

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/17

17 Infantry Brigade

April 1941

APR 1 to 9. AMIRIYA.

R.A.P. conducted from gear carried from MATRUH in haversacks. 6 cases of V.D.; 2 of Uretheritis, 4 soft sores; during this period Pedicute Corporis were found on the personnel of two Coys and arrangements were made for the disinfection of clothing and blankets.

APR 9 to 12. AT SEA.

Voyage uneventful.

APR 14.

Left DAFHNI Camp by M.T. and then by train. Disentrained at ORPHANE 1300 hrs 15 APR 41, withdrew to DOMOKOS PASS arriving 1200 hrs 16 APR 41. Positions controlling the pass were taken up. 3 Coys being forward on a three mile front, the other two in reserve. Late that afternoon 2/7 Bn took up a position on the left of the road while a company of 2/5 Bn were installed on the right flank. In view of the difficult nature of the terrain the R.A.P. was placed well forward in a sunken path on the side of a hill and a WOUNDED COLLECTING POST arranged about a thousand yards back on the road. Capt ANDERSON of 2/8 Bn arrived with the remnants of his Bn and he agreed to take over this post while he was with us.

APR 17.

The R.A.P. truck arrived and relieved the situation re supplies and stretchers. Supplies were furnished to 2/8 Bn and 2/4 Bn R.A.F.'s. During the dive bombing on this and the subsequent days one officer was killed and one O/R seriously and two slightly wounded. The evacuation was arranged by Col RUSSELL of 2/1 Fd Amb who furnished two ambulances which were parked some five hundred yards behind the cross roads. He also supplied four stretcher bearers to travel with the R.A.P.

APR 19/20.

DOMOKOS was evacuated without further casualty. Shortly after arriving in the BRAILLOS Valley the convoy was heavily bombed. The driver of the R.A.P. truck was killed and four others wounded. The unit amongst whom we were sheltering -- a Palestinian Coy -- had one killed and five wounded.

APR 21.

The Bn took up a position on BRAILLOS PASS. The R.A.P. was located in a woody dell well sheltered and covered. Major LEMPRIERE of 2/2 Fd Amb arranged to station an ambulance with the R.A.P.

APR 23/24.

The evacuation of the BRAILLOS position was completed after slight contact with the enemy. A 30 cwt truck supplied by 2/2 Fd Amb followed behind the R.A.P. to collect walking wounded.

APR 26.

After shedding four rifle Coys, less 1 Pl, to various rear guard commands in the PELOPANNESUS the remainder of the Bn embarked at KALAMIA without further strife. The R.A.P. truck and all non-portable gear being destroyed.

APR 27/28.

Transport bombed. No casualties.

APR 29.

Arrived AMIRIYA. Departed for FALESTINE.

(Sgd) E.H. HEDBERG. Capt.

R.H.O.

UNIT REPORT FROM MAJOR H.C. GUINN (2/7)
TO BE INSERTED HERE

Summary of activities of 17 Bde Details from Evacuation of GREECE 26/27 April until orders for evacuation of CRETE up till 30 May.

Embarking with details of H.Q. Coy; 2/6 Bn from KALAMI, GREECE, on 26/27 April I boarded the "COSTA RICA". Enemy aircraft were very active from daylight 27 April, but the small arm A/A defence on board was very effective and managed to keep the bombers up until approx 1500 hours, when a plane coming out of the sun dropped a stick of bombs, which resulted in the ultimate sinking of the "COSTA RICA".

A point worth while mentioning here is the conduct of troops on board whilst the vessel was sinking; the behaviour of the troops was excellent, there being no panic or rushing of boats. This is shown by the casualties which occurred; one O.R. was accidentally drowned and one received a fractured leg owing to the starboard lifeboats being smashed by the destroyer "Hereward". Several other destroyers also lifted troops.

Details arrived in CRETE and were disembarked from HMS "Hereward" at 1800 hours at SUDA BAY, then collected in parties of 50 and marched to a dispersal area 3 miles EAST of SUDA, where unit areas were allotted. At this area, as the 2/7 Bn was almost a complete unit, 2/5 and 2/6 Bn details were collected at one centre. The numbers at 2000 hours were approx, 2/5 Bn 2 Officers, 30 O.Rs.

During the morning 28 April, 2/6 Bn was organised into 3 parties of 1 Ofr and 20 Ors and 2/5 Bn left as one party. At 1000 hrs Major Starr, 2/5 Bn, and I were sent for by Lt.Col WALKER, D.S.O., E.D., Comdr 2/7 Bn, who assumed command of 17 Bde Details. He had been in touch with G.O.C., 6 Aust.Div., and Brigadier Vasey, 19 Bde. Orders were issued for a move to a bivouac area near KALIRE'S VILLAGE allotted by Brigadier, 19 Bde. It was some 10 miles from present position. The move commenced at approx 1630 hrs and troops settled in a new area. Rations were very meagre, sufficient only for half a days ration per man; as most troops had lost all their gear and mess tins previously. Food containers were used as mess gear; no knives or forks being available; blankets were almost non-existent.

Parade state and return of Arms and Amn rendered to 2/7 Bn. Similar rations were made available for 30 APR. Amenities Officer 19 Bde supplied some comforts to Q. M., 2/7 Bn and proportion was received by 2/6 and 2/5 Bns. These comprised towels, clothing, soap, few toothbrushes and 7 razors. Rations were supplemented by scrounging parties from units and bartering of smokes for fruit.

A lecture was given to all units in this area on 2 MAY by General FREYBURG, after which Lieut-Col WALKER called conference of senior officers 2/5 and 2/6 Bn. Major STARR and I attended.

During this last two days further details of both units had been turning up; 2/5 Bn now approx 4 Ofrs, 70 O/R's.; 2/6 Bn 8 Ofrs and 150 O/Rs. C.O. 2/7 Bn ordered 2 Coys of 100 O/R's to be formed from 2/5 and 2/6 Bn. Capt BROWNE was in charge of 2/6 Bn Coy. These Coys were almost without arms, but arms were being drawn from Arty Regts in area, but situation there was acute; sufficient being available for some 140 O/R's. Organisation complete and remained as such until evening of 3 MAY following a conference at 19 Bde H.Q. when Brig VASEY returned from conference with G.O.C., N.Z. Div. The 2/7 Bn then came under their command; remaining details 2/6 and 2/5 Bns had then to hand their rifles over to 2/7 Bn and reverted to or came under Command Lieut-Col CREMOR who was given charge of unarmed forces in KALAMAI -KALIBES sector. 2/7 Bn moved off on Sunday morning.

On 5 MAY 41 2/6 Bn moved to area previously occupied by 2/7 Bn and 5 and 6 Bns came under command CREMOR FORCE, and were rationed by 2/2 Fd Regt. Total now of 2/5 and 2/6 Bns, plus other details, Aust and British Troops, was 15 Ofrs and 327 O/R's. (approx) Lieut-Col CREMOR of 2/2 Fd Regt attended conference at SUDA area H.Q. (Maj Gen WESTON) on morning of 5 MAY 41 and called conference of senior officers 16 and 17 Bde and issued instructions on afternoon of 8 MAY 41 that 16 and 17 Bde Details would form 2 units.

17 Bde Details were now approx 280 all ranks, Major MUHLHAN being i/c and Major STARR 2 i/c; I then was attached to Col CREMOR'S Staff. Units were to occupy two stop positions in KALAMAI-KALIBES Sector - organised 2/5 and 2/6 Bn Details - 3 Coys, 1 armed with Yankee rifles and 2 armed with British rifles.

- ROLE.
- (1) To occupy "stop" positions on roads leading from RETIMO and SUDA.
 - (2) Prevent beach landing on beach between KALIBES and SUDA Pt.
 - (3) To protect coastal battery and searchlight "clusters" and A/A Battery in this sector and include prison at SUDA POINT. 2/5 and 2/6 Bns allotted position on left approx 4000 to 5000 yards frontage. From all exclusive Mouth of KAILARIAS R. to all inclusive SUDA POINT.

Recce of position was made during morning of 9 MAY 41 and movement restricted to Coy Comdrs recce during daylight. The position to be occupied by 2200 hrs 9 MAY 41.

A visit from Lieut-Col WILLS, R. Marines G.S.O. 1., SUDA Area H.Q. produced results in S.A's., a few M.M.G.'s without tripods and wire without pickets. Works policy was intensive digging and wiring - laying of A/T Mines and Anti personnel mines; these latter however did not eventuate.

The defensive positions eventually selected were a compromise between "locality" and "beach" defence - the Battle positions being occupied by a nucleus during daylight only - this state continued until the morning of evacuation.

All unarmed personnel were moved within perimeter defences during 11/12; Col CREMOR rejoined his unit for embarkation and Major STARR assumed command of Corps Bde Gp, which was now under control of 2/5 and 2/6 Bns. On 15 May 41 Gen WESTON visited the area and made a tour of inspection. Major STARR was indisposed and left for hospital next day; subsequently the hospital was captured by the Germans and was in their hands for some 3 to 4 hours. Major COHEN of 2/2 Bn took over command. About this time 2 3" mortars arrived for each unit, but minus base plates, pickets and tripods for MMGs were also made available.

New H.Q. were selected for Group in KALAMAI village (SUDA POINT) on 17 May 41. The same day Major MUHLHAN and Capt KERR were evacuated; Major MUHLHAN to hospital and Capt BROWNE took over command 17 Bde Details. Capt KERR moved to Transit Camp for embarkation for purpose of rejoining unit. He was given nominal rolls of each unit, 2/5 and 2/6 Bns.

Lieut RAWSON of 2/6 Bn was selected as a Supply Officer and did quite a good job in getting necessary stores, rations and clothing, etc. for Groups. 2/5 and 2/6 Bn occupied positions, still carrying on with digging and erection of wire and other obstacles, until 20 MAY 41, when landing took place. From 20 MAY until 26 MAY it was necessary to remain under cover during daylight and preparation of defences were curtailed to a certain extent. Much bombing and machine gunning took place over area but no casualties to units occurred. On 21 MAY Lieut-Col CREMOR came back and took over command Bde Group.

After visit by Lieut-Col CREMOR to Force H.Q., which had by this time moved to a position in a Wadi 2 miles West of SUDA POINT, on afternoon of 26 MAY, he issued instructions that 17 Bde Group would take over from 2/C Bn near PERIVOIA. This order was countermanded at 2000 hrs on instructions from Force H.Q. Speaking to Force at 2100 hrs, was told that situation was well in hand. At 2130 hrs, made contact with some officers of N.Z. unit who said that they had been told to get out and travel South. At 0530 hrs 27 MAY, on instructions from Lieut-Col CREMOR, I reported to Force H.Q. for instructions on following points :-

- (1) Was there any line left.
- (2) Was any evacuation taking place; if so, when and where.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

COMMUNICATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO
"THE DIRECTOR"

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
CANBERRA

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS:
"AUSWARMUSE"

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO.

"They gave their lives. For that public gift they received a praise which never ages and a tomb most glorious—not so much the tomb in which they lie, but that in which their fame survives, to be remembered for ever when occasion comes for word or deed. . . ."

MELBOURNE OFFICE:

347 KING STREET
(POST OFFICE BOX 214 D.)
TELEPHONE NO. F 2597

2 Echelon

Capt Wright

4960

6931
m v

THE DIRECTOR
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

I made contact with Brig BRUNSKILL but could not find any others of the Staff Of Force H.Q.; General FREYBERG had just laid down for a rest and Brig STEWART (GSC 1) could not be found.

The information received from Brig BRUNSKILL was as follows :-

- (1) No line left.
- (2) Evacuation was taking place from SPHAKIA and time for your move will be notified.

No further instructions came through up to 0900 hrs. Lieut-Col CREMOR then visited H.Q. and came back with instructions for all personnel of units under his command to immediately rejoin their units.

17 Bde Group to provide a Coy for protection of Force H.Q., as well as one Pl armed with all automatic weapons available, to report to O.C., Commandos, or Col FINLAYSON, SOUTH of NEONKHORION to form another line. Remainder to move during daylight hours in parties no larger than five and rendezvous in a selected area, SOUTH of NEONKHORION, where units would be reformed and marched to SPHAKIA for evacuation.

A conference of all Officers 2/5 and 2/6 Bns was called and instructions issued. 80 men under Lieut JAWSON and Lieut LAVER were ordered to report and take over protective duties of Force H.Q.; these men relieved portion of 2/2 and 2/3 Fd Regt. When orders were received to move this was the last time that the 17 Bde detachments were together as a unit.

Lieut REILLY was given 25 men with all available LMG's and moved off, but later stated that Col FINLAYSON could not be contacted and he was ordered to move his party on; as were other units, N.Z. and R. MARINES, sent along for a similar purpose.

Capt GILBERT who was in charge of 2/5 Bn Details was given necessary instructions for a move. 2/5 and 2/6 Bns were now split up. Instead of being allowed to assemble SOUTH of Village, provosts and picquets of R. Marines prevented anyone moving SOUTH and the afternoon was spent in an olive grove a half mile off the village which was severely strafed from approx 1700 hrs until 1930 hrs. From now on the situation was impossible.

Owing to the holdup which occurred at NEONKHORION Village, troops kept filtering along the banks of the KALARIAS River. A move commenced 2100 hrs on 27 MAY and from this time on no definite unit was held together, but parties of Aust., N.Z. and British troops would be assembled under an officer. Marching was very hard and many troops fell out owing to fatigue and insufficient rations.

Arriving at INVOS on morning of 28 MAY, with a party of 2 Cfrs and 20 O/R's, I was prevented from going further. Two days were spent here and an endeavour was made to get troops together and some 80 all ranks of 2/5 and 2/6 Bns were in the party. When the column moved at 2000 hrs on 29 MAY 41, it comprised of 12 ofrs and 180 O/R'S. (Aust & N.Z.). This column was held up by road blocks and road control point on the escarpment overlooking the sea, 6 miles from SPHAKIA.

As it was breaking day all movement was stopped, the party was broken up into groups of 20 O/R's under an officer and told to make contact with Major BURSTON of 2/3 Fd Regt, A/Movement Control Officer, for instructions re rations and embarkation. This is the last I saw of many of the men of both units. A party was called for carrying rations up to 2/7 Bn in the front line and they were guaranteed priority of embarkation that night by Movement Control Officer. It is worthy of note that the only volunteers for this job came from 17 Bde personnel and a party of 1 ofr and 40 O/R's moved off under Lieut A.J. REILLY of 2/6 Bn. This party was not evacuated from CRETE. There is little further to add of the activities of details of these 2 units. Although not coming into direct contact with the enemy, the units were allotted a role which required energy, steadfastness and resource under most difficult and trying conditions. All ranks displayed adaptability in overcoming these difficulties.

27 JUNE 1941.

(Sgd) J.G.ROWAN, Major, 2 i/c 2/6 AUST INF BN.

PART III

NARRATIVE
OF OFFICERS, N.C.O's and MEN
WHO ESCAPED.

REPORT BY LIEUT H.E. SWEET ON ESCAPE FROM GREECE.

Upon the afternoon 26 APR 41 just before the Battalion proceeded to the wharf, I received orders from Major GUINN to remain with the Transport until such time as I received a written instruction from either the Brigadier or the Brigade Major to destroy the Transport, and then proceed to the wharf to embark the Transport personnel, with the main body of the Battalion.

I contacted Lieut LOWAN who agreed to bring back instructions to destroy the vehicles.

At approximately 0100 hrs 27 APR 41 I received a note delivered by a member of the 2/6 Bn (timed either 2000 or 2100 hrs) to destroy vehicles and proceed to 2/8Bn area for embarkation. Having no idea where 2/8 Bn were located, and not desiring to waste any more time, I proceeded direct to the wharf and parked the vehicles with troops on board about 300 yards from the wharf.

I walked the wharf and learned that the 2/8 Bn had already embarked, and the last of the 2/5 Bn were just going aboard. I did not have time to return to the vehicles, unload the troops, and return to the wharf to embark because the destroyers drew out 5 minutes after I arrived at the wharf.

After the destroyers had left, I drove my troops down the beach road and dispersed among the trees for the night.

The morning of the 27 APR 41 I was called to a conference by Brigadier FARRINGTON and a plan was constructed for the embarkation of the remaining personnel who numbered 8500 in all. Of this number, I can recall 1600 being Australian Troops. An order of march was established upon the following lines. English troops, Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Palestinian, Cyprians. The head of the column was to be at a nominated starting point at 2100 hrs. The force was lined up and waiting, when advice was received that the Royal Navy would not be coming in to embark troops that night.

I dispersed the troops further up the hilly slopes and away from the town by dawn, and rested for the day. There were continual enemy air activities during the day.

The following evening 28 APR 41, I was advancing along the main road toward the town to the starting point, when enemy fire could be heard, and seen, coming from the vicinity of the wharf.

I met Brigadier FARRINGTON on the road and he directed me to take my force down and assist in clearing the enemy from the town. I was to contact the English Colonel who was commanding a force which had made contact with the enemy, and come under his command.

I proceeded towards the town with my force, but halted on receipt of a further message ~~xxxx~~ from the Brigadier, deleting my previous instructions and ordering me to provide guard protection for the Main Body, who would embark from the beaches.

I remained in this position for several hours until I was called to a conference and there learnt that the Brigadier had decided to lay down his arms at 0530 hrs, also the Navy had signalled they would not be back to take any more troops off.

Brigadier FARRINGTON announced that he had no objection to any officer or man who wished to make an attempt to escape, and advised officers that the best direction would be to follow the coast south.

I returned to my men and explained what the Brigadier had said, also advised them to break up into small parties if they wished to make an attempt to escape. I also stated that I intended to try and escape and would proceed to do so before 0530 hrs.

Together with Col RENTON, W.C. NOLAN and two privates we commenced our journey south along the coast. Only 25 miles from KALAIATA could be travelled by vehicles, and from there onwards a foot track had to be followed over the mountains.

After a day's very strenuous marching, we reached a small town DRAGHEILA, and there rested for the night. Many of the personnel who commenced the journey, fell out and gave up hope of getting away.

The following day to avoid observation from the air, we hid in a cave and at evening came down into the town to try and obtain news of the enemy.

I met an English Colonel who told me that the Germans were in the towns to the south and north of our position and he had sent a message to them surrendering the small party who had collected in the village. The enemy had replied that they would come round on the following morning and take the party prisoner.

As a last resort signallers were posted during the night on the high ground in the hope of attracting a unit of the Royal Navy.

At approximately 0100 hrs I was awakened and advised that contact had been made with a British Destroyer and it was coming in to take off the party in the town.

At 0330 hrs I boarded H.M.S. "HERO" together with my original party that started 2 days before from KALAIATA. The destroyer travelled a short distance down the coast and picked up a further two men and then proceeded direct to PORT SAID where the party was disembarked.

Upon arrival at Dragheila, I was pleased to learn that 3 members of my force in KALAIATA had made the journey and escaped with our party on the destroyer.

After spending one night and a day at KANTARA Transit Camp I rejoined my unit at HILL 69 with 1 W.C. and 4 privates.

(Signed) H.E. SWEET Lieut.

H.T.C. 2/5 Bn A.I.F.

REPORT BY WO (II) NOLAN F. ON ESCAPE FROM GREECE.

During the withdrawal of 2/5 Bn from forward areas to KALAMATA area, I was attached to A Echelon MT under the direction of Lieut. SWEET. Included in 2/5 Bn personnel were AASC and Corps Petrol Park MT drivers, the total strength being 1 Officer and 44 Other Ranks. The Bn dispersed in an area about 8 miles from KALAMATA on the morning of 26 APR 41, and moved the same afternoon.

MT personnel remained with their vehicles in this area awaiting instructions to destroy all vehicles except two, which were to be later used to carry the drivers to the embarkation point.

At about 0100 hrs 27 APR 41 Lieut SWEET directed the destruction of vehicles. This was carried out by damaging radiator, draining sump and running engines until they seized. Component parts were then broken.

MT personnel moved to the town of KALAMATA and approaching the quay a convoy halted in front of us. As no movement of this halted convoy took place Lieut SWEET went forward and found the vehicles were empty of personnel, and just left blocking the roadway. He then went forward to the quay.

I remained with the MT personnel and cleared the road of Palestinian troops who were crowding forwards towards the quay.

Lieut SWEET returned and advised personnel that embarkation was not possible at that time, and he led us to a covered area about two miles south of the town.

During the day of 27 APR enemy aircraft was active and some machine gunning took place in the area.

On the night of 27 APR Lieut SWEET took all personnel along a beach track towards the quay and organized the troops for embarkation. Advice was then received that embarkation was not possible. As several thousand troops were in the area considerable congestion took place, and some difficulty was experienced in making a passage out of the town.

Lieut. SWEET led the personnel about 2½ miles out of the town and dispersed them to sleep for two hours. Rising at 0430 hrs on 28 APR the party moved a further 3 miles down the coast and occupied a rocky well protected ravine running from an escarpment to the sea.

During the day, except for recon planes and some machine gunning of roads in the vicinity, the men had a chance to rest. At dusk, Lieut. SWEET assembled the party and moved towards the town. Within three miles of KALAMATA we were met by Lt.Col RENTON, who spoke to Lieut. SWEET.

At this time enemy flares, machine gun fire and some artillery fire began in the town area. Lieut SWEET directed me to throw a screen at right angles to the road as information had been received that enemy elements had penetrated towards the road. Our party took up this position, and a search revealed a number of JUGO SLAVS hidden in creek beds. These and other unarmed troops were directed from the main road down to the beach track.

After ensuring that all personnel had been cleared from the area and that no enemy elements were in the vicinity, Lieut SWEET directed me to move our party about two miles along the road and occupy a distributed position parallel with the main road, and a frontage east of the road.

Listening posts were sent out and communication kept with Lieut SWEET and Col RENTON who had gone by a road at right angles to the one we controlled towards the beach where contact with the enemy had been made.

About 0200 hrs on 29 APR Lieut SWEET instructed me to move our party on to the road down to the beach as a covering force, and he prepared to repel a tank attack from the direction we had moved.

Lieut SWEET established his HQ at a point on this road.

No enemy elements were contacted by us, but it was obvious that embarkation was not taking place. Lieut SWEET told me that Naval units had been withdrawn from the area and that a Brigadier intended to surrender, but that this would not be verified until 0430 hrs. The time was then 0345 hrs, and as a number of LT vehicles were in the vicinity I used, by direction of Lieut SWEET, 4 reserve personnel to examine these vehicles, start them and if possible concentrate them. A supply of petrol, rations and ammunition was located and eight vehicles were made ready to move, with adequate reserves of water.

At 0430 hrs Lieut SWEET spoke to our party and explained that the Brigadier previously referred to had in fact sent a captured German Officer with a British Officer for the purpose of surrendering his force, but that the Brig. gave every officer and man the opportunity of escaping if possible, though the chance of escape was remote.

Lieut SWEET said he would try to escape himself. He elected Cpl HENNESSEY to control personnel who wished to remain. At this stage the men were utterly worn out, and it was only the example and leadership displayed by Lieut SWEET that had kept them together so long.

Other troops literally panicked and threw away their arms. These were mostly Palestinian and Cypriot.

I accompanied Lieut SWEET and 4 CR's together with Col RENTON in one of the vehicles referred to earlier. Col RENTON is an elderly gentleman and was under the direct care of Lieut SWEET.

After travelling till dawn to KALALIRA we then took track where the road ends to a small town on the coast called DRAEGHEILA, 20 miles away. This journey by cliff tracks was a nightmare. Over portion of the journey a donkey was used to carry Col RENTON. Night was spent near an isthmus where an adequate watch was kept.

The day of 30 APR was spent in cover overlooking the cove. Air activity in the morning destroyed small craft in a cove nearby. During the ~~evening~~ evening Lieut SWEET moved us to the coast and a Corps Signaller with us kept signalling to sea.

Early in the morning of 1 MAY 41 response to signals was received, and finally contact with units of the Royal Navy was made. Wading out to the ship's boats from a shingle shore, we were soon comfortably housed, and finally disembarked at Fort Said.

At all times I received sufficient and adequate direction and advice from Lieut SWEET.

REPORT OF MOVEMENTS OF 2/6 AUST INF BN REAR PARTY

"K"

On night of 26 APR 41 we were ordered to stand by trucks (14 men) under Lieut BENNS and await orders from Bde to destroy same. This party bivouaced together that night in the Bn transport area but no order was issued. The following morning Lieut BENNS and myself proceeded to Bde area in KALAI, and contacted Capt GRAY. He informed us that he had issued orders to destroy transport the previous night and proceed to embarkation area. He then issued new orders to report at crossroads at 2100 hrs with party personnel.

The party reported at the appointed time and found the boats were not there to take us off so we then bivouaced in the surrounding foothills and reported back the following night. At approximately 2045 hrs a mixed barrage (machine gun and mortar) swept the beach. All troops were ordered by officers to take up defensive positions in a ditch running at right angles to the beach. Whilst taking up this position, Pte BOWLER received G.S.W. in chest. The firing continued for two or three hours and all but one enemy gun was silenced by New Zealand Forces. During this action warships manouvered close into the beach and evacuated all walking wounded (2 boatloads). By this time warships were unable to remain any longer so they put out to sea leaving approx seven to eight thousand troops.

The Brigadier in charge then called all officers to a conference and stated that his command had ceased, also that he had despatched a captured German Officer, accompanied by a British Officer, as an envoy to enemy forces surrendering the town and troops occupying it. Lieut IATERSON, on return to the party, informed us that capitulation was to take place at 0500 hrs.

He informed us that it was not necessary to partake in the total surrender. We then in small parties made our way to the coast road and discovered trucks that had not been destroyed. By this means of transport we proceeded south to a town, I believe, is known as SELINIKA, finding it impossible to obtain a boat of any description and left our transport as the road had ended.

We then, on foot, proceeded south along the coast. About ten miles from SELINIKA several members of our party, with a number of other troops, decided to commandeer a fishing smack of some 80 or 90 tons. We advised them against doing this in daylight as enemy planes were active. When the remainder of the party had proceeded about five miles we were forced to take cover by enemy planes. When raid had cleared we were able to discern the planes bombing and machine gunning the vessel. The following day reports were received from Ptes WIER and GRIFFIN that Pte GILLETTE received machine gun bullets in thigh, three men were killed and twelve wounded. These men were evacuated to a village further south and taken care of by civilians.

We then proceeded along the coast to a village where we were informed by local inhabitants that the British Gunboat would be passing at 2000 hrs that night. We then took cover near this village all that day and was joined throughout the day by small parties of mixed British troops. At nightfall we went to the village and slept in the church as blankets and clothing were scarce. We set up an all night watch but no boat was sighted. We repeated this the following night. We had received information from the villages regarding enemy troop movements, that they were closing in on the village from both sides. On 29 APR, about 1000 hrs, a British Colonel who was with the party advised us to surrender. He then sent a Greek messenger to contact the enemy forces. They replied to Mayor of village that no harm was intended the village or inhabitants, while British troops kept clear of it or them, and that their sole object was the British troops in that area.

That night, a nightwatch was again posted on the cliffs and, in answer to our signals, a reply was received at 0130 hrs from the warship "KIMBERLEY". After ascertaining the number of party (68) she advised us to proceed to the beach where she was sending her whalers to evacuate us. All signalling was performed by British Army Sigs. who were in the party. During the movements from KALAI the members of the party

were continually harassed by machine gun fire from enemy patrol planes.

In my opinion the men displayed great determination and fortitude as the enemy forces were unable to cover the same distance in three days as compared with their one day.

After embarkation we proceeded to PORT SAID, thence to MANTARA by transport and entrained for this camp. The Navy showed great daring in picking up small parties of escapees as the movement was performed in the early hours of dawn. They had to proceed at full speed to escape enemy plane action.

To the best of my knowledge Lieut BENNE and Lieut FATERSON dropped out of the party six miles south of KALAMAI. I cannot state whether they are prisoners of war.

(SGD) VX 6858 W. HARRISON . Cpl.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn.

At KALAMAI BEACH on 29 AIR 41, a number of men surged forward towards the waters edge, intending to swim out to the warships which were about 200 yds out from the shore. They were ordered back at revolver point by an English Officer who, at the same time, fired three shots at several Palestine Pioneers, who had jumped aboard the whale boat intended for walking wounded.

For two or three hours, the Navy had been signalling, but did not seem to get any response from the shore.

Further along the north end of the beach, where part of the troops had taken up a position in a ditch which ran at right angles to the beach, we were again given an order to fire by an unknown officer. Instantly an A.I.F. Officer gave the order to hold our fire as there were hundreds of our own troops in front.

There seemed to be a general feeling among the troops that there were "Fifth Columnist" activities that night, as at one stage an officer of high rank was giving orders to the different Units on the beach, and at the same time using a torch when even smoking was not permitted.

(Sgd) W. HARRISON, Cpl
VX 6858

2/6 Aust Inf Bn.

26 APR. 41 On the evening of the embarkation of the 2/6 Bn, I was attached to 17 Bde H.Q. and on the movement of the latter unit to the boats I marched with them. A portion of Bde Staff was evacuated leaving amongst those known to me the following :- Capt GREY, Lieut MORRIS of Corps Guards, Lieut YOUNG, 2/7 Bn, Lieut BENNS 2/6 Bn, Lieut PATERSON 2/6 Bn. That part of Bde Staff left at KALAMATA then went to their original position where heavy machine gunning and bombing was experienced the next day.

27 APR 41 All this day was spent in concealment. Two Sgts were killed during the day - Sgt McMAIL of "D" Coy 2/6 Bn & Sgt VAUSDEN of 17 Bde H.Q. In the evening the troops were fallen in and again marched to the wharves but as there were no ships this night we again returned to our previous areas.


28 APR 41. This day was spent under even more trying circumstances than the previous - bombers of all descriptions coming in relays of forty or fifty at a time from early morning until late dusk. In the evening the troops were fallen in and marched down towards the pier. After having covered half the distance, i.e. approx where the road which passed past 2/6 Bn bivouac area and the beach net, we were met by heavy fire from L.M.C.'s. and some artillery or mortar fire. The men promptly lined a stream bed facing the town which was obviously at this time in the hands of the enemy. I estimate there were between 300 or 400 men, each fourth or fifth man being in possession of some weapons. One Vickers machine gun was placed approx 300 yds north in order to enfilade the front. We were attacked by half a dozen enemy armed with sub-machine guns but on the command of Lieut-Col BINTON a fusillade was fired and the attack beaten off. This officer then assembled all the infantrymen available and pistol in hand led the attack on the town, recapturing it from the Germans with terrific casualties to the enemy. N.Z. and AUSTR. troops were conspicuous by their numbers in this action which could not have lasted more than 45 minutes. After the recapture of the pier it was decided to re-muster the troops on the beach approx $\frac{3}{4}$ mile west of the town, and await the arrival of the navy which turned up about 2300 hrs. As the Naval L.O. and code had been captured earlier great difficulty was experienced in gaining communication, fifth columnists being very active, giving false and misleading information to the navy up to the moment a party landed. A few troops were taken off and the navy put to sea. A conference of all officers was called and it was explained to them that owing to ammunition shortage and the indefensibility of the ground a general capitulation was to take place next morning. It was explained that any troops who desired to attempt escape were at liberty to do so. Lieut PATERSON assembled the remnants of 2/5, 2/6 and 2/7 Bns and the decision to make down the peninsula and escape was made.

29 APR 41. 0445 hrs. Food was commandeered and a truck found. A start was made in the direction of the town of (Vide map town 8). After having gone a mile a halt was made as were informed that the enemy were in occupation of the next village. At this stage Lieuts BENNS, PATERSON and YOUNG stayed behind while the greater part of the party pushed on to the village where the road was found to end. It was learnt that the enemy patrol vacated the town the previous afternoon. Here it was necessary to push on on foot. I went on with a party of Cypriots, Greeks, Serbs, English and Palæstinians to LIHANIA where we arrived after 30 hours marching.

30 APR 41. This day was spent in hiding in a cave and occupied in buying a boat for £20 and five watches and accumulating food and water which was very graciously supplied by friendly Greeks. Some sniping was experienced during the day but no casualties sustained. Enemy aircraft flew over continually and machine gunned all visible small boats. At dusk a start was made in loading the food and gear onto the boat and we finally left at 2030 hrs. After rowing approx 15 miles a destroyer was heard and early on the morning of the 1st MAY, we were taken on board the H.M.S. "KIMBERLY". Owing to my possession of map, compass and protractor, I was able to give the position of the three remaining parties known to me to be on shore. Boats were duly sent and by 0450 hrs 1 MAY 41, all troops were taken aboard.

(Sgd) VX 3459 Pte WOOD M.H.

Bn H.Q. 2/6 Bn.



KALAMATA

"L"

Hamlet

GYTHION

TRAHILA

1st Party X

SELINITZA

2nd Party X




Scale
1" = 5 miles

3rd Party X

LIMANIA

- /// Hills
- Road
- - - Track

X
Picked up
by destroyer



REPORT BY CPL. G. FOOT, VN5045 on ESCAPE FROM GREECE.

On the night of 27 APRIL, when the BN moved to the beach to embark, the transport drivers were told to remain behind and wait orders to destroy their vehicles. The time then being about 1730 hrs. Lieut. YOUNG was waiting on the road and told me he was staying there waiting for a message to destroy the vehicles and move to the beach. I then went back to the drivers and went to sleep. At 0300 hrs 28 APRIL, I was awakened by Lieut. YOUNG. He told me he thought there must be something wrong as no message had been sent back to him. I stayed with Lieut. YOUNG until 0700 hrs when he told me to go and see if I could locate BDE H.Q.'s. I got a truck and he came with me. We drove through the town of KALAMARDA towards the beach. On nearing the beach Lieut. YOUNG seen an officer he knew who I learnt afterwards was Captain VILE. ^{VIAL} After a talk with this officer, Lieut. YOUNG told me the 2/5 and 2/6 Bn drivers had been left behind also, and that we were to be taken off that night. Lieut. YOUNG and myself then went back to the drivers and told them to destroy their vehicles. When this was done, they were to move in small sections down to where BDE H.Q.'s was situated. On this move the bombers were very active and it was about 1500 hrs when the last of them arrived. I then made a roll and reported to Captain GRAY, he gave me instructions that at 2000 hrs I was to march the drivers to the road leading to the beach and report to him. This I did and was told we would move to the embarkation place with the rest of the troops. After waiting on the beach till 0200 hours 29 APRIL, it was decided that the Navy was not coming and all troops would go to the hills and wait there till night came. While we were in the hills that day, enemy aircraft was very active, and carried out many raids on the areas we had left the previous day. In the afternoon, I noticed a small sailing boat enter the harbour. This was machine-gunned by planes, but from what I have learnt since, this was only a ruse. At about 1600 hrs, I heard several bursts from a machine gun in the distance. The sound did not sound familiar, but when nothing else happened, I thought nothing more of the incident. At 1930 hrs the troops started to move down the hills, and when coming through the scrub and nearing the road, rifle and machine gun fire was heard nearby. Also several shots from a field piece was fired down the road and into the hills. At this stage, everyone was a little doubtful as to what was going on.

We decided to move forward up along the roadside and when passing a white house was met by machine gun fire, apparently coming from the sea. Everyone realized by now that the Germans were in the town and around the jetty. Things were soon organized and the NEW ZEALANDERS took the front line with other troops forming a reserve line along a dry creek bed. After about an hours fighting, the Germans were apparently wiped out as firing ceased, all except for one machine gun that was firing from a boat in the harbour. After a short time, this was also silenced. The time would now be about 2330 hrs 29 APRIL. The troops were again organized and lined up in twelves along the beach waiting to be taken off by the Navy who were only a short distance from the shore. As far as I know, the wounded were the only ones to be taken off that night. At about 0245 hrs 30 April the Navy pulled away from the shore and left between 2000 and 9000 troops on the beach. Soon after this, an English Brigadier called a conference of all officers. We were then told that the force intended to remain on the beach and surrender in the morning. It was here that Lieut. YOUNG, Lieut. BENZ and Lieut. PATTERSON got the 17 BDE together and decided that we would try to escape. They got three trucks and we proceeded down the road for about two miles, then the trucks were stopped and everyone got out. We were then told by the Officers that they also intended to surrender in the morning, but anyone wishing to go could do so.

PAGE 2.

It was here where seven (7) 2/7 Bn drivers, two (2) Intelligence men and myself decided that we would still try and escape. There were also about 20 others from various other units with us. We took a truck and drove to the next town where we had to leave our vehicle owing to the road ending there. It was now breaking day and several enemy planes were about. We decided that we should go along the coast until we could get a suitable boat to get away in. After walking for about 5 miles, we seen a large fishing boat of about 150 tons. There were also some others down at the boat and they said we could go with them as it could take about 70 men. At about 1330 hrs 30 APRIL, everyone was aboard and they were trying to get the engine started. We then heard aircraft overhead and was soon attacked by three single engined dive bombers. They dropped about nine bombs, but I think only one of these hit the ship. Everyone was calm and remained below deck. When they were not successful with the bombs, they machine-gunned the boat, and it was soon a mass of flames. Everyone then attempted to get out and swim ashore. It was here that we lost all our equipment, clothing and food. My estimation of the casualties would be about 20 men. Captain VILE and an English Major whom I believe to be Major PARK did fine work. Major PETERS stayed behind with the wounded and the rest of us decided to push on. It was now very difficult travelling as we had no boots and only a little clothing that the Greeks had given us. After travelling over very rocky country, we arrived at the next town about five miles distant at 1700 hrs. We were told by the people there that British ships passed by the next town along the coast so we pushed on. It was a distance of about seven (7) miles and we arrived there 2000 hrs. All that night we waited, but no ships came. In the morning of 1 MAY, we went into the hills and lay low. Several enemy planes were about, but did not see us. In the afternoon, we were told that the Germans sent a note asking if we intended to fight or surrender, as our food supplies were nil and we had very little ~~ammunition~~ arms, a note was sent back offering our surrender. At about 1900 hrs. two English signallers asked for volunteers to go on guard and watch for ships. Six of the 2/7 Bn, myself and the two signallers went out to a peak about half a mile away to keep watch. It was the third watch that heard a ship and flashed the S.O.S. This was answered. They then woke up the signallers who gave full particulars of the situation. It was not very long then before a boat was lowered and came ashore to get all those there. There were three destroyers in all, and after looking along the coast for any others who had managed to escape, eventually left the coast of GREECE at 0500 hrs 1 MAY.

It was a marvellous piece of work on the part of the NAVY.

(Signed) Cpl. G. FOOT,
VX 5845,
2/7 Bn.

Notes for staffs conf 1940 - hrs 20 c/hr.

Gr H.Q. at home house as from 2000 hrs.
Send daily strength state.

- Send H.O.R.s to Gr H.Q.

Ration return each unit { on men
& hand

Sub O to establish central dump of
surplus rations & P.O.L. ^{unit} + petrol + ammo
Advise accurate detail of Egyptian & British
troops.

Bren gun parties to ensure guns on board
& mounted ready for use. All riflemen prepared to fire.
Same for Tech equipment.

Grouping of Sigs -

Med. evacuate to Greek hosp -

- Serials grouped in 50's not 40's.

Probably taken on board by native boats.
Ed cont org. into detachments.

Drivers stay with vehicles under T.O.s.

Yps to be informed that giving away rations
ceases forthwith as it is not known where
next supply will come from.

Be prepared to provide ^{boys} Mignets against allies
rushing boats. 25000 in area.

2/5 be prepared to re-inforce Mignets
~~send boy to night fl~~ ^{R of 2/5/50} Balance
near at hand

2/8 B.M.
2 K.R.R.

2/6 2 NZ
2 RASC

2/2 3 N.Z.

4d boy
3 NZ boy
1 Brit arty

2/5
1 NZ
1 2/2 B.M.

Bde less of HQ

* 2 drivers of rice truck

Brig 4 ✓
B.M 4 1 ✓
S.C 4 1 ✓
I.O 4 1 ✓
L.O 4 1 ✓
Sgt Smith ✓
Runner ✓

5 - 7

Emb. Strength Return

26 cfr

	<u>off</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	
2/1 Hd Regt	23	270	22 - 235
2/2 Hd Coy.	6	192	5 - 167
Bde H.Q.	4	103	3 - 90
		20	
2/5 Bn.	29	546	28 - 549
18-250 2/6	17	299	16 - 249
2/7	32	728	31 - 669
	1	34	
2/8	23	440	22 - 441
2/2 Hd Amb.	9	141	8 - 114

M.T. Drivers

2/1 Hd Regt	1 - 35?	
2/2 Hd Coy	1 - 25	1 - 15
Bde H.Q.	1 - 23	
2/5 Bn	1 - 17	
2/6	1 - 50	
2/7	1 - 59	
2/8	2 - 33	1 - 25
2/2 Hd Amb.	1 - 27	
	<u>9 - 269</u>	
of H.A.	5 - 11	

2/2 Linnor Bo. less one boy.


Reece Party, Yorkshire Dragoons
Rosh ~~Pinna~~ Pinna

Brig. } ~~Safad~~
Col King } Central Hotel
Chap. Young } Safad



SKETCH OF ASSEMBLY AREA


Scale 1 sq = 50 yds approx



26 Apr 41

SKETCH ASSEMBLY AREA

Scale 1 sq = 60 yds approx



26 APR 44

~~1/5~~ Bn Strength

23 Officers

443

O.R.

466
276

466

Strength


2/2 Fd Coy R.A.E.

0600

25 Apr 41

5 offrs
186 O.Rs.

attached
1 offr
5 O.Rs



Total 6 offrs

191 O.Rs

27 Vehicles

By W. L. Meyer

Low Area

BND	46
A	
B	
C	45
D	
HQ.	180
Runners	5

2/6 BN

Total 276

Detached Duties

BND	2
A	103
B	120
C	56
D	114
HQ	4
Total	<u>400</u>

W. J. ...
Capt ...
1235 hrs
25 Apr 41

HQ 17 Aust. Inf. Bde.

2/8 Bde.

NR 37

26

Drivers Party will now

consist of 1 Officer &

25 O.R.s. A not as
stated at conference. ©

~~Adj. Major~~ Capt
Adj. 2/8 Bn.

17 Aug. 1945 Bde

2/2 Aug. 11. am.

Vehicle position of 2/2 Aug. 11 am
as at 1730 hrs 26 Apr. 41.

Observations

- 1 with C.C.S
- 1 with 2/7
- 2 with 2/2 H. am. HQ carry 7 jeeps
- 1 with " HQ loaded with Med stores
- 1 " " " - free.

Within H.Q. area -

- Cars 2
- Vans 15. 3
- trucks 30. 10
- 3T. 2

NOTE!

We also have 5 2/8 km
30 cars in our area which
we have promised to destroy
when so ordered.

One 30 car will be used to carry drivers who are
standing by to destroy vehicles.

Attached W
70 2/2 am

1

3

2

24 17

9

2024

86

2762

17 sheet of Bde / 2/2 7d Amb.

① STRENGTH RETURN

9 Officers + 141 O.R.

+ 6 lying (casualties)
1 sitting

② RATIONS ON VEHICLES

Rations surplus over 3 days
are on vehicles.

③ RATIONS ON PERSONNEL

each man has 3 days
rations.

Mybaltin

Unit Col

Command; 2/2 7d Amb

26 April, 1941.

17th Aust Inf Bde

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

This work done on one machine & repeated before receipt of the message

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

Comds A B C D Secs

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

Comd ALLEN gp

01

26

<i>Concentrate</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>units</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>your</i>	<i>section</i>
<i>of</i>	<i>ALLEN</i>	<i>group</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>operating</i>	<i>area</i>
<i>with</i>	<i>view</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>moving</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>a</i>
<i>beach</i>	<i>assembly</i>	<i>area</i>	<i>east</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>jetty</i>
<i>0</i>	<i>time</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>move</i>	<i>at</i>	<i>short</i>
<i>notice</i>	<i>later</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>organise</i>	<i>concentration</i>	<i>into</i>
<i>groups</i>	<i>one</i>	<i>officer</i>	<i>or</i>	<i>WCO</i>	<i>to</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

D.K.s 0. no movement

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

of vehicles in concentration

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1310

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

1505

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *A B C D Sec*

FROM *ALLEN gp*

Originator's Number. *02* Date. *26* In Reply to Number

<i>You</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>make</i>	<i>arrangement</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>render</i>
<i>unreadable</i>	<i>figures</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>vehicles</i>	<i>abandoned</i>	<i>on</i>
<i>road</i>	<i>by</i>	<i>your</i>	<i>see</i>	<i>within</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>miles</i>	<i>KALAMAI</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>report</i>	<i>has</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>on</i>	<i>completion</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>destruction</i>	<i>by</i>
<i>fire</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>order</i>	<i>regarding</i>	<i>vehicles</i>	<i>present</i>
<i>area</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>made</i>	<i>later</i>	<i>ask</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

[Handwritten Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

1506

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO ALLEN GA

FROM B. Sec

Originator's Number

023

Date

26

In Reply to Numbers

02

ack													

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions Degree of priority

Time of origin.

1503

Signed

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50.030

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO ALLEN 9h

FROM B per

Originator's Number 0 24	Date 26	In Reply to Numbers 0 2
-----------------------------	------------	----------------------------

Task completed over	area	12	miles
beyond KAHAMAI			

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of periority

Time of origin.
1823

Signed

Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO A B C D Secs

FROM ALLEN gp

Originator's Number. 04 Date 26 In Reply to Number

Embarkation serial numbers allotted A Sec 1 to 66 B Sec 67 to 86 C Sec 87 to 111 D Sec 112 to 123

eps approach beach or/and quay by beach route i.e. from SOUTH reporting control post @ comdr responsible that only their serials embark @ all eps half nations local watch forthwith @ A/R rifles LMG's and MMG's with all arms will be sent to quay side and/or beach by units

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE USE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

(2)

FROM	Originator's Number.	Date	In Reply to Number
-------------	----------------------	------	--------------------

in memorandum	M/T	with carrying parties	detailed by units	concerned	Please	report immediately	Serial
numbers	used	to	prevent	British	troops	other	than
measures	to	prevent	British	troops	other	under	command
ALAN	and	from	filtering	on	to		
ships							

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: *Hand*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN
1935

SIGNED
W. B. ...

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

INSTRUCTIONS
AND
OVERT

57
8
58

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

8-114
9-269
5-11

122
4.5
79
278
116
373
30
343

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.O.R.

T.H.I.

GR.

No. of copies

Order

Quantity

Destination / Remarks

Date

In Reply to Number

Embarkation Serials

Serial No.	Unit	Totals	OR.
1	2/2 nd Amb	0	30
	2/1 st Regt.	1	20
2	" "	5	46
3	" "	5	46
4	" "	5	46
5	" "	5	46
6	" "	1	31
	2/2 nd Coy	1	18
7	" "	2	49
8	" "	1	50
9	" "	1	50
10	Bde. HQ	1	50
11	" "	2	30
	2/5 th Bn	2	17
12	" "	2	49
13	" "	2	49
14	" "	2	49
15	" "	2	49
16	" "	2	49

17
18

2/5 Am

2

49

19

2

49

20

2

49

21

2

49

22

2

49

2/6 Am

6

42

23

1

2

24

w

48

25

w

48

26

w

48

27

w

48

28

w

48

2/7 Am

2

49

29

2

49

30

2

49

31

2

49

32

2

49

33

2

49

34

2

49

35

2

49

36

2

49

37

2

49

38

2

49

58

2/7 Am
2/6 Am

} 1
}

12
7

Embarkation Serials

Serial No.	Unit	Total	GR
1	2/2 2 nd Coy	0	30
	2/1 2 nd Coy	1	20
2	" "	5	46
3	" "	5	46
4	" "	5	46
5	" "	5	46
6	" "	1	31
	2/2 2 nd Coy	1	18
7	" "	2	49
8	" "	1	50
9	" "	1	50
10	Proc. HQ	1	50
11	" "	2	30
	2/5 1 st Coy	2	17
12	" "	2	49
13	" "	2	49
14	" "	2	49
15	" "	2	49
16	" "	2	49

17
18
19
20
21
22

2/5 Am

2

47
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38

2/6 Am

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48
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48
48

2/7 Am

39

2/7 Bn

2

49

40

2

49

41

4

20

2/8 Bn

1

26

42

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43

2

49

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49

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48

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5

3

2/2 7d Amb

1

42

51

7

42

Drivers

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2

52

2

49

53

2

49

54

1

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55

1

50

56

2

49

57

1

20

Op HQ

5

11

58

2/7 Am }
2/6 Am }

} 1
}

12
7

Destroy vehicles in dispersed areas
NOT by fuel or running engine dry
only applicable to ALLEN Sq. Drivers
assemble in 2/8 BN area after completion

26 Apr 41

Brookshaw.

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *A B C and D Secs*

FROM *ALLEN GROUP*

Originator's Number. *07* Date. *26* In Reply to Number

Destroy vehicles in all dispersal areas NOT by fire or running engine dry @ ONLY applicable to ALLEN OP and this must be notified to adjoining units who may attempt to destroy their vehicles without orders

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.	TIME OF ORIGIN
<i>J. B. ...</i>		<i>Time of receipt was noted at 2113 which has been checked by ...</i>	<i>2025</i>
SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)			T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R. ~~...~~

2113

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DAY STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *A B C D Seco*

FROM *ALLEN GP*

Originator's Number. *05* Date *26* In Reply to Number

<i>assemble</i>	<i>anti</i>	<i>aircraft</i>	<i>teams</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>three</i>
<i>personnel</i>	<i>each</i>	<i>at</i>	<i>heads</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>columns</i>
<i>⊙</i>	<i>advise</i>	<i>number</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>teams</i>	<i>available</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNED	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN GYPHER. SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY. <i>By runner</i>	TIME OF ORIGIN <i>1000</i> <i>where this means 2100 hrs</i>
--	--	---	--

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

B Sec

FROM

ARMY CP

Originator's Number

Q 7.

Date

26

In Reply to Number

<i>2/8</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>embark</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>remain</i>	<i>on duty</i>
<i>and</i>	<i>embark</i>	<i>with</i>	<i>last</i>	<i>gp.</i>	<i>please.</i>
<i>embarking tonight please</i>					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2/30

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO *ALLEN 4p*

FROM <i>B see</i>	Originator's Number <i>0.26</i>	Date <i>26</i>	In Reply to Numbers <i>0.5</i>
-------------------	------------------------------------	-------------------	-----------------------------------

<i>56</i>	<i>gun</i>	<i>teams</i>	<i>available</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>arranged</i>
<i>distribution</i>	<i>over</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>serials</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>partly</i>
<i>44</i>	<i>just</i>	<i>tho</i>	<i>just</i>	<i>arrived</i>	<i>from</i>
<i>DAPHNE</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>including</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>extra</i>	<i>serial</i>

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means. Signed: <i>Brook Maj.</i>	If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER Signed:	Originator's instructions Degree of priority <i>Runner</i>	Time of origin. <i>2300</i>
			T.H.I.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.O.R.
C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.
	OUT		OFFICE DAILY STAMP.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO *ALLEN*

FROM *B. see*

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Numbers

0.26

26

05

<i>56</i>	<i>gun</i>	<i>teams</i>	<i>available</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>arranged</i>
<i>distribution</i>	<i>over</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>serials</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>party</i>
<i>off 147</i>	<i>inst.</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>just</i>	<i>arrived</i>	<i>from</i>
<i>DAPHNE</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>including</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>extra</i>	<i>serial</i>

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of periority

Time of origin.

Brook
May

Runner

2300

Signed

Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

B Sec

FROM

ALLEN CP

Originator's Number

Q 3

Date

8/6

In Reply to Number

2/7 Bn

One

trucks

at

quay

0

have

been

moved

towards

quay

and

desire

you to

move

balance

of 1 group

after

them

along

beach

road

0

1 Corps

sign

will

follow

you

0

~~*0*~~

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2233

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R. 2

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO 2/1 7d Regt 2/27d Coy

FROM 17 Bde	Originator's Number 0 27	Date 26	In Reply to Numbers —
-------------	-----------------------------	------------	--------------------------

move	serials	1 to 9	in	order	along
beach	rd	7d Regt	leading	0	head of column
not	to	pass	rd	corner	until further
orders	0 Bde	HQ	is	moving	to rd corner on
beach	rd	and	will	open	here at 2400 hrs

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.				If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER.				Originator's instructions Degree of periority				Time of origin. 2320	
Signed <i>Brookley</i>				Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)								T.H.I.	
System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	T.O.R.	
												C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads	

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

89
CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN
OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

Brigadier Allen

FROM

Brigadier Parryton

Originator's Number

22

Date

26

In Reply to Number

<i>Destroy</i>	<i>vehicles</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>7mi</i>	<i>disposal</i>
<i>areas</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>by</i>	<i>fer</i>	<i>or</i>	<i>running</i>
<i>engine</i>	<i>dry</i>	<i>(.)</i>	<i>ONLY</i>	<i>at head</i>	<i>to</i>
<i>Allen</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>this</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>be</i>
<i>passed</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>adjoining</i>	<i>unit</i>		
<i>Repeater verbatim 15 units 20/26</i>					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

TIME OF ORIGIN

2015

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

88
CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

Z

FROM

*Allen Sp.
ack.*

Originator's Number

06

Date

26

In Reply to Number

Z1.

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

2000
T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

87

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

~~AZ~~ Z

FROM

Allen Sp.

Originator's Number

05

Date

20

In Reply to Number

Serials 1 to 123 taken up @ Entankation HQ
 Allen Sp established EASTERN corner STONE FENCE
 around house about central beach front
 @ Can you establish telephone @ Headquarters can
 be moved to suit your arrangements if
 necessary

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2000

SIGNED

J. Johnson

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

ALLEN Gp

FROM

D Sec

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

26

03

ack

0

Received

1900

hrs

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1901

SIGNED

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO Brig Allen, Col Lister AMPC, Rajahmundry R. Sigs, Camp Const 81 BSN Area

FROM Brig. Parvathin

Originator's Number

ZI

Date

26

In Reply to Number

Z Det organised as under (1) Brig Allen comes all Area Tps
 and 40 B.Tps SE. KALANASI (1) Col LISTER all Tps N.E. KALANASI
 (1) Major Pemberton all Tps arriving by ry KALANASI (1) Comes all organised
 units into groups sq fitly forth with
 reporting this HQ's number of signals already taken up
 (1) Camp Const 81 BSN will organise all repeat all parties NOT repeat
 NOT catered for above (1) Signals allotted Brig Allen 1-150

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

Col	Leslie	151 -	300	Rain Pemberton	301 - 400. (1)
Comdr	report	daily	0900 hrs	serial nos remaining	(1)
all	embarkation	ordered	from the HQ's	besting	serials (1)
all	trps	approach	beach	or land	away by beach
route	ie	from	South	reporting	Control Post (1) They will be
marshalled	under	orders	improvised	embarkation	staff which will
allow	serials	of	ships, Coxswains etc	(1) Comdr	responsible that only

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP



TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

These serais embark (1) armed guards will be detailed by comms concerned (1)
 Comdr of report Camp Comr 81 BSA numbers and unit odd parties
 not repeat not catered for in these serais (1) No vehicles will be
 destroyed without permission the JG. except RAF (by F.S.S) &
 308 Coy RASC (1) after departure first flight 50% vehicles will be
 destroyed but not by running engine to obtain seizure (1) 7ET to
 concerned by Comdr and running cars allotted units (1)

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

DID to be established by Comdros (1) all the half rations excel water for health
 (1) Comdros organize medical for area and also allotment ~~slips~~ at short notice
 (1) No rations available ship and scarcity at probable destination (1) Reps
 Comdros report daily 2000 hr and 1000 hr (1) Col. Lister and Navy Pemberton
 details LO's for health permanent duty this HQ's (1) L.M.G's, A/Tk Refills
 with all AMM will be collected by units & sent to quayside and for bases
 in minimum quantity H.T (1) carrying parties detailed by units concerned

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

SECRET

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

Essential
will

highest
importance

standard of
traditions

discipline

observed

in accordance

B7 Top Hand

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY **HIGH**
IMMEDIATE.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1800

T.H.I.
1845

T.O.R.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SIGNED

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

Brig Allen

Br D/L Hand

W. H. Allen
Brig

1500

1842

Post
Tinnis

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

B Sec

FROM

ARRIED CP

Originator's Number

02

Date

26

In Reply to Number

<i>2/8</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>remain</i>	<i>on duty</i>
<i>and</i>	<i>embark</i>	<i>with</i>	<i>last</i>	<i>gp. please</i>
<i>embarking tonight please</i>				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

[Signature]

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2130

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

B Sec

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

ALIEN CP

Originator's Number

Q 3

Date

20

In Reply to Number

<i>One</i>	<i>ship</i>	<i>at</i>	<i>quay</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2/7 B</i>
<i>have</i>	<i>been</i>	<i>moved</i>	<i>to back</i>	<i>quay</i>	<i>and</i>
<i>decide</i>	<i>you</i>	<i>to move</i>	<i>balance</i>	<i>of 19</i>	<i>rows</i>
<i>after</i>	<i>then</i>	<i>along</i>	<i>beach</i>	<i>road</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>1 Corp</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>follow</i>	<i>you</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>only</i>
<i>embark</i>					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

J. J. J.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2030

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

26 ap 1942
Army to B-11

Speeds, density, security, comd., tools, as

last night.

Runners to Bde.

Liaison with preceding units.

Rear party 1 off 7 OR in 15 cwt truck 2/7

Bn remain until whole coln clear then follow. 2/5 Bn to effect until they pass 47

Recc track out from present position.

Remain as at present. Ifs may move this after

Drivers rem. with vehs. No more of the from areas.

no leave. Ifs carry 3 days rations. Bal. remains on trucks.

Units org. in parties of 40 under an off. All guns mtd but no fire unless directly attacked. L.O. + runner to 16 Bde. Advise Brig often location with sketch. Food move late after.

Maj. Bishop + Lt Lowen - units

lgh box O.C. Bde HQ. Dig in

BM + IO. assembly areas.

No veh. destroyed without an order.

Bns to be ready for any eventuality incl land action.

D.R.

Force

D	Sp	Conts.
C	En	Div.
A		16 Bde
B		17 Bde

2/5 - 2/8 5 miles

2/8 - 2/6 1/2

2/6 to Bde 14 miles

17th Aust Inf Bde Op Inst no 3, 25 Apr 41

1. The Bde Gp will move on tonight following Gp A (16th Gp) order Gp D, Gp C, Gp A, Gp B.
2. Order of march Gp B
Bde H.Q.
2/8 BN
2/1 7th Regt
2/2 7th Amb
2/6 BN
2/7 BN
2/5 BN
Amb Amb sec.
3. Route MILOI-TRIPOLIS-MEGALOPOLIS-KALAMAI
4. S.P. Units own turn offs.
5. Speed, density, comd, security, tools as in of inst. no 2.
6. Each unit MUST liaise with preceding unit for time of start.
7. on arrival at destination send runner to Bde.
8. 2/5 BN station one off with 15 cwt truck of ORs to prevent any other Apts breaking into coln.
9. Recce track out from present posn.
10. 2/2 7th Coy are preceding coln to clear rd.
11. Recce party moves under Maj. Bishop.

Bishop Maj

17th Aust Inf Bde Op Inst no 5

1. The Bde Gp will move on tonight following Gp A (16th Gp) order Gp D, Gp C, Gp A, Gp B.
2. Order of march Gp B
Bde H.Q.
2/8 BN
2/1 4th Regt
2/2 4th Coy
2/6 BN
2/7 BN
2/5 BN
4th Coy Recs
3. Route MILOI - TRIPOLIS - MEGALOPOLIS - KALAMAI
4. S.P. Units own turn offs.
5. Speed, density, comd, security, tools as in op inst. no. 2.
6. Each unit MUST liaise with preceding unit for time of start.
7. on arrival at destination send runner to Bde.
8. 2/5 BN station one off with 15-wt truck of ORs to prevent any other Gp breaking into coln.
9. Keep track out from present posn.
10. 2/2 4th Coy are preceding coln to clear rd
11. Keep party moving under 4th Regt.

Phoebus Gp

All C.O.s.

Brig at camp 1530

1. Drivers extremely tired.
2. If we are to extricate ourselves it is imperative that at any halt every officer get out & help.
3. Every driver must be informed that the safety of the force depends on his efforts tonight.
4. Brig. considers stage arrived when C.O.s get all offrs together and give them straightest possible talk.
5. Tendency to lassitude in taking cover when aircraft approaches.
6. Order of march & times to leave own turnoffs -

Bde H.Q. Z.

2/8 Bn Z

~~2/2 31st Coy Z + 30~~

~~2/1 120 Bn Z + 30~~

2/1 7th Regt Z + 50

2/2 7th Amb Z + 60


2/6 Bn (less det) Z + 60

2/5 Bn (less 1 Coy) Z + 60

2/4 Bn } Z + 90
Mot. Sec. Unit }

7 Route MIKOI - TRIPOLIS - MEGALOPOLIS
PARADISIA - KALAMAI

25th
August



BIVOUAC
DISPOSITIONS
outside ARGOS

SCALE $\frac{1}{2}$ " = 100 yds

Op. Instruction no. 1.

24 Apr 41.

2/8 BN. Lt Col. Mitchell

1. Under instructions from Brig. Allen 2/8 BN comes under cond. 17 Bde Gp.
2. Your role in to night's march is to provide a rear gd. behind "C" Gp. Div. Gps. (Lt Col. Gouch, cond.)
3. The head of the force passes S.L. (E 1753) at 2130 hrs. as per copy of order attached.
4. Would you please arrange to contact Lt Col Gouch 2/11 MG BN who is cond. Div. Gps. so that you follow in rear of his Gp. We unfortunately cannot give you timings as we do not know their strengths.
5. On arrival you will come within the area of 17 Bde Gp. and would you then provide us with a runner to remain at this H.Q., together with a statement that all your Gps have arrived or otherwise.

Stan Lawry
M2

All units.

Following items for your attention please:-

1. Submit by 1200 hrs embarkation strengths by units also no. of vehicles with each unit at present incl. H. carrying Ht.
2. Draw 7 days rations at ATHENS Racecourse at 1400 hrs
3. P.O.L. Fill tanks and carry on 30 units - 6 cases, or 1 ton
4 cases, or 15 cars + cars - 2 cases. Also oil in
prop to above
4. Vehicle maintenance to be carried out with as little
movement as possible.
5. Leave NO leave from this location under any
circumstances. Units will record the absence
of any pers. and vehs. on special duty.
6. P.A.D. No firing unless directly attacked. All
movement completely restricted. Drivers rest in
prep. for further move to night.
7. Units remain ready to move at short notice.
8. Establish straggler collecting posts on rd.
9. Recce for W.P.s in area.
10. Medical arrangements as on march.
11. M.G. Pls revert to Coy. Comd. 2000 hrs 24th

24th 41

Brookley

Exp

A. 16 Bde

B. 17 Bde + 2/8 BN

C. Div 3/4

D. Corps 3/4

	Bde.	20
✓	2/7	30
✓	3d Bay	15
✓	2d Coy	15
	2d Regt	20
✓	2/6	30
		<hr/> 130
✓	3/8 BN	

NOTES. B. III verbal orders 24 ap
to 24 ap

- 1 Bde gp. to which is att. 2/8 Bn. will move from M1101 + will follow 16 Bde gp.
- 2 2/8 Bn will form a rear gd + march behind Div Yhs who follow 17 Bde gp.
- 3 S.P. rd + rdy crossing E 1453
- 4 S. Time 2130 hrs
- 5 Route. Present posn YELIFIS - MAGARA - CORINTHUS - KHALIR - MEDIHON - ARGOS - MILIO.
- 6 Pro provide T.C.P. on route
- 7 2/3 Bn provide anti sabotage gds in pass D. 94 and CORINTH canal
- 8 v. Am dark 40 day 10
- 9 night 12 in 20
increase if practicable
- 10 Parking lights but remove ^{red} rear lights.
- 11 7 days rations carried 3 on main
2/2 th sub will provide 1 ant for Div Yhs.
to report to Lt Col Gouch
- 12 order of march. ^{Bde.} 2/7 Bn.

- L.O. to watch when 16 Bde tail clears. Last vehicle will have 81 on it.
Rations at 1900 hrs at location 200 yds on right hand side ^{of Rds} south of Div.
Security, comd + tools same as yesterday's order

Report centre head of coln.

- Runner to Gp Hq. on arrival at destination
Report on arrival
No vehicles to be destroyed except on written order of Brig - or B.M.

17 Bde Op. Instr. no 2 24 Apr 41

1. The Bde gp to which is attached 2/8 Bn will move tonight to MILOI and will follow Gp 'A' (16 Bde gp).
2. 2/8 Bn will form a rear gd + march behind Gp 'C' (Div. Hqs) who follow 17 Bde Gp.
3. S.P. for main coln. rd + ry crossing E 1753
S.P. for Gp 'B' (17 Bde gp) is 16 Bde Turnoff.
4. Gp 'A' pass S.P. at 2130 hrs 24 Apr.
5. Route. Present posn - ELEVSIS - MEGARA - KORINTHOS - KHILIO MEDHION - ARGOS - MILOI.
6. 6 chst Div. P.S. Coy will provide T.C.P.s along route.
7. 2/3 Bn provide anti-sabotage guards in pass at D 94 and CORINTH CANAL.
8. Density night 40 v.t.m. day 10 v.t.m.
9. Speed " 12 m.p.h. " 20 m.p.h.
increase if practicable.
10. Parking lights will be used but red rear lights will NOT be shown.
11. 7 days rations to be carried - 3 on the man.
12. 2/2 3rd chst will provide one ant. for Div Hqs.
Gp to report to Lt Col. Gouch.

13. Security, comd, and supply of tools as laid down in yesterdays order.
14. All units on arrival at destination send runner to Bde H.Q. with report of arrival complete or otherwise.
15. Report centre head of coln.
16. No vehicles are to be destroyed except on written order of Brig. or B.M.
17. order of march.

Bde H.Q.

2/7 BN.

2/2 7d Coy.

2/2 7d Amb.

2/1 7d Regt.

2/6 BN.

Each unit to liaise with unit preceding it in order of march for time to join coln. after last vehicle of preceding unit has passed.

Brook Sig

17 Bde Op Instr no. 2

24 cth. 41

1. The Bde gp to which is attached 2/8 Bn will move tonight to MILOI and will follow Gf. A (16 Bde Gp)
2. 2/8 Bn will form a rear guard & march behind Gf. C (Div Gp) who follows 17 Bde Gp.
3. S.P. for main coln. rd & ry crossing E. 1753
S.P. for Gf. B (17 Bde Gp) is 16 Bde Turnoff
4. Gf. A pass S.P. at 2130 hrs 24 cth.
5. Route Present form - ELEVSIS - MEGARA -
KORINTHOS - KHILIOMEDAIOM - ARGOS - MILOI.
6. 6 Dist Div Pro. Coy will provide T.C.P.s along route.
7. 7/3 Bn provide anti sabotage guards in pass at D. 94 and CORINTH CANAL.
8. Security night 40 v. d.m. day 10 v. d.m.
9. Speed 12 m.p.h. 20 m.p.h.
increase if practicable.
10. Parking lights will be used but red rear lights will NOT be shown.
11. 7 days rations to be carried - 3 on the man
12. 2/2 4d sub. will provide one sub. for Div. Gp. Gf. to report to Lt Col Gough.

- 13. Security, cond., and supply of tools as laid down in yesterdays order.
- 14. All units on arrival at destination send runner to Bde H.Q. with report of arrival complete or otherwise.
- 15. Report centre head of column.
- 16. No vehicles are to be destroyed except on written order of Brig or B.M.
- 17. Order of march.

- Bde H.Q.
- 2/4 B.N.
- 2/2 7th Coy
- 2/3 " Ant.
- 2/1 " Regt.
- 2/6 B.N.

Each unit to liaise with unit preceding it in order of march for time to join coln after last vehicle of preceding unit has passed.

Mark
→ chey.

Bde
 7th Regt.
 - Coy
 atmt.
 2/5 less 1 coy
 2/6 - 3 coy
 2/7 Bn.
 2/8

Z
 Z
 Z+30
 Z+30
 Z+50
 Z+60
 Z+60
 Z+60
 Z+90

Bde
 2/8
 2/2 7th Coy
 Coy 2/1 MG
 2/1 7th Regt
 2/2 7th atmt
 Coy 2/6 less deta
 2/5 (less 1 coy)
 2/7
 atmt sec.

Camp 1800 hrs.

82

Army Form C. 2128

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO BELT

FROM

IRSE

Originator's Number

I 19

Date

23

In Reply to Numbers

Detrop	Itmor	0	Enemy recce	aircraft
and	bombers	in	over	and
active	over	area	throughout morning	
18	Enemy	bombers	flew	offshore
1528	hrs.			South

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.


If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions Degree of periority

Time of origin.

1305

Signed



Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50.000 pads

Div orders per h.o. 1740 hrs 24 pth
2/5 Bde. with 25!

Th. chby 2/1 7d Regt } bonds reporting
boy 2/1 M&BN (less 1 Pl) } here

Force to move out forthwith to def posn
on left flank.

Col of enemy MT 450 strong moving
to MESOLONGHI.

Take up def posn astride LEVADIA

- DELPHI rd & be in posn by

dawn 24 Apr. at Pts 1912 - Pt 1558 in sq
Y 40.

cover demolitions in sq Y 40.

Remain until orders recd from
comd 19 Bde. to withdraw.

Send h.o. to 19 Bde 24 Apr to
co-ordinate.

Leave resp offr. guide at LEVADIA

Turn off to enemy 2/5 pth is not
directed with other pth along Athens rd.

Huber Cat

Lt Col King.

1. Information. A column of 450 enemy M.T. is reported moving towards MESOLONGI.
2. Intention To occupy a def. posn. astride LEVADIA-DELPHI rd in area PTS 1912 and 1558 in sq. Y. 40. to cover demolitions being effected in that area.
3. Method. You will command this force and under your comd. you will have 2/5 BN, one Tp 2/1 7th Regt. and one Coy (less one Pl) of 2/1 M.G. BN.
4. You will move your force to this posn. to night and are to be in occupation of the def. posn. by dawn 24 Apr. 41.
5. You will remain in position there until you receive orders from 19 Bde to withdraw.
6. Lieut Lowen will report to you to act as L.O. to 19 Bde under whose comd you will be. Send him to 19 Bde H.Q. for co-ordination of withdrawal of that force with yours.

2.

4. Leave a resp. offr. guide at LEVADIA
turn off to ensure that aft of your
force is turned along the DELPHI rd
and is not directed towards ATHENS
with the general flow.

1830 hrs.
23 Apr 41

Brookley

D. R.

L. O.

Bde.

2/6 BR

2/7 "

2/11 3d Regt

2/2 Coy

2/2 Strbs

Coy 2/1 M.G. BR

1870 2/2 M

[Faint signature]

[Faint, illegible handwriting]

23 Apr 41.

17 Aust Inf Bde O. O. No. 7.

Ref Maps ATHENS 1/250,000

Information.

1. 6 Aust Div is being concentrated to undertake a new strategical role which will probably mean embarkation and a landing which necessitates moving as lightly equipped as possible.

The move will be covered by a N.Z. Bde and attached Aust tps occupying a def posn astride the rd THRIVE-ELEFSIS three miles south of KREIKOUKI (E.07).

2. Enemy. There has been no contact on the BRAILOS front except for a few instances of long range artillery shelling.

Intention.

3. The Bde Gp will move as part of ALLEN Gp to a new location on night 23/24 Apr.

Method.

4. The move will be in accordance with the attached timetable.

5. Tps will be carried on unit MT plus 21 3-ton trucks per Bn.

6. An officer or reliable NCO will be in comd of each truck which becomes the unit.

7. Bren guns with mountings fixed to meet air attack will be carried in each truck.

8. IMGs and A T. rifles with full establishment of mags loaded, also Thompson guns and amn will be carried by each sec.

9. First line amn will be carried by distributing two bandoliers per man and at least one box per vehicle.

10. Picks, shovels and axes will be issued to all vehicles and the whole establishment so distributed. On debussing each unit comd will see that tools are carried.

11. Two PIs 2/7 Bn on their left flank will come under comd 2/6 Bn for purposes of the move. 2/7 Bn to inform 2/6 Bn of their locations.

12. MG PIs under comd will remain with Bde and move with them. All Mk VIII Z amn will be carried.

13. It is imperative that fluidity of movement be maintained in order to reach the destination during the hours of darkness.

14. In event of delays caused by damaged vehicles or roads, the offr will take charge of his unit as a working party to clear the obstruction. THIS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. All vehicles which cannot be got moving within 5 minutes will be removed from the rd and disabled.

15. COs will impress on offr and NCOs the great importance of taking comd in all circumstances and under any emergency.

16. Sidelights only will be used on vehicles. These will be extinguished in event of an air attack and at any halt.

17. The comd of each vehicle is responsible for dismounting two men at each and every halt to see that the driver is awake and that vehicles move on again with the convoy. Also in the event of a temporary stoppage to ensure that following vehicles are signalled on.

18. Other than as in para 17 there will be no overtaking within the convoy.

19. Windscreen glasses will be removed from all vehicles including troop carrying tpt provided.

20. In event of an air attack offr and NCO will take comd to prevent long dispersion of tps and to overcome delay in re-embussing. Not only does the success of our move depend on this and the clearing of rds, but the safety of the force remaining depends on this movement being completed according to schedule.

21. Comds will be responsible to meet land attack as well as air attack, particularly from parachutists, and tps will dig in immediately on arrival at their destination. At this location no movement whatsoever will be allowed during daylight.

22. Parachute protection :

- (a) Units are responsible for their own concealment areas.
- (b) 1 Armd Bde has been made responsible for the THRIVE area.

23. AA fire. Units will make clear to all tps that after leaving defensive positions and moving to concealed areas AA fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.
24. Tps may be informed of the necessity for the maintenance of steadfastness.

Admin.

25. It is anticipated that one Recovery vehicle will be attached to each Bn.
26. It is of the utmost importance that tps be equipped as lightly as possible and to ensure this the following action will be taken.
- (a) All documents will be destroyed, but on NO ACCOUNT will anything be destroyed by fire.
- (b) All optical instruments will be carried.
- (c) Signal instruments only will be carried. The balance of their equipment will be destroyed.
27. Dress - Fighting order with greatcoats. Officers will take only that which they can carry.
28. Three days rations will be carried by all ranks and filled W.Bs. Further rations will be available at destination. NO stops on the rd for meals.
29. Any tents erected will be left standing.
30. Water tanks will be destroyed and all non-passenger carrying vehicles. If any have to be destroyed, the destruction will be effected at "B" echelon area and not in fwd areas. All vehicles that can be used for tp carrying will be taken.
31. Vehicles will NOT be set on fire, if a fire does occur it must be extinguished at once. Destruction will be delayed as long as possible, but it is essential that everything left behind is rendered unserviceable.
32. Traffic control. 6 Aust Div Provost Coy will be responsible for traffic control throughout the route.
33. Petrol. All vehicles will commence the journey with full tanks and in addition the following will be carried:
- Trucks 30 cwt and over - three cases.
Vans 1 ton and under - two cases.
Cars - one case.
- Oil in proportion will also be carried.
34. 2/2 Fd Amb is attaching one Motor Amb and one 30-cwt truck for walking wounded to each Bn. (Also one M.A. with Mobile Soc).
- Intercomm.
35. Bde Op HQ will close at present location and move in front of 2/7 Bn and behind 2/6 Bn.
36. 2/6 Bn will liaise with Arty for the passage to embussing point. An offr will report to Arty HQ when Bn is ready to move through the Arty lines and to effect the passage of the Bn with least possible interference with their fire plan.
37. 2/7 Bn is to advise this HQ when the leading vehicle is loaded, when Op HQ will close down.

Ack.

Method of issue LO & Sigs.
Signed at 1440 hrs,

[Signature]
Major,
Bde Major, 17 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

Copy No. 1	2/5 Bn	Copy No. 9	S.C.	Copy No 17	Gd Pl Comd
2	2/6 Bn	10	I.O.	18	Coy 2/1 MGLBn
3	2/7 Bn	11	LO 1	19	6 Aust Div
4	2/1 Fd Regt	12	LO 2	20	16 Aust Inf Bde
5	2/2 Fd Coy	13	T.O.	21	19 " " "
6	2/2 Fd Amb	14	Sig O.	22	2/2 Fd Regt
7	Comd	15	Sup O.	23	File
8	B.M.	16	O.M.E.	24-26	War Diary
				27-30	Spares.

SECRET.

Movement Time Table.

The column will move under control of Lieut V.J. Schofield, HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde.

Serial No.	Unit	Starting Pt	Start Time 23 Apr	Route	Speed & Density night	Remarks.
1	2/2 Fd Amb (less dets)	Own turnoff	2330 hrs	rd	40 v.t.m.	Move off under orders Lieut Schofield. Leave
2	Rear Bde HQ	do.	2330 hrs	LAMIA- LEYAIDEIA- THRIVE-	10 m.i.h.	Mob Sec to pick up 2/7 Bn.
3	2/2 Fd Coy (less 4 & 5 Secs)	do.	2330 hrs	KREIKOUKI- ELEFSIS (E25) MEGARA, (E.04)	Day 10 v.t.m. 20 m.i.h.	5 Sec to join E16 Bde Go at LEYAIDEIA 4 Sec to move in rear of 2/5 Bn.
4	2/1 Fd Regt (less dets)	do.	2345 hrs			
5	2/5 Bn	rd & tk junc (Y 3236)	2330 hrs			Pick up 4 sec 2/2 Fd Coy at their S.P.
			<u>24 Apr</u>			
6	2/6 Bn	do.	0030 hrs			Commence thinning out any fwd tps likely to be overlooked at 1900 hrs and dribble them back moving to a pt clear of 2/5 Bn. Line of FDLs to be denied until 2100 hrs.
7	2/7 Bn	do.	0130 hrs			Commence thinning out fwd elements at 2000 hrs. Line of FDLs to be denied till 2130 hrs. Pick up Mob Sec Fd Amb at their turn off.

- Notes.
1. No move will take place East of rd junc Y3827 before 0100 hrs 24 Apr 41.
 2. After moving into column on rd there will be a halt when head reaches Y3827, during which men will rest and sleep, but remain in their bases except for as in para 17.
 3. Serials 1 to 3 will each liaise with succeeding serial to advise when last vehicle is on the rd.
 4. The column will open out to daylight density from the front commencing at 0530 hrs 24 Apr 41.

6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No. 5

Copy No:

23 Apr 41.

TO: OROT IRSE TAMO MAJA KUSI DACI Med DAPM Q

1. Ref 6 Aust Div OO No. 6, para 28, delete from "no attempt will be made" to end of para, and in para 1 alter location of covering posn from three miles SOUTH of KRIEKOUKI to one mile SOUTH of KRIEKOUKI.
2. All tps will be warned that the convoys will be dispersed at destination in concealment areas for lying up by day. Embarkation will then take place during the following night or nights, and the colns will be led to beaches by Embarkation Staff. Strict control of personnel whilst in the concealment areas is absolutely essential. Bathing is to be prohibited, as is any other unnecessary movement in or about the concealment areas.
3. Gun sights and all optical instruments, together with signal stores incl wireless sets, will be taken to destination.
4. The GOC transmits this personal message: "This is the time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty and everyone on duty must be at his post. Units must be ready with self help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Every officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative, energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads."

J. D. Macnamara
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

REF ID: AUST 1/150 000

INFORMATION

1. (a) The enemy are in Lania and have made some contact on HVALAN Front.
2. (a) ANZAC CORPS is continuing its withdrawal Southwards and the R.N. and R.A.F. are co-operating.
(b) The withdrawal is being covered by a force astride the rd THIVE - ALPHEUS one mile South of KAKIKUKI (807)
(c) 1 Arm Bde is responsible for parachute protection of THIVE Area.
(d) 16 & 17 Aust Inf Bdes with attached Units will form the ALLEN GROUP.

3. ALLEN

ALLEN Gp will withdraw Southwards.

4. REINFORCED.

Composition of ALLEN Gp. :-

H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde
J Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
46 L.A.D.
2/2 Aust Bn
2/3 Bn
H.Q. 17 Aust Inf Bde
K Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
43 L.A.D.
2/5 Aust Bn
2/6 Aust Bn
2/7 Aust Bn
G Coy plus 6 Pl 2/1 Aust M.G. Bn
2/1 Pd Bgt B.A. 6 Aust Div (Less one bty)
and (less det under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)
E Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
40 L.A.D.
2/2 Pd Coy RAS
2/2 Pd Amb

5. MOVE

withdrawal will commence on night 23/24 Apr 41. The head of ALLEN Gp will NOT pass rd junct Y 5123 before ~~0100~~ hrs 24 Apr 41.

0100

6. ROUTE

HVALAN - LEVADIA - THIVE KAKIKUKI - ALPHEUS (2 25) -
MIGANA (804).

7. S.P.

(a) S Rd Junct Y 5123

8. START TIME

- (a) 0100 Hrs 24 Apr 41.
- (b) The head of 17 Aust Inf Bde will NOT cross the Start point before 0130 Hrs. Contact will be made with the rear vehicle of the 16 Aust Inf Bde to prevent double banking on the move to start point.

9. ORDER OF MARCH

2/3 Bn.
2/2 Bn

Op. H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde
1st Line H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde

2/2 Fd Amb.
H.Q. 17 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Fd Coy (Less dets).
2/1 Fd Regt.
2/5 Bn
2/6 Bn
Bde op H.Q.
2/7 BN.

10. RECCO PARTY.

Major C.V. Edgar 2/2 Bn has proceeded with Unit representatives and guides to destination point and will be responsible for allocation of vehicle and personnel dispersion areas.

11. SPARE VEHICLES.

Spare Vehicles will move at the rear of the Unit columns to pick up stragglers. An Officer is to be in charge of spare vehicles to control lifting personnel from immobilised vehicles.

12. DENSITY AND SPEED.

During the hours of darkness - 40 vtm. and 10 m.i.h. and as soon as visibility is sufficient changed to 10 V.T.M. and 20 m.i.h. If possible to m.i.h. will be increased from the head of the column. In this case the V.T.M. will be maintained and the vehicles in rear will conform to the accelerated speed. A rd control point will be dropped by the leading vehicle to indicate the change in density and speed.

13. PROTECTION AND CONTROL

(a) Each vehicle will appoint an Officer or N.C.O. to command the vehicle and he will be responsible for the march discipline and protection of vehicle and personnel. At destination point he will assume control of the vehicle personnel as a fighting unit. All troops will be warned that the convoys will be dispersed at destination in concealment areas for lying up by day. Embarkation will then take place during the following night or nights and the columns will be lead to beaches by Embarkation Staff. Strict control of personnel whilst in the concealment areas is absolute essential. Bathing is to be prohibited as is any other unnecessary movement in or about the concealment areas.

(b) A/A protection It is left to the discretion of vehicle commander to carry out any action he considers necessary to protect vehicle and personnel against enemy aircraft and parachute attack. Commanders are to be impressed with the fact that the move is to be carried on so that progress of the column is NOT unnecessarily impeded.

(c) Supervising Officers for blocks of 10 Vehicles are to be dispersed throughout the column to exercise control over vehicle commanders of the blocks of 10 vehicles.

(d) All ranks must be engendered with the spirit of SELF -HELP to carry out this operation successfully

14. LIAISON Two L.Os from 17 Aust Inf Bde will report to 16 Aust Inf Bde H.Q. at 2130 Hrs 23 Apr 41 to move with Commander ALLEN

15. MEDICAL

- (a) 1 Motor Amb in rear of 2/3 Bn.
- (b) 1 Motor Amb in rear of 2/2 Fd Amb.
- (c) 1 Motor Amb in rear of 2/5 Bn.
- (d) 1 Motor Amb in rear of 2/6 Bn.
- (e) 1 Motor Amb in rear of 2/7 Bn.

(f) A Medical Mobile section will move in rear of ~~main~~ Group Convoy

16. ADEN

Administrative Instructions will be carried out as per 6 Aust Div C.O. No 6 22 Apr 41. and 6 Ausy Div Adan Instr 22 21 Apr 41. except where this order varies these instns.

INTERCOM

17 16 Aust Inf Bde H.Q. closes present location at 0145 Hrs on 24 Apr 41. Thereafter at head of column. On arrival at destination a report centre will be established on road at head of debussing point. Comdr of 17 Aust Inf Bde will report the arrival of his section of the Group. The H.Q. vehicle at head of column will be recognised by khaki cloth draped on the front and rear of leading vehicle.

GREEKS.

18. On no account are any orders to be accepted from GREEK Soldiers or civilians and Group H.Q. will be notified immediately of interference by GREEKS

H.H. Hammer
..... Major.
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

For ALLEN GROUP

Distribution:-

- 1 16 Aust Inf Bde
- 2 17 Aust Inf Bde
- 1 File
- 1 war Diary
- 1 6 Aust Div.

The GOC transmits this personal message:-

" This is the time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty and everyone on duty must be at his post. Units must be ready with self help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Ev-ry officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads."

SECRET

FORCE HQ OPERATION ORDER NO. 14.

Copy No. ¹⁸.....

23 Apr 41.

Ref Map G.S. 1 : 1,000,000.

INFORMATION

1. As given in Force "I" Summaries.
2. Force is now organised as:-

ANZAC Corps	}	Force Tps.
80 Base Sub-Area		
88 Base Sub-Area		
4 H		
3 R. Tanks		
NZ Reinforcement Bn		
Aust Reinforcement Bn		

INTENTION

3. British Troops in GREECE will withdraw from GREECE.

METHOD.

4. Covering posn will be occupied by one NZ Div on ridge South of ERYTHRAI.
5. Embarkation.
 - (a) Formations will withdraw to Collection Areas and thence be marshalled to Beaches, vide Appendix "A".
 - (b) Areas of location of Collection Areas and Beaches are shown at Tracing "A" and Appendix "C".
 - (c) Comds. of Collection Areas will establish guides at a suitable pt on the rd approach to their respective areas. This pt will be marked by a "tin" lantern. Exact locations are given at Appendix "C".
 - (d) Comds. of units and sub-units will report to Collection Area HQ on arrival.
6. Organisation of Collection Areas and Beach Parties:
 - (a) Staffs are detailed at Appendix "B".
 - (b) Functions of above staffs and general embarkation procedure is given at Appendix "E".
7. Responsibility for withdrawal orders.
 - (a) ANZAC Corps: will ensure withdrawal orders are issued to all units under Comd. and in support incl units of 1 and 88 Base under Comd NZ Div and A.I. units in Corps area.

/(b)...

- (b) 80 Base Sub-Area: will ensure that (with exception of 4 H, 3 R. Tanks, NZ Reinforcement Bn and Aust Reinforcement Bn) all units, sub-units, dets, parties and stragglers in ATHENS area are cleared to collection areas by dawn 26 Apr 41 incl guards and sentries and individual offrs.
- (c) 82 Base Sub-Area: will ensure that all units, sub-units, dets and stragglers in the area, incl KHALKIS, are withdrawn to Collection area MEGARA by dawn 25 Apr 41, incl rd control, AA units and H.P. posts.
- (d) A.A.D.C.: will be responsible that AA units and dets do in fact withdraw, and will arrange maximum protection for ARGOS aerodrome during withdrawal period.
- (e) "I" Branch: C.S.O. will ensure all sigs units are withdrawn as they become available.

8. Rd Movement.

- (a) Movement by rd will be at night. Sidelights will be used, to ensure maximum practical speed.
- (b) Breakdowns will be cast aside, and passengers transferred to other vehicles. Towing is forbidden.
- (c) Offrs on MGS will mingle in cols to assist in rd control.
- (d) As from 1500 hrs 24 Apr Formations leaving the front will be responsible for their own traffic control as services of 82 Base Sub-Area will be withdrawn on night 24/25 Apr 41.
- (e) Such movement as is inevitable by day will be made at 5 (five) V.T.M.

9. Force HQ Protection Sqn: will be formed at DAPHNE Camp under 80 Base Sub-Area out of all remaining tanks of 1 Armd Bde, 4 H and 3 R.T.R. Its further movement will be ordered by Force HQ where it will maintain a liaison offr.

ADH.

- 10. (a) Destruction of Military Stores. see Appendix "D".
- (b) Explosions and burning (other than documents) will be avoided as far as possible.
- (c) Documents.

All documents will be destroyed by fire, except those concerning pay and accounts of ORs, which will be taken away.

/11....

11. Dress.

Greatcoats worn, full equipment (less pack) incl respirator. Hard rations may be carried in greatcoat pockets. No other articles whatsoever will be permitted in the lighter craft, and it will be a special duty of Beach parties to ensure this order is obeyed.

12. Further adm orders are being issued separately.

INTERCOMIN.

13. (a) Force HQ. Force HQ (less Battle HQ) will be evacuated vide Appendix "A"

(b) Force Battle HQ Will remain until all tps are evacuated, and its further movements are uncertain. it will remain in W/T contact with EGYPT and CRETE.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of Signature.....

Method of Issue.....

R. W. Belchem Maj GS
Brigadier,
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy Nos.

ANZAC Corps	1 -	30
80 Base Sub-Area	21 -	35
82 Base Sub-Area	36 -	45
O.C. 4 H		46
O.C. 3 R. Tanks		47
NZ Reinforcement Bn		48
Aust Reinforcement Bn		49
Cond. Collection Area		
RAPHEIA	50 -	54
PORTO RAFTI	55 -	59
MAGALA	60 -	64
THEODHOR	65 -	69
NAUPLION	70 -	74
Cond Beach Party "C"	75 -	79
"D"	80 -	84
"J"	85 -	89
"K"	90 -	94
"Q"	95 -	99
"T"	100 -	104
Full Branch Dist. Force HQ	105 -	139
Force Sigs	140 -	
Capt Tweedie for IDEAST	141 -	145
War Diary	146 -	147
File	148 -	149
Spare	150 -	155.

Serial No.	Unit.	Night 22/23	Night 23/24	Night 24/25	Night 25/26	Night 26/27	Approx Nos.	Remarks
1.	First NZ Bde Gp	Front covering Posn.	Covering Posn	Covering Posn	Move to THEODORA Collecting Area	Embark J Beach	4000	Tpt returned to ANZAC Corps on arrival at Covering Posn
2.	Second " " "	-	Front to Lie-Up +	"Lie-Up" Beaches C & D for embarkation			3000	1500 men to each Beach
3.	Third " " "	-		Front to "Lie-Up" +	Lie-Up to Beaches C & D for embarkation		6000	3000 to each Beach
4.	First Aust Bde Gp	-	Front Lie-Up+	Lie-Up Beach J for embarkation			4000	
5.	Second " " "	-	-	Front Lie-Up+	Lie-Up to Beach P for embarkation		4000	
6.	HQ ANZAC Corps	-	Front MANDRA	MANDRA to Beach J for embarkation			5000	
7.	Base details (first party) and R.A.F.	Base-NAUPLION area (Rd and Rail)		Embarkation at Beach S	-	-		Move from Base as ordered by 80 B.S.A.
8.	Base details (second party) includes Yugo-Slavs and Force HQ (less Battle HQ)	-	Base to NAUPLION	Base-NAUPLION	-	Embarkation Beaches S&T	5000 S 2000 T	Move from Base as ordered by 80 B.S.A.
	4H				Location NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach S	500	

Serial No.	Unit	Night 22/23	Night 23/24	Night 24/25	Night 25/26	Night 26/27	Approx Nos.	Remarks
10.	3 R. Tanks	Covering Posn GLYPHADA 3	-	-	Location - NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach S	400	less Squ for protection Force HQ
11.	NZ Reinforcement Unit				Base -NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach T	350	
12.	Aust " "				" "	Embarkation Beach S	350	
13.	82 Base Sub Area (1 Armd Bde)			Location Beach P	Embarkation Beach P		1200	
14.	Force Battle HQ				ATHENS- NAUPLION			
15.	Force HQ			ATHENS- NAUPLION				
16.	Dets 82 Base Sub Area		THEBES- ATHENS (Rail)	ATHENS- NAUPLION (Rail)		Embarkation Beach S	1200	

- NOTES:
- (1) + Where Units are shown as proceeding to "Lie-Up" they will proceed to their respective Beach Collecting areas if possible, but will halt at dawn of rd lie up if this point has not been reached.
 - (2) All arrangements for provision of the necessary lifting transport for ANZAC Corps will be made by HQ ANZAC Corps with the assistance of vehicles sent up by Force HQ.
 - (3) All arrangements for provision of the necessary lifting transport for units other than RAF or ANZAC Corps will be made by 80 Base Sub Area.
 - (4) Written orders will be sent to C i/c Collecting Area at each respective Beach stating whether the transport will be returned or destroyed in the collecting area under the orders of the C i/c Collecting Area.

Staffs for Collecting Areas & Beach Parties.1. Area RAPHENA - ("C" Beach)

(a) Collection Area.

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(b) Beach Party ("C" Beach)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
1500 of Second NZ Bde Gp	Apr 24/25

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(c) Units or Formations to Embark at this head

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
1500 of Second NZ Bde Gp	Apr 24/25

3000 of Third NZ Bde Gp	Apr 25/26
----------------------------	-----------

Collecting Area and Beach Staffs Embark with last Unit 25/26

2. Area PORTO RAFFI - ("D" Beach)

(a) Collecting Area

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(b) Beach Party ("D" Beach)

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(c)

<u>Units to Embark</u>	<u>Date</u>
1500 of Second NZ Bde Gp	Apr 24/25

3000 of Third NZ Bde Gp	Apr 25/26
----------------------------	-----------

Collecting Area and Beach Staffs embark with last units 25/26.

3. Area HAGARA ("P" Beach)

(a) Collecting Area

Comd	Lt-Col BARTER
Staff	Capt CLARKE
	Reps AUSCORPS
	Rep NZ Div

(b) Beach Party ("P" Beach)

Comd	Lt-Col MARNHAM
Staff	Major MACRAE
	Major SPENCE
	Capt MACGREGOR
	Rep AUSCORPS

<u>(c) Unit or Formation to embark</u>	<u>Date</u>
Second Aust Bde Gp	25/26
82 Base Sub Area (1 Armd Bde)	25/26

Collecting Area and Beach Staff embark with last Unit
25/26.

4. Area NAUPLION. ("S" & "T" Beaches)

(a) Collection Area

Comd) Lt-Col COURAGE

Staff of HQ 66 Gp AMPC
one Offr detailed by Q(M)

(b) Beach Party ("S" Beach)

Comd Major SEAGRIM

Staff one Offr detailed by Q(M)
three Offrs (A.I.L.Os)

(c) Beach Parties ("T" Beach)

Comd)
Staff) To be detailed by ANZAC Corps

<u>(d) Units or Formations to Embark</u>		<u>Date</u>
Base Details (first party) RAF details	S	24/25
5000 Base Details (Second Party) (includes YUGO-SLAVS & Force HQ less Battle HQ)	S	26/27
4H	S	26/27
3 R.Tanks	S	26/27
Aust Reinforcement Unit	S	26/27
Dets 82 Base Sub Area	S	26/27
2000 Base Details	T	26/27
NZ Reinforcement Unit	T	26/27

Collecting Area and Beach parties embark with last parties
on 26/27.

Positions of Collecting Areas and BeachesRef 1/500,000 MAP B.T.G.61.

Collecting Area -----	Beach -----	Collecting Area Guides will meet at-----
RAPHINA (West of at 5648)	C (6248)	Rd 5347
PORTO RAPHTI (West of at 5835)	D (6233)	Rd Junc 5535
MEGARA (SE of at 0649)	P (0647)	Rd 1050
THEODORA (NE of at 8647)	J (8544)	Rd 9047
NAUPLION (NE of at 5709)	{ S (5204) T (6000) }	Rd Junc 4712

Demolitions.

The policy as regards Demolitions will be as follows: -

(a) GENERAL.

- | | | |
|---------|--|--------------------------------------|
| (i) | Shell Installation PERAMA | } To be
Destroyed. |
| (ii) | Shell Standard & Socumbel (DRAPEDZONA) | |
| (iii) | Ristes Installations | |
| (iv) | Seaplane Base | |
| (v) | British Petrol Dump (SKARAMANGA) | |
| (vi) | No. 1 A.A.D. | } Only essentials need be destroyed. |
| (vii) | " 2 A.A.D. | |
| (viii) | " 3 A.A.D. | |
| (ix) | " 4 A.A.D. | |
| (x) | Ordnance Depot MEMIDI | } Hand over to Greeks. |
| (xi) | Australian Ordnance Depot | |
| (xii) | British Petrol Dump KEPHISSIA Rd | } Destroy |
| (xiii) | British Petrol Dump GLYPHADA | |
| (xiv) | No. 4 L of C Vehicle Park. | see para (d) below. |
| (xv) | R.E. Store | } Hand over to Greeks. |
| (xvi) | R.E. Wkshops | |
| (xvii) | R.A.S.C. Supplies | |
| (xviii) | W.T. Stations at | |

NOTE: Items No. 5, 12, 13 can suitably be destroyed by rifle fire.

(b) ROAD.

On suitable localities in depth in forward areas by ANZAC Corps, and on road pass South of ERTHRAI by 4 NZ Bde, in greatest possible depth.

(c) RAIL.

Arty demolitions which will delay enemys advance or hinder his action will be blown. Rail demolitions for long term effect will NOT be undertaken.

(d) M.T.

A very large amount of M.T. will be arriving in new areas with tps. In the early moves some of this will be required for later stages and should not be destroyed. It will be the responsibility of rear Bdes to organize R.E. demolition squads in each area who will systematically destroy all M.T. dispersed in their area, by smashing the radiator and batteries and breaking the engine casing with a sledge hammer. All implements and tyres will also be rendered unserviceable. This work can be undertaken on responsibility of Bdes as soon as it is known that their M.T. will no longer be required.

(e) GUNS.

Will be rendered useless by removal of breach mechanism. All gun sights will be brought away.

(f) TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, WIRLESS etc.

All portable equipment of a technical nature will be removed. What cannot be removed will be destroyed.

(g) GENERAL.

The general policy will be that nothing useful in the way of military equipment shall be allowed to fall into the enemys' hands. NO fires will be lit and on no account whatever are POL to be destroyed by fire.

(h) The following bridge will be destroyed when our troops are forced to withdraw behind them and in any case on final withdrawal. Preparation demolitions will be arranged by Comdrs as follows :-

- (i) KHALKIS - (preparation and execution order under 82 Base Sub Area arrangements.)
- (ii) CORINTH - (preparation under CE, execution order of Offr of HQ British Forces in Greece)
- (iii) Other bridges destruction of which would have suitable delaying effects on enemy advance.

(j) ANIMALS.

Horses will be shot. Mules will be handed to the Greeks.

DOCUMENTS.

All secret documents less war diaries will be destroyed by fire before they are in danger of falling into enemy hands.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

1. (a) Supplies, P.O.L. and Amn and Water are to be dumped as tabulated as below under arrangements to be made by S.T. Force H.Q.

Place	Water	No. Rations	P.O.L. galls.	Amn. Boxes SAA	Date to be stocked.	Remarks
KHALKIS	Rely on local resources	12000 /	5000+	30 Boxes SAA	24/4	/ 3 dys for BdeGp +50 miles for BdeGp
MARKOP-LION	4000	24000 /	2000	30 Boxes SAA	23/4	/ 3 dys for 8000
MEGARAE	4000	24000 /	1000	"	23/4	"
Pt 8 miles E. of CORINTH	4000	24000 /	2000	"	23/4	"
ARGOS	2000	90000 /	40000+	200 Boxes SAA	23/4	/ 6 dys for 15000 + 300 mile for 1200 vehicles

- (b) The N.Z. Bde holding the ERYTHRAI covering position will draw from B.S.D. Race Course in its own transport. The maintenance of the remaining Inf Bde Gps in the line will continue as at present. If Aus Corps require more supplies to be sent up the necessary demand will be submitted to S.T. Force H.Q. It is hoped that no further supplies will be needed between now and 24th April when these Bdes will be within reach of supplies as specified in sub-para (a) above.

- (c) Transport 50 lorries have been released from the Force H.Q. Pool and are proceeding to H.Q. Aus Corps tonight in compliance with their request for additional transport.

Medical

2. Medical resources under control of D.M.S. Force H.Q. are being allotted for use during the withdrawal and evacuation :-

Location	Beach	Unit	Date to be ready	Remarks
RAPHENA	C	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attached	24/4	Pto be supplemented by Bde Gp on arrival
PORTO RAFTI	D	Fd Amb less two Secs with Amb Car attd	24/4	"
LAVRION	E	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attd	24/4	"
MEGARA	F	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attd	23/4	"
8 miles E. of CORINTH J & K		Fd Amb less 2 Secs with Amb car attd	23/4	"
ARGOS	U T S & R	Sec Fd AmbP to be followed by C.C.S. when available. Two Amb Cars to be attached.		"
ATHENS		26 Gen Hospital 5 Aus Gen Hosp. M.A.C.=		=to form a pool of amb cars to be controlled by 26 Gen Hosp and cars to be sent to relieve those sent in with casualties from outside.

(b) Serious casualties unfit to travel will be evacuated to 26 Gen Hospital and 5 Aus Gen Hosp in ATHENS area as long as the road is open. Casualties which cannot be removed after the evacuation will remain in the Dressing Stations of Fd Ambs or C.C.S. to be taken over by the enemy, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva convention.

MESSAGE FORM

83

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.
	OUT		OFFICE DATE STAMP.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO BELT

FROM IRSE

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Numbers

0.21

23

JVHO	report	contact	with	enemy	party
est.	15	and	small	wireless	set
by	their	right	coy	at	pt
where	valley	leading	from	left	passes
GIBRALTAR	to	gap	0	engaged	by
MMG	and	inf.	fire	resulting	in
total	party	becoming	casualties	0	country

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of priority

Time of origin.

Signed

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO

FROM	Originator's Number 0.21	Date	In Reply to Numbers
------	-----------------------------	------	---------------------

too	precipitous	investigate	or	recover	incessant
set	o	time	of	action	1945
has	o	Yasey	advised	a	Local
inhabitant	reported	late	afternoon	a	German
far	est	BN	strong	coming	from
that	direction	o	Yasey	advised	

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of periority

Time of origin.

W. J. Mack...
Signed

Immediate

2143

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO BELT

FROM IRSE

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Numbers

0 21

23

JUL 0	report	contact	with	enemy	party
est	15	and	small	wireless	sets
by	their	right	coy	at	pt
where	valley	leading	from	left	passes
GIBRALTAR	to	gap	0	engaged	by
M.M.G.	and	inf.	fire	resulting	in
total	party	becoming	casualties	0	country

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of periority

Time of origin.

Signed

Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50.000 pads

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial N
	OUT		OFFICE DATE STAMP.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Numbers

0 21

too	precipitous	investigate	or	recover	workers
set	0	time	of	action	1945
has	0	Yasey	aboard		Local
infantry	reported	late	afternoon	a	German
was	est	BD	strong	coming	from
lat	direction	0	Yasey	advised	

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions
Degree of periority

Time of origin.

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

Immediate

2143

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50,000 pads

SECRET.

Ref. No. _____

FIELD GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.

Copy No. _____

This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file and all drafts or copies of original outgoing messages which may have been retained by the originator must be burnt on receipt of this copy. This message must not be referred to in clear, on the telephone or in any non-secret correspondence.

11/APSJD/4 - 5000 - 6.9.40

To—	IRSE, TAMO.	Date	23.
		Time of receipt	1600.
FROM—	BELT. 0.177	Despatch	1725

MOST IMMEDIATE

Enemy MT coln moving SOUTH of road MESOLONGHI ○

IRSE will detail one Bn move ^{defensive} take up position astride road DELPHI ~~PSY~~ LEVADIA ○

One tp arty and one coy less one platoon MGs detailed come under cond. Pn forthwith ○

Force must be in position by dawn 24 Apr to ensure safe withdrawal own force night 24/25 Apr ○

6 Aust Div demolition parties now working on road LEVADIA - DELPHI ~~AND~~ and believed to be in square Y40 ○

Route to pass must repeat MUST be via LEVADIA ○ Commanders supporting units instructed report your H.Q. forthwith

Force will withdraw under orders Cond. TAMO night 24/25 Apr.

All informed.

A. B. [Signature] W. [Signature]
Cipher.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

CSA ✓ OSN O.U.U

OUT

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

IRSE

FROM

BELT

Originator's Number

0183

Date

23

In Reply to Number

Have you received and acted on
 our 0/177 repeat 0/177 ☉ Reply
 immediately

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO *BELT*

FROM *IRSE*

Originator's Number *0 20* Date *23* In Reply to Numbers *0 183*

<i>yes</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>job</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>hand</i>	<i>actively</i>

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means. *Brook May*

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's instructions Degree of priority *Immediate*

Time of origin. *2132*

Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50.000 pads

BEACH ORGANISATION FOR EVACUATION.

1. Attached diagrams (Appx A1 and A2) show specimen layouts of the organisation for the evacuation. It must be realised that these are only diagrams and that the actual geographical layout must in each case be decided on the spot.
2. Troops for evacuation are collected in a Collecting Area. This Area requires an Area Staff whose responsibilities are to receive, disperse, administer control and despatch the forces to be evacuated.
3. The troops are despatched from the Collecting Area to the Assembly Area on demand from the Military Landing Officer working in conjunction with the Navy Officer in charge who is the Beach Master:
4. The Assembly Area is a reservoir for the Point of Embarkation on the beach.
The Assembly Area is maintained to capacity during the period of embarkation by the order of the Principal Military Landing Officer on the beach addressed to the Collecting Area Cadr.
When the lighters or Landing Craft are about to arrive at the beach, the beach master will request the M.L.O. to bring forward from the Assembly Area a specified number of troops.
5. Traffic control is provided by the beach organisation under the direction of the Principal Military Landing Officer.
6. The Assembly Area including the beaches is under the control of a Staff, for which special provision has to be made.

The composition of the Staff for each beach is:-

1 P.M.L.O.	Lt-Colonel.
4 M.L.O's	Majors or Captains if possible.
10 M.C.O's	To assist M.L.O's
6 M.P's	
4 Despatch Riders.	

cycles.

As many as possible of the above should be mounted on motor

7. Each collecting area may serve as many as three beaches and as many as two Assembly Areas may be required for each beach.
8. A Field Ambulance is required for each Collecting Area. An M.D.S. is established in the Collecting Area. An A.D.S. with ambulance and stretcher parties is established in the Assembly Area. An R.A.P. is established in proximity to the beach if this is necessary in addition to the A.D.S.
9. Notes on the responsibilities of the various officers concerned are attached. In addition the following general points must be emphasised.
 - (a) It is vital to the success of the operation that men should be moved from Assembly Areas to beaches only as and when called for by the Beach Master. No one must move from Assembly Area to Beach until ordered to do so.
 - (b) Fullest use must be made of cover by day.
 - (c) Vehicles must not be driven closer to beaches than the area selected for vehicle destruction.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS OF BEACH ORGANISATION.

Responsibilities of Officer Commanding Collecting Area.

The O.C. Collecting Area is responsible:-

- (i) for reception of units and formations sent to his area.
- (ii) for directing through his area to other collecting areas units and formations destined for those other areas. (This will happen only where a coast road runs through a collecting area).
- (iii) for selection of a point for M.T. destruction and for ensuring that M.T. is destroyed.
- (iv) for sending forward to Assembly Areas sufficient personnel to keep these areas full.
- (v) for the selection of a Regulating Point and the marking of routes from Collecting Area to Assembly Areas.
- (vi) for ensuring that the orders of the Beach Commander regarding A.A. and ground protection are known to troops and carried out.

Responsibilities of M.L.O. i/c Embarkation Area.

M.L.O. i/c Embarkation Area is responsible:-

- (i) for the handling of all troops from the time of their arrival at the Control Point, until embarked by the M.O. i/c Beach.
- (ii) that troops are allotted to Assembly Areas at Control Point.
- (iii) for the selection of Control Point and Assembly Areas, if not already chosen by higher authorities and pointed out to M.L.O. The latter should afford as much cover as possible, and be within reasonable distance from the beach so that troops can be readily called forward as required.
- (iv) for the selection of routes between the Control Point and Assembly Areas, and between the Assembly Area and the Beach. Routes to be easily identified and suitably marked for night and day use.
- (v) That the Officer i/c Control Point carries out his duties properly, and that the necessary signs are maintained by night and day at this Point;

/(vi) ...

- (vi) That the Officer i/c Assembly Area distributes the troops in it accordance with his instructions; that this area is not overcrowded, and that sufficient troops are immediately available in the area as required by the N.O. i/c on the Beach.
- (vii) That the Military Officer i/c on the Beach carries out his duties properly, maintaining sufficient troops at the embarking points as required by the N.O. i/c, and that embarking points are suitably marked for night or day use, as required by the N.O. i/c.
- (viii) That, should an M.L.C. at an adjacent beach be able to embark more men than he has available; sufficient men should be handed over to him to maintain a steady flow from all beaches.
- (ix) That, on the Rear Guard Commander taking over control, the Officers and O.R.'s under his charge are embarked as early as possible.
- (x) That the orders of the local Commander regarding A.A. and ground protection are known to troops and carried out.

Responsibilities of Officer i/c Assembly Area.

Officer i/c Assembly Area is responsible:-

- (i) to carry out instructions as given by the M.L.C. i/c Embarkation Area.
- (ii) To see that no more than the required number of troops are present in the Assembly Area at any one time. Other troops should be held between the Control Point and the Assembly Area in covered positions previously selected.
- (iii) To see that troops are suitably distributed in the Assembly Area.
- (iv) To send forward troops for embarkation as required by the O. i/c Beach, taking care that no troops go forward without orders.

Responsibilities of Officer i/c Control Point.

- (i) To carry out instructions as given by the M.L.C.
- (ii) To maintain suitable signs by night and day to guide troops to their correct Assembly Areas.
- (iii) To allocate troops to Assembly Areas at Control Point.
- (iv) To take charge of Military Police at Control Point.

/Responsibilities of O. i/c Beach ...

Responsibilities of Officer i/c Beach.

- (i) To carry out instructions as given by the M.L.O.
 - (ii) To work in close conjunction with the B.O. i/c Beach, and to ensure that troops are called forward from the Assembly Area as required by him.
 - (iii) To see that the troops embark in an orderly manner and that the instructions of the N.O. i/c as to the numbers to embark in each boat are adhered to.
 - (iv) To see that all arms and equipment as ordered are taken on board.
 - (v) To ensure that each embarkation point is suitably marked for day or night use,
-

Appendix "A1" to GP/1 dated 21 April 1941.

DIAGRAM OF BEACH ORGANISATION.





DIAGRAM OF SPECIMEN BEACH ORGANISATION.



6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.

Copy No.

22 Apr 41.

Compiled from information received between 1800 hrs 20 Apr 41 and 1700 hrs 22 Apr 41.

Ref Maps: ATHENS - 1:250,000
LAMIA - AMANISSA - 1:100,000

1. OWN OPERATIONS. (i) Ground. 6 Aust Div is now consolidating its position at the head of the BRAILOS pass.

(ii) Air. Although operating against greatly superior numbers, our Air Force has achieved remarkable success, the following casualties to EA definitely confirmed; 19 Apr 16, 20 Apr 22 machines, and on 21 Apr one recon plane, 2 bombers, and possibly a third bomber were brought down by AA fire in our area, and the RAF figure is not known. The majority of the EA destroyed on 20 Apr was brought down during a raid on ATHENS. Throughout these operations only 6 of our machines were lost.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS. (i) Ground. The enemy forces have been following up our withdrawal, but as far as it is known his strength SOUTH of LAMIA is NOT yet formidable.

(ii) Air. Enemy air activity has shown a considerable reduction during the last two days. This is possibly due to the operations of our own Air Force. Recon machines have however been reported flying SE along the main rd on four occasions today. A Recon planes was seen to land and take off in the LAMIA area (5749) on 21 Apr.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS. It is thought that the enemy is approaching the BRAILOS Pass in two cols. The formations concerned have suffered considerable casualties from previous operations, but those most affected are not known.

(a) VIA DHOMOKOS: - 5 Armd Div - in the LAMIA area.
9 Armd Div - moving through DHOMOKOS.
75 Inf Div)
Legion ADOLPH HITLER) following 9 Armd Div.

(b) VIA COAST. } 6 Mtn Div, possibly followed by 5 Mtn Div through
EREFRIA (Y 5097).
Armd Div (possibly 2nd) through ALMIROS (Y 6183)

4. MOVEMENT IN AND BEHIND ENEMY LINES. Some movement was seen in the LAMIA valley on 22 Apr, but to date no MT have been reported SOUTH of the R. SPERKHEIOS. Enemy pls were reported across the River at 1245 hrs. The activity at the demolished br on the main rd would indicate that the enemy is preparing a crossing at this point. A concentration of MT was observed in KOMMA (3149) at 1200 hrs, and a large coln of MT moved into the village at 1345 hrs. Some MT moved west along the north bank of the river.

5. RD RECCE. A report on main rd south from PALAIOKHORION to AMFISSA near the GULF of CORINTH is attached as appendix "A".

Time of Signature: 1830 hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.


Capt
For Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

As per 6 Aust Div Int
Summary No. 5.

STOP PRESS: TAMC reports at 1430 hrs enemy inf reached 315435. Our PDIS under fire from Med Arty.

APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.ROAD REPORT - 20.4.42.

Ref Maps: ATHENS 1:250,000
 LAMIA - AMPHISSA 1:100,000

PALAIOKHORION - GRAVIA STA - EVANGELISTRIA - KASTELLI - GRAVIA -
 ELIAON - AMPHISSA - FEATURE 1910.

From PALAIOKHORION to GRAVIA Sta the road surface is fair to good and the road will take two streams of traffic - the bridge over the railway line 316320 was in good order at 1100 hrs 20 Apr.

From GRAVIA Sta to EVANGELISTRIA the surface is good but the road is very narrow - the road finishes at EVANGELISTRIA and there is no road or bridge over the stream between this village and KASTELLI.

From the EVANGELISTRIA turn off the main road has a good surface, and the road to KASTELLI was a fair surface, but is narrow.

I walked along the road from KASTELLI running into a GORGE, which goes in a SW direction, and found that, if the first 300 yds were cleared there would be quite a fair track, suitable for light traffic. I could see about 3000 yds of this road, and it appeared to be quite fair.

From GRAVIA to ELIAON the road surface is fair and the grade is generally fairly steep, but not difficult. There are some sharp bends, but this road can take MT of any nature.

From ELIAON to AMPHISSA the road runs through a huge olive grove - good dispersion area - and is in good condition for MT of any nature.

From AMPHISSA to past feature 1910 ref 175112 (and on the right of the road) the road is steep, but quite good. There the country opens out, but off the road, on both sides the country side is covered with jagged rock formations, a good anti tank obstacle.

Possible points of ingress are the gorge in Sq 2519 and the road running SW past feature 1910.

There does not appear to be any other point of ingress.

(Signed) K.R. EASDOWN, Lieut,
RAA 6 Aust Div.

NOTE: The above recon was made in the rain, speed of staff car did NOT exceed 25 MPH. This is the maximum speed, good average speed for MT would be 15 MPH.

6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.Copy No. **16**

22 Apr 41.

Compiled from information received between 1800 hrs 20 Apr 41 and 1700 hrs 22 Apr 41.

Ref Maps: ATHENS - 1:250,000
LAMIA - AMANISSA - 1:100,000

1. OWN OPERATIONS. (i) Ground. 6 Aust Div is now consolidating its position at the head of the BRAILOI pass.

(ii) Air. Although operating against greatly superior numbers, our Air Force has achieved remarkable success, the following casualties to EA definitely confirmed; 19 Apr 16, 20 Apr 22 machines, and on 21 Apr one recon plane, 2 bombers, and possibly a third bomber were brought down by AA fire in our area, and the RAF figure is not known. The majority of the EA destroyed on 20 Apr was brought down during a raid on ATHENS. Throughout these operations only 6 of our machines were lost.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS. (i) Ground. The enemy forces have been following up our withdrawal, but as far as it is known his strength SOUTH of LAMIA is NOT yet formidable.

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3. IDENTIFICATIONS. It is thought that the enemy is approaching the BRAILOI Pass in two columns. The formations concerned have suffered considerable casualties from previous operations, but those most affected are not known.

(a) VIA DHOMOKOS: - 5 Armd Div - in the LAMIA area.
9 Armd Div - moving through DHOMOKOS.
75 Inf Div)
Legion ADOLPH HITLER) following 9 Armd Div.


(b) VIA COAST. - 6 Mtn Div, possibly followed by 5 Mtn Div through ERETRIA (Y 5097).
Armd Div (possibly 2nd) through ALMIROS (Y 6183)

4. MOVEMENT IN AND BEHIND ENEMY LINES. Some movement was seen in the LAMIA valley on 22 Apr, but to date no MF have been reported SOUTH of the R. SPERKHEIOS. Enemy pls were reported across the River at 1245 hrs. The activity at the demolished br on the main rd would indicate that the enemy is preparing a crossing at this point. A concentration of MF was observed in KOMMA (3149) at 1200 hrs, and a large coln of MF moved into the village at 1345 hrs. Some MF moved west along the north bank of the river.

5. RD RECCE. A report on main rd south from PALAIOKHORION to AMFISSA near the Gulf of CORINTH is attached as appendix "A".

Time of Signature: 1830 hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.


Capt
Jr Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

As per 6 Aust Div Int
Summary No. 5.

STOP PRESS: TAMC reports at 1430 hrs enemy inf reached 315435. Our FDIS under fire from Med Arty.

APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.

ROAD REPORT - 20.4.42.

Ref Maps: ATHENS 1:250,000
LAMIA - AMPHISSA 1:100,000

PALAIOKHORION - GRAVIA STA - EVANGELISTRIA - KASTEELI - GRAVIA -
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Possible points of ingress are the gorge in Sq 2519 and the road running SW past feature 1910.

There does not appear to be any other point of ingress.

(Signed): K.R. EASDOWN, Lieut,
RAA 6 Aust Div.

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6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.Copy No. 17.....

22 Apr 41.

Compiled from information received between 1800 hrs 20 Apr 41 and 1700 hrs 22 Apr 41.

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LAMIA - AMANISSA - 1:100,000

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Time of Signature: 1830 hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.


Capt
Major Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

As per 6 Aust Div Int
Summary No. 5.

STOP PRESS: TAMC reports at 1430 hrs enemy inf reached 315435. Our FDIS under fire from Med Arty.

APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 6.ROAD REPORT - 20.4.41.

Ref Maps: ATHENS 1:250,000
 LAMIA - AMPHISSA 1:100,000

PALAIOKHORION - GRAVIA STA - EVANGELISTRIA - KASTEELI - GRAVIA -
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RAA 6 Aust Div.

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MAP REF. ATHENS 1/256000

OPERATIONS LOG IRSE

DATE 26 Apr 15

SERIAL NO.	ORIG. NO.	TITLE REC. OR SENT.	OUTWARD TO.	INWARD FROM.	T.O.O.	INFORMATION	REMARKS
85						<p>Comds report daily 0900 hrs serial nos remaining. All embarkation ordered from the H.Q. noting serials. All ltrs approach beach or/and quay by beach route i.e. from South reporting control post. They will be marshalled under orders improvised embarkation staff which will allot serials to ships, caigues etc. Comds responsible that only the serials embark. Armed guards will be detailed by comd concerned. Comd to report Camp Comd P.I.B.S.A. nos used units add parties NOT repeat NOT entered for in their serials. No vehicles will be destroyed without permission this H.Q. except RAF (by F.S.S.) and 308 Coy RASC. After departure first flight 50% vehicles will be destroyed but not by running engines to obtain sugar. 7et to be covered by comds and running cars allotted units. DID to be established by comds. All ltrs half rations excl water forthwith. Comds organise medical for area and also allotment ships at short notice. No rations available ship and Scarcity at probable destination. Reps comds report daily 2000 hrs and 1000 hrs. Col LISTER and May PEMBERTON detail LO's forthwith permanent duty this H.Q. L.M.G's, P/Tk. with all arms will be collected by units and sent to quayside and/or beach in minimum quantity M.T. carrying parties detailed by units concerned. Essential high standard of discipline observed in accordance with imperial traditions. B7 Left Hand.</p>	

SERIAL No	Orig No	Time Recd or Sent	Outward To	Inw. From	T.OO	INFORMATION.	Remarks.
P2	I 19	1305	6 DIV			Sitrep, Ditmor enemy recce aircraft and bombers in ones and twos, active over area throughout morning. 18 enemy bombers flew approx South 1228 hrs.	
P3	O 21	2143	6 DIV			2/6 Bn will report contact with enemy party estm 15 and small wireless set by their right Coy at pt where valley leading from left passes GIBRALTER to gap. Engaged by MMG and inf fire resulting total party becoming casualties @ country too precipitous investigate or recover wireless set. Time of action 1945 hrs. Local inhabitants reported late afternoon a German force estm Bn strong coming from that direction @ Vasey advised. The possibility of air attack in this area must be not be overlooked and units will ensure that slit trenches are dug immediately for all ranks. Air sentries will be posted with A/P L.M.Gs mounted and armed. P.A.P measures enforced.	
P4	B 1	0930 3 MAY	2/3 2/6 Bns				
P5	Z 1	NIL		Brig Parrington	1800	Z Det organised as under. Brig Allen comds all Aust Tps and 40 Bn Tps SE KALAMAI @ COL LISTER all Tps NE KALAMAI @ Maj PEMBERTON all Tps arriving by rd by KALAMAI Comds will organise all Tps into groups of 50 forthwith reporting this H.Q number of serials already taken up @ Camp comd 81 B.S.A will organise all repeat all parties not repeat not captured for @ Serials allotted Brig Allen 1-50. COL LISTER 151-300, MAJ PEMBERTON 301-400	(most immediate)

MAP

ATHENS 1/250,000

OPERATIONS LOG

DATE 22 Apr

13

SERIAL No	ORIG No	Time Rec'd or Sent	Outward To	Inw. From	T.O.O.	INFORMATION	REMARKS
73	Q 41	NIL		6 Div	1445	Div Comdr directs that except on moonlights when rd is reasonably visible regulation dimmed headlights will be used by all vehicles except when visible by the by ground observation. when vehicles are halted all lights will be switched off. all informed	(21 Apr)
74	043	NIL		19 Bde	0820	Rly tunnels 304230, 413040 not blown, and constitute way round front 14 Bde H.Q. suggest you order tunnels to be blown. Demolitions to be covered by 17 Bde H.Q.	
75						HOB0 will come under comd 17 Bde forthwith in lieu of URSU, and be prepared to move at one hour notice with 17 Bde H.Q. HOB0 will hand over present task to URSU forthwith. Ack Emergency.	(Immediate)
76	142	NIL		6 Div	1800	Sitrep 26 1430 hrs enemy inf reached 315435. our F.D.L.S under fire from Med Arty.	(Immediate)
77	143	NIL		6 Div	2115	Sitrep 27. nothing further to report	(Immediate)
78	138	NIL		6 Div	1245	Patrol reports will be fwd daily to 6 Div giving routes, topographical and other information as soon as possible after completion by units. These are required by Corps by 0900 hrs daily.	
79	139	1349		6 Div	1245	Sitrep 22 Ground ops 1000 hrs enemy MT in area 315450 engaged by arty.	
80	Q 55	NIL		6 Div	1715	GR0P personnel remaining under your orders	
81	0170	0400	received 3/4	6 Div	2100	2/3 1st Regt at PGCE 16 1 locations not moving fwd	Importance

MAD ATHENS 1/2 50,000

OPERATION LOG

IRSE

DATE 22 APR 12.

SERIALS No	SENDER No	TIME RECEIVED OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	REMARKS
72					<p>Covering force under Comd Lt Col Louch, and composed of units now on west bank of river will commence thinning out at 0200 hrs 19 Apr. and will finally vacate posn at 0300 hrs, remainder of force will commence withdrawal 1900 hrs 18 Apr in accordance with following time table @ H.Q 17 Bde 1900 hrs. NZ Fd Bty, 1945. A/Th Bty Cleone Tp 2130 hrs. 2/5 Bn (less two comp) 2215 hrs 292 Fd Coy 2030 hrs. Should a block on rd occur all officers must use their utmost endeavours to clear it. Reps RA, RE, A/Th, Inf and M.Gs will leave 1830 hrs and R.V. vicinity KOMPA 4 miles south of LAMIA where G.S.O.1 will contact them</p> <p>Speed and density day 15 MPH 10 V.T.M night 6 M.P.H. 40 V.T.M. Starting point will be at exit from own unit lines</p>	(18 Apr)
73	0 35	0923		19 Bde 0845	2/4 Bn will relieve 2/5 Bn to be completed by 0600 hrs 22 Apr where possible took RE stores and will be left in present posn on mutual exchange basis	

SERIAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME RECEIVED OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARD		INFORMATION	CONF	REMARKS
				FROM	T.O.O			
69	0 19	1256	RAR 6 DIV			Copy no 9.00 no 1 Ack.		
70	0 5	2130	1st Aust Corps			Sitrep report LO from H.Q 1 Armcd Bde indicates no enemy south VENE-TIKOS, no information enemy movements 17 Bde occupies ponn as required.		By L.O. (16 APR).
71	X160	1205		Corps	2000	Corps will close at 0800 hrs 17 Apr 41 and open at SOUMPASI at the same time Comms will be est by W/T and D.R. from SOUMPASI to formations. no L/T comms. are required following W/T channels required. Corps to 6 Div. Corps to 17 Aust Inf Bde and H.Q 1 Armcd Bde on one grp. Corps At the same time a signal centre will be est just south of LAMIA with W/T and D.R. comms to Corps and LEVADERIA. Sigco will ensure that all sig offices with which they are in comm are advised of this location. Ack.		
72	0 13	1600	To all units Damage force			Damage force will withdraw during night 18/19 Apr to an area south of LAMIA. Marching elements of above force now on west bank riv. PENIOS will ferry to east bank and occupy a ponn to cover the river from that side. Tp carrying 1/2 of their units will move forth with via TYRNAYOS - LARISSA to embussing area on east bank of river Unit tp will proceed to LAMIA area		

ATHENS 1/250,000

OPERATION LOG GRSE

Date 22/4/41 10

SERIAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME RECEIVED OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARD		INFORMATION	CONF.	REMARKS
				FROM	T.O.O.			
57	I 17	0735	6 Div			Ref map LAMIA 1/100,000 17 Bde est 315348 enemy seen planes over area 0715 hrs.		message dated 21/4/
58	I 37	0800		6 Div	2115	Sitrep no 21 Three EA brought down, 2 by Bofors 1 by LMG		
59	O 160	0900		6 Div	2100	Following from adv Force H.Q. Rly viaducts of masonry or concrete in cliff face south of LAMIA are not to be destroyed unless contrary orders received from force comd Ack please.		Immediate (21/4/41)
60	O 43	0930		19 Bde	0820	Rly Tunnels 304230 413040 not blown and constitute way round front 17 Bde. suggest you order tunnels to be blown. Demolitions to be covered by 17 Bde		
61	I 10	0945		19 Bde	0835	19 Bde now est 329398 Dispositions 19 Bde following request for dispositions 17 Bde be forwarded to 19 Bde		
62	O 16	1019	6 Div.			Lt Hayes returned this morn escaping capture. advises wooden bridge with good macadam surface still intact at ATHENS sheet 1/250,000 Y1856		
63	I 17	1040	16 & 19 Bdes			Location 17 Bde 1100 hrs LAMIA 1/100,000 215348?		
64	O 17	1125	6 Div			Ack.		message dated 21/4/
65	O 35	0920	17 Bde	19 Bde	0845	2/11 will release 2/5. to be completed by 0600 hrs 22 Apr. where possible tools R E stores, amm will be left in present form on mutual exchange basis 23 NZBn taking up posn right of 2/11		
66	I 36	NIL		6 Div	1330	Sitrep number 20. nothing to report 6 Div est Y540147.		21/4/
67	O 166	1055		6 Div	0955	Comds or senior reps all addresses will report 6 Div on Receipt of this message.		Immediate.
68	O 18	1252	6 Aust Div RAE			Ack		

SERIAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME Recd or sent	OUTWARD To	INWARDS		INFORMATION	CONF	REMARKS
				FROM	TOO			
51						<p>allotted task of protecting left flank. 6 Div in (Y22) especially feature 2008 in (Y22) and rds approaching GRAVIA vicinity (Y2425) Comd 16 Bde contacting you confer result your needs of 20 Apr. regarding security left flank to your rear defence these locations localities to be treated as urgent. Ack.</p> <p>(Form available to 16 Bde for this flank defence tasks consists of the depleted 2/2 Bn & 2/3 Bn as soon as they can be reorganised)</p>		Immediate by L.O.
52	0/138	NIL		6 Div	1935	6 Div closing present location 1930 hrs 20 Apr reopening AYIA MALINA and same time		(Important) 20/4/41
53	—	0805	All Bns 2/3 Fd Regt 2/2 " Coy 2/2 " Amb			<p>1 Be prepared to move from present locations at short notice 2 No further deployments of Tps</p> <p>3 maintain present localities but be prepared for a quick move</p> <p>4 please provide liaison with this H.Q.</p> <p>Bde will be prepared to move at short notice</p> <p>(1) will move as a Bde Gp. 2/3 Fd Regt, 2/2 Fd Coy 2/5 2/6 2/7 Bns (2) Tpt will be provided by corps destination unknown. (3) No further deployment of Tps (4) maintain localities but be prepared for quick move</p> <p>M.T. and personnel not absolutely required send to B ech.</p>		
54								
55	I 110	1835		6 Div	0945	Situation report n° 23 nothing to report.		(message in cipher).
56	I 16	1930	6 Div			Location as at 1930 hrs Y3036		

BATAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME RECD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION - REMARKS
46	I 15	NIL	6 DIV		Sitrep a heavy attack 0730-0845 by formation J 488 on EA brought down.		
47	E1/40	NIL		292 Coy RE 1020	Present location of my unit HQ is village south side of main rd BRALLOS-POLYDROSON 15 miles east of tunnel crossing an endeavouring collect unit and recover some vehicles will remain present location pending further orders about half unit present		
48	I 16	1836	6 DIV		Sitrep 1120 hrs 1 EA 1220 hrs 1245 hrs 7 EA bombing and M.G fire over area.		
49	O/160	NIL		6 Div 2100	Following from Adv Force HQ Rly Viaducts and masonry or concrete in cliff face south of LAMIA are not rptd not to be destroyed unless contrary orders are received from force comd & Ack.		
50	O/161	NIL		6 Div 2205	Warning order be prepared to adjust dispositions of Bde in your Bde area by detaching 2/5 occupy defensive form outside rd in sq Y22 facing J.W. area now occupied by 2/5 will be allotted 16 Bde to act as Belle res to you. recce party 2/5 incl comd required proceed recce 22 apr. meet Col GARRETT 1 Aust corps at your HQ 1000 hrs 22 apr. Ack.		(Immediate) 21/4/41
51	O 167	NIL		6 Div 1916	17 Bde is responsible for covering tracks leading eastwards from MAVROLITHARION (Y13) and will patrol westward as far as the vertical grid (Y10) to ascertain possible approach enemy if necessary standing patrols will be maintained food of covering posts 6 Div to be informed as soon as possible of locations and strengths covering posts and patrols. 16 Bde has been		

NO	ST	IN TIME RECD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION - MARKS
37					with few casualties. Personnel carrying MT beginning to arrive in fwd area, move proceeding as planned continuous air activity over area. A/Tk Bty will be handed over to comd DOMOKOS force as required.		
38	O 119	NIL		6 Div 1655	Detach A/Tk bty now under your comd to comd DOMOKOS force (Brig LEE) when your force clear DOMOKOS & report by returning D.R. progress withdrawal your force.		
39	O 15	1817	FROG? (A/Tk Bty)		on arrival at DOMOKOS you will report with you bty to Brig LEE comd DOMOKOS force and come under his comd, collect your other troop as it reaches DOMOKOS.		
40	L 14	1900	6 Div		Ref maps ATHENS 1:250,000 17 Bde est at 320 330		
41	L 10	1254	(14/4/41)	1 Sub area 1655	Incomplete units arriving LARISSA will only be sent fwd on orders from Adv H.Q. 81 Base Sub area will keep Adv force H.Q. informed of these arrivals.		(14/4/41)
42	E 1/38	NIL		292 RE	Lt WARCUP with one sec plus details two other sec camping on North side of rd KALABAKA-TRIKKALA 200 yds east of Km stone 19. For urgent work please direct on Lt WARCUP & am remaining with adv sec at tunnel at junction of GREVENA-KALABAKA. KALABAKA-YANNINA rds until 0800 hrs 18 Apr when I hope to report your H.Q.		(17/4/41)
43	API	2005		2/5 2022	ACK.		17/4/41
44	L	1900	6 Div		Ref maps ATHENS 1:250,000 17 Bde est at 320 330		19/4/41
45	O 28	NIL		19 Bde 0305	Ref your CY2 @ Cancel message commencing 4514 correct message begins request arrange @ Coy NURE concentrated earliest possible & in absence other information from you an arranging Coy ft be stopped in para 3/3391 and return direct to NURE		20/4/41

SERIAL NO	TENDER NO	TIME RECD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION - REMARKS
29	014	1232	6 Div		Bridge at mountain route 17 Bde destroyed		
30	013	1225	6 Div		24 Bn 245 Pm		
31	013	1225	6 Div		on west bank and receive possible crossing		
32		2 pm	By Black RASC.	1255	can you deliver to this HQ 200 ft pontoon equipment w/ failings that FB equipment for immediate use there is a route from the position of 24 Bn Art. to Lin Thomai via Pymmaro & Larissa there are 6 bridges to cross which have been unsuccessfully bombed distance about 17 mile fair traffic down road but well controlled.		
33	I27	1300	6 Div	16 Bde 1120	report that 1 Bn of enemy still in Nadi South of Honno 4360 also another Bn moving SW from Honno some elements of which have crossed R. Penoneros at approx 4057		Libertines Marriage
34	I9	1300	6 Div		Road near for by-pass around Larissa shows no suitable tracks found in area covered based on track south from Syn Thomai with fair weather subject to check a fair track should be available tomorrow.		
35	I169	1237	at HQ	Adv Force HQ 0930	Will move soon as possible after arrival LARRISSA to area TRIKKALA marching personnel will be lifted under arrangements R.R.Q. Bn will receive food to area KALABARA Adv Force HQ dispatched LARRISSA with detailed instructions.		(Immediate) (14 Apr 41)
36	I9	1300	6 Div		Road near for UYR pass around LARRISSA shows no suitable tracks found in area covered based on track south from SYN THOMAI		(18 Apr.)
37					Sitrep. All marching personnel should be across river by 1900 hrs @ most of vehicles now through		

SERIAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME RECD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION - RE MARKS
24 cont					fly one motor but one rec ATK group left VELEMISTION. Movement of British Brig cannot be stopped.		
25	010	15 ⁰⁰ 15 ³⁰	ANZAC Cpt		In view information from your LO that bridge R. RENEIOS is blown and congestion rd. due most 3 Armd Bde. I consider my only course is to remain present posn until a route of retreat has been found. Anticipate being able remain here until night 18/19 Apr. Will then out in daylight tomorrow if possible.		
26	011	1545	OC VELEMISTION		You will withdraw to KALARRAKA at 1600 hrs 18 APR if not previously in contact with enemy. Enclosed message MUST be passed by you immediately to R.E. det at bridge over R. YENETIROS South GREVENA		
27	012	1540	OC R.E. det		You will withdraw at 1300 hrs 18 APR to KALARRAKA. You will blow the bridge prior to withdrawal unless you are satisfied that CREEK Bde will carry out demolition on arrival of enemy.		
28	T6		2/5 Pn	17/4	One section required as security guard on road over dry canal on main road to be mounted immediately and maintained until withdrawal of R.E.		Immediate

SERIAL NO	SENDER NO	TIME RECD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION	REMARKS
19 Cont					it may be taken over Only damage is a hole in main petrol tank apparently made with a bayonet Vehicle bears Army Bde sign and number L 4144654 and 78			
20	E1/34			292 0815 Ed Coy	Greek soldiers and animal transport returning from direction GREVENA continues to head to KALABAKA If it is intended to divert this W to KETSIVON in order to keep TRIKALAI clear adequate Creek officers and staff must be posted at rd junction			
21	06		ber	1210	Alk X 160			
22	07		ber	1217	copy of 4 op instr no 10 00R			
23	X 160	1205		ber 2000	ber will close at 0800 hrs 17 April and open at 0800 hrs 18 April. At the same time commo will be estb by W/T and D/R from SOUMPAZI to formations no L/T commo are required following W/T channels required. ber to GEP4 and NEJE on one group. At the same time a signal centre will be estab just south of L AMIAL with W/T and DR commo to ber and LEVADEIA HALL will be responsible for comm to MILK as from 0800 hrs 17 April a sign will ensure that all signal office sign which they are in commo advised of their location @ Alk			
24	08		ber	1325	3 Armd Brig commenced withdrawal from River VENETRIKOS. 0930 hrs 16 April Tail expected clear KALABAKA 1600 hrs 17 April Delaying det one carrier			see serial No 21

TRIKKALA 1/100,000

OPERATION LOG IRSE

DATE 16 APR 41 (3)

SERIAL NO	SENDER	RECD	CUTWARD TO	INWARDS		INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION	REMARKS
				FROM	TOO				
15	H.3	1452		Lt Hughes 292 Fd Coy	1030	Received your message 1015 hrs party worked yesterday and all last night at tunnel put in mixed charges all ammoniat and 5000 lbs Greek dynamite Electric cord and cordage string. Staff Capt Greek Dix holding METSOVON told me his engineers were responsible for firing, refused allow us to fire. Handed over to him as he is good man and understands demolition. I was returning when I received your message. Reports here speak of Germans long way off METSOVON unlikely approach for some days as dead Bde will only hold GREVENA till this evening if I have not fired by then. Which way do I return eventually. Will require approx 16/50 gals petrol and rations after tonight. Strength of party now 18. please send petrol and rations as possible. Will you please send D.R. to clear up these points this afternoon. Interpreter would be very useful if can spare.			
16	L5	1458	Lt Hughes	292 Fd Coy		Major Jones informed @ you may withdraw with @ hand over responsibility for demolition of tunnel to Greek Engineers.			
17	0294	0830			0325	ON 7 fuel by planes. A. DEMETRIOS. 2000 hrs 14th Ap. Recce party arrives KALABAKA 0650 hrs. By arrival 0800 hrs 15th Ap.			(15 April)
18	0317	0820			0730	2 1/2 chds. in unit location opens OUMDAFI			16 April
19	EY/33			292 Fd Coy	0800	0100 hrs 17 April. When returning from one of my demolition parties at 1930 hrs yesterday 1/2 Km S of village marked on map as VELEMISTION found a 10 ton LEYLAND workshop long abandoned and being looted by villagers I drove it back to my unit from whom			

TRIKKALA
1/100000

OPERATION LOG

IRSE

DATE 15 APR 2

SERIAL NO	SENDER OR SENT	TIME REGD OR SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM TO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION	REMARKS
6					the demolition in the East mentioned instance the decision rests with the NCO in charge of the demolition party concerned.			
7	O.1	2300		29244 RE	Please arrange to destroy disabled tank at left of main rd just East of rd fork during daylight from 16 Apr. Patrol tanks contain 100 gals mol ready for demolition			
8	WS1	0730	(16 Apr)	2/11 0715	Sitrep nothing to report during night			
9	I 3	0740	1 AUST COY		Sitrep II 2/11 nothing to report during night 2/5 Sitrep. Enemy air activity 1755 hrs 1820 hrs recon plane over area. 1830 hrs one EA dive bombed rd NW KATABAKA 1922 hrs 2 EA bombed TRIKKALA area machine gunned area 6848 rd map TRIKKALA 1/100000. 0450 hrs one EA dive bombed rd KATABAKA 6848			
10	F 1	NIL		2/5 0825	Sitrep 2/5 700470 ref TRIKKALA.			
11	O 3	1239	2/2 Tel Coy		Please obtain 20,000 yds Demant wire as discussed and deliver to 2/11 Bn.			
12	O.4	1245	All units		C.O each unit added to attend conference this H.Q 1600 hrs 16 Apr.			
13	I 2	1755	1 AUST COY		Sitrep two enemy air activity One ME110 1245 hrs one EA 1540 hrs on recon over KALABATA. 16 EA dive bombed area approx 6 miles East of KALABATA			(message dated 15 Apr)
14	L21/30	1452		292 1300 Tel Coy	Message from Lt Hughes in reply to mine ordering him to remain at Tunnel until ordered otherwise or arrival of enemy is fwd herewith. For information please say if any fresh orders can be given Lt Hughes is his withdrawal			

TRIKKALA 1:100,000 OPERATION LOG

DATE 15 April 40

1

INITIAL NO	SENDER	TIME RECD	TIME SENT	OUTWARD TO	INWARDS FROM	TOO	INFORMATION	CONF	ACTION	REMARKS
1	T1			Boys ANZAC		1915	Litred 17 Bde HQ with 685480 ref map TRIKKALA 1:100,000 30-40 EA dive bombed TRIKKALA 0730 hrs @ Two crew STUKA dive bomber brought down sent back to 81 Base sub area			
2	0286	2155			1 Aust Corps	1330	You will move at once to KALANIKA 86949 and come under orders of 17 Aust INF Bde @ Route ELASSON DOMENIVON T1256 A DAMASI T1746 across river then to rd Junat 1835 thence westwards.			(Message dated 14 Apr)
3	0183	2055			adv Engrs H.Q.	1835	292 A.F.D Coy RE 607 A.M.P.C placed under command ANZAC Corps for 17 Bde upon receipt this signal @ LOCATION these units KALABAKA for ANZAC CORPS only @ To msg 0176 of 14 Apr add engineer tasks of KALABAKA as well incl demolitions on METSEYON PASS.			Message 14 Apr
4	0254	NIL			1 Aust Corps	0215	NZ 7th Bty leaves AG DEMETRIOS 2000 hrs 14 Apr. Recon party arrives KALABAKA 0600 hrs @ Bty arrives 0800 hrs 15 Apr.			Important
5	AB1	1945			2/11	NIL	2/11 H.Q 2ly cutting 664504 map ref TRIKKALA 1:100,000 C2460 @ Coy disposed and fire plan found when completed.			
6		2215		292 Coy RE 2/11 Coy RE			A demolition party is to be placed on each and prepared for demolition on TRIKKOLA-GREVENA rd. and on tunnel and other demolitions on TRIKKOLA-YANNINA rd respectively. These blocks will be blown on receipt of a written order signed by Bde Comd M.G.S.O.I or in the event of enemy action designed to prevent.			

Greek brothers

The fate of John Metaxas followed his successor. From the moment he thought of a separate armistice with Germany England opposed to his plans, and ask for his loss. The prime minister of Greece Alex. Kozizis is dead murdered by English agents. The members of this murdering complot have left for Alexandria. They have followed the well known order of the British fugitives and went with them to Africa.

Kozizis was desided to stay and make peace

2

He had understood that it was
wise to keep on fighting. He was
also quite sure that the only thing
which would save Greece was ~~the~~
peace.

But peace was not in accordance
with the wishes of England. Thus
they murdered him also as they
have poisoned John Metaxas who
had not the madness to fight Germany.

This is the truth and we want
you at least to know it. We want
you to know that all this dreadful
things happened since English came
to our country. The secret service
the treachery and the murdering
rule our country. Is it allowed
to kill our political man only
because they are thinking as real
Greeks having in view the Greek future?
Must we always sit up? No, Greek
brothers! The time came that we
must also say our opinion.

Do not let these jail personalities
to complete our full delivery to the
Britishers. Get free from them and
their gang. Greek patriots take at
last the chance of Greece in your
hands before it is too late, before
the last occasion disappears, before
they last show rings. A dark fate
weighs in the British sympathising
way of King George the second. The
God of does not want him! With his
death came to our country. All the
Greek political men died one after
the other. The bad fate of George
the second got them as well as
our whole country, where thousands
of widows and orphans are mourning
the remainings of an unfair loss and
the sacrifices offered by the young
people of our country.

4
Greek brothers come with our side
and fight for a new free and
regenerated Greece. Fall without
any pity on to the responsible.

We are coming. We are walking
to liberate Athens and Greece
from the British cholera.

The secret popular organisation of Greece

ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ!

Ἡ μοῖρα τοῦ Ἰωάννου Μεταξᾶ βρῆκε καὶ τὸ διάδοχό του. Ἀπὸ τῆ στιγμῆ πού σκέφθηκε νὰ κλείση, γιὰ τὸ καλὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μας, εἰρήνη μετὰ τῆ Γερμανία, στάθηκε ἀντιμέτωπη σ'αὐτὸν ἡ Ἀγγλία καὶ ζήτησε τὸ χαμὸ του.

Ὁ Πρωθυπουργὸς μας Ἀλέξανδρος Κορυζῆς εἶναι νεκρὸς, δολοφονημένος ἀπὸ Ἀγγλοὺς πράκτορες.

Τὰ μέλη τῆς κυβερνήσεώς του πού εἶχαν ἀναμιχθῆ μετὰ τοὺς Ἀγγλοὺς στὴ δολοφονικὴ αὐτὴ συνωμοσία, δραπέτευσαν γιὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρεια. Ἀκολούθησαν τῆ γνωστὴ προσταγὴ τῶν Ἀγγλῶν φυγάδων καὶ πήγανε μαζί τους στὴν Ἀφρική.

Ὁ Κορυζῆς ἦταν ἀποφασισμένος νὰ μείνη γιὰ νὰ κλείση τὴν εἰρήνη. Εἶχε καταλάβει πὼς ἦταν παράλογο νὰ ἐξακολουθήση τὴν ἀντίσταση. Εἶχεν ἀκόμα ἀκράδαντη πεποίθησι, ὅτι ἡ μοναδικὴ καὶ τελευταία εὐκαιρία γιὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἦτανε τὸ ἄμεσο κλείσιμο τῆς εἰρήνης.

Ἡ εἰρήνη ὅμως δὲν ταίριαζε βέβαια μετὰ τὰ σχέδια τῶν Ἀγγλῶν πολεμόφιλων. Ἔτσι δολοφόνησαν κι'αὐτόν, ὅπως δηλητηρίασαν τὸν Μεταξᾶ, γιὰτὶ δὲν εἶχε τὴν τρέλλα νὰ θέλῃ νὰ πολεμήσῃ μετὰ τῆ Γερμανία.

Αὐτὴ εἶναι ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ θέλουμε νὰ τὴν μάθετε ἐπὶ τέλους. Θέλουμε νὰ ξέρετε πὼς πραγματικὰ ἔγιναν αὐτὰ τὰ ἀποτρόπαια γεγονότα, πού ἀπὸ τὴν πρώτη μέρα πού φανήκαν οἱ Ἀγγλοὶ στὸν τόπο μας, κατάντησαν νὰ γίνουν συνήθεια. Τὸ Σέκρετ Σέρβις, ἡ πρόδοσία καὶ ἡ δολοφονία διευθύνουνε τὴ χώρα μας. Ἐπιτρέπεται νὰ σκοτώνουνε τοὺς πολιτικούς μας μόνο καὶ μόνο ἐπειδὴ σκέπτονται ἑλληνικά, ἔχοντας ὑπ'ὄψη τους τὸ ἑλληνικὸ μέλλον; Ἐμεῖς πρέπει πάντα νὰ σιωποῦμε; Ὁχι, Ἕλληνες ἀδελφοί! Ἦρθε ἡ ὥρα νὰ ποῦμε

καὶ μεῖς τῆ γνώμη μας. Μὴν ἀφήσετε τὶς ἐγκληματικὰς ὑπάρξεις νὰ συμπληρώσουν τὴν παράδοσὴ μας στοὺς Ἄγγλους! Ἐλευθερωθεῖτε ἀπ'αὐτοὺς κ'ἀπὸ τὴν κλίκα τους! Ἕλληνες πατριῶτες, πάρτε ἐπὶ τέλους τὴν τύχη τῆς Ἑλλάδος στὰ χέρια σας προτοῦ περάσῃ καὶ ἡ τελευταία εὐκαιρία, προτοῦ σημῖνῃ ἡ τελευταία ὥρα!

Μιὰ σκοτεινὴ μοῖρα βαραίνει τὴν ἀγγλόφιλη πολιτικὴ Γεωργίου τοῦ Β! Ὁ Θεὸς τῆς Ἑλλάδος δὲν τὸν θέλει! Μαζὶ μ'αὐτὸν ἤρθε καὶ ὁ θάνατος στὴ χώρα μας. Οἱ Ἕλληνες πολιτικοὶ πέθαναν ὁ ἓνας ὕστερα ἀπὸ τὸν ἄλλο!

Τοὺς βρῆκε ἡ κακὴ μοῖρα Γεωργίου τοῦ Β!, ὅπως βρῆκε καὶ ὅλη τὴ χώρα μας, ὅπου χιλιάδες χῆρες καὶ ὄρφανὰ πενθοῦνε τὰ λείψανα τοῦ ἀδίκου χαμοῦ καὶ τῆς θυσίας ποὺ προσέφερε ἡ νεολαία τῆς πατρίδας μας . . .

ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ, ταχθεῖτε στὸ πλευρὸ μας καὶ πολεμήστε μαζί μας γιὰ μιὰ ἐλεύθερη ἀναγεννημένη Ἑλλάδα! Ριχθεῖτε ἀμείλικτα ἀπάνω στοὺς ὑπεύθυνους!

Ἐρχόμαστε! Βαδίζουμε γιὰ νὰ ἐλευθερώσουμε τὴν Ἀθήνα καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὀλόκληρη ἀπὸ τὴν ἀγγλικὴ χολέρα!

• Η ΜΥΣΤΙΚΗ ΛΑΪΚΗ ΟΡΓΑΝΩΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ •

MAP REF. ATHENS 1/250 000

OPERATIONS LOG IRSE

DATE 26 Nov

SERIAL NO.	ORIG. NO.	TIME REC. OR SENT.	CUTWARD TO.	INWARD FROM	T.O.O.	INFORMATION	REMARKS
86	-	-	W Gp	D Sec	1901	Ack received 1900 hrs	(in reply to O 3)
87	O 5	2000	Z			Serials 1 to 123 taken up. @ Embarkation H.Q. Allen Gp established Eastern corner Stone fence around house about central back front Can you establish telephone @ H.Q. can be moved to suit your arrangements if necessary.	
88	O 6	2000	Z			Ack.	
89	Z 2	-		Perig Pairington	2015	Destroy vehicles in all force dispersal areas not by fire or running engine dry @ Only applicable to Allen Gp and this to be passed to adjoining unit	(Immediate)

28 Apr 41.

17 Aust Inf Bde O. O. No. 7.

Ref Maps ATHENS 1/250,000

Information.

1. 6 Aust Div is being concentrated to undertake a new strategical role which will probably mean embarkation and a landing which necessitates moving as lightly equipped as possible.

The move will be covered by a N.Z. Bde and attached Aust tps occupying a def poan astride the rd THRIVE-ELEFSIS three miles south of KREIKOUKI (E.07).

2. Enemy. There has been no contact on the ERAILOS front except for a few instances of long range artillery shelling.

Intention.

3. The Bde Gp will move as part of ALLEN Gp to a new location on night 23/24 Apr.

Method.

4. The move will be in accordance with the attached timetable.

5. Tps will be carried on unit MT plus 21 3-ton trucks per Bn.

6. An officer or reliable NCO will be in comd of each truck which becomes the unit.

7. Bren guns with mountings fixed to meet air attack will be carried in each truck.

8. IMGs and A T. rifles with full establishment of mags loaded, also Thompson guns and amn will be carried by each sec.

9. First line amn will be carried by distributing two bandoliers per man and at least one box per vehicle.

10. Picks, shovels and axes will be issued to all vehicles and the whole establishment so distributed. On debussing each unit cmd will see that tools are carried.

11. Two PIs 2/7 Bn on their left flank will come under comd 2/3 Bn for purposes of the move. 2/7 Bn to inform 2/6 Bn of their locations.

12. MG PIs under comd will remain with Bns and move with them. All Mk VIII Z amn will be carried.

13. It is imperative that fluidity of movement be maintained in order to reach the destination during the hours of darkness.

14. In event of delays caused by damaged vehicles or roads, the offr will take charge of his unit as a working party to clear the obstruction. THIS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. All vehicles which cannot be got moving within 5 minutes will be removed from the rd and disabled.

15. CO. will impress on offr and NCOs the great importance of taking comd in all circumstances and under any emergency.

16. Sidelights only will be used on vehicles. These will be extinguished in event of an air attack and at any halt.

17. The comd of each vehicle is responsible for dismantling two men at each and every halt to see that the driver is awake and that vehicles move on again with the convoy. Also in the event of a temporary stoppage to ensure that following vehicles are signalled on.

18. Other than as in para 17 there will be no overtaking within the convoy.

19. Windscreen glasses will be removed from all vehicles including troop carrying tpt provided.

20. In event of an air attack offr and NCO will take comd to prevent long dispersion of tps and to overcome delay in re-embussing. Not only does the success of our move depend on this and the clearing of rds, but the safety of the force remaining depends on this movement being completed according to schedule.

21. Comds will be responsible to meet land attack as well as air attack, particularly from parachutists, and tps will dig in immediately on arrival at their destination. At this location no movement whatsoever will be allowed during daylight.

22. Parachute protection:

(a) Units are responsible for their own concealment areas,

(b) 1 Armd Bde has been made responsible for the THRIVE area.

23. AA fire. Units will make clear to all tps that after leaving live positions and moving to concealed areas AA fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.

24. Tps may be informed of the necessity for the maintenance of steadfastness.

Admin.

25. It is anticipated that one Recovery vehicle will be attached to each Bn.

26. It is of the utmost importance that tps be equipped as lightly as possible and to ensure this the following action will be taken.

(a) All documents will be destroyed, but on NO ACCOUNT will anything be destroyed by fire.

(b) All optical instruments will be carried.

(c) Signal instruments only will be carried. The

balance of their equipment will be destroyed.

27. Dress - Fighting order with greatcoats. Officers will take only that which they can carry.

28. Three days rations will be carried by all ranks and filled W.Bs. Further rations will be available at destination. NO stops on the rd for meals.

29. Any tents erected will be left standing.

30. Water tanks will be destroyed and all non-passenger carrying vehicles. If any have to be destroyed, the destruction will be effected at "B" echelon area and not in fwd areas.

All vehicles that can be used for tp carrying will be taken.

31. Vehicles will NOT be set on fire, if a fire does occur it must be extinguished at once.

Destruction will be delayed as long as possible, but it is essential that everything left behind is rendered unserviceable.

32. Traffic control.

3 Aust Div Provost Coy will be responsible for traffic control throughout the route.

33. Petrol. All vehicles will commence the journey with full tanks and in addition the following will be carried :

Lorries 30 cwt and over - three cases.

Vans 1 ton and under - two cases.

Cars - one case.

Gil in proportion will also be carried.

34. 2/2 Fd Amb is attaching one Motor Amb and one 30-cwt truck for walking wounded to each Bn. (Also one M.A. with Mobile Soc).

Intercomm.

35. Bde Op HQ will close at present location and move in front of 2/7 Bn and behind 2/6 Bn.


36. 2/6 Bn will liaise with Arty for the passage to embussing point. An offr will report to Arty HQ when Bn is ready to move through the Arty lines and to effect the passage of the Bn with least possible interference with their fire plan.

37. 2/7 Bn is to advise this HQ when the leading vehicle is loaded, when Op HQ will close down.

Ack.

Method of issue LO & Sigs.

Signed at 14.45 hrs,


Major,
Bde Major, 17 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

Copy No. 1	2/5 Bn	Copy No. 9	S.C.	Copy No 17	Gd Pl Comd
2	2/6 Bn	10	I.O.	18	Coy 2/1 MGLn
3	2/7 Bn	11	LO 1	19	6 Aust Div
4	2/1 Fd Regt	12	LO 2	20	16 Aust Inf Bde
5	2/2 Fd Coy	13	T.O.	21	19 " " "
6	2/2 Fd Amb	14	Sig O.	22	2/2 Fd Regt
7	Comd	15	Sup O.	23	File
8	B.M.	16	O.M.E.	24-26	War Diary
				27-30	Spares.

SECRET.

Movement Time Table.

The column will move under control of Lieut V.J. Schofield, HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde.

Serial No.	Unit	Starting Pt	Start Time	Route	Speed & Density	Remarks.
1	2/2 Fd Amb (less dets)	Own turnoff	2330 hrs	rd	40 v.t.m. night	Move off under orders Lieut Schofield. Leave
2	Rear Bde HQ	do.	2330 hrs	LAMIA- LEYADEIA-	10 m.i.h.	Mob Sec to pick up 2/7Bn.
3	2/2 Fd Coy (less 4 & 5 Secs)	do.	2330 hrs	THRIVE- KREIKOUKI- ELEFSIS(E25)	Day 10 v.t.m.	5 Sec to join 16 Bde Gp at LEYADEIA
				MEGARA, (E.04)	20 m.i.h.	4 Sec to move in rear of 2/5 Bn.
4	2/1 Fd Rgt (less dets)	do.	2345 hrs			
5	2/5 Bn	rd & tk junc (Y 3236)	2330 hrs			Pick up 4 sec 2/2 Fd Coy at their S.P.
			<u>24 Apr</u>			
6	2/6 Bn	do.	0030 hrs			Commence thinning out any fwd tps likely to be overlooked at 1900 hrs and dribble them back moving to a pt clear of 2/5 Bn. Line of FDLs to be denied until 2100 hrs.
7	2/7 Bn	do.	0130 hrs			Commence thinning out fwd elements at 2000 hrs. Line of FDLs to be denied till 2130 hrs. Pick up Mob Sec Fd Amb at their turn off.

- Notes.
1. No move will take place East of rd junc Y3827 before 0100 hrs 24 Apr 41.
 2. After moving into column on rd there will be a halt when head reaches Y3827, during which men will rest and sleep, but remain in their buses except for as in para 17.
 3. Serials 1 to 3 will each liaise with succeeding serial to advise when last vehicle is on the rd.
 4. The column will open out to daylight density from the front commencing at 0530 hrs 24 Apr 41.

17 Apr 41

Road Recce Report.

PART I.

Ref Map TRIKKALA 1/250,000

Object of Recce to find route through to LARISSA -
ATHENS Main Rd in vicinity of Sq S.2389.

Recce Party left TRIKKALA by AGIA KYRIAKE Rd S7930. Proceeded along rd for 1 mile, but was unable to go any further owing to condition of rd, which is fit for HT only.

Party then returned to TRIKKALA and proceeded along rd leaving TRIKKALA S7830. This rd which is B.2 was followed as far as MAVROMATI S7317 where party contacted Greek Col, who reported road as impassable, being blocked by several bogged trucks. Col also informed us that all rds leading to KARDITSA S.9108 in square 7912 were impassable. Col was endeavouring to reach KARDITSA, where he is to take over a Greek camp for tps, believed to be about 1000. There were approx 300 Greek tps at MAVROMATI and about 200 travelling from TRIKKALA to MAVROMATI.

At no place would the road from TRIKKALA to MOUZAKION prove impassable to tanks, but a washaway at the bridge SOUTH of MOUZAKION could not be crossed in its present state. A route NORTH via GILANTHE would probably prove passable to tracked vehicles, though impassable to wheeled vehicles.

Directions for leaving TRIKKALA.

Turn right at square, proceed for $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, then turn right at bomb crater in rd. Cross rly line .2 of mile farther on.

J. Bedells

Lieut.

PLACE	NAME	GRID REFS	ROADS	BRIDGES	REMARKS.
TRIKKALA	S7932 to GURZI S7225		B.2 (vehicles unable to leave rd owing to drains on side). Surface of rd dirt metal composition.	Were crossed at S7830, S7728, S7628. All bridges were single line traffic and fit for hvy M.T.	Traffic on this rd consisted mainly of peasants who were going to and from TRIKKALA for provisions. Bridge over River PENEIOS at S7628 can be easily demolished river would then prove considerable obstacle.
GURZI	S7225 - BELETSI S6923		B.2 surface as above, rd as on map appears to be inaccurate, following straight to BELETSI, when rd forks to the left.	NIL	Open stretch of grass land fit for Bivouac Area at S6723.
BELETSI	S6923 - MOUZAKION S6917		B.2. Surface as above runs through foothills, several bad bends.		
MOUZAKION	S6917 - MAVROMMATI S7317		B.2 as far as MAVROMMATI then deteriorates to B4, rd unmarked on map.	Good stone bridge at S6917 fit for hvy M.T.	Washaway 100 yds NORTH of bridge and approaches to bridge need attention from Engineers. At present impassable to hvy M.T.; possible to cars and 1 ton tpt.
MAVROMMATI	S7317 Onwards		Impassable		

J. Bedello

Lieut.,
O.C. Recce Party.

17th April

Location Statement

2/5 Bn 700470
 2/11 Bn 664504
 1 Bty NZRA 699478
 1 Bty 1st Aust A/Ar Rgt. 6Q Sg 6150 PE 392 693480
 [2 guns "C" Troop with 2/5 Bn
 3 guns I " with 2/11 "
 3 guns H " with 17 Bde HQ in reserve
 HQ 64 Med Rgt 729452
 211 Bty HQ 733446
 [A Troop 733443 732445
 [C (how) Troop 686482 682480
 64's 211 Bty
 [Lead 64 643545
 [Rear " PL 367- Sg 6150

D boy 2/1st Aust MG Bn
 [13 Bn with 2/5 Bn
 14 " " 2/11 "
 15 " " 17 Bde HQ in reserve

HQ 1st Armd Bde
 Det base the 3 R.T.R.
 292 Army Td boy RE
 607 AMPC

675506 (N1 SEC)

2/2 Fd Amb - Mob Sec - Rear 2/5 Bn
 1 Amb with each 2/5 - 2/11 Bns
 Remainder B set area approx 5 miles east TRIKKALA
 2/2 Fd Coy HQ approx 2 miles N of TRIKKALA 7833

Demolitions
 [1 sec operating from tunnel - KALABAKA
 [1 sec " " KALABAKA - TRIKKALA
 1 sec clearing rd KALABAKA - TRIKKALA

"B" Ech - area approx 5 miles east TRIKKALA

Location Statement.

LOCATION STATEMENT 16 Apr 41.

2/5 Bn	700470
2/11 Bn	664504
1 Bty NZRA	699478
1 Bty NZRA O.P.	Sq 6150 Pt 392
1 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt HQ	693480

- | 2 guns "G" Tp with 2/5 Bn
- | 3 guns "I" Tp with 2/11 Bn
- | 3 guns "H" Tp with 17 Bde HQ in reserve

HQ 64 med Regt	729452
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211 Bty HQ	733446
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- | "A" Tp 732445
- | "C" (How) Tp 682480
- OPs ~~para~~ 211 Bty
- | Fwd O.P. 643545
- | Rear O.P. Pt 367 Sq 6750

"D" Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn

- | 13 Pl with 2/5 Bn
- | 14 Pl with 2/11 Bn
- | 15 Pl with 17 Bde HQ in reserve

HQ 1 Armd Bde

Det Crsr Tks 3 RTR

292 Army Fd Coy RE

607 AMPC

2/2 Fd Amb - Mob Sec - Rear 2/5 Bn
 1 amb with 2/5, 2/11 Bns. Remainder
 B Ech area approx 5 miles EAST TRIKKALA.

2/2 Fd Coy - HQ approx 2 miles N of TRIKKALA
 Sq 7833
 | Demolitions :
 | | 1 Sec operating from tunnel - KALABAKA
 | | 1 Sec operating from KALABAKA-TRIKKALA
 | | 1 Sec clearing rd KALABAKA - TRIKKALA

"B" Ech - area approx 5 miles EAST TRIKKALA.

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