

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/16

2/16 Infantry Battalion

August 1943 - January 1944,
Markham - Ramu Valley
Campaign

MARKHAM-RAMU VALLEY CAMPAIGN

		OFFERS	ORS
BATTLE CASUALTIES	KIA	1	10
	DOW		3
	WIA	3	44

ACCIDENTALLY WOUNDED			5
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SICKNESS

MALARIA	449
SCRUB TYPHUS	36
OTHER CAUSES	151

DIED FROM MALARIA	Nil
" " SCRUB TYPHUS	6
" " OTHER CAUSES	Nil

	OFFERS	ORS
REINFORCEMENTS	9	12

MARKHAM RAMU VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

2/16 Aust Inf Bn.

From 15 Sep 43 - 5 Jan 44.

Compiled by 2/16 Intelligence Section.

Battalion strength as at 15 Sep 43.

Offrs 32

O R's 758

Of these numbers the following were nominated to form an L O B Group.

Offrs 4

O R's 82

The fourth campaign of the 2/16 Bn opened on 15 Sep 43 at 0630 hrs when advance elements consisting of A Coy, HQ Coy, and Battalion Headquarters explained at DURANDS 'drome for NADZAB on lower MARKHAM VALLEY.

At 2200 hrs 14 Sep, these troops had been taking part in a training exercise near PORT MORESBY. 10 hours later they were marching from No 2 airstrip NADZAB to bivouac at MAC'S CAMP North of NADZAB. There was some enemy ^{AIR} activity but no attack.

LAE is situated on the East coast of NEW GUINEA at the apex of HUON GULF. Pre-war it had been the administrative centre for AUSTRALIAN MANDATED TERRITORY. It is 27 air miles from LAE.

On 15 Sep when advance elements of the battalion landed, 25 Bde were already in action racing eastwards towards LAE. 9 Div - seaborne - were also in action advancing westwards into the same objective.

2/16 Bn landed at NADZAB in three groups on three successive days. Weather conditions delayed on a flight and the third flight when almost in sight of NADZAB, was ordered to return to PORT MORESBY because of enemy air activity over HUON GULF. The second party explained at JACKSON'S DROME and the third at WARDS DROME.

From No 2 strip, the advance party of the battalion moved to a bivouac area at MAC'S CAMP, North of NADZAB. It was not until 9 Sep that the complete battalion had reassembled there.

At a company commanders conference at 1930 hrs 15 Sep, the C O issued orders for the battalion to occupy the area West of NADZAB in a protective role.

This plan was countermanded as a result of information received at 0935 hrs 16 Sep that 3 Bn 503 Rgt (U S Paratroops) had contacted a Japanese force N E of YAIU (ref map NADZAB 1 in 1 mile in area of log crossing 592532). The battalion

less (B C D coys) which had not yet arrived from MORESBY, was ordered to move to YALU.

B H Q , A and H Q Coys moved off at 1030 hrs 16 Sep along the main road NADZAB - LAE and arrived at YALU at 1515 hrs. B Coy arrived at No 2 strip on 16 Sep and by 1200 hrs were following the main party to YALU. (C and D Coys which did not arrive until 17 Sep were ordered to bivouac at MAC'S CAMP and await further orders).

At 1630 hrs 16 Sep, B H Q were established at YALU map ref NADZAB 543345. Orders from the Bde Commander were - "DO NOT move until you hear from me. Will contact you before 0630 hrs tomorrow (17 Sep) by runner or IO if line should fail."

At 1800 hrs ^{one TP of} 54 Bty 2/4 Fd Arty Regt with Lt ROSS as F O O was placed in support of the battalion.

At 2125 hrs the C O was called to a conference at Bde HQ to receive the Bde Commanders orders from the B M. Information from native sources was that any enemy were withdrawing from LAE along the track log crossing area 592532 (NAD AB 1:63360) to BOANA. 2/16 Bn were ordered to prepare an ambush at 57757 (NADZAB 1 : 63360).

The battalion moved at 0635 hrs 17 Sep and arrived at MURNUM waters at 1420 hrs. The march was hard and for long stages through water. As a result many of the troops suffered from sore feet.

Several reconce patrols were sent forward or onto high features to gain information. Patrols reported no sign of enemy in the area.

At 1715 hrs 17 Sep the C O received a warning order to stand by to return to NADZAB preparatory to moving to KAIAPIT. Later, Maj DUCHATEL the battalion ANGAU representative reported that an ANGAU patrol had moved to the headwaters of the MURNUM and crossed the track BUMBUM-MURNUM -NIET but had seen neither Japs nor their tracks. They had seen tracks of an American patrol.

Further information was received from 21 Bde that 3 Bn 503 U S para-troop Regt had contacted Japs that day (17 Sep) but had been ordered to withdraw.

By 2000 hrs orders were received from 21 Bde for 2/16 Bn to move back to NADZAB via YALU the following morning.

The head of the column moved off on the return trip at 0730 hrs 18 Sep and reached MAC'S CAMP at 1130 hrs 19 Sep. (C Coy on 18 Sep at MAC'S CAMP were ordered to stand by to move to KAIAPIT on 1 1/2 hrs notice.)

Information received at 2110 hrs 19 Sep from reliable native sources was that the enemy was moving from UPPER MARKHAM towards KAIAPIT and

sending armed native patrols down the MARKHAM RIVER. The report also stated that the enemy were constructing a bridge over the Northern reaches of the UMI RIVER near foothills of the FINISTERRE RANGES.

On the morning of 20 Sep further information was received that 2/6 Aust Independent Squadron had attacked and captured the Japanese held village of KAIAPIT. 120 Japs were reported killed.

During the morning of 20 Sep and night 20/21 Sep, enemy bombers escorted by fighters were again over NADZAB area. No 2 strip was bombed but little damage was done. There were no casualties.

Coy Commanders conference was held at 0850 hrs and 1215 hrs 21 Sep. Information as at 1700 hrs 20 Sep was :

1. Captured enemy documents contained reports of movement of one Jap battalion through MARAWASA to KINANTU.

2. Enemy forces estimated at 500 had been driven from KAIAPIT. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy. It was considered that the survivors had withdrawn to establish their HQ's in the vicinity of HARUAPUM.

3. 2/6 Independent Squadron with one coy of PAPUAN Infantry were established at KAIAPIT. Their patrols had reconnoitred West as far as MANIANG RIVER without making contact.

4. An air strip was in course of construction at KAIAPIT. It was expected to be ready for air transport by 1200 hrs 21 Sep.

Orders were that 21 Bde would concentrate in KAIAPIT as soon as possible after the air strip was ready.

2/16 Bn was ordered to capture MARAWASA, exploit to AROFAGAN CREEK and hold ground West of MARAWASA.

At this stage in the operations 2/27 Bn were still in reserve at PORT MORESBY

By 1722 hrs 21 Sep The G Coy and D Coy had landed at KAIAPIT by air. D Coy's task was defence of the air strip.

The remainder of the battalion moved to No 1 strip for air movement to KAIAPIT on the following morning. Ferrying of troops by transport planes continued throughout the morning 22 Sep.

At this stage the Bde group consisted of :

2/16 Bn (KAIAPIT)

2/14 Bn (NADZAB)

2/27 Bn (MORESBY)

2/6 Independent Squadron

B Coy Papuan Inf Bn (less 1 pl)

1 Coy 2/6 Field Amb.

1 Detachment S D C (1 offr and 15 o r's)

1 Detachment Gun Transport Coy (4 jeeps and trailers)

Maj DUCHATEL (ANGAU)

Engineer Recce Party

N I S I interpreter

ANGAU native carriers

By 1300 hrs 2/16 Bn had concentrated in area of KAIAPIT VILLAGE forming a temporary perimeter defence. 21 Bde HQ's had moved in during the day and were established in the mission building in the high spur overlooking the village from the North.

By 1800 hrs, the battalion had advanced to the MANIANG RIVER area 770915 (ONGA 1 : 63360) with the intention of moving on to the UMI RIVER at first light 23 Sep. This march entailed crossing the many channels of the MANIANG RIVER spread over a total breadth of approximately 2000 yards.

A message from 21 Bde received at 0200 hrs 23 Sep cancelled this plan. The battalion was ordered to remain at the MANIANG position until native carriers could be reinforced. A patrol of pl strength was however, ordered forward to make a reconnaissance of the UMI crossing - Maj DUCHATEL to supply native guides.

Lt WALDER with 12 Pl, lightly equipped, moved out at 0530 hrs 23 Sep to carry out this task.

A second patrol under Cpl BLOOMFIELD C Coy, moved out at the same time for about 600 yards N E of the MANIANG RIVER perimeter. The patrol returned at 0730 hrs with the information that 3 unoccupied pill boxes had been located.

A third patrol was sent out at 0730 hrs on the same bearing to travel 800 yards beyond the point reached by Cpl BLOOMFIELD. They reported further unoccupied pill boxes and weapon pits in the area. These defences, it was thought, had been constructed to cover the withdrawal of the enemy to the UMI.

At 0735 hrs Lt WALDER reported from track junction 770932 (ONGA 1 : 63360) that 6 men had been detached to patrol S W of the track. The main party were pushing on towards the UMI RIVER.

Latest reports through 21 Bde sources were that the enemy had withdrawn up the YAFATS RIVER towards NARUAPUM. A patrol to the YAFATS at 0745 hrs 23 Sep under command Lt SCOTT verified this report that the YAFATS was clear.

T/r reports received at 0755 hrs the same day indicated that there were no enemy troops along the YATI RIVER to MARAWASA. At 0900 hrs, 10 B25's passed over the battalion position heading N W towards MARAWASA to bomb and strafe villages along the YATI. On their return 1½ hrs later, one B25 for some unexplained reason, dropped a bomb about 500 yards from the battalion position.

By 1015 hrs 23 Sep after 1½ hours march, the battalion reached the East bank of the YAFATS RIVER and formed a perimeter defence with standing patrols established beyond the North and South flanks.

12 Pl were now in position covering the UMI crossing. Lt WALDER reported sighting 3 Japs across the river. They were fired on but escaped into the hills.

The remaining two platoons of B Coy moved out of the Bn perimeter at 1105 hrs and formed a Coy defensive position between the YAFATS and the UMI RIVERS for the night 23/24 Sep.

Information available at a Company Commanders conference at the YAFATS at 1630 hrs 23 Sep was that the enemy forces in the MARKHAM had been identified as 3 Bn 58 Regt less one coy annihilated at KAIAPIT. The enemy plan was also known. 78 Regt was to concentrate at MARAWASA by 25 Sep and advance on K AIAPIT. Later T/R reports disproved earlier reports (0755 hrs) that enemy had withdrawn beyond MARAWASA. A T/R plane reported being fired on from trench systems around SAGERAK. The plane was also fired on from MARUAPUM - North of SAGERAK. Further to these T/R reports 2/6 Independent Squadron patrols sighted 6 Japs near OOTOO UNTZ moving North.

Latest information about our own troops was that 2/27 Bn had arrived from KAIAPIT that morning 23 Sep.

The intention of the 2/16 Bn was that B Coy establish ^abridgehead at the UMI and cover the crossing of the remainder of the battalion. Troops were to cross at the rate of 60 men per hour.

12 Pl (Lt WALDER) crossed the UMI covered by 17 Pl (Lt McCULLOUGH) which had moved forward to support 12 Pl at the UMI. 17 Pl then crossed and followed North towards SAGERAK. 13 Pl was then given the task of holding the UMI crossing (SAGERAK is situated at the foot of a high range of hills about 3 miles forward of the UMI crossing on the North side of the YATI RIVER.)

A patrol sent on 23 Sep by A Coy from the battalion position at the YAFATS to clear a village 500 yards North, returned with sweet potatoes, bananas, corn and news that unoccupied defensive positions were sited in the village. No enemy or recent traces of him was seen.

A further report on 24 Sep by a native just returned from MARAWASA was that approximately 20 Japs were in the foothills overlooking SAGERAK and approximately 20 more on the track leading to MARAWASA.

On 24 Sep at 1015 hrs a patrol from C coy moved North to contact a 2/6 Independent Coy patrol. They were to come under control of 2/6 patrol leader until 1300 hrs and then rejoin C Coy. The combined patrol contacted a party of

of Japs at approx 1300 hrs . 1 man from C Coy was wounded. Our patrol withdrew and rejoined C coy the following day 25 Sep.

The battalion was now advancing to the UMI. By 1230 hrs, B and C Coys were across B Coy moved forward to join 12 and 17 Pls on the high ground covering SAGERAK and C Coy were responsible for picketing the high ground between the UMI crossing and SAGERAK.

The UMI was rising fast and considerable difficulty was encountered in moving the battalion across. The pioneer platoon did yeoman service in manning the rope, ferrying the stores across and rescuing the washaways. The ease with ^{which} the natives "bounced" their way across the fast flowing stream was a source of wonder and envy to troops battling inch by inch along the rope.

Rubber boats were tried at this stage with little success. They were, however, used to advantage later.

News was received at 1145 hrs 24 Sep that 12 Pl had walked into IMG fire but that 2" Mortar fire had caused the enemy to withdraw. Later 17 Pl also contacted strong enemy positions but withdrew under cover of 2 " mortar smoke.

10 Pl (Lt DUNCAN) was overlooking SAGERAK by 1440 hrs and was pushing on with 13 Pl in support. By 1700 hrs 10 Pl had made contact and Lt DUNCAN had been wounded by a sniper.

B Coy was ordered by the C O to remain on the high ground overlooking SAGERAK. They were to keep up harassing fire during the night and prepare to attack the village the next morning.

By 2000 hrs the battalion had completed the UMI crossing and was moving towards SAGERAK.

At 2030 hrs orders were received from 21 Bde for 2/16 Bn to break contact with the enemy and withdraw back across the UMI to the old positions on the YAFATS RIVER.

Withdrawal commenced at 0300 hrs 25 Sep. 11 Pl (Lt CROMBIE) was left as a standing patrol on high ground overlooking SAGERAK.

Recrossing the UMI in the dark presented considerable difficulties but again with the assistance of the pioneer platoon the crossing was completed by 0800 hrs without casualties.

A perimeter defence was taken up back beyond the YAFATS and MANIANG RIVERS at 821 904 (AMARI 1 : 63860).

Bde information from captured documents and P O W statements received at 1200 hrs 25 Sep was that 57 DIV - approx 1500 troops from SALANDUA were moving down from SID or BOANA. 20 DIV were expected to arrive in the UMI area that day.

By 1200 hrs 25 Sep Lt CROMBIE reported that SAGERAK had been evacuated over-

- night. The Japs left documents, diaris^e, medical stores and all equipment except rifles.

Lt FRAIER of U S Engineers moved from SAGERAK with a C Coy protective patrol to re connaitre a suitable landing strip. He reported having pegged out a site which only required 4 hrs labour to fit it for the landing of transport planes.

On 26 Sep, 2/16 Bn withdrew further to take up a defensive position about 1400 yards from KALAPIT at 838903 (ONGA 1 : 63360).

A patrol from D Coy reported RUMU unoccupied. Other patrols North and South along the MANTANG RIVER found no traces of the enemy.

Reports from native sources on 27 Sep indicated that Japs were moving back from HARUAPUM through WANKUN. The battalion was ordered to advance again as far as its old positions on the YAFATS RIVER. The move was completed by 1645 hrs 27 Sep.

28 Sep A and C Coys moved ahead of the battalion to the UMI. A Coy crossed on this occasion in 8 minutes and formed a bridgehead to cover the crossing of the rest of the battalion. C Coy occupied SAGERAK and at 1310 hrs pushed forward a patrol under Lt BREMER to clear and hold ANTIGIWAN and MARINGGUSIN. This patrol reported by 1700 hrs that MARINGGUSIN had been reached without contacting any enemy and that the track SAGERAK -MARINGGUSIN was suitable for jeep traffic.

By 1730 hrs the remainder of the battalion, using rubber boats had crossed the UMI and entered SAGERAK to take up a defensive perimeter for the night 28/29 Sep.

At 0630 hrs 29 Sep the battalion advanced deployed from SAGERAK through villages along the YATI to take up defensive positions on WANKUN HILL ref (AMARI 1 : 63360).

WANKUN was an interesting geological "freak" - a prominent hump rising abruptly above the floor of the river valley. For days the battalion had advanced along an amazingly flat river basin approx five mile wide with no feature to break the monotony of the dead level kunai plain. Here at WANKUN in the middle of the plain was a natural O P about 300 feet above river level with observation far into the RAMU VALLEY beyond MARAWASA & MARASATISSA and RAGITBARIA.

Defensive positions were taken up on the WANKUN late afternoon 29 Sep and patrols pushed forward reported MARAWASA and MARASATISSA clear of enemy. A third patrol to RAGITBARIA could not reach its objective before dark so was recalled.

After our patrols had returned, 2/14 Bn pushed through to occupy MARAWASA.

From WANKUN that night numerous fires could be seen away to the North side of the RAMU. There were no signs of movement in that direction in the morning.

30 Sep was to prove one of the most gruelling days marching of the campaign. The bound for the day was to have been ARIFAGAN CREEK. The "creek" proved to be a dingy pool, an insignificant dry watercourse which faded out in the kunai and one

lone tree barely sufficient to shade BHQ. The battalion had no alternative but to push on to form a perimeter in the South bank of the RAMU. The line of march passed by a crashed P 38. Later information was that the pilot had baled out and had been rescued by a Piper Cub plane.

During 30 Sep a U S soldier with a war dog attached himself to BHQ and accompanied them along the RAMU for several days.

It was a complete surprise to most of the battalion to learn that during the days march - actually just before reaching ARIFAGAN CREEK - they had crossed the divide between the MARKHAM and RAMU river basins. The divide was impossible to pin point on the ground as the gradients were imperceptible. The only visible indication that a divide had been crossed was that rivers now flowing in the opposite direction from the MARKHAM drainage basin.

(The area of ARIFAGAN CREEK was later selected as a site for a fighter strip and developed under the name of GUSAP strip became wellknown as a base for air operations in the RAMU and FINNISTERRES.

At this stage (30 Sep) the battalion was well ahead of its supply columns so rations had to be dropped from DOUGLAS air transports that evening and the following morning.

This was the first time that supply columns had been unable to keep daily or two daily contact with the battalion. Up to this time troops had been living on hard rations supplemented by sweet potatoes, taro, pawpaws, native tomatoes and bananas obtained in generous quantities from deserted native gardens.

Maj Gen VASEY landed in a Cub Moth near the RAMU RIVER late 30 Sep and visited the battalion.

At 1100 hrs 1 Oct, Lt WHITE with 9 Pl patrolled forward to the GUSAP RIVER. The battalion followed at 1430 hrs to reach a bivouac area South of the GUSAP 464144 at 1700 hrs (FINNISTERRES 1 ;; 63360)

From this area it was an easy march (3 hr) the following morning 2 Oct to establish a bridgehead across the GUSAP. Engineers immediately commenced the construction of a bridge across.

During the morning's march a message picked up on the track from Lt DUNNEA 2/7 Aust Independent Squadron stated that his patrol had passed through BUMBUM and BOPARIMPUIN and that the Japs had left on 28 Sep. His intention was to move to DUMPU via KAIGULAN.

A Coy was ordered forward at 1045 hrs 2 Oct to occupy KAIGULAN and recce the air strip. The Coy crossed TUNKAAT RIVER and heard firing from a clump of timber 1000 yards to their front. It was found later that a party of Japs had fired on a patrol from 2/7 Independent Squadron attempting to cross the RAMU. By 1630 hrs 2/7 Independent Squadron was moving around the right flank to cut off

the enemy withdrawal and A Coy (7 Pl leading) were moving in to attack. A Coy reported the timber clear by 1735 hrs. 6 enemy were reported killed. Our casualties were one killed. During the attack Lt WATTS, 7 Pl Commander decapitated a Jap with a sword he picked up. A Coy did not reach their objective that evening.

Information to hand on morning of 3 Oct was that the Jap road head had been pushed South as far as WAMPUM so A Coy were ordered to push on and complete their task of occupying KAIGULAN and send patrols forward to WAMPUM. This patrol led by Lt BUCHANAN returned to A Coy base at 1917 hrs with the report that the village was unoccupied. At 1100 hrs the same day (3 Oct) Lt BREMER with 14 Pl was given the task of patrolling to NAMAPUT to secure a prisoner or enemy identification. His patrol left GUSAP RIVER at 1200 hrs.

Close to NAMAPUT the leading scouts were fired on and one man killed.

14 Pl immediately attacked driving the surviving enemy out of the village into the foothills. Our casualties were 1 killed 1 died of wounds and 2 wounded. Enemy casualties were 14 killed. Identifications were secured from enemy dead and the patrol returned to base. Cpl HARRIS acting pl sgt was later awarded the MM for outstanding courage and leadership in this attack. When Lt. BREMER was wounded Cpl HARRIS took over command of the platoon and, although wounded, carried on with the attack and later covered the withdrawal of the stretcher party.

Next morning 4 Oct at 0815 hrs the battalion moved from the GUSAP towards DUMPU. The SURINAM RIVER was crossed without opposition and a perimeter defence formed on the North bank at 1513 hrs. 18 Pl under Lt SCOTT moved forward at 1530 hrs to clear DUMPU. By prearranged signal the platoon indicated that the village was occupied by the enemy. The remaining two pls under Maj. SYMINGTON OC D Coy, moved up for a company attack. The enemy withdrew however without firing a shot and D Coy were in occupation by 1725 hrs 4 Oct. One Jap straggler was killed. Before withdrawing the enemy burnt all huts. Quantities of food, clothing and ammunition were captured. An examination of latrine pits indicated that dysentery was rife among the Japs. This confirmed earlier reports that the 58 Regt was very low in morale through sickness.

By 1200 hrs 5 Oct the battalion had concentrated at DUMPU and were digging defensive positions. Clothing captured at DUMPU included a crate of silk lap-laps. Later in the day the battalion took on a colourful aspect with D Coy parading in lightly coloured lap-laps while newly washed JG's were drying.

Maj. DUCHATEL with a protective patrol from 10 Pl moved out at 1730 hrs to reconnoitre possible landing strips. He reported surveying a suitable area 2000 yards long which could be made ready for use by 0900 hrs 6 Oct.

DUMPU was destined to be of major tactical importance in the later stages of the campaign. The primary object of the current operations had been to clear the enemy from the valley and establish (and protect) a fighter strip as a base for air operations against BOGADIM and MADANG on the North Coast of NEW GUINEA.

This fighter strip was already in process of development at GUSAP and the role of 21 Bde now was to assist in its protection. This would entail taking up defensive positions North of GUSAP and in the FINNISTERRES. To maintain these protective forces an air supply point was vital - and even more so if later attempts were to be made against the Jap road head at DAAMOINA about 14 miles away.

DUMPU area 3000 yards East of the RAMU RIVER and South of the URUA RIVER was ideally situated to provide this vital air supply point.

Patrolling was active from DUMPU but no contacts were made. One patrol returned laden with Zebu steaks. The spirit in which the steak was tackled was willing enough but on this occasion the flesh was far too strong.

13 P1 (Lt ANDERSON) was ordered to establish a standing patrol at the Lakes at 681576 (DUMPU 1 : 63360) by 1600 hrs 6 Oct. The LAKES were approx 2000 feet above sea level in the foothills of the FINNISTERRES. A standing patrol was maintained in this area by successive platoons until 13 Oct.

Bde Hq's moved into DUMPU and 2/16 Bn received orders at 1130 hrs 6 Oct to move out the following morning.

During the afternoon 6 Oct, ASC personnel arrived. They brought news of bread, fresh butter and fresh meat following so were made welcome.

The C O and Coy Command rs left at 0900 hrs 7 Oct to reconnoitre a battalion defensive position at BEHEI. By 1130 hrs the battalion had moved forward and were digging perimeter defences.

By 1200 hrs patrols were operating mainly to the North and East. For the next two days the battalion provided large working parties to assist in improvements to the DUMPU air strip.

News was received from 21 Bde at 1400 hrs that 2/27 patrols had contacted 8 Japs at Key Point 4 in the FINNISTERRE RANGES.

On 8 Oct two patrols were sent out from BEHEI. No 1 patrol, led by WO 11 YOUNG moved North of BEHEI into the hills and established an O P at 678595 (DUMPU 1 : 63360)

Sgt. LETHLEAN took out patrol No 2 as a fighting patrol but did not make contact

A report from patrol No 1 at 1725 hrs stated that an O P had been established with observation over the valley from GUSAP to 2 miles beyond BEHEI and of part of the FARIA VALLEY. They had also found evidence that the O P had been occupied recently. Well defined tracks led from the position back to higher ground later

known as BERT'S POST.

San Enemy stragglers stumbled onto D Coy perimeter at BEHEI on night 8/9 Oct. They escaped in the darkness. One man from D Coy was wounded.

YOUNG'S O P reported 9 Oct that an unidentified patrol had been seen at 0700 hrs on a feature about 1200 yards North of their position. Lt Mc CULLOUGH with patrol No 3 moved out from BEHEI through YOUNG'S POST to investigate. At 1120 hr 9 Oct Lt Mc CULLOUGH reached the O P. He estimated it would take the patrol 4 days to reach the position North of the O P as the country was so rugged and steep. One spur was almost perpendicular and it was impractical to move around the flank. Soon after leaving YOUNG'S O P, patrol No 3 located a Jap Coy defensive position vacated about 4 days previously.

At BEHEI Coys were instructed to maintain listening posts at night approx 200 yards forward of their Coy positions. Positions were not to be occupied until 1900 hrs and digging to be complete by 2000 hrs. At this stage of the campaign, malaria was rife throughout 21 Bde troops. The fever was responsible for a high rate of casualties and was giving cause for alarm to unit commanders.

The night 9/10 Oct was uneventful.

No 3 patrol on 10 Oct reported very slow progress. Terrain was particularly rough and so steep that much of the climbing had to be done on hands and knees. They were fired on from a feature later known as DON'S POST.

Lt Mc CULLOUGH asked permission to attack but was instructed to attack only small enemy posts. At 1410 hrs the patrol was endeavouring to outflank the Jap position. At 1440 they were in thick jungle unable to observe. Under orders from the C O, the patrol withdrew to a position soon to be known as BERT'S POST about 500 yards N W of YOUNG'S O P. Cpl COLLINGWOOD attached to the patrol from the Intelligence Section was sent back from this position with 2 ORs to HQ with all available information about the enemy.

Restricted patrolling was carried out on 11 Oct. No 3 patrol was again making limited progress towards enemy positions. At 0915 hrs Oct 12 Lt Mc CULLOUGH reported back to HQ leaving Cpl AITKEN in charge to bring the patrol back.

Lt ANDERSON had established another O P at BRIANS HILL by 1400 hrs and Sg BATES in charge of a recce patrol was investigating a reported road in the vicinity of ROSES HILL. Sg BATES reported no possibility of a road there as the country was too rugged and steep. His patrol moved to BRIANS HILL and was given a new task to recce a route from there to the MENE RIVER.

Back at BEHEI, Capt WRIGHT had moved enroute to KUMBARUM by 1755 hrs to

protect 54 Bty 2/4 Field Regt Arty. This necessitated altering battalion dispositions to form a perimeter with 3 remaining rifle Coys and HQ Coy support troops.

In the late afternoon a party from the Bn L O B Group in MORESEBY arrived at BEBEI. Their well fed and well clad appearance occasioned much good natured comment.

That night No 3 patrol reported in.

Next day 13 Oct at 1200 hrs, the Bn received a warning order to prepare to move to JOHNS KNOLL area to relieve 2/27 Bn which had been engaged in heavy fighting for 36 hrs. At 1330 the Bn was moving in order of march - B BnHQ C A Bn and D Coys. By 1900 hrs the head of the column reached GUYS POST.

Patrols operating from BEBEI had been recalled and a guide was left to bring them along behind the Bn. They had all reported in to GUYS POST by 2400 hrs 13/14 Oct.

At GUYS POST information was received that the 2/27 Bn had been heavily counter attacked on 12 Oct by Jap forces supported by mountain gun fire. Attack after attack was driven off until the enemy finally withdrew. Enemy casualties were estimated at 150 killed. On 14 Oct the Bn moved up from GUYS POST at 0830 hrs and had taken up a defensive position on JOHNS KNOLL by 1400 hrs with D Coy forward, A Coy astride the Jap L of C and C Coy with BnHQ 300 yards to their rear. B and HQ Coys were further back protecting B Echelon and the native carriers camp. Standing patrols were established along the Jap L of C on either side of A Coy, and at HEVERIDGES POST ref 693604 (DUMP 1 : 63360).

At 0655 hrs 15 Oct a recce patrol from A Coy of 1 NCO and 3 ORs moved out 600yds East along the Jap L of C. They reported no enemy in sight.

B Coy under Capt ATKINSON moved out at 0900 hrs to investigate reports of a possible Jap L of C 2000 yards North of Bn positions. They reached feature 6000 at an actual altitude of 4000 feet and found that it gave excellent observation of the FARIA RIVER. Here they entered a heavy rain forest but were unable to find any Jap L of C.

The patrol returned to base at 1545 hrs 16 Oct to report no signs of Japs or their tracks in area NE of feature 6000.

D Coys position on JOHNS KNOLL was shelled by Jap mountain gun on 15 and 16 Oct. The Coy was well dug in on the reverse slope of the hill and no casualties were sustained. The F O O 2/4 Field Arty on one occasion moved out into a fox hole on the forward slope of the knoll in an unsuccessful attempt to flash spot the location of the enemy mountain gun. The arty O P was then moved forward about 500 yards along a ridge running West of D Coy position. A protective patrol of 1 NCO and 6 ORs was attached to the F O O.

Lt BUCHANAN with 8 Pl was sent forward in the direction of the FARIA junction with orders to contact the enemy and bring back a prisoner for identification and information. The patrol made contact about 1000 yds out. The enemy withdrew leaving 5 dead. These were identified as 78 Regt and confirmed reports from 21 Bde that elements of 78 Regt were opposed to our forces in the FARIA RIVER area.

At 1750 hrs A Coy took over forward position from D Coy who were placed in reserve ready to move out to FARIA JUNCTION by first light the following morning 17 Oct.

D Coy moved out at 0545 hrs 17 Oct to engage ^{the} enemy contacted along FARIA RIVER by 8 Pl. By 1230 they had reached the village ref 709639 (DUMPU SHEET) without opposition. They reported the village was a large unoccupied Jap camp with many fox holes and well built bunkers. An old Jap arty O P was located on a spur 200 yards East of the track just beyond the village.

One platoon (Sgt LONGMAN) moved down the track and contacted enemy in a small village overlooking MAINSTREAM ref 709635. 2 Japs were killed. Our casualties were 2 wounded.

The platoon was then withdrawn to a coy defensive position overlooking the village ref 709639 (DUMPU 1 ; 63360)

Next morning 18 Oct 17 Pl (Lt McCULLOUGH) moved forward to MAINSTREAM. By 0930 hrs contact had been made again with the enemy in that area. Enemy casualties were 1 killed. Our casualties were 1 killed 1 wounded.

C coy were ordered to relieve D Coy at the FARIA JUNCTION on 19 Oct. For the remainder of the period the battalion occupied JOHNS KNOLL area, each rifle coy in succession spent a three-day tour of duty at this forward base. At first a standing patrol of a platoon strength was maintained forward at the junction FARIA MAINSTREAM from first light to 1830 hrs daily. Later platoons maintained a 24 hr standing patrol on the ridge overlooking the village and "island" at the junction.

D Coy were relieved by C Coy at 1200hrs 19 Oct. 13 Pl (Lt ANDERSON) in position at the forward river crossing observed 3 Japs approaching a log bridge across the FARIA. They were fired on and two were killed. During the next two days 20 and 21 Oct 13 Pl covered by 14 Pl on the ridge above MAINSTREAM made two unsuccessful attempts to contact the enemy by moving around the right flank.

During the night 19/20 Oct, 14 Pl made an unsuccessful attempt to move around the high ground on the left flank of the forward position. They were fired on from the PLATEAU ref 681611 on HIME RIDGE and returned to their base.

At 1000 hrs 20 Oct Pte LESTER crossed MAINSTREAM and returned to report the ISLAND and timber beyond, clear of the enemy. He brought back an LMG which had been abandoned by 17 Pl when they had been forced to withdraw back across the river on

18 Oct.

Lt WHITE led a patrol from JOHNS KNOLL on 21 Oct to investigate the PLATEAU but the enemy had withdrawn over night.

13 Pl made a further attempt to make contact around the right flank on 22 Oct. From high ground on right they moved back towards the creek junction on far side of MAINSTREAM. At 1000 hrs they came under heavy fire from well sighted enemy IHCs. They were assisted in withdrawal by diversionary fire from 14 Pl overlooking the ISLAND and by smoke laid by 54 Bty 2/4 Field Regt. Our casualties were 1 missing (later reported killed), 2 died of wounds and Lt ANDERSON wounded.

On 20 Oct and 22 Oct WO 11 MORRIS led patrols through the forward positions towards KANKYRIO with the object of reconnoitring a possible route well around to the right flank towards the SADDLE. Very little information was obtained by the first patrol through lack of time. The second - a smaller three day patrol returned at 1700 hrs with information that Japs had been observed digging defensive positions on the rising ground well behind the FARIA area.

A Coy relieved C Coy 23 Oct. Patrolling forward and to the right was continued. All patrols from this forward base were forced to move out towards the right flank. To the left the almost precipitous lower slopes of SHAGGY RIDGE commanded by well placed Jap pill boxes with observation over the bare slopes, the FARIA, MAINSTREAM and the left shoreline.

This party caused appreciable casualties to the enemy. Cpl Murphy continued the attack until ordered to withdraw.

timber on the North bank. While crossing the island they were fired on from concealed enemy pill boxes in that area and from positions on the high ground overlooking the FARIA. During the withdrawal Sgt. JOHNSTONE was killed. Cpl MURPHY took charge and the party withdrew back across the river. Cpl MURPHY was later awarded a bar to his M M for his coolness and leadership in extricating the two sections from a difficult situation. Our casualties were 1 killed, 3 missing and 8 wounded. Of the missing, two returned under cover of darkness and one was later reported killed.

At the same time 8 Pl (Lt BUCHANAN) moved around to the right flank and Lt MCULLOUGH led a patrol through dead ground high up on the left flank.

B Coy relieved A Coy on 28 Oct and carried out a vigorous patrolling policy from 28 Oct - 4 Nov. Acting on information that fresh tracks had been seen by patrols along a well defined track thought to be a Jap L of C, a party was sent out to set an ambush. Lt CROMBIE reported on his return that a Jap section had moved onto them before the ambush was set up. The ambush party killed two enemy scouts and withdrew.

On 30 Oct a recon patrol of 2 Sgts, 2 ORs, 1 section of P 1 B and 50 native

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A Coy relieved C Coy 23 Oct. Patrolling forward and to the right was continued. All patrols from this forward base were forced to move out towards the right flank. To the left the almost precipitous lower slopes of SHAGGY RIDGE commanded by well placed Jap pill boxes with observation over the bare slopes, the FARIA, MAINSTREAM and our own forward positions made any attempt at outflanking to the left abortive. On 25 Oct Sgt. JOHNSTONE and two sections of 9 Pl, covered by the remaining section and one section of 7 Pl on the South bank, crossed MAINSTREAM to patrol into the timber on the North bank. While crossing the island they were fired on from concealed enemy pill boxes in that area and from positions on the high ground overlooking the FARIA. During the withdrawal Sgt. JOHNSTONE was killed. Cpl MURPHY took charge and the party withdrew back across the river. Cpl MURPHY was later awarded a bar to his MM for his coolness and leadership in extricating the two sections from a difficult situation. Our casualties were 1 killed, 3 missing and 8 wounded. Of the missing, two returned under cover of darkness and one was later reported killed.

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On 30 Oct a recon patrol of 2 Sgts, 2 ORs, 1 section of P 1 B and 50 native

carriers left to carry out a 14 day recon and to observe enemy movement in KANKIRYO area. 33 natives reported back at 1700 hrs 5 Nov, and at 2100 hrs 10 Nov the patrol rejoined the battalion at its new position on the MENE RIVER. They had been unable to establish an O P near KANKIRYO.

The policy of all forward Coys during the period 17 Oct - 7 Nov, had been to carry on constant patrolling with the object of harassing the enemy, securing prisoners if possible, hampering his patrolling activity and dislocating his L of C.

Patrolling in the FARIA area was restricted on 5 Nov. The battalion had been warned of an impending air strike by 5 Air Force at 1000 hrs on suspected enemy defensive positions on the forward slopes of the SADDLE. At 1010 hrs, approximately 60 MITCHELLS and MARAUDERS were over the target area indicated by arty smoke shells. All bombs fell in the target area.

D Coy relieved B Coy on 4 Oct.

Lt ROBINSON reported an ambush set across the Jap L of C at 0915 hrs 6 Nov. A Jap patrol approached but the ambush was sprung too soon and surprise lost. One Jap was killed and the ambush party withdrew.

An advance party from 2/25 Bn arrived at 1930 hrs 7 Nov at JOHN KNOLL. 2/25 Bn were to relieve 2/16 Bn. The relief was completed by 1400 hrs 8 Oct. 2/16 Bn moved into the MENE RIVER area vacated by 25 Bde.

At a conference at the MENE RIVER area on 11 Nov, the C.O. instructed company commanders that the role of 21 Bde would continue to be :-

1. To prevent enemy penetration in the RAMU and MARKHAM VALLEY.
2. To protect GUSAP.
3. To protect RADAR installations.
4. To protect GOROKA, GERUP and BENA BENA.

Training was also undertaken - Def positions, ambushes, etc.. Large working parties were engaged on road making and on constructing buildings on a new M.D.S. site.

By this, our forces had complete air superiority. An occasional night raider was over the area. Their objectives were apparently the air strips, supply dumps and arty battery positions. Bombs were dropped on various occasions but no damage was done.

A report was received on 17 Nov, that 2 P 38's were missing from a fighter sweep over IAE - MADANG - ALEXISHAVEN. All troops, particularly air sentries, were asked to keep a look out for flares. It was thought that the pilots may have baled out safely in the hill country. The airmen were not found. There was an alert lasting 1 hr on 19 Nov.

Unidentified aircraft were over the area. Some bombs were dropped but no damage

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During the period 11 - 22 Nov, the battalion "rested" in the MENE RIVER position. Large working parties were engaged on road making and on constructing buildings on a new M.D.S. site.

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damage sustained.

A training cadre for officers and N.C.O's was held 19 - 21 Nov and on 22 Nov companies commenced training. At 2100 hrs however, 21 Bde issued a warning order that 2/16 Bn would relieve 2/33 Bn in GUYS POST - SHAGGY RIDGE area by 29 Nov.

The advance party moved to GUYS POST via the LAKES on 27 Nov. The change over was completed by 29 Nov. The battalion was disposed with C Coy on SHAGGY RIDGE,

A Coy occupied platoon positions at BERTS POST, DONS POST and McCULLOUGH'S RIDGE, with a section post on GREEN KNOLL.

D Coy occupied positions on the FARIA RIVER, the LOOKOUT and the PLATEAU with a reserve platoon at GUYS POST. BHQ and HQ Coy with B Coy in reserve were stationed at GUYS POST.

As at the forward position from JOHN'S KNOLL, companies in succession took over the forward position on SHAGGY RIDGE at regular intervals.

The position occupied on SHAGGY RIDGE was unique in the battalion history. SHAGGY RIDGE was a narrow razor back with an altitude of over 5000 feet. A thick rain forest covered the crest of the ridge. Heavy mists sometimes obscured the position for days at a time. At such times observation was limited to less than 100 yards. On clear days however, observation was possible as far as the sea near MADANG. On one occasion Jap barges were seen moving down the coast.

The ridge was at no part wider than a few yards, narrowing at the foremost section position. The most forward position - a fox hole - was occupied by one lone Bren gunner. For the first time in its history, the battalion held ground with a "one-man front".

At this stage of operations, the C.O., Lt. Col. SUBLET was detailed to attend L.H.Q. Tactical School and left for AUSTRALIA. Maj. SYMINGTON O.C. D Coy was appointed to administer command during the C.O.'s absence.

Lt. McFARLANE F.O.O. 8 Bty 2/4 Arty Regt. in position at KUMBARUM was attached to C Coy on 1 Dec.

Patrols were out daily from forward companies on SHAGGY RIDGE. Movement both on the right and left flanks was limited by the extremely steep slopes and particularly on the left, by rubble and smashed undergrowth and bamboo thickets, the result of continuous pounding by our 25 pdrs.

At 1215 hrs 2 Dec, Lt. SCOTT'S pl occupying the PLATEAU position was taken by surprise when an enemy 75 mm gun shelled their position for approximately 30 minutes. Until then the position had been considered defiladed from enemy arty fire. Fortunately no casualties were suffered and only minor damage was sustained by the cookhouse. 13 platoon and the cookhouse rapidly took up new positions on a safe reverse slope.

The population of the native compound at GUYS POST was increased by 6 Kanakas

,their wives and babies on 3 Dec,all collected by A Coy.

During Dec, SHAGGY RIDGE position was apparently noted as the most popular A.I.F. tourist resort.A continual stream of visitors and mere curious onlookers caused traffic difficulties on the "one man"^{one} front company commander erected a notice board along the narrow L of C,warning off the idly inquisitive. 2

The filming of a Department of Information picture,"The Jungle Patrol" was ~~commenced~~^{three} commenced at the time. "Film Stars" were chosen from the ~~3~~ Bns of 21 Bde to form a typical A.I.F. section and most of the shots were made on SHAGGY RIDGE position. Lt. ELLEMORE moved out with a small 4 day recce patrol on 3 Dec. His task was to locate the Jap L of C SHAGGY RIDGE - KANKIRYO. The patrol failed to reach its objective,a 4200 foot feature through lack of time. The patrol leader estimated that it would have taken an extra 2 days to reach the feature.

Patrols were now moving out on either flank of the PIMPLE with the object of drawing enemy fire.^{Any enemy fire} was immediately countered by heavy concentrations from our arty and mortars.

2/14 Bn, occupying JOHNS KNOLL positions reported that,their forward company at the FARIA-MAIANSTREAM positions had been fired on at 1115 hrs from an enemy position on the lower slopes of SHAGGY RIDGE. Lt. SCOTT was sent out with a fighting patrol to investigate. The patrol encountered an impassable cleft in the side of SHAGGY RIDGE and had to turn back.

Visitors on 7 Dec included the G.O.C. and Bde Commander.

G Coy was relieved at 1200 hrs and A Coy took over the forward position and main patrolling activities.

Visitors on 8 Dec included an R.A.A.F. party with an A/C^{pilot} making observations for future possible air strips strikes.

A warning was issued this day from Bde Intelligence that the enemy was using native spies.Suspected natives were reported to be wearing red lap-laps.Battalion carriers removed red articles with alacrity.

Early morning 10 Dec,a formation of planes flew over the area.They excited no comment until bombs were bursting in the valley.They had been taken for granted as our planes and so were able to carry out a surprise attack on GUSAP strip.22 fighters later identified as TONI's (M 109F) were counted.Our fighters were sighted shortly afterwards climbing high to attack.By 0900 hrs a dog fight was in progress but it did not last long. The enemy fighters were soon heading for MADANG travelling fast.

BERTS POST issued a warning at 1210 hrs that a suspected enemy patrol had been observed behind our lines in the vicinity of KUMBARUM track. A patrol sent out could locate neither the suspected patrol nor any suspicious tracks.

That same night 10/11 Dec, a section post 5 strong at YORWERTS KNOLL was

surprised by an enemy raiding party of 7 men. The Japs rushed the positions at 2300 hrs with the bayonet. Our casualties were 4 slightly wounded. Both parties withdrew. The section claimed one Jap killed but when they reoccupied the position at 2400 hrs, the body had been removed.

Early morning 11 Dec, a patrol from D Coy was sent out in an attempt to contact the Jap party which had raided YORWERTHS KNOLL. 5 Japs were sighted on the edge of a ravine. When fired on they jumped over the edge and managed to get away.

A second patrol (11 Dec), under Lt. SCOTT moved out to the right, around the lower slopes of SHAGGY RIDGE to investigate a report from 2/14 Bn, that enemy movement had been observed there. Lt. SCOTT reported the area clear of enemy.

Throughout the week 11 - 18 Dec, patrols were cleared the timbered slopes below YORWERTHS KNOLL daily.

On 11 Dec, the C.O.C Gen. VASEY ^{MAJ} accompanied by Col MORE-COSGROVE, the Canadian Attache to the High Commissioner of Australia, visited BHQ. The party observed Jap tracks crossing the track LAKES - GUYS POST. It was presumed that these were tracks of the suspected Jap patrol observed from HERTS POST two days previously.

C Coy moved ^{to} forward position 12 Dec. They reported considerable small arms fire from direction of 25 Bde. A later 25 Bde SITREP stated that Japs in strength had attacked their forward company position.

2/16 Bn patrols were ordered to recon MENE RIVER valley to locate possible enemy approaches on to 25 Bde positions.

Firing to the rear of the PIMPLE was reported on 13 Dec. A patrol from A Coy sent out from DONS POST moved in at 1015 hrs with the information that they had engaged in a fire fight with enemy posts while moving back around the West slopes of SHAGGY RIDGE. There were no casualties.

WARHAWIS were over SHAGGY RIDGE frequently during this period. Their task was to reconnoitre the PIMPLE and beyond, with particular reference to possible air strike targets.

Arty concentrations were brought down on the PIMPLE on 18 and 19 Dec. Patrols moving out to investigate results found enemy positions still occupied. 1 Jap was killed on 19 Dec.

The O P on SHAGGY RIDGE reported 2 enemy barges, 3 miles North of BOGADIN during late afternoon 22 Dec.

Plans were now being prepared for an attack on Jap positions on the PIMPLE and the remaining ^{enemy} held part of SHAGGY RIDGE. On 24 Dec, Capt. CHRISTIAN flew over the area in a WIRRAWAY to make a preliminary reconnaissance. Arty and Air Force were to co-operate and a comprehensive and detailed time table for the support was being planned.

Christmas Day was duly celebrated in traditional style despite handicaps. A.C.F. hampers and private Christmas parcels were distributed. Battalion cooks excelled themselves and provided real Christmas dinner *orgies* of turkey, ham, pudding, fruit and cream. How such delicacies were prepared on the spot in impromptu ovens, remains a source of wonder. The dinner was a triumph for battalion cooks and divisional supply lines.

Minimum patrolling only was possible during the afternoon 25 Dec.

The first Christmas gifts had been received on 22 Dec. Parcels of cigarettes and comforts, gifts from 41 Fighter Squadron USAF and 4 A/C Squadron R.A.A.F. were dropped at GUYS POST area by three WIRRAWAYS.

This generous gesture was very much appreciated by the troops and duly acknowledged.

On 26 Dec Capt. CUMBER 2/2 PUNJABS and Capt. THOMPSON 2 BULACHS were attached to the battalion for training in jungle warfare tactics.

The plan of attack on SHAGGY RIDGE had now been finalised. The estimated enemy strength was 3 platoons spread from 300 - 400 yards along the razor back behind the PIMPLE. B Coy were to attack and capture the PIMPLE and exploit for 300 yards along the ridge. D Coy were to move forward on the success signal and consolidate ground won by B Coy.

16 P 40's led by 2 BOOMERANGS were to carry out 2 strafing runs and 1 bombing run using 500 lb bombs. Arty (8 and 54 Btys) were to bring down rolling concentrations on the PIMPLE and the ridge beyond. H hour was fixed at 0900 hrs 27 Dec. Battalion MMG's and 3" MORTARS were to give additional support and 2/27 Bn was given a diversionary task - to attack enemy positions forward of FARIA - MAINSTREAMS positions.

The following is detailed plan of Air and Arty support :-

H - 60 to H - 40 16 P40's ^{will be} dive bomb the PIMPLE.

H - 40 to H - 30 Arty concentration on PIMPLE.

H - 30 to H - 15 8 P40's strafe PIMPLE and RIDGE.

H - 15 to H - 1 Arty concentration on PIMPLE.

H to H + 15 Arty lifts 100 yards

H + 16 to H + 20 Arty lifts 50 yards

H + 21 to H + 35 Arty lifts 50 Yards

H + 36 to H + 41 Arty lifts 100 yards

H + 42 to H + 50 Arty lifts 100 Yards

H + 51 to H + 61, Arty lifts 50 yards

H - 15 to H + 20 8 P40's strafe opportunity targets on RIDGE or SADDLE.

H - 15 to H + 60 2 BOOMERANGS provide air cover and observe for enemy arty.

Heavy mist obscured the PIMPLE at dawn on 27 Dec but fortunately these had di

had dispersed by H - 60 when the supporting aircraft were scheduled to open the attack. The 16 P40's led by 2 BOOMERANGS were over the target right on time. The bombing was accurate except that one fell short. Our forward troops had however, been withdrawn beyond safety limits for the preliminary stages. At H hour (0900) 10 Pl (Lt. GEYDON) crossed the start line. The clamber up the steep incline to the PIMPLE was made more difficult by loose shale thrown up by the bombing and shelling. Bamboo ladders had been carried forward to assist in negotiating the worst patches and steepest pinches but proved to be too cumbersome and had to be discarded. Cpl. McMAHON'S section was held up by Jap grenades thrown from a well sited Jap pill box. Cpl. Mc MAHON and WO 11 MORRIS were wounded. Cpl. HALL led his section in from the right. He dashed ahead and wiped out the pill box singlehanded and so allowed the platoon to get a footing on the ridge. For his outstanding leadership, Cpl HALL was later awarded the D.C.M.

At 0946 hrs, 10 Pl were established along approximately 100 yards of the ridge from the PIMPLE forward to another similar feature.

At 1005 hrs 11 Pl moved through to exploit beyond the second pimple but were held up by rifle fire and grenades from a Jap sanger. 3 men were wounded. Outflanking the position was impossible as the sides of the razor back were almost perpendicular. O.C. B Coy withdrew 11 Pl and ordered B Coy to consolidate on the ground already won. This was completed by 1045 hrs.

D Coy relieved B Coy by 1100 hrs and commenced digging in with two platoons on the ridge and one platoon in reserve below the first PIMPLE. Casualties were 5 enemy killed (others may have been buried in destroyed pill boxes). Our casualties to this stage were 1 killed 7 wounded.

T/R planes reported numbers of Japs withdrawing back towards the SADDLE. These opportunity targets were strafed.

One Jap refused to surrender and remained in his pill box in D Coy's perimeter. It took over two hours before he was blasted out by grenades.

At 1145 hrs Japs counter attacked a third pimple beyond the sanger which had held up D Coy. They were apparently under the impression that our troops had occupied forward to this point. The counter attack was abortive.

Next day 28 Dec D Coy were ordered to continue the attack. Troops spent most of the night 27/28 Dec digging around the second pimple so that they could approach the Jap sanger from a more advantageous position. The Japs were eventually blasted out by 7 Div Engineers using blast bombs.

18 Pl (Lt. SCOTT) commenced a wide encircling movement down the slope on the right flank of SHAGGY RIDGE at 0830 hrs. Climbing up through the belt of timber, they attacked the third pimple at 1212 hrs.

Sgt. LONGMAN was the first onto the new objective and, inspired by his courage and dash, the leading section quickly overran the position.

16 Pl (Lt McCAUGHEY) which had been covering from the second pinnacle the flanking move of 18 Pl, now moved through and exploited to the far end of the ridge. 16 and 18 Pls consolidated on the newly won ground.

This completed the capture of SHAGGY RIDGE.

For his inspiring leadership during the second phase of the attack Lt. SCOTT was awarded the M.C. Sgt. LONGMAN gained the M.M. for his exploit during the same attack.

An enemy 75mm gun opened on the new position at 1327 hrs. The first 16 shells cleared the crest and landed in BHQ area at GUYS POST. There were no casualties. BHQ vacated the area permanently.

Approximately 80 Japs were observed forming up to counter attack D Coy. The attack was repulsed and finally broken up by accurate arty fire.

An enemy mountain gun or 75mm was in action against our forward positions at intervals during 29 - 31 Dec inclusive. Lt. McCAUGHEY was killed at 1420 hrs 29 Dec by a tree burst.

D Coy casualties during the period 27 - 30 Dec were killed 1 officer and 7 wounded.

On 27 Dec an F.S.S. Sgt was killed while calling ^{on} enemy troops in a pill box to surrender.

G Coy relieved D Coy at 1340 hrs Dec 30.

The G.O.C. Maj. Gen. VASEY visited the battalion this time to offer his congratulations on the success of the attack.

Warning orders that 2/16 Bn would be relieved by 2/9 Bn were received at 1430 hrs 31 Dec.

The Bn advance party, followed by the main party moved out at 0830 hrs 1 Jan followed by the main party on 2 Jan. By 1600 hrs the Bn was established in the MENE RIVER area. At 1500 hrs, the Bde issued a warning order. The Bn would move back by air to PORT MORESBY. Evacuation commenced at No 2 Strip DUMPU area 0830 hrs 4 Jan. The first plane was away at 0850 hrs.

Next day the battalion was encamped in the area vacated by 2/9 Bn in the 7 MILE VALLEY, PORT MORESBY.

Training in the mornings and sport in the afternoon was the daily routine until 15 Feb when troops embarked for AUSTRALIA - and leave.

ATTACK ON SHAGGY RIDGE2/16 Aust Inf Bn
10 Jan 44INDIVIDUALS.

During the two days operations 27-28 Dec 43, several men distinguished themselves by their devotion to duty, initiative and in all cases total disregard to personal safety. Apart from those whose actions brought forth citations in Appx C there were others whose conduct deserves special mention -

On 27 Dec 43, ~~xxxxxx~~ during the first attack on pimple on SHAGGY RIDGE WX13929 Pte LESLIE ALEXANDER FRASER and NX 113336 Pte LESLIE JAMES NICHOLLS FOR holding an isolated post in front of enemy posns for ⁶ hours until relieved under mist.

On 28 Dec 43 during the attack on the last PIMPLE on SHAGGY RIDGE WX 4905 Pte WALTER HAYDEN OFFER for his unselfish action whilst under fire from well dug in enemy posns. He went forward and drove Japs from one posn with grenades, then kept other posts engaged until his section came forward to take their objective. His action denied the Jap posns where they could inflict severe casualties on his advancing section. Again on the 29 Dec 43 during ~~the attack~~ enemy shelling he cut down a tree causing tree-bursts that were threatening to wipe out two forward posts. He was wounded severely ^{IN THIS ACTION} and had to be evacuated.

On the 28 Dec 43 during the attack on the last PIMPLE on SHAGGY RIDGE NX98673 A/CPL CLAUDE FREDERICK AGNEW for his action in getting his OSMG into posn under enemy grenade fire and firing continuously at enemy posns whilst Sgt LONGMAN went forward to bring out two badly wounded men. It is considered that this action greatly assisted in the success of Sgt LONGMAN'S efforts.

SECTIONS

The RAP functioned under adverse conditions as near as space would permit to the most forward posns. They with their Stretchers bearers were always on the job, and deserve every praise. Padre CUNNINGHAM MBE was wounded whilst assisting in the removal of a severely wounded man from fwd of an occupied Jap post. (His action subsequently assisted in the removal of the said Jap.)

Outstanding work was done by the Pioneer Pl during the two days 27-28 Dec 43. The ridge had been blasted for weeks by Arty and Mortars so that besides the almost perpendicular slope, the surface was mostly loose shale. This Pl was right on the heels of the fwd Pl, and although subjected to enemy Arty fire and sniping, carried on cheerfully and tirelessly, and had a track cut to the fwd FDLs almost as soon as these were consolidated. This track was cut on the precipitous Western slope of SHAGGY RIDGE, and which gave access to all posns without tps being exposed to Jap snipers or shelling. This Pl figured in the supply of amm to the most fwd posns. Theirs was always a cheerful effort.

The Sig Pl, as always worked hard and efficiently, and it does not require front line action to bring out its best qualities, and very often their stirring efforts go un-noticed. Comms must and are maintained at all cost; so that when ones conduct stands out so far as to come under special notice in this Pl and be cited for an award it must be truly deserving. (see Appx C Citations)

The mortars come into their own in this section and thier shooting was accurate and effective and, along with the Arty contributed in no small way to the success of the show. A very effective weapon when well handled and in this operation was in expert hands.

The MMGs worked hard delivering a withering fire in support of the attack on SHAGGY RIDGE. When the first PIMPLE was taken they moved a gun f fwd to support the further attack. This gun proved a veritable thorn in the side to the enemy and was singled out by their Arty for special attention. One of the crew, Sgt BATES, was wounded but remained on duty. They were given permission to take their gun to another posn but preferred to remain and dig in where they were.

The "Q" Staff during this type of warfare has a job which is particularly difficult as transport is always a problem and is not simplified by the fact that that their Unit is seldom concentrated in one area. The O.C. and staff is to be congratulated on its efforts throughout the campaign. The cooks of this unit have always recieved the unstinted praise of all personnel. B Coy's cooking staff's achievement under Sgt J. HOUNSHAM in providing the men with hot pasties for breakfast on the morning of the attack deserves special ~~mention~~ mention.

There is one Arm of the Services which helped as much as any other to give the men confidence when going into action. This was the Arty, particularly the personnel of 8th^{54th} Bty. who were supporting us. The accuracy of thier shooting seldom failed to claim the admiration of all tps, and was indeed an added stimulus. No doubt due to the close co-operation between FOO and CP. Thier adm and inter-com seemed uncanny and it was probably this state of things that enabled them to do with thier barrages that which denied the Japs all chance of liming an automatic weapon along the axis of our advance; which was never more than three abreast and usually ^a one man in front.

Individually the actions of MAJOR GAUNT C.O. 8 th Bty and FOOs LIEUTs PEARSON: MACFARLANE: DETHRIDGE ^{and Sig?} were particularly noticeable. MAJOR GAUNT seized every opportunity to go fwd and study the problems of Coy Comdrs in relation to Arty. LIEUT PEARSON moved fwd with the fwd Pl on the attack on SHAGGY RIDGE and was always in a position to see what was going on. Owing to the untiring efforts of Arty Sigs he was able to establish a fwd OP in the shortest lapse of time. LIEUT DETHRIDGE went fwd and continued the good work on the second day. LIEUT MACFARLANE carried on operations at rear OP whilst other^{CO} was moving fwd. These Officers were always cool and cheerful and afforded Coy Comdrs absolute co-operation

There was one other who figured prominently in this action- - this was in the person of 2/LIEUT TOMMY ROBERTS of COLORADO, a member of the 5th U.S.A.A.F. Hewent fwd with the leading section and was **always** amongst the leaders. His actions on these two days won him the admiration of Coy and Pl Comdrs, and such frontline soldiers as SGT McMAHON (MM), SGT JONES and all pers taking part in the operations. He did more to cement the friendship between the American and Australian forces than any other man. The 5th U.S.A.A.F. already had the esteem of the tps in the valley and LIEUT ROBERTS boosted it 100%.

This report would not be complete without reference to the splendid co-operation of the 4th A.C. Sqn R.A.A.F. Whenever and wherever we went there ^{WERE} ~~was~~ two BOOMERANG aircraft scouting to our front and flanks. They ~~became~~ to be known affectionately as "BLUEY" and "CURLY" and when the posn became more or less static in the SHAGGY RIDGE --FARIA area it was their habit to fly low at the end of their mission over fwd visible posts and drop gifts of cigarettes, sweets, etc, notat that time prourable ^C fwd. These actions were appreciated by ALL personel and opportunitiea were taken tothank the personnel of 4th A.C. Sqn R R.A.A.F. for their thoughtfulness. When one of these planes failed to return to its base it caused the boys as much, if not more, concern as the loss of one of our own leaders.

The FUZZY WUZZIES carried on as usual.

= BEFORE - & - AFTER - THE - OPERATIONS - AGAINST - JAP =
 = HELD - POSNS - ON - "SHAGGY RIDGE" =
 = 28 - DEC - 43 =

DISPOSERS		BY		COY.		TIME		COLOR	
AS	AT			0700	HRS	28	DEC	SHOWN	PURPLE
"	"			1200	"	"	"	"	CARMINE
OPERATIONS		BY		18PL				"	RED
				16PL				"	GREEN

McLAUGHEY'S KNOLL

SNIPERS IN THIS AREA
GAVE TROUBLE 27 DEC

POST MANNED BY
CPL RIGOLL - MOST FWD
POSN HELD BY D Coy
NIGHT 27-28 DEC

WHEN 18 PL CLEARED THIS
AREA 16 PL PASSED THROUGH

DISPOSNS D COY
0700 HRS 28 DEC

ROUTE TAKEN BY 18 PL IN
OUTFLANKING MVT MORNING 28 DEC

THE PIMPLE
REF 686638
KUMBARUM SHEET 1:25000

MMG SUPPORTING OPS 28 DEC

FIRST PT OF INEMY
RESISTANCE REACHED
27 DEC

FWD POSNS PRIOR TO 0900 27 DEC


SCALE 1 IN TO 50 yds

INT SECT
2/16 BN
25 JAN 44

SKETCH OF SHAGGY RIDGE

REF MAP - KUMBARUM 1:25000

C Coy DISPOSNS AT 1500 HRS. 30 NOV 43



MORTAR RANGE TO TARGET - 1050 YDS.

INTERSECTION OF BEARINGS M.M.G. POSN.

M.M.G. TARGET : LEFT ARC 338°
: RIGHT " 75° } FROM GUN

RANGE TO ENEMY - 1200 YDS




ARTY O.P.	TO	JOHN'S KNOLL	108°
"	"	FARIA JUNCTION	40°
"	"	M.M.G	140

INT. SEC
2/6 BN.
2 DEC 43

17D

SUPIRIMPOSI - KUMBARUM SHEET. 1:25000




15 DEC. 43



N° 1 PATROL
N° 2 PATROL
IMPASSABLE
L/C FARLEY'S PATROL

--- } C. Coy
 --- }
 --- }


Showing Sgt LARRIE'S Patrol 17 DEC 43



70

ANNOTATION
of
AIR PHOTO V 38

17



PATROL ROUTE --->

SCALE 3 INS TO 1 MILE APPROX

D.F. 1:24000

2/16 B.
INT. SEC.

7 DEC. 43.

30

PATROL TRACE


3-13 DEC 43

SUPERIMPOSE

KUMBARUM

PAIPA SHEETS

1:25000



Ellemore's Patrol ---
 Geyton's Patrol ---

50
 66

"INT" SEC
 2/16 BN

TRACE SHOWING DISPNS OF 2/16 BN 29 NOV 43

INT SEC
2/16 BN
29 NOV 43

68

63

CCOY + 1 SEC. MMGS

1 DET. MOR
ARTY. O.P.

MMC

-18 Pl D Coy

8 PL ACOR

SEC 17 PL D COY

ACor HQ + 9 PL LESS 1 SEC "A"

SEC 9PL ACOR

7PL ACOY

SEC 17 PL DCoy

SEC 17 PL D Coy


- 16 PL & D Coy H.Q.

- 60

72

Field Sketch
EVAPIA RIVER AREA
Ref M^t Otto. 1 in.

TRACE N^o 2




Scale 6 ins to 1 ml.

"INT" SEC
2/16 BN

PANORAMA

LOOKING NORTH ALONG THE EASTERN SLOPE OF SHAGGY RIDGE.



TIME TAKEN 1 HR 30 MINS
VISIBILITY BAD.
RANGES BY RANGE FINDER

POINT OF OBSERVATION
REF. 697624. KUMBARUM 1:25000.


DONE BY INT SECT 2/16 BN.
DATA SUPPLIED BY M.M.G. PL.

12/12/43

6N

PATROL TRACE

SUPERIMPOSE ON ENLARGEMENT OF CORRECTION TO DUMPU SHEET 1:63.360.




LEGEND

PATROL N°	1	1 HR
"	2	4 1/2 HRS
"	3	1 HR
"	4	1 1/2 HRS
"	5	7 1/2 HRS
"	6	10 HRS OUT
"	7	8 HRS
"	8	4 1/2 HRS
"	9	
"	10	
"	11	
"	12	
"	13	
JAP L.O.F.C.		
JAP POSNS		

"INT" SEC
2/16 BN
6 NOV 43

TRACE NO 1




LT. McCULLOUGH
2nd PATROL 5-6 NOV

LT. ROBINSON
2nd PATROL 5-6 NOV


SCALE 1 IN TO 1 MILE

REF: TRACE AMENDMENT DUMPU


SHEET 1 IN TO 1 MILE



FIELD SKETCH



REF: FIELD SKETCH




"D" COY DISPNS 1700 HRS 5 NOV 43

SCALE 1 IN TO 220 YDS

INT SEC
2/14 BN
5 NOV 43

AMENDMENTS TO DUMPU 1:63360.




SCALE 1 IN. TO 1 MILE

"INT." SEC.
2/15 BN.
28 OCT.

FEATURE 3467

As seen from 100° 120' from Coy HQ M'ULLOUGH'S RIDGE



Main Lanes - Shaggy Ridge L.O.F.C. Follows Skyline

SECTION OF MAIN L.O.F.C.

TRACK SHOWN AS SCOTT'S HIGHWAY
MAIN L.O.F.C. GUY'S POST TO SHAGGY RIDGE

105° FROM ROAD TO GUY'S POST.

POINT OF OBSERVATION
Coy HQ 100 x 300°

M. N

FOREGROUND FROM Coy HQ TO SCOTT'S HIGHWAY INCOMPLETE

SCALE: ACCURATE IN DEGREES.


BEARINGS: MAGNETIC.

FROM A SKETCH BY

S. SGT. W.H.T. REARSE. B. COY. 2/16 BN.

12/12/43

YORWERTHS KNOLL.
SCENE OF JAP
ATTACK. 10/12/43



LETHLEENS HILL
330°

ROSES HILL (HERALD'S)
334°

BRIAN'S HILL

PINES

TO McCULLOUGH'S HILL (SHAGGY RIDGE)


5°

YOUNGS O.P.
2°

VIS: GOOD

LOOKING NORTH FROM BEEBEI

INT SEC
R/16TH BN 43



Field Sketch of
 Shaggy Ridge
 from John's Knoll
 removed for reproduction
 in Vol VI Army.
 by D. Dexter

LOOKING NORTH FROM BEEBE




File BN 43
 INT SEC

19
0


SUPERIMPOSE ON
DUMPU SHEET
1 IN. TO 1 MILE.

3

TRACE. N° 2




DISPNS. 1530 HRS. 4 OCT 43.



"INT" SEC
2/16 BN
29 OCT 43.

EYE SKETCH SHOWING ROUTE OF N^{os} 2 & 3 PATROLS.



LEGEND

ENEMY AREA	X
OWN FWD POSN	X
N ^o 2 PATROL	---
N ^o 3 PATROL	---

"INT" SEC
2/16 BN.


22N

11

703

ENLARGEMENT PORTION KUMBARUM SHEET 1:25000.

DADI DEFENSIVE POSNS



SCALE 1" TO 220 YDS.

V.I. 25 FT. (APPROX.)

INT. SEC.
DADI
22 NOV 43.

M.M.G.


2/16BN DISPOSNS 14 OCT 43

SUPERIMPOSE ON KUMBARUM 1:25.000

D coy

63 70

73 63



STD PATROL

60 70


"INT" SEC
2/16BN
17 OCT 43

60 73

SHOWING AREA OF OPS CARRIED OUT BY A COY 2 OCT 43
REF MAP DUMPU 1IN TO 1 MILE

REF MAP DUMPU 1IN TO 1 MILE


①



190

Superimpose on Kumbarum 1:25000
Showing Route of Le Hills Patrol

Dec 19 - 43.




24 OCT 43
INT SEC
2/10 BN


MADE FROM OLD HIMI RIDGE

VIS: GOOD

TOM'S HILL 94°
OLD 227 BN 183°



16
0



TIME 1145 HRS


SHELL HOLES

16 OCT 43
INT SEC 2/10 B~

UPPER FARIA AS SEEN FROM JOHN'S KNOLL.

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
NADZAB 3550 1 INCH SERIES



CONTROL:	Triangulation by 2/6 Aust. Svy. Bty. R.A.A. and 8 Aust. Field Survey Section A.I.F. connected to Astronomical Fixation by 2/1 Aust. Army Topo. Svy. Coy. at Wau Long Lat. 146° 42' 35-60" Long. 07° 20' 28-12"
PROJECTION:	Lambert Conformal Orthographic
AIR PHOTOGRAPHY:	8th Photo Squadron 3rd Air Force
MISSIONS:	19y 38y 164y 199y 67z
COMPILATION:	3 Aust. Field Svy. Coy. A.I.F. From Air Photographs and Intelligence reports
DRAWING:	3 Aust. Field Survey Coy. A.I.F.
REPRODUCTION:	2/1 Aust. Army Topo. Svy. Coy.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

LEON	BOANA	MT SALAWAKI
WAME	NAGTAB	LAS
BOANER	WADO	NGUON 622.7
OB	WADOBAN	W
W		W

Overestimates in given for West and East sheet edges

C 08° 27' 51" C 06° 25' 01"

True North
Grid North
Magnetic North

Magnetic declination from True North at center of sheet is about 6 1/2 East

Bridge (and write what shown otherwise)

Motor Road

Jeep Track

Foot Track

Reported Track

Telegraph Line

Airfield

Sea Plane Base

Cemetery

Mission Station

Spot Height

Grasslands

2000-750

361

Savanna country in savannas

Spring Well, Waterhole

Mangroves

Dense Jungle Forest

Forest

Scattered Timber


Plantation rather common


Secondary Growth


Contours - Form Lines usually in wood during spring


Ridges


Cliffs














Ref.	First Class.	Second.	Third.	Fourth.
Trig. Stations and altitude				▲ 805' ○ 653' ⊙ 325' + 202'
Astronomical Station				
Native Garden				
Native Village				
Unidentified Native Village				
Buildings				
River or perennial Stream				
Non perennial Stream				
Fathom Line				

<p>TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET</p> <p>FOR AN INTERVIEW TO THE SUBJECT OR SUBJECTS FURNISH THE GRID REFERENCE OF THE</p> <p>CONVENT AND TO BARBERS. THEY ARE TO REMAIN FOR THE INTERVIEW.</p> <p>PAY ATTENTION TO VARIOUS NATIONAL FIGURES AND TO</p> <p>THOSE PRINTED ON FACE OF THE MAP</p> <p>POINT NAGAR VILLAGE</p>	
<p>EAST</p> <p>Take note of letters in which</p> <p>grid line meet and in which</p> <p>general contour lines are found</p> <p>on each margin of the map</p> <p>to give the line of the map</p> <p>definitely south accurately.</p>	<p>WEST</p> <p>Take note of letters to which</p> <p>grid line meet and the</p> <p>contour lines are found</p> <p>on each margin of the map</p> <p>to give the line of the map</p> <p>definitely north accurately.</p>
43	44
<p>430</p> <p>430 440</p>	
<p>440</p>	
<p>REFERENCE</p> <p>GRID REFERENCE TO NAGAR AND</p> <p>BARBERS, NAGAR, BARBERS, DISTRICT AND VILLAGES</p>	

Officers using this map are requested to make any necessary additions or
corrections on the map itself and forward to A. D. Survey, H.Q. N.G.F.

1:253,440

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONETHE BLUE FIGURES IN THE BORDER OF
THIS SHEET REFER TO CO-ORDINATES
OF EQUATORIAL NEW GUINEA ZONEMARKHAM
NEW GUINEAREFER TO THIS MAP AS
2033 MARKHAM
4 MILES TO 1 INCH

P11 1006 12033

CONTROL: Supplied by AD Svy. NGF
Based on Astronomical Observations,
Hydrographic and Administrative
Surveys.

AIR PHOTOS: 5th Air Force.

COMPILATION: 1 Aust Mob Litho

Sec AIF, Aust Svy Corps Sep. 43.


REPRODUCTION: 6 Aust Army Topo

Svy Coy AIF, Aust Svy Corps.

SECOND EDITION Oct. 43.

Permanent Water	
Stream of Uncertain Course	
Water Race	
Swamp or Marsh	
Hill Features	
Limit of Navigation for Launch	
Cornal Plantations	
Bakir Plantations	
Native Gardens	
Grassland	
Dense Jungle Forest & Forest & Co. u	
Mangrove	

Scale 4 Miles to 1 Inch
Miles 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Yards 10000 20000
1 Centimetre to 2.5344 Kilometres
Kilometres 0 5 10 15 20


INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS
(Approximate Magnetic Variations (W.E.))

Motor Roads	
Foot Tracks	
Probable Tracks	
High Tension Line and Powerhouse	
Native Village and Mission Station	
Known Height	
Approx. Height	
Caval Reef	
Accident, or E. L.G.	
Suspense Data	
Other Buildings, Camps, Mines, Etc.	

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE TO THIS SHEET					
LETTERS AND FIGURES ARE GIVEN ON THE FACE OF MAP					
POINT		LETTERS			
Kalapit		Q Q			
East		North			
Take west edge of square in which point lies and read the figure printed opposite the line on north or south margin. Estimate in tenths of square.		Take east edge of square in which point lies and read the figure printed opposite the line on east or west margin. Estimate in tenths of square.			
8		9			
5		0			
FULL REFERENCE (Q Q 8590)					
Unit: Metre Square: 10,000 Reference to nearest 1000					

RCDIG1021191


19
D



TIME TAKEN 4 HRS.
VISIBILITY VARIED: MOSTLY MISTY.

PANORAMA LOOKING NORTH WEST
FROM PORKYS KNOLL


DONE BY SGT. KNOX.
INT. SECT. 2/16 BN.
19.12.43.



Vis. BAD.

Looking West from VORWEDTH KNOLL.

D's L.T. J.C.
20. Dec. 47.



UPPER FARIA VALLEY AS SEEN FROM
JOHN'S KNOLL

INT SEC
2/10 BH


WAR DEPARTMENT
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY

PRELIMINARY SHEET
Subject to correction

PROVISIONAL MAP


For use by
War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for Sale or distribution

GUSAP
B 55/6
NORTHEAST NEW GUINEA
To Sanda 15°
To Sangapuli 146°20'




Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, USAFFE, by
Base Map Plant, USAFFE, September 1945.
Compilation from tri-rectangular photographic mission (64-V June 1945
by 8th Photo Sq, 8th Air Force, U. S. Army.
Platymetry from vertical and oblique photographs, using stereographic
pairing and information from NGF, HQNGF, Aust LNO, Adv LNO,
ANGAU and RAAP.
Elevations for features determined by Fairchild Stereo-camera
and information from HQNGF.
Grid based on control furnished by AD Survey, NGF, Feb and Mar 1943
and from Aust Oil Co.
Lambert conical orthomorphic projection.

LEGEND
Trails, probable
Trails, intermittent
Streams, intermittent
Swamps
Jungles
Plantations
Grassland
Fern lines, interval approx 100 ft.



RELIABILITY DIAGRAM
A-From vertical and oblique photographs
B-From stereo photographs and/or
distant oblique photographs.



"WARNING: FORM LINES ONLY, NOT CONTOURS"
All Elevations are Approximate
NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEIGHT CORRECTIONS AND
OTHER DATA ON THIS MAP AND WILL REPORT TO
THE CHIEF ENGINEER, USAFFE, APO 501."

Grid & True North
Mag. North
6°15' E
or
111 Miles
Approximate mean declination 1943
Annual magnetic increase 3'


INDEX TO SHEETS		
MT. KUBARI	POMMERN BAY	SAIDOR
DUMPU	GUSAP	NANKINA
FININTEGU	AMARI	IKWAP

REPRODUCED BY BASE MAP PLANT, USAFFE, SEPTEMBER 1945.
1000 METER MODIFIED BRITISH GRID SYSTEM
W. G. I. EQUATORIAL ZONE
Origin of grid: Lat. Equator, Long. 100°E, whose coordinates
are X = 5,000,000M and Y = 500,000M.
To give the coordinates of a point use only larger figures
on the grid lines, and add estimated tenths of kilometers.
The small numbers at the corners are the full coordinates
referred to the origin of the grid zone.
Nearest similar reference on this grid is 500 km distant.
ALWAYS indicate grid letter in giving a reference on
this grid.
GUSAP
S545 - E14600/15x20

25

1

CORRECTIONS TO DUMPU SHEET 1:63360



SCALE 1" = 1 MILE

"INT" SECT.
2/8 B—
5. Nov 43.

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
EQUATORIAL ZONE

NEW GUINEA PAIPA

NOTE: GRID ON THIS MAP DOES NOT AGREE
WITH MT KUBARI 1 INCH PROVISIONAL EDITION

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
PAIPA 3619 1:25,000 SERIES



CONTROL: Taken from Mt. Kubari 1 Inch Provisional Edition
PROJECTION: Lambert Conical Orthomorphic
AIR PHOTOGRAPHY: 8th. Photo. Squadron 5th. Air Force
MISSIONS: 142z, 293y
COMPILATION: 2/1 Aust Army Topo Survey Coy.
REPRODUCTION: 2/1 Aust Army Topo Survey Coy.

LOCALITY DIAGRAM			
URIGINA	MT KUBARI	POMMERN BAY	
	AMUSON		
	KUMBARUM		
MT OTTO	DUMPU	GUSAP	
	DUMPU		
BENA BENA	FINITEGU	AMARI	



The blue figures within the borders of this map are for artillery purposes and denote corrections in minutes and seconds of arc on time. There is no convergence correction in this zone.

Officers using this map are requested to make any necessary additions or amendments on the map itself and forward to A.D. Survey H.Q. NGF

NOTE Form Lines are intended to indicate shape of hill features and should not be taken as contours. Heights are only approximate.

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
AND BE ATTENTIVE IN THE MARGINS OF THE SHEET
PAY ATTENTION TO LARGER MARGINAL FIGURES AND TO
THOSE PRINTED ON FACE OF THE MAP
POINT PAIPA
EAST
Take west edge of square in which point lies and read the figure printed against the line on east or west margin as on the line itself on the face of the map (east margin, east margin)
NORTH
Take north edge of square in which point lies and read the figure printed against the line on north or south margin as on the line itself on the face of the map (north margin, north margin)
REFERENCE: 605 705
UNIT: METRE SQUARE. GRID REFERENCE TO NEAREST...
NEAREST SIMILAR REFERENCE DISTANT 100 KILOMETRES

Reef
Trig. Stations and altitude
First Class
Second
Third
Fourth
Astronomical Station
Native Garden
Native Village
Unidentified Native Village
Buildings
River or perennial Stream
Non perennial Stream
Fathom Line

Swamp (subject to inundation)
Spring Well, Waterhole
Mangroves
Dense Jungle Forest
Forest
Scattered Timber
Plantation (other marked)
Secondary Growth
Contours Form Lines (contour lines facing uphill)
Ridges
Cliffs

OCT 43



Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, USAFFE, by
Base Map Plant, USAFFE, June 1943.
Compilation from trigonometric serial photography, missions
27X Feb 1943, 30X Feb 1943 and 72X Mar 1943 to 5th
Photo Sq, 5th Air Force, U.S. Army and information from AOB,
GDU, Geographical Section Advanced HQ and Property and
Survey Branch, Dept of Interior AOT.
Topography from vertical and oblique photographs using
triangulation plotting and Pictorial stereo-comparisons.
Grid based on control furnished by A.D. Survey, NGP, Feb and Mar 1943.
Lambert Conformal Orthographic Projection.

RED OVERPRINT BY 271 AUST. ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY.
FROM INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY H.Q. NEW GUINEA FORCE

CAUTION:
This map was produced from serial photographs. Due to
lack of accurate ground control, distances scaled on this
map may be at variance with actual ground distances.

LEGEND

- Secondary roads, ————
- Trails, probable, - - - - -
- Streams, intermittent, ~~~~~
- Swamps, ————
- Jungle, ————
- Grassland, ————
- Farm lines, interval approx 100 ft., ————
- Native gardens, ————
- Emergency landing ground, ————

Scale 1:33380 (Approx) or 1 inch equals 1 mile

1 1/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 Yards

"WARNING: FORM LINES ONLY, NOT CONTOURS"

NOTE: SPINDERS USING THIS MAP WILL HAVE HAZARD CORRECTIONS AND
ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO THEIR ATTENTION AND WILL BE SENT TO
"THE CHIEF ENGINEER, USAFFE, APO DOL"

0°32' E
8°15' E
9 Miles
11 Miles

True North
Mag North

Approximate mean declination 1943:
Annual magnetic increase 3'

DUMPU	GUBAP	HANKINA
FINITEGU	AMARI	IKWAP
KAINANTU	ONGA	LERON

1000 METER MODIFIED BRITISH GRID SYSTEM
NORTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE
Origin of grid 3°S Long 150°E, whose coordinates
are 2,000,000 M and 1,000,000 M.
To give the coordinates of a point, use only larger figures
on the grid lines, and add estimated tenths of kilometers.
The small numbers at the corners are the full coordinates
referred to the origin of the grid zone.
Referred similar reference on this grid is 500 km. distant.
ALWAYS indicate grid letter in giving a reference on this
grid.
Blue ticks within map indicate 10 km grid of Equatorial zone.

AMARI
5600-EI4600/15X20

Bartholomew


NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
EQUATORIAL ZONE

SECOND EDITION

NEW GUINEA KUMBARUM

NOTE: GRID ON THIS MAP DOES NOT AGREE
WITH THE GRID SHOWN ON KUMBARUM 3670
1:25,000 SERIES, WHICH IS SUPERSEDED

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
KUMBARUM 3672 1:25,000 SERIES




Astronomical Fixation at Dumpu
Lat. 05° 50' 34.40"
Long. 145° 44' 29.55"
Extended by Instrumental Traversing
by 3 Aust. Fid. Svy. Coy. A.I.F.
Lambert Conical Orthomorphic
8th Photo Squadron, 5th Air Force
346W 310Y 245Y 273X 277Z
2/1 Aust. Army Topo. Survey Coy.
with aid of intelligence reports.

Bridge
Motor Road
Jeep Track
Foot Track
Reported Track
Telegraph Line
Airfield
Sea Plane Base
Cemetery
Mission Station
Spot Height
Grasslands

LOCALITY DIAGRAM			
URIGINA	MT KUBARI	POMMERN BAY	
MT OTTO	GUSAP		
BENA BENA	FINITEGU	AMARI	

The blue figures within the borders of this map are for Artillery
purposes and denote corrections in minutes and seconds of mean time.
There is no convergence correction in this zone.



Officers using this map are requested to make any necessary additions or
amendments on the map itself and forward to A.D. Survey H.Q. NGF
NOTE Form Lines are intended to indicate shape of hill features and
should not be taken as contours. Heights are only approximate.

Reef	
Trig. Stations and altitude	First Class Second Third Fourth
Astronomical Station	
Native Garden	
Native Village	
Unidentified Native Villages	
Buildings	
River or perennial Stream	
Non perennial Stream	
Fathom Line	

Swamp	
Spring Well, Waterhole	
Mangroves	
Dense Jungle Forest	
Forest	
Scattered Timber	
Plantation	
Secondary Growth	
Contours - Form Lines	
Ridges	
Cliffs	



Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, USAFFE, by
Base Map Plant, USAFFE, June 1943.
Compilation from trimetrogon aerial photography, missions
57X Feb 1943, 50X-387 Feb 1943, 72X Mar 1943 and 156Z June 1943
by 8th Photo Sq, 5th Air Force, U. S. Army and information from
AGS, OIU, Geographical Section Advanced LHO and Property
and Survey Branch, Dept of Interior ADT.
Topography from vertical and oblique photographs using
111-metrogon plotting and Fairchild stereo-comparator.
Grid based on control furnished by AD Survey, NGP, Feb and Mar 1943.
Lambert Conical Orthomorphic Projection.

RED OVERPRINT BY 2d AUST. ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY.
FROM INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY H.Q. NEW GUINEA FORCE

CAUTION:
This map was produced from aerial photographs. Due to
lack of accurate ground control, distances scaled on this
map may be at variance with actual ground distances.

LEGEND

- Secondary roads
- Trails, probable
- Streams, intermittent
- Swamps
- Jungle
- Grassland
- Form lines, interval approx 100 ft.
- Native gardens
- Emergency landing ground

Scale 1/63360 (Approx) or 1 inch equals 1 mile

0 1/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles
0 1/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kilometers
1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 Yards

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MAKE PERSON CORRECTIONS AND
ADJUSTMENTS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO
"THE CHIEF ENGINEER, USAFFE, APO 50."

"WARNING: FORM LINES ONLY, NOT CONTOURS"

Approximate mean declination 1943
Annual magnetic increase 3'

MT OTTO	DUMPU	GUSAP
BENA BENA	FININTEGU	AMARI
GONOMI	KAINANTU	ONGA

1000 METER MODIFIED BRITISH GRID SYSTEM
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE
Origin of grid: Lat 0°S Long 150°E, whose coordinates
are X=3,000,000 M and Y=21,000,000 M
To give the coordinates of a point use only larger figures
on the grid lines, and add estimated tenths of kilometers.
The small numbers at the corners are the full coordinates
referred to the origin of the grid zone.
Nearest similar reference on this grid is 500 km distant.
ALWAYS indicate grid letter in giving a reference on this
grid.
Blue ticks within map indicate 10 km grid of Equatorial zone.

FININTEGU
S600-E14540/15X20
REPRODUCED BY BASE MAP PLANT, USAFFE, JULY 1943

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

NEW GUINEA ONGA

NOTE: THIS MAP SUPERSEDES ONGA 1 INCH PROVISIONAL EDITION

REFER TO THIS MAP AS:
ONGA 3551 1 INCH SERIES



NOTE: Form Lines are intended to indicate shape of hill features and should not be taken as contours. Heights are only approximate.

CONTROL: Extended from NADZAB 3550 and WAIME 3583 1 INCH SERIES with the aid of Air Photographs

PROJECTION: Lambert Conical Orthomorphic

AIR PHOTOGRAPHY: 8th. Photo Squadron Fifth Air Force

MISSION: 38Y 86Y 72XX 98B 43Y


COMPILATION: 2/1 Aust. Army Topo. Survey Coy.

REPRODUCTION: 2/1 Aust. Army Topo. Survey Coy.

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET			
PAY ATTENTION TO THE SMALLER CO-ORDINATE FIGURES AT THE EDGES AND IN MARGINS. THEY ARE FOR FINDING FULL CO-ORDINATES			
PAY ATTENTION TO LARGER MARGINAL FIGURES AND TO THOSE PRINTED ON FACE OF THE MAP			
POINT KAMBADAM			
EAST	66	NORTH	85
Take west edge of square in which point lies and read the figure printed against this line on east or west margin as on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate (with care) southwards.			
REFERENCE 56000			
UNIT: METRE SQUARE. 5000 REFERENCE TO NEAREST 1000 NEAREST SIMILAR REFERENCE DISTANT 100 KILOMETRES			

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

FINTEGA	AMARI	LIN IWAP
ONGA	ONGA	ONGA
KAINATI	ONGA	LERON
LAMARI RIVER	MT KARSINA	WAIME




Bridge (road, except where shown otherwise)	
Motor Road	
Jeep track	
Foot track	
Reported track	
Telegraph line	
Airfield	
Sea Plane Base	
Cemetery	
Mission Station	
Spot Height	
Grasslands	

Reel	First Class	805'
Triangulation Station	Second	652'
	Third	529'
	Fourth	202'
Astronomical Station		
Native Garden		
Native Village		
Undiscovered Native Village		
Buildings		
River or perennial Stream		
Non perennial Stream		
Fathoms Line		

Swamp (indicated by wavy lines)	
Spring Well, Waterhole	
Mangroves	
Dense Jungle Forest	
Forest	
Scattered Timber	
Plantation (rubber, coconut)	
Secondary Growth	
Contours - Form Lines (indicated by wavy lines)	
Ridges	
Cliffs	

Officers using this map are requested to make any necessary additions or amendments on the map itself and forward to A. D. Survey H.Q. N.G.F.

ENLARGEMENT OF CORRECTION TO DUMPU 1:63360.




TRACE. No 3.

FIRE PLAN 2/16 B-

9 Oct 43

To 1200 1 Hrs



Reliability: Compass bearings and pacing

1" Sect
2" B-
2" ov

