

**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

**Item number: 8/3/19**

**2/19 Infantry Battalion**  
**January - February 1942**

BN - MUAR

18.1.42 SUNDAY : Left Jemaluang approx 0400 hrs. Arrived 3 miles east Bakri Crossroads approx 1500 hrs 18.1.42. Contacted Indian Ambulance - Indian Lieut with ambulance arrived at 19 Bn harbour - approx 1630 hrs. Ambulance sent forward to Bakri Crossroads to pick up 2/29 Bn wounded who were reported as being at crossroads. Ambulance driver returned and reported that he was unable to find any wounded. 2 men of 2/19 Bn suffering from dysentery evacuated by ambulance. These were the only men evacuated by ambulance from Muar - ? names. This was the one and only time I was in contact with the Fd Ambulance. On 21.1.42 after the Bn had broken through a roadblock, the ambulance truck was found on the side of the road riddled with machine gun bullets - driver dead - dead Japanese in amb. Apparently the driver had tried to break through the block to contact 19th. About 1800 hrs or a little later I heard that Brand had a number of wounded forward - Col Anderson decided to bring them back as soon as contact was gained with 29th. Heavy shelling 2100 hrs - no casualties.

19.1.42 MONDAY : About 0900 hrs heavy fighting - left flank - with casualties from 'D' Coy about 0930. At same time, truck arrived from B Ech with one wounded man and reported that B Ech was surrounded and fierce fighting in progress - no further casualties from B Ech. Fighting continued on all flanks throughout day (Bn area) - 1800 hrs - 50 casualties from 19th Bn. From 1800 hrs on casualties from 29th and 45 Ind Bde and 2/15 Fd Regt (Bty) filtered in 2200 hrs there were approx 100 casualties in Bn area. 45 Ind Bde HQ blown up by aerial bombing. Unable to contact amb. Report came through that Vic Brand would join 19th that night - no sign. 29th Bn and 45 Ind Bde joined 19th Bn.

20.1.42 TUESDAY : 0500 hrs. Col Anderson decided to put wounded on trucks and leave at 0700 to endeavour to return to Parit Sulong. 0700 hrs - left Bakri. Bn spent day fighting along rd and breaking through roadblocks. I think Vic Brand joined the Bn during the morning of 20.1.42 - I did not see him until 21.1.42 at Parit Sulong. Many more were wounded and killed this day - wounded put on trucks. Ambulance pulled off side of road and put in convoy. - About 1800 hrs broke through last road block and proceeded to Parit Sulong during night of 20.1.42 and early morning 21.1.42.

21.1.42 : Arrived 3 miles (approx) west of Parit Sulong at 0300 hrs. Japanese in occupation and holding bridge. Fierce fighting during day - trucks were bunched in centre of perimeter along road - machine gunned from air. Further casualties. On the night of 21.1.42 I estimated that there were about 400 or more wounded of 29th, 19th, Indian Bde and 2/15 Fd Regt and a few strays. This high figure may be accounted for by Col Anderson's order that no injured man was to be on the perimeter during the night. A large % of the wounded were walking cases.

22.1.42 : Attempt to take Bridge failed - further casualties - many of whom were killed. At about 1100 hrs I heard that there had been a general order to withdraw - the majority of the walking wounded had left by this time. For about  $\frac{1}{2}$  hr prior to this the trucks carrying the badly wounded (almost moribund in many cases) had been shelled, bombed and machine gunned - several trucks had been blown up and others were on fire. I then set out with Lieut Austin and a few other wounded and crossed the Muar. I am unable to give details of casualties &c. - 19th Bn has figures.

(Sgd) R. L. Cahill Captain

Statement by Capt. R. L. Cahill R.M.O. 7/19 Bn.

Additional facts told verbally by Capt. Cahill: 21.1.42. Warden message sent requesting medical supplies be dropped from air. This was received at this H.Q. and Air Liaison Officer informed & requested to treat the matter as most urgent. Air Force were unable to do this during 21st. but 22nd dropped 2 containers filled with med supplies & 1 with food in vicinity of Parit Sulong.

Capt Cahill received these supplies.

21.1.42. After arriving Parit Sulong, Col Anderson had parley with Japanese Comd requesting permission for trucks filled with wounded to be passed through to Yung Peng. This request under unconditional surrender. Col. Anderson could not agree to such conditions and attempt was made to take the bridge. R.M.O.

2/19th BATTALION, A.I.F.

18th January, Orders received to leave JEMALUANG at 0400 hrs. 19th. Jan. 42  
1942.

Bn 2 i/c (Major Oakes) Lieut. Davidson, Lieut. Neild and nucleus of Platoon Sgts. "RQMS" Good to be left to hand over area to incoming NORFOLK UNIT. (5)

19th January Bn left JEMALUANG at 0400 hrs in 2/2 Reserve. M.T. Convoy, and head of column reached YONG PENG at approximately 0830 hrs. Instructions to proceed to BAKRI on YONG PENG-MUAR Road. Col. Anderson went ahead, followed by "B" Coy. He contacted Brig. Duncan 45 Indian Infantry Brigade about Brigade Headquarters. 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP. Ordered to take up position covering BAKRI Road Junction. "B" Coy reached Road Junction about 1030 hrs. took up position about 1/3 mile South. "C" Coy next about 400 yds North. "A" Coy about 100 MP. "D" Coy less 2 platoons (Lieut. Varley's left at PARIT SULONG Bridge Lieut. Wilson at BUKIT LANKAP ENDAU River) North of 100 MP. Enemy between 2/19 and 2/29 at 101 MP. Remnants Ghawalis & Raj. Rifles, south of "B" Coy. Japs about 7 miles North road junction. "A" Coy 2/29 (less 1 pl BAKRI Rd. junction at approx. 1100 hrs. This coy was ordered by Col. Anderson to regain contact with 2/29 Bn. --- attack failed. For remainder of day "C" Coy 2/19 carried out aggressive patrols West, and allowed a <sup>Section</sup> selection of 2/19th Carriers under Lieut. Howard to get contact with 2/29th Bn. Brought Capt. Gibson (2/29) back to see Col. Anderson.

DISPOSITIONS AT 1800 HRS.

2/19th Bn. same, except "C" Coy now at BAKRI Road Junction.

2/29th less "D" Coy now all together about 101MP.

45th Brigade 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP.

B. Ech 2/19 98 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP.

During night heavy enemy shelling, forward troop 2/15th Field Regt about 100 MP, forced to take up new position about 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP.

20th January Same dispositions, but Japs again between 2/19th and 2/29th.

"A" Coy ordered to attack, assembled, but owing to delay

with 2 ATK Guns, had not moved when a heavy Jap attack developed from the South on Bn. H.Q. Japs took high ground overlooking and within 150 yds of Bn. H.Q. "A" Coy went in to attack, retook hill, but were heavily pressed. Col. Anderson ordered "B" Coy. Flank attack on Japs from West to East. Very successful, counted Jap casualties, 67, (evidently very much greater) Japs retreated, "B" Coy 2 wounded.

"B" Coy took up position to East of "A" Coy. Continual heavy attacks on "B" Coy all day.

About 1300 hrs 2 Coys Jats arrived and put in position, covering East of position. During morning 2/19th "B" Ech. very heavily attacked. -- 45th Indian Brigade H. Q. bombed. All killed except Brigade Commander (Brig. Duncan) Brigade Major (Major Anderson) & Assist. Staff Capt., all others casualties, plus Signals. Col. Anderson took charge and during afternoon ordered 2/29th Bn. to withdraw & join 2/19th Bn. This move completed by approx. 2000 hrs. Remnants of 2/29th consisted of "A" Coy, 50, "B" Coy, 100, "C" Coy 50. "B" Coy were kept intact, "A" & "C" Coys placed under command "D" Coy 2/19 Capt. Westbrook.

Night Perimeter formed with following troops, 2/19th includ. "A" & "C" Coys 2/29th "B" Coy 2/29th. 2 Coys Jats, Remnants of GHAWALIS & RAJ RIFLES.

Messages had been received from H. Q. A.I.F. per 109 Set, in high grade cipher but cipher destroyed. Finally received in Syllabic, "WITHDRAW ON YONG PENG".

21st January During early morning wounded ~~at~~ in trucks, all unessential equipment dumped. Force began to move East at 0700 hrs, in following order.

2/19th Bn. with rear protected by Indian Troops & "B" Coy 2/29th Bn. Transport & Arty. Bty. on road.

At approx. 99 MP, at 0800 hrs contacted Japanese (1 Coy) & Road Blocks, covered by well dug position on top of cutting with approx. 6.M.G.'s. Great difficulty experienced intaking

position. On North side taken by "B" Coy (Lieut. Ibbott killed)  
On South side cutting, Col. Anderson, after he had ordered "A"  
Coy to create a diversion and noise to the South, took it  
with a few men. He put one gun out of action with a  
grenade and shot two Japs at other gun with his pistol.  
Heavy shelling and pressure on rear (West) throughout. M.T.  
Column began to move East again at 1145 with force moving  
deployed in rubber. Reached 2/19th Bn. "B" Ech, which had con-  
sisted of Transport Drivers, 6 platoon, 1 section carriers,  
2 detach/<sup>ments</sup> Mortars plus Lieut. Varley's platoon from PARIT SULONG  
(relieved by 5 Norfolk Platoons). All vehicles out of action  
and force except for killed had disappeared. Moved on East  
and at 1215 about 97½ MP contacted enemy in strength, with  
Road Blocks (later found to be six) Continual endeavour all  
afternoon to force Jap position, with very limited success  
and heavy casualties. Very heavy attacks by Japs on rear and  
very heavy shelling. At 1730 hrs position was extremely  
serious, the Indian Troops, except Jats, demoralised, and  
force was gradually contracted into a length of road about  
800 yds long. Col. Anderson decided on a dusk attack. Heavy  
smoke and H. E. from Mortars Z-5 to Z at Z, "C" Coy and "A" Coy  
attacked, "C" from the North Jap flank.  
This action brought into distinction the superlative initiative  
of Australian Troops - every man was fighting mad. Mortar  
shells were directed on to targets by Infantry men a few yards  
from the target (voice relayed back) gunners were fighting with  
rifles, bayonets and axes (range too short for 25 pdrs. except  
to Jap rear areas West). A gun crew pushed its 25 pdr. round a  
Cutting and blew out the first road blocks (vehicles) at 75 yds  
range. Carriers pushed within 5 yds of Japs M.G.'s and blew  
them out. Two carriers almost cut the walls of a 4 inch  
walled concrete house/<sup>to pieces</sup> with Vickers. House contained 3 Jap  
M.G.'s and about 60 men. Men went forward under heavy M. G.  
fire and chopped road blocks to pieces with axes. About  
1830 hrs the Japs had had enough and cleared out, leaving

hundreds of casualties.

The column moved on and contact with enemy was lost.

The force moved on through the night along a long causeway- Advance guard out, then carriers at head of main body, then vehicles (filled with wounded) Armoured cars at rear, troops marching in single file on each side of road, with M. T. in the centre.

22nd January At approx. 0300 hrs. Lieut. Varley rejoined unit, with 50 men, and about the same time an Indian sepoy was found. He stated that he had been fired upon by Japanese that afternoon near by. Col. Anderson not knowing the position to the East decided to send 2 D.R.'s to the PARIT SULONG BRIDGE. They were challenged in a foreign language by 4 men dressed with pith helmets, but not fired on. A patrol was sent forward to the bridge and on being fired on, it was decided to attack the bridge at 0700 hrs (2/19th Bn. to do the attack. Moved forward "B" Coy North side, "C" Coy South side clearing PARIT SULONG village. An English speaking Malay met Col. Anderson, Major Anderson and Lieut. Burt and told them that the Johore Military Forces held the bridge. Lieut. Burt was left to give instructions to "A" and "D" Coys and M. T. column. The Malay led Col. Anderson, Major Anderson and small escort into Jap Ambush. "C" Coy was available and attacked with bayonet and grenades Col. Anderson using his voice and ordering "A" "B" "C" & "D" Coys to attack there and then, although "A", "B" and "D" Coys were not available about 1 Jap in 10 would speak English and the enemy pulled out. The bridge was found to be in Jap. hands and the Malay/got away. meantime had

The force pushed on and the bridge was attacked by "A" Coy, attack repulsed, only 4 men being left out of 1 platoon. Bridge very heavily defended with M. G's in houses. Finally the West side of Bridge was captured but further progress found impossible without AIR support which was applied for. The Arty couldn't fire, the range being too short, and mortars were ineffective against the houses.

About 1100 hrs. position was in the form of a perimeter, triangular in shape, apex at the Bridge, baseline about 1000 yds from apex with "A" Coy at Bridge, "B" Coy North side of road "C" Coy South side then 2/29th Bn. and Jats South side and "D" Coy North.

The aerial support for an attack didn't arrive, although the enemy to the West were heavily bombed and machined gunned by our planes.

The enemy were shelling heavily, attacking from the West with Tanks (which they lost) and machine gunning from the air. Gradually the Jats were demoralised, the other Indians, who were completely broken and had thrown away their arms, were an absolute nuisance and were finally sent out of the area to become P.O.W.

Gradually the rear was forced in, as the perimeter had to contract owing to casualties and defections of the Indian troops. At dark the Jap tanks, tried to attack along the road, but a 25 pdr. stopped that, then the Tanks through the rubber but "D" Coy with Bakelite Bombs and Mills Grenades destroyed five.

Col. Anderson before dark tried to get two ambulances with badly wounded East through the Jap lines. The enemy refused, except on complete surrender, Col. Anderson refused to consider it, and the ambulances were left by the enemy on the Bridge. During the night Lieut. Austin, who was badly wounded and one O/R. drove them back into our lines. A nasty night.

23rd January Position rapidly became untenable after daylight. Very heavy shelling, with large casualties "D" Coy attacked by enemy.

Col. Anderson decided to leave M. T., Guns, and wounded and withdrew North, then East to YONG PENG.

Orders were given for the force to withdraw to the North (Bearing 340 degrees), then East "B" Coy, then "C" Coy, then "A" Coy, then 2/29th Bn., then "D" Coy (who covered the withdrawal) at five minute intervals.

M. T. Guns and Equipment were destroyed and the withdrawal was reasonably successful. The force went out as a force. We were sent down to G. B. Depot, Johore Bahru for reorganisation.

The 2/19th Bn. as follows:-

219 Officer and men fit for duty after a rest.

72 Killed

76 Wounded & Missing

52 Wounded and moved out with the Battalion

Remainder Missing.

Col. Anderson was given permission to form a new Battalion of approximately 900 men and officers. The Battalion took in 690 Reinforcements.



2/19 BN.

23 Jan:- Bn withdrew from PARIT SILONG to YONG PENG (Detailed previously)

24 Jan:-

1500 hrs - 1st Elements (B & C Coys) reached YONG PENG and contacted LOYAL REGT, Australian A.D.S. Ambulances and 2/3 M.T. sent to pick men up.

25 Jan:-

0200 hrs Col. Anderson reached H.Q., A.I.F. near RENGAM.

0830 hrs Left for General Base Depot, Johore Bahru, and worked all day on basis of his own Bn Establishment (Permission to do so having been given by Maj General Gordon Bennett) During day the officers and men returned to G.B.D.

The new establishment as follows -

4 Rifle Coys, each of 4 Pls, each Pl with 4 Secs -

2 L.M.G.Secs, and 2 Assault Secs - Coy strength 184 men

(Incl Coy Sigs) Bn H.Q. - Co, 2l/c, Adj. l.O (plus sgt. and 6 men) Orderly Room Staff Asst. Adjt.

- (a) Bn Sigs Pl
- (b) Bn Carrier Pl (7 Carriers each with Vickers and 1 Bren Gun)
- (c) Mortar Pl - 3 3" Mortars
- (d) AA, Pioneer, and Ammo Supply Pl
- (e) Transport Sec. 27 Drivers l/c Tpt. Sgt.
- (f) Q.M., R.Q.M.S, and Q.M. Staff.

25 Jan:- Total strength Bn H.Q. 194 Men

Total Persn Bn { Officers 34 plus D.M.O and Padre  
{ Men 922.

The basis was rather flexible at the time and over the following few days adjustments were made. Additions to above figures were attachments such as Pay Sgt, Postal Orderlies, etc.

26 Jan:- Until withdrawn to Singapore Island.

General allotment of men and officers to various jobs -

C.O. Col Anderson M.C. (Later V.C. M.C.)

2/lc Maj. Oakes

Adj. Capt. Hughes

I.O. Lieut. Burt  
Asst. Adj. Lieut Nield.  
R.M.O. Capt Shiels .  
Padre H.W.Greenwood  
Sigs Lieut Minto  
Mortars Lieut. Douglas  
Carriers Lieut. Carne  
Pioneers Lieut. Sanderson  
Q.M. Lieut Good (ex. R.Q.M.S.Good)  
O.C. A. Coy - Capt. Cousens - 21/c Lieut. Beverley  
O.C. B. Coy - Maj. Keegan - 21/c Lieut. Weilley  
O.C. C. Coy - Capt. Thomas - 21/c Lieut. Gollan.  
O.C. D. Coy - Maj. Vincent(Later M.C.) 21/c Capt. Westbrook  
(who was evacuated to 10 A.G.H) then Lieut.  
Wilson.

Pl Comdrs - Original 2/19 Bn as follows:-

Lieuts. Ritchie, Bennett, Davidson, Varley (Later M.C.)

Reinforcement officers (Total Names NOT KNOWN)

Lieuts. MINTO, CARNE, BRENNAN, SANDERSON (Ex. Commands Unit) all had been sent by 2/19 Bn to O.C.T.U.

Plus Lieuts OTTLEY, BARTON.

After a few days Col Anderson was told his next task - the right flanks Bn, covering the Outer Bridgehead of the Johore Causeway, to enable all Imperial Forces to withdraw to Singapore Island.

X Force (C.O. Brig. Taylor (22 Aust Inf Bde) to cover outer bridgehead - Right 2/19 Bn A.I.F. Centre 2/20 Bn A.I.F., Left 2 GORDONS - hold E and F lines Inner Bridge Head - 240 Men 2 A.S.Highlanders (G Line)

The 2/19 Bn Area (approx) North as far as TAMPOI-TEBRAU-JOHORE BAHRU X Rds, East to TEBRAU River, South to JOHORE, Military Force Barracks, West Excl, Railway Line.

Extensive Recce took place - and taking day of withdrawal as D, the Bn took up positions D-1 at 1400 hrs.

Dispositions - D Coy covering TABRAU, TAMPOI, JOHORE BAHRU X Rds.

B Coy - Right Flank from INTERNATIONAL Club forward along river.

A Coy - Johore Barracks

C Coy - To rear of D Coy

Bn. H.Q. - Area behind and to west of Johore Barracks,

On D (think 2nd Jan) at 0830 hrs. the various elements of the Imperial Forces (EAST FORCE - 2/18 Bn A.I.F., Dogras) WESTFORCE (2/30 Bn 2/26 Bn) 9 Ind Div, 11 Ind Div began to come through X Force lines, movement continued all night. At approx. 0530 hrs on D plus 1, the last elements had passed over causeway, and Brig. Taylor gave orders for X Force to withdraw, all troops of 2/19 Bn were over Causeway by approx. 0730 hrs, after passing through A.S. Highlanders. There was no contact with the enemy.

BRIG. TAYLOR'S PLAN (adapted from that prepared by Lt. Col Stewart (A.S.H.)

Outer bridgehead E and F lines with No withdrawal behind F line. Inner Bridgehead (Independent Command Lt. Col. Stewart) G Line (a half circle around head of Causeway radius about 600 yds)

ARTY Support - 2/10 Fd. Regt, plus 1 British Fd. Regt. (either 82 or 88) Should there be contact, a barrage was to be brought down on E Line (after withdrawal of our forces) then on F Line (again after withdrawal) and the same on G Line.

The Singapore Island side and Causeway covered by 2/4 M.G. Regt. and Hydrabads as stated before there was no contact and no shots were fired.

30 Jan.:- On reaching Singapore Island the 2/19 Bn went to a Dispersal area about 4 miles S.E. Causeway, and the same day were transported to the 22 Aust Inf Bde Sectn - The 2/19 Bn Sectn was on Western side Singapore Island - NORTH to and EXCL MURAI River, South and INCL BERIM River, then wedge and triangular shaped East to Rd Junct 7019.

Coy Dispositions -

A Coy CHOA CLIFT KANG Village and Sgs. 6419, 6519

B Coy - FWD. and within 1000 yds. Johore Straits, North to MURAI River - 2 pls. on water front.

C Coy - Reserve in Sg. 6421

D Coy - On Johore Straits - South to BERIM River, and within 1000 yds

water, 3 Pls fwd.

Bn. H.Q. - Sg 6421

It was found that in spite of the frontage of 3800 yds to a depth of up to 9000 yds, thick country, swamps etc. that there was no preparation whatsoever, no fieldworks - even weapon pits wire or communications - B and D Coy actually had to carry everything - rations wire etc. a distance of approx. 2 miles from the end of the only available road.

6 Observation and Listening Posts were established, and gave good information as to Jap movements across the straits - Lieut. Ottley and 2ORS did a Recce Patrol on the Johore side. Continuous topo recce was carried out, weapon pits dug and section wiring commenced.

In addition to Security Patrols at dawn, clearing patrols operated over the entire fwd area during the day.

(The writer met with an accident and about this time (2 days before landing) went to 13 A.G.H.

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18th Jan. 1942:- Orders received to leave JEMALUANG at 0400 hrs. 19th Jan. 42 Bn. 2 i/c (Major Oakes.) Lieut. Davidson, Lieut. Neild and nucleus of Platoon Sgts "RQMS" Good to be left to hand over area to incoming NORFOLK UNIT. (5)

19th Jan. Bn left JEMALUANG at 0400 hrs in 2/2 Reserve. M.T. Convoy, and head of column reached YONG PENG at approximately 0830 hrs. Instructions to proceed to BAKRI on YONG PENG-MUAR Road. Col. Anderson went ahead, followed by "B" Coy. He contacted Brig. Duncan 45 Indian Infantry Brigade about Brigade Headquarters. 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP. Ordered to take up position covering BAKRI Road Junction "B" Coy reached Road Junction about 1030 hrs. took up position about 1/3 mile South. "C" Coy next about 400 yds North. "A" Coy about 100 MP "D" Coy less 2 platoons (Lieut. Varley's left at PARIT SULONG Bridge) Lieut. Wilson at BUKIT LANKAP (ENDAU River) North of 100 MP. Enemy between 2/19 & 2/29 (at 101 MP) remnants GhaWalis & Raj. Rifles, south of "B" Coy. Japs about 7 miles North Road Junction. "A" Coy 2/29 (less 1 pl BAKRI Rd. Junction at approx. 1100 hrs. this coy was ordered by Col. Anderson to regain contact with 2/29 Bn. ---attack failed.

*Section* For remainder of day "C" Coy 2/19 carried out aggressive patrols West, & allowed a ~~selection~~ of 2/19th Carriers under Lieut. Howard to get contact with 2/29th Bn.

Brought Capt. Gibson (2/29) back to see Col. Anderson.  
DISPOSITIONS AT 1800 hrs.

2/19th Bn. same, except "C" Coy now at BAKRI Road Junction.  
2/29th. less "D" Coy now all together about 101MP.

45th Brigade 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  =,  
B Ech 2/19 98 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP.

During night heavy enemy shelling, forward troop 2/15th Field Regt about 100MP, forced to take up new position about 99 $\frac{1}{2}$  MP.

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"B" Coy took up position to East of "A" Coy. Continual heavy attacks on "B" Coy all day.

About 1300 hrs 2 Coys Japs arrived and put in position, covering East of position. During morning 2.19th. "B" Ech. very heavily attacked. --45th. Indian Brigade H.Q.'rs bombed. All killed except Brigade Commander (Brig. Duncan) Brigade Major (Major Anderson) & Assist. Staff Capt, all others casualties, plus Signals. Col. Anderson took charge and during afternoon ordered 2/29th Bn. to withdraw & join 2/19th Bn. This move completed by approx. 2000 hrs. (Remnants of 2/29th consisted of "A" Coy, 50, "B" Coy, 100, "C" Coy, 50,) "B" Coy were kept intact, "A" & "C" Coys placed under command "D" Coy (2/19) Capt. Westbrook.

Night Perimeter formed with following troops, 2/19th. (include "A" & "C" Coys 2/29th) "B" Coy 2/29th. 2 Coys Japs, Remnants of GHAWALIS & RAJ RIFLES.

Messages had been received from H.Q. A.I.F. per 109 Set, in high grade cipher (cipher destroyed). Finally received in Syllabic, "WITHDRAW ON YONG PENG".

21st Jan. During early morning, wounded ~~in~~ in trucks, all unessential equipment dumped. Force began to move East at 0700 hrs, in following order.

2/19th. Bn. with rear protected by Indian Troops & "B" Coy 2/29th. Bn. Transport & Arty. Bty. on road.

At approx. 99 MP, at 0800 hrs contacted Japanese (1 Coy) & Road Blocks, covered by well dug position on top of cutting with approx. 6.M.G's. Great difficulty experienced in taking position. On North side taken by "B" Coy (Lieut. Ibbott killed) On South side cutting, Col. Anderson, after he had ordered "A" Coy to create a diversion & noise to the South, took it

with a few men. He put one gun out of action with a grenade, & shot two Japs at other gun with his pistol. Heavy shelling & pressure on rear (West) throughout. M.T. column began to move East again at 1145. with force moving deployed in rubber. Reached 2/19th Bn. "B" Ech, which had consisted of Transport Drivers, 6 platoon, 1 section carriers, 2 detachments Mortars plus Lieut. Varley's platoon from PARIT SULONG (relieved by 5 Norfolk Platoons) All vehicles out of action, & force except for killed had disappeared. Moved on East & at 1215 about 97½ MP contacted enemy in strength, with Road Blocks (later found to be six) Continual endeavour all afternoon to force Jap position, with very limited success & heavy casualties. Very heavy attacks by Japs on rear, & very heavy shelling. At 1730 hrs position was extremely serious, the Indian Troops, except Jats, demoralised, & force was gradually contracted into a length of road about 800 yds. long. Col. Anderson decided on a dusk attack. Heavy smoke & H.E. from Mortars Z-5 to Z, at Z, "C" Coy & "A" Coy attacked, "C" from the North Jap flank.

This action displayed the absolute initiative of Australian Troops - every man was fighting mad. Mortar shells were directed on to targets by Infantry men, a few yards from the target (voice relayed back) gunners were fighting with rifles & bayonets & axes (range too short for 25 pdrs. except to Jap rear areas West) A gun crew pushed its 25 pdr. round a cutting & blew out the first road blocks (vehicles) at 75 yds range. Carriers pushed within 5 yds of Japs M.G.'s. & blew them out. Two carriers almost cut the walls of a 4 inch walled concrete house/with Vickers (house to pieces

contained 3 Jap M.G.'s. & about 60 men.) Men went forward under heavy M.G. fire & chopped road blocks to pieces with axes. About 1830 hrs the Japs had had enough, & cleared out, leaving hundreds of casualties.

The column moved on, & contact with enemy was lost.

The force moved on through the night along a long causeway - Advance guard out, then carriers at head of main body, then vehicles (filled with wounded) Armoured cars at rear, troops marching in single file on each side of road, with M.T. in the centre.

22nd. Jan.

At approx. 0300 hrs. Lieut. Varley rejoined unit, with 50 men, & about the same time an Indian sepoy was found. He stated that he had been fired upon by Japanese that afternoon near by.

Col. Anderson not knowing the position to the East decided to send 2 DRs to the PARIT SULONG BRIDGE. They were challenged in a foreign language by 4 men dressed with pith helmets, but not fired on. A patrol was sent forward to the bridge, on being fired on, it was decided to attack the bridge at 0700 hrs (2/19th. Bn. to do the attack). Moved forward "B" Coy North side, "C" Coy South side (clearing PARIT SULONG village) An English speaking Malay met Col Anderson, Major Anderson & Lieut Burt & told them that the Johore Military Forces held the bridge. Lieut Burt was left to give instructions to "A" & "D" Coys, & M.T. column.

The Malay Lead Col. Anderson, Major Anderson & small escort into Jap ambush. "C" Coy was available & attacked with bayonet & grenades Col. Anderson using his voice & ordering "A" "B" "C" & "D" Coys to attack here and then although A, B, D Coys were not available (about 1 Jap in 10 would speak English) the enemy pulled out. The bridge was definitely found to be in Jap hands. (The Malay got away).

The force pushed in, & the bridge was attacked by "A" Coy, attack repulsed, only 4 men left out of 1 platoon. Bridge very heavily defended with M.G.'s. in houses.

Finally the West side of Bridge was captured but further progress found impossible without AIR support (applied for). The Arty couldn't fire, the range was too short, & mortars were ineffective against the houses.

About 1100 hrs. position was in the form of a perimeter, triangler in shape, apex at the Bridge, baseline about 1000 yds from apex with "A" Coy at Bridge, "B" Coy North side of road, "C" Coy South side then 2/29th Bn. & Jats South side & "D" Coy North.

The aerial support for an attack didn't arrive, although the enemy to the West were heavily bombed & machined gunned by our planes.

The enemy were shelling heavily, attacking from the West with Tanks (which they lost) & machining gunning from the air. Gradually the Japs were demoralised, the other Indians, who were completely broken, & who had thrown away their arms, were an absolute nuisance, & were finally sent out of the area to become P.O.W.

Gradually the rear was forced in, as the perimeter had to contract owing to casualties & defections of the Indian troops. At dark the Jap tanks, tried to attack along the road, but a 25 pdr. stopped that, then the Tanks through the rubber but "D" Coy with Bakelite Bombs, & Mills Grenades destroyed five.

Col. Anderson before dark tried to get two ambulances with badly wounded East through the Jap lines, refused, except with complete surrender, Col. Anderson refused to consider it, & the ambulances were left by the enemy on the Bridge.

During the night, Lieut. Austin, who was badly wounded and one O/R, drove them back into our lines. A nasty night.

23rd. Jan.

Position rapidly became untenable after daylight. Very heavy shelling, with large casualties "D" Coy attacked by enemy Col. Anderson decided to leave M.T., Guns & wounded & withdrew North, then East to YONG PENG.

Orders were given for the force to withdraw to the North (Bearing 340 degrees), then East "B" Coy, then "C" Coy, then "A" Coy then 2/29th. Bn., then "D" Coy (who covered the withdrawal) at five minutes intervals.

M.T. Guns, & Equipment were destroyed, & the withdrawal was reasonably successful. (the force went out as a force).

We were sent down to G.B. Depot, Johore Bahru for reorganisation The 2/19th Bn. as follows:-

219. Officer & men fit for duty after a rest.

72. Killed.

76. Wounded & Missing.

52. Wounded & moved out with the Battalion.

Remainder Missing.

Col. Anderson was given permission to form a new Battalion of approximately 900 men & officers. The Battalion took in 690 Reinforcements.

*S.F. Burt*  
 (S.F. BURT)  
 Leave  
 I.O. 2/19 Bn. etc.

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

2/19 Am. A.S.D.

13

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
1 Jan 42 Jemamang	No change in position of Bn. Preparation of R Coy at 1200, unlesq Kluang Rd continuing. Corduroying rd Talau Hill village progressing. All ranks hardened by marching. Improvements to defence works. Capt A. G. Newton (of HQ Coy) etc all work at 170 mile peg.	
2	Patrol of R Coy (Capt P. Reynolds) proceeded on 48 hr task for training in ops. behind enemy lines. Other works as for 1 Jan.	
3	R (Capt Austin) from D Coy, sent on 48 hr task similar to that from A Coy 2 Jan.	
4	R (Capt Wally) from D Coy, sent on 48 hr task similar to that from D Coy 3 Jan. Routine work continuing.	
5	Reorganisation of main defences of Jemamang proper enabled withdrawal of D Coy from village area. Additionally to harbour work, trench & shelter & camouflage improvements effected.	giving tactical advantage of 2 Reserve Coy.
6	D Coy relieved C Coy in forward positions at Hill by on road block in mining area. C Coy returned to original reserve position & HQ. Patrol of 2 secs under Capt R Austin sent to recce enemy movements Ponbian.	
7	D Coy ordered to move fwd to Endau to reinforce a Coy of 2/20 Bn, whole force under comd Major Robertson. Scheduled start 1000 hrs delayed by premature blowing morning. Endau bridge security patrols reported foot tracks S & SW of position proceeding further into jungle.	

*[Signature]*



# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

*2/19/50 A.S.S.*

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<i>8 Jan #2 Jemberang</i>	<i>Patrol sent to investigate rifle &amp; mks fire heard 0930 hrs from vicinity Buket Besar approx 20 miles NNE from Jemberang. Also patrol under Lt SM Middleton along track from 119 mile peg to Nimsdale Cr. Negative results from these patrols. Task of Yuggaroh patrol increased to include Sekakap. Mobile Bath Unit established at old camp site.</i>	
<i>9</i>	<i>Order to move on 8 Jan of 2/30 PM from position of close support on Kluang Rd to a new task on Western front. CO decided to cease work on new A Ech area &amp; to receive &amp; prepare position in area recently occupied by 3/30 PM for A &amp; B Ech's together. Such area chosen in rubber immediately North of arty wagon lines &amp; so, from a prepared position there these forces were able to conform to the general allround dispositions of the bn.</i>	
<i>10</i>	<i>Yuggaroh patrol reported finding enemy stick bombs &amp; life belts. Also rescued LAA's pilot who had sea-crashed with minor injuries.</i>	
<i>11</i>	<i>Work on new A Ech area hurriedly put in hand. Capt W.P. Archer (Y.O) making the new harbours. Capt R. G. Hewson instructed to increase harbour facilities in the Coy area, to obtain more favourable dispositions of man power. Mine fields N of new A &amp; B Ech area received &amp; marked by Pioneer Off. Lt J. Grindley</i>	

*[Signature]*

# WAR DIARY

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-2118.

2/19 Bn A.I.D.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
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Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
12 Jan 42 Jemberang	All 2" mortars fired by personnel who qualified. Capt C. Fallow compiled report on safety precautions & results which later proved invaluable. All A.I.D. moved up from Kota Tinggi Rd to new area.	
13 " "	Tests of bakelite bombs also continued. Routine work continuing. During period 10/13 Jan, Lieut Pickup AC (Barner Offr) made 2 trips to Singapore to ord. to change carriers from English to Australian type & urgent work was done on these to get them for service.	
14 " "	Reece party Major R.W. Oakes & Capt R.G. Hewton with news left for Westforce to recon positions on N/S road N of Jabit. Request to 22 Aust Inf Bde HQ to release D Coy at Endau. All personal gear was reduced to minimum & stored in houses at X Rds for removal to base.	
15 " "	Bn ordered to prepare to move to West coast. Adv parties of 5 Norfolk's arrived 1400 hrs & stayed overnight. Orders changed approx 2200 hrs & Norfolk parties to be at Ayer Hitam 1600 hrs 16 Jan. Jenggarih patrol reports MYAF landed with rations & took off with wounded pilot.	
16 " "	D Coy less 16 Pl (Lieut R. Wilson) returned to Bn & instructed to move to new district.	

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# WAR DIARY

2/19/47 A.S.

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
0200 hrs 18 Jan 47 Jumawang	Carriers left main body left.	for diary of A. & B. Cochs in appendix A. Appendix B.
0400 0730 0830 1745 1600 1900	Main body joined carriers Picked up Lt Col. Main body moved to Paris Selong. In took up position; 1 Pl Day left to cover bridge at Paris Selong. C Coy attack on road block successful and contact effected 2/29 Br. Night positions taken up.	
0800 hrs 19 Jan 47 Dakri.	Enemy attack on our left flank "A" Coy Counter attack by H Coy successful.	Appendix C
0845 0930 1000 1100 1400 1500	Enemy withdrew. CO requested by acting Brig to assume comd. as most of the Staff were casualties	
1600 1700 1800 1745 1740	Wireless communication broke down 2 Coy Jats arrived under Major White. Enemy attack on left flank beaten back with assistance of carriers & mortars. West force advised of seriousness of situation. Subsequently instructions received to withdraw to Young Peng. Message by armoured car to 2/29 Br to withdraw at 1800 hrs. Wireless communication re established Ad force formed wide perimeter Wireless communication with 2/29 Br broken off. C Coy patrols reported close contact with enemy patrols on left flank	

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

*2/19/54 A.S.S.*

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
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(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<p>2000hrs 19 Jan 54 Bakri 2030 2330 2400</p>	<p>Three parties from 2/29 bn totalling approx 200 joined perimeter Report received that road between bn &amp; Bakri village had been cut. 1 Pl of A Coy sent to clear this.</p> <p>Bakri evacuated; road block reported clear proved incorrect. Heavy shelling commenced.</p>	
<p>0430 20 Jan 54 Bakri 0645 0700 0800 0845 1100 1230   1600 1730</p>	<p>Comms conference &amp; plan of withdrawal issued Rearguard placed in covering position. Advance Guard (B Coy) of 2/19 bn moved off, remainder following in order.</p> <p>Advance Guard held up by ambush 1 mile from perimeter. A Coy successfully attacked on right flank of ambush but main enemy party continued to fight with great determination. Ambush destroyed.</p> <p>Advance Guard (A Coy) held up 1 mile further down road by enemy astride road. A Coy in close contact. D Coy attacked left flank; close carrier support. main column consistently shelled, with petrol actions in rear. Enemy still in position.</p> <p>Enemy shelling increased. Attack on rearguard driven off by Jato. Coy attack with bazooka successful. 3 road blocks cleared. Column pushed forward, C Coy advance guard. Wireless communication with next force <sup>still</sup> lost.</p>	<p><del>appendix C</del></p>

*[Signature]*

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

2/19 hrs a 1/2

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
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## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
0200 hrs 21 Jan, 42, 4 miles front Parit Suloung.	Force 4 miles from Parit Suloung.	<del>Appendix D</del>
0400 . . . Parit Suloung	C Coy patrol sent to ascertain position at Parit Suloung bridge	
0600 . . .	Force moved forward.	
0715 . . .	C Coy patrol contacted 3/4 mile from Parit Suloung & reported	
	having been fired on from south bank of river.	
	On pushing forward the Advance Sq (C Coy) was fired on from	
0800 . . .	flank but attackers were speedily disposed of. Main force	
	of column moved up into cover of rubber.	
0900 . . .	Wireless communication reestablished with rest force who	
1100 . . .	advised support had been sent. Heavy enemy shelling.	
1615 . . .	Close contact from this time to the end of the engagement.	
1730 . . .	Artillery reported 100 rounds remained.	
1800 . . .	an attack	
	M.G. nests on north bank cleaned out & North bank secured.	air support for attack next
	Efforts to evacuate wounded through Japanese lines unsuccessful.	morning asked for.
	Japanese would only agree to do this on total surrender of force, to	
	which CO would not consent. Tank attacks on perimeter; tank	
	hunting parties claimed 6 certain & 1 doubtful, bringing total	
	for the force to 11, plus 9 previously destroyed by 7/29 hrs.	
	Enemy pressure all night	
0700 hrs 22 Jan Parit Suloung.	2 AF plane dropped supplies of morphine & food	Appendix E
0800 . . .	A Coy attack on bridge disclosed enemy in strength.	
0930 . . .	Withdrawal commenced.	
23 Jan 42 Yang Peng	By nightfall most of Coy groups of HQ had reached Yang Peng	Appendix F

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

2/19 Am A.I.S.

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
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Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
24 Jan #2 Johore Bahru.	All men not evacuated to hospitals were sent to GBD at Johore Bahru by M 7 where bn was to be re-organised. G.O.C instructed CO to reorganise bn on new establishment based on lessons learned in Malaya. Parit Sulong engagements, to submit proposals for such new establishment for approval & to complete reorganisation in 4 days.	Appendix C
25	New establishment submitted & approved on afternoon 25 Jan. Bn being reorganised for reception of troops newly arrived this day from Australia. Bn also permitted to take in trained troops from other 22 Aust Inf Bde units in depot.	
26	Drafts commenced to flow in. Reorganisation of bn continuing.	Appendix "G" C
27	Reorganisation completed & bn fully equipped. CO ordered to receive & be prepared to move bn to cover West Coast Rd to covering in from Pontian Kechil in vicinity water catchment area. Bn also warned for rearguard work on final withdrawal of Bde forces to Island. Outet bridgehead to be formed by 7/19 Am on right, 7/20 Am centre & 2 Am The Gordon Highlanders on left.	
28/29	All time available from refitting & equipping spent in field training. Regular members very footsore. Coy Comdts given plan for holding outet bridgehead in area received.	
30	Bn moved out in morning to take up positions for outet bridgehead. Under Command were 2 Armoured Cars, 1 British Coy of 25 pdr & 14 British A 7k Guns. Contact & liaison made with 7/20 Bn. Bn responsible for blowing Tebran bridges (covered by 1 Coy 7/18 Am) after passage of Eastforce. 11 Ind Div moved in by West Coast Rd through Gordons; 9 Ind Div & 29 Aust Inf Bde moved in through the bn front. Moral delayed & hrs through loss of contact with 22 Ind Inf Bde.	

*[Signature]*

WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

2/19 Am A.S.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. 1. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
31 Jan 47 Johore Bahru Island, West Coast.	Last ammunition party of Westforce passed through at 0500 hrs when our forward ops from Tebuan area commenced withdrawal covering further demolitions en route. At 0600 hrs orders received for full rearguard to withdraw; this was carried out by Coy (who checked through river bridgehead (Arlyll + Subulataid High-land) + moved across causeway to an assembly area on Island in rubber. M moved by MT to an area on west coast between Sungai Mudai + Sungai Serih, 1 rifle Coy (A Coy) having responsibility of Chua Cho Kang village. Quick night dispositions taken up + communications with Sde + arty established.	Murai? Chua Cho Kang
1/4 Feb 47, West Coast Island.	Piece of area by Coy Comdrs. Dispositions of bn - A Coy + 1 PL + 4 MG in area Chua Cho Kang village n North; B + D Coys forward dividing area between Sungai + Sungai Serih. B Coy right, D Coy left; C Coy + details HQ Coy on motor track immediately east of Bukit Murai. Arty observation from Bukit Murai. Defence works dug. Considerable difficulty in obtaining labour to assist in portering stores, equipment, rations, ammunition etc as B + D (forward) Coys had no roads n carries up to 14 miles had to be made. Pls linked up eventually by phone in forward area.	
5 Feb 47	Shelling took place + from 4 + 5 Feb onward noise of motor vehicles n hammering could be heard across Straits of Johore. 12p A2K guns under control + disposed on roads in rear of bn. Taborous patrol policy pursued day + night.	
6	At night Lt Col Otley (A Coy) + 2 Ods crossed the Straits by canoe + returned following night. Arty engaged on enemy movements + evidence of activity by sound on mainland.	
7	CO evacuated to hospital (Alpukang). Lt Col M. Oakes took over but was promoted Lt Col + appointed to Comd of 26 Bn. Major A + Robertson (720 Bn) arrived about 2300 hrs.	[Signature]

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

2/19/42 ASD

-OR-

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<p>8 Feb 42 0900 hrs. W. Coast Island</p> <p>1200</p> <p>1830</p> <p><del>2230</del> 2030</p> <p>2300 2100</p> <p>2300 2100</p> <p>2330 2130</p> <p>2255</p>	<p>Tour of area Lt Col Oakes &amp; Major Robertson. D &amp; B Coys reced then considerable shelling especially A Coy. Enemy air recce active. 1115 hrs M &amp; H area bombed. Lt Col Oakes marched out to his new comd; Major Robertson comd. Major Vincent r/c. M &amp; H &amp; B Coy moved to new area. A &amp; D Coys reported enemy crossing Straits. Line to Sde HQ cut. D Coy reported enemy attack Surgei Berib repulsed. B Coy reported heavy fighting at Coccaunt Grove on right flank. Contact lost with left fwd Pl. Heavy casualties Right fwd Pl. Right flank forced back. B Coy holding. Enemy penetration in force between right flank &amp; 2/18 AM. C Coy moved to river area N. of M &amp; H to counteract possible enemy flanking movement.</p>	<p>Appendix A</p> <p>Appendix D &amp; F.</p>
<p>9 Feb 42 hrs. W. Coast Island</p> <p>Early AM</p> <p>0530</p> <p>0600</p> <p>0630</p> <p>0700</p> <p>0730</p> <p>0800</p>	<p>C Coy reported at least 3 Coys enemy moving on rd in 2/18 AM sector. Remnants of B Coy withdrew. C Coy to withdraw to North of Sde HQ. Flanking patrol reported enemy movement East of M &amp; H. Patrol unsuccessful in attempt to gain contact with A Coy &amp; was fired on from bank of Surgei Berib. C Coy to send patrol to endeavour contact Sde HQ but enemy attack intervened. Attack repulsed. Enemy appeared to be strongly reinforced. D Coy ordered to withdraw from Beach position to rear of M &amp; H. C Coy decided to fight way to road but enemy in strength prevented this. M &amp; H in contact with C Coy with orders to advance along dirt rd. Our attack launched. C Coy decided position untenable. Effort to use re-entrant by changing perimeter to south east was unsuccessful as enemy was out in force. C Coy ordered withdrawal.</p>	<p>Appendix J</p> <p style="color: red; font-size: 2em;">7</p>

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# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

2/19 Bn A.I.F.  
R. Bn

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<p>Thurs. 9 Feb 47. G. B. D. at Island Golf Links</p>	<p>At midnight 9/10 Feb approx 150 members of 7/19 Bn who had lost contact during the withdrawal had assembled at General Base Depot at Island Golf Links &amp; were re-equipped &amp; formed into 1 Coy.</p>	
<p>10 Feb 47</p>	<p>This Coy formed part of R. Bn &amp; was designated 10th Coy (Casualty) comprising details of 7/18 &amp; 7/20 Bns respectively. Coy Comd Major Lark Logan, 2/Lt Lieut H. Pickup, Pl Comdrs Lieuts A. Wilson, J. Mitchell, W. Hunt &amp; A. D. Bagnall. CSM W. J. James &amp; 6 guns Spgt Betts. R. Bn comd by Lt Col Hayes, 2/Lt Major J. Bradley (ex 7/19 Bn) Capt Lieut J. G. Reed (7/19 Bn) CSM Capt N. J. Joppe (7/18 Bn) Asst CSM Lieut G. Good (2/18 Bn) Chaplain, Padre H. Wardale Greenwood (7/19 Bn) RSM W. G. Brady.</p>	
<p>1200 hrs</p>	<p>Coy fully armed equipped &amp; rationed. 1 x 1 ton truck per Coy allotted for stores.</p>	
<p>1340</p>	<p>Coy moved to embussing point in which park area G. B. D. embussed &amp; moved to Reformatory Hill, completing last 2 miles on foot.</p>	
<p>1900</p>	<p>Coy took up tactical dispositions on Reformatory Hill &amp; occupying feature on same side of road.</p>	
<p>1930</p>	<p>Coy comd. instructed Pl Comds. to prepare to move at 2000 hrs.</p>	
<p>200</p>	<p>Coy moved along Reformatory rd, past Pl Comd A. Wilson) leading. Route led through Bukit Tuarah Village (then on fire) to Jurong Trig, with many halts en route.</p>	
<p>2400</p>	<p>Coy occupied area in narrow rubber belt North of Trig point. Pls placed in perimeter &amp; double sentries posted.</p>	

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# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2/19 Bn a Coy  
-70 Bn

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.

Summary of Events and Information.

Remarks and references to appendices.

0700 hrs 11 Feb 42 Jurong  
Triq

Alarm given by sentries & enemy immediately attacked in con- siderable force both frontally & on each flank. Patrol dug up on right flank caught fire & whole area brightly illuminated. Coy suffered many casualties from grenades & MG fire & was forced to withdraw. Contact with HQ & Pls was impossible. Coy Comd. Major R. W. Keegan collected a party which included Lieuts A. Pichup & A. Barragale & some 20 ORs & proceeded to endeavour to regain contact with HQ: this proved to be impossible. Shortly after, an enemy patrol was encountered & Major Keegan severely wounded by automatic fire. Five aides of party & other 2/19 Bn personnel found & Bn assembled at BOD.

HQ HQ was contacted & directions received to location of HQ 22 Aust Inf Bde. En route a party of 2/19 Bn personnel was encountered & the whole amalgamated under command of that party Capt C. H. Cousins.

During the 2/19 Bn action the following 2/19 Bn officers were reported missing: Major R. W. Keegan (wounded & missing), Lieuts A. Wilson, J. Hitchel & D. G. Neild. Major H. G. Sadler (ex 2/19 Bn) was also reported missing.

B. H. G.

WAR DIARY

OR

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

2/19 Br A & D  
A Coy.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.

Summary of Events and Information.

Remarks and references to appendices.

0600 hrs 9 Feb 42, Island West Coast

Enemy movement observed around right flank. Runner dispatched to HQ to convey information; contacted BC who instructed withdrawal along axis Choe Chu Kong road to road junction.

Appendix 11-14-D

0900  
1000

Coy withdrew. Col instructed Coy to take up position in rear of Sgt on line. By this time other elements of the had joined A Coy, also Major Merritt + approx 1st of 1/20 Bn. Major Merritt assumed command of force.

2000

Capt Cairns reported to 22 Aust Inf Bde HQ for instructions. Perimeter as then formed to be held. Intermittent firing during night on forces left flank

0400 hrs 10 Feb 42

Col HQ instructed force to withdraw at 0500 hrs. Force withdrew + proceeded to Bukit Timah village; during withdrawal 2 casualties from air attacks.

0500

1200

Bukit Timah

Arrived Bukit Timah Village + after midday were placed in position as protective force for the HQ, forward of Bukit Timah Barracks.

1300

Orders from Col to prepare to move at 1400 hrs. This move cancelled, fresh instructions to effect that the force to move under Major Merritt by way of Reformatory Road

1730

1815

Reformatory Road

Debused at 1815 + proceeded 1/2 mile along Reformatory Road + took track to left. Contacted Coy of Malay Regt which was to form force's left flank.

Tactical position was most unsatisfactory, particularly because of obvious occupation by enemy ash + mortars of what appeared to be force's objective. Major Merritt decided to withdraw the force + to form a perimeter 800 yards forward of reformatory road.

[Signature]

# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

2/19th a.s.  
"A" Coy

-OR-

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required.)

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Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<p>700 hrs 10 Feb 42 Reformat. on road.</p>	<p>Force placed in perimeter. Encampment &amp; firing observed; no contact. Reports from snipers indicated force was surrounded.</p>	
<p>2300 0500 hrs 11 Feb 42 Reformat. on road 0545</p>	<p>Ofc decided position untenable &amp; to withdraw to contact with own forces. Withdrawal commenced under fire. Capt Merritt wounded. No contact made with formed bodies on withdrawal but a 2nd patrol advised Capt McCausens (then in Command) that collection post had been established near Div HQ. Force assembled at collection post &amp; was joined by elements from 2 Bn.</p>	

*[Signature]*

WAR DIARY

OR

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C-2118.

2/19 Br a I J

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

(Erase heading not required.)

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
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12 Feb 42. 1<sup>st</sup> Force  
Potaucaie Gardens.

all details 2/19 Br were ordered to Potaucaie Gardens for resting & reorganisation.

For recommendations for awards see appendix E.

13 Feb 42 do

Lt Col Edmund Anderson was discharged from 13 AGH & on reporting to Dwn. was ordered to reform the Br, details of which were being assembled at Potaucaie Gardens. 180 men were reformed into one Coy of 4 PIs under command Capt CH Bouvens & one Coy of mixed details strength 147 under command Capt Purcott & were put under command. 2 PIs commanded by Lieut Sanderson & Bennett & 1 det. mortars under Lieut Douglas were attached to 2/20 Br.

2/19 Br ordered to take up dispositions on a southern flank & by 1800 hrs was in position in area 795105.

0900 hrs 14 Feb 42

Line rectified & 1 Coy pushed forward to Hill 115 ref 789100. Contact was maintained with details of 6 PIs on left flank <sup>with</sup> 1 Coy of Gordon & 2/4 Bn on right flank. Original positions were subjected to very heavy shelling. Vigorous patrolling was carried out. Although enemy movement was seen, contact was not made.

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# WAR DIARY

Army Form C-2118.

OR

2/19 Pm A I F.

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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
Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence  
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Vol. I.  
Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to appendices.
<p>0600<sup>hrs</sup> 15 Feb 42 Rep 489400.</p> <p>7000 hrs - - -</p> <p>1600</p>	<p>Patrol contacted small party of Japanese &amp; enemy killed. Considerable enemy movement observed. Enemy reported to be massing immediately south of our position, about 1500 yards distant &amp; an attack was anticipated. During the morning &amp; afternoon enemy arty fire was intensified &amp; included mortar &amp; shells of heavier calibre than previously experienced.</p> <p>Lt Gardner was killed &amp; 2 eds severely wounded by shelling.</p> <p>Patrols led by Sgt Riley made contact &amp; killed one Japanese soldier. Later Sgt Riley was killed in endeavouring to identify the contacts he had made.</p> <p>Warning order received that negotiations were in train with the Japanese but until the cessation of hostilities paroling was rigorously carried out.</p>	

*Census*

*[Signature]*

ENLARGEMENT BAKRI CROSS-ROADS AREA.



TO MUAR ←

TO PT. SUDONG → 10 MILES

N

Main road  
Blocked  
20.1.42.

Enemy  
attack 300.  
19 Jan

Enemy attack  
500 Jan 19.  
0800. Jan 19.

SCALE: 1" TO 1 MILE





JOINS MAIN  
MUAR-BATU  
PAHAT. RDS. ←

CULTIVATION (RUBBER, ETC)  
SWAMP (FRESH WATER)  
JUNGLE UNCOLOURED


2/19 Bn "1" Sec

NO YES ✓





ENLARGEMENT PARIT SULONG AREA



SCALE :- 1" TO 1 MILE

CULTIVATION  
JUNGLE



UNCOLOURED



2/19 Bn "1" SEC

1 JAN - 15 FEB

APPENDIX A.      A & B ECHELON.

18 JAN 42.

0200 hrs. A & B Ech, led by OC HQ Coy, Capt R.W. Newton, left JEMALUANG. O.C. A Ech was Capt H.C.H. Macdonald, O.C. B Ech was T.O. Capt W.P.Bracher.

0730 hrs. Arrived AYER HITAM.

0830 hrs. Arrived YONG PENG. Capt R.W. Newton then went on ahead with the recce party. Capt Newton joined the C.O. at PARIT SULONG Br. After CO had established Bn HQ (about 1 mile EAST of BAKRI) Capt Newton proceeded to recce a harbour for A & B Ech. The terrain of the country made this a difficult task as the rd was for the most part built-up, with wide and deep ditches on either side and flanked by swamp.

1230 hrs. OC Recce party decided to use as harbour a native kg about 7 miles from Bn HQ. Later a new harbour in a rubber plantation approx 2 miles from Bn HQ was chosen. *Capt Newton considered had to be close up because of danger of Causeway & P/S Bdg being cut.*

1430 hrs. Harbour occupied. It was felt that this position of A & B Ech was too far fwd in relation to Bn and it was considered advisable to recce on the following day for a more suitable position EAST of PARIT SULONG Br where 2/29 Bn had its B Ech.

1600 hrs. Capt Newton reported progress to CO.

1700 hrs. Coy kitchen trucks arrived, but it was not possible to get the prepared meal (stew) fwd to the Coys. A & B Ech personnel, totalling about 150 were disposed in position in perimeter. From early afternoon sounds of heavy firing, both Arty and SAA had been heard from direction of Bn. With exception of one shell which fell nearby, lightly wounding 1 NCO, there was no activity during the night.

19 Jan 42

0300 hrs. No 17 Pl of D Coy under Lieut J.A. Varley joined the force.

0700 hrs. 200-300 enemy observed moving in N.E. direction across EAST side of perimeter. Enemy widely dispersed, closest elements about 50-100 yds distant. Fire was opened, inflicting many casualties. Firing broke out from NE corner of perimeter where enemy had forced a gap with the result they were able to infilade the EAST side of perimeter. Sniping observed from trees. Enemy pressed in force and Capt Newton ordered a ~~slight~~ withdrawal of tps on EAST side of perimeter so as to rectify the line, in view of this penetration. Just prior to this withdrawal the Q.M.? Capt D.I.Mc Duncan was killed. Southern side of perimeter came under fire, but this ceased when the Vickers on S.W. corner opened fire.

Immediately the firing started the T.O. Capt W.P. Bracher ordered the drivers of the vehicles to withdraw same back along the rd out of danger. About 20 vehicles, incl 1 carrier were got onto the rd, 1 truck reached Bn HQ (Sgt Meale driving) with a wounded man and 4 trucks got away, one of which was abandoned owing to mechanical breakdown due to enemy fire, at PARIT SULONG. The other three trucks suffered M.G. fire from the air all the way to YONG PENG. Remaining vehicles could not proceed as the rd was blocked by a water truck which had overturned and had caught fire. The driver of the carrier was shot and the carrier ran off the rd into the ditch. Rd to PARIT SULONG being thus blocked, the vehicles tried to join Bn but found that our concrete cylinders had been formed into an effective rd block some 600 yds from A & B Ech harbour. Armd car from direction of P.S. reported that enemy had not crossed Northward over the rd. At outbreak of firing No 17 Pl of D Coy placed in position N of Chinese house in vicinity of Coy HQ. Enemy seen in strength on high ground to EAST which had been evacuated. Pressure of the attack forced the EAST perimeter to withdraw across rd, through camp.

0900 hrs. None of our tps EAST of rd.

1000 hrs Main enemy activity weakened - mostly sniping and MG fire on observed movement. Accuracy of enemy rifle fire considered poor.

1100 hrs. N.W. section of perimeter reported that they had repulsed a light attack.

1130 hrs. An attack from 3 planes, M.G. and bombing, former directed mostly at vehicles on rd causing casualties. Carrier sent in endeavour to force way to Bn HQ but was wrecked by land mine on rd. Crew of 2 were uninjured, being picked up subsequently by Lieut Howard in a carrier and armd car.

1530 hrs. In the interval till this time only spasmodic fire from enemy. Large concentrations of enemy observed assembling WEST of perimeter and NORTH across main rd. MG fire from high ground to the EAST and sniping increased. Rd was covered by enemy MGs sited EAST and WEST along main rd. One party approached N.W. corner of perimeter crying, "Hullo Aussies, wa are Indians" and were shot down. Light enemy attack SOUTH of N.W. corner repulsed with bayonet.

1600 hrs. Enemy appeared to be massing on WEST side of perimeter.

1630 hrs. Capt Newton considered the concentrations of these forces on EAST, SOUTH and WEST sides indicated that Bn had either been overwhelmed or had withdrawn in the other direction. In view of these factors, Capt Newton decided to evacuate A & B Ech area as soon as it was dark. This was discussed at a conference with Capt Bracher and Macdonald and Lieut Varley when proposed route etc was gone into.

1640 hrs. Attack by enemy in strength equal to a Coy developed on WEST side of perimeter, the intense fire from which indicated that a preponderance of SMGs was being brought to bear.

1700 hrs. The fact that firing in direction of Bn had ceased may have influenced Capt Newton to commence the withdrawal without delay as he may have felt that the force under his comd was not sufficiently strong to withstand an attack during the night time. Plan of withdrawal was that personnel be organised into three gps under Lieut Varley, Capt Bracher and Capt Macdonald, to cross the main rd in that order, under covering fire of remainder, into swamp opposite, head NORTH then EAST then SOUTH to rejoin the rd beyond the causeway, thus outflanking the enemy.

1715 hrs. MG fire from bend at EAST end of rd prevented Lieut Varley's party from crossing rd. MG silenced by Pte Nimmo who crossed rd, approached close to MG emplacement and effectively used his Thompson S.M.G. Lieut Varley's party, after making a wide detour, lost contact with remainder of force and joined Bn about 0400 hrs 21 Jan at approx 4 miles from P.W. Br.

Enemy forces on WEST continued to press and closed in and our tps withdrew about 50 yds. Capt Bracher's party crossed the rd and took up positions to cover the crossing of the remainder. The third and last party was about 100 yds from the rd when its OC, Capt H.C.H. Macdonald was wounded and on his instructions the party continued without him and Capt R. Newton took charge of it. This party successfully gained the opposite side of the rd. The force less Lieut Varley's pl which became separated, moved in a N.E. direction and bivouaced for the night.

20 JAN 42. On moving back onto main rd, a det of Norfolks under Maj W.Kidd was contacted and gave information that P.S. br had fallen to enemy. Capt Newton then decided to strike SOUTH through BATU PAHAT and to make his way back to Bn lines and later as many small enemy forces were met and also on account of feeding problems with force of about 100 strong, he decided to break his force up into small parties many of which found their way back.

Appa B.

17 JAN 42. Orders received for the Bn to proceed to the MUAR District and come under command 45 Ind Inf Bde, the move to be made from JEMALUANG at 0400 hrs on 18 Jan 42. At this time the Bn was less Lieut Wilson's Pl (No 16 Pl) and some patrols from D Coy still engaged in the ENDAU area. A standing patrol of 1 NCO and 9 ORs from A Coy were at TENGGAROH and Maj R.F. Oakes, Lieut Davidson, Lieut Neild, Lieut Bennett and 16 ORs representing platoon Sgts or Cpls and members of Q Staff to hand over defence of JEMALUANG to the 6 Norfolks, who were to arrive on 18 Jan 42. The orders were to pick up GSO 1, Col Thyer at YONG PENG and to meet a guide from ~~A/T~~ 45 Bde at PARIT SULONG. Also that a tp of British A/Tk guns would come under commd at YONG PENG.

18 JAN 42. At 0200 hrs Carriers were sent on ahead to await arrival of the Bn at AYER HITAM. The remainder of the Bn moved off sharply at 0400 hrs in three groups. The main body with Rifle Coys, 2 trucks per Coy composite loaded, A Ech group comprising remainder of Coy transport, two dets Mortars, No 2 Pl (AA) Carrier platoon less those employed on carriers (tpt protective pl); 3rd group, B Ech.

NOTE. Three 101 Wireless sets were attached to Bn at JEMALUANG for use in MUAR district.

Move went off without incident on time.

0700 hrs. AYER HITAM, joined by Carriers, one sec (Sgt Holm) to A Ech, column proceeded YONG PENG. CO and Adjt (Capt Hughes) and recce party gp (Capt Newton) proceeding on ahead.

0800 hrs. Arrived YONG PENG and picked up GSO 1.

0900 hrs. Contacted 45 Bde guide, Maj. Maxwell at PARIT SULONG. Proceeded immediately to BAKRI the HQ of Brig Duncan, 45 Bde, leaving the Adjt (Capt L. Hughes) at PARIT SULONG to hold the Bn there pending further orders.

0945 hrs. Reported to Brig Duncan at Bde HQ which was established at about mile 99½, MUAR-PARIT SULONG Rd, who gave us the latest information of the situation. Owing to a breakdown of commns the tactical position was not very clear. The 45 Bde were disposed as follows:- The 4/9 JATs with whom commns had been lost, were somewhere between 6 and 8 miles NORTH of BAKRI with only one line of withdrawal by Estate rd, coming in about a mile and a half WEST of BAKRI. The remnants of the Garwali Rifles and the RAJ Rifles, who had been roughly handled by the enemy, and had lost both their commanding officers and many British officers, were disposed some 2 miles South of BAKRI on the PARIT-JIWA rd. The Bde, with some protective tps and 4 Armoured Cars were located at 99½ mile peg. The 65 Bty (Maj Julius) was in action with one tp at BAKRI X rds and one tp near Bde HQ. The 2/29 Bn. A.I.F. (Col Robertson) less one Coy and one pl, who had arrived the previous day, were disposed in a position astride the main rd about 1500 yds WEST of BAKRI X Rds with A Coy, which was the Coy less one pl, holding the X rds itself. The 2/29 Bn was in contact with the enemy and were being supported with harrassing fire by the Arty. It also had in support composite tp of AIF A/Tk guns.

The strength of the enemy was unknown, but he was believed to be in some force accompanied by tanks, 9 of which were destroyed by the 2/29 Bn the previous day. It was the intention of the Brig. to recall the JATS and to re-group the Bde.

In the meantime it was necessary for the 2/29 Bn to remain in their present position to cover the JATS line of withdrawal and for the 2/19 Bn to cover the very important X rds at BAKRI, particularly in view of enemy movements reported from P. Jiwa. The nature of the ground, unfortunately was distinctly unfavourable for the Bde. Brig Duncan gave orders for the 2/19 Bn to debuss and deploy neighborhood of the 100 M.P. and cover the BAKRI X Rds. A D.R. was sent back with orders to the Adjt to move the Bn up in Coy blocks with wide intervals and dispersion owing to extremely unfavourable open road conditions between P.S. and BAKRI. The rd for the larger part was without cover and straight and there was considerable enemy air activity.

1000 hrs. Col Robertson arrived at Bde HQ, reporting enemy movement to his S.W. and asked that his A Coy at BAKRI X Rds be relieved. This was agreed to by Brig Duncan as soon as 2/19 Bn were in a position to do so.

1100 hrs. B Coy (Capt Keegan) arrived and was ordered to occupy a position astride the BAKRI - P. JIWA Rd, about 1 mile SOUTH of BAKRI and was ordered to patrol strongly. One sec of the British A Tk Guns att. under comd. Bn HQ was opened at 100 $\frac{1}{2}$  M.P. C Coy disposed to the right and fwd of the Bn. A Coy left of the rd. D Coy less 16 and 17 Pl in rear. (No 17 Pl was det. to protect a large bridge at PARIT SULONG. The Mortars, less two dets. were disposed in Bn HQ area with one sec of Carriers held in reserve and one sec sent to patrol the rd from BAKRI to B Coy. On the deployment of the Bn C Coy (Capt Snelling) was ordered to relieve A Coy 2/29 Bn at BAKRI.

1300 hrs. Reports from B Coy indicated enemy movement to S.W. and reports from C Coy that BAKRI was being sniped by enemy and that the rd between BAKRI and 2/29 Bn was cut by enemy. Attempts by armd cars to clear the rd failed.

1400 hrs A Coy 2/29 Bn were relieved by C Coy 2/19 Bn. C Coy was disposed 14 Pl right and fwd of BAKRI, 13 Pl left and fwd of BAKRI, 15 pl reserve near BAKRI X Rds. One det of Mortars was sent to C Coy under comd. D Coy took up C Coy's original position in Bn deployment area.

1430 hrs. Attempt by A Coy 2/29 Bn to rejoin their Bn and to clear the rd failed. They were held up by an enemy light automatic, firing from a position some 600 yds N.W. of the X Rds and also from firing on the SOUTH of the rd. The Mortar det was ordered to engage enemy and C Coy were given the task to clear the rd.

1510 hrs. No 14 Pl attacked on the right of the rd and 13 Pl on the left supported by 2 Armd cars and a Carrier (Lieut Howard). The Pls met with little opposition and the rd was cleared.

1600 hrs. Supplies of amm, food, a wireless truck and other gear was sent fwd to 2/29 Bn under escort of 2/19 Bn Carriers (Lieut Howard), no opposition was met.

1630 hrs. Carriers returned accompanied by wounded from 2/29 Bn, HQ Coy comdr 2/29 Bn and Maj. White 2 i/c JATS. They brought information too that Col Robertson had been killed that morning. C Coy was ordered to picquet a gap between 2/29 Bn and BAKRI and maintain the rd open and an all night picquet of 2 secs, Cpl Smith's NORTH of the rd and Cpl Irwin's SOUTH of the rd. Line comm between Bn HQ and C Coy was established.

CO saw Bde comdr and asked if 17 Pl at P. SULONG could be relieved as WESTFORCE had promised, also suggesting increase in the garrison there. Arranged for the night dispositions of the force and was informed of the withdrawal of the Rs and Gs. Maj White was detailed to bring in the JATS

3.

which he had left the day previously some 6 miles NORTH of BAKRI and he expressed the opinion that this should be accomplished by early on the 19th.

1800 hrs. Withdrew B Coy closer into C Coy for night dispositions, likewise Bn area. Towards dusk there was some patrol actions by enemy recce patrols and apart from the occasional bursts of fire the night, which was very dark, was passed without ~~incident~~ *incident*.

Bde Comd ordered one Coy to move through 2/29 Bn and to contact the enemy along the MURR rd to cover and aid the withdrawal of the JATS. CO asked for one sec A Tk Guns to be att for the task and ordered A Coy to move at 0730 hrs next morning to fulfil this role. One sec Carriers (Sgt Christie) was ordered to take up outpost positions in the area now occupied by A Coy.

19 JAN 42.

0715 hrs Carriers relieved A Coy.

0730 hrs A Coy ready to move off, but delayed by non arrival A/Tk Sec. Rs and Gs moved through Bn area to proceed back to BAKRI and to re-occupy yesterday's positions.

0750 hrs. Heavy machine gun fire broke out from Carriers in A Coy area and these carriers were pushed back by strong and rapid enemy attack coming from the S.W.

0800 hrs. Small forward elements of the enemy succeeded in getting on the ridge that A Coy had occupied and which overlooked the rd in the Bn area. A Coy were ordered to attack immediately and recover the hill. C Coy were ordered to hold the Rs and Gs and employ them in the B Coy task as tride the JIWA rd and a carrier was sent to Capt Keegan of B Coy to attack the enemy in rear, moving on the line 400 yds SOUTH of and parallel to the main rd.

0830 hrs. A Coy was astride the ridge having been taken by Lieut Weill's Pl attacking from the front and supporting ~~and~~ flank attack by Lieut Crawford's Pl. Then B Coy's attack came in rear of the enemy sandwiching the enemy in between the two Coys. Reserve Pl of A Coy (Lieut Ritchie) was put in at the same time on the right flank. The enemy took heavy casualties and withdrew in some disorder in a S.E. direction, leaving behind a number of automatic weapons and a Bn gun. Lieut Reynolds was severely wounded in this engagement and we had some 12 killed and 10 wounded.

At 0830 hrs reports that A Ech, which was harboured in a strong position about 98 M.P. had been heavily attacked by the enemy. The information was brought by Sgt Meale, Transport Sgt, who brought in some wounded.

0940 hrs. Position in Bn area was cleared and strong patrolling ordered. Reports indicated the presence of the enemy to the SOUTH of the Bn and

the S.W. and A Coy returned to their original positions and B Coy disposed on their left, SOUTH of the rd which covered the left flank and rear of Bn and Bde HQ. Attempts were made to contact A Ech with carriers (Lieut Howard) and 2 armd cars, but a small rd block had been established by the enemy across the rd between Bn and A Ech.

1000 hrs Bde HQ received a direct <sup>By AIR BOMB</sup> hit inflicting very severe casualties. The whole of Bde staff except the Brig himself and the A/BM, Maj Anderson 3 Ind Corps, were killed or seriously wounded. ~~and~~ Among the casualties were Maj Julius who was seriously wounded and later killed in an attempt to get him to medical aid. The Brig was severely shocked, being in the adjoining room and Maj Anderson asked the CO 2/19 Bn. to take command.

1100-1200 hrs Light contacts and enemy movement reported by A & C Coys to the SOUTH and S.W. and in view of these reports, it was impossible to render any assistance yet to A Ech, as the forces threatening BAKRI were then in considerable strength and the loss of BAKRI X rds endangered both the 2/29 Bn and the JATS. It was intended to use this latter Bn to relieve the position at A Ech as soon as they arrived.

1300 hrs. An enemy attack was made on the left flank ~~and~~ C Coy won a body of Rs and Gs who were in a position on a small ridge fwd of C Coy's res. pl (No 15). A sharp enemy attack forced the withdrawal of the Rs and Gs but the enemy maintained their attack in the face of 15 Pl's fire which was very deadly and held the attack.

1330 hrs. A British officer and some 25 Rs and Gs came up in support and with 15 Pl in a counter attack recovered the ridge.

1400 hrs. Two Coys of the JATS passed through BAKRI with information that the main Bn was following immediately. They were ordered to assemble EAST of Bn HQ preparatory to an attack to relieve A Ech. Firing broke out between BAKRI and 2/29 Bn and no further JATS arrived. Enemy attacked both our outposts on this line, cut off the Northern picquet (Sgt Taylor, who relieved Cpl Smith) and forced his withdrawal on to the 2/29 Bn, while Cpl Irwin's sec, as far as is known, had only one survivor.

1430 hrs. Contact had been gained with the enemy SOUTH of B Coy and an enemy attack in strength was launched about 1500 hrs. The attack was pushed in with great determination. One sec of Carriers was pushed in in support and to cover B Coy's flank. 2 Secs of D Coy, under Lieut Austin were pushed in to support B Coy's left flank and also two ~~secs.~~ <sup>carriers</sup> of ~~D Coy~~ were pushed in to strengthen this flank which looked at one time in danger of being forced. Two dets of mortars were brought to bear on the enemy and also 2 Mortars which the 565 Bty had succeeded in borrowing from the Indian tps were brought in support as well.

1500-1600 hrs The position was grave but the intense and accurate Mortar fire succeeded in breaking up the enemy's attack and he withdrew after infliction of heavy casualties. In this engagement RSM Middleton, with the aid of a 2" Mortar succeeded in inflicting many casualties on enemy tps. Lieut Austin was severely wounded in this engagement.

1630 hrs. Wireless comm with 2/29 Bn had broken down and Sgt Quinn, 2 Loyals volunteered to take a message through ordering them to be prepared ~~xxx~~ to withdraw at 1830 hrs as it was thought then that the remainder of the JATS had been cut off somewhere. Orders had been received in the meantime from WESTFORCE for the Bde to withdraw to YONG PENG. After the breakdown of the enemy attack the night dispositions were recced and the Bde gp was moved in nearer to Bn and the Indian tps were located to the Northern sector. The question of relieving of A Ech now became urgent but pressure was now being maintained on all the tps in the fwd area and it was felt that from the apparent state of the trng of the two Coys of JATS that had arrived, it would have been unwise to have employed them in the relief without some support that could be ill afforded from the front.

1730 hrs. Wireless comm with 2/29 Bn was re-established and Maj Orloff commanding 2/29 Bn gave his Arty programme. Arty programme started at 1830 hrs to cover the withdrawal. During this period some patrol actions were fought on the NORTH of the X Rds and in one of these Lieut Glasson was severely wounded. Firing could be heard in the direction of 2/29 Bn which was obviously meeting with some opposition.

1900 hrs. Just after dark reports were made that the rd between Bn and C Coy at BAKRI had been cut by the enemy and one pl A Coy (Lieut Ritchie) was ordered to proceed down and clear any opposition with bayonet and bombs, no firing.

2000 hrs. Capt Snelling, C Coy at BAKRI reported that parties from the 2/29 Bn had arrived there and Lieut Ritchie had arrived and reported the rd all clear. The night was very dark and Capt Snelling was ordered to send the 2/29 Bn through in Coy gps so that they could be led into areas in their location in the perimeter with the least difficulty. Some 1550 men each of A and C Coy, the latter commanded by Capt Bowring and 100 of B Coy (Capt Maher) were the only parties that arrived and apparently the rest of the Bn had been cut off. At about this time Indian tps on the Northern perimeter suffered a terrific fire panic and opened up very heavy fire, throwing grenades at the same time. They were steadied with the greatest difficulty and suffered from jumpiness the remainder of the night.

2100 hrs. Parties of the 2/29 Bn came in and were led into position and Capt Snelling was ordered to hold BAKRI until 2300 hrs in the hope that further parties would arrive. At this hour the vacation of BAKRI was ordered and C Coy came in at 2330 hrs.

2400 hrs. Enemy commenced shelling the area heavily and one of the first few shells secured a direct hit on a 25 pdr of the 65 Bty inflicting casualties.

20 JAN 42.

0100 hrs. Continued enemy shelling which ceased about 0300 hrs

0430 hrs. Orders were issued to the Coys for the withdrawal. Certain unnecessary gear in various trucks was to be dumped and the wounded of ~~xxxx~~ which there was some considerable number were to be loaded on these vehicles. It was done under the control of Capt Cahill (RMO) and assistance by Sgt Thompson (Ord Rm Sgt) and Sgt Guerin (Stretcher Bearer Sgt). The force was slightly re-organised, Maj Anderson was to act as liaison between the Indian gps which were divided into two, one with 2 Coys of JATS under Maj White and the other gp RAJ RIFs and Gawalis Bn. A & C Coys 2/29 Bn were to be under comd of Capt Westbrook, D Coy. Maj Vincent of D Coy was acting as 2 i/c of the 2/19 Bn. The orders were for the advance guard to move off at 0700 hrs, B Coy (Capt Keegan) were allotted



this task. A Coy were to move on the right of the rd, DCoy the left of the rd and C Coy in rear, then the two Indian gps on either flank in rear again and B Coy 2/29 Bn with A/Tk Bty acting as rearguard. 65 Bty and the remainder of Bn and Bde tpt to move under protection of the inf units. The two Indian gps received special orders to assist in fighting off attacks in the rear. Capt Hughes (Adjt) was put in charge of the rear area. The rearguard B Coy 2/29 Bn (Capt Maher) was to be in position between the perimeter and BAKRI to cover the withdrawal from the perimeter by 0645 hrs.

0700 hrs. Move went off to time.

0800 hrs. The advance guard was held up by ambush near A Ech area. B Coy attacked with great vigour but were held. The enemy were holding a line on the SOUTH of the rd and A Coy were ordered to attack on the right of B Coy flank. A Coy were only engaged with light opposition and broke through, meeting with stronger opposition a little more forward in ~~our~~ old A Ech area which had apparently been abandoned by us. The enemy ambush still continued to hold with great determination and a sec of Carriers (Sgt Leaver) were sent fwd to assist. They were used with great determination but were not able to force the block. D Coy reported the left flank as clear. A Coy on clearing its area came back to attack the enemy in rear.

0900 hrs. In view of the delay the CO asked the 65 Bty comd to put ~~up~~ up harrassing fire in the direction of BAKRI X Rds which was done. Considerable smoke arose from this direction and it was thought that the arty fire had set alight to the village. The ambush had finally to be assaulted with bayonets and bombs before further move could be made. It was a very grim and determined stand made by this enemy body.

1100 hrs. Lieut Ibbott was killed here and Lieut Quinlan was severely wounded. B Coy received fairly heavy casualties. A Coy were ordered to replace B Coy's advance guard and the move was continued.

In passing through A Ech area the body of Capt D.I. Mc Duncan (QM) was found and several others of our killed, Also 2 wounded men

1230 hrs A Coy was held ~~by~~ up by enemy who appeared in strength and who had established strong rd blocks at about Mile 96½. The fwd Pl (Lieut Crawford) was pinned here and Lieut Weily's and Lieut Ritchie's Pls were both put in on the left flank which appeared to offer the best prospects. Reports were received that contact with enemy in rear <sup>of our col.</sup> had been effected and enemy commenced shelling the rd, causing casualties to the tpt and other personnel. A Sec of Carriers (Sgt Christie) were employed to assist A Coy. DCoy was ordered to press in an attack on the left flank having the close support where possible of the carriers and heavy fighting ensued. No decision could be obtained. From this time on enemy shelling became increasingly heavy and owing to the unfavourable terrain and the thick cover it was necessary to close up the tpt. Enemy attacks in the rear became increasingly strong and at last succeeded in penetrating the rear of the column and taking the last 4 trucks. A strong counter attack by the JATS and various elements of AIF and led by Brig Duncan was successful and drove the enemy back. Brig Duncan was killed in this action. Maj Vincent, who was then controlling the fwd area was using heavy mortar fire to try and get the attack through but the enemy were in a very favourable position and the CO then decided to employ C Coy which had been held in reserve on account of the threatened rear.

1730 hrs. C Coy was ordered to carry the rd block by an assault on the right flank, after a strong preparation of Mortar fire. D and A Coys to synchronise their attacks with C Coy. The Mortar fire was held after C Coy's attack on to the enemy positions until the attacking infantry were only between 70 and 60 yds away. This enabled them to get through the heavy machine gun fire which was being employed by the enemy. The attack was successful. Capt Snelling, who led the attack was severely wounded in the leg. Enemy fire was made inaccurate by the Mortar support and the close support afforded by the Carriers and the C Coy casualties were comparatively light. Some 60 Indian tps very gallantly accompanied C Coy on this assault. The rd blocks, which were very solid comprised of M.T. and felled rubber trees but were rapidly demolished by working parties. The arty assisted with the demolition by firing HE into the stacked MT. There were still some snipers in the vicinity and casualties were caused in the working parties. 50 men under Capt Maher (2/29 Bn) were put through on the left flank to finally mop up with the bayonet. Darkness had fallen and wounded were collected rapidly and placed on trucks, gun limbers and every available space. Control of the force was regained and infantry were deployed on either side of the tpt.

1930 hrs. The force continued its progress in the direction of PARIT SULONG. Owing to the difficult nature of the country, with swamps on either side of the rd, it was not possible to deploy men off the rd and the infantry who were very exhausted from the heavy fighting, had to march on either side of the slow moving tpt on a rather narrow rd. It was a very dark night which added to the fatigue. The morale of the whole force was high and though weary, were determined to break through if possible. Good progress was made without halt for two hours, during which time about 4 miles was covered. The column was joined here by some survivors of A Ech, Indian tps and No 17 Pl (Lieut Varley). Reports of rumours from the Indian tps that PARIT SULONG was in the hand of the enemy reached Bn HQ. It was impossible to get any confirmation or check back, so a halt was ordered at 2230 hrs and attempts were made to get wireless communication through to WESTFORCE, which we failed to achieve. The force was then at about Mile 91 and on the open straight causeway, coming through with no cover from air and the CO determined to push on to within about 3 miles of PARIT SULONG where the rubber started again. In view of the many wounded requiring urgent attention and to save time on recce, two D.R.s, Ptes Levick and White volunteered to go on ahead and endeavour to establish the position at PARIT SULONG. In view of the conditions obtaining it was a very gallant action on the part of these men. With the dark night and a certain number of bomb craters in the rd they had to employ the use of their headlamps. They returned an hour later with the information that they got on to the bridge not being challenged by British, but suspicious actions by apparently a sentry group nearby led them to suspicion the presence of enemy. The column started again and made slow progress owing to holdups due to bomb craters.

21 JAN 42.

0230 hrs. The column was halted 3 miles from PARIT SULONG where the men were rested and what food available was issued out.

0400 hrs. A patrol 8 strong from C Coy (Sgt Daviess) were sent into PARIT SULONG. At the same time orders were issued to comdrs that at 0600 hrs the 2/19 Bn less tpt and carriers would push on into PARIT SULONG and the remainder of the force ~~was~~ would follow under Capt L. Hughes.

0715 hrs. C Coy patrol was contacted about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile from PARIT SULONG. They reported that they were fired on at the bridge and one man wounded but were not certain whether they were Japanese forces. Two well-dressed Malays assured the C.O. that there were no Japanese in the vicinity and that it was only the JMF Forces who were at PARIT SULONG. The decision was made to push straight on with the Bn and to lose no further time by recce in view of the strong enemy forces that were following up in our rear. C Coy were advance guard, widely deployed, A Coy on the right and B Coy on the left. DCoy was left at the mile post from PARIT SULONG to cover the rear and the ~~bridge~~ approach of the main body. The rd ran straight through rubber with an occasional Malay house on either side of the rd and some 50 yds from it. On each side of the rd were great drains 14 ft wide and about 4 to 5 ft of water therein. Nearly all of the footbridges across these drains had been destroyed. The column pushed on and about 600 yds from PARIT SULONG Village, which was North of the bridge rapid fire broke out from the left of the rd followed by a bayonet attack by about a Coy of the enemy. The Japanese commander had not made a good appreciation and part of his attack on our flank were forced to ground both by the rd drain and by the well directed and controlled fire of C Coy. B Coy were immediately put in to attack on C Coy's left flank and held that flank and started to press the enemy who were pinned in ~~from~~ very poor cover. The enemy were only attacking on the left of the rd. A DR was sent back to bring up carriers, two of which were sent down the rd and brought heavy fire to bear on the enemy's left flank. This force of Japanese suffered heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw.

0830 hrs. The main body arrived reporting enemy tanks contacted their rear. The tpt and arty was forced to remain on the rd owing to the drains and the rather boggy nature of the country. The arty had one tp fwd and they commenced shelling the SOUTH banks of the river at PARIT SULONG. One tp in rear were also engaged on harrassing fire. Just before their arrival enemy tanks had attacked the rear and had apparently over-run the A Tk guns of the British arty. It was reported but not confirmed that two tanks had been hit by these guns. Later tanks followd up and the rear tp of the 65 Bty accounted for one with a direct hit. This tp had to leave one gun behind which had become bogged. The gun was rendered unserviceable. D Coy was deployed as rearguard on the EAST of the rd and B Coy 2/29 Bn on the WEST. A small reserve of 40 AIF personnel of different units were held in reserve to this area under comd of Lieut Reynolds, who though very severely wounded handled the small force with great gallantry. Enemy infantry now gained contact with our force in rear and commenced to exercise strong pressure.

0900 hrs. From this time onwards close contact was maintained with the enemy on this front until the engagement was broken off next day. B and C Coys were ordered to press on and try and secure the NORTH bank of the river, but were held ~~up~~ badly by machine gun nests concealed in isolated buildings and the village.

0930. Two Coys of the JATS were ordered to ~~skkssk~~ take the NORTH bank of the river, attacking by the WEST of the rd. The attack was put through with great elan and took the bank SOUTH of the village but were not able to deal with the machine gun nests there.

1030 hrs. Lieut Pickup O.C. Carriers, was sent to recce enemy machine gun positions and to deal with them. These he located and with another carrier, Cpl Irwin's, and his own carrier, by vigorous action cleaned them out and B Coy were able to secure the remainder of the NORTH bank of the river. Two mortars were employed to support our infantry in the rear and were engaged in searching and harrassing tasks to break up enemy attacks. Arty were employed on harrassing tasks on the rd and in their fwd role were not able to sweep much on account of the heavy rubber trees on either side. From 0930 onwards the force was shelled by arty and mortars and later aerial activity increased and machine-gunning from the air took place.

1100 hrs. A Coy were ordered to recce and prepare to attack ~~the~~ to force the bridge with the support of mortars. They were ~~ordered~~ to relieve B Coy who were to come back in reserve and B and C Coys were ordered to patrol strongly both the left and right of the rd respectively.

1200 hrs. The enemy pressure in the rear increased considerably and we were forced to rectify our line considerably. One pl of D Coy (Sgt Hunt) was moved from the right of the rd to strengthen B Coy 2/29 Bn's left flank. About this period wireless comm from WESTFORCE advised the column that strong assistance was on its way and that an independent Coy would be operating that night to our assistance.

1400 hrs. Shellfire in the direction of YONG PENG was clearly audible. The enemy shelling increased. A Coy advised that they were desirous of putting through the attack but with the increasing pressure from the rear it was felt they would not be strong enough on their own to execute the attack and it was inadvisable at that stage to employ the two reserve Coys B and C. ~~Early~~ Aerial activity was considerable and casualties from machine gunning were being inflicted.

1615 hrs. Two large calibre bombs were dropped, inflicting heavy casualties including Lieut G. Gill (Signal officer). Following this further rectification of the line in rear was necessary as the enemy had increased his pressure there. It was felt that only by heavy and accurate mortar fire that a strong enemy attack was held. Amm both of arty and mortar was getting very low.

1630 hrs. Capt Cahill (RMO) and Capt Brand (RMO 2/29 Bn) reported that many early wounded would die unless they received early treatment and the CO agreed that only these cases be put into ambulances and attempt to pass through the Japanese lines. There was very small hope but it did give these men a slight hope.

1700 hrs. A request was made by wireless for air support the next morning on the SOUTH bank of the PARIT SULONG river, to cover our crossing as it was doubtful then, in view of the expenditure of amm, whether sufficient mortar bombs remained. The arty was unable to give us this support on account of the timber. Requests for morphia was made at the same time. Casualties were heavy now and strong attempts by the enemy to penetrate were made. Night dispositions were detailed approx on the lines that the forces were fighting except that the fwd elements were brought back and a closer perimeter formed.

2000 hrs. A wounded driver from the two ambulances which had left at 1800 hrs returned and reported that the Japanese had refused passage of the wounded and demanded the complete surrender, in the meantime the wounded were to be used as a rd block. At this time the enemy were continually maintaining their pressure and the whole area of the force was swept with ground fire, mortars and arty.

2200 hrs. An enemy tank penetrated the perimeter and proceeded up the rd. A 25 pdr (Sgt Tate's) of the 65 Bty was sited for A/Tk work and engaged it at 30 yds and obtained a direct hit with HE and then put 4 more shells into it. Other tanks attacked on the EAST of the rd ~~from~~ through the rubber. The tank which had penetrated burst into flames and for the next 3 hrs lit the whole area like a torch and added to the din of battle with the frequent explosions of its shells. Tank hunting parties were organised by Capt Westbrook ~~and~~ of D Coy and 6 tanks for certain and 1 doubtful were ~~claimed~~ in addition to the one on the rd ~~that night~~ that night. Sgt Smith of the Pioneer Pl was particularly active in this work. A Tk rifles, bakelite bombs, Mills Grenades and small arms fire was used in their destruction.

2400 hrs. The ambulances with the wounded returned. Lieut Austin, who had been badly wounded the first day of the engagement had succeeded in running these ambulances slowly and silently back by gravity, so that the Japanese did not hear them move and when they were turned, drove them back to our perimeter. The process of doing this took 2 hrs as the trucks were moved foot by foot.

22 JAN 42.

0700 hrs. A ~~KB~~ British plane came down ~~from~~ very low and dropped right in the middle of our tpt 3 containers of supplies containing morphia etc. which was very urgently needed. The constant shelling continued at daylight.

0800 hrs. B Coy suffered heavy casualties from this source, among the casualties killed here was CSM Moody. Capt Harris, Capt Maher (2/29 Bn) Capt Fallow (Mortars) were also wounded and Maj Anderson, BM was killed. This very gallant officer had been an inspiration to all and was of the greatest service in maintaining liaison with the Indian units. The enemy launched a strong attack closely supported by tanks and this was held with some difficulty and tanks were pressing right round on our right flank against C Coy. Owing to casualties, man-power was getting very short and it was apparent that no air support would be forthcoming. A Coy were ordered to test the strength of the enemy across the river which they did and succeeded in getting on to the bridge but were unable to progress disclosing 6 machine guns at least covering that line of approach. At this time the shelling from the enemy on our wounded and tpt on the rd was increasing our casualties and the CO came to the decision that a withdrawal was possible, abandoning tpt and wounded, as it would have been impossible to force the bridge and the attack which was continuing on our rear was such as to indicate that the enemy would force a decision very shortly.

~~The decision~~ *Eight Tanks were now attacking from the WEST Flank.*

0900 hrs. The decision to withdraw was made and comdrs were sent for and orders were issued for the quick disengagement and Coys to move out through a checking point at 5 minute intervals. The Coys most fwd were to precede. Arty were ordered to render their guns unserviceable and carriers were destroyed. D and 2/29 Bn were ordered to withdraw last. The line of withdrawal ordered was by the EAST flank where beyond the rubber was thick

country and the tributary flowed parallel to the rd into the main stream. There was no opportunity for recce of this line, but it was appreciated that the enemy would not place himself between this river and our forces. A bearing for the withdrawal was given which led two miles NORTH to a footbridge.

0930 hrs. Withdrawal commenced which went through quite smoothly in spite of heavy shelling and ground fire. There were few casualties. The line of withdrawal was unopposed but the heavy swamp country made it difficult to re-contact the various Coy gps and Coys made individual ways back to YONG PENG. 68 wounded of this Bn alone were able to withdraw with this force. Some of the units were subjected to machine-gunning from the air during the withdrawal and the majority of the tps got into YONG PENG the next day, 23 Jan before midnight, the time which had been set to blow the bridge at YONG PENG. The move across country through very heavy and difficult swamps was accomplished in good time considering the heavy going, the extreme exhaustion and foot weariness of the tps, in addition to being hampered by wounded.

The strength of the Bn going into action on leaving JEMALUANG was 29 Officers and 690 ORs.

The casualties for this engagement were:-

	<u>Officers.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>
Killed	3	60
Missing believed killed and died of wounds		17
Wounded and missing	6	67
Wounded	4	64
Missing	2	51
	<u>15</u>	<u>359</u>
<u>Total Casualties</u>		

The morale of the men fighting this engagement was throughout of the highest order. They were well trained and skilled in the use of their weapons. The fire control was splendid and for the severity of the fighting, comparatively little ammunition was used. The wounded were deserving of the highest praise, in spite of the grimness of their lot not a single complaint or protest was ~~made~~ voiced.

1 JAN - 15 FEB

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APPENDIX C - RE-ORGANIZATION OF BN.

24 Jan 42.

0900 hrs. Owing to the complete loss of all Bn records by enemy action at PARIT SULONG it was necessary for a nominal roll of all personnel on strength as at 17 Jan 42 to be obtained from 2 Ech.

1200 hrs. Nominal roll was received from 2 Ech. Orderly Room Sergeant, Sgt S.W. Thompson then started to prepare the necessary machinery for the compilation of Casualty returns, Coy rolls etc.

2000 hrs. All ground-work completed for the checking of casualties and posting of same for the following day.

25 JAN 42.

0900-1630 hrs Casualty returns were checked and prepared. ~~and~~ Orderly Room Sgt, Sgt S.W. Thompson reported that all casualties had been checked and posted and forwarded to 2 Ech.

26 JAN 42.

The following officers rejoined the Bn from OCTU - Lieut ~~X~~ V.S. Carn, Lieut W. Minto, Lieut N.F. Douglas, Lieut M.J. Brennan and Lieut R.E. Sanderson, ex Rose Force.

The following reinforcement officers ex G.B.D. marched in:-

- |                    |                     |                      |
|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Lieut W.S. Brown,  | Lieut A.F. Buderus, | Lieut E.W. Eagleston |
| Lieut R.W. McGee,  | Lieut G.K. Forbes   | Lieut H.M. Barton    |
| Lieut C.W. Lewis,  | Lieut D. Ottley     | Lieut C.P. Furner    |
| Lieut T.W. Madden. |                     |                      |

The following were promoted to Commissioned rank:-  
NX 32109 WO 2 Good G. to Lieut and appointed Q.M.

The draft was taken in from approx 100 men of 22 Bde, some not very well trained and who had been at G.B.D. for some time. The balance of some 530 were from a draft which landed on the 24 Jan. These men were not acclimatized and the greater proportion could be classified as almost untrained.

1900 hrs. The posting of reinforcements to Bn and Coy rolls and on necessary casualty returns had been completed. Casualty returns forwarded to 2 Ech at 1910 hrs.

APPENDIX D. - ACTION OF A COY, WEST COAST.

8-9 FEB 42. Enemy did not land on ACoy frontage. Contact with Bn was cut off.

9 FEB 42.

0800 hrs. Enemy movement observed on right flank and contact with enemy effected. Lieut Shaw, Intelligence G.H.Q. attached, and one intelligence OR, Pte Curnow were sent to endeavour to contact Bn HQ and advise as to position. En route contacted Brig Taylor who informed them that Bn HQ was cut off and ordered A Coy to withdraw along axis of rd from Choa Chu Kang to rd junc, 664192.

0900 hrs. A Coy withdrew with attached pl of 2/4 M.G. Bn leading, moving through 2/29 Bn who were then holding a line fwd of the rd junc.

1000 hrs. About this time the Coy was moved to new position in rear of a line occupied by units of 2/4 M.G. Bn and immediately on the right of the 2/29 Bn.

1730 hrs. Party of the 2/18 Bn relieved A Coy in this position and A Coy moved to position approx 3/4 mile in rear. At this time other elements of the 2/19 Bn had joined A Coy including Lieuts Gollan, Davidson and Eagleston of C Coy and Lieut Varley of D Coy. Also approx one pl of the 2/20 Bn, Maj Merritt, who assumed comd of this force and went into night dispositions.

2000 hrs. Capt C.H.Cousens, O.C. A Coy, reported to Bde HQ for orders and was instructed the position was to be held until further orders. There was intermittent firing during the night on the forces on the left flank.

10 FEB 42.

0400 hrs. Orders by runner from Bde HQ received, to withdraw at 0500 hrs along BUKIT PANGANG rd and after a wait near KEAT HONG Village it was ordered to continue the withdrawal to BUKIT TIMAH Village. En route suffered two casualties from air bombing.

1200 hrs. Coy was met by LO from Bde HQ who advised that instructions for the task of the party would be issued shortly and pending orders small issues of rations were made from AASC dump found nearby. This composite force was then placed in the position of a protective force to Bde HQ then situated fwd of B.T. Racecourse.

1300 hrs. The force was then under orders to withdraw to new position, this order being cancelled and ~~new~~ by new instructions the force under Maj Merritt was moved by tpt (2/2 Res M.T. to Reformatory rd.

1730 hrs. Embussed.

1815 hrs. Debussed. Orders were to push through Sleepy Valley Estate, 7414 on to Chock Liang Estate, 7315 and there to gain contact with the "X" Bn which was operating in that area. O.C. Force, Maj Merritt endeavoured to locate the area but was unable to do so owing to the darkness of the night and the inability to distinguish features and further it would appear that the enemy had already reached the area. 2 English Sigs reported they had met the enemy some 500 yds fwd of the position they were then. In view of the uncertainty of the position Maj Merritt decided to dispose the force for the night in a good area some 800 yds NORTH of Reformatory Rd, approx 756136.

2100 hrs. The perimeter was established. Movement was heard and occasional firing was observed but no actual contact made.



Movement seemed to indicate that before midnight the enemy were around the area occupied by the force.

11 FEB 42.

0500 hrs. O.C. decided position was not tenable and force would fight its way back at first light and regain contact with own forces in the area of Reformatory rd.

0545 hrs. Withdrawal commenced and one drew fire from enemy who were on the high features in the vicinity as well as in several houses. During the withdrawal Maj Merritt, Lieuts Davidson and Eagleston were wounded and Lieut Brown reported missing. The withdrawal continued in deployed formation and under good control, but enemy fire caused a considerable number of casualties.

0900 hrs. Considerable air activity at the same time and the rear elements were machine-gunned from the air. Contact with the enemy had been broken off. During the withdrawal the force had not made contact with any formed bodies of our own tps and Capt C.H. Cousens, who was now in charge of the force learned from a patrol that a C.P. had been established near Div HQ, to where he led the Coy, arriving there about 1000 hrs, where they were joined by elements of the "X" Bn.

8 FEB 42.

0900 hrs. Maj R.F. Oakes and Maj Robertson recce the fwd areas of D Coy and then to B Coy. At about 1000 hrs enemy commenced to shell heavily the Bn area putting a considerable amount of fire down on B Coy area, forcing the recce party to cover for  $\frac{3}{4}$  hr. Enemy air activity was considerable, which was engaged mainly on recce work with occasional bombing. During the morning bombs from low-flying aeroplanes fell near Bn HQ, causing a few casualties. Maj Oakes left to take over comd 2/26 Bn and Maj. Robertson took over comd 2/19 Bn with Maj T.G. Vincent as 2 i/c. During the afternoon Bn HQ area was heavily and consistently shelled with casualties to both Bn and C Coy.

1830 hrs. Maj Robertson decided to move Bn HQ and C Coy some 600 yds EAST along the rd and a little SOUTH of it to a point 647212.

Sig officer, Lieut Minto arranged comms during the late afternoon. Bde and the arty comms had all been severed by the shelling and personnel were working in an endeavour to re-establish them.

There was normal activities, patrolling etc with occasional shelling.

2030 hrs. B and D Coys reported by telephone enemy crossing JOHORE STRAITS in small craft. Very light flares for arty defensive fire were sent up from fwd areas, but no fire from arty was produced. B Coy estimated at least 50 boats landed at Coconut Grove (No 7 Plns area). Five boats approaching the SOUTH BERI in D Coy area were driven off with losses.

Attempts to get comms through to the arty failed and no arty support was available. B Coy reported heavy fighting in the Coconut Grove area.

2130 hrs. Contact was lost with left flank of B Coy. There were also landing on No 8 Pl area, which pl suffered heavy casualties and were forced back. Lieut Barton was wounded here. Landings also took place on No 6 Plns (B Coy) area - Lieut McGee. The fighting was very confused, B Coy was still able to held its main ground while heavy enemy penetration in force was reported on the right flank and between that and the 2/18 Bn.

2255 hrs. C Coy, less one pl, were moved to area on creek approx 641219 to prevent enemy flanking movements into the rear of B Coy and between fwd areas and Bn HQ. C Coy reported at least 3 Coys of enemy moving along rd in 2/18 Bn sector and the sounds of heavy fighting in the direction of the main rd.

0400 hrs. The remnants of B Coy, who had suffered heavy casualties, were forced to withdraw and Maj Keegan, Coy comdr reported in at Bn HQ. C Coy was then withdrawn to position immediately NORTH of Bn HQ and on the NORTH side of the dirt rd ~~thru~~ with Bn HQ, protection pl etc in a perimeter SOUTH of the dirt rd.

0530 hrs. Patrols reported enemy movements EAST of Bn in the vicinity of ridge 649213. Capt Thomas with patrol was sent out in an endeavour to gain contact with A Coy and was not successful in this, being fired on from the SOUTH banks of the S. BERI. C Coy were ordered to send a fighting patrol of one pl to investigate enemy movement and if possible to get through and contact Bde HQ. Before the patrol had moved out the enemy had arrived in force and attacked Bn perimeter area which was stopped by rifle and LMG fire.

0630 hrs. D Coy ordered to withdraw and to come up in rear of Bn position, Maj Robertson having decided to endeavour to fight the way back to main rd and rejoin Bde; but the enemy were in some considerable strength. Two pls of D Coy arrived but the other two pls met with opposition and were

cut off and moved through the swamps. Maj Vincent was despatched with orders to C Coy to attack NORTH of the dirt rd in an Easterly direction conforming with Bn HQ and D Coy who were attacking SOUTH of the rd. The attack was launched with carriers in close support and succeeded in gaining about 200 yds, but were held by the enemy who were well supported by both mortars and Bn guns. Heavy casualties were sustained on both sides. Capt Hughes was reported killed in this action. 4 Carriers were disabled. 0730 hrs. About this time it became apparent that the position could not be held as the enemy was around the left flank, having captured our tpt. Contact with C Coy was lost. An effort was made to utilise a re-entrant on the right flank by changing the direction of the Bn more to the S.E. This was unsuccessful as the enemy was met in strong force and heavy machine gun fire was encountered. Maj Vincent was reported wounded in this action. Maj Robertson then ordered the withdrawal across the swamps and the upper reaches of the S. Beri. The remaining two carriers were rendered unserviceable by our own tps, one being driven over the bank into the mangrove swamps. Small parties of D Coy who failed to receive the order to withdraw from the final position engaged the enemy for some time later and were finally forced into the swamps. The tpt split into several parties whilst crossing the swamps and one party which included Majors Robertson and Keegan and Chap Greenwood and about 40 ORs, some of whom were wounded, reach the Turong Rd where the first of our other forces were contacted. The wounded were sent to an Indian hospital under the care of Padre Greenwood. Maj Robertson reported direct to GOC at HQ AIF and later to HQ 22 Aust Inf Bde at BULIM Village area.

In the engagements which took place in this area the following officer casualties were reported:-

Missing believed killed

Missing and wounded

Missing

Maj. L. Hughes

Lieut R.W. McGee

Lieut A.F. Buderus

Lieut D. Ottley

Maj T.G. Vincent


APPEN R.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
14 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend NX 60090 Lieut J.A. Varley for the M.C.

In the initial engagement, when A and B Echelon were overwhelmed, Lieut Varley showed conspicuous gallantry and leadership in the handling of his platoon which covered the withdrawal of a number of men. Later on he rejoined the Bn and showed the same conspicuous gallantry throughout the engagement at PARIT SULONG. His platoon was on the flank of the Bn and by constant aggressive action kept the enemy opposite him on the defensive for a day and night.

By personal example and courage he maintained his men's high morale after three days close fighting. In his case it was all the more praise-worthy in that his platoon had not had sufficient rest from their recent active patrolling and encounters with the enemy in the Endau district where he showed the same high quality of leadership.


  
Lt. Col.  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Comd  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

Appendix. E.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
23 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend NX 52483 Sgt Hunt W.G.  
for the ~~P.M.M.~~


In the engagement at BAKRI and PARIT SULONG  
Sgt Hunt took command of his platoon when his Pl Comd  
was wounded early in the engagement and showed conspicuous  
gallantry and leadership in the handling of his platoon.  
In the final withdrawal, his platoon was on the extreme  
flank and orders failed to reach him. He was surrounded  
by the enemy and attacked with his platoon and broke his  
way through the enemy ranks.

  
Lt. Col.  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Comd.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
23 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend NX 25576 Pte M.W.V. Curnow for the M.M.


At the engagement at BAKRI and PARIT SULONG, Pte Curnow, who was a member of the "I" Section, attached to A Coy, showed conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in constantly informing Bn HQ of enemy movement and the dispositions of his own Coy. A lot of the information brought by Pte Curnow was invaluable to us and it was often brought over country which was heavily swept by enemy fire.

  
Lt.Col.  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Comd.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
23 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend No. 3848240 Sgt Quinn J.  
of the 2 Loyals for the M.M.


At the engagement at BAKRI and PARIT SULONG  
Sgt Quinn, who was attached to the Armoured Cars, although  
badly wounded and injured, displayed conspicuous gallantry  
in the handling of his armoured car. It was his determined  
efforts that finally assisted our infantry in breaking  
through the enemy cordon to get information, ammunition  
and rations to the 2/29 Bn.

  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Lt.Col.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F. Comd.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
23 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend NX 35271 Sgt Parramore G.B.  
for the D.C.M.

During the initial enemy landings on the Island of SINGAPORE, Sgt Parramore showed conspicuous gallantry in the handling of his Carrier and in a determined attack dislodged the enemy from a ridge overlooking the main force, silencing an artillery piece and several machine guns. He handled his carrier with utmost determination and conspicuous personal gallantry.


  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Lt.Col.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F. Comd.



2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
23 Feb 42.

It is desired to recommend NX 34967 Major T.G. Vincent for the M.C.

In the engagement at BAKRI and PARIT SULONG this officer was acting as 2 i/c of the Bn and showed conspicuous gallantry and leadership throughout the engagement. He was constantly on one or the other of the fronts we were engaged on, showing complete disregard for his personal safety. He led several counter attacks and a great deal of what success was obtained, was due to his personal efforts.



Lt.Col.  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Comd.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
21 Feb 42.

RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD.

It is desired to recommend NX 28467 Sgt Tate B. of 65 Bty, 2/15 Fd Regt for the M.M.

At the engagement at PARIT SULONG during the afternoon and night of **29** Jan, Sgt Tate's gun was on the road at the end of the transport column, used for A/Tk work and normal tasks. The transport was confined to the road by two large ditches and in consequence was subjected to heavy and accurate shell fire and M G fire. Sgt Tate constantly maintained his gun in action under these difficult conditions and at night succeeded in destroying a medium enemy tank, which had penetrated the perimeter, at 50 yards range from his gun. Later that night he destroyed a further tank.

With the confined area, heavy artillery and small arms fire and the complete lack of cover it required the highest degree of courage and leadership to maintain his gun and to <sup>ful</sup> fill the tasks he was called upon to ~~fill~~ do.

*Col. Blunden*  
*Co. 2/19 Bn A.I.F.*

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
14 Feb 42.


It is desired to recommend NX 35709 Pte Williams A.A.  
for the M.M.

Throughout the engagement at BAKRI and PARIT SULONG, 18-22  
Jan, Pte Williams, who was a Bn Stretcher Bearer displayed  
outstanding courage and devotion to duty in the care and  
collection of the wounded. This was performed constantly  
under heavy shell and machine gun fire.

On 20 Jan he accompanied the bayonet charge of C Coy  
when the main road block was forced and recovered many  
wounded under heavy M.G. fire.

On Jan 21 when with D Coy at night in the close fighting  
which accompanied the penetration of our perimeter by tanks  
he was responsible for the collection and care of the wounded.

He was constantly on his task with complete disregard to  
his personal safety and fatigue.

  
Lt.Col.  
(C.G.W. Anderson) Comd.  
2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

NX

Chaplain Greenwood

attached 2/19/32 AIF

Military Cross.

In that during the attack on Singapore Island in the area north of the S. Berik on the morning of 9 Feb 42 he displayed conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He showed a complete disregard for personal safety and moved about amongst the wounded under heavy mortar & small arms fire dressing their wounds and doing all in his power to make them comfortable.

He constantly cheered and encouraged the fighting troops and by his fearless example was an inspiration to all those with whom he came into contact.

He was, with me, the last of the M.C. party to withdraw through the swamps south of the position and he attended to several wounded men during the withdrawal.

NX

Sgt. Thompson. S.

2/19/32

Distinguished Conduct Medal.

In that at the S. Berik area on the morning of 9 Feb 42 during the enemy attack on Singapore Island he displayed conspicuous gallantry & constant devotion to duty. He bombed out an enemy party which was holding up our attack and showed an absolute disregard for his personal safety in firing his rifle from an exposed position on a bare ledge & inflicting casualties on a M.C. team. He continued in this manner until wounded & by his courageous bearing encouraged the men in his vicinity to greater efforts.

Wm. G. Colman M.C.

*Duplicate must send*

*C. G. S. Under*

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

27 Feb 42.

*th. G.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS.

Omitted from the lists of names for awards for "Mention in Despatches" was the undermentioned name which should be placed on the list 5th in ~~normal~~ preference.

*order of*

NX 34741 Lieut Pickup A.C. who commanded his Carrier Pl with considerable distinction, <sup>which was</sup> continuously employed in close support of infantry, with considerable success. This officer showed great personal gallantry in the handling of his platoon.

2/19 Bn. A.I.F.  
26 Feb 42.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GALLANTRY IN THE ACTION OF BAKRI & PARIT SULONG  
JAN 18 - 22.

I wish to submit the following names for mention in despatches.

NX 70191 Capt R.W.L. Snelling, showed outstanding leadership and courage in the command of his Coy and led a splendid bayonet charge which forced the big road block at BAKRI and was severely wounded in the action and later, though twice wounded, his courage was an inspiration to all. He took charge of the wounded on the withdrawal being ordered.

NX 34771 Capt K.L. Westbrook, led his Coy with considerable distinction and was largely instrumental in organising tank hunting parties at night which led to the destruction of 6 tanks.

NX 35079 Capt L. Hughes, was the Adjutant of the Bn. He displayed the greatest resource and coolness in the control during the engagement under most difficult conditions. Also showed personal gallantry in the close fighting which took place.

NX 35027 Major R.W. Keegan, showed outstanding leadership in the command of his Coy which, though suffering severe casualties, maintained the same high morale through very difficult conditions.

NX 12527 Lieut F.R. Reynolds, although severely wounded early in the engagement, remained on duty commanding survivors of other Units for 2 days in the front line.

NX 58094 Lieut J.G. Welly, showed great leadership and courage in several attacks his Coy was employed in.

NX 34902 Lieut F.G. Beverley, commanded his Coy with distinction and was

NX 55227 WO 11 Middleton V.C.C., was conspicuous for his courage and gallantry in the handling of a 2" Mortar which was instrumental in breaking up a strong enemy attack. Throughout the engagement he showed resource and courage.

NX 52565 Cpl Robb A.S. (A Coy), throughout the engagements displayed the highest quality of leadership as a section leader and was mortally wounded at the head of his section at PARIT SULONG Bridge.

NX 35596 Sgt Smith G.M. (Pioneer Pl), showed great courage and initiative in tank hunting at night and was responsible for the destruction of several.

NX 52558 Cpl. Stein B.W. (B Coy), showed great leadership and determination in commanding his platoon after his platoon commander had been killed.


NX 52564 Sgt Leaver M.W. (Carrier Pl), commanded his carrier with great determination, engaging enemy machine guns at close quarters, covering advancing infantry.

NX 35692 Pte Trinder L.C. (B Coy), took command of the remains of his platoon after the commander and NCOs were killed or wounded, showing great qualities of leadership and personal courage.

Lt. Col.  
Comd 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

ENLARGEMENT FROM SINGAPORE & JOHORE MAPS


$3 \frac{1}{11} \cdot 3 \frac{1}{12} \cdot 3 \frac{1}{15} \cdot 3 \frac{1}{16}$



DIRT ROAD  
15 main Road  
TENGAN AERO  
to  
AMA KENG Village

On Map +  
Clay moved  
to 1830. Feb 8.

SCALE: - 4 INCHES TO 1 MILE



CONVENTIONAL SIGNS USED.

2/19 Bu has on a new Establishment of the  
the Battle of Bala + P/Salons.

There were 4 Regt Pl per Coy. and Pls were numbered

1-4 A Coy 5-8 B Coy 9-12 C Coy 13-16 D Coy  
Carriers Pl. Motor Pl. Sign. Pl. and Inspection Pl.

were known by their designations

Note. The 2 w.g. shown B Coy area. were for 1/4 MG Bz  
attached to 1/8 Bz. The w.g. Pl is a Coy area  
were from 1/4 M.P. and made known and A Coy.



FILE

1 JAN - 15 FEB

REAR