady improvement in the security-mindedness of soldiers.

In AMF Int Review No. 43 it was reported that, whereas in Aug 42 approx 8% of unit censored mail required further treatment by Fd Censorship Secs, the percentage had been reduced in Jan 43 to 5.3% and in May 43 to 3.2%.

Later figures show a further improvement. For the period Jan 44 to Feb 44, for example, the percentage was 1.56% - a very satisfactory figure.

Attempts to disclose unit locations and future unit movements are still the main trouble. These breaches of censorship are responsible for 55% of all excisions.

The improvement in the effectiveness of Unit Censorship appears to have resulted, in large degree, from:-

- (a) lectures by FS and Fd Censorship personnel;
- (b) the application of check censorship by Fd Censorship Dets as near as possible to the point of origin of letters, thus enabling prompt remedial action to be taken in units when breaches of Unit Censorship occur there.

Unremitting effort on the part of all concerned is still necessary not only to maintain the present standard but also further to improve that standard.

29. SOUVENIRS:

A recent FS report from the MADZAB area draws attention to the increasing co-operation by troops with the authorities in the matter of returning souvenirs through Intelligence channels.

It is clear from discussion with personnel returning from the RAMU VALLEY that troops have learned that souvenirs forwarded through Intelligence are reaching the addressees nominated.

In talks on Captured Documents and Equipment FS lecturers found that troops showed more interest in the topic "Procedure for Souvenirs" than in any other aspect of the subject.

30. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS:

A report from forward areas states that no documents of great importance have been found amongst those captured during the ORGORUNA operations, nor amongst those still being returned from the KANKIRYO area.

A Japanese diary found at KANKIRYO contained the following entry which offers a possible explanation:-

"All important documents are to be returned to the Coast by 20 Jan 44."

(Adapted from AMF Weekly Int Review No. 81).

31. PRISONERS OF WAR:

Japanese Intelligence regulations dated 10 Oct 43, and captured in the CAPE GLOUCESTER area in Jan 44, provide that PW are to be searched immediately by the troops effecting the capture, and deprived of whatever possessions, particularly documents, maps etc, that are found.

The PW and his possessions are then to be forwarded to Unit Headquarters for examination by the Intelligence Officer and then to Division Headquarters (Area Army). It is of interest to note that the instructions contain the following:-

"Punishment in this area is forbidden except in special cases".

32. JAPANESE CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION:

Enemy Intelligence regulations require that reports and messages will show the date on which information was received, its source, and degree of credibility. Reliability is classified as follows:-

- (a) Observations personally made, or information received from an especially reliable secret agent.
- (b) Information received from a comparatively reliable secret agent, and fairly certain.
- (c) Uncertain and obscure.

33. COUNTERING RUMOURS:

An effective method of countering rumours has been adopted at a US Bomber Group Headquarters. Just as the movie programme is about to commence, an announcement is made over the public address system as follows:-

"Regarding rumourhere are the facts....."

This is followed by a short talk on the dangers of spreading rumours, and any questions put by the audience are answered by the announcer.

(AMF Weekly Int Review No. 82).

SECTION XVIII

PW REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ETC.

34. ALLIED SUBS HAMPER ENEMY SEA TRANSPORT IN JAP WATERS:

Allied submarines are seriously impeding Jap sea transport in the East China and Yellow Seas, if cognisance is taken of a recent PW statement. The PW, who was captured in NEW BRITAIN on 30 Dec 43, said that owing to the activity of Allied submarines in Jap Home waters recruits were now taken from SHINOMOSEKI (Western tip of HONSHU IS - main island of JAPAN) to FUZAN (SE coast of KOREA) - a 120 mile trip across the Strait of Korea and thence by railway to HSUCHEW. (This constitutes a sea and rail journey of approximately 2120 miles). The PW said that this was necessary to avoid the dangerous crossing from SHIMONOSEKI to SHANGHAI. (If the sea route were used, the journey would be only 580 miles and very much speedier than travel on Chinese railways).

(IR 240).

35. DESPONDENT NOTE IN CAPTURED JAP DIARY:

Habitually Imperial Japanese HQ has endeavoured to safeguard the morale of the Jap civilian and soldier. Until the US operations in the Marshalls, Carolines and Mariannas, Tokyo Radio has been ever ready to tell the people of the smashing of the Allied sea and air fleets and the defeat of Allied land troops. Japanese news centres have been reluctant, until recently, to put the people and the soldiers "in the picture."

In the NEW GUINEA theatre, however, troops apparently have some form of "bush telegraph" which relays losses, to news and food starved troops. Instances of this form of communication were given in Second Aust Army Review No. 97. Enemy troops in forward areas, it has been observed, sometimes learn the news of defeats and further Allied landings some 3 to 5 days after their occurrence. Considering the distance these morale-breaking reports have had to travel, it must certainly indicate to Jap Staff Officers that bad news travels exceedingly fast, in the face of their complete restrictions on news of such nature.

In a diary (an extract of which is given below) recovered at KANKIRYO 1 Feb 44, news of the Allied landing at SAIDOR was anticipated before its actual execution. The short extract given below together with several received during the FINSCHHAPEN and RAMU operations, have indicated a growing distaste by the enemy to be sacrificed as human "guinea pigs" for Japan.

The diary recovered belonged to Sup Pte OSEKI of 78 Inf Regt (20 Div) and the following is a quotation dated 29 Nov 43.

"There is no force in the rear to relieve us. We (78 Inf Regt 20 Div) may be sacrificed in NEW GUINEA and a repetition of GUADALCANAL take place. An emergency plan has been drawn up for us to concentrate within 24 hours at YOKOPI in case the enemy lands behind us on the coastline and cuts off our rear!"

NOTE: The US landing at SAIDOR took place on 2 Jan 44.

36. THE TRAINING OF JAP NAVAL PILOTS:

A naval air pilot captured in HUON GULF on 22 Sep 43 gave interesting details of Jap air training both basic, intermediate and operational.

Basic or elementary training consisted of six months practical training. Trainees were taken up during elementary training in planes and given instructions in flying, landing, take off, night flying etc. Trainees were aloft about four times per day for flights of about 15 to 20 minutes. At the end of six months they would have about 100 flying hours to their credit.

Intermediate training: This followed the basic training period and lasted about 4 months during which time trainees added a further 70 - 80 hours to their credit. The methods were the same as in elementary training but more advanced.

Operational training: On completing the first two stages trainees entered this group as pilots. They commenced solo flying in more advanced types of aircraft. Operational instruction included special ground or base training, formation flying and aircraft carrier training.

The instructors were usually NCOs who had considerable flying experience. They were very strict and never seemed pleased with pupils.

When new pilots were first attached to an operational unit and also when they took part in their first night mission, they flew in formation with experienced flyers.

Medical Examination: Pilots were subjected to a strict examination. Most importance was attached to lungs, chest, eyes and nose, but all parts of the body were very thoroughly examined. Height and weight were considered most important. In the SWFA men were given

PT in the morning and afternoon.

Prior to an operational flight against Allied objectives, pilots and crews merely lined up in front of their planes just before taking off and received some last minute instructions.

General: The flying hours of the average Jap pilot in the SWPA was considered to be 1000.

PW stated that new pilots in SWPA flew with more experienced ones but if necessary would be sent out alone.

There were NO instructions as to how many flying hours a pilot had to have before being sent to an operational area. Men were sent as required. The PW had not heard of pilots with only 200 hours being sent to the SWPA.

Jap pilots were not thought to deteriorate after long service in the SWPA; on the contrary the PW thought as they were mostly young (between 21 and 23 years of age) they gained by longer periods of such service. Long rest hours at their base compensated for severe strain whilst on combat missions.

Reserve of Pilots: PW thought there were more pilots than planes in JAPAN, but this was certainly NOT the case in the SWPA.

The PW considered naval flyers superior to Army as it required more experience to navigate airplanes over sea or from carriers, whereas Army flyers flew mostly over land - Naval flyers received better pay and food than Army but the Army had a greater variety of planes and were stricter in discipline.

37. PROPAGANDA - PHILIPPINES:

According to a report from TOKYO Radio on 5 Feb 44, the TOJO Film Coy has completed a motion picture epic "Tear Down the Stars and Stripes". According to Domei Radio, Lt Gen NARA Akira attended the preview and made the following comment:-

"The film vividly brought back memories of the fighting against Corregidor fortress. As was already seen in the picture the Japanese forces fought against the US forces, but not against the PHILIPPINES. It was to be regretted that Jap forces were obliged to launch an attack against the Filipino, who resisted the Japanese under the instructions and oppression of US forces." The above remark was made by Lt Gen NARA with reference to the scene in the picture wherein Filipino mothers are seen broadcasting to their sons in the US forces to plead with them to cease resistance against the Jap forces. NARA concluded that "This picture should prove slightly popular among Filipinos when it is screened in the PHILIPPINES."

(It is quite likely that Lt Gen NARA's final utterance regarding its propaganda value in the PHILIPPINES will be a reasonably accurate appreciation.)

NOTE: Lt Gen NARA Akira was GOC 65 Bde in its PHILIPPINE campaign. The Bde figured together with other formations, in the successful attacks on BATAAN (Apr 42) and CORREGIDOR (May 42). Only 141 Inf Regt of 65 Bde has been identified in NEW BRITAIN. The remaining two regiments - 122 and 142 Inf Regts are thought to be in TRUK and PHILIPPINES respectively.

Lt Gen NARA did not come to the 8th Area Army theatre

Int Review No. 98

Page No. 10


but Maj Gen MATSUDA Iwao comd the defending forces (incl 141 Inf
Regt) in Western NEW BRITAIN.

K. H. Lee

Lt-Col
GS (Int)
SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY
7 Mar 44

APPENDIX
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
INTELLIGENCE
OP 7 MAR 1944

JAPANESE LANDING CRAFT



**DIAHATSU (Army)
Large LCG.**

Characteristics
Length 40-50 ft
Beam 10 ft (approx)
Height 8-10 ft
Draught 3-5 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



**TOKU DIAHATSU
Special Large M L C**

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large has been classified by the 82nd Airborne Division as a Special Large M L C. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



**YAMASEN (SAMPA)
Cargo Type Barge**

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel


This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



SHOHATSU (Small Type)

Characteristics
Length 30-35 ft
Beam 8-10 ft
Height 3 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



HYDROPLANE TYPE

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



TILLER TYPE

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



**COLLAPSIBLE RUBBER BOATS
(Large and Small)**

Characteristics
Length 30-35 ft
Beam 8-10 ft
Height 3 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



COLLAPSIBLE ASSAULT CRAFT

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



PICKET BOAT

Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.



MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT


Characteristics
Length 40 ft
Beam 10 ft
Height 8 ft
Draught 3 ft
Fuel 400 gal
Engine 100 HP diesel
Speed 10 knots
Capacity 100 personnel
Armament 1 7.7 mm machine gun
Construction Steel

This large is termed Type A Landing Craft (LCG) in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is a large Japanese LCG in the 82nd Airborne Division. It is considered that as the name DIAHATSU is common to reports made by these formations, the official designation should be DIAHATSU (Army) Large LCG.

ADV/MISC/1572


Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mtd. Lith. Sec. (AIF) Aust. S.

000958M




APPENDIX B
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY


INT. Review No. 98
OF 7 MAR 1944




The suspension is very similar to that of the Recent Model Tankette. It consists of 4 bogie wheels mounted in two pairs, a large rear bogie wheel returns the track, a front sprocket and two return rollers.



The gun mounted in the turret appears to be a 37mm. It is probable a co-axial M G is fitted, though no turret rear M G is visible. There is an M G mounted in the left front of the hull.




The maximum armour is considered to be approximately 16mm. An approximate ground clearance of 18" may be ascertained by knowing the height of the tank to be 7 ft.



The depth, width and straight uninterrupted lines, possibly indicate the vehicle to be an amphibious tank. A central hatch in the rear of the hull is possibly for engine inspection. An exhaust silencer high on the off rear indicates that it may be above a water line.

JAPANESE NEW MODEL TANK



Aerial photographs taken on 2 Nov 43 North of Sulphur Creek (South of Rabaul), show twelve Japanese tanks of a hitherto unidentified model. As the photographs are somewhat indistinct, only approximate details and diagrammatic sketches can be given. The diagrams are not intended to be technically accurate, but only to show the general appearance.

The possibility of this tank being amphibious should not be overlooked. The front of the tank is similar to other Japanese amphibious tanks and the general appearance suggests that it has been designed to give maximum volume and consequently good flotation. This assumption is supported by the fact that there appears to be an exhaust silencer mounted high on the offside rear.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	7 tons (approx)
Length	13 ft (approx)
Width	7 ft (approx)
Height	7 ft (approx)
Armament	A gun mounted in turret (possibly 37mm.) Possibly a co-axial mounted MG, and an MG mounted in left front of hull.
Armour (maximum)	16mm (approx)
Crew	3-4

Appendix "C"

NOTES ON PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION IN NEW GUINEA

Photographic interpretation is playing an increasingly important part in jungle warfare. Allied air superiority has driven the enemy to cover in every part of NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN where active operations are in progress. Stringent camouflage discipline has made Japanese L of C installations and defences most difficult to detect. The study of photographs, in conjunction with all other available Intelligence from documents, PW, visual sightings and known course of enemy movement has revealed important operational information on numerous occasions.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that photographic interpretation plays its fullest part only when all other Intelligence factors are borne in mind when interpretation is carried out.

The following notes make no attempt to deal fully with the subject but record points noted during recent operations in NEW GUINEA which, it is felt, may be of value to personnel dealing with photographs of similar terrain taken under similar operational conditions.

TOPOGRAPHY

REEFS

In vertical photographs coral formations are plainly visible except:-

- (a) When the surface of the water is badly ruffled by wind
- (b) When the surface of the water reflects light sufficiently to obscure observation of underwater detail.

The break of surf on a reef indicates that the reef is shallow.

In operations it has been found that it is safer to avoid the use of reef-fringed beaches even though passage to the beach appears adequate for landing craft. In an approach to such a beach, dangerous and often unsuspected underwater snags are commonly encountered.

SANDBANKS

The appearance of sand and gravel banks differs from reef, having a smooth and evenly textured surface as against the mottled appearance of coral. The sand edges are not definite.

BELCHES

Coral sand shows whiter on photographs than any other type.

On the R.I. Coast, from MASHING RIVER to just south of SILLUM, the beaches are composed of white loose water-worn pebbles varying in size from half an inch to six inches in diameter. On vertical photographs, these beaches appeared to be composed of sand, only low-level obliques showing their true composition. Barges found no difficulty in using the beaches. The beach surface was durable but there was no material binding the loose stones and for this reason it was necessary to use lift with four-wheel drive. Tracked vehicles picked up numbers of loose stones in the tracks when traversing such beaches.

It is common for sand beaches to form at the mouths of rivers.

RIVERS AND STREAMS

The obviously fast-flowing stream broken by rock obstructions has commonly proved fordable to both foot troops and jeeps. The bed is usually boulder-strewn with heavy gravel or rock bottom. The valley in which such a stream flows is usually steeply cut.

Tidal streams are frequently most easily forded on foot and by MT over the beach at the river mouth where a narrow shelf is often deposited by water action.

When streams follow a sluggish, meandering course, the depth is difficult to determine.

COMMUNICATIONS

SEA

Small freighters, luggers and barges are used by the Japanese to supply forward bases and barges for further distribution.

BARGE HIDEOUTS

The enemy takes all precautions against air observation of such hiding places which may be found in any stream negotiable by barges and under trees overhanging the coast. In some instances channels have been cut to gain access to streams otherwise barred.

The hideouts are disclosed on photographs by studying the area in conjunction with all other available intelligence. Track activity usually small in extent, but distinctive, reveals the location.

Camps and dumps are usually associated with barge hideouts.

ROADS

Black soil, unsurfaced, graded roads such as were encountered in the RAIN VALLEY usually showed on photographs white or light grey when dry and dark grey to black when wet.

Roads surfaced with coranus, owing to their coral content, appear on photos as an intensely white tone. Coral makes an excellent all-weather surface.

BRIDGES

Bridges built by the enemy are usually of wooden stringer construction.

TRACKS

Native tracks are found throughout NEW GUINEA ranging from hunting foot-paths to cut tracks made under Government supervision. Japanese normally use existing tracks, but when necessary cut their own.

Tracks through heavy timber are difficult to follow on photographs. However, the general route of main tracks can usually be found from the positions of villages, gardens and clearings, for these are normally located close to through tracks.

Tracks in tall grass sometimes give the impression of long trenches but the absence of excavated soil will often clarify the position. Trenches are usually in a zig-zag pattern.

Beds of gravelly streams have often been used by jeeps and heavier MT in dry weather.

Foot tracks also commonly follow the beds of such streams with an alternate track for use in flood time.

RESOURCES

FOODSTUFFS

The Japanese depend to some extent on local resources from native gardens and gardens which they plant themselves.

Native gardens vary considerably in layout in various districts of NEW GUINEA but are usually not regularly shaped nor geometrically divided. There have been a few cases of natives planting gardens on the European pattern, but these instances are rare and may be attributed to close mission influence.

Japanese gardens, indicative of the presence of camps, are regularly laid out in parallel lines having a "patchwork quilt" appearance on photographs.

DUMPS

Dumps of all types are generally located under heavy timber along established tracks and close to barge hideouts. Main factors enabling location are:-

- (a) Tracks
- (b) Locations in photos of wrecked barges and sighting of barges in specific areas.

None of these factors provides conclusive evidence but each must be considered in conjunction with other intelligence available.

Tracks which enter cover but do not apparently pass through, indicate the presence of enemy installations among which may be dumps and bivouacs.

ADMINISTRATION

CAMPS

These are always located under timber. Camps are indicated in photographs by tracks leading into the area. Huts or tents are sometimes seen. Camps concealed in heavy timber are often indicated by tracks skirting the edge of the timber. Tracks also skirt high kunai on occasions.

The enemy has on many occasions sought cover for bivouacs and dumps in coconut plantations. These do NOT afford adequate camouflage, tracks and activity beneath the trees are visible on photographs.

From the foregoing it will be seen that tracks are the main photographic guide to locating enemy activity. Generally speaking track discipline was good and indiscriminate making of tracks was avoided. The enemy was not usually confronted with the problem of concealing MT tracks.

TACTICAL

In examining photographs for defences it should be borne in mind that the Japanese invariably digs in and camouflages positions cleverly.

Platforms have frequently been constructed in trees for observation.

Use has been made of landslides to give a good field of fire for MG, mortar and Bren guns.

The chief weapons have been 75mm field guns, 37mm tank-attack guns, 70mm battalion guns, 20mm guns, mortars, HMGs (JUKI), LMGs and rifles. All these are easily concealed in jungle and their definite identification on photographs is difficult unless, as happened on a few occasions, they were sited in grass patches. This also applies to weapon pits or foxholes.

Tracks frequently enabled the location and reporting of areas of enemy activity, the siting of which indicated probable defences.

MG and SL are not normally camouflaged but alternative and dummy positions have been used. It is possible that in some cases, SLs are removed from their pits during daylight. SLs have, at times, been mounted on tracks.

Dummy personnel were also used by the enemy during recent operations in NEW BRITAIN.

(NGF Weekly Int Summary No.162)

SECRET

Copy No...39.....

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 99

(Based on information received from 1800 hrs 6 Mar 44 to 1800 hrs 13 Mar 44)

1. Recipients of this document will take special care to ensure the secrecy thereof.

They will also ensure that the contents of those portions sidelined are NOT distributed lower than Lt-Cols Comd.
2. Except as specified above, recipients may promulgate the contents for the information of all units; but in so doing, they must quote HQ Second Aust Army Int Review No. 99 and such sources as are acknowledged by HQ Second Aust Army.
3. A receipt for this summary is NOT required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.

CONTENTS

Page 1.	Introductory (a) General Resume (b) Enemy Strengths
Page 4.	Summary of Operations by Areas (a) Land (b) Sea (c) Air
Page 9.	Enemy Operational Bases, Works and Installations Development Enemy Airfields NW Sector
Page 11.	Security and Censorship (a) Care of Maps (b) Insecurity of Movement
Page 12.	PW Reports, Captured Documents Etc. (a) Jap Soldiers' Attitude to War (b) Jap News at Home and Abroad (c) Jap Survivors Cited for Sea Journey (d) Jap AA Criticised (e) Japs Misjudge US Marines.

APPENDICES

- (a) 7.92mm (.312 in) "CZECH" LMG (Bren Type)
- (b) Map PALAU IS Group

Headquarters
Second Aust Army
14 Mar 44

Distribution:

See over

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW CIRCULATION LIST

	<u>Copy No.</u>
GS (Int) Adv LHQ	1 - 3
GS (Int) LHQ	4
GS (Int) First Aust Army	5
GOC Second Aust Army	6
3 Aust Corps	7
1 Aust Div	8 - 9
NSW L of C Area	10
Vic L of C Area	11
SA L of C Area	12
Tas L of C Area	13
HQ VDC NSW	14
Sydney Fortress	15
Newcastle Fortress	16
Kembla Fortress	17
Arty Trg Centre GRETA	18
2/8 Armd Regt Australia	19
57 AA (Comp) Regt Australia	20
HQ 1 Aust Armd Corps Trg Bde Puckapunyal	21
HQ 1 RAE Trg Centre WAGGA	22
AAEE Trg Depot EGGLEBURN	23
HQ Aust Central Sig Trg Depot BONEGILLA	24
HQ 1 Aust Inf Trg Bde DUBBO	25
HQ 2 Aust Inf Trg Bde BATHURST	26
HQ 4 Aust Inf Trg Bde COWRA	27
2 Aust Inf Special Trg Gp BATHURST	28
1 Aust Para Bn (AIF) Australia	29
GS (Int) HQ Second Aust Army (Ia)	30
C1 Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School SEYMOUR	31
C1 Second Aust Army Officers' School WARELLAN	32
Eastern Area RAAF	33
Southern Area RAAF	34
USAFPE Base Sec 7 SYDNEY	35
Battle Board	36
Pilo	37
War Diary	38 - 39

PART 1

INTRODUCTORY

(a) GENERAL RESUME

1. Enemy resistance to the Allied extension of the beachhead at LOS NEGROS ISLAND, ADMIRALTY GROUP, is weakening. The whole of the Northern portion of the Island is under Allied occupation but small pockets of resistance West of PAPITALAI continue to hold out.

The US landing on 8 Mar at LOHERUM POINT on the NW shore of LOS NEGROS menaces enemy forces operating to the West of MONOTE airfield.

2. In the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY Area, BOUGAINVILLE IS the concentration of enemy force outside US perimeter presages an attack in strength.

3. Further US landings at VOLUPAI PLANTATION, TALASEA Area and at LINGA LINGA PLANTATION, ELEONORA BAY on the North NEW BRITAIN Coast have placed Jap forces evacuating Eastward from the REIN BAY Area, in a precarious position. American forces from VOLUPAI have occupied TALASEA and the enemy is reported to be withdrawing to the South.

Jap activity around the TOL - TORIU - UBILI Areas together with the withdrawal Eastward of enemy forces from both the North and South coasts suggest that the enemy is concentrating for a tight defence of the GAZELLE PENINSULA on ground that will be convenient for short supply lines as well as stiff defence.

4. The Allied advance along the RAI coast has been held up by strong enemy defensive positions on the Western bank of the KAMBARA RIVER.

The enemy abandoned two shore batteries, 44 barges and large quantities of medical supplies at MINDIRI - a possible pointer to deteriorating morale in the NE Area.

5. In the SOLOMONS and NEW BRITAIN Allied aircraft have been primarily engaged in -

(a) Countering enemy preparations for their threatened

attack on the CAPE TOROKINA perimeter BOUGAINVILLE IS.

(b) Strikes against Jap supply and administrative areas at RABAU.

6. The enemy's resumption of interception over HANSA BAY and WEWAK shows an employment of reinforced fighter strength in the HOLLANDIA-WEWAK Areas and is probably a natural outcome of the deteriorated situation (from the air aspect) in regard to RABAU and the ADMIRALTYs.

7. Jap air strength in the SWPA continues to decline. Estimates as at 10 Mar show a total of 601 compared with 902 on 15 Feb 44.

8. Shipping activity in the NE Area is still dormant but normal sightings are reported in the WEWAK-HOLLANDIA Area.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTHS

9. There has been no change in estimated enemy strengths in NEW BRITAIN but enemy withdrawals along the North and South coasts of the Island have caused a reassessment of area totals as well as the creation of a new garrison area at TORIU (30 miles SW RABAU - on NW coast NEW BRITAIN).

Due to the departure towards RABAU of the bulk of 17 Div 141 Inf Regt (65 Bde) and ancillary troops the enemy strength in the TALASEA - HOSKINS Area is now 1000 (-5000).

The UBILI garrison is being strengthened and now is estimated to be 1000 strong.

TORIU (30 miles NE of UBILI) has been garrisoned by 1000 troops. There is a track which the enemy has used extensively of late, from ZUNGEN POINT leading across NEW BRITAIN to TORIU, so it may be anticipated that the TORIU garrison will tend to further increase in strength.

At GASMATA, the withdrawal of the bulk of 54 Inf Regt (17 Div) and 2 Bn of 228 Inf Regt (38 Div) has reduced the previous estimate (3000) to 1000 troops. The RABAU garrison consequent to the reported influx of troops from Central and Western NEW BRITAIN has been increased in estimate by 6000. The new estimate is 46,000 troops.

The ADMIRALTY IS strength at 8 Mar was 2420 after a deduction

of 1380 known enemy killed.

In British NEW GUINEA the enemy strength estimate has been raised to 57,000. The increase of 6000 is due to reinforcements considered to have arrived in the area during Feb. Of the new arrivals 3000 troops were for 20 Div, 2000 troops for 51 Div and 1000 miscellaneous troops for HOLLANDIA.

The estimate for the HOLLANDIA - VANIMO Area is 5000 (up 1000). ATTAPE is believed to be the concentration point for 2000 of 20 Div reinforcements. Its strength estimate is therefore 2000.

Reinforcements (arrived Feb) for 51 Div in the WENAK - BUT Area have increased the strength of this base to 17,500.

Whilst HANSA BAY received 1000 of 20 Div reinforcements in Feb. it is now considered that 1500 of 20 Div remnants (previously carried in the HANSA BAY total) are still in MADANG. Consequently the HANSA BAY estimate has fallen by 500 to 11,000 troops and the MADANG estimate has been raised to 21,500.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

(Reported between 1800 hrs 6 Mar 44 and 1800 hrs 13 Mar 44)

(a) LAND - SOLOMONS

10. BOUGAINVILLE

Enemy activity against the TOROKINA perimeter has increased. From time to time Jap guns have shelled Allied positions, at first with very little success. During night 8/9 Mar the enemy opened a limited offensive and succeeded in breaking through the Eastern side of the perimeter, but was driven out on 9 Mar leaving 100 dead. Since then Japanese forces have been concentrating around the perimeter as though for a large scale attack. Enemy shelling has intensified against the aerodrome.

All intelligence reports to date suggest that the enemy in the South of BOUGAINVILLE is reduced to living "on his fat," and has not been able substantially to augment his stock of supplies and ammunition. His capability of staging an offensive of any weight seemed to be rapidly dwindling. His delay in attempting one seemed to suggest abandonment of the intention to do so, except for one cogent factor, viz: he was building and protecting a road from his Southern bases towards EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY.

If he is concentrating his forces from the South for an attack on the US perimeter, this therefore may well be a desperate measure which must be short lived unless complete success is gained very early. It would also represent another instance of the Jap local Commander proceeding doggedly with the original plan, notwithstanding changed circumstances, disrupted supply, and loss of air superiority.

However there is no clear evidence that the concentration is being built up only from the South. Indeed Jap troop movements reported East and NE of the US perimeter could be consistent with an approach from those directions. Possibly therefore the enemy is gathering everything he has got from all sides preparatory to a desperate attempt to evict the Allied forces from their TOROKINA air base.

11. CHOISEUL

A reliable report received on 10 Mar states that 500 Japs from CHOISEUL have been evacuated by barges to the BUIN-FAISI Area.

12.

NORTHERN COAST

WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA

At 1000 hrs 6 Mar American forces successfully landed near VOLUPAI PLANTATION on the West coast of WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA. The landing was made against slight enemy opposition and 12 Japanese were killed.

On the day following the landing, despite heavy opposition, the American forces succeeded in pushing forward and clearing the enemy from LITTLE MOUNT WORRI and during night 7/8 Mar occupied BITOKARA (1 mile NW TALASEA).

TALASEA airfield and WARU villages (1 mile West of TALASEA) were occupied on 8 Mar and LIAP (1 mile SE VOLUPAI) and TALASEA on 9 Mar. Enemy resistance apparently broke off at that stage and by 11 Mar US forces had reached BOLA (1½ miles WSW TALASEA) without making contact with the Japs, who are reported to be withdrawing to NUMUNDO PLANTATION (15 miles SSE TALASEA).

13.

ELEONARA BAY

US forces made a second landing along the Northern coast at LINGA LINGA PLANTATION on the South shore of ELEONARA BAY on 11 Mar. This force should cut off any Japanese now situated along the North shore of NEW BRITAIN West of the disembarkation point.

14.

REIN BAY

On 6 Mar a US patrol operating from IBOKI captured one Jap at TALIWAGA (6 miles SE of IBOKI).

15.

SOUTHERN COAST

A report received from native sources indicated that 1800 Japanese at KAMALGAMAN anchorage (2½ miles NNW CAPE JACQUINOT) were hastily constructing defence works.

Report received from reliable sources stated that all tracks from WIDE BAY to OPEN BAY were well covered by enemy forces and that small parties of Japanese were moving to TORIU (9 miles North OPEN BAY) from TOL (North shore of HENRY REED BAY).

A native report received on 11 Mar mentioned considerable enemy activity near KALAI PLANTATION.

American forces have made substantial advances Eastwards along the Southern coast and on 10 Mar were 27 miles beyond MOEWE HARBOUR. No resistance had been encountered.

A small Jap force is reported by natives to be holding GASHATA airfield with KALAGEN village and AGUR, GASHATA, DILILO and AWRIN ISLANDS (GASHATA Area) all free of the enemy.

16.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

LOS NEGROS IS

Despite fierce enemy resistance US forces consolidated their positions and pushing out succeeded in driving along the native skidway and reached the road junction to the North. Allied forces then moved Westward to SALAMI beach and to PORLAKA.

US troops gained PAPITALAI POINT (600 yds WNW PORLAKA) on 7 Mar. Some units continued their Northward drive through MOKERANG PLANTATION and by 11 Mar had reached the NW tip of the Island after encountering only minor opposition from the enemy.

Allied naval units assisted in the silencing of enemy coast guns at the entrance to SEEDLER HARBOUR and American forces with naval escort entered the Harbour and landed at LOMERUM POINT (1½ miles NW PAPITALAI) on 8 Mar. Dumps containing petrol and bombs were found in LOMERUM PLANTATION.

A small force of Japs are holding high ground West of PAPITALAI and despite US artillery bombardment were reported to be still in position on 11 Mar. (Late report: US attack ejected this enemy force).

Up to 2000 hrs 8 Mar 1579 Japanese had been killed on LOS NEGROS since the landing on 29 Feb.

17.

NEW GUINEA

RAI COAST

West of SAIDOR American forces on 11 Mar reached the East bank of the KAMBARA RIVER but were unable to cross the river owing to LMG SA and mortar fire from enemy located in defensive positions on the West bank.

Medical supplies, 2 shore batteries and 44 barges were left behind by the enemy at MINDIRI following a hurried evacuation.

On the inland tracks Allied patrols are mopping up enemy troops trying to escape Westwards.

18.

DUMPU

Australian patrols reported that Japanese are patrolling the SADDLE (2¼ miles WSW YOKOPI) and other forces are in prepared positions at MATALOI 1 and also occupying a feature 3400 feet high in position 3½ miles WSW DAUMONIA.

On 6 and 7 Mar our arty concentrated on enemy positions in WARDS Village (1¼ miles WSW SAIPA 2).

(b) SEA - OPERATIONS

19. Allied warships and light naval craft have been active against enemy small craft and shore targets in BOUGAINVILLE, NEW BRITAIN, WITU GROUP, LOS NEGROS ISLAND and NEW GUINEA.

In BOUGAINVILLE efforts were mainly directed against enemy positions in the TOROKINA area. An Allied warship also silenced an enemy battery at MUTUPINA.

An Allied light tank, being carried on a landing craft, sank an enemy troop laden barge off CAPE HOLLMAN (NEW BRITAIN) on 9 Mar. PT boats sank an enemy 750 ton cargo vessel one mile NE of LINDENHAFEN on the night 7/8 Mar.

PT boats also inflicted damage on enemy barges around CAPE GAZELLE and at JOHN ALBERT HARBOUR and GAROVE ISLAND.

On 7 Mar Allied warships shelled enemy positions on LOS NEGROS ISLAND and carried out minesweeping in SEEDLER-HARBOUR.

In NEW GUINEA, PT boats attacked ANGILA BAY (BOGIA), HANSA BAY, CAPE JUNG and CROISILLES, MADANG and ALEXISHAFEN. These attacks resulted in the destruction of enemy small craft and a fuel and ammunition dump. Return fire was experienced from CAPE CROISILLES but elsewhere no opposition was encountered.

20. SIGHTINGS

SOLOMONS

Enemy merchant shipping seems to have disappeared from SOLOMONS waters. The only activity reported from this area concerned submarine and coastal barge movement around BOUGAINVILLE.

21. NEW IRELAND

No enemy shipping movement has been reported from the NEW IRELAND area during the past week. KAVIENG HARBOUR was again reported clear of shipping on 8 Mar. Small scale barge activity has been observed around the coast of NEW IRELAND and MANUS ISLAND.

22. NEW BRITAIN

From the twelve 600-700 ton merchant vessels sighted in the RABAUL Area on 4 Mar enemy shipping had dwindled on 10 Mar to two similar vessels and approximately 400 barges. Elsewhere in NEW BRITAIN sightings were confined to coastal barge activity.

23. NEW GUINEA

Small merchant vessels of from 500 to 1500 tons continue to operate in the WENAK Area and along the coast to the West. Sightings are consistent with normal supply activity.

East of WENAK enemy coastal barge traffic continues.

24. DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Enemy shipping activity in the HOLLANDIA Area continues. The largest concentration was over the period 8/10 Mar when a freighter transport of 2-4500 tons, two "stack aft" vessels of 1500-2500 tons and a 7-10,000 ton tanker were sighted in the area.

25. PHILIPPINES

On 11 Mar an enemy naval task force comprising 2 battle ships, one heavy cruiser, an aircraft carrier and several destroyers were seen moving SW from a point 20 miles North of LUZON.

(c) AIR - OUR OPERATIONS

26. CENTRAL PACIFIC

Reports of American aerial activity in this area are not complete but continuous attacks are being delivered against the remaining Jap strongholds in the MARSHALLS namely TAROA, WOTJE, MILLE and ENIDJ and against PONAPE in the Eastern CAROLINES.

27. SOLOMONS

Allied air activity was characterised by particularly heavy attacks on enemy concentrations, gun positions and supply dumps forward of the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY perimeter and a heavy attack on embarkation points in NW CHOISEUL ISLAND. Of over 1100 sorties made, 929 were in the areas forward and SE of the Allied perimeter. Detailed results were not reported but target areas were well covered.

28. NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY GROUP

With the exception of 2 heavy attacks on PANAPAI and KAVIENG airfields by Liberators and Lightnings which rendered both airfields unserviceable, and a light attack on BORPOP, Allied aircraft have concentrated their attacks in support of operations in the ADMIRALTYS. The attacking aircraft made 115 sorties against LORENGAU, NDRILO, HAUWEI, BEAR and PITYILU IS, supply areas, and in close support of ground troops.

29. NEW BRITAIN

The Allied air effort has been stepped up to 1162 sorties in the NEW BRITAIN Area. In the vicinity of RABAU the weight of the attacks fell on the wharf and town areas destroying many buildings and stores although heavy damage was also caused to AA installations, LAKUNAI and TOBERA airfields, supply areas at VUNAPOPE and North of RABAU.

Strikes against shipping and barges particularly off the GAZELLE PENINSULA coast resulted in the destruction of 3 small vessels, at least 14 barges, 2 schooners and damage to 7 small vessels, 63 barges and launches.

Lighter, but effective attacks, were made on targets in JACQUINOT BAY, at TALASEA, GASMATA and CAPE HOSKINS.

30. NEW GUINEA

Allied aircraft made 427 sorties during the week. The airfields and installations in the WEWAK and HANSA BAY Areas received the main weight of the attacks and heavy damage was caused to grounded aircraft, stores, AA positions and the runways. Strikes against shipping between WEWAK and HOLLANDIA resulted as follows:- sunk 1 freighter (2000 tons), 1 tugboat, damaged 2 stack aft vessels (500 and 1500 tons), 1 freighter transport, 6 barges and luggers. The remainder of the attacks were sharp blows at REMPI MISSION (near ALEXISHAFEN), ATEMBLE, AIYAU, in the YALAU Area, and KRONPRINZ HARBOUR.

Patrolling fighters destroyed 8 enemy aircraft in the general WEWAK Area apart from 31 destroyed intercepting Allied raiding missions.

31. NW SECTOR

Allied activity was restricted to attacks on TOEAL, the barge dispersal areas at SAUMLAKI, TIMOERA, KAINANA and BABO by Beaufighters, Mitchells and Catalinas. Air reconnaissance is still the major role of Allied aircraft in this Sector.

32. ENEMY OPERATIONS

Despite 2 further Allied landings and extension of operations in the ADMIRALTYS and on the RAI coast, the enemy has shown little reaction in the air. The only reported raids were 2 in the SAIDOR Area and one each at LOS NEGROS IS and KIAIPIT - little or no damage or casualties were caused.

Defensively the enemy has been more active, intercepting once over RABAU and HANSA BAY and three times over the WEWAK Area, but suffered the loss of 50 aircraft, a very high proportion of the intercepting fighters. An additional 5 aircraft were destroyed and at least 35 damaged on the ground.

Evidence of the enemy's watching role in the NW Sector is given by indications of unidentified and enemy aircraft NW of DERBY, over MERAUKE and NE of DARWIN.

SECTION VI

ENEMY OPERATIONAL BASES, WORKS AND INSTALLATIONS

REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT OF ENEMY AIRFIELD GROUPS IN NW SECTOR

33. The initial stages of the enemy offensive in both NE and NW Sector were characterised by the seizure of, and consolidation on established airfields strategically located on the axes of his advance. When the enemy was forced on the defensive, he commenced, towards the end of 1942, the development of strong airfield groups and is still extending and furthering those groups.

Development of airfields on this principle has given fluidity of movement for transport supply, equipment, and operations, and enables a rapid concentration of maximum strength at any one given group for offensive or defensive purposes.

In NW Sector the enemy has developed a series of airfield Groups as under.

34. AMBON GROUP

This group consists of 7 operational airfields namely LAHA, LIANG, AMAHAI, KAIRATOE, HAROEKOE, OLD NAMLEA and NAMLEA. Development and constructional work is still going on. The group, lying midway between CELEBES and DUTCH NEW GUINEA occupies a key defensive position and further development is likely. AMBON in addition to its value as an air base has a high value as a naval, trans-shipment and supply base resulting from good port facilities and extensive and safe anchorages.

35. KAI - AROE ISLANDS

It was not until forced on the defensive that the enemy commenced airfield construction in Mar 1943 and at present has 8 airfields in the Group - 2 at DOERA, one each at LANGGOER, FAAN, DOELAN and LETFOEAR (KAI IS), and DOKA BARAT and TRANGAN (AROE IS). There is also a seaplane base at TABERFANE.

The group, being only slightly further from DARWIN than FUIORO, is well placed for staging attacks on the DARWIN Area, and patrolling our sea lane thereto. Its strategic position makes it the enemy's first line of defence against attack on AMBON and HALMAHERAS from the South and on the airfields on the South coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA from the East and the SE.

36. TIMOR GROUP

On occupation, the enemy gained 2 airfields namely PENFOEI and DILLI which were developed and improved. Group development commenced in June 43 firstly by building 3 satellite fields around FUIORO and secondly by construction of a further 3 airfields around KOEPANG. Concurrently the old Dutch ELG at ATAMBOEA was extended and made serviceable and another ELG was built on ROTI ISLAND.

Although the prime function of the 2 groups appears defensive the lack of revetments and dispersal facilities compels the conclusion that the enemy is counting on the inability of the Allies to put all the airfields in the area out of action rather than the defensive strength of each individual group of airfields. In view of this, construction of further airfields must be expected in the numerous suitable sites available. These 2 groups form another first line of defence to possible Allied Northward moves.

37. DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Development of airfields was slow, and up till Dec 1943, 7 scattered airfields were operational namely, BABO, TIMOEKA, WAKDE; HOLLANDIA, UTAROM, NABIRE and JEFMAN IS. It was not until Dec 43-Jan 44 that the Group principle appeared in the MANOKWARI - BABO Area with the urgent preparation of 4, possibly 5, additional airfields within a radius of 70 miles. The MANOKWARI Group is the most important and is being rapidly built up as a strong rearward base. There have been indications that MANOKWARI falls into much the same class as AMBON and KAOE BAY (HALMAHERA) in the enemy plans for strengthened defence of the Sector SE to SSE of DAVAO.

All the airfields in DUTCH NEW GUINEA occupying as they do a "crossroads" location from DAVAO to the South coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA are in a useful position for staging airplane traffic.

The recent burst of activity in the MANOKWARI GROUP may be the forerunner of similar activity on the VOGELKOP Peninsula - GEELVINK BAY Area.

38. HALMAHERA

Since Oct 1943, 4, and possibly 2 more, airfields have been constructed around KAOE BAY and possible strips have been reported at (a) MOROTAI IS, (b) BOELI BAY and (c) BISA IS.

The KAOE BAY Group is an intermediate staging base between the present front line and the PHILIPPINES and recent activity in the Bay leaves no doubt that much effort is being invested there to develop this strategic area.

39. CELEBES

The most important airfield in the CELEBES is located at KENDARI which has been developed as a rearward base becoming a busy staging and repair centre. The Japs have improved 3 airfields in the vicinity of MACASSAR and reports suggest that airfields at MALIMPOENG (97 miles N of MACASSAR) and PALOE (in West centre of CELEBES) are possibly operational. There are also 2 airfields at the NE tip of CELEBES

which are regarded as serviceable.

The Groups of airfields are not only important for the defence of the CELEBES itself but form part of the staging route to JAVA. In view of the strategic position of the CELEBES the construction of further airfields is to be expected and may be in hand at the many known suitable sites.

40. BORNEO

At present, only 4 possibly 9 of the 13 or 14 airfields which existed in BORNEO before Japanese occupation are believed to be militarily operational. In addition the Japs are understood to have constructed 6 airfields strategically placed in the NE section of the island, within a range of 600 miles from known airfields in the PHILIPPINES. It is probable that further airfields are under construction.

The airfields along the East coast are part of the alternative route from the PHILIPPINES to JAVA - SUMATRA. Those in the NE provide a satisfactory basis for a strong operational and/or defensive group but those in the South are scattered.

41. JAVA

At the time of Jap occupation 89 airfields are known to have been in existence. 12 of these are believed operational but only 2 have been photographed, viz: TADJEONG PERAK (SOERABAYA) and MALANG (50 miles South of SOERABAYA) where runways have been lengthened and it can be assumed that the enemy will defend the bases strongly in this part of NEI.

The economic wealth of JAVA makes it the chief prize of the NEI. Excellent communications give greater scope for large scale defence and as a result the enemy is expected, if he has not already done so, to organise a system of airfield groups there.

Other minor groups exist at SELARU (TANIMBAR IS), BOELA (CERAM) and what are known as the LESSER SOENDA airfields in the FLORES Area. These too, play an important part in the Jap scheme of defence but their roles are minor compared with the aforementioned groups, as they are mainly used as ELCS, reconnaissance and staging bases or for defence of purely local targets. Further development is possible in these areas.

(Adapted from AAF Int Sum 188)

SECTION XVI

SECURITY AND CENSORSHIP

SECURITY - CARE OF MAPS

42. Reference was made in AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No.72 to the capture of Japanese maps which were obviously stencilled reproductions of two of our maps.

The story as to how our maps fell into Japanese hands in the first place now appears in a captured Japanese document, translated in ATIS SWPA Bulletin No. 764, which reads -

" Commendation"

2nd Lt OTSUBO, Hirotochi of 7 Coy 79 Inf Regt.

On commencement of Div combat at ARNDT and JIVEVANING Area on 14 Oct 43 the abovenamed was ordered to recon-

noiter the high ground West of ARNDT, and to occupy all key positions. While on his way to his objective with his pl, he encountered some enemy officers at close range. An attack was immediately carried out as a result of which three enemy officers were killed in action. From the dead bodies, he captured 2 detailed maps (scale - 1/25,000, 1/65,000) of this battlefield and 1 aerial photograph.

During the NEW GUINEA operations, inaccurate maps with a scale of 1/250,000 were being used by us. Consequently, those maps captured by 2nd Lt OTSUBO are a great contribution to our future plans and operations.

I hereby present him with a dagger in recognition of his distinguished services.

Dated 15 Oct 43
20 Div Comdr
Lt-Gen KATAGIRI, Shigoru!

INSECURITY OF MOVEMENT

43. The need for the exercise of greater care in checking personnel on drafts is illustrated by the escapades of an Australian youth who, on three occasions, travelled without authority from the mainland to forward areas in NEW GUINEA.

In Aug 42, whilst AWL from a training camp, he went to NORTH Q'LAND by train, and thence to NEW GUINEA by boat. He was apprehended at EFOGI by the Field Security Wing, and returned to the mainland where he was tried and fined by Court-Martial. Again in May 43 he travelled to NORTH Q'LAND and there told an officer that he desired to rejoin his unit in NEW GUINEA as he was AWL. He again landed in NEW GUINEA and proceeded to forward areas on foot. He was returned to his unit and discharged.

Later, dressed as a Lieutenant, and using the excuse that he wanted to rejoin his unit, he travelled by air to NEW GUINEA and by plane, invasion barge and hitch-hiking again entered forward areas. He was arrested and admitted to hospital but escaped and returned to a forward area. On this occasion he was arrested, returned to BRISBANE and prosecuted.

(SEE WEEKLY INT SUMMARY No. 83)

SECTION XVIII

PW REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ETC

JAP SOLDIERS' ATTITUDE TO WAR

44. In a litany of castigations against Americans in general, "Nippon Times" on 3 Mar 44 per medium of TOKYO Radio said that in contrast with US troops, Japanese soldiers "knew what they were fighting for."

Judging from PW statements there must be a certain percentage of Japanese who have a very sketchy idea of what JAPAN's war against the Allies is all about. Below are some extracts on the subject chosen from the latest Interrogation Reports.

A PW captured at LAE 30 Oct 43 said that "he did not like war, and thought that countries should live at peace. He did not particularly care whether JAPAN won or lost this war. He also added that he thought that JAPAN's war with CHINA was to exploit CHINA's wealth. He considered JAPAN was wrong and compared her to thief."

Many PW have summed up their feelings towards war in the belief that war is futile and that they wished for a speedy conclusion. Most PW do not want to return to JAPAN. This feeling is brought about by fear of the consequences to themselves and relatives and possibly aided by surprised gratitude that they have NOT been tortured or killed as they were led to expect.

One PW captured at SAIDOR on 3 Jan 44 said that as far as he was concerned, there was no sense in arguing the pros and cons of present war. Troops were simply ordered to do a job and there was no room for argument. He certainly had a practical view and did not waste words in useless argument.

A PW who surrendered at TAUALI (9 miles SW of CAPE GLOUCESTER) on 30 Dec 43 had a realistic image of JAPAN's War Policy. Amongst other things he said that Jap diplomats were at fault and that he had never accepted the Jap Government version of reasons leading up to the outbreak of the G.E.A. War.

Chiang Kai Shek was blamed by one PW for the outbreak of the CHINA war - rather an elastic stretch of imagination.

JAP NEWS AT HOME AND ABROAD

45.

A PW captured 18 Sep 43 made some pertinent comments on methods of news distribution to the fighting troops and Japanese civilians. The PW was a Superior Pte and had been in CHINA with 41 Div which at present has been given the unenviable task of defending MADANG.

The PW under interrogation said that when in CHINA (middle of Jul 42) he had seen a Japanese "News Sheet". It chiefly concerned events in CHINA and seldom had any reference to the G.E.A. War.

Since his arrival in NEW GUINEA (24 Feb 42) there had been no organised attempt to distribute either home or war news except for an occasional announcement by the Coy O.C. From this source he had heard of the destruction of 8 Jap destroyers and 8 transports in the BISHAROK SEA Convoy and the heavy loss of life in 115 Replacement Regt which was from his district of GUMMA Ken (14 divisional district prefecture).

In JAPAN, generally only good news was published, although immediate relatives of men discharged minus legs and arms, might have been told something of the true situation. Prior to discharge men were warned NOT to refer to their experiences nor to military operations.

The Japanese public would probably abide by the decisions of Military leaders although some older people might possibly wish JAPAN to quit the war when they heard of the reverses suffered.

Whilst the general public of JAPAN still trusted TOJO, he was not a particular favourite of the fighting troops in NEW GUINEA. They considered him a poor strategist and based their criticisms on his conduct of the NEW GUINEA campaign.

Comment - Just as news of losses and disasters have filtered through to the forward troops despite the enemy's cordon of restrictions, so also, it is possible that repatriated troops will furnish the people of JAPAN with disturbing facts. The long war in CHINA, with its military obligations and consequent restrictions of food and clothing,

aroused the people to complain in 1941, but the early successes of the G.E.A. War pacified them. Now the tide of success is on the ebb, and the Jap public may begin to hear about it from returning soldiers.

JAP SURVIVORS CITED FOR SEA JOURNEY OF 96 MILES IN 31 DAYS

46. TOKYO Radio on 3 Mar 44 announced a citation issued by the Comd of Japanese Forces in the Southern Regions, commending the Color Guard of an Endo Unit for exceptional valour in defending Regt colors.

TOKYO Radio painted an extravagant picture of the heroism of the Color Guard who successfully escorted the Regt colors in a small boat after their transport had been sunk in an attack by "more than 100 aircraft." The transport was engaged with several others in running reinforcements and supplies to LAE in Mar 43. (The attack occurred on 3 Mar 43 off CAPE CRETIN, SE tip of HUON PENINSULA).

The lifeboat carrying the colors was strafed by MG on 4 occasions. Col ENDO and Lt KONDO were killed. The remainder of the party safely landed 10 kilometers West of CAPE MERKUS (ARAWA Area NEW BRITAIN) 31 days after taking to the lifeboat.

The citation described the color party's outstanding service as a "paragon for Imperial Soldiers."

Comment - Col ENDO Torahel was Comd 115 Inf Regt. The ill-fated BISMARCK SEA convoy which was completely smashed during 3 - 6 Mar of last year was carrying replacements for 66, 102, 115 Inf and 14 Pz Arty Regts of 51 Div. Some survivors landed in NEW GUINEA, NEW BRITAIN, the De ENTRECASTEAUX and KIRIWINA Groups. Those that landed in Allied territory were captured or killed but a number were absorbed in the garrison forces at GLOUCESTER and ARAWE.

The incredible thing is that whilst the lifeboat was launched off CAPE CRETIN (then held by the enemy) and the objective of the convoy was LAE, the crew went in the opposite direction to CAPE MERKUS (a journey of 96 sea miles), finally reaching land 31 days later, and were cited for their valour.

JAP AA CRITICISED

47. A PW from 238 Inf Regt which was stationed in the WEWAK Area during Feb - Jun 43, stated that although there were numerous AA guns around WEWAK, AA fire was very inaccurate, probably due to inexperienced gun crews, plus the fact that Allied planes were too fast. The PW had not seen one hit registered.

(I.R. 234)

JAPS MISJUDGE US MARINES




48. A PW of 141 Inf Regt (65 Bde) captured at TARGET HILL by US troops on 7 Jan 44, said that his countrymen were under the impression that the US troops landing at GLOUCESTER were short of weapons. It was considered that the Jap forces at GLOUCESTER would have an easy time driving them out, but were disagreeably surprised to find the Americans well armed. The landing of tanks and heavy arty came as a shock.

Adlyce
Lt-Col
GS (Int)
SECOND AUST ARMY
14 Mar 44

7.92mm (.312in) "CZECH" LMG (BREN TYPE)

USED BY THE JAPANESE


APPENDIX A
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
INT Review No. 99
OF 14 MAR 1944



INDEX TO ANNOTIONS

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 Receiver | 13 Ejection opening |
| 2 Magazine opening cover | 14 Piston head |
| 3 Gas ports | 15 Butt plate lug |
| 4 Foresight and block | 16 Butt |
| 5 Cocking handle | 17 Breech block |
| 6 Cocking handle slide | 18 Barrel locking nut |
| 7 Carrying handle | 19 Barrel |
| 8 Ejection opening cover | 20 Butt group |
| 9 Butt strap and plate | 21 Return spring |
| 10 Return spring retaining nut | 22 Return spring rod |
| 11 Butt plate buffer springs | 23 Flash eliminator |
| 12 Piston post | 24 Bipod |

APPENDIX B
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
INT Review No. 99
OF 1 1 MAR 1944



Copy No. 59.....

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 100

(Based on information received from 1800 hrs 13 Mar to 1800 hrs 20 Mar 44)

1. Recipients of this document will take special care to ensure the secrecy thereof.

They will also ensure that the contents of those portions side-lined are NOT distributed lower than Lt-Cols Comd.

2. Except as specified above, recipients may promulgate the contents for the information of all units: but in so doing, they must quote HQ Second Aust Army Int Review No. 100 and such sources as are acknowledged by HQ Second Aust Army.
3. A receipt for this summary is NOT required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.

CONTENTS

Page 1.	Introductory (a) General Resume (b) Enemy Strengths
Page 4.	Summary of Operations by Areas (a) Land (b) Sea (c) Air
Page 10.	Security and Censorship (a) Rumours (b) Censorship (c) Impersonation of Officer
Page 11.	PW Reports, Captured Documents etc. (a) Enemy Intentions SWPA (b) The Jap soldier as seen by his prisoner.

APPENDICES

- (a) Jap Oil Transport Position as at 1 Jan 44.
- (b) Use of Fishing boats in NEW BRITAIN Area.
- (c) Map - Enemy Air strength Far East and Pacific Theatres.
- (d) Jap Picket boat - drawing and details.
- (e) Jap 75mm HE Shell - Hollow charge - illustration and details.
- (f) Jap new improved hand Grenade - illustration and details.
- (g) Barge concealment methods - drawings.

Headquarters
Second Aust Army
21 Mar 44

Distribution

(See over)

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW CIRCULATION LIST

	<u>Copy No.</u>
GS (Int) Adv LHQ	1 - 3
GS (Int) LHQ	4
GS (Int) First Aust Army	5
GOC Second Aust Army	6
5 Aust Corps	7
1 Aust Div	8 - 9
ESW L of C Area	10
Vic L of C Area	11
SA L of C Area	12
Tas L of C Area	13
HQ VDC NSW	14
SYDNEY Fortress	15
NEWCASTLE Fortress	16
KEMBLA Fortress	17
Arty Trg Centre GRETA	18
2/8 Armd Regt AUSTRALIA	19
57 AA (Comp) Regt AUSTRALIA	20
HQ 1 Aust Armd Corps Trg Bde PUCKAPUNYAL	21
HQ 1 RAE Trg Centre WAGGA	22
Arty Trg Depot INGLEBURN	23
HQ Aust Central Sig Trg Depot BONEGILLA	24
HQ 1 Aust Inf Trg Bde DUBBO	25
HQ 2 Aust Inf Trg Bde BATHURST	26
HQ 4 Aust Inf Trg Bde COMRA	27
2 Aust Inf Special Trg Gp BATHURST	28
1 Aust Para Bn (AIF) AUSTRALIA	29
GS (Int) HQ Second Aust Army (Ia)	30
CI Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School SEYMOUR	31
CI Second Aust Army Officers' School NARELLAN	32
Eastern Area RAAF	33
Southern Area RAAF	34
USAFCE Base Sec 7 SYDNEY	35
Battle Board	36
File	37
War Diary	38 - 39
Second Aust Army HQ Distribution	40 - 41

PART 1

INTRODUCTORY

(a) GENERAL RESUME

1. Anticipated large scale enemy attacks against the Allied perimeter at CAPE TOROKINA, BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND, materialised during the week. The enemy succeeded in penetrating US defences but successful counter attacks restored the Allied line. The enemy is reported to be regrouping for further attacks. He suffers the disadvantage of having no air support whereas his artillery is subjected to an effective hammering by Allied aircraft.
2. Withdrawal of enemy forces towards the GAZELLE PENINSULA, NEW BRITAIN, continues. On the WILLIAUMEZ PENINSULA Allied forces are gaining ground. US patrols to GASHATA and adjacent islands confirmed a previous report that the enemy had evacuated the area.
3. On LOS NEGROS ISLAND pockets of enemy resistance continue to hold out SW of HOMOTE and in the PAPITALAI Area.

US forces landed on and occupied HAUWEI ISLAND on 13 Mar thus removing the threat to Allied surface vessels entering SEEADLER HARBOUR. On 15 Mar a further landing was made at LUGOS PLANTATION, MANUS ISLAND and by 17 Mar both the LORENGAU airfield and village were in Allied hands.

All strategic areas in the ADMIRALTY GROUP are now under Allied control. Jap remnants, although still capable of organised resistance, must meet an inevitable end.

4. On the RAI coast, American forces are still held up by strong defences on the Western bank of the KAMBARA RIVER. A US patrol moved by boat past the next two river mouths GUASE and KABENAU and landed at MELAMU PLANTATION. An Aust patrol (one of apparently three operating from DUMPU in the rear of Jap forces in the KAMBARA RIVER Area) met the American patrol on 17 Mar in the vicinity of MELAMU PLANTATION. There is no news yet of any further movement of American troops by water round the Jap KAMBARA RIVER positions.

5. In the RAMU area, Allied activity has been confined to patrolling.
6. Shipping sightings in the WEWAK - HOLLANDIA area have increased and may possibly be linked with the reported movement of 36 Div from NORTH CHINA via the PHILIPPINES into North and NW NEW GUINEA.
7. Being unable to operate shipping in NE waters the enemy must be drawing heavily on existing reserves of supplies for the maintenance of forces in the SOLOMONS, NEW IRELAND and NEW BRITAIN areas. Allied air forces have accordingly turned heavy strikes throughout the NE area on enemy supply dumps and installations. Stores areas, warehouses and dock installations at RABAU have suffered considerably from consistent attacks.
8. Air attacks against WEWAK have intensified. A total of 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on installations, airfields and supply areas during the week, causing heavy damage.
9. Effective air strikes on enemy shipping in Northern NEW GUINEA waters have resulted in the loss of 3 destroyers and 2 medium freighters and damage to 7 freighters.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTHS

10. The enemy is rapidly stepping up his troop strength in the NW Sector, particularly in the PHILIPPINES and along the North coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

The estimated enemy strength in the NEW BRITAIN Area has undergone little change. The troop strength at RABAU is now assessed at 45000 (down 1000). JACQUINOT BAY (100 miles SSW of RABAU) on the Central South Coast is being strengthened up to a probable 1000 troops.

In the ADMIRALTY, after allowance for 2000 known dead (up to 18 Mar), the enemy strength has fallen to 2000.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA (incl HOLLANDIA - VANIMO garrisons) has been strengthened by an estimated 5000 troops. The total is 62,000.

MADANG, due to the departure of 1500 troops of 20 Div Inf to HANSA BAY, has now 20,000 troops whilst HANSA BAY is occupied by

12,500 troops (plus 1500).

Due to the arrival of elements of 36 Div (ex North CHINA via PHILIPPINES) plus airfield construction and L of C troops, the estimated enemy strength in the HOLLANDIA - VANIMO Area has been raised 5000 to 10,000 troops.

Further garrisoning of the North coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA is in progress. The arrival of an estimated 1500 troops of 36 Div has raised the estimated enemy strength along the North coast to 10,000. SORONG, NABIRE and SARMI are each garrisoned by 1000 troops. There is also evidence of the presence of a major formation HQ at MANOKWARI.

Enemy troop strength in the PHILIPPINES is estimated at 70,000 and includes 16 Div, the bulk of 36 Div (destined for NW NEW GUINEA coast). The addition of 10,000 troops in the PHILIPPINES is due to the presence of 30 IHB - considered in the area.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

(Reported between 1800 hrs 13 Mar and 1800 hrs 20 Mar. 44)

(a) LAND - SOLOMONS

11. BOUGAINVILLE

The long expected Japanese offensive against the TOROKINA perimeter is in full swing. The enemy penetrated the perimeter on a number of occasions but US counter attacks, in which tanks were used, restored the line to its original position. Artillery duels were a feature of operations. Enemy guns attempted to neutralise the airfields. Allied counter battery fire however, plus direct air support, gained a heavy advantage.

NEW BRITAIN

12. NORTHERN COAST

On 12 Mar 44 it was reliably reported that approx 200 Japs were at SENGI (7 miles SSE WALO), foodless and living from native gardens.

A native report received on 14 Mar stated that 180 poorly-equipped Japs had passed through EA-EA (2 miles South East CAPE DESCHAMP) from TAL-SEA on their way to PONDO and that more were following. Another report informed that the Japanese were concentrating large numbers of carriers at CAPE BOSKINS in anticipation of a move to BIALLA PLANTATION (15 miles NE BANGULA BAY).

In the WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA US forces are still advancing and have occupied all villages along the East coast as far South as PATANGA and on 15 Mar were in contact with the enemy between PATANGA and KILU (9 miles SSE TAL-SEA). One patrol penetrated as far down as NUHUNDO PLANTATION on 15 Mar without contacting any of the enemy.

Patrols are maintaining contact in the ELEONARA BAY Area.

13. SOUTHERN COAST

Following an unconfirmed report that the bulk of enemy located at GASHATA had left on 14 Mar, an American patrol landing on the coast found no Japs, but discovered 30 enemy destroyed planes from which all armament and instruments had been removed. The strip was in a fairly good condition.

Another patrol landing on GASHATA, AWRIN and AVAHIN ISLANDS did not observe any enemy but found many abandoned defence positions.

From ARAWE comes the report that a patrol on its way to LAHAGAI (20 miles ENE DIDMOP) killed 3 Japs at VAKAN (14 miles ENE DIDMOP). An unconfirmed native report of a large number of the enemy at AUGITHI (6½ miles North LAHOGAI) has been discounted.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

14.

LOS NEGROS

On LOS NEGROS operations appear to be progressing. The whole of the area North of the skidway and East of a line South from PAPITALAI is in Allied hands.

The enemy is strongly resisting in positions 3 miles SW HOMOTE, 1-1/3 miles SW and 2300 yds West PAPITALAI Village, 350 yds South PAPITALAI Mission and 1/2 mile South of LOMBRUM POINT.

On 17 Mar US troops attacked an enemy strong post one mile WSW PAPITALAI with Tk A rockets, demolished 5 pill boxes and killed 50 Japs.

15.

HAUWEI ISLAND

After an Allied patrol attempting a landing on HAUWEI ISLAND had struck trouble, naval and air support enabled troops to be landed on 12 Mar and overcome enemy in prepared positions. The following day the Island was completely occupied by the Americans. 42 Japanese were killed in these operations.

16.

ELANUS ISLAND

Supported by naval bombardment and shelling from HAUWEI and BUTJOLU ISLANDS (latter occupied by US forces 11 Mar without opposition) US forces landed in the vicinity LUGOS PLANTATION (2 1/2 miles WNW LORENGAU) against little enemy opposition.

The landing force split. One party moved South; the other moved East along the coast towards LORENGAU. A few hours after landing the coastal force was 1/2 mile from the airfield. The other party was halted by mortar fire 1 1/2 miles South of the Mission. Artillery fire cleared the enemy and enabled the advance to continue. The "Southward" force then moved East and on 15 Mar reached a point 1/2 mile West of LORENGAU.

In the meantime the coastal force occupied the airfield on 16 Mar and despite strong enemy opposition South and West of the strip advanced towards LORENGAU.

On 17 Mar, US forces fought through an elaborate bunker and trench system in the township, and reached the jetty West of LORENGAU RIVER. The enemy retreated into the hills South of LORENGAU.

NEW GUINEA

17.

RAI COAST

Many Japs still remain in the TARIKNGAN - YOGA YOGA Area.

The Americans are still held up East of KAMBARA RIVER but report the area between the river and BAU PLANTATION clear of the enemy.

A US patrol occupied SAGA SAGA on 13 Mar. This patrol moving from SAGA SAGA to ARAWUM (4 1/2 miles SSW MARAKUM) met "well-equipped" Jap troops 2 1/2 miles WSW SAGA SAGA on 18 Mar.

18.

DUMPU

An Australian patrol on 14 Mar reached a point 2 miles SSW KABENAU RIVER mouth and on 15 Mar passed SE through SEKWANUM (4 miles SW MARAKUM) and thence West to BARUM (2 1/2 miles SSW KALIKO) without observing any enemy movement. It reached KALIKO on 16 Mar and observed Japs on the beach. Withdrawing to BARUM the patrol was attacked by 30 Japs on 18 Mar and subsequently withdrew after killing 2 of the enemy.

On 16 Mar a patrol to MARAKUM reported no enemy seen but located recently-evacuated enemy positions. A further patrol to ARAWUM made no contact with either Japanese or Americans in the area.

On 17 Mar an Australian patrol contacted an American patrol which had landed in the vicinity of MELAMU PLANTATION.

The same day a patrol going to JAPPA reached a point 3 1/2 miles SSE of the village without sighting any enemy.

SAIPA 1 and 2 and NATALOI 2 were reported clear of the enemy on 13 Mar but some Japs were located 2 miles WSW NATALOI 2.

On 14 Mar contact was made with the enemy 1/2 mile North of DAUMOINA and maintained during 15 and 16 Mar. Many recently constructed defensive positions were observed on a feature one mile NE DAUMOINA on 17 Mar.

(b) SEA - SOLOMONS

19.

Allied air and surface attacks have kept the movement of Jap barges down to the bare minimum number necessary to sustain the troops on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND - the presumable role of the barges.

A submarine "ferry service" operates to and from RABAU; otherwise Jap shipping seems to have vanished from SOLOMONS waters.

20.

NEW IRELAND

In the NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY ISLANDS waters one month ago, approximately 70 naval and unidentified and merchant vessels were observed. During the past week only 4 vessels were sighted. Allied air and surface operations permit the enemy no freedom of movement.

21.

NEW BRITAIN

Except for probable submarine movement and possibly some undetected barge traffic, no shipping moves either in or out of RABAU. Two small cargo vessels and 1 flak ship have remained there for 5 days, plus anything up to 400 barges.

22.

NE NEW GUINEA

An increased amount of shipping has been observed in the more Northerly waters of NEW GUINEA. Seven naval vessels, 28 merchant type, 7 unidentified and approximately 400 barges were sighted in the general WENAK area during the past week. Some of these vessels may have been sighted more than once.

Sightings of interest are -

Date	Naval	Merchant	Location	Course
Mar 12		7 merchant	off NW KARKAR IS.	South
14	1 destroyer	2 merchant	SISSANO LAGOON	-
18	3 destroyers	2 large freighters (attacked)	bet. VALIF and KAIRIRU IS.	towards WEWAK

The number of barges and small craft has greatly increased, as shown by the following -

Date	No.
11 and 12 Mar	31
13	15
14	2
15	47 plus
16	200
17	64
18	50

Total sighted for week 409 plus

The climax of the week in this area was reached when on night 18-19 Mar Allied warships bombarded WEWAK, KAIRIRU and MUSCHU IS damaging or sinking many small craft and barges.

WEWAK's importance as a supply centre (in terms of shipping) is under serious threat of eclipse. The enemy may soon find it necessary to remove the focal point for his supply shipping to HUMBOLDT BAY, which has the best harbour in the North NEW GUINEA coast. If so there will be inevitable and perhaps vital effects on whatever plans he may have for the defence of MADANG. Even now shipment of supplies forward to ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG is entirely by barge and small coasters. If this supply line is to be stretched back to HUMBOLDT BAY the enemy's capability for maintenance will be strained. As a result he will have to either reduce his forward garrisons or boost his supply facilities. He seems to be at least attempting the latter by use of off-coast island staging areas and of fishing craft (See Appendix "B").

23.

NW NEW GUINEA

Greatly increased naval and merchant activity is noted in the HOLLANDIA Area.

Four convoys of interest were as follows -

Date	Naval	Freighters	Tonnage	Location	Course
Mar 13		7 freighters	7250	32 mls WNW HUMBOLDT BAY	East by South
Night 15/16	3 escorts	3 freighter tpbs	18000	70 mls NNW HUMBOLDT BAY	SSE
18	4 "	4 " "	14000	65 mls East by North HUMBOLDT BAY	Heading to HUMBOLDT BAY.

Date	Naval	Freighters	Tonnage	Location	Course
Mar 19	1 prob gun- boat	6 vessels	8000 tons	DORE BAY (MANOKWARI)	

24.

GENERAL

Japanese Oil Transport position at 1 Jan 44 (see Appendix "A").

Japanese sea carriage - Use of fishing boats (see Appendix "B").

(c) AIR - OWN OPERATIONS

25.

SOLOMONS

Allied aircraft, with 621 sorties, are still concentrating their effort on direct support of ground troops, enemy gun positions and supply areas forward of the perimeter at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY.

Other targets included AA positions on POPORANG and SHORTLAND ISLANDS, barges near JABA RIVER, BUKA PASSAGE and a small vessel in CHOISEUL BAY.

26.

NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY

Allied air attacks were spread over more objectives than during the previous week with 164 sorties against targets on NEW IRELAND and 55 sorties delivered at LORENGAU and vicinity before Allied land operations extended into the area.

The attacks on NEW IRELAND resulted in damage to ammunition dumps, coastal guns and AA positions at KAVIENG, BORPOR airfield, and to 5 barges along the coast. The radar tower at CAPE ST GEORGE was destroyed.

27.

NEW BRITAIN

Allied air forces are still hammering NEW BRITAIN heavily. In the RABAU Area (701 sorties) particular attention was paid to stores areas, buildings, warehouses, dock installations and shipping. The heavy damage to stores and warehouses will embarrass the enemy supply problems especially as he cannot risk shipping in the area without incurring heavy casualties.

Further damage was done to the TOBERA, RAPOPA and LAKUMAI airfields with consequent drain on enemy materials, resources and manpower for repair work.

Strikes against Jap shipping in waters between RABAU and UBILI resulted in the sinking of 5 and damage to 27 barges, 2/100 foot surface craft, a gunboat and a tug.

Beauforts in night attacks struck at the UBILI area and KAMALGAMEN (JACQUINET BAY) where concentrations of enemy personnel have been observed. Personnel and barges at GAROVE ISLAND were also attacked.

28.

NEW GUINEA

Allied aircraft struck heavily with 1147 sorties excluding strikes against shipping. The WEWAK Area was attacked with intensity comparable with the attacks against RABAU. The majority of the 846 sorties was by medium and

heavy bombers which dropped approximately 1500 tons of bombs on BORAH, KAIRIRU ISLAND, WEWAK town and airfield and the supply area at BRANDI PLANTATION, causing heavy damage and large fires throughout the area. Enemy fighters vainly intercepted in the early part of the week, but lost at least 43 aircraft in combat.

Damaging attacks were made in the HANSA BAY Area, on ATEBLE, TADJI, MADANG-ALEXISHAFEN Areas and in support of ground forces at YALAU and along the BOGADJIE ROAD.

Effective strikes on shipping including the total destruction of a convoy of 5 vessels near KAIRIRU ISLAND on 18 Mar result as follows -

Sunk - 3 destroyers, 2 medium freighters, 8 barges
Damaged - 7 freighters (4 medium 3 small) and 3 barges

29.

NW SECTOR

Allied air activity was again restricted but included 2 night attacks by 21 Liberators in all on SOURABAYA, the dock and factory area being damaged. The only other target attacked was BABO where fires were started.

ENEMY OPERATIONS

The enemy has shown little offensive spirit and merely made nuisance raids against SAIDOR, MONOTE, DUMPU airfield and again in the SOLOMONS. Preliminary reports indicate that 50 attacks were made by enemy aircraft on the Allied warships which shelled WEWAK Area on night 18-19 Mar.

At WEWAK, the enemy tried at first to stem the Allied air offensive by interception but after losing 43 aircraft gave up. Sporadic interception over RABAU resulted in further loss to his depleted air strength in that area. Total losses in combat and on the ground were 53, plus damaged aircraft.

30.

SECTION 111

Estimate of Enemy Land Based Air Strength in SWPA, BORNEO and the PHILIPPINES on information to 1700 hrs 18 Mar 44.

Areas	F3	2EF	L/B LB	T/B & D/B	F/B	F/P	OBSN	As at 17 Mar	Compara- tive as at 18 Feb 44
<u>NE AREAS</u>									
New Britain	9		4		1	7	3	24	180
New Ireland)									
Admiralty)	4			2				6	32
New Guinea	110	18	115			6	17	266	220
Solomons						1		1	6
<u>NW AREAS</u>									
Timor &)									
Soemba)	10	4	3				6	23	18
Amboin, Ceram)									
Bocoro)		8	6						
					24		5	43	62

Areas	Fs	2KF	L/B HB	T/B & D/B	F/B	P/P	OBSN	As at 17 Mar	Compara- tive as at 18 Feb 44
Aroe & Kai Is.	10							10	21
Halmahera			3			3		6	16
Dutch New Guinea	5		3			15	3	28	38
Celebes	30							30	70
Java-Bali- Lombok	30	9	24			9	5	77	51
Sub Total								514	714
Borneo	12						7	26	31
Philippines						37	6	43	32
Grand Totals	220	39	158	2	1	109	54	583	777

(AAF 191)

Attached as Appendix "C" is map showing Dispositions of Japanese Air Strength in FAR EAST and PACIFIC THEATRES as at 1 Mar 44. It will be noted that, while there has been considerable drop in strength in NE Sector SWPA, estimates for the NW Sector have risen sharply since 1 Mar 44.

SECTION XVI

SECURITY AND CENSORSHIP

31. RUMOURS

During the last few months there have been consistent references in Censorship and Security reports to the prevalence of rumours circulating amongst the troops from all areas. These rumours cover a wide range of subjects - for example, at present great interest is shown in the future role of Australian forces, for which tasks in many different areas have been suggested.

Those troops, who have been undergoing training for some time, tend to become bored from the monotonous routine and so fall easy prey to gossip and conjecture which they assimilate and pass on, mainly from wishful thinking, without realising the harm done by the spreading of false information.

It is apparent, by the great amount of rumour-mongering being carried on at present, that officers are neglecting that aspect of security. It is the duty of all officers to investigate immediately any rumour and, if advisable, present facts to discount and refute such rumours, at the same time pointing out to the offenders the harmful consequences to their fellow troops.

Troops should be encouraged to report at once any attempt to spread propaganda work or alarmist rumours by either soldiers or civilians.

(Extract from AMF Int Review No.84)

32.

CENSORSHIP

It is apparent that a greater volume of troops' mail is being posted through military channels than was the case when full Unit Censorship was in operation.

Letters containing censorable matter which were previously posted through civil channels to avoid censorship, are probably now passing through normal unit postal channels.

Unit Security Officers should check on the volume of mail at present passing through Unit postal channels, so that in the event of re-impositions of Unit Censorship on receipt of a warning order, any decline in the volume of mail would immediately be revealed.

33.

IMPERSONATION OF AN OFFICER

A US Army private was recently dressed as a First Lt of Infantry and instructed to make his way from LAE to FINSCHHAFEN, to GUSAP, to MADZAB, to DOBODURA, to LAE. He was given no officer's identification, travel or authority papers. The entire trip was accomplished in 32 hours and the "Officer" was never questioned or asked to produce identification or authority at any time.

The practice of accepting an officer at face value is still very prevalent and the danger of an enemy agent impersonating a member of our own or Allied forces should be stressed to all personnel. A uniform means nothing in accepting a stranger in a military area. The simplest way for an enemy agent to enter a military area without attracting attention, would be to don the uniform of troops in that area. Credentials should always be thoroughly checked regardless of the rank of the person concerned.

(Adapted from United States Army
Counter-Intelligence Bulletin No.33)

SECTION XVIII

PW REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ETC.

34.

ENEMY INTENTIONS SWPA - PW STATEMENT

A PW from 9 Shipping Engr Regt captured at SAIDOR on 3 Jan said that whilst in MADANG in Nov 43, he had heard persistent rumours that Japs intended to abandon BRITISH NEW GUINEA owing to difficulties of supply. It was intended to build up strength in DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Supplies could be transported more readily to that area as convoys were NOT exposed to attack to the same extent as further South. He had also heard that airfields were being built up in Northern NEW GUINEA and that when sufficient strength had been assembled in DUTCH NEW GUINEA, an attack, possibly with the aid of paratroops, would be made against North AUSTRALIA.

He regarded the rumours as ridiculous and thought that wishful thinking was partly responsible. Popular opinion was that 20 and 41 Divs were being sacrificed in a battle against time.

While at SAIDOR Jan 44, he heard that MADANG was likely to become the front line since it was NOT possible for Japanese troops to make a firm stand between SAIDOR and MADANG owing to lack of personnel and equipment. Reinforcements would probably be brought from WEYAK to MADANG by MT.

(I.R. 231)

Comment - Whilst the PW stressed that his information was "merely hearsay" it is quite likely that the Engineers engaged in the large transport of troops and their COs would pick up vital information as readily as some Allied transport drivers. The PW information re the role of 20 and 41 Divs as well as the enemy's weak coastal resistance forward of MADANG has been partly borne out. There is no doubt about the building up of Jap air and troop strength in DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

The PW suggestion that air attack might be made on North AUSTRALIA with the aid of paratroops is an indication of the conception of enemy capability - at least in some Jap minds. Of course, like all rumours, the PW version must be whittled down and down to uncover the original story, which may have been a surmise as to an airborne thrust into PAPUA. Quite likely some Japs still regard PAPUA as part of "N AUST" and speak of it so.

35.

THE JAPANESE SOLDIER AS SEEN BY HIS PRISONER

The following informative analysis by an American of the Japanese Serviceman appeared in O.N.I. Weekly, 23 February, 1944, Vol.111 No.8. It must be remembered that it is only one man's view based on contact with a limited number of enemy personnel.

During my imprisonment, I met two distinct Japanese types; the hardened campaigner and the reservist with no combat experience. The campaigner was a taciturn individual, hardened mentally and physically. He was much more considerate of the prisoners than were some of the reservists. He showed no dislike or contempt for the Americans; merely a puzzled curiosity. He seldom allowed himself to speak freely. He was apparently reconciled to the war. He was sincere in his belief of ultimate Japanese victory, but showed very little enthusiasm for the war. I got the impression that he had written himself off as a casualty long ago, and was now living on borrowed time. He talked most of his family and farm.

The Emperor, his Officers, Japan's foreign policy and Allied subjects, were matters beyond his depth, and taboo. The exception who would discuss such subjects in English was extremely bitter. PEARL HARBOUR, he said, was in reprisal for the sanctions. He considers the Far East an exclusively Japanese preserve, economically and because the people in the area are of the same colour. The Chinese are his friends. When I asked why JAPAN was killing so many of her friends, he would smile and say the Chinese are erring children who must be punished and forcibly shown what kindly intentions the Japanese have toward the Chinese. He spoke of the inherent kindness of the Japanese - even pointed out as an example that he had given me a cigarette. That the Americans were selfish was evidenced by the Exclusion Act forbidding Japanese emigration to the United States. He would sum it all up by saying "you keep us out of America; we keep you out of the Far East." He regards the Americans as soft. He pointed out that after 40 years the PHILIPPINES still cost us money. Under Japanese rule, the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS would be paying Japan huge dividends.

He was exasperated at my remark that JAPAN was committing national hara kiri in fighting AMERICA. He said "all you Americans think that way - you are fools. How can 50 million white Americans defeat 100 million Japanese?" When I questioned

his estimate of our population he was disgusted at my ignorance. Statistical ignorance of anything outside JAPAN was typical of most Japanese soldiers. They would discuss Japanese plane production in terms of a million planes per year. Their estimates of Japanese production were so huge that I repeatedly asked for written figures, thinking I had misunderstood their words. Invariably the figures corresponded with their words.

The reservist was a more loquacious individual, between 18 and 25 years old as a rule. He was very suspicious of the Americans on first contact, but grew to like and trust them on short acquaintance. He was scared of his noncommissioned officers, and hated his commissioned officers who slapped him so frequently. A Japanese soldier salutes all his superiors, enlisted or commissioned, and admonition is expressed by slapping. A corporal can slap a private, the sergeant can slap a corporal, and so on up the line. I saw no Japanese officer slapped. There is a very wide gulf between the Jap officer and enlisted man. Propaganda effort in this direction should be centered on emphasizing those traits of Japanese officers which the average Jap dislikes, i.e. selfishness, brutality, seeking profit out of the war, gaining glory at the expense of soldiers' lives (the Attu incident being a case in point).

The reservist was avid for news of America. Many had friends who had studied in this country. He wanted to know about life here.

Individually the reservist was delighted to be away from the fighting front. He did not like the idea of JAPAN and AMERICA at war. He was sure that he would receive a welcome in the United States after the war. I received at least 12 addresses of Japanese sentries who wanted me to visit them after the war's end. I'm certain they would receive me as a close friend. They were sure that I would welcome them in the States. The reservist in fact has little interest in the war. He is anxious to get back home to his family. A morican wrist watches, fountain pens and cameras fascinate him. He buys or takes all such articles he can find. It was touching to hear him describe the "Parker Pen", the "Elgin Watch". His respect for the quality of American products was extremely flattering, and indicated that the average Japanese was unable to afford such luxuries at home.

He considers the Emperor as a close relative, not to be discussed, much less criticized. I got the impression that the Emperor was a rather nebulous father, all powerful, but not subject to criticism for his acts. He is apparently too close to the Japanese soldier to be debunked and any reference to the Emperor in a joking way is taboo. I feel that any attempt to debunk the Emperor by propaganda will fail, as the Japanese attitude towards the Emperor is conditioned by custom and tradition; I doubt if fact and logic could change it. The Japanese will resent any slighting reference to his Emperor as would an American by any slighting reference to his father.

The Japanese soldier has little liking or respect for his political leaders. He feels that the only organization in JAPAN which has a continuing policy is the Army; and that the Army has to do the dirty work for the politicians. The majority of Japanese are convinced the war was caused by America's desire to dominate the Far East. The more intelligent Japanese, speaking out of earshot of his companions, would ask if it were not true that the war was brought about because of America's aid to CHINA.

The Japanese seems incapable of taking a definite stand on doing a job. He always seeks an order from a superior. Lacking that order, he consults his equals until a compromise agreement is worked out. He will not interfere with an equal regardless of how much he disagrees with him. On a road repair job I was in charge of one day, I had 100 American prisoners of war and three Japanese sentries. One sentry wanted the crown taken off the road,

the second sentry wanted the shoulders of the road shoveled into the holes, while the third sentry wanted the holes in the road dug out and put on the shoulders. We worked all day, in perfect harmony doing all three things, ruined two kilometers of perfectly good road, and all three sentries felt they had done a good job. The second day, an officer came by and directed that the holes in the road be filled in. The sentries promptly directed that the crown of the road be taken off and put into the holes.

Japanese soldiers were very much alike in their opinions and beliefs. Such uniformity speaks well for their propaganda agency. The soldier in the field is not permitted to listen to a radio; however, Japanese officers closely follow the broadcasts of KGEI. The Japanese camp commander told us that since no news was given to the Japanese soldier, there was no reason for giving it to American prisoners. The only news the soldier receives is contained in a propaganda Ministry publication, which contains pictures, statistics and other information necessary to keep up the soldier's morale. During March 1943, after the Russians had retaken STALINGRAD and parts of the CAUCASUS, the old Japanese coloured situation maps showed no change except that the cities which the Russians had recaptured were moved eastward out of the red coloured occupied zone.

The Japanese pictures the average American as an easy-going, fun-loving and hard-drinking dolt, blessed with a certain amount of ingenuity and a great deal of wealth, with little inclination for work and no interest in the war. He likes to talk to Americans, and admires their eternal optimism. When I asked one particularly intelligent and decent Japanese how he could stomach the starvation of the prisoners he shrugged his shoulders and said "it is order."

(Adapted from AAF Int Summary No.189)

Adyce Lt-Col
GS (Int)
SECOND AUST ARMY
21 Mar 44

JAP OIL TRANSPORT POSITION AS AT 1 JAN 44

Prior to 7 Dec 41 JAPAN drew on world sources of supply including the UNITED STATES, and she was supplied by tankers of the various Maritime Nations, including her own. Upon entry into the war she has had to assume this two-fold responsibility, production and transportation. The occupation of the NETHERLANDS INDIES quickly solved her production problem, and in an endeavour to solve the transport problem, and probably in anticipation of events to come, she constructed many fine tankers between 1937-1941 to build up her fleet.

On 7 Dec 41 her tanker fleet consisted of 85 vessels totalling 564,216 gross tons. Upon the fall of the NETHERLANDS, she acquired an additional 10 vessels, making a total of 601,412 gross tons, sufficient to meet her current needs.

Navy oilers now afloat are estimated at 12 vessels - 93,280 tons. It is a definite fact that many of the fast merchant tankers are employed for naval use, since over 50% of the oil requirements are for naval use.

As part of the Allied offensive in the PACIFIC, oil tankers have been a major target, and serious inroads have been made on them. Recorded losses to date are 43 vessels sunk (374,646 tons) and many additional ones damaged.

There is also definite intelligence that the enemy is employing the use of oil barges for sea transport of oil products. These barges are of both self-propelled and towed types and have been observed in southern waters. There is also some evidence that oil is being transported by small wooden vessels, but in any event not of sufficient proportion at this time to be considered seriously.

Construction estimates for 1944 of tanker tonnage in the light of available intelligence have been set at 15 vessels (about 125,000 tons). This estimate is definitely subject to revision.

Japanese petroleum requirements for 1944 have been estimated at some 56,000,000 barrels, and, of this total, about 35,000,000 barrels of products are required by the navy, the balance by merchant marine, army and industry.

The enemy's ability to move the quantities required has reached a critical stage, since it has been noted that many dry cargo vessels are being employed for this use and continued tanker losses will require further use of these vessels and other substitute measures, cutting deeply into the enemy's entire merchant fleet, thus weakening his ability to supply both economic and military needs.

(Condensed from AAF Summary No.186)

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No.100

APPENDIX "B"

USE OF FISHING BOATS IN NEW BRITAIN AREA

GENERAL

It is indicated that enemy Western NEW BRITAIN garrisons for some months prior to the recent Allied landings were supplied by fishing boat from GAROVE ISLAND. Supplies were taken to GAROVE apparently by small merchant vessel or destroyer.

The use of fishing boats as the backbone of a supply system is a new feature in this theatre and the probable reasons for their use, and capabilities may be worth examining.

CHARACTERISTICS

The route GAROVE to the NEW BRITAIN mainland entails a trip of some 70 miles in the open waters of the BISMARCK SEA. This fact probably persuaded the enemy to use fishing boats rather than MLC for the trip, since the fishing vessels would undoubtedly be better sea boats. For coastal work the MLC is probably preferable, being more readily concealed, more easily unloaded and of shallower draught.

CAPACITY

The average load capacity of the fishing boats is 25 cubic metres suggesting that this would represent an average capacity of some 7-1/3 tons per vessel.

It is reported that 18 Japanese type and 19 Formosan type boats were operating from GAROVE by September 1943. In addition ten large MLC were in use. The average monthly transport of the group of fishing boats and the MLC mentioned above was just over 1000 tons of supplies and 700 personnel. From WEWAK to MADANG each boat could carry 20 persons.

METHODS

As with barges, movement was carried out only at night, the usual time of arrival at IBOKI or KARAI-AI being 0530 hrs. Movement on moonless nights was preferred.


5 Sea Transportation Bn was reported to be operating fishing boats between GAROVE and KARAI-AI. This is a new type of organization for water transport. It is not yet certain whether such battalions operate fishing boats only or fishing boats and MLC.

CONCLUSION


The recent use of GAROVE and LORENGAU, and reported activity at BLUPBLUP, KARKAR and BAGABAG ISLANDS off the NEW GUINEA coast, point to the fact that the enemy is seeking to minimise the losses in shipping entailed in using established ports and shipping lanes. The plan may be to dump cargoes on islands lying off main routes, later to be distributed by smaller craft - small seaworthy boats of the class under discussion, are more suitable for the passage of open sea stretches.

(Condensed from AAF Summary No.186)

SECRET



000959N



REPRODUCED BY 5 AUGUST ARMY TOPOGRAPHY COY AIF, DFO 43
OVERPRINTED BY 5 AUGUST ARMY TOPOGRAPHY COY AIF, MAR 44

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No.100

APPENDIX "D"

TYPE "C" JAPANESE PICKET BOAT

The attached line drawing of a recently captured Jap Picket Boat incorporates some variations to earlier examinations of this class of vessel. Details are as under -

DIMENSIONS -

Length - 60ft
Beam - 14ft

HULL EXTERIOR -

Two wing semi-circular turrets mounting twin 13.7mm HMGs, top and stern turrets, a 54mm single shot cannon, both turrets were hand operated.

ENGINE -

Large six cylinder diesel motor, approx 600 h.p., driving a single blade type screw enclosed in steel propeller guards.

SPEED -

Estimated 15/20 knots.


ARMOUR -

Armour generally of $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plate but $\frac{1}{2}$ " used in the two 54mm turrets.


(Adapted from NGF Summary No.162 and report from CTG 70.1 USN)

NOTE - Scale of line drawing should be corrected to read 6.4ft = 1 inch.

APPENDIX C
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
NGF Review No. 100
21 MAR 1944



WATER LINE





LENGTH 60'F
BEAM 14'F
ESTIMATED SPEED 15-20 KNOTS

ELEVATION

PROPELLER GUARD

APPROXIMATE FLAIR
DEVELOPMENT AT
3'F INTERVALS FROM
BOW TO POINT "X" ON
PLAN



PLAN

TWIN 13MM HMG.

54MM

JAPANESE PICKET BOAT

SCALE 6FT = 1 INCH

REDRAWN BY GSI NGF FROM ORIGINAL
BY INTELLIGENCE UNIT CT.G. 70.1 U.S. NAVY



REPRODUCED BY 2A AUST ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY FEB 44

APPENDIX "E"

JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE 75mm HE SHELL

The "hollow charge" principle has been recorded so far for the following Japanese weapons only -

Rifle Grenade
1 Kg Aerial Bomb
1/3 Kg Aerial Bomb

The principle was discussed in AMF Technical Intelligence Summary No.8. Briefly, the increased effectiveness of hollow charge explosives is due to the mutual compression of the explosive shock waves within the hollow of the cone or cylinder.

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTILE

The projectile consists of a cylindrical body into which an ogival head (with two wrench flats on it) is screwed and held in position by a grub screw. The head has a left hand thread and is provided with a grub screw for a standard fuse. For transit, a slotted black bakelite plug fills the fuse hole and bears three ideographs "left hand knob."

In the body, the explosive cavity is parallel-sided to a short distance from the bottom to which the sides then taper. The explosive in the cavity is enclosed in a shaped cardboard container, embedded in wax at the bottom. ("Type '24', Explosive, manufactured July 1943" was written in Japanese characters on the outside of the cardboard in the sample examined.) The inner surface of the explosive is shaped to fit a metal "cone", thus embodying the "hollow charge" principle. This metal cone, by a flange, fits neatly on a ledge below the thread for the shell head, from which it is separated by a millboard washer.

Towards its apex the cone curves in, and opens into a metal tube leading to a detonator and primer, thus permitting the detonation of the nose fuse to set off the main charge from the base (a soft nose and tail fuse would appear to have been a simpler design.)

The bottom of the cardboard explosive container carries a cardboard cylinder in which sits an aluminium cup containing a priming composition of fine white powder.

Pressed into the powder and forming a lid for it, is a flanged aluminium cup containing a detonator. This smaller cup is covered by a blue lacquered silk disc between a card and an aluminium washer, the primer cup being crimped over the latter to hold the primer detonator assembly together.

The inside of the shell body and head, and the inside and outside of the cone and tube, are all lacquered.

DIMENSIONS OF THE PROJECTILE

Diameter at bourrelet	: 75mm
Diameter below bourrelet	: 74mm
Diameter at driving band	: 77mm
Length overall, (unplugged and unfused)	: 240mm
Length overall (when plugged)	: 250mm
Length overall (when fused)	: 297mm
Length of body	: 182mm

Int Review No.100

Appendix "E"


Length of head	: 67mm
Distance, base to driving band	: 24mm
Distance, driving band to bourrelet	: 125mm
Wall thickness of body (general)	: 6.5mm
Wall thickness of head (maximum)	: 7.5mm
Wall thickness of head (minimum)	: 3.5mm
Thickness of base	: 16.5mm
Diameter of body cavity	: 61mm
Depth of cavity from top of body	: 166mm
Internal diameter of metal cone at base	: 49mm
Depth of metal cone, to join with tube	: 54mm
Internal diameter of tube	: 16.5mm
Thickness of metal cone	: 1.8mm (approx)
Thickness of tube	: 0.7mm (approx)
External diameter of primer cup	: 18.5mm
External diameter of detonator cup	: 18.5mm
Depth of primer cup	: 25mm
Internal diameter of detonator cup	: 9.0mm
External depth of detonator cup	: 17.0mm
Depth of detonator	: 11.0mm
Diameter of base of cone in explosive	: 52mm
Depth of cone to apex	: 98mm
Angle of apex of cone	: 29°
Distance from apex of cone to -	
(a) tip of head, loss fuse	: 167mm
(b) tip of fuse after impact	: 212mm

A drawing of the shell is attached as part of this Appendix, scale $\frac{1}{2}$ actual size.

(Condensed from NGP Summary No.164 and report by CE 2 Aust Corps)

JAPANESE 75mm H.E. SHELL HOLLOW CHARGE

APPENDIX E
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
INTERVIEW No. 100
21 MAR 1944



FROM DRAWINGS BY
CZ BRANCH 2 AUST CORPS



APPENDIX "F"

JAPANESE NEW IMPROVED TYPE HAND GRENADE ("KISKA")

CHARACTERISTICS

Colour	Black with red top and brass fuse
Length (incl fuse)	3½ in
Length of body	2-5/16 in
Diameter of body	1⅝ in
Weight	300 gms (10.6 oz)
Weight of main filler	55 gms (1.9 oz)
Main filler	Cast picric acid
Delay	4 to 5 seconds
Markings - on striker head	CH
on fuse	
body	17th Year, 8th month SHOWA era (Aug 42)
on delay	
train holder	4 to 5 seconds

DESCRIPTION

Body - It has smooth, cast iron or steel, nonserrated sides which have a 1/16 in shoulder at each end projecting from the body. The inside of the body is finished with black lacquer to keep the filler from contact with the steel sides and the filler is wrapped in heavy paper.

Fuse - The fuse is similar to that used in the Types 91 and 97, with improvements. In order to prevent the cover from springing off the fuse body when the safety pin is withdrawn, a screw in the fuse body projects through a slot in the cover, keeping it in place and allowing it to move down with the striker when struck.

The striker body carries a machined striker point instead of a screw as with Types 91 and 97, thus eliminating the necessity for screwing down the striker to arm each grenade.

Flash Deflector - A deflector $\frac{3}{8}$ in width and $\frac{7}{8}$ in diameter is fitted on top of the grenade cover. Two $\frac{1}{8}$ in holes diametrically opposite, are punched in the outer periphery and coincide with the spanner holes in the fuse body. This positions the gas vent in the fuse 90 degrees from the air vents in the flash deflector.

The deflector eliminates the possibility of burning the thrower's hands and reduces the probability of disclosing the thrower's position during night operations.

Instructions for use - (from a translation of the label)

- (i) Grasp hand grenade as in picture.
- (ii) Pull safety pin from top and firmly strike end.
- (iii) Throw hand grenade immediately.

To prevent accidental discharge

- (i) Keep safety pin in place.
- (ii) Wrap cord around shank and secure after pin is inserted.
- (iii) Avoid striking end in this condition.

Operation of fuse -


- (i) Remove safety pin
- (ii) Strike end of striker cover
- (iii) This fires a cap which initiates a four to five seconds delay train.
- (iv) The delay train in turn fires a detonator which initiates the main charges.

(AMF Weekly Int. Review No.85)

APPENDIX F
TO SECOND AUST. ARMY
INT Review No. 196
OF 21 MAR 1944

APPENDIX B (ii) TO AMF WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO. 95 OF
17 MAR 44

JAPANESE NEW IMPROVED TYPE HAND GRENADE ("KISKA")





GSI (a) ADV LHQ

BARGE CONCEALMENT METHODS AT NAMBARIWA



NOTE
 OVERHANGING FOLIAGE COMPLETELY COVERS THESE HIDEOUTS BUT IS OMITTED TO SHOW THE CONCEALMENT METHODS



SECRET

Copy No.....40.....

HEADQUARTERS SECOND AUST ARMY

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 101

(Based on information received from 1800 hrs 20 Mar to 1800 hrs 27 Mar 44)

1. Recipients of this document will take special care to ensure the secrecy thereof.

They will also ensure that the contents of those portions side-lined are NOT distributed lower than Lt-Cols Comd.
2. Except as specified above, recipients may promulgate the contents for the information of all units: but in so doing, they must quote HQ Second Aust Army Int Review No. 101 and such sources as are acknowledged by HQ Second Aust Army.
3. A receipt for this summary is NOT required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.

CONTENTS

- | | |
|---------|--|
| Page 1. | Introductory
(a) General Resume
(b) Enemy Strengths |
| Page 3. | Summary of Operations by Areas
(a) Land
(b) Sea
(c) Air |
| Page 7. | Security and Censorship
(a) Security Discipline |
| Page 8. | PW Reports, Captured Documents etc.
(a) A Jap Disgruntled
(b) Jap LP Corps and Pacification Squad. |

APPENDICES

- (a) Map - Estimate of Enemy Strengths NW Sector
- (b) Map - Jap Air Bases NW Pacific Area
- (c) NEI under Japanese Rule

Headquarters
Second Aust Army
28 Mar 44

Distribution

See over

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW DISTRIBUTION LIST

	<u>Copy No.</u>
GS (Int) Adv LHQ	1 - 3
GS (Int) LHQ	4
GS (Int) First Aust Army	5
GOC and BGS	6
3 Aust Corps	7
1 Aust Div	8 - 9
NSW L of C Area	10
Vic L of C Area	11
SA L of C Area	12
Tas L of C Area	13
HQ VDC NSW	14
SYDNEY Fortress	15
NEWCASTLE Fortress	16
KEMBLA Fortress	17
Arty Trg Centre GRETA	18
2/8 Armd Regt	19
57 AA (Comp) Regt	20
HQ 1 Aust Armd Corps Trg Bde	21
HQ 1 RAE Trg Centre	22
AEIE Trg Depot INGLEBURN	23
HQ Aust Central Sig Trg Depot	24
HQ 1 Aust Inf Trg Bde	25
HQ 2 Aust Inf Trg Bde	26
HQ Aust Recruit Trg Centre	27
2 Aust Inf Spec Gp	28
1 Aust Para Bn (AIF)	29
GS (Int) HQ Second Aust Army (Ia)	30
Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School	31
Second Aust Army Officers' School	32
MLO SS CANBERRA	33
Eastern Area RAAF	34
Southern Area RAAF	35
USAFFE Base Sec 7 APO 927	36
Battle Board	37
File	38
War Diary	39 - 40
HQ Second Aust Army Circulation	41 - 42

PART 1
INTRODUCTORY

(a) GENERAL RESUME

1. On 20 Mar United States Forces landed and subsequently occupied the islands of ELOMUSAO and EMIRAU in the ST MATTHIAS GROUP. "The Japanese position in RABAU has been made even more precarious as the result of the occupation of EMIRAU ISLAND.

The establishment of an airfield on this island, with those already in being at LOS NEGROS, NISSAN ISLAND, TOROKINA and on the mainland of NEW GUINEA, will practically complete the encirclement of RABAU with Allied air bases.

Similarly, KAVIENG is fast being made untenable, and the possibility of RABAU being supplied from that base via the KAVIENG - NAMATANAI road and barge traffic across the ST GEORGE'S CHANNEL, is becoming somewhat remote." (AMF Int Review No.86)
2. Withdrawal of enemy forces towards the GAZELLE PENINSULA, NEW BRITAIN continues.
3. In the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, Allied forces continue to strengthen their hold. Some Japanese remnants are resisting strongly but their complete annihilation appears inevitable.
4. Operations in NEW GUINEA have been confined to patrolling. Australian patrols from the RABAU VALLEY continue to operate in the hinterland and along inland tracks between the KAMBARA and MINTJIM RIVERS.
5. Enemy offensive effort against the Allied beachhead at CAPE TOROKINA, BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND is deteriorating. The Jap lack of air support and our continuous air strikes against his supplies and troop concentrations in this area are apparently limiting his capacity to take the offensive.
6. No movement of enemy vessels has been observed in SOLOMONS, NEW BRITAIN and ADMIRALTY waters. Considerable shipping activity at and around WEWAK is consistent with the movement of reinforcements and supplies into the area.

7. Enemy activity in the NW Area embraces -
- (a) Increase in shipping sightings in the NW Sector suggesting that the strengthening of the area is proceeding at an increased tempo.
 - (b) Rapid construction of new airfields in the HALMAHERAS and DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
 - (c) Reversion to the policy of conserving aircraft potentially capable of strongly defending WEWAK.
 - (d) Increase in air strength (including bombers) in the HOLLANDIA Area.
8. Allied air effort has primarily concentrated on -
- (a) Support of Allied ground forces at CAPE TOROKINA, BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.
 - (b) Strikes at base installations and supplies at RABAU.
 - (c) Continuous heavy raids on the WEWAK Area.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTHS

9. The estimated enemy strength in the NE and NW SWPA except in the ADMIRALTYS, remains unchanged.
10. In the SOLOMONS, 2 Bn 45 Inf Regt (6 Div) forfeited 300 troops in an attack on the TOROKINA perimeter. This is the first real identification of a 6 Div unit reported for some time.
11. In the ADMIRALTYS known enemy dead to 26 Mar total 2594. An estimated 500 is added, leaving the Jap defenders approx 900 strong.
12. A late report from LHQ indicates movement on a considerable scale from MADANG to EENSA BAY.
13. Attached as Appendix "A" is map showing enemy strengths in NW Sector as at 15 Mar 44.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

(Reported between 1800 hrs 20 Mar and 1800 hrs 27 Mar 1944)

(a) LAND - SOLOMONS

14. BOUGAIEVILLE

The enemy is still concentrated around the TOROKINA perimeter. He opened another large scale attack on 24 Mar against the Northern sector, again penetrating at some points in the initial stages, but a US counter attack drove the Japanese out and restored the line. 300 Japanese were killed. Artillery duels are still being carried out and our aircraft and naval forces have helped considerably by bombing and shelling Japanese gun positions many of which have been neutralised.

The enemy suffered many casualties during patrol skirmishes prior to 24 Mar.

15. ST MATTHIAS GROUP

On 20 Mar US forces landed on EHIRAU and ELO MUSAO ISLANDS. No enemy were contacted on EHIRAU. Some slight opposition on ELO MUSAO was quickly overcome.

16. NEW BRITAIN

NORTHERN COAST

On 22 Mar Allied forces reached BULA-BADA (19 miles North of TALASEA) without sighting any enemy. In the South patrols contacted enemy at a point 5½ miles SSE NUNUENDO PLANTATION and at GARU (9½ miles SW TALASEA). The bag of Japs was: 3 captured, 15 killed.

The enemy is still withdrawing Eastward. A native report received on 18 Mar stated that approximately 1000 Japs many of whom were unarmed passed through EL-BA on their way to POEDO. Another report on 20 Mar indicated that 200 Japs at CAPE HOSKINS were observed moving East.

The US Force which landed at LINGA LINGA PLANTATION on 11 Mar was withdrawn on 18 Mar. Six days later a further landing was made at the same place without opposition. Enemy casualties subsequent to the landing were 10 killed and 30 captured.

On 25 Mar a US force landed at KALU RIVER (RIEBECK BAY) without opposition but encountered some enemy later.

SOUTHERN COAST

Contact with the enemy was made on two occasions only, once by a patrol from GASHATA to LINDENHAFEN on 19 Mar when 3 Japs were killed and the other occasion North of AUGITHI where 3 more Japs were accounted for.

Reports received indicate a general enemy withdrawal Eastwards. Natives state that the enemy are still at PALMALAL on JACQUINOT BAY but that Allied bombing forced their withdrawal from KAMALGAMAN.

17. ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

LOS NEGROS

Enemy partially dressed as US troops unsuccessfully attempted to capture a radio station on morning of 21 Mar 44.

Enemy resistance on LOS NEGROS is confined to two isolated forces, the first one mile South of LOBERUM POINT, reported to be surrounded; the other, a force estimated at 425 strong stated to be putting up slight resistance 1½ miles SW PAPITALAI MISSION. (This force has now commenced a withdrawal towards the SW of the island.)

MANUS ISLAND

Operations are proceeding satisfactorily. The LORENGAU drome is in Allied hands and a perimeter round it consolidated. From LORENGAU American forces are driving down Roads No.1 and 2 and along the coast to SALESTIA PLANTATION. The force advancing along No.1 Road encountered enemy at LIEI RIVER ford (2½ miles West LORENGAU). The central force down No.2 Road encountered strong enemy defences in depth 200 yds North to 200 yds South of ROSSUN. US troops then commenced an encircling move from the NE and reached a point 600 yds South of ROSSUN whilst another party worked its way South along the LORENGAU RIVER and made contact 200 yds South of ROSSUN.

A strong defensive enemy position 300 yds South of ROSSUN was attacked and destroyed on 25 Mar 44. Further Allied troops are pushing on South of ROSSUN at a fast rate.

On 19 Mar a patrol to SALESTIA PLANTATION reported no contact with the enemy. On 25 Mar contact was made 2 miles SE of the PLANTATION and 25 Japs were killed.

A waterborne patrol from LIAP landed at BUNRALIS MISSION on 21 Mar without making contact.

No contact was reported by a patrol which landed at KALI BAY (West coast) on 24 Mar.

18. NEW GUINEA

US forces are still holding the East bank of the KAMBARA RIVER and guarding tracks in the vicinity.

An amphibious patrol landed at KUBALI PLANTATION, BOGADJIM, on 22 Mar and reported sighting no MT along the NORTH SOUTH road BOGADJIM but that foxholes had been dug along the beach and machine gun positions prepared at the mouth of the MINTEIM and GORI RIVERS. It also reported that main enemy strength was located in area ERIEA PLANTATION.

In the KAMBARA RIVER Area US forces are patrolling inland trails and 13 Japs have been killed in the vicinity of SAGA SAGA. Approx 200 dead Japs were found along the track YOGA YOGI - SINDAMAN.

Australian patrols from the DUMPU Area have been operating freely between KIER and KAMBARA RIVERS and even as far East as KUL 2 (1½ miles SSE CAPE RIGNY) where contact was made with an American patrol.

DUMPU

Our troops are actively patrolling. A patrol to JAPPA reported no enemy in the village but made contact 1200 yds NNE and $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles NE thereof.

In the DAUMOINA Area our patrols were active and reported Japanese 1100 yds NW DAUMOINA and also NE of DAUMOINA.

MATALOI 1 is occupied by the Japanese who are constructing further defence works. MATALOI 2 and KISA reported as unoccupied.

(b) SEA - SIGHTINGS

19. NE SECTOR

Excluding the waters North of WEWAK only barges and a few submarines have been sighted in the NE Area. RASAU still harbours one 750 ton cargo vessel and numerous barges. Other barges are scattered along the Northern coast of GAZELLE PENINSULA and forward to BANGULA BAY.

20. NE NEW GUINEA

Many barges and freighters have been observed in the vicinity of WEWAK.

A total of thirty seven freighter type vessels and 16 unidentified vessels were sighted during the week in harbour and waters adjacent to WEWAK. As well as 9 naval type craft, 300 barges were observed operating in this area.

21. NW NEW GUINEA

Increased activity is again noted in DUTCH NEW GUINEA waters. In the early part of the week several freighters, 2 small escorts, and a few barges were sighted at HOLIANDIA. Nothing has been reported in this base since. Moving into the area 4 vessels - (12,000 tons) were sighted on 25 Mar 20 miles NW by North of WARDE ISLAND.

On 23 Mar 4 merchant vessels - (7500 tons) were observed in MANOKWARI. On 25 Mar 4 freighters totalling approx 3,250 tons were sighted at NOEMFOOR ISLAND (North GEELVINK BAY).

On 23 and 25 Mar concentrations of merchant vessels approximating 11,000 tons were noted at BABO, FAK FAK, KOKAS, KAIMANA BAY, UTAROM and BOELA (CERAM).

22. TIMOR

Sightings on 26 Mar of 4 medium vessels at LAUTEM and one vessel at WAMAR IS suggests normal shipping movement for supply purposes.

23. HALMAHERAS

On 23 Mar a recce of the HALMAHERAS showed -

<u>Naval</u>	<u>Merchant</u>	<u>Barges</u>
2 destroyers	14 freighter transports	14 barges
1 gunboat	1 freighter	several small
1 submarine chaser	2 stack aft vessels	craft
	8 unidentified merchant	
4 naval	25 merchant	14 plus

These vessels were concentrated in MOROTAI STRAIT, WASILE BAY, GALELA BAY, MITI IS and KAOE BAY.

24. FLORES ISLANDS

Nine small vessels were sighted along the North East and Southern coasts of the FLORES GROUP on 24 Mar.

25. PHILIPPINES

On 24 Mar 3 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, one destroyer and 2 large auxiliary oilers were sighted on the SE coast in the BASILAN STRAIT (7 miles SE by East of South tip of MINDANAO ISLAND). The grading of this sighting is E3.

26. SEA - OPERATIONS

Heavy naval units bombarded KAVIENG for 3½ hours on 20 Mar. It was reported that CHINATOWN was levelled and only a few buildings remain. On the same day naval units in support of ground forces bombarded targets West of PAPITALAI village and at SE tip of MANUS ISLAND destroying enemy positions and ammunition dump. After a lapse of 3 days, naval craft once again are active in the waters North of NEW BRITAIN. They shelled shore installations, houses, petrol dumps and barges causing some damage and sinking several barges.

(c) AIR - OWN OPERATIONS

27. SOLOMONS

Allied aircraft are still concentrating their efforts in support of groundtroops in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY perimeter striking heavily at enemy personnel supplies and gun positions forward of the perimeter. Damaging attacks were also made on the airfields at BUKA, KARA and KAHILI and the NUMA NUMA Area.

28. NEW IRELAND - ADMIRALTY

Air activity was on a restricted scale but included a heavy attack on the airfield at PANAPAI and smaller attacks on the airfield at KAVIENG and the radar station at CAPE ST GEORGE.

A small force of Bostons supported ground operations South of LORENGAU.

29. NEW BRITAIN

Allied aircraft made 1056 reported sorties in the area with the concentration of effort (967 sorties) still at RABAU and its environs. Heavy damage was caused to stores, buildings, ammunition dumps, AA and gun positions at RATAVAL, VUMPOPE, in the town area, along the wharves. The airfields, as a result of these and preceding attacks, were reported on 24 Mar as unserviceable.

Aircraft from SWPA struck effectively at enemy troop concentrations in JACQUINOT BAY, between CAPE POMAS - BANGULA BAY, CAPE HOSKINS and GAROVE ISLAND.

30. NEW GUINEA

Pursuing the policy of previous weeks, continued attacks against the WEWAK Area resulted in the delivery of 446 sorties against ground targets and shipping in this area, destroying stores, installations, AA positions at WEWAK, BRANDI and MUM

PLANTATIONS, KAIRIRU IS and DAGUA, and starting fires throughout the area. A total of 313 sorties were made against targets outside the WEWAK Area which included TADJI airfield, barges, luggers and installations at AITAPE, enemy positions and HQ on the BOGADJIM ROAD, personnel and AA positions at HANSA BAY and the MADANG-ALEXISHAFEN Area.

Allied fighters effectively patrolled over the WEWAK Area.

31.

NW SECTOR

Allied air activity remains on a small scale and apart from reconnaissance was confined to heavy bomber raids on BABO and UTAROM. Allied aircraft operating in this sector have engaged in minelaying operations with considerable success.

32.

ENEMY OPERATIONS

The enemy has taken little offensive activity in any theatre, the largest raid being a night attack against American positions in the TOROKINA perimeter by 6 aircraft.

Defensively the enemy has ventured little and seems finally to have left the defence both of WEWAK and RABUL to his AA defences, despite a concentration of 274 aircraft (incl 132 fighters) at HOLLANDIA on 21 Mar which, it would seem could be used either offensively or defensively.

In the NW Sector considerable airfield development is going on. At least 9 strips are in the course of construction or completed in the MALMAHERAS and other airfields throughout the area are ready or being prepared for use against the increasing Allied threat to his NE Sector bases.

SECTION XVI

SECURITY AND CENSORSHIP

33.

SECURITY DISCIPLINE

The value of "Security Discipline" is well emphasised in RAF Security Liaison Letter No.18 from which the following is a condensed extract -

"The establishment of security is rooted in discipline. Discipline and security are inseparable. Poor security is lax discipline."

The quotation is from the security instructions issued by the Japanese.

The point is well made. Security is the defence against indirect attack, the danger of which will seldom be apparent and will often be intermittent.

That defence will only be maintained if certain fundamental precautions are taken as a matter of habit. Routine acceptance and observance of standard regulations develop that habit and ensure that the precautions are effective whether the danger is apparent or not.

The habit of security-mindedness is largely one of suspicion - almost, it might be argued, of pessimism. The good security officer expects the worst to happen and provides accordingly. He

assumes that the secret papers on his desk will probably blow out of the window unless there is a weight on them; that the casual visitor to his office will attempt to read them if they are left face upwards; that he will leave his brief case in a taxi unless it is secured to his wrist; and that a third party is listening in on a crossed line to every telephone conversation which he makes.

From the security angle, an outlook such as this has much to recommend it. Thousands of pounds are being paid out annually in alimony by those who found themselves in the divorce courts because they rashly assumed that the only people who would ever read their letters were those for whom they were intended. In the same way the enemy intelligence staff receives much valuable aid from those who assume that a letter is never lost or stolen, and that the addressee can always be relied on to destroy it when instructed to do so. The habit of assuming that anything said or written may reach the enemy provides a useful antidote to any tendency to take risks, and it also ensures that certain precautions are taken without question and as a matter of routine.

This "almost pessimistic" outlook is also invaluable when it comes to assessing the need for limited briefing on secret matters. The purpose of reducing to an absolute minimum the number of those who know the whole story is based, not on distrust of the remainder, but on the principle that the fewer there are who know, the less possibility there is of any leakage. A man's integrity may be beyond question, but there is always the chance that he may talk in his sleep, when under an anaesthetic, or when delirious. There is also the possibility that he may be knocked over by a bus when carrying secret papers, and that they may be scattered all over the street as a result. The number of high ranking officers who have been knocked over by buses during this war is admittedly small, but that is not the point. In matters affecting the lives of many men and the success of an important operation, not even one chance in a thousand should be ignored. There are so many inevitable and necessary risks which must be taken that it is criminal to take even the smallest chance that can legitimately be avoided.

(3 Aust Corps Int Summary 98)

SECTION XVIII

PW REPORTS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ETC.

34.

A JAP DISGRUNTLED

A Jap Ldg Pte captured at SIO on 10 Feb 44 stated that although he had escaped operational fighting by becoming attached to 20 Div HQ he had learnt from other members of 20 Div Inf Group that fighting in CHINA was mere play compared with that in NEW GUINEA.

In CHINA provisions, ammunition etc were always plentiful.

In NEW GUINEA Jap airplanes were seldom seen and when they did come, there seemed to be little desire to protect troops.

Men were disgusted with Jap tactics and many vowed they had NO desire to return to a country that had deliberately abandoned them.

The PW stated that he only realised the true state of affairs after he was abandoned and with 5 others endeavoured to escape Allied patrols and live in NEW GUINEA as long as possible.

Comment - According to the PW, he and his fellow escapees had no desire to return to their unit. This showed a surprising reversal of all ingrained Jap qualities, LOYALTY, SINCERITY, OFFENSIVE SPIRIT and sense of RESPONSIBILITY to the Emperor.

The abandonment of all Japanese ideals, and the choice of a jungle life in preference of a return to OSAKA with the victorious "Army of the Gods" is a total volte face. It is proof, that given the time, the Jap High Comd will, by lack of consideration for the essential needs of the fighting troops, help to break down that artificial Morale on which they have built their armies.

TOJO shortly after his installation in 1941 as Prime Minister of JAPAN said "The spirit of the Army is held of greater importance than equipment."

It is evident that lack of equipment and supplies is undoubtedly affecting the morale of TOJO's fighting men.

35.

JAP MP CORPS AND PACIFICATION SQUAD

DUTIES AND ORGANISATION

Some details of Jap MP and Pacification Squad organisations are given below. As the information has been culled from PW sources its value should be assessed and its distribution restricted accordingly.

It is apparent that wherever Japanese troops are stationed there are MPs. They are (according to PW) easy to distinguish from regular troops as they are allowed to let their hair grow long, thus enabling them to impersonate civilians. On such occasions pistols are carried under cover.

The Pacification Squad, whilst a secret co-operator with the MP Sec, endeavours to pacify local inhabitants, thus eliminating sedition. Children in the occupied territory are taught patriotic Japanese songs. In CHINA, the Pacification Squad personnel were elderly men and young women.

MP ORGANISATION

The GOC is termed "Provost Marshal General" and is presumed to be a Lt-Gen. He is directly responsible to the Minister for War for police work within the Army and has jurisdiction over naval personnel when ashore.

The lowest MP rank is a Cpl.

MPs operate from a MP Sec Office and only deal with Military matters with the exception of reports from civilian police on offences which may encroach on Army regulations. MPs naturally have wider powers than the civilian police.

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL OF AREAS

It is presumed that the rank of a Provost Marshal of areas would be a Maj-Gen or Col. A Provost Marshal is stationed with the Ministry of War and at each of the following places -

Northern District of Japan proper, Eastern District of Japan proper, Central District, Western District, Formosa, Kwantung Army (MANCHUKUO). Each Expeditionary Force has also a Provost Marshal General.

Each of the above Provost Marshal Generals, whilst under cmd of a formation, had to report to his respective GOC as well as direct to the Minister of War.

In peace time an MP Sec, under cmd of a Lt-Col or Maj, was attached to each Div HQ in JAPAN.

The chain of cmd during wartime is presumed to be Minister of War, MP Corps, Div MP Unit, Regt MP Sec.

The MP Sec is broken up into "Cmd" Sec, "Thoughts" Sec, "Adm" Sec, "Judicial" Sec.

THE CMD SEC

Is responsible for unit adm, records, files and compilation of dossiers. The Sec in CHINA also has selected officers who specialise in subjects such as that of the COMINTERN.

THE "THOUGHTS" SEC

This Sec enforces National Security Laws concerning offences against the State, such as Communist activities and subversive propaganda by or among members of the Military forces. It investigates suspicious occurrences and individuals.

ADM SEC

This Sec enforces Military Law concerning offences prejudicial to good order and discipline in forces, saluting or observation of proper respect to superiors.

JUDICIAL SEC

This Sec is concerned with the adm of Criminal Law and investigation of such offences as murder or robbery committed by or among members of military forces.

The MP Sec co-operates with the Pacification Squad inasmuch that any crime unearthed by the Pacification Squad is reported to the MP Sec, which undertakes all investigation and responsibility.

The reason for this is to ensure that the Pacification Unit does nothing to arouse native suspicion.

AUXILIARY MPs

These are additional personnel obtained from Inf units to "police" districts or for guarding such a place as a PW camp. Auxiliary MPs are not permanently attached to the MP Sec, but relieved daily or weekly according to circumstances.

JAP PACIFICATION SQUAD

The Pacification Squad follows up and operates immediately behind advancing forces. It is responsible to the GOC Expeditionary Force or Area Army.

Its duty is complete pacification of the locality allotted to it and maintenance of local and military security in that area.

It is responsible for differentiating between friend and enemy and investigation of local political and economic conditions.

Information regarding recalcitrants and offenders is passed by the Pacification Squad to the MP Sec.

Information supplied by Chinese and SWPA natives is paid for, presumably through the Army Finance Sec.

Liaison is maintained with Army Units from Coys upwards and if troops are needed to quell local disturbances the Army Unit in the area is called upon to furnish them.

Army also supply interpreters needed to deal with Chinese and SWPA natives.

In the SWPA, interpreters (according to PW) were thought to be former pearling or coconut plantation employees.

The Pacification Squad also gathers information on morale and loyalty of local populations by working through the local village Headman and checking the statements of one against the other.


The local populations are told of Japan's purpose in the Greater East Asia programme, through village Headman, and by lectures and especially illustrated pamphlets. The latter have been used in NEW BRITAIN.

Members of the Squad wear a military uniform without insignia of rank but with a badge on the left breast. The description of the badge is not definite, but probably a blue wavy stripe on a $2\frac{1}{2}$ " x $1\frac{1}{2}$ " khaki background.


R. Joyce

Lt-Col
GS (Int)
SECOND AUST ARMY
23 Mar 44


SECRET



000960F



8
Review 101



000961G



APPENDIX "C"

NEI UNDER JAPANESE RULE

The following information on the NEI under enemy occupation is from a source believed reliable.

SOERABAJA

The Minseibu, a branch of Japanese Civil Administration, was very high handed and had no regard for the natives. The Javanese coolies were kicked and beaten if they did not work hard enough and were likely to go foodless. A Djoeragan asked for material to mend his prau but was refused and told if his prau sunk through lack of repairs he could "bloody well swim home." Despite severe beatings the coolies frequently stole food from godowns.

There were plentiful supplies of vegetables, fruit, meat and fish in the market but prices were prohibitive. At the Warongs (small native eating houses) tea and coffee without milk cost 3 and 6 cents per cup and enough rice to fill the stomach cost 80 cents. The Chinese shops on roads to the market sold fruit and vegetables but no rice or sugar. The natives were only allowed to smoke "kretek" (native cigarettes) and were beaten if seen smoking imported cigarettes which only the Japs could buy.

Materials, such as resin, pitch, tarred hemp, cotton for sails, iron and brasswork for use in native praus were unobtainable and substitutes such as matting sails, and bark for caulking had to be used.

The harbour looked desolate and no attempt had been made to repair previously destroyed installations with the exception of the naval establishment. Very few ships were in the harbour and salvage work was in operation on a sunken vessel. The coolies and some women in the harbour area commenced work at 0700 hrs and worked, with a small break for midday meal which they provided themselves, till 1600 hrs.

The Japanese have confiscated in most cases without payment, at least half of the native praus taking the best for themselves. Prau owners were given food only for their services and were allowed to operate for the Minseibu with the result that Chinese and native trade was at a standstill. Open sea fishing is prohibited and reserved for the Japanese. Natives had to fish from the shore.

At night the towns and villages were blacked out. Kerosene is reserved exclusively for the Japanese and natives had to substitute coconut oil for lighting.

MAOEMERE - (FLORES ISLAND)

The Japanese are located ..

- (i) between TOKO MAOEMERE and TOKO GELETE
- (ii) TANDJOENG PERAK (old name Tg. DARAH). In front of this cape is a small island and nobody is allowed to navigate through this strait. Any prau attempting to come near the TANDJOENG is shot at.

About 200 coolies were used at MAOEMERE to load sand from the beach into trucks which were taken in the direction of the

APPENDIX "C"

Page No. 2

aerodrome, believed to be 4 km. South of MAOEMERE. Comment - It is known that there is a first-class aerodrome under construction at MAOEMERE and that the Japanese have been using this aerodrome for several months.)

BIMA - (FLORES ISLAND)

The whole township was burned down and destroyed, including most of the godowns along the jetty. The only thing undamaged was the palace of the Sultan and about six godowns near the end of the jetty.

The population of BIMA had run away to the mountains. A carriage driver stated that pamphlets had been dropped and that afterwards the town was demolished. This made a tremendous impression on the population.

(Condensed from AAF Int Summary 193)

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118

(adapted)

H. 1002 2/42

Unit FRA SECOND AUST ARMY

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 1 Mar 44 to

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
			<u>STAFF</u>	
			FRA Brig W H ST. CLAIR	
			SORA I (Fd) Lt-Col B B WATCHORN	
			SORA II (Fd) Major J S SMART	
			Staff Captain Capt G M TAYLOR	
			IO	
			SO Svy (Arty) Lt-Col R S ATKINSON	
			Lt (Survey) Lt A H TUNNEY	
			IG (Coast) Lt-Col C A ORD	
			IGA (Coast) Capt R A EISOR	
			IG (AA) Lt-Col H G W MYERS - vice Lt-Col EEDRY (Detached)	
			IGA (AA) Capt P S HILL	
			ISLA (Coast & AA) Capt F C GOMES	
			<u>CLERKS</u>	
			WO I L P GOSS	
			Sjt P R THODEY	
			L sjt S W WOOD	
			Bdr A W PRICE	
			Bdr N J THORPE	
			Bdr G W HODGSON	
			Gnr W KNIGHT	
			Gnr G A JONES	
			<u>A/WAS</u>	
			Bdr L H HOUGH	
			Bdr A J PHRSELL	
			L bdr M C FISHER	
			Gnr T G ROBERTS	
			Gnr S C HOWSE	

lun

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

H. 1008 2/42

Unit BRA SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 1 Mar 44 To 2400 hrs 14 Mar 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Mar 1		Instructions received for deletion from OGB of 365 HAA Tp LUTHERGOW	<i>Km</i>
	" 2		Brig ST. CLAIR and Capt TIEDEMANN visited REBELA to witness 40 mm and 3.7-in shoot by VDC NSW Trg School (NGWRA)	<i>Km</i>
	" 3		Nil.	
	" 4		Maj BENSON and Capt TIEDEMANN visited Sydney AA Ops Room. 4 to 7 Mar - 9 Aust Fd Regt range practice on TIANJARA Arty Range. Fire and movement practices each day.	<i>Km</i>
	" 5		Nil	
	" 6		Nil	
	" 7		106 Post OCTU Shoot 340 Rds Sub Calibre from MALABAR directed by Lt-Col ORD. Capt GOMERS visited School of Artillery (AA) - Discussed various SL matters with Lt-Col A. L. BRENTWOOD GSO I SL MGRA Staff.	<i>Km</i>
	" 8		Nil	
	" 9		106 Post OCTU Shoot 40 Rds 9.2-in full calibre from BANKS Bty directed by Lt-Col ORD. Brig ST. CLAIR and Capt TIEDEMANN inspected 2/17 Aust LAA Bty (Airborne).	<i>Km</i>
	" 10		31 OR's move to BRISBANE as reinforcements for "H" Hy Bty.	<i>Km</i>
	" 11		Field exercise of 1 Aust Svy Bty completed at BERRIMA. Capt TIEDEMANN appointed BM RAA HQ PT MORESBY BASE SUB AREA as from 8 Mar 44. Capt TIEDEMANN visited AA Arty firing practice at NORTH HEAD. VDC personnel of Sydney AA Gp participated. Shooting showed a decided improvement by VDC in their drills. Capt TIEDEMANN previewed AA Trg Films at G (Vis Trg) Second Aust Army.	<i>Km</i>
	" 12		Nil.	
	" 13		4 Aust F Sp Bty 1 Aust Svy Bty commenced movement to GRETA. A. BABER from Operational Research Section arrived to investigate Arty Svy Problems. Visited 1 Aust Svy Bty to hear criticism of exercise. Lt L. WARHAM returned to regimental duties SYDNEY AA Gp. Capt P. S. HILL (NEWCASTLE AA Gp) and Lt W. M. FRECKER (SYDNEY AA Gp) reported for temporary attachment to BRA Staff.	<i>Km</i>
	" 14		Nil.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

H. 1009 2/42

Unit BRA SECOND AUST ARMY

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 15 Mar 44 To 2400 hrs 23 Mar 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Mar 15		Movement of 4 Aust F Sp Bty and 1 Aust Svy Bty completed. Bty HQ's opened GRETA. Movement 1 Aust Div Arty to GRETA suspended until further instructions issued. Lt-Col H. G. W. MYERS reported for attachment to BRA Staff as IG (AA) vice Lt-Col J. HENDRY.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 16		Lt-Col ORD directed GA Post OCTU (LHQ School of SLs Course No. 106) firing practice 18 pr HENRY HEAD.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 17		Lt-Col MILLEDYNE D of A and Capt SCURRIE arrived from LHQ to inspect Converter 104 and discuss Fire Control generally, Lt-Col ORD accompanied them on inspection. Capt COOMBS visited SYDNEY AA Gp and discussed with BM (Maj CALDER) SL layout in SYDNEY Area. Visited School of SL and discussed with CI (Lt-Col ROBINSON) progress of Courses. Inspected training at 1 Aust SL Trg Regt.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 18		Lt-Col MYERS visited AA Arty firing practice at NORTH HEAD. Cloud ceiling of 4800' precluded "low height" shoot. Line barrage was fired and results were satisfactory. VMC personnel of SYDNEY AA Gp participated.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 19		Lt-Col MYERS attended further AA practice at NORTH HEAD, VMC personnel again participating. "Low height" method of practice was used. Drill needs much improvement. Lt-Col MYERS also inspected VDC trg at GEORGES HEIGHTS.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 20		Lt-Col ATKINSON visited GRETA with Mr. BABER to observe and report on "Short Base Registration" and Merton method of engaging targets. Lt TIMNEY visited GRETA to conduct a course of photographic interpretation for 10 officers at Arty Trg Centre. Duration of Course 20 Mar to 1 Apr. Lt-Col ORD directed Coast Arty Junior Officers Course No. 1 from HENRY HEAD a.m. and Post OCTU LHQ School of SLs Course 106 from HENRY HEAD p.m.. Lt-Col MYERS visited VDC HQ.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 21 (Lt-Col WATCHORN visited GRETA and conducted Fd Arty range demonstrations in Short Base Ranging and firing using Merton Gridding on oblique photographs.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 22 (Lt-Col MYERS inspected AA Units of NEWCASTLE Fortress with DOME.	<i>Ln.</i>
	" 23		Lt-Col ORD directed Coast Arty firing practice 6-in full calibre from SOUTH HEAD. Practice was carried out by Post OCTU students - Course 106. Lt-Col MYERS visited 57 Aust AA Regt and inspected training.	<i>Ln.</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

H. 1002 2/42

Unit BRA SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 24 Mar To 2400 hrs 31 Mar 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Mar 24		Lt-Col ORD inspected CA Installations in KEMBLA Fortress Area, and inspected VDC training on 25 Mar 44.	<i>Rub.</i>
	" 25		Lt-Col ORD returned from KEMBLA. SM2997 received setting out re-organisation resulting from decision to scale down to VDC Manning of AA Defences in NEWCASTLE and KEMBLA.	<i>Rub.</i>
	" 26		Lt-Col MYERS inspected VDC Operations Room personnel training at MOORE PARK Gun Sta.	<i>Rh.</i>
	" 27		Lt-Col ORD visited the CA Junior Officers Refresher Course (Infantry Wing) at WEST HEAD. Lt-Col MYERS visited LHQ School of Arty (AA)	<i>Rub.</i>
	" 27		Nil	
	" 28		Nil	
	" 29		Lt-Col ORD directed a Coast Arty Practice from BANKS Bty (9.2-in full calibre shoot) carried out by Bty detachments from DRUMMOND Bty CA KEMBLA.	<i>Rub.</i>
	" 30		Lt-Col MYERS and Capt HILL visited VDC HQ and discussed VDC training. WGRA arrived from MELBOURNE, conferred with GOC. Accompanied by Lt-Col ORD he visited 106 Course LHQ School of SL - Coast Arty Courses. Lt-Col ATKINSON visited GRETA, to conduct Photo Interpretation School, will be attached to 4 Aust F Sp Bty.	<i>Rub.</i>
	" 31		WGRA visited LHQ School of Arty (Fd Med & Svy) also viewed range practice at HOLSWORTHY LHQ School of Arty (AA). Capt COOMBS inspected training at 1 Aust SL Tg Regt. Capt COOMBS visited LHQ School of Searchlights Rm and was present at practical Tactical Control Tests.	<i>Rub.</i>
				<i>Rh. Macdonald</i>
				Capt. SCRA Second Aust Army

WAR DIARY ~~OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)

Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMY Date and Time.—From 1 MAR 44 To 31 MAR 44

St 7453

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
			<u>CE STAFF STATEMENT</u>	
	C.E.		Col W. D. McDONALD Acting	
	SORE I.		Maj C.H.D. HARPER Allotted SLE (Fd) for special School	
	SORE (Frt) & A/SORE (Wks)		Maj H. E. LANG	
	Asst SORE (Wks)		Lt G. PARKER	
	IORE & SORE (Pers)		Lt H. D. SEARL Awaiting move to HGF	
	SOPE (Stores)		Lt J. DAVIES Attd	
	LO on RAE Trg Centre			
	WAGGA matters		Lt D. TWEDDELL Attd	
	SORE (Camflg)		Maj N. G. CHAPMAN School	
			Lt GILMOUR Acting IORE & SORE (Pers)	
			Lt BRAMMALL " Asst Works Off pending return of Lt PARKER to Unit	
			WO II SUTTON, E.D.	
			Sgt PETTIGREW, C.R. School	
			" MACALLISTER, R. (AWAS)	
			Cpl REYNOLDS, W.	
			" HAMMOND, M. (AWAS)	
			" MURRAY, P. (AWAS)	
			Spr MAKER, A.	
			" BOULTON (AWAS)	
			" CAMPBELL (AWAS)	
			DETACHED: Sgt SWAIN, R.H. (to 4 Aust AA & Frt Coy)	
			Spr GOZIAN (nee McGRATH to Svy)	

C.E. SECOND AUST.

Lang Hays

WAR DIARY ~~OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required).


 Army Form C. 2118
 (adapted)

 Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMY Date and Time.—From 1 MAR 44 To 31 MAR 44

St 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CE SECOND AUST ARMY	1 Mar	Memo 2926	Experiments - 1 Aust Para Tp RAE with bladders from American Ranger boats.	
	"	" 2928	Camouflage personnel - Postings.	
	"		Lt-Col McDonald & Maj Harper return from NEWCASTLE.	
			Capt COULSON to leave.	
	2 Mar	Memo 2933	Return of Officers - RAE Trg Centre. Postings.	
			Major Lang and Lt Parker to Green Point.	
			Brigadiers Lucas and Torr met by C.E.	
	3 Mar	Memo 2935	Aust Forestry Group - "B" Class personnel.	
		" 2942	Accommodation - Gowan Brae	
	4 Mar	" 2952	to E in C - Staffing of Engr Trg Units.	
			Maj Harper to Vic Bks to 2 Aust CE Works re Gowan Brae.	
			Sgt Macallister to 8 days leave.	
	5 Mar	"	Sgt Pettigrew to 6 Aust AA & Frt Coy for 2 days.	
			C.E. to RMC Duntroon, Cowra, & 50 DCRE Bathurst.	
	7 Mar	" 2959	to E in C re OCTU Candidates failure.	
		2964	to 1 Aust Div RAE Trg Centre - Staff School (Aust) Applications for	
			Maj Lang to South Head and Middle Head	
		" 2969	to 2 Aust CE Works - Tomaree Bty - Water Supply.	

C.E. SEC | AUST. ARMY



WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMYDate and Time.—From 1 MAR 44To 31 MAR 44

St 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CE SECOND AUST ARMY	8 Mar		Lt Searl to Wagga	
		Memo 2978	To DAQMG Proposed accommodation Second Aust Army Gowan Brae site.	
	9 Mar		CE & SORE I to WAGGA. SOREI returning 11th via Cowra. CE on to LHQ	
			Lt Seapl ex Wagga. Lt Davies to 2 Aust CE Works	
		Memo 2983	to AQMG re Office filing cabinets.	
	10 Mar	" 2984	Repairs to Wiles Cooker - 1 AustSL Trg Regt.	
			Cpl Mondy to rest Day prior to movement on 11 to LHQ E in G's branch.	
			Lt Tweddell to Marellan Major Lang to City Area and Vic Bks.	
	11 Mar	" 2994	Materials for W & D Facilities NW Pylon Sydney Harbour Bridge	
	13 "	" 2997	to E in C Engineer Officers from civilian sources	
		" 2998	to Q - Twin 6 pr Installation - Green Point	
		" 3004	RAE Officers for Parachute Trg Tp.	
		" 3007	Release of RAE Officers to Dept of Civil Aviation.	
			Major Harper to VDC HQ.	
	14 Mar	" 3009	Cre 1 Aust Div, RAE Trg Centre - Regimental List RAE (Fd) Rec for substantive Captains	
		" 3013	to AMS NX118873 Lt J.J. Davies to be attached for further two months.	
		3017	to AMS - Lt K.R. Gilmour to be attached for a period of two months.	
			Major Lang to 6 AA & Frt Coy - 2 days.	


 C.E. SECOND AUST. ARMY

WAR DIARY ~~or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMYDate and Time.—From 1 MAR 44 To 31 MAR 44

St 7433

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CE SECOND AUST ARMY	15 Mar	Memo 3018	Report on visit of Inspection of RAE Trg Centre, Wagga, Rec Trg Centre Cowra, DCRE Bathurst by Major Harper.	
		" 3019	to AMS Return of Officers RAE Trg Centre	
		" 3021	to E in C Major Machine Tools	
		" 3022	to DADOS - Special Equip for 1 Aust Parachute Bn (AEP)	
	16 Mar	" 3026	to CRE 1 Aust Div - VX130551 Lt L.G. Bower - change in allotment for duty.	
		" 3028	to "Q" Boiler Feed pump North Head Barracks.	
		" 3030	" " AWAS Accommodation - AA & Coast Arty Stations Belmore Drill Hall	
		" 3037	to 2 Aust CE Works - Georges Heights - 351 Hy AA Tp AWAS Accommodation	
		" 3038	do AWAS Accommodation - 1 AA Bty Cremorne Maj Harper to VDC HQ	
			LT Tweddell to RAE 1 Aust Div	
	17 Mar	" 3040	Instructional Staff - RAE Trg Centre, Wagga	
		" 3041	to "A" IX48775 Cpl Sprake T.J. - Transfer to 5 AA & Frt Coy from 270 LAD	
		" 3042	to CRE 1 Aust Div. Shire of Hornsby: Demolition Bridge over Peats Ferry	
		" 3044	to E in C - "KOREE" Shock Absorber	
		" 3046	" " - Towed Targets.	
		" 3047	to G (Ops) Ferry for Damaged Aircraft Shealhaven River NOWRA Maj Harper to Concord Hospital to see Maj Yarrington.	
	18 Mar	" 3052	to "Q" Accommodation - Kembla Frt	
		" 3053	to 2 Aust CE Works - proposed alterations to Canteen at Cowra Maj Harper to 2 Aust CE Works.	
			Maj Lang to 4 AA & Frt Coy until morning of 22 Mar.	

G.E. SEC D AUST. ARMY

WAR DIARY ~~OF THE INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMYDate and Time.—From 1 MAR 44To 31 MAR 44

St 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CE SECOND AUST ARMY	20 Mar	Memo 3056	to RAE Trg Centre - Re Boxes Filing Steel, Safe Fireproof	
		" 3058	Command Paymaster - Hunter & Williams Rivers Strategic Bridges Approach Roads.	
		" 3059	G Trg - Visual Trg Huts. C.E. returned ex LHQ Lt Tweddell to 25 Pd Coy Spr Boulton to 14 days leave.	
	21 Mar	" 3063	to BGS - Proposed WE - CE Branch Second Aust Army	
		" 3067	to AMS - Promotion to rank of T/Capt NX125909 Lt J.A. McKenna	
		" 3068	to HQ VDC - Training Syllabus - VDC Engineer Platoons Maj Harper to VDC HQ with above	
		" 3069	RAE Trg Centre - Visit to E in C by OCs of RAE Units.	
		" 3072	AMS - Posting of Officers - RAE Trg Centre	
		" 3073	A Branch - Transfer Cpl Delade, N. Cpl Mondy, Attachment Cpl Murray P.A.	
	22 Mar	" 3077	Camp Comdt - NF465806 Spr J.M. Campbell - Classification as specialist Clerk Group III	
		" 3079	E in C - List of names for consideration for posting of SORE I E & M for DES. CE and Major Harper to Kembla Frt.	
	23 Mar	" 3084	SORE Stores - Deficiencies SW Huts supplied to 1 RAE Trg Centre from 6 Aust Works & Park Coy.	
		" 3086	Hawkesbury River Bridge - North Side Accommodation 2 Grn Bn	
		" 3088	AUS - Attachment of Officers CE Branch	
		" 3090	2 Aust CE Wks - 54Camp Hospital - Wagga.	
		" 3091	Auxiliary Power supply - North Head. CE to 2 Aust CE Works.	
	24 Mar	" 3094	2 Aust CE Wks - Fortresses & Defended ports - Reserve Water supply.	


 G.E. SECOND AUST. ARMY


WAR DIARY or ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMY Date and Time.—From 1 MAR 44 To 31 MAR 44

St 7455

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
CE SECOND AUST ARMY	24 Mar	Memo 3096	Sewage and Drainage "Ambleside"	
		" 3098	RAE Trg Centre - re Transfer N390323 Cpl Fisher, G.B.	
	25 Mar	" 3604	"Q" - AWAS Accommodation Hamilton Drill Hall - N/c Frt	
		" 3105	AMS - NX8218 Lt G.S.Parker to be returned to 2/1 Aust Fd Coy	
		" 3106	" HX171677 Lt K.R.Gilmour to be posted as IORE vice above.	
		" 3108	E in C - N100669 Lt (T/Capt) E.V.Blaydes 5Aust AA & FrtCoy	
	27 Mar	" 3109	BGS - V50801 Major H.E.Lang SORE II Frt - to Act SORE I vice Major Harper	
			Maj Harper temporarily allotted to SME for Spec Course.	
			Sgt Pettigrew to SME for school.	
			Lt Tweddell to Wagga for 3 days.	
		" 3114	"Q" - Accommodation Wksps Avoca St Randwick	
		" 3117	DAA & QMG RAE Trg Centre - RE 3007 Consolidations etc.	
		" 3128	AMS - Appointment as Instr LHQ BD School VX112098 Lt R.J. Sebastian RAE (BD)	
	28 Mar	" 3127	RAE Trg Centre - Aust Panel Bridge	
			Major Lang to Vic Bks	
			Lt Searl to Vic Bks and then to Narellan.	
	29 Mar	" 3128	Accommodation Sydney Frt Area - North Bty CA.	
		" 3129	Engineer Officers from civilian sources.	
		" 3132	E in C - Master TTV "Koree"	
	30 Mar	" 3133	Booby Trap components.	
		" 3136	E in C - Mech equip for 2/2 & 2/3 Aust Forestry Coy	
		" 3137	RAE Trg Centre - 1 Aust CRE NG Forests 7 1 & 2 A Forest Svy Coys & Raising of.	
			Maj Lang toDCRE Chatswood.	


 C.E. SECOND AUST. ARMY

WAR DIARY ~~or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)

Unit CE SECOND AUST ARMY

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44

St 7455

[illegible]

G.E. SECOND AUST. ARMY

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit Survey Service
HQ Second Aust Army Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44

51 7135

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
Bumside			VX117058 Major M.C. Black DAD SVY	
			N12065 Capt J.H. Hansen SO SVY	
			NX173250 Sjt Connors D.E. Chief Clerk	
			VX101960 Sjt O'Donoghue P.J. Computer	Detached to RAAF Svy Flight Canberra 1 Mar 44.
			NX18695 Spr Mulcahy E.J. Storeman	
			VX61588 Spr McLennan P.J. Draftsman	
			NX175103 Spr Johnson L.D. Draftsman	
			NF445953 Spr Gowen P.C. Stenographer	

Michael Black
for HQ Second Aust Army

(Erase heading not required).

(adapted)

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar 44 To 31 Mar 44

91 7455

[illegible]

LCB/CG

WAR DIARY

SECRET

No. _____

PROPOSED DISBANDMENT OF
SURVEY SERVICE.

HEADQUARTERS,

SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY.

SWY/253/44

16 Mar 44.

BGS

1. Listed below for information are the duties at present being carried out by the Survey Service.

Operational

- (a) Supervision of Second Aust Army programme of Aerial Survey now being carried out by RAAF.
- (b) Supervision of Second Aust Army programme of Aerial Survey in the course of completion by Adastra Airways Pty Ltd (It is anticipated that the above work will be completed in May 44.)
- (c) The carrying out of any special field Surveys in NSW Area.
- (d) Duties in respect to the administration of 13 Aust Fd Svy Depot.

Non Operational

- (e) Liaison with State Departments on technical survey matters.
- (f) Liaison with Hydrographic Branch PAN (Survey Branch) on technical matters.
- (g) Investigations of source of supply of special survey stores and equipment for Survey Directorate, IHC.

- 2 -

- (h) Responsible for the keeping of Survey records and technical data in NSW Area and for the issuing of such information.
- (i) Responsible for the payment of accounts out of Aust Svy Corps funds for surveying expenses incurred in this Area.
- (j) Responsible for the control of supply and issue of Military Maps in this Area.

2. In the event of the disbandment of the Survey Service, Second Aust Army, it is suggested that it would be of advantage to Field Survey to have representation on the establishment of NSW L of C Area.

Major
DAD SURVEY SECCND AUST ARMY

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2
(adapted.)

Unit HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

Date and Time.—From 1 MAR 44

To 31 MAR 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PARRAMATTA	1 MAR 44		Summary of 'A' Branch Staff on Strength 1 Mar 44	
	1 MAR 44		365 AUST HAA TP - DELETION OF A10755	
	2 " "		Second Aust Army Routine Orders Serial No 9 73-81.	
	2 " "		Aust Arty Trg Centre - Reorganisation of A10974.	
	4 " "		Reorganisation of - H Ny Bty (Coast)IE L Ny Bty (Coast)IA A10959	
	4 " "		First Victory Loan A11057	
	5 " "		Reorganisation of L A Ds AEME A11025	
	9 " "		Second Aust Army Routine Orders Serial No.10 82-86.	
	9 " "		5801 AUST AA/CA BTY (HE) RAISING OF A11205.	
	10 " "		REORGANISATION OF - ONE COY 1 AUST PD AIB A11300	
	13 " "		2 AUST DOORS BP - RAISING OF A11440.	
	13 " "		REORGANISATION AND RAISING OF 3 STRAIN AND UNITS AND	
			ANCILLARY UNITS ATTACHED A11438	
	13 " "		9 AUST DOORS OF COY (TRG 3) RAISING OF A11441	
	16 " "		Second Aust Army Routine Orders Serial No.11 87-97.	

[Signature]
DAAG SECOND AUST. ARMY

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118
(adapted.)

Unit HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

Date and Time.—From 1 MAR 44 To 31 MAR 44.

2104 542 St. 1621

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
PARRAMATTA	17 MAR 44		PERSONNEL IN STATIC INSTALLATIONS SERVING IN OTHER THAN THEIR HOME STATES A11702.	
	20 MAR 44		1 AUST FD AHB - REORGANISATION OF PERSONNEL A11817.	
	"		AUST CENTRAL FD SVY DEPOT - DELETION OF A11870	
	20 MAR 44		16, 17 AND 20 AUST RADIO MAINT SECTIONS AHB - RAISING OF A11866	
	22 "		1 AASC TRG CENTRE - REORGANISATION OF A11916.	
	"		BOMB DISPOSAL UNITS AHB - REORGANISATION OF A11957.	
	23 MAR 44		SECOND AUST ARMY ROUTINE ORDERS SERIAL NO. 12. 98-105.	
	"		2 & 3 AUST ARMY TRADES TRG CMP TS - REORGANISATION OF A11952	
	24 MAR 44		1 AHB TRG CENTRE - REORGANISATION OF A43	
	25 "		TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL TO WATER TRANSPORT. A.12.	
	26 "		2 AUST MT TRG DEPOT - REORGANISATION OF A.104.	
	29 "		SECOND AUST ARMY LOCAL DEFENCE PRD DIRECTION BOARD A290	
	30 "		SECOND AUST ARMY ROUTINE ORDER SERIAL NO. 13 106-111.	

[Signature]
DAG SECOND AUST ARMY

'A' BRANCH STAFF ON STRENGTH - 1 MAR 44.

APPT.	RANK	N A M E.	WHETHER POSTED OR ATTACHED ETC.
DAAG (0)	MAJOR.	A.S. CHILD	Previously attached now posted as from 10.2.44.
SC (0) 2	CAPT.	F.B. JOHNSON	Previously attached now posted as from 23.12.43.
SC (0) 4	LIEUT	D.B. HUNTER	POSTED AS FROM 1.1.44.
SC (PS)	CAPT.	D R A MURRAY	Previously attached then posted 23.12.43 and transferred to HQ 2 Aust Beach Gp 6.3.44.

EQ SECOND AUST ARMY

A10755

423/1/157

1 MAR 44

365 AUST E A A TP (STATIC) (LE)

DELETION OF

SYDNEY FORTRESS

Copy to - NSW L OF C AREA	Q...
NSW L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE	DDST
GOC ADM COND	DMS
GS (OPS)	ADDS
GS (SD & TRG)	DDQS
ERA	DDME
DA & CMG	ADAPS
AMS	AD AMENITIES

LMQ SH2151 of 25 Feb 44 advises that 365 EAA Tp (Static) (LE) is being deleted from OOB AMF.

2. Action will be taken by EQ Sydney Fortress as set out hereunder:

DELETE

War Office Serial No	UNIT	WE REF	Posted Strength (exclusive of VDC component) as at 12 Feb 44
			Offrs ORs Total
46717	365 AUST EAA TP (STATIC) (LE)	VI/13G/2	- 9 9

3. Personnel made available by the deletion of the unit in accordance with this instruction will be transferred to AA units selected by BRA Second Aust Army.

4. Sydney Fortress will ensure that all relevant unit records are adjusted to the satisfaction of NSW L of C Area RO and DFO, and in this regard particular attention will be given to investigations regarding personnel AWL or illegally absent and the completion of the reports of Investigating Officers in connection therewith.

5. Sporting equipment will be dealt with in accordance with GRO A494/43.

6. Regimental Trust Funds will be disposed of in terms of GRO F819/43 para 29.

7. (1) All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment.

(ii) Controlled equipment will be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army Adm Instn, No 180.

(iii) Uncontrolled Stores and equipment will be returned to 1 Aust Returned Stores Depot, Rosebery.

(iv) Vehicles will be returned to 3 Aust Vehicle Park, Ryde.

(v) ASC stores including reserve and emergency rations will be returned to Stationery Depot NSW L of C Area.

(vi) Stationery, non-expendable stores, and publications will be returned to Stationery Depot, NSW L of C Area.

- (vii) Camp accommodation stores held on FI and FI (a) will be returned to the appropriate QN.
8. Mess accounts will be finalised to the satisfaction of Comd Sydney Fortress.
9. Sydney Fortress will forward weekly progress reports on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 20 Mar 44.

W.S. MacLennan
DA & QEG SECOND AUST ARMY

RESTRICTED.

The information given in this document is not to be communicated,
either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not
holding an official position in His Majesty's Service.



SERIAL No. 9

No. 73-81

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS

PART I

By

Maj-Gen H W LLOYD, CB, CMG, CVO, DSO

Adm Comd

SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY

*Headquarters,
Second Australian Army.
2nd March, 1944.*

General Staff.

G 73. SCHOOLS AND COURSES — LIST OF STUDENTS QUALIFIED

List of students who qualified at the undermentioned schools is published
as Appendix "A" to these orders:

1. LHQ School of Artillery (Fd) — Liverpool
77/2/91 No 3A Course - BCs and Potential BCs.

2. LHQ School of Mechanization — Seymour
77/8/36 No 15 Course - D & M MC (Addendum)
3. LHQ AAMC School — Ivanhoe
77/10/16 No 19 Course - Medical War
4. LHQ AAOC School — Broadmeadows
77/13/79 No 29 Course - General Army Organization and Ordnance Procedure.
5. LHQ AFV School — Puckapunyal
77/15/66 No 27 Course - Tank Wireless
6. LHQ School of Hygiene and Sanitation — Sydney
77/21/19 No 19 Course - Hygiene and Sanitation
7. LHQ School of Artillery (AA) — Randwick
77/24/30 No 49 Course - LAA NCOs Fire Control Conversion
77/24/33 No 51 Course - HAA Gunnery (AWAS)
8. LHQ School Supervisory Personnel — Darley
77/25/30 No 3 Course - Supervisory Personnel (AWS)
9. LHQ School of E & ME — Ingleburn
77/34/73 No 8 Course - EME "B" Vehicles
10. LHQ School of Army Cooking & Catering — Chermide
77/40/9 No 10 Course - NCO Cooks
77/40/10 No 11 Course - Caterers' Refresher
11. LHQ School of Army Cooking & Catering (Mobile Wings 1 & 2) — Liverpool
77/45/2 No 2 Course - Cooking (Addendum)
12. First Aust Army Adm (NCOs) School — Cabarlah
77/109/10 No 13 Course - Orderly Room Sjts (Addendum)
13. First Aust Army AASC School — Cabarlah
77/110/22 No 13 Course - General Duties
14. Second Aust Army Junior Leaders' School — Seymour
77/69/2 No 1 Course - Detention Barracks Instructors
15. 2 Aust Trg Bn (AWS) — Ingleburn
77/89/37 No 4 Course - Cooking and Catering (AWS)
16. VDC Engineer Training Course — Wagga
77/142/7 No 12 Course - General Engineer Training

G 74. LOSS OF ARMY PASSES

1. The following Ordinary Passes AAF A96(a) have been reported stolen on 13 Feb 44:—

No 26980 issued to Mr A L FARRELL
No 26981 issued to Mr A S FARRELL

2. Unit comds will detain any person attempting to use these passes and will report such attempt immediately to HQ Second Aust Army.

(To be repeated in Unit ROs.)

G 75. PHOTOGRAPHY — APPROVED PHOTOGRAPHERS

1. Attention is directed to the provisions of GRO 18/44.
2. The following amendments are made to Appendix "B" of Second Aust Army Routine Order 123/43:—

(a) NSW L OF C AREA

- (i) BATHURST add - F R SMITH, 36 Rocket Street
- (ii) WEST MAITLAND add - JAMES F LUCEY, 7 Victoria St
- (iii) add - MULLUMBIMBY - R E RUDD, Chemist
CAMDEN - C M CLARK, Chemist,
90 Argyle St
COWRA - PARDEY BROS STUDIOS
CAMPBELLTOWN - R VENESS, Chemist,
159 Queen St

(b) QUEENSLAND L OF C AREA

- (i) BRISBANE Delete - P VICTORSEN,
Central Building, Edward St
- (ii) ROCKHAMPTON add - C W MILLS, Emu Park
- (iii) add - MARYBOROUGH - CAMPBELL PORTRAIT STUDIOS, Kent St
ESK - W R DODD, Chemist
GYMPIE - MURRAY STUDIOS
GLADY McD ELLIOTT, Chemist
CHARTERS TOWERS - C GRIFFITH, Chemist
- A WADLEY, Chemist

(c) WA L OF C AREA

- add - ALBANY - JEFF COLES, Stub Terrace
- BANBURY - G S COX, Williams Street
- M J THOMAS, 116 Victoria St

CMK/llust.

Brig GS

Administration.

A 76. FIRST VICTORY LOAN

1. The Commonwealth Government will shortly raise a loan of £150,000,000 to be called the "First Victory Loan", and such loan will be given the widest publicity.

2. All units (including Formations and Fortress etc HQ) will forthwith appoint a suitable officer to be the unit "Victory Loan Officer" to act as publicity officer and adviser. Such "Victory Loan Officer" will be responsible for the canvassing of all members of the unit for subscriptions to the said loan.

3. The names of the officers so appointed will be forwarded to HQ Second Aust Army not later than 7 Mar 44.

4. Capt L Connolly will act as Second Aust Army Victory Loan Officer and HQ Vic L of C Area has agreed to act for HQ Second Aust Army in respect of all Second Aust Army units south of Bonegilla in connection with the said loan.

A 77. PERSONNEL — TRANSFER AND MOVEMENT OF

1. Units will quote the instruction of the highest authority (e.g. LHQ, Second Aust Army, L of C Area or Records Office) on all relevant documents and correspondence relating to the transfer, movement or detachment of personnel.

2. Formation and Fortress HQs, Trg Bdes and Centres will ensure that units required to act, are advised of such authority.

A 78. CURRENT AFFAIRS — INSTRUCTION OF ALL RANKS

1. Attention is directed to the provisions of GRO 823/43.

2. COs will ensure that the provisions of paragraphs 2 & 3 of the said GRO concerning instruction in and discussion of the matters contained in "The Current Affairs Bulletin" are strictly adhered to.

3. Where practicable, COs will consult an officer of the AAES and arrange with him for instruction of officers in the preparation and handling of discussion periods based upon the abovementioned bulletin.

A 79. OFFICERS — MOVEMENT OF

1. Attention is directed to Second Aust Army Routine Order 274/43, which is repeated for the information of units which have come under command since it was promulgated:-

"1. The movement to their new appointments of officers of Second Aust Army who have been transferred or re-posted within the formation will be effected within two days of the receipt of the instructions.

2. The movement of officers from Second Aust Army to appointments in formations outside the command of Second Aust Army will be effected in accordance with the undermentioned conditions:

(a) Instructions will be issued for officers to move "forthwith" as "early as possible" or on or by a particular date.

(b) After the receipt of an instruction to move an officer "forthwith" the officer concerned will not be granted leave and arrangements will be made for his immediate movement.

(c) After the receipt of an instruction to move an officer "as early as possible" the Formation etc concerned will immediately signal the date the officer will be ready to move. Should however the officer be entitled to leave, Army Headquarters will be immediately advised by signal of the amount of leave due.

Army Headquarters will then signal instructions as to the amount of leave to be granted and the date by which the officer will be ready to move.

3. In all instances, Army Headquarters will be advised of the departure date of the officer immediately the movement is effected.

4. Second Aust Army Routine Order No. A201/43 is cancelled."

A 80. TRADE GROUP CLASSIFICATIONS — AWAS

Where members of the AWAS are qualified by appropriate trade tests and are filling a vacancy on WE in one of the trades shown on the lists for female soldiers set out in GRO 636/43 as amended, they will be appointed to the corresponding trade grouping notwithstanding that such posting may be shown in the WE under the heading "Non Specialists."

A 81. RED CROSS MARKING — DENTAL UNITS

1. The Dental Service of the AMF is entitled to full protection within the meaning of the Geneva (Red Cross) Convention.

2. The following procedure will be adopted in connection with such marking:-

(a) When units or sections of the AA Dental Corps are operating with medical installations in fixed locations, the accommodation used will be suitably marked with the Geneva Red Cross in conformity with the marking of the unit to which the dental unit or section is attached.

(b) When dental units or sections are operating independently, accommodation used will not be marked with the Geneva Red Cross.

(c) Vehicles issued in accordance with WE IV/71/2 (A Dental Unit) or detailed by other arms for transporting dental units or sections thereof will not be marked with the Geneva Red Cross.

3. Transport or accommodation only temporarily used or required by units or sections of the AA Dental Corps need not be marked with the Geneva Red Cross.



BRIG
DA & QMG

APPENDIX "A" TO SECOND AUST ARMY ROUTINE ORDER

G 73 OF 2 MAR 44

1. LHQ School of Artillery (Fd) — Liverpool				
77/2/91 No 3A Course - BCs and Potential BCs. 3 Jan 44 - 5 Feb 44				
Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
NX203	Capt	Wilson S M	2/1 Aust Fd Regt	Q3
2. LHQ School of Mechanization — Seymour				
77/8/36 No 15 Course - E & M MC (Addendum) 26 Nov 43 - 25 Dec 43				
V21884	S sjt	McLean C S A	2 Aust MTD	Q
3. LHQ AAMC School — Ivanhoe				
77/10/16 No 19 Course - Medical War 3 Jan 44 - 12 Feb 44				
N72743	WO 1	Denning G A	2 AAMC Trg Bn	Q
N260083	S sjt	Wallace R F	3/14 Aust Fd Amb	Q
N172360	A s sjt	Williams E G	1 Aust Fd Amb	Q
SX31259	Sjt	Hill R W	3/14 Aust Fd Amb	Q
4. LHQ AAOC School — Broadmeadows				
77/13/79 No 29 Course - General Army Organization and Ordnance Procedure. 3 Jan 44 - 29 Jan 44				
NX113311	S sjt	Tomkins V R	2 Aust Tk Bn Ord Fd Pk	Q
5. LHQ AFV School — Puckapunyal				
77/15/66 No 27 Course - Tank Wireless 28 Dec 43 - 5 Feb 44				
NX101395	Cpl	Clark R C	2 Aust Tk Bn	D
NX115485	L cpl	Reid R W	2 Aust Tk Bn	D
6. LHQ School of Hygiene and Sanitation — Sydney				
77/21/19 No 19 Course - Hygiene and Sanitation 30 Oct 43 - 10 Dec 43				
NX104926	Lt	Munro W A	1 Aust Fd Amb	Q1
NX82090	Sjt	Brisbane D S	18 Aust Inf Bn	Q2
WX19245	Sjt	Dunstan R T	1/45 Aust Inf Bn	Q2
N261113	Sjt	Gardner W F	34 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Q2

LHQ School of Artillery (AA) — Randwick

No 49 Course - LAA NCOs Fire Control Conversion
3 Jan 44 - 5 Feb 44

Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
NX86346	Sjt	Goodwin T R L	658 Aust LAA Bty	Q
NN17339	Bdr	Harrington D M	657 Aust LAA Bty	Q

LHQ School of Artillery (AA) — Randwick

77/24/33 No 51 Course - HAA Gunnery (AWAS)
3 Jan 44 - 12 Feb 44

VF345931	Sjt	Turpie M	Melbourne AA Ops Room	Q
NF410568	L sjt	Gardiner T N	HQ 3 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF447217	Bdr	Ausling E	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF457286	Bdr	Davis K M	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF410600	Bdr	Haslam E I	HQ 18 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF410599	Bdr	Wilson F N	HQ 18 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF443205	A bdr	Linigen M	HQ 8 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF447207	L bdr	Barnes M	HQ 14 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF446250	L bdr	Ivers B I	HQ 8 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF452637	L bdr	Jarvie P	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q

8. LHQ School Supervisory Personnel — Darley

77/25/30 No 3 Course - Supervisory Personnel (AWS)
10 Jan 44 - 7 Feb 44

NF440848	Bdr	Kemp G M L	HQ 14 Aust HAA Bty	Gp 2
NF392196	L bdr	King M	HQ Kembla Frt	Gp 2
NF445940	Gnr	Barnie J M	HQ 18 Aust HAA Bty	Gp 2
NF461698	Gnr	Briggs A M	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Gp 3
NF437145	Gnr	Lees J	HQ 63 Aust SL Bty	Gp 2
NF440732	Gnr	Smith T M	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Gp 3

9. LHQ School of E & ME — Ingleburn

77/34/73 No 8 Course - EME "B" Vehicles
6 Dec 43 - 29 Jan 44

N453483	Lt	Wilson E W	109 Aust Bde Wksp	Q
---------	----	------------	-------------------	---

10. LHQ School of Army Cooking & Catering — Chermide

77/40/9 No 10 Course - NCO Cooks
17 Jan 44 - 7 Feb 44

QX48642	Sjt	Kennedy T D	HQ AA & Frt Sigs Eastern Area	Class I Gp 2
V18691	Sjt	Wootton W A	1 Aust Fd Arty Trg Regt	Class I Gp 2
NX174762	Cpl	Williams W G	1 Aust SL Trg Regt	Class I Gp 2
NN111080	Gnr	Harris F J	9 Aust Fd Regt	Class I Gp 2

LHQ School of Army Cooking & Catering — Chermside

77/40/10

No 11 Course — Caterers' Refresher
27 Dec 43 - 5 Feb 44

Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
N99012	WOII	Boyd E L	1 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Q
NX125074	WOII	Dickson H J	20/34 Aust Inf Bn	Q
N195001	WOII	Dowland S W	20/34 Aust Inf Bn	Q
N77173	WOII	Leggo C J	32 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Q
QX5125	WOII	McCreanor E	12 Aust L of C Sigs.	Q

11. LHQ School of Army Cooking & Catering (Mobile Wings 1 & 2) —
Liverpool

77/45/2

No 2 Course — Cooking
20 Oct 43 - 17 Nov 43 (Addendum)

N268724	Sjt	Norton J C	2 AAMC Trg Bn	Gp 2
NX98244	Tpr	Wathen J E	1 Aust Armd Corps Trg Regt	Gp 2
VX85266	Gnr	Bull L T	HQ Kembla Frt	Gp 2
SX2523	Spr	Brown A V	2 RAE Trg Bn	Gp 2
TX3006	Sigmn	Hodgetts H B	1 Aust Sig Trg Bn	Gp 2
V205930	Pte	Baxter H W	2 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2
N334462	Pte	Benjamin T	1 AASC Trg Bn	Gp 2
N442856	Pte	Boidin A H	5 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2
V513255	Pte	Dunne E E	28 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2
NX109752	Pte	Hughes J T	41 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2
V175865	Pte	Riddell A C R	34 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2
SX29330	Pte	Sandstrom N C	32 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Gp 2

12. First Aust Army Adm (NCOs) School — Cabarlah

77/109/10

No 13 Course — Orderly Room Sjt
29 Dec 43 - 29 Jan 44 (Addendum)

NX101310	Sjt	Jordan L J	41/2 Aust Inf Bn	Q
NX13775	L sjt	James B L	HQ 18 Aust HAA Bty	Q

13. First Aust Army AASC School — Cabarlah

77/110/22

No 13 Course — General Duties
31 Dec 43 - 3 Feb 44

NX123379	Sjt	Cameron G D	15 Aust Coy AASC	Q
NX101106	Sjt	Searles K A	13 Aust Coy AASC	Q

14. Second Aust Army Junior Leaders' School — Seymour

77/69/2

No 1 Course — Detention Barracks Instructors
15 Jan 44 - 12 Feb 44

VX119399	S sjt	Davies E B	Second Aust Army Junior Leaders' School	Q
N22031	Sjt	MacPherson W J	5 Aust Detention Barracks	Q
NX144790	Sjt	Ryan W R	6 Aust Detention Barracks	Q
NX89192	L sjt	Mitchell E A R	5 Aust Detention Barracks	Q
SX16936	Cpl	Skidmore N C J	9 Aust Detention Barracks	Q

2 Aust Trg Bn (AWS) — Ingleburn

77/89/37

No 4 Course — Cooking and Catering (AWS)
4 Jan 44 - 1 Feb 44

Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
NF465093	Gnr	Bannister E	HQ 57 Aust SL Bty	Q
NF464251	Gnr	Hiscock C I	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF450952	Gnr	Thorpe J B	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF461558	Sigwn	Fox R	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q
NF464099	Pte	Grebert L J	HQ Coast Arty Kembla	Q

16.

VDC Engineer Training Course — Wagga

77/142/7

No 12 Course — General Engineer Training
23 Jan 44 - 5 Feb 44

N169932	Lt	Ball M B	29 Bn VDC NSW	Q
V389280	Lt	Jepson A K	23 Bn VDC Vic	Q
V367707	Lt	Neilson J B J	11 Bn VDC Vic	Q
V351864	Lt	Walker J A	9 Bn VDC Vic	Q
N390137	A Lt	Campbell W A	15 Bn VDC NSW	Q
V368635	Cpl	Osborne L C W	2 Bn VDC Vic	Q
V266107	A cpl	Anderson A S	13 Bn VDC Vic	Q
V369332	A cpl	Mullett W J	2 Bn VDC Vic	Q

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

410874

610/2/14

2 MAR 44

AUST ARTY TRG CENTRE - REORGANISATION
OF

AUST ARTY TRG CENTRE

Copy to NSW L of C Area Records Office	DMS
NSW L of C Area District Finance Office	ADDS
1 Aust Div	DDST
Sydney Fortress	DDME
1 Aust Svy Bty	DDOS
4 Aust F SP Bty	ADAFS
GOC Adm Comd	AD Monities
G (Ops)	
G (SD & Trg)	
BRK	
DA & QMG	
AMS	
Q	

LEQ SM2154 of 26 Feb 44 advises that an amendment to the OOB AMF, may be anticipated to provide for the reorganisation of Aust arty Trg Centre.

2. Action will be taken by HQ Aust Arty Trg Centre as follows:-

(a) DELETE

Posted Strength
as at 5 Feb 44

War Office Serial No	Unit	O	ORs	Total
46486	1 AUST FD ARTY TRG REGT	7	131	138
48126	1 AUST TK & TRG REGT	9	104	113
46793	1 AUST L AA TRG REGT 2	9	65	74
46488	1 AUST H AA TRG REGT	3	27	30
48127	1 AUST SVY & F SP TRG BTY	2	12	14
TOTAL		30	339	369

(b) REORGANISE

Posted Strength
as at 5 Feb 44

War Office Serial No	Unit	O	ORs	Total
46791	2 AUST FD ARTY TRG REGT (Three TrgsBty)	18	142	160
46791	<u>AS</u> 2 AUST FD ARTY TRG REGT comprising:			
	HQ	8	33	41
	One Fd Arty Trg Bty	5	50	55
	One LAA Trg Bty	3	36	39
	(consisting of Bty HQs & two Tps)			
	One HAA Trg Bty	3	36	39
	(consisting of Bty HQs & two Tps)			
	One Tk & Trg Bty	2	30	32
	(consisting of Bty HQs & one Tp)			
		21	185	206

Tk A Trg Bty and the HAA Trg Bty will only be retained until such time as the personnel on the trainee strength of these Btys become DPL and are drafted by NSW L of C Area Records Office.

3. Personnel required to complete the reorganisation of 2 Aust Fd Arty Trg Regt will be obtained by the transfer of suitable personnel from units deleted in accordance with para 2 (a) of this instruction.

4. The personnel rendered surplus consequent upon the implementation of this authority will be disposed of as follows:-

(a) Officers who are seconded and ORs who are on X-List will be returned to their parent unit.

(b) Aust Arty Trg Centre will submit a list of officers who cannot be returned to their units in accordance with para 4 (a) showing the following particulars:-

Army number, substantive and present temporary rank, full name, age, parent unit, military experience, date of appointment to commissioned rank, civil occupation, and training and medical classification, and if A2 or B class nature of disability.

(c) ORs who cannot be returned to their unit in accordance with para 4 (a) will be made available to HQ 2 Echelon for reallocation. Aust Arty Trg Centre will submit a return to HQ Second Aust Army showing the following particulars :-

Army number, rank acting lance and substantive and trade grouping, full name, age, present unit, military experience and medical classification and if A2 or B class nature of disability.

5. The army number, substantive and present temporary rank full name and parent unit of officers transferred or reported in accordance with this instruction will be forwarded to HQ Second Aust Army as soon as possible.

6. HQ Aust Arty Trg Centre will transfer from the units deleted in accordance with this instruction such stores and equipment as are considered necessary to complete the training of trainees in 2 Aust Fd Arty Trg Regt.

7. Equipment rendered surplus consequent upon the implementation of this instruction will be disposed of as follows:-

(a) Controlled stores:- Under separate instructions to be issued by HQ Second Aust Army.

(b) Uncontrolled equipment :- Return to Returned Stores Depot

8. All recruits being trained in the units being disbanded in accordance with this instruction will be transferred to 2 Aust Fd Arty Trg Regt.

9. NSW L of C Area Records Office has been instructed to allot the reinforcements on becoming DPL in Arty Trg Regts, who cannot be placed under orders for immediate drafting forward as reinforcements, for further training to the undermentioned units in a similar manner to 'Young Soldiers':-

Fd Arty Reinfts to 9 Aust Fd Regt
Tk A Reinfts to 1st Aust Tk A Regt
AA Reinfts to Sydney AA Gp
Svy & F Sp Reinfts to 1 Svy Bty and 4 F Sp Bty

10. The regimental funds and sporting equipment of units being disbanded in accordance with this instruction will be transferred to 2 Aust Fd Arty Trg Regt.

11. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment.

12. Officers and Sgts Mess accounts of the units to be disbanded will be finalised to the satisfaction of Comd Aust Arty Trg Centre and District Finance Officer.

13. Comds of the units being reorganised will be responsible for the completion of unit records to the satisfaction of NSW L of C Area Records Office & Finance Office and in this regard, particular attention will be given to investigations relating to members AEL or illegally absent and for finalisation of Courts of Inquiry or Investigating Officers' reports in connection therewith.

14. It is requested that the reorganisation be completed by 20 Mar 44.

15. Aust Arty Trg Centre will forward weekly progress reports on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 13 Mar 44.

W. J. ...
DA & CMG SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

H HY BTY (COAST)(LE) - REORGANISATION OF
L HY BTY (COAST)(LE) - REORGANISATION OF

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY
 423/1/159

4 MAR 44

A10959

HQ SYDNEY FORTRESS

Copies to : HQ FIRST AUST ARMY
 NSW L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE
 NEWCASTLE FORTRESS
 KEMBLA FORTRESS

G (OPS)
 G (SD)
 B R A
 Q

1. LHQ SM2229 of 23 Feb 44 advises that amendments to the OOB, AMF may be anticipated for the re-organisation of the abovenamed units.
2. HQ Sydney Fortress will provide the following OR personnel from CA units under command to complete H and L Aust Hy Btys to WE :-

	<u>H BTY</u>	<u>L BTY</u>
Sgts CASL	-	1
<u>TRADE GP 11</u>		
Instrument Operators Fire Control	4	-
" " Searchlight	-	2
" " Switchboard	-	4
" " Plotter	-	3
<u>TRADE GP 111</u>		
Gunlayers	1	1
Rangetakers	2	1
Technical storeman	-	1
<u>NON SPECIALISTS</u>	24	26
TOTAL	<u>31</u>	<u>39</u>

3. As H and L Aust Hy Btys are required for an operational area HQ Sydney Fortress will ensure that the personnel being transferred are all fully trained in their ranks and/or trade and that no promotions or trade groupings are made to enable the required ranks and trades to be provided.
4. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment and will be issued with clothing in accordance with tropical scale "B" vide GRO 205/43 and any amendments thereto. Jungle green will not be issued.
5. All such personnel will be prepared for draft in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army Routine Order A354/43.
6. The provisions of GRO 321/43 will be observed.
7. It is desired that the personnel required for H Hy Bty are ready for movement by 12 Mar 44 and those for L Hy Bty by 25 Mar 44.
8. HQ Sydney Fortress will advise HQ Second Aust Army immediately the drafts are ready for movement.

A. G. Lang Capt
 BRIG
 DA & QMG SECOND AUST ARMY

A11057

HQ Second Aust Army,
4 Mar 44.

70/5/8

FIRST VICTORY LOAN.

The Commonwealth Government extends a special invitation to all service personnel to participate in the forthcoming First Victory Loan on the success of which so much depends in bringing this war to a fitting conclusion.

HQ Second Aust Army has accepted the obligation to do its best for the fighting troops and asks all who can to play their full part to make the Victory Loan an outstanding success. To help in this, an Army Victory Loan Officer has been appointed. Every unit, no matter how small, is also appointing a Victory Loan Officer, whose duty it will be personally to make it easily possible for all members to subscribe.

Although one duty of the Army Victory Loan Officer is to guide Unit Loan Officers, it obviously will be impossible for any one man personally to supervise the activities of all unit officers - scattered as they are throughout the length and breadth of New South Wales. Direction and assistance will be given, but it is felt that units will play their full part to ensure that the Loan is a success.

Capt. L. O'B. Conolly, who has been appointed Second Aust Army Victory Loan Officer, will be in charge of all Loan activities as far as Second Army is concerned. He will act as liaison officer with the civilian loan organisers, and will pass on to unit Loan Officers information, literature, posters, etc. to help them to interest their personnel in the Loan.

From time to time directions will be given designed to further the success of the First Victory Loan. Ready compliance will be sincerely appreciated.

H. W. Lloyd

(H. W. Lloyd) Maj-Gen.
ADM COMD SECOND AUST ARMY.

DISTRIBUTION:

All Units, Second Aust Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

A11025

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY
423/32/21
5 Mar 44

REORGANISATION OF LADs - AEME

1 AUST DIV
2/8 AUST ARMD REGT

Copy to:- NSW L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE
GOC ADH COMD
G (OPS)
G (SD & TRG)
DA & QMG
AMS
Q

DDST
DMS
ADDS
DDOS
DDME
ADAPS
AD AMENITIES

LHQ SM2245 of 29 Feb 44 advises that amendments to the OOB, AMF have been made and action will be taken by addressees in accordance with Appendix "A" attached hereto.

2. It is desired that the reorganisation of these units be completed not later than 29 Mar 44.
3. 1 Aust Div will advise HQ Second Aust Army promptly the regimental particulars of the two personnel surplus to the reorganisation of 308 Aust LAD.
4. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment.
5. HQ Second Aust Army will be advised when the instructions contained herein have been implemented.

W. J. ...
Brig
DA & QMG SECOND AUST ARMY

APPENDIX "A" ISSUED WITH A11025 DATED 5 MAR 44.

SERIAL	ACTION BY	ACTION	UNIT		W. ESTABLISHMENT			TO BE DRAWN FROM	PERSONNEL			REMARKS		
			War Office Serial No.	Designation	Ref No.	O	ORs		T	O	ORs		T	
1	1 AUST DIV	XPAND TO	45891	308 AUST LAD (TYPE 'G')	I/25K/1	1	38	39	308 AUST LAD (TYPE 'A') Strength as at 22 JAN 44 AEME personnel formerly att to 111 AUST TK/A REGT RAA Vide WE II/7/5 Total Surplus to WE	1	17	18	Surplus pers to be re-allotted to vacancies within AEME units under comd HQ SECOND AUST ARMY.	
										-	23	23		
										1	40	41		
										-	2	2		
2	2/8 AUST ARMED REGT	"	61484	2/94 AUST LAD (TYPE 'H')	I/25L/1	1	59	60	2/94 AUST LAD (TYPE 'B') Strength as at 22 JAN 44 AEME personnel formerly att to 2/8 AUST ARMED REGT Vide WE I/5B/1 Total	1	18	19		
											-	41	41	
										1	59	60		

RESTRICTED.

The information given in this document is not to be communicated,
either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not
holding an official position in His Majesty's Service.



SERIAL No. 10

Nos. 82-86

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS

PART I

By

Maj-Gen H W LLOYD, CB, CMG, CVO, DSO

Adm Comd

SECOND AUSTRALIAN ARMY

*Headquarters,
Second Australian Army,
9th March, 1944.*

General Staff.

**G 82. SCHOOLS AND COURSES — LIST OF STUDENTS
QUALIFIED**

List of students who qualified at the undermentioned schools is published
as Appendix "A" to these orders:

1. LHQ Small Arms School — Bonegilla
77/5/16 No 1 Course - Special 20 mm Hispano Gun Course

- 2 LHQ AASC School — North Geelong
77/7/85 No 2 Course - Supply Officers
- 3 LHQ Gas School — Cabarlah
77/17/14 No 23 Course - Unit Gas Offrs & NCOs (Addendum)
77/17/18 No 27 Course - Unit Gas Offrs & NCOs
- 4 LHQ School of E & ME — Ingleburn
77/34/84 No 2 Course - EMEs Searchlights
- 5 Flinders Naval Depot — Crib Point
77/35/8 No 8 Course - Naval Bombardment
- 6 NSW L of C Area AWS NCO School — Killara
77/96/19 No 14 Course - AWS NCOs
- 7 Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School — Seymour
77/63/45 No 1 Course - Signals
- 8 Second Aust Army Postal School
77/78/9 No 9 Course - Postal Orderlies Refresher

G 83. OFFICIAL UNIT PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Attention is directed to the provisions of GRO 18/44.
2. With reference to para 7 (a) of the said GRO, Formation and Fortress HQs and units desiring to process films or photographs taken for Official purposes will make application for permission so to do through normal channels to HQ Second Aust Army.
3. Such applications will contain the following information :-
 - (a) the reason for the desire to process such films or photographs, and
 - (b) particulars of photographic material held and whether such material is held on WET or is private property.

CMK/est.

Brig GS

Administration.

A 84. LEAVE — FREE TRAVEL

1. Attention is directed to the provisions of GRO 598/43 and Second Aust Army Routine Order 58/44.

2. Free travel on leave will not be granted more frequently than as set out hereunder, save in exceptional individual cases which are authorised under the personal signature of a Formation Commander :-

DESTINATION	FREQUENCY OF TRAVEL
Up to 150 miles	- Not more than once monthly
Over 150 miles but within the L of C Area	- Not more than once in six months
Over 150 miles and outside the L of C Area	- Not more than once in twelve months.

3. The frequency of free travel which is permitted applies to all types of leave, and if a member has free travel once within the appropriate period on any type of leave, he may not be granted free travel again within that period on the same or any other type of leave without the special authority referred to above.

A 85. APPREHENSION OF ABSENTEES WITHOUT LEAVE

1. Attention is directed to the provisions of GRO 599/43.
2. In order to avoid stoppage of pay and adjustment or cancellation of allotments to dependants of members who have already been accounted for by apprehension, admission to hospital, extension of leave or other causes, COs of units will ensure that appropriate enquiries are made from relevant L of C Area Records Offices in accordance with para 7(a) of the abovementioned GRO before action is taken to declare a soldier an illegal absentee.

A 86. AAB 83 — ISSUE TO PHILANTHROPIC REPRESENTATIVES

1. Formation and Fortress HQs, Training Centres, Bdes and Units concerned will issue AAB 83 (Record of Service Book) to authorised representatives of the officially recognised philanthropic organisations, viz:- Australian Red Cross Society, Australian Comforts Fund, Salvation Army, YMCA, YWCA.

2. In respect of such representatives, entries will be made on pages 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 only of the AAB 83 and the other pages will be cancelled.

Handwritten signature

BRIG
DA & QMG

APPENDIX "A" TO SECOND AUST ARMY ROUTINE ORDER

G 82 OF 9 MAR 44

1. LHQ Small Arms School — Bonegilla				
77/5/16 No 1 Course - Special 20 mm Hispano Gun Course 14 Feb - 19 Feb 44				
Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
N67825	Sjt	Joyce D T	Aust Water Tpt Trg Centre	Q
N387419	Sjt	Zwolsman J	Aust Water Tpt Trg Centre	Q
VX46420	A cpl	Hansen E R	Aust Water Tpt Trg Centre	Q
2. LHQ AASC School — North Geelong				
77/7/85 No 2 Course - Supply Officers 20 Dec 43 - 21 Jan 44				
NX119984	Lt	Warren C R E	13 Aust Coy AASC	Q
3. LHQ Gas School — Cabarlah				
77/17/14 No 23 Course - Unit Gas Offrs & NCOs (Addendum) 26 Aug - 18 Sep 43				
QX48760	Lt	Anderson T P	11 Aust Fd Regt	Q1
TX6429	Lt	Clark M R	135 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	Q1
NX107032	Lt	Gould M H	13/33 Aust Inf Bn	Q1
NX132936	Lt	Hain R W	HQ 3 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
VX112506	Lt	Lelean C O	HQ 57 Aust SL Bty	Q1
NX101452	Lt	Ludeke J T	2 Aust Tk Bn	D
NX101930	Lt	O'Connor D L	HQ Coast Arty Newcastle	Q1
NX109597	Lt	Pert R J W	HQ Coast Arty Kembla	Q1
NX101321	Lt	Tucker N G	17 Aust Inf Bn	Q1
VX81804	WOII	Teeson A	135 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	Q1
SX23659	Sjt	Bowman L	3 Aust Tank Bn	Q2
N75102	Sjt	Brown M A	20 Aust Inf Trg Bn	Q1
QX36485	Sjt	Jones W N	1 AAOC Trg Bn	Q1
NX113851	Sjt	Mangnall J E	3 Aust Tk Bn	Q1
QX15104	Sjt	McIntyre A	7 Aust MAC	Q1
SX31674	Sjt	Niehuus R D	2 Aust Tk Bn	Q1
NX101929	Sjt	Nightingale R	HQ Coast Arty Newcastle	Q1
NX146693	Sjt	Riley P	HQ 3 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
N71298	Sjt	Rohrick J H	2 Aust Grn Bn	Q2
NX101490	Sjt	Smith J L	2 Aust Tk Bn	Q1
NX149974	Sjt	Smithers F R	HQ 8 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
NX148717	Sjt	Young A	652 Aust LAA Bty	Q2
N171415	A sjt	Lackie H L	221 Aust LAA Bty	Q1
NX110527	A sjt	Lock A J	2 Aust Coast Arty Trg Bty	Q2
VX83256	L sjt	Carnie J R	4 Aust F Sp Bty	Q1
NX105795	L sjt	Hughes D G	HQ 5 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
VX22692	L sjt	Murphy W	2/8 Aust Coy AASC	Q1
NX146758	L sjt	Spargo W P	34 Aust Inf Bn	Q2
N151518	L sjt	Thompson D R	15 Aust Coy AASC	Q1
NX114954	Cpl	Dunn J R	18 Aust Inf Bn	Q1
NX166745	Cpl	Manuel E R	1 AASC Trg Bn	Q1
NX111683	Cpl	Nalder G F	17 Aust Inf Bn	D

3. LHQ Gas School — Cabarlah				
77/17/18 No 27 Course - Unit Gas Offrs & NCOs 21 Jan - 14 Feb 44				
Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
NX167700	Lt	Mayne S L	20/34 Aust Inf Bn	Q1
NX101526	Lt	Watson K B	2 Aust Tk Bn	Q2
SX23692	Sjt	Ash F E	2 Aust Tk Bn	Q1
NX105938	Sjt	Caldwell S	HQ Coast Arty Kembla	Q2
NX137374	Sjt	Hammond D E	13/33 Aust Inf Bn	Q2
VX119281	Sjt	McNamara J P	HQ 14 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
NX91238	Sjt	Teilfel W H	HQ 3 Aust HAA Bty	Q1
4. LHQ School of E & ME — Ingleburn				
77/34/84 No 2 Course - EMEs Searchlights 10 Jan - 19 Feb 44				
NX160991	T capt	Batten F W	Frt Wksp Newcastle	Q
NX147189	Lt	Byrne E J E	Frt Wksp Kembla	Q
NX173018	Lt	Matchett J G	HQ Frt Wksp Sydney	Q
5. Flinders Naval Depot — Crib Point				
77/35/8 No 8 Course - Naval Bombardment 15 Nov - 4 Dec 43				
QX43831	Bdr	Robertson J W	11 Aust Fd Regt	Q
QX26192	Bdr	Taylor R	11 Aust Fd Regt	Q
NX9103	A bdr	Willmott A N	2/1 Aust Fd Regt	Q
6. NSW L of C Area AWS NCO School — Killara				
77/96/19 No 14 Course - AWS NCOs 29 Dec 43 - 2 Feb 44				
NF409844	L sjt	Wright E G	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q
TF150308	Bdr	Briggs L S	HQ 62 Aust SL Bty	Q
NF444288	Bdr	Corben D	1 Aust SL Trg Regt	Q
NF446811	Bdr	Davis K	HQ 3 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF452366	Bdr	Farrington M M	HQ 61 Aust SL Bty	Q
NF447206	Bdr	Kennedy L R	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF444802	Bdr	Molesworth P M	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF443391	Bdr	Murrell G L	HQ 1 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF444294	Bdr	Winn A	HQ 60 Aust SL Bty	Q
NF446242	Bdr	Wood E D	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF444255	A bdr	Craik J P	HQ 15 Aust HAA Bty	Q
NF445400	L bdr	Kirkland D J L	HQ Newcastle Fortress	Q
NF409639	L cpl	Jones N F	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q
NF436589	L cpl	Scott F E N	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q

7. Second Aust Army Junior Leaders School — Seymour
 77/63/45 No 1 Course - Signals
 16 Jan - 12 Feb 44

Regtl No	Rank	Name	Unit	Class
NF409189	L cpl	Barton J M	HQ AA & Frt Sigs Eastern Area	D
NX114880	L cpl	Williams M H	9 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	Q
NX165958	Sigmn	Cooper R H	111 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	Q
NX144384	Sigmn	Edson J H	9 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	Q
NX171188	Sigmn	Gillard R E	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q
N446910	Sigmn	Walsh H N	12 Aust L of C Sigs	Q
NX169942	Sigmn	Wotton K W	1 Aust Inf Pde Sig Sec	Q
NF409172	Sigmn	Alexander N H	HQ AA & Frt Sigs Eastern Area	Q

8. Second Aust Army Postal School
 77/78/9 No 9 Course - Postal Orderlies Refresher
 14 Feb - 20 Feb 44

N270942	Sjt	O'Connor J C	1 AASC Trg Bn	Q
N80102	A sjt	Anderson G L	3 Aust Armd Corps Regt Sig Trg Unit	D
NX123118	A sjt	Hartmann K L	21 Aust Inf Trg Bn	D
N450841	A sjt	Stead L T B	11 Aust Grn Bn	D
NX94979	L sjt	Griffiths A	HQ 30 Aust HAA Bty	Q
N214571	L sjt	Lewin W A	18 Aust Emp Coy	D
VX35385	L sjt	Tully L W	8 Aust Adv Wksp	D
V311319	Cpl	French E H	HQ Coast Arty Port Phillip	D
NX129923	Cpl	Gates B W	15 Aust Coy AASC	D
NX124792	Cpl	Kidd J A	2 Aust Adv Ord Depot	D
NX27282	Cpl	McKenna L J	2 Aust Regt Sig Trg Unit	D
NX21188	Cpl	Tiller W R	113 Aust Gen Hosp	Q
N413448	A cpl	Burt G H	21 Aust Emp Coy	D
VX62904	A cpl	Clark C N	17 Aust Fd Coy	D
N217817	L cpl	Sheehy J	103 Aust Convalescent Depot	D
N443021	Pte	Chippendale F S K	103 Aust Gen Hosp	D

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY
423/1/162
9 Mar 44

2801 AUST AA/CA BTY (HE) - RAISING OF

A.11205

SYDNEY FORTRESS
NEWCASTLE FORTRESS
KEWBLA FORTRESS

Copy to : NS. L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE DMS
 GOC AMB COLD ADDS
 G (OPS) DDST
 G (SD & TRG) DDOS
 BRA DDME
 DA & SIG aDAPS
 AMS AD AMENITIES

LHQ SE2401 of 4 Mar 44 advises that an amendment to the OOB, AMF, may be anticipated for the raising of 2801 Aust AA/CA Bty.

2. Action will be taken by HQ Sydney Fortress as follows :-

RAISE FOR NG FORCE

WAR OFFICE
SERIAL NO

UNIT

WE

2 WE STRENGTH

92161	2801 AUST AA/CA BTY (HE)	VI/12B/I	6	170	176
-------	--------------------------	----------	---	-----	-----

It will be noted that WE VI/12B/I provides for 6 officers and 183 ORs but no action will be taken to raise the fire control personnel (1 sgt and 12 ORs) pending further instructions from LHQ.

3. The officers required in the raising of 2801 AUST AA/CA BTY (HE) will be medically classified A and will be obtained as follows :-

- (a) Separate instructions are being issued by LHQ (NS) regarding the appointment of officers of the rank of Captain and above.
- (b) It is requested BRA submit a return to reach AMS not later than 12 Mar 44 setting out particulars of all Lieutenants at present in CA & HAA units under command who are available and considered suitable for the following appointments :-

Lieutenant, CASL (with experience on 9.2 equipment)
Lieutenant, GPO (with experience on 9.2 equipment)
Lieutenant, Plotting Officer (with HAA Experience)
Lieutenant, Tactical Control Officer (with HAA experience)

The return will show the following particulars:

- (i) Regt No substantive and present temporary rank, full name.
- (ii) Present posting.
- (iii) Details of military service.
- (iv) Recommended appointment.

2.

4. (a) Details of the OR personnel required in the raising of 801 Aust AA/CA Bty are set out in appendix A of this instruction. They will be :-

(i) Selected by HQ Sydney Fortress from CA & HAA units under command.

(ii) Concentrated at some suitable location at the discretion of HQ Sydney Fortress.

(b) Personnel selected will be medically classified A.

5. HQ Sydney Fortress will ensure that the personnel selected are fully trained in HAA & CA duties similar to those provided for on WET VI/12B/1.

6. All personnel will be prepared for draft in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army RO A354/43.

7. The provisions of GAO A321/43 will be observed.

8. Pending authorisation of the reduction in scales of manning of AA and CA units under command HQ Second Aust Army no action will be taken to replace personnel transferred to 801 Aust AA/CA Bty.

9. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment and will be issued with clothing in accordance with tropical scale B vide GRO 205/43 and any amendments thereto. Jungle green clothing will not be issued.

10. A new WET (E2/273c) is at present under consideration and on receipt of this WET, stores and equipment (including controlled stores) will be issued under instructions from HQ NG Force.

11. The equipment is at present being installed and it is intended that the Bty assist in its installation.

12. Bty training will not be carried out until after the unit's arrival in NG.

13. It is desired that the raising of 801 Aust AA/CA Bty should be completed by 31 Mar 44.

14. HQ Sydney Fortress will submit a weekly progress report on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 17 Mar 44.

A. G. Lang Capt.

BRIG
DA & CIG SECOND AUST ARMY

APPENDIX "A"

Issued with A11205 of 9 Mar 44

DETAIL OF OR's REQUIRED FOR 1 801 AUST AA/CA BTX (HE)
(TO BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH WE VI/12B/1)

RANKS AND TRADES	TO BE SELECTED FROM		REMARKS
	HAA	CA	
WO II - BSM 1/c Engine Rooms	- -	1 1	To have experience on 9.2 equipment.
BQMS	-	1	
SERGEANTS - BCA	-	1	
CASL	-	1	
Gun detachments	3	-	CA personnel to be trained in use of Fire Direction Table. CA personnel to be trained in use of DRF. CA personnel to be trained in use of 9.2 inch plotting equipment.
GPOA	1	-	
PO's assistant	-	1	
Predictor	1	-	
TRADE GROUP II			
Instrument Operators -			
CASL	-	6	
Height Takers	8	-	
Predictor	6 (a)	6 (a)	
T I	2	3	
S A Plotter	3	3 (a)	
TRADE GROUP III			AA personnel to include 6 gun numbers trained as fuze setters.
Clerks	-	3	
Engine Hands 1/c	-	20	
Gunlayers	4	2	
Range Takers	-	3	
Technical Storeman	-	1	
NON-SPECIALISTS			
Batmen	-	2	
Batman-Driver	-	1	
Drivers MT	-	3	
Gun Numbers	12 (b)	38 (c)	
Hygiene Dutymen	-	1	
Mess Orderlies	-	3	
Storemen	-	1	
Switchman (CASL)	-	6	
Telephone Orderlies	-	16	
Total RAA	40	124	
Attached personnel as detailed in WE VI/12B/1	-	6	
Total required	40	130	

NOTES - (a) Includes one bombardier
(b) " two bombardiers
(c) " three "

ALL300

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY
423/5/91
10 MAR 44

ONE COY OF 1 AUST FD AMB. - REORGANIZATION OF

1 AUST DIV

Copy to:- 1 AUST CORPS	DDST
NSW L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE	DIS
GOC AD - COID	ADDS
G (Ops)	DDOS
G (SD & Trg)	DDME
DA & QMG	ADAPS
AMS	AD AMENITIES
Q	

Pending the issue of a WE and redesignation, action will be taken as set out hereunder by HQ 1 Aust Div, to reorganize one company of 1 Aust Fd Amb on an AIF basis, (plus certain additional personnel) for subsequent allotment to 2 Aust Beach Gp:-

<u>REORGANIZE :</u>	<u>OFFRS</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
One Coy 1 AUST FD AMB (WE II/16/4)	3	63	66
Plus additional personnel as follows:-			
S sgt (dispenser)	-	1	1
S sgt (quartermaster- sergeants)	-	1	1
Cpls (a)	-	2	2
Ptes (b)	-	8	8
<u>Attached - AEHE</u>			
Cfn, Mech MV (Trade Group II)	-	1	1
TOTAL	3	76	79

- (a) (i) Storeman for pack stores; (ii) steward stores
(b) Comprises 4 drivers MT, 2 general dutymen, 2 ambulance orderlies.

2. The officers will be nominated by LHQ (DGMS)

3. The army number, full name, substantive and present temporary rank and parent unit of all officers transferred or reposted in accordance with this instruction will be forwarded to HQ Second Aust Army as soon as possible.

4. The OR personnel required to reorganize one company 1 Aust Fd Amb will be provided as follows:-

- (a) by concentration in the Coy, vide para 1, of the AIF personnel medically class "A" available within 1 AUST FD AMB.
- (b) by withdrawal of suitable AIF personnel medically class "A" from 3/14 AUST FD AMB.
- (c) subject to implementation of sub-paras (a) and (b) above, any ORs personnel still required to complete the new unit to WE will be allotted under instructions to be issued by 2 ECH LHQ.

5. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will retain personal arms and equipment.

6. All personnel will be prepared for draft in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army RO A354/43.

7. The officer appointed to command this Coy will report to NSW L OF C AREA RO for instruction in 'Unit Records' procedure.

8. Unit equipment and medical stores will be provided by the transfer, as far as practicable, of equipment now on charge to 1 Aust Fd Amb, and the issue of the remainder in accordance with a scale to be promulgated at a later date by LHQ (DGMS) from appropriate Depots of Med and Vet Stores.

9. Separate instructions will be issued by HQ Second Aust Army at an early date covering the disposal of the remaining personnel and equipment of 1 Aust Fd Amb.

10. 1 Aust Div will submit weekly progress reports on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 18 Mar 44.

A. G. Lang Capt
for BRIG
DA & QMG SECOND AUST ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

423/48/13

13 MAR 44.

A.11140

HQ 2 AUST DOCKS GP - RAISING OF

HQ RAE TRG CENTRE

Copy - HQ NG FORCE

NSW L OF C AREA RO

AUST DOCKS SERVICES TRG COY

GOC ADM COMD

GS (OPS)

GS (SD & TRG)

G E

DA & GKG

A M S

'Q'

DEST

DMS

ADDS

DDOS

DDMS

ADAPS

DAD AMENITIES

1. LHQ SM 2556 advises that action will be taken to raise HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp for LEQ.

2. Action will therefore be taken by HQ RAE Trg Centre as follows:-

RAISE

War Office
Serial No.

UNIT

WE Ref No.

WE STRENGTH
Offrs ORs Total

48685

HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp

IV/11F/1

8 19 27

3. The personnel required to form this unit will be provided by -

- (a) absorption of the officers and other ranks posted to HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp and at present held in NG.
- (b) nomination of additional officers by LEQ (E in C)
- (c) drafting of suitable general reinforcements as and when available, under direction of NSW L of C Area Records Office from -
 - (i) Docks Services Trg Coy
 - (ii) RAE Trg Centre
- (d) Transfer of suitable applicants from formed units under separate instructions from LEQ.

4. The army number, substantive and present temporary rank, full name and parent unit of each officer transferred or reposted in accordance with this instruction will be forwarded to HQ Second Aust Army.

5. Personnel absorbed vide sub-para 3(a) above will remain in NG, at the discretion of HQ NG FORCE, as a detachment of HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp for the administration of Docks Operating units in that area.

6. The particulars by ranks and trades of the personnel already posted to HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp will be advised immediately such information is obtained from HQ NG Force.

7. All personnel transferred in accordance with this instruction will return personal arms and equipment.

8. Arms and equipment required to complete personal issues and equipment in accordance with WET E2/PA will be issued under supervision of HQ Second Aust Army by 1, 2 and 3 Aust BODs.

9. The officer appointed to command HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp, or such officer as he may nominate, will report to NSW L of C Area RO for instruction in "Unit Records" procedure.

10. All personnel of HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp will be prepared for draft in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army RO A354/43.

11. RAE Trg Centre will forward weekly progress reports on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 25 Mar 44.

A. G. Long Capt
DA & QMG SECOND AUST ARMY

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

SECRET

REORGANISATION & REALLOTMENT OF CERTAIN
ARMED UNITS & ANCILLARY UNITS ATTACHED

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY
423/30/49

A11438

/3 Mar 44

HQ 2 AUST TK BN GP

Copy to : QLD L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE
NSW L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE
GO ADM COMD
GS (OPS)
GS (SD & TRG)
BRA
CE
CSO
DA & QMG
AMS
Q
A A CH D
D D S T

D D S
D D S
D D S
D D S
COMD PAY
C L O
A P M
A D A P S
DAD EDUCATION
DAD AMENITIES

1. LHQ SM2499 of 7 Mar 44 advises that amendments to the OOB, AMP may be anticipated to provide for the reorganisation, reallocation or disbanding as indicated of the undermentioned armed and ancillary units:-

UNIT

ACTION

31 AUST TK TPT PL (LESS 2
SECS) AIF

To retain unit equipment and to be moved to 4 Aust Armd Bde under separate instructions.

2 AUST TK BN (AIF)

To be disbanded

2 AUST TK BN SIG TP (AIF)

To be disbanded

2 AUST TK BN WKSP

Separate instructions to be issued for movement to Qld where units will be disbanded. Move with personal arms and equipment and hand tool kits only.

286 AUST LAD (TYPE B)

To be disbanded

2 AUST TK BN ORD FD PK

To be disbanded

1 AUST INDEP ARMD REGT WKSP

2. Action will be taken by HQ 2 Aust Tk Bn Gp to disband 2 Aust Tk Bn (AIF), 2 Aust Tk Bn Sig Tp (AIF), 2 Aust Tk Bn Ord Fd Pk and 1 Aust Indep Armd Regt Wksp in accordance with Appendix "A" hereof and the following instructions.

3. No transfers of personnel from units to be reorganised or disbanded will be effected except as provided herein or on the specific authority of HQ Second Aust Army. Records Offices have been directed not to record such transfers unless so authorised.

4. HQ 2 Aust Tk Bn Gp will forward to HQ Second Aust Army as soon as possible, a list in triplicate of all officers of disbanded units becoming available for transfer or reposting in accordance with this instruction, such list to include the following personal particulars:-

Army number, substantive and present temporary rank, name in full, age, ~~military experience~~, date of appointment to commissioned rank, civil occupation or training, medical classification, and in the case of those medically fit class 'A2' or 'B', nature of disability.

This list will be submitted to cover each of the following categories separately:

- (a) Seconded officers, showing present appointment together with recommendations for their transfer to other units remaining on COB, and in which these officers would remain seconded;
- (b) Officers up to and including the rank of major who are fitted in all respects for operational service, and recommended as suitable for posting as reinforcement officers, and who are within the prescribed age limit for their rank as set out in GRO 168/42 and amendments thereto;
- (c) Officers who are not medically fit class 'A' but who comply with the prescribed age limits as set out in GRO 168/42;
- (d) Officers who are over the age limit for their rank as set out in GRO 168/42 irrespective of their medical classification; and
- (e) Officers carried on the 'X' List of their unit (other than seconded officers), with present location if known.

6. A list containing the undermentioned particulars of all other ranks personnel made available to 2nd Echelon LHA in accordance with Appendix 'A' to this instruction will be forwarded in triplicate to HQ Second Aust Army as soon as possible:

- (a) Army number;
- (b) Rank (acting lance or substantive) and trade or non-specialist classification;
- (c) Medical classification and (in respect of WOs and NCOs only) age;
- (d) AIF or CMF.

7. All personnel of the units referred to in para 1 of this instruction will be prepared for draft in accordance with the provisions of Second Aust Army RO A354/43. All personnel will retain personal arms and equipment and jungle green clothing will not be issued.

(a) Except as herein otherwise provided, uncontrolled equipment of units to be disbanded will be disposed of in accordance with para 15 of Second Aust Army Adm Instruction No 180.

(b) Detailed instructions for the disposal of vehicles and controlled stores other than those provided in sub para (c) hereof will be issued separately.

(c) Appropriate equipment of 1 Aust Indep Armd Regt Wksp will be transferred to complete WET scale of 2/7 Aust Armd Regt Wksp under separate instructions.

(d) ASC stores including reserve and emergency rations will be returned to the nearest Supply Depot.

(e) Camp stores held on AAFs Fl and Fla will be returned to appropriate Camp HQ.

(f) Stationery, non-expendable stores and publications will be returned to Stationery Depot NSW L of C Area.

9. Officers and Sgts Mess Accounts, of units to be disbanded in accordance with para 2 hereof will be finalised to the satisfaction of the comd 2 Aust Tk Bn Gp.

10. Regimental Trust Funds will be disposed of in accordance with para 29 of GRO F819/43.

11. Sporting equipment will be dealt with in accordance with GRO A494/43.

12. Comds of units to be disbanded will be responsible for the completion of unit records to the satisfaction of the appropriate Records and Finance Offices. In this regard, particular attention will be given to investigations relative to members AWL or illegally absent and/or investigating officers' reports in connection therewith.

13. HQ 2 Aust Tk Bn Gp will forward fortnightly progress reports on the implementation of this instruction, the first of such reports to reach HQ Second Aust Army by 1 Apr 44.

A. G. Lang Capt.
DA & HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

APPENDIX 'A' TO SECOND AUST ARMY A11433 OF 13 MAR 44

SERIAL NO	UNIT	AVAILABLE FOR REALLOTMENT		DISPOSAL OF PERSONNEL
		Officers	ORs	
1.	2 AUST TK BN (AIF)	33	722	(a) Personnel other than AEME will be at the disposal of 2 Ech. (b) AEME personnel will be available to Qld L of C Area for selection of suitable personnel to fill vacancies of AEME units of 4 Aust Arm'd Bn Gp; balance will be available to 2 Ech LHQ.
2.	2 AUST TK BN SIG BATT	2	17	Pers will be placed at the disposal of 2 Ech & moved under separate instns to the Central Sig Tsg Depot as general Sig reinforcements.
3.	2 AUST TK BN ORD FD PK	1	19	(a) Pers will be transferred for absorption within 7 Aust Ord Fd PK BATT. (b) Separate instructions will be issued for the movement of personnel to Qld with personal arms and equipment only.
4.	1 AUST INDEP ARM'D REGT WKSP	3	81	Personnel will be at the disposal of 2 Ech LHQ.

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HQ SECOND AUST ARMY

423/48/11

13 MAR 44.

A.114418

9 AUST DOCKS OPERATING COY (TYPE C)
RAISING OF

AUST DOCKS SERVICES TRG COY

Copy to - RAE TRG CENTRE	' Q '
1 AUST PORT MAINT COY	DDST
NSW L OF C AREA R O	D M S
GOC ADM COMD	ADDS
GS (OPS)	DDOS
GS (SD & TRG)	DDME
C E	ADAPS
DA & QMG	D&D AMENITIES
A M S	

1. Consequent upon a discussion with CRE 1 Aust Docks Gp, it is now desired that Aust Docks Services Trg Coy take action to raise 9 Aust Docks Operating Coy (Type C) in accordance with the provisions of HQ Second Aust Army Memo 410434 of 24 Feb 44.

2. Such memo will be amended as follows:-

- (a) third line of para 1 -
 - Delete - RAE Trg Centre
 - Insert - Aust Docks Services Trg Coy
- (b) first line of para 11 -
 - Delete - RAE Trg Centre
 - Insert - Aust Docks Services Trg Coy
- (c) last line of para 11 -
 - Amend 6 Mar 44 to read 23 Mar 44.

A. G. Loring, Capt.
DA & QMG SECOND AUST ARMY