

**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

**Item number: 8/2/18**

**18 Infantry Brigade**

**January 1943**



WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 218.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

or  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.  
(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	30 Jan		Requested from 41 US Div limited scale of one-inch maps. Lieut. N.C.J. SHERWIN , LO2 evacuated to M.D.S..	
	31 Jan		Maj-Gen A.S. ALLEN CB, CBE, DSO, VD visited the Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTTEN DSO)  For period 14 Dec 42 - 22 Jan 43 see attached Report on Operations CAPE ENDAIADERE-GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA Area  On 11 Jan word was received that the Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTTEN DSO) had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by C-in-C S.W.P.A. (General Douglas MACARTHUR).	Ops. Diary and files for Jan. are attd.



# WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 21-3.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II, and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

## or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	23 Jan		<p>HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde closed 179302 at 0930 hrs reopening at SANANANDA. As a result of the increased area allotted to 18 Aust Inf Bde (7 Aust Div O.208 received at 0045 hrs 23 Jan) 18 Aust Inf Bde Op. Instn O.132 of 22 Jan was amended by O.133 of 23 Jan.</p> <p>2/10 Aust Inf Bn patrol attempted <del>to contact</del> without success, to contact right flank of 14 Aust Inf Bde.</p> <p>A congratulatory message received by Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTTEN) from Lt-Gen. E.F. HERRING CBE, DSO, MC, ED (NGF 06270).</p>	These documents are att'd to Ops Diary.
	24 Jan		<p>Active patrolling by all units in accordance with 18 Aust Inf Bde O.133. Contact made between left flank 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and right flank 14 Aust Inf Bde, direct telephone comm being installed.</p>	
	25 Jan		<p>11 stray Japs killed night 24/25 Jan. Ten Ps.W. captured at 1200 hrs. 41 US Div assumed operational control of area ORO BAY - GONA.</p> <p>Lt-Gen E.F. HERRING CBE, DSO, MC, ED, Maj-Gen GAVASEY CBE, DSO, Maj Gen the Rev. T. McCARTHY visited the Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTTEN DSO).</p> <p>HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde to forward twice daily reports on PPOPONDETTA landing strips.</p>	
	26 Jan		<p>Further report on crashed WIRRAWAY forwarded to 4 A.C. Sqn RAAF.</p> <p>Harrassing fire on MANGROVE ISLAND as result flares seen this area night 25/26 Jan 7 Japs killed by our patrols.</p>	
	27 Jan		<p>Recce party of 2/163 US Bn visited Bde area.</p> <p>B.M. (Major J.A.Y. DENNISTON) and S.C. (Capt W.R. KENT) visited HQ 41 US Div and discussed relief of 18 Aust Inf Bde by US tps.</p>	
	28 Jan		<p>Owing to difficulties of comm reports on POPONDETTA Strip could neither be collected nor passed on.</p> <p>Order for relief of 18 Aust Inf Bde by 2/163 US Bn issued at 1230 hrs</p>	See 18 Bde O.175 of 28 Jan att. & FO6 of 163 US Regt.
	29 Jan		<p>Relief of 18 Aust Inf Bde by 2/163 US Bn completed. 18 Aust Inf Bde concentrated SOPUTA area</p> <p>FO1 of 41 US Div received.</p>	

23/31 Jan '43.



to Co 18<sup>th</sup> Bn.

Plan of attack for 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 126  
to establish Bridgehead over  
Senimi Creek, night of 20/21 Dec.

1. Orders were given orally - ~~Suppl~~  
Supplimented by pointing out on ground  
and from latest air Photos.

### General Plan

(A.) Artillery: 2350 to 2400 Place  
concentration on area 292247  
South west to point of Woods  
at 291244 (Ref - Buna locality  
map). Following this fire the  
artillery to be ready to place  
fire in this area in the event  
of an enemy counterattack. Artillery  
will be informed of the forward  
location of our troops after Bridgehead  
is established

(B.) 37 mm

(for position see situation map)

2350 to 2400 Move gun to right



(2)

of Pill box and fire 30 rounds  
of Canister ammunition down  
trail.

(C) 2400 L B Co Move around  
Pill box on right of 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 126  
line cross river left of Bridge  
gain the ground on the enemy  
side and move up the trail  
towards the old strip in a  
wedge formation. The Point to  
advance 75 yards up the trail  
the Right and left flanks to  
spread out respectively 75 yards  
from either side of the trail.  
all enemy resistance within the  
wedge will be destroyed. When  
this area has been gained the  
troops will dig in, and hold  
this wedge or semi circle formation



(3)

B Co Machine gun section will be moved across at the earliest possible moment and establish fire lanes that will stop any Jap counterattacks.

(D) A Co. to be ready to move from its present position on the line. The reserve platoon will move across the bridge immediately after the Bridge head has been established. The platoon on the line will follow the reserve Platoon. A Co will extend the width of B Co to the East.

(E) C Co will remain in its present position. Immediately following A Co extension of the line they will move across the Bridge and extend the West side



Wedge.

F. Immediately following the artillery and mortar fire 2400. The troops on the East and West side of the Bobaduna trail will hold their small arms fire to the front to avoid hitting the men of B Co.

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### Suggested Plans:

1. Move troops back from present location and place artillery on the enemy position to be followed by smoke. Attack by Infantry to be made when smoke is over the enemy position on the North



Page ⑤

sides of the creek. Artillery or  
3 mks to be effective must  
be on the positions which  
have stopped two Infantry  
attacks

2. attempt to find crossing  
East of Bridge and some distance  
from the Jap defense. Come  
in on the flank of the Jap.

(Reconnaissance now being made  
on side of 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 128<sup>th</sup>) - No  
possible crossing West of trail on  
this side).

3. Move tanks up the Bridge  
and destroy enemy position  
to front. Then to follow



Page 6.  
by an Infantry attack.

Phelan M. Beaver  
May 1918



HEADQUARTERS. FIRST BATTALION  
126TH INFANTRY APO 32. WSA. WPA.

Dec 21, 1942.

1. Strength of 1st Bn. at time of attack  
at 2400h. Dec. 20, 1942.


A. CO.	OFF	E.M.	ATT MED
CO. HQ	2	15	1
1ST PLAT. DISBANCD			
2ND PLAT	0	26	
3rd PLAT.	0	29	1
WEAP. PLAT.	0	23	1
	2	93	3
B. CO			
CO HQ	2	18	
1ST PLAT		20	1
2ND PLAT.	1	20	1
3rd PLAT.		14	1
WEAP PLAT.	1	31	
	4	103	3
C. CO.			
CO HQ.	1	10	
1ST PLAT		24	1
2nd PLAT.		21	1
	1	55	2

reason for large number  
of men in Co. HQ.  
most of these men  
are unfit. names shot  
for front line duty.  
Several of these men  
cannot be trusted with  
arms.

Report to  
accompany Plan  
of attack for 18th  
Bn

BN HQ + HQ CO.		
BN HQ. sec	5	10
CO. HQ.	2	14
COMM. PLAT	0	19
P&A. PLAT	1	23
37MM PLAT		30
ATT. FROM SEC CO. 126		3
	8	99
BN. AID STAT.	3	10
AT. CO. 128		6
	18	366
		8





*Taken from BUNA Aerial Photo  
N 24. BLOWN UP SIX TIMES.*

*SITUATION MAP OF FIRST BATTALION 126 INF.  
AT 2400L 20 DEC. 42. S/SGT SWEET.*



RIFLE MEN

RIFLE MEN

BUNKER

BUNKER

50 YDS

Approximate Location

18 INCH APPROX. SLOPING BANKS

SPILES LEFT IN PLACE

WEEDS - STILL TOO DEEP FOR WADING  
WATER DEEPENS FAST - OVER HEAD  
KNEE TO WAIST DEEP

BRIDGE 3 FT. ABOVE WATER

3 STRINGERS IN BRIDGE

GOOD SOLID ROAD

BELIEVE BRIDGE WOULD SUPPORT A TANK.



52 Report  
1st. Bn. 126 Inf.

21 Dec. 1942

Subject: Report of attempted bridge head nite of  
20 Dec. 1942.

1. The 37 m.m. gun was placed in position to left of Dobodura track south of bridge. Fired 30 rounds of canister ammunition. Fired on north bank of creek, from 2350 hrs. to 2400 hrs.
2. Co. B men started moving north across creek at 2400 hrs. They moved just to west of bridge. Water at first was knee to waist deep. As they approached center of creek water became over head deep. No enemy fire up till now. Platoon leader moved west along creek in effort to find shallower crossing but ran into heavy mossy undergrowth of deep mud. Returned to bridge and he and 5 men crawled onto good section on far side. Four of men ran north on bridge to northern bank. Other two men followed close behind. As 4 men reached bank two Jap m. guns opened fire for vicinities shown on sketch. Four men dove on bank on left side of bridge and gained some protection from river bank. What they stated to be 18 inches high and gently sloping. Jap. m.g. fire was sweeping bridge knee high. And a few rifle shots were coming from both sides + front.



(2)

The two men still on bridge jumped into creek to escape m.g. fire. Ground to north of creek is very flat with no grass or other objects for concealment. The Jap. m.g. fire was very heavy, and it was impossible for any man to remain on bridge. Six men returned to south side of creek by swimming. It was necessary for two of the men to help back one of others who could not swim. The officer who was in charge of group who crossed river stated that in his belief it would be impossible to make any advance movement along northern bank of creek while Jap. m.g. were firing their grazing fire. The heavy undergrowth and mud would not permit them to cross at any other point.

3. Ten minutes after men returned to southern bank of creek the Jap m.g. again opened fire down bridge with two light m.g. and a .50 cal. m.g. which had not previously fired. Officer also stated that section still up would support a light tank, and that track on both ends of bridge was firm.

4. No casualties

Lt. Elliget

1st. Bn 52



SECRET

Adv HQ NG Force  
4 Jan 43.

Subject: Recce Report - tracks SOPUTA-BUNA Rd-  
SOPUTA-SANANANDA Rd

32 US DIV  
7 AUST DIV  
- 18 Aust Inf Bde  
GOC  
DCGS

Enclosed for information is a report on the above recce  
carried out 3 Jan 43.

*Thompson*  
for Maj-Gen  
DCGS



Left SILHAI in jeeps with Capt POCHAI, Ltut STEVENS and four native police at 0730 and proceeded to KELLY'S Camp near GIKHA.

Left KELLY'S Camp at 0900 and moved westwards through low-lying country, swampy for the most part, to BUNA VILLAGE Camp on the BUNA R., thence to the SIWORI Camp distance 30 min from the BUNA Camp. Time of arrival at SIWORI Camp 1010.

From SIWORI Camp passed on skirting a large area of land grass. Finally crossing it where it is about 300 yds wide. Moved thence through light forest country for about 200 yds, thence into a low-lying area of swampy country, thence a short distance of high land (about 250 yds), thence into swampy country again for about 400 yds, thence over a short distance of high ground to a branch of KICHINDI Cr: 1230. At this point I estimated that we were about 300/400 yds from SAHAWAIDA RD. I therefore sent native IARABA ahead alone with instructions to approach the road without being seen. He returned after an absence of 20 min and reported that near the road he heard Japanese talking. He also reported that we were only a short distance from No 2 Bridge, that our line was above it and NOT between Bridges No 1 and No 2.

The patrol therefore moved back along the track for about a mile for the purpose of locating another line of approach lower down between the two bridges.

Luncheon Camp. Time of arrival 1330.

From Luncheon Camp the patrol at 1400 moved NW through forest country and soon passed into a vast area of swamp knee and waist deep and getting deeper. Signs on trees indicated even a higher level. I therefore sent one police with a guide forward. After an absence of 20 min he returned and reported waters chest deep and a large stretch of water spreading SW.

At 1515 I sent Sgt MATTHEW, 1 police and the guide IARABA back along our line with instructions to confirm the guide's report as to the whereabouts of the bridge.

At 1545 we heard bursts of machine gun and rifle fire coming from the direction of the point we had reached at 1230.

At 1615 Sgt MATTHEW returned and confirmed the guide's report as to the position of the road and bridge. He also reported that when he was about 300 yds from the road he was seen by two snipers in a tree, one of whom blew a whistle, that immediately ground troops opened fire with machine-guns and rifles.

MATTHEW then withdrew and reported back to me.

At 1625 the patrol moved back to SIWORI Camp, thence to KELLY'S Camp arriving at that place at 1805.

I am definitely of the opinion that there is no line of march for troops between the route taken by the patrol and the coast.

REASONS.

1. My own survey line from BUNA VILLAGE to SAHAWAIDA RD 10 yrs ago took me through vast swamps and emerged at the junction of the GARARA - SAHAWAIDA Rds.
2. Our own observations and experiences after luncheon yesterday.
3. The reports of men of SIWORI and BUNA VILLAGES who were with me yesterday, before and after luncheon.



The answers to the questions (a) and (b) set out in my instructions are:-

- (a) No.
- (b) No answer required.

As to the possibilities of the route followed by the patrol, I am of the opinion:-

- 1. Troops could move along it.
- 2. It could be developed into a Jeep carrying road by approx 3000 yds of corduroy.
- 3. It could be improved by deviations into the grasslands skirted by the patrol which would reduce the length of corduroy mentioned by 500 yds.  
This route however, is NOT considered suitable for tanks unless very heavy corduroy is used.


*W.R. Humphries*  
Capt.

W.R. HUMPHRIES  
Capt AIFCAU  
4/1/1943



# LOCALITY


Scale: 4 Inches to 1 Mile




LEGEND

TIMBER		TRACK	
SWAMP		BRIDGE	
A.A. POSITION		WATERCOURSE	
HEAVY A.A.		COCONUT PLANTATION	
LIGHT A.A.		GRASSLAND	
DEFENCE POST			

WARNING  
 GRID DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH  
 THAT SHOWN ON PREVIOUS EDITION



## DIAGRAM





Report on road TARA KENA to SANANANDA.

The creek at TARA KENA is deep and unfordable at the crossing where it is about 60 feet wide.

By wading into the sea outside the mouth of the creek I have crossed to the sand spit chest deep on several occasions when no canoes were available.

From TARA KENA onwards towards SANANANDA the track for the first 1000 yards or so is only a few feet wide - the sea on one side and swamp on the other. On more than one occasion I have seen the waves sweep across the narrow trail and flow into the swamp.

Approx 1000 yards from TARA KENA the swamp recedes from the coast and there is a broad belt of sandy soil 100 yards wide in places right on to the creek marked GIRUWA on the map.

This creek is fordable at low tide if one wades out to the sand bar just beyond the actual mouth of the creek.

I regret I cannot recall the width of this creek at the crossing. I think I can say with safety that it is not more than 100 ft wide.

From the creek on to SANANANDA the road is wide and suitable for MT.

Sgd. W. R. HUMPHRIES  
Capt.

*Atkinson*  
*Capt*



HEADQUARTERS BUNA FORCES

4 Jan 43

SUBJECT: Commendations.

TO : Units Indicated Below.

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FROM C-in-C.

The GOC, NGF, has pleasure in forwarding the appended signal from the C-in-C, Allied Forces:

"Please accept yourself and convey to your staff and command hearty congratulations on the successful conclusion of operations on BUNA front. They have been thoroughly planned and valorously executed".

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ Col.

i/c Adm, Adv NGF.

ORDER OF THE DAY

by

Lt Gen E. F. HERRING C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D.

General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force  
3rd January 1943

" Now that the battle for BUNA is over and won, I desire to express to all ranks who have engaged in the battle, whether on the ground, or in the air; American and Australian alike, my heartfelt appreciation of your magnificent and prolonged effort. The enemy's defences were exceedingly strong and he fought the battle with a selfless devotion to duty that was worthy of a better cause. He had to defend an area that lent itself to defence: the going has been hard, you have performed great feats of endurance, you have overcome and borne hardships with cheerfulness and with a determination to prevail so steadfast, that your efforts have been crowned with victory.

" You have done a job of which both our countries should indeed be proud.

" The battle for BUNA is but a step on the way, we have now to clear the enemy out of SANANAIDA Area. You know what the going will be like, it will not be any easier than BUNA, but I know that you will tackle it with the same determination, and, I believe, with the same result.

" Good luck to you all."

/s/ E. F. Herring, LIEUTENANT GENERAL,  
GOC, New GUINEA Force.

*E. F. Herring*  
R. L. FICHELNERGER,  
Lt Gen, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Distribution:

(20) - 18th Aust Brig)

(20) - CO 130th Inf

(20) - CO 12th Inf

(20) - CO 12th Inf

For distribution to companies.



*Serial No 3*

*9x 28*

# FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

*Advt HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde* (Unit)

**PART A—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.**

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
	*		
	*		
<i>Brigadier</i>	1		
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors	1		
Captains	2		
Lieutenants	4		
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters	1		
Totals	9		

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

**PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.**

**Officers JOINED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**Officers QUITTED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.**

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
Brigadier	NR 7	Wentler J.F.	Brigadier General	Yes	
Major	NR 48	Dunstan J.F.	R.M.		
Capt	SR 214	Stent W.R.	32		
Capt	VX 14811	Coombes D.S.	Pres Sub		
Lieut	SR 4500	Connolly P.R.	20		
Lieut	SR 514	Wether J.F.	70		
Lieut	SR 17549	McCormack M.R.	20		
Lieut	SR 2101	Shannon M.J.	20	No	at 12345 Regt
Captain	SR 13703	Gray G.H.	Captain		at 12345 Regt

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment

See HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

(Unit)

2 Jan 42

(Date of Despatch)

*[Signature]*

(Signature of Commander)

18 Aust Inf Bde

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)







*Sgt HQ 15 Aust Lf Bde* Unit.

**PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.**

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners			Fire Control Operators			Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers			Fitters			Pattern Makers		
Armourers			Fitters and Turners			Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery			Fitters, Cycle			Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen			Fitters, Drivers			Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers			Fitter's Mates			Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors			Fitters, M.V.			Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.			Fitters, Railway Signal			Plumbers		
Blacksmiths			Fitters, Signal			Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers			Grinders			Printers		
Bricklayers			Gun Layers			Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers			G.P.O. Assistants			Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller			Gun Operators			Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner			Hammermen			Riggers		
Clerks		1	Height Takers			Riveters		
Clerks, Engineering			Helio Operators			Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply			Instrument Mechanics			Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical			Instrument Mechanics, Surgical			Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers			Instrument Operators			Sawyers		
Computers			Intelligence Duties			Shoemakers		
Concretors			Joiners			Signallers		
Cooks			Leather Stitchers			Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital			Linesmen			Stokers, Stationery Engine		
Coppersmiths			Linesmen, Signals			Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies			Lithographers			Surveyors		
Despatch Riders			Machinists			Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers			Masons			Tailors		
Draughtsmen			Masseurs			Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural			Mechanics, Dental			Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical			Mechanics, M.T.			Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal			Mechanics, Typewriter			Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical			Mechanics, Wireless			Turners		
Driver Mechanics			Millwrights			Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators			Miners			Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant			Moulders			Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters			Nursing Orderlies			Watermen		
Electricians			Nursing Orderlies (Mental)			Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units			Nurses, Trained			Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal			Observation Post Assistants			Wheelers		
Engine Artificers			Operating Room Assistants			Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C			Operators, Signal			Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers			Opticians			Woodturners		
Farriers			Painters					
<i>General Duty</i>		1						
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)		2						

Notes— (a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.  
(b) Authorized Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

*Sgt HQ 15 Aust Lf Bde* Unit.

*[Signature]* Signature of Commander.  
*S. G. 15 Aust Lf Bde*

Date of Despatch *2 Jan 42*

*[Signature]* Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.



*Serial 4*

## FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

*How HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde* (Unit)

**PART A—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.**

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
<i>Brigadier</i> *			
Lieut.-Colonels	1		
Majors	1		
Captains	2		
Lieutenants	4		
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters	1		
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9</b>		

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

**PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.**

**Officers JOINED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**Officers QUITTED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.**

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
Major	NA 7	Wester J F	Infantry	Yes	
Major	NA 43	Dennis G J	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 214	Wester J F	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 4577	Kennedy W	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 9000	Kennedy W	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 214	Wester J F	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 17249	McEwen J A	Infantry	Yes	
Capt	NA 3101	Wester J F	Infantry	Yes	
Captain	NA 17383	Gray S A	Infantry	Yes	

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment

4th 18 Aust Inf Bde  
(Unit)

9 Jan 43  
(Date of Despatch)

Thos R L P [Signature]  
(Signature of Commander)  
28th Aust Inf Bde  
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)







*Adv HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde* Unit.

**PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.**

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners			Fire Control Operators			Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers			Fitters			Pattern Makers		
Armourers			Fitters and Turners			Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery			Fitters, Cycle			Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen			Fitters, Drivers			Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers			Fitter's Mates			Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors			Fitters, M.V.			Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.			Fitters, Railway Signal			Plumbers		
Blacksmiths			Fitters, Signal			Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers			Grinders			Printers		
Bricklayers			Gun Layers			Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers			G.P.O. Assistants			Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller			Gun Operators			Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner			Hammermen			Riggers		
Clerks		1	Height Takers			Riveters		
Clerks, Engineering			Helio Operators			Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply			Instrument Mechanics			Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical			Instrument Mechanics, Surgical			Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers			Instrument Operators			Sawyers		
Computers			Intelligence Duties			Shoemakers		
Concretors			Joiners			Signallers		
Cooks			Leather Stitchers			Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital			Linesmen			Stokers, Stationery Engine		
Coppersmiths			Linesmen, Signals			Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies			Lithographers			Surveyors		
Despatch Riders			Machinists			Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers			Masons			Tailors		
Draughtsmen			Masseurs			Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural			Mechanics, Dental			Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical			Mechanics, M.T.			Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal			Mechanics, Typewriter			Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical			Mechanics, Wireless			Turners		
Driver Mechanics			Millwrights			Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators			Miners			Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant			Moulders			Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters			Nursing Orderlies			Watermen		
Electricians			Nursing Orderlies (Mental)			Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units			Nurses, Trained			Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal			Observation Post Assistants			Wheelers		
Engine Artificers			Operating Room Assistants			Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C			Operators, Signal			Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers			Opticians			Woodturners		
Farriers			Painters					
<i>General Duty</i>		1						
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)		2						

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.  
(b) Authorized Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

*Adv HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde* Unit.

*Thos E. Colvin*  
Signature of Commander.

Date of Despatch *9 June 42*

*7 Aust Div A.C. 18 Aust Inf Bde*  
Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.



*Serial No 5*

## FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

*Adv HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde* (Unit)

**PART A—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.**

1 Ranks	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	3 Surplus to Establishment	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
* Bryden			
Lieut.-Colonels	1		
Majors	1		
Captains	2		
Lieutenants	4		
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters	2		
<b>Totals</b>	<b>10</b>		

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

**PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.**

**Officers JOINED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**Officers QUITTED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.**

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
Regimental	NX 4	Whiston J J	BM	Yes	
Major	NX 48	Dominion J G	BM	Yes	
Capt	SX 214	Mont W R	SC	Yes	
Capt	VX 10577	Smith J C	SC	Yes	
Lieut	OX 9500	Smith J G	I.O.	Yes	
Lieut	OX 519	Smith J J	I.O.	Yes	
Lieut	OX 2101	Smith J G	I.O.	Yes	
Lieut	OX 17549	Smith J G	I.O.	Yes	
Platoon	SX 17383	Smith J G	Platoon	Yes	Platoon
Platoon	N 0160	Smith J G	Platoon	Yes	Platoon

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment

1st A Coy 1st Div  
(Unit)  
16 April 1943  
(Date of Despatch)

*[Signature]*  
(Signature of Commander)  
7 April 1943  
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)











*Serial No 6*

**FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS**

*Advt HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (Unit)*

**PART A—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.**

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
*			
<i>Brigadier</i>			
Lieut.-Colonels	1		
Majors	1		
Captains	2		
Lieutenants	4		
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters	2		
Totals	10		

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

**PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.**

**Officers JOINED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**Officers QUITTED during week.**

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

**PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.**

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
Brigadier	MA 7	Wentham G. J.	Appointment Base Comd	yes	
Major	MA 45	Denmiston J. J.	GM	yes	
Capt	SA 214	Stent W.R.	SC	yes	
Capt	VA 14577	Boonbe D. E.	Base Comd	yes	
Lieut	SA 9500	Connolly P. B.	FO	yes	
Lieut	SA 519	Cutler J. J.	FO	yes	
Lieut	SA 2101	Sherrin W. J. E.	LO	yes	
Lieut	SA 17349	McCalm	LO	yes	
Chaplain	N 0100	Walter R. A. W.	Chaplain	no	at HQ
Chaplain	SA 40254	Morris J. J.	Chaplain	no	at HQ

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment

Order HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

(Unit)

23 Jan 43

(Date of Despatch)

*[Signature]* Capt  
7 Aust Div. 18 Aust Inf Bde

(Signature of Commander)

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)











*Serial No 7*

## FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

*Advt HQ 18 Aust L Force* (Unit)

### PART A—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached)	Surplus to Establishment	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment.)
	*		
	*		
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors	1		
Captains	2		
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants	4		
Quartermasters			
<i>Squad</i>			
Totals	10		

\* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

### PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

#### Officers JOINED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

#### Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank	Name	Corps	Date	Cause

### PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank	Name and Initials	Corps	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)



PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers Posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed
Major	1217	Wentworth J.F.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1218	Wentworth J.G.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1219	Wentworth J.H.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1220	Wentworth J.I.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1221	Wentworth J.K.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1222	Wentworth J.L.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1223	Wentworth J.M.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1224	Wentworth J.N.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1225	Wentworth J.O.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1226	Wentworth J.P.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1227	Wentworth J.Q.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1228	Wentworth J.R.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1229	Wentworth J.S.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1230	Wentworth J.T.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1231	Wentworth J.U.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1232	Wentworth J.V.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1233	Wentworth J.W.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1234	Wentworth J.X.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1235	Wentworth J.Y.	1st Cavalry	Yes	
Major	1236	Wentworth J.Z.	1st Cavalry	Yes	

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held	Personal Number	Name and Initials	Corps	Date of attachment	Nature of attachment

1st Cavalry (Unit)  
30 Jan 43 (Date of Despatch)

[Signature] (Signature of Commander)  
NGF (Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving)











*War Diary*

Army Form 28  
Adapted, Large  
(Pads of 100)  
Reprinted March, 1942—a.w. 10m pads.

# MESSAGE FORM

**CA.  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS.**

IN  
  
OUT

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STA  
No. of Groups  
GR.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 2/9 2/10 2/12 Aust Inf Bns Rptd 7 Aust Div

FROM 18 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's Number  
0.132

Date  
23

In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally)	Map	(.)	GONA	LOCALITY	5
(Revised)	4	inches	to	1 mile	10
(.)	Infra	(.)	All	organised	15
enemy	resistance	area	GIRUWA	SANANAIDA	20
CAPE	KILLERTON	has	been	overcome	25
(.)	US	tps	are	holding	30
coastline	East	of	GIRUWA	(.)	35
DEFENTION	(.)	18	Aust	Inf	40
Bde	will	consolidate	coastline	FROM	45
incl	GIRUWA	LAGOON	2229	to	50
incl	CAPE	KILLERTON	1831	(.)	55
Method	(.)	A	and	C	60
Coys	2/10	Bn	revert	cond	65
parent	unit	forthwith	(.)	Beach	70
Sectors	(.)	2/12	Bn	(.)	75
incl	West	bank	GIRUWA	LAGOON	80
224293	to	excl	creek	mouth	85
217295	(.)	2/9	Bn	(.)	90
incl	creek	mouth	217295	to	95
incl	clearing	at	208298	(.)	100
2/10	Bn	(.)	excl	clearing	105
at	208298	to	incl	CAPE	110
KILLERTON	(.)	Bns	will	patrol	115
areas	as	follows	at	least	120
twice	daily	and	will	destroy	125
or	capture	enemy	wherever	found	130

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: \*(EXCEPT) WIRELESS  
SIGNATURE *[Signature]*  
ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.  
SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.H.I.

T.O.R.



# MESSAGE FORM

**CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.**

IN  
 OUT

No. of Groups  
**GR.**

Serial No.  
 OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO (2)

FROM

Originator's Number      Date      In Reply to Number

<i>(Write horizontally)</i>				
(.)	2/12	Bn	(.)	area
south	of	beach	from	South
end	GIRUWA	LAGOON	to	incl
road	bend	214291	(.)	2/9
Bn	(.)	area	south	of
beach	from	road	bend	214291
to	incl	clearing	south	of
Western	boundary	(.)	2/10	Bn
from	track	junc	181311	to
cross	tracks	178304	to	incl
village	1830	thence	right	boundary
(.)	ALL	bns	will	arrange
organised	beach	defence	throughout	their
area	(.)	ACK		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS: **(EXCEPT)** WIRELESS

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

\* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

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SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
 DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN  
**1531**

**T.H.I.**

**T.O.R.**

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SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER



W.D.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

CAUTION AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN  
OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)  
TO 2/7 Aust. Cav. Regt, Bde, 2/16 Aust. Caval. Regt, 5/18 Aust. Cav. Regt, det 2/4 Aust. Fd Coy  
2/9, 2/10, 2/12 Aust. Inf. Bde, det 2/5 Aust. Fd Amb, det 10 Aust. Fd Amb

FROM 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.      Originator's Number 0133      Date 22      In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally) GENERALS	BLAMEY	HERRING	and	VASEY	5
have	each	expressed	their	hottest	10
congratulations	and	gratitude	to	the	15
Brigadier	commanding	and	all	commanders	20
officers	and	other	ranks	of	25
the	18	Aust	Inf	Bde	30
Gp	for	the	carefully	planned	35
and	magnificently	executed	operations	which	40
have	resulted	in	the	capture	45
of	SANANANDA	and	the	coastline	50
from	GIRUWA	to	CAPE	KILLERTON	55
and	completion	of	the	virtual	60
clearing	of	JAPANESE	from	PAPUA	65
of	Brigadier	WOOTEN	congratulates	all	70
ranks	of	the	Bde	Gp	75
on	their	sustained	efforts	under	80
most	trying	conditions	in	the	85
recent	fighting	and	on	the	90
outstanding	success	which	they	have	95
achieved	of	to	be	brought	100
to	the	notice	of	all	105
troops	under	command	addresses	of	110
ACU	all	informed			115
					120
					125
					130

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: ( ) WIRELESS				THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.				ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY				TIME OF ORIGIN 1530	
SIGNATURE				SIGNATURE								T.H.I.	
* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."												T.O.R.	
(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)													
SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER		



W.D.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN  
OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO 2/7 Aust. Cav. Regt, 15th Aust. 2/16 Aust. Ambr. Regt, 5/1 Bty 2/1 Aust. Fd Regt, det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy  
2/9, 2/10, 2/12 Aust. Inf. Bns, det 2/5 Aust Fd Ambr, det 10 Aust Fd Ambr

FROM 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. GP  
Originator's Number 0133  
Date 22  
In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally) GENERALS	BLAMEY	HERRING	and	VASEY	5
has	each	expressed	their	hottest	10
congratulations	and	gratitude	to	the	15
Brigade	commanding	and	all	commanders	20
officers	and	other	ranks	of	25
the	18	Aust	Inf	Bde	30
GP	for	the	carefully	planned	35
and	magnificently	executed	operations	which	40
has	resulted	in	the	capture	45
of	SANANANDA	and	the	entire	50
from	CIRUWA	to	CAPE	KILLERTON	55
and	completion	of	the	virtual	60
clearing	of	JAPANESE	from	PAPUA	65
0	Brigade	WOOTTEN	congratulates	all	70
ranks	of	the	Bde	GP	75
on	their	sustained	efforts	under	80
most	trying	conditions	in	the	85
valiant	fighting	and	on	the	90
standing	success	which	they	has	95
achieved	0	to	be	brought	100
to	the	notice	of	all	105
troops	under	command	addresses	0	110
ACK	all	informed			115
					120
					125
					130

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SIGNATURE  
\* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

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SIGNATURE

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN  
1530

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.H.I.  
T.O.R.



**W.D**

**MESSAGE FORM**

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

**CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.**

IN  
OUT

No. of Groups  
**GR.**

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO **4 A.C. Sqn RAAF**

FROM **18 Aust Inf Bde**

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

**0134**

**22**

(Write horizontally)

5				
10	Generals	BLANEY	HERRING	and
15	have	sent	expressed	their
20	appreciation	and	gratitude	to
25	Brigadier	Commander	and	at
30	Woods	and	the	rate
35	the	18	Aust	Inf
40	Sp	he	the	careful
45	and	unusually	executed	operations
50	have	resulted	in	the
55	of	SANANANDA	and	the
60	from	GIRUWA	to	CAPE
65	and	the	completion	of
70	initial	change	of	JAPANESE
75	PAPUA	of	Brigadier	WOOTEN
80	to	express	his	thanks
85	appreciation	for	the	will
90	operation	cooperation	of	4 A.C. Sqn
95	units	assist	operations	from
100	WAPAKERE	to	SANANANDA	CAPE
105				
110				
115				
120				
125				
130				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT <b>AS WRITTEN</b> BY ANY MEANS: ( ) WIRELESS				THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT <b>IN CYPHER</b> IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.				ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY				TIME OF ORIGIN			
SIGNATURE				SIGNATURE								1130			
* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."												T.H.I.			
(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)															
SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER				
												T.O.R.			



MESSAGE FORM

CAUTION  
AND  
INSTRUCTIONS.

IN  
OUT

**W.I.D.**

No. of Groups  
GR.

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 4 A.C. Sqn RAAF

FROM 18 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's Number  
0134

Date  
22

In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally)

5				
10	Generals	BLANEY	HERRING	and VASEY
15	have	each	expressed	their
20	compassionate	and	gratitude	to
25	Brigades	Commandy	and	all
30	of	and	the	of
35	the	18	of	of
40	of	for	the	of
45	and	magnificently	executed	operations
50	have	resulted	in	the
55	of	SANANANDA	and	the
60	from	GIRUWA	to	CAPE
65	and	the	completion	of
70	of	of	JAPANESE	from
75	PAPUA	of	Brigades	WOOTEN
80	to	express	his	Thanks
85	Appreciation	for	the	Willing
90	expectation	cooperation	of 4 A.C. Sqn	and RAAF
95	during	of	operations	from
100	ENDAIDERE	to	SANANANDA	CAPE
105				
110				
115				
120				
125				
130				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: ( ) WIRELESS

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNATURE  
\* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

SIGNATURE

1630.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER



War Diary.

SUB MACHINE GUNS.

HQ 18 AustvInf Bde.  
25 Jan 43.

N.G.FORCE.

1. In view of the possibility of replacement of automatic weapons at present held by units by new weapons from Ordnance, it is desired if possible, that units of this Bde be issued with the OWEN SMG in preference to TSMG.
2. It is considered essential that only one type of SMG be issued to avoid complexity of amm supply.

(G.F. WOOTTEN) Brig.  
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.



*War Diary*

Army Form C.2128  
(Adapted, L.A.R.)  
(Pads of 100)  
Reprinted March, 1942—a.w. 10m pads.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN  
OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 2/9 2/10 2/12 Aust Inf Bns Rptd 7 Aust Div

FROM 18 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's Number  
0.132

Date  
23

In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally)

Ref	Map	(.)	GONA	LOCALITY	5
(Revised)	4	inches	to	1 mile	10
(.)	Infs	(.)	All	organised	15
enemy	resistance	area	GIRUWA	SAHANANDA	20
CAPE	KILLERTON	has	been	overcome	25
(.)	US	tps	are	holding	30
coastline	East	of	GIRUWA	(.)	35
INTENTION	(.)	is	Aust	Inf	40
Bde	will	consolidate	coastline	<del>to</del> FROM	45
incl	GIRUWA	LAGOON	2229	to	50
incl	CAPE	KILLERTON	1831	(.)	55
Method	(.)	A	and	S	60
Coys	2/10	In	revert	cond	65
parent	unit	forthwith	(.)	Beach	70
Sectors	(.)	2/12	In	(.)	75
incl	West	bank	GIRUWA	LAGOON	80
234293	to	excl	creek	mouth	85
217295	(.)	2/9	In	(.)	90
incl	creek	mouth	217295	to	95
incl	clearing	at	200293	(.)	100
2/10	In	(.)	excl	clearing	105
at	200293	to	incl	CAPE	110
KILLERTON	(.)	Bde	will	patrol	115
areas	as	follows	at	least	120
twice	daily	and	will	destroy	125
or	capture	enemy	wherever	found	130

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: \*(EXCEPT) WIRELESS

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNATURE *[Signature]*  
\* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER



# MESSAGE FORM

**CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.**

IN  
OUT

No. of Groups  
**GR.**

Serial No.  
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

(2)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally)

(.)	2/13	Bn	(.)	area	5
south	of	beach	from	South	10
end	GIRUWA	LAGOON	to	incl	15
road	beach	214391	(.)	2/9	20
Bn	(.)	area	south	of	25
beach	from	road	beach	214391	30
to	incl	clearing	south	of	35
Western	boundary	(.)	2/10	Bn	40
from	track	junc	181311	to	45
cross	tracks	178334	to	incl	50
village	1830	thence	right	boundary	55
(.)	All	bus	will	arrange	60
organised	beach	defence	throughout	their	65
area	(.)	ACK			70
					75
					80
					85
					90
					95
					100
					105
					110
					115
					120
					125
					130

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS: **(EXCEPT)** WIRELESS

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER** IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNATURE

*[Handwritten Signature]*

SIGNATURE

\* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

1531

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER



LOC-L NEWS TO 2300 L/ 15

The award of the Victoria Cross (Posthumously) to OX1071 Cpl J.A. French for gallantry in action at MILNE BAY has been announced.

The Company of which Cpl French was a member was attacking a Japanese position on the GORONI RIVER about one mile from K.B. Mission during the afternoon of 4 September 1942. The advance of the section of which Cpl French was the commander was held up by the fire from three enemy machine gun posts.

Ordering his section to take cover, this N.C.O. advanced and silenced one of the posts with grenades. His supply of grenades being exhausted he returned to the section, obtained more grenades, and again advanced and silenced the second post. Armed with a T.S.M.G. he then attacked the third post, firing from the hip as he went forward. He was seen to be hit hard by the fire from this post but continued to advance. The enemy gun was heard to cease fire and the section then pushed on. It was found that all members of the three enemy gun crews had been killed and that Cpl French had died in front of the third gun pit.

By his cool courage and disregard of his own personal safety Cpl French undoubtedly saved many casualties amongst the members of his section and was greatly instrumental in allowing the attack to continue.

- SUMMARY OF ABC NEWS BULLETIN 1900L/ 15 -JAPANESE ATTACKED NEAR SALAMUA

The outstanding feature of General MacArthur's communique to-day was the report that fighting is proceeding around MUBO, about 15 miles south of SALAMUA. Our troops made a surprise attack. A total of 116 enemy dead have been counted. It is not easy to obtain a true picture of the extent of the fighting but it is more than a patrol action. The attack was made by Australians who had been living for some time in rugged bush country. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise.

Both sides had to rely on light infantry weapons and machine guns. The air cooperation with our ground troops was excellent. A constant attack on the enemy positions was maintained.

The SALAMUA area was attacked on Wednesday by our Liberator units. GASMATA and MADANG were also attacked.

A Japanese patrol has been sighted north of GOMA. It is thought that this is a remnant of the GOMA garrison. There is no news of a Japanese force moving down the coast following the landing of some troops near LAE recently. Bad weather has hampered fighting around SANAMANDA.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CONTINUES

The Russian offensive in the Northern Caucasus and in the Lower DON continues. Marshal Timoshenko is said to be commanding the Soviet thrust at LENINGRAD. At STALINGRAD the Russians continue to wear down German resistance.

AUSTRALIAN NEWS

The Commonwealth Government is considering imposing a 30-mile-per-hour speed limit all over Australia.

More than 3000 telephone numbers in Australian capital cities will be altered soon. They will be announced in the next directory.

- RELIGIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT -

R.C. Mass will be celebrated on Sunday January 17 at No 37 Radio Station (Workshop Area) at 1000 hrs.

Confessions, Saturday January 16 from 1900 hrs in Chaplain's tent, Div HQ.

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PART I

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 16 AUS INF BDE OP AT CAPE HINDAIADERE,  
GISSA POINT AND BAHARANDA AREA - 14 DEC 42/23 JAN 43.

Ref Maps:- BUHA LOCALITY REVISED Approx 4" to 1 mile.  
GONA LOCALITY REVISED Approx 4" to 1 mile.  
BUHA (SECOND EDITION) 1" to 1 mile.

PRELIMINARY.

1. On 8 Dec 42 Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTEN DSO) was making a recon of GOODENOUGH ISLAND where 2/12 Aust Inf Bn was stationed.
2. At this time 16 Aust Inf Bde was disposed as follows:-

(a)	Hq 16 Aust Inf Bde	-	MILNE BAY
(b)	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	MILNE BAY
(c)	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	WANIGELA and PORLOCK HARBOUR.
(d)	2/18 Aust Inf Bn	-	GOODENOUGH ISLAND.
3. On 8 Dec a message was received from MILNE BAY for Bde Comd to return forthwith to MILNE BAY. Passage was made by HMAS BROOME and, on arrival at MILNE BAY at approximately 1900 hrs, Bde Comd learnt from Maj-Gen. C.A. GLOWES that he was to report to C-in-C at MORESBY on the following day.
4. Bde Comd and B.M. left by plane for MORESBY at 0600 hrs 10 Dec arriving there at 1050 hrs when Bde Comd received verbal instructions from the C-in-C (Gen. Sir THOMAS BLANEY).

TASK OF BDE.

5. C-in-C informed Bde Comd that the advance of 32 US Div from the South was held up at CAPE HINDAIADERE on the general line of the NEW STRIP, from the West at BUHA VILLAGE which was in our hands, and from the South at approx track junc 362255. In accordance with HQF Op In-tnc Nos. 49 and 51 two Australian inf bns and two tys of tks were to be moved to CAPE HINDAIADERE area where Brig. WOOTEN, who was to fly there immediately was to assume comd of this force to clear up the area of NEW STRIP and OLD STRIP to BUHA MISION held by the enemy.
6. It was intended that the two Australian bns should be 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and one bn from 7 Aust Inf Bde.
7. In accordance with Brig WOOTEN's request it was subsequently directed by the C-in-C that the second bn should be 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and that that bn should be relieved of its responsibilities at WANIGELA and PORLOCK HARBOUR by a bn of 7 Aust Inf Bde. The necessary administrative arrangements were completed with Col WHITE (GS HQF) and NOIC.

11 Dec.

8. At dawn Bde Comd flew to POPONDETTA where he conferred with Lt-Gen HERRING, GOC HQF and DSO (Brig. HOPKINS) at AIV HQF. Later he flew with DSO to DOBODURA where he met Lt-Gen RICHENBERGER, Comd 1 US Army Corps who had assumed personal direction of ops of 32 US Div.
9. During the afternoon Comd and DSO reconed area of the NEW STRIP where 188 US Regt was held up by the enemy on the general line of the NEW STRIP from the sea to the main DOBODURA track. Comd spent the night at 32 US Div.
10. B.M. flew to MILNE BAY and reported to GOC MILNE FORGE. Details of move of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and att'd Engnr and Medical personnel were arranged at a conference at Force Hq attended by GSO I, AQ, CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn, BN and IO. At this conference it was arranged that MILNE FORGE should be responsible for the movement of all units and att'd units 16 Aust Inf Bde until their arrival at HARIKO 3222.



11. At a conference at 18 Aust Inf Bde HQ, BM arranged the composition of skeleton Adv HQ to move by sea and for the following recon party to fly to MORESBY - BM, Bde Sig Offr, IO and Engr Offr 2/4 Aust Fa Coy. Recon party departed by air for MORESBY at 1600 hrs.
12. It was arranged by Col. WHITE that Lt-Col. C.R. HODGSON (2/6 Aust Armd Regt) should join this recon party.

12 Dec.

13. Bde recon party flew to DOBODURA, arriving at about 0800 hrs, and proceeded to HQ 32 US Div, reporting to Bde Comd.
14. At approximately 1100 hrs a conference was held at 32 US Div attended by GOC NGF (Lt-Gen HERRING), Commanding General US Corps (Lt-Gen RICHELBERGER), Commanding General 32 US Div (Brig-Gen. BYERS), Bde Comd and BGS.
15. At this conference it was decided that at a time to be notified by him after the arrival of tps of 18 Aust Inf Bde, Brig. WOOTTEN should assume comd of the NEW STRIP sector with under comd 128 US Regt (Comd, Col MARTIN) comprising 1/126, 1/128 and 3/128 US Bns and attd adm units.
16. At approximately 1300 hrs Bde Comd and Bde recon party moved fwd from HQ 32 US Div to proposed site for Bde HQ on the coastal track at 308238.
17. At 0730 hrs Bde HQ and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn sailed from GILI GILI in HMAS "COLAC", "BROOME" and "BALLARAT".
18. CO 2/10 Aust Inf Bn who had flown from WANIGELA to MILNE BAY accompanied HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.
19. During the night 12/13 Dec the convoy approached CAPE SUDEST and were met by barges which brought fwd CO's 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns and one pl 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to HARIKO.
20. At this time news was heard of a Japanese naval force approaching BUNA and the convoy returned to PORLOCK HARBOUR.

13 Dec.

21. During the day detailed recon of fwd posns on the line of NEW STRIP were made by CO's 2/6 Aust Armd Regt, 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns. On the night 13/14 Dec convoy arrived at ORO BAY where tps were disembarked, marched two miles West along coast and rested.
22. One tp of four tks which had been landed at HARIKO the previous night were moved up the beach across the entrance of creek 315236 to tank lying up area approximately 310236.
23. For this move aircraft noise camouflage was requested through 32 US Div but did not eventuate.

14 Dec.

24. CO's recon of fwd areas were completed. Personnel of HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn set off from ORO BAY at first light to march overland, arriving area HARIKO where they spent the night and moved on to Bde HQ and Bn bivouac areas respectively at first light 15 Dec.
25. This march was one of a most exhausting nature involving as it did marching in battle order along almost continual soft sand and the crossing of the SAMBOGA RIVER which was chest high and in a hot muggy atmosphere.
26. At this stage a reference may well be made to the tenuous nature of the L of C for the area which depended alternately on air from MORESBY, which was liable to interruption both by enemy action and bad weather and which depended further for its extension from DOBODURA on a native track ill-suited to the Jeep traffic it was called upon to bear and where frequent bogging was almost inevitable, and, on the other hand, upon small boats from ORO BAY which were both insufficient in number and again most susceptible to enemy action.



27. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn personnel rested in bivouac area. Coy Goals, pl  
goals, and section leaders made recess of fwd area.

28. Australian tps available to Bde Comd in the area at this stage were:-

- (a) Hq 16 Aust Inf Bde.
- (b) One tp 2/6 Aust Armd Regt.
- (c) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp (comprising 5 carriers).
- (d) Det 2/4 Aust Pa Coy.
- (e) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- (f) Det 2/5 Aust Pa Armd.

29. Arty already in the area comprised:-

MANNING Tp 2/1 Aust Ar Regt of four 25-pdrs (29252340).  
HALL Tp 2/5 Aust Pa Regt of four 25-pdrs (31702230).  
O'HARE Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty of three 3.7" hpws and  
one 105 mm gun (240190).

These tps were widely dispersed from each other and depended on different  
lines of supply and means of tpt for their sup.

30. On night 15/16 Dec second tp of four tks of 2/6 Aust Armd Regt  
disembarked at HARIO and moved straight up beach to tk lying up area.

16 Dec.

31. Unit recess continued. Bde Comd conferred with Lt-Gen EICHENBERGER,  
Col MARTIN and Col HARDING (US Apty) at 1500 hrs. At this conference it  
was decided that Bde Comd should assume comd of the sector on 17 Dec.  
and that an arty C.P. should be established at Bde Hq.

32. From patrols, air photographs and intelligence sources it was known  
that the enemy was firmly entrenched along the line of NEW STRIP, in  
depth through the CAPE ENDAIADERE coconut area and in depth along OLD  
STRIP while the bridge at 294244 was covered by pill boxes sited in  
depth both fwd of and on his own side of the bridge.

33. Enemy pill box pens were both numerous and strong and had proved  
practically impervious to gunfire with instantaneous fuse. These  
pill boxes were so sited as to be mutually supporting while they were  
themselves inter-connected by a series of fire and crawl trenches.

34. As a result of his appreciation, Bde Comd had decided to attack on  
a one bn front past the East end of NEW STRIP up the coast to CAPE  
ENDAIADERE and thence West to the line of SEMMI CREEK with the object  
not only of clearing this area of enemy and facilitating supply by sea  
but of turning the enemy's flank by securing a bridgehead over the  
SEMMI CREEK in the vicinity of its mouth. At the same time US tns were  
to maintain pressure and gain all possible ground to their respective  
fronts.

35. At this time US tps were disposed as follows:-

On the right 3/126 US Bn from the coast to approximately the  
dispersal bays at the East end of the NEW STRIP, thence 1/126 US Bn to  
approximately 297243 while 1/126 US Bn was astride the DOBODURA track  
South of BRIDGE 294244.

36. After recess it had been appreciated that the CAPE ENDAIADERE  
coconut plantation area was suitable for the employment of tks operating  
in close conjunction with inf.

37. Attd as Appx "A" are notes dealing in detail with the tactical  
employment of tks in these and subsequent ops.



17 Dec.

- 38. At 0900 hrs in accordance with Lt-Gen EICHELBERGER's direction, G. WOOTTEN notified all units in the area of his assumption of comd of the NEW STRIP sector.
- 39. 18 Aust Inf Bde Op Operation Order No. 1 was issued (Copy att'd as Appx "B").
- 40. Bde Comd conferred with Lt-Gen HERRING and Lt-Gen EICHELBERGER at HARIKO at 1400 hrs.
- 41. Between 1800 and 1930 hrs tks were moved fwd from lying up area to FUP. For this move aircraft noise camouflage again did not materialise, despite assurances that it would be available. From the fwd areas however it was reported that it was unlikely that the noise would have been heard, and, if heard at all, would probably be confused with aircraft. This assumption was subsequently borne out by interrogation of P.W.

18 Dec.

ATTACK BY 2/9 AUST INF BN ON CAPE ENDAIADERE.

- 42. Preceded by arty shoot on registered targets, this attack was launched at 0700 hrs and was gallantly and brilliantly executed. Though heavy casualties were suffered, such dash was displayed that the coastline West of CAPE ENDAIADERE was reached at 0800 hrs and though long and bitter hours of fighting and mopping up remained, the backbone of the Japanese resistance in this area was broken. Casualties in the initial stages were heavy but this was unavoidable. They would however have been far heavier had the attack not been pressed home with the determination that was shown.
- 43. In this first attack the area taken was that lying approximately between the North-South 303 grid line and the coast, but narrowing between the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP and the coast owing to strongly held and fortified Japanese positions in these dispersal areas.
- 44. Both Capt H.G. WHITHEAD and Lt-Col G.R. HODGSON of 2/6 Aust Armd Regt were wounded in the early stages of the action and two tks were made early casualties - one by Molotov cocktail and the second when its engine failed while alongside burning am dump which set it on fire. The cooperation between tks and inf had left nothing to be desired and the momentum of the attack was never allowed to slacken.
- 45. By 1500 hrs the area captured had been generally cleared of enemy and mopped up but a strong enemy centre of resistance consisting of approximately 20 pill boxes situated at the dispersal bays at East end of NEW STRIP had resisted all attempts to subdue it. At approx 1600 hrs an attack by two coys 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and four tks was made upon it. Hard and continuous fighting ensued in this locality for approx two hours but at 1800 hrs approx the strong point was reduced. This eliminated the bottle neck East of NEW STRIP.
- 46. By nightfall the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP, thence North approximately along the 302 North South grid line was in our hands.
- 47. Casualties suffered by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn during the day were -  
Offrs; 5 killed 6 wounded, ORs; 44 killed 105 wounded.
- 48. Tk casualties during the day totalled two burnt out (mentioned above) and one requiring considerable repairs to vision slits which had been badly splintered by MG fire.
- 49. During the night 18/19 Dec 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys arrived at bivouac area previously occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn at HARIKO.



19 Dec.

50. The days operations consisted in completing mopping up of <sup>the</sup> area gained, in minor advances to straighten out line on West end in establishing firm contact between left flank 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and right flank of 3/128 US Bn across East end of NEW STRIP.

51. The enemy, dislodged from his strongpoints at the East end of NEW STRIP by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on 12 Dec abandoned his hold on the STRIP during the day and by nightfall it was in our hands.

52. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had now concentrated in bivouac area previously occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn while further troops had arrived to replace casualties.

53. It was decided to continue operation on 20 Dec and in order to strengthen 2/9 Aust Inf Bn for the purpose of exploring and exploiting all possibilities of securing bridgehead over SIKHAI GK, C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was placed under command 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.



64. To move the bn across the swamp was to prove a slow and arduous task but one which, successfully completed by early morning of 23 Dec, was to take the enemy completely by surprise and to give us possession of the vital bridge which in turn was to give us access to the OLD STRIP almost without casualties. The enemy had deemed the country impassable and had neglected it in his defensive plan - refusal to accept the "impassability" of the ground gained both surprise and immediate success.

65. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn were engaged during day in mopping up ground gained in straightening out the line and in reorganisation for attack on 23 Dec.

23 Dec.

66. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued the operation by attacking to the west supported by tanks which were themselves greatly restricted in their manoeuvre by the swampy nature of the ground and by nightfall had captured the whole area bounded by the SIMEMI CR to the west and by the coast to the North and East.

67. The enemy continued to hold one post on a small island in the mouth of SIMEMI CR which was to prove a source of annoyance until the end of the action. It was decided not to attempt to attack this as it was considered to do so would only be to result in heavy casualties without due reward for it had been found that no practicable tank crossing existed along the whole length of SIMEMI CR.

68. Although, in fact, it was not found practicable to attempt to cross the SIMEMI CR near its mouth without bridging this possibility remained as a constant threat to the enemy during the operation. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn made, in fact, no further attacks but their presence along the bank of the SIMEMI CR resulted in great interference with the enemy's power of movement and necessitated his employing a considerable portion of his force to guard against this threat to his left flank and rear.

69. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn were to remain in control of this area until the successful conclusion of ops. This entailed a high standard of discipline on the part of all ranks as they were constantly subject to enemy fire and in addition to some of the overruns from our own troops attacking Jap positions on the OLD STRIP from the West and NW.

23 Dec.

70. By first light 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less one coy were in position across SIMEMI CR at SE end of OLD STRIP.

71. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn were ordered to extend from present bridgehead over the SIMEMI CR SE to take in BRIDGE at 294244 and to ensure that bridgehead was in sufficient depth to allow engineers to repair bridge for use by tanks. This was accomplished by military practically without opposition the enemy having been completely surprised by a move across what he had regarded as completely impassable ground. The vital bridge head was virtually absorbed without casualties.

72. 1/126 US Bn were ordered to move across the BRIDGE and maintain contact with the left flank of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

73. 1/126 US Bn was moved to the area previously occupied by 1/126 US Bn immediately South of BRIDGE.

74. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn having secured the bridgehead then moved up to OLD STRIP and by nightfall had advanced some 400 yards on the right and 200 yards in the centre while 1/126 US Bn on the left maintained contact as left flank guard. During the night 23/24 Dec a supply boat at HARIKO was fired on and set on fire by two unidentified motor boats firing what was thought to be .50 MG.



75. It was decided to continue the attack the following day when one tp of four tks would be allotted in support of B/10 Aust Inf Bn.
76. In this connection there remained the possibility of AA guns which were known to have been in existence on STRIP being employed in an A/Tk role. No light or medium AA guns had however fired on our aircraft for many days. The possibilities therefore remained that either the enemy had run out of ammo or, as the arty had grounds to believe, the guns had been destroyed by our own arty which had been active in that cause. Alternatively it was realised that the enemy might be deliberately maintaining light and medium AA silence as a ruse. It was accordingly decided that until this position was clarified no greater tank force should be committed than the smallest tactical unit i.e. one tp of three tks while a fourth tk was held in immediate reserve.

#### 24 Dec.

77. B/10 Aust Inf Bn supported by one tp of three tks attacked up OLD STRIP but, while ground was made, the initial momentum of the attack was lost when two successive tks became casualties when hit by a dual purpose AA A/Tk weapon of approximately 3-in calibre. A third tk was bogged and subsequently hit by gunfire. The endeavour to push further forward on the right was unable to make progress against heavy fire from strong Japanese posn in coconut grove bordering the Northern side of the OLD STRIP. The A/Tk gun revealed by the enemy was engaged by arty and was destroyed. Both this gun, and a second, also hit by arty, were captured in U/S condition by inf on 25 Dec (see para 78). No further tks were to become casualties from gunfire in any of the succeeding four actions in which tks were engaged in this area.
78. On the initial tks being put out of action it was decided not to commit further tks until the A/Tk gun had been dealt with. The inf accordingly maintained pressure using arty support and endeavouring to use both infiltration and encircling tactics. Local advances only were however achieved in the face of heavy opposition.

#### 25 Dec.

79. At first light G. Coy B/10 Aust Inf Bn reverted to combat parent unit and moved to BRIDGE area. During the night 24/25 Dec B/10 Aust Inf Bn had attempted to gain further ground under cover of darkness by means of fighting patrols but these were without success and it was reported that the Japanese posn was strongly held.
80. Bn went fwd to see CO B/10 Aust Inf Bn. The necessity for the employment of soft spot tactics as emphasised by the Bde Comd was passed on to CO B/10 Aust Inf Bn and the advisability of employing his reserve coy to push N along outskirts of STRIP to gain ground and threaten enemy right flank was pointed out to him.
81. G. Coy, which was in Bn reserve was ordered by CO to make this movement, made slow progress during the day on the left flank of the Americans who were themselves on the left of B/10 Aust Inf Bn and as a result of this slow progress did not make their presence felt. Despite determined efforts by inf, B/10 Aust Inf Bn made no further progress that day.

#### 26 Dec.

82. It was proposed that G. Coy B/10 Aust Inf Bn should attack across the STRIP from their posns on the left while inf in the centre and on the right endeavoured to make such ground as they could.
83. This attempt was successful in part and ground was gained on all coy fronts. During this attack two AA/A/Tk gun posns (referred to in para 77) were captured. A. Coy however in the centre and G. Coy on the left finished the day in a disorganised state and it was not until the following morning that their exact posn was made known.



84. During the night 26/27 Dec B Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn on the right were counterattacked. This counter attack was repulsed with numerous enemy casualties.

27 Dec.

85. The day was occupied in minor advance and consolidating the line now secured.

86. During the morning the enemy staged an air raid with approximately 50 planes. No damage and few casualties resulted.

87. On the night 27/28 Dec Jap again made a local counter attack on the right flank 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, but, was without success.

88. It was decided to move one 85-pdr fwd to an emplacement which was prepared at the Southern end of the Old Strip where, utilising excellent observation that was available, it could shell the Jap pens at the Northern end of the STRIP. Conspicuous success attended this move and, from then until the end of the action, this gun achieved outstanding results. Both A.P. Shot with No. 5 charge and H.E. with Capped Fuse were used and did material damage to Jap pillboxes.

(outstanding)

28 DEC.

89. Tanks were moved to assembly area at the Eastern end of the New Strip. At 1030 hrs Major MOSS was ordered by the Bde Comd to organise and make a force for a probable attack with tanks from our left across the STRIP to the Japanese pens in the coconuts.

90. The day was spent in reorganising. One composite Coy of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn under command Lieut HESON being made available to reinforce 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, while A Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was moved left to make contact with C Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. U.S. tps previously bridging the gap between right of C Coy and left of A Coy, now bridged gap between right of A Coy and left of B Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in pen on STRIP. During the afternoon a further attempt was made with arty support by C. and A. Coys to attack coconut grove but this was not successful.

91. Accordingly Bde Comd arranged for tp of four tanks which were now available to be moved forward at first light 29 Dec to a pen North of BRIDGE and for a conference to be held at H.Q. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to discuss plan for 29 Dec.

29 Dec.

92. At 0900 hrs a conference was held at Hq 2/10 Aust Inf Bn attended by Bde Comd, CO and Adj 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, BM, and Majors MOSS and TYE (2/6 Aust Arm Regt) and tk tp leaders. Plan of attack was discussed at this conference and confirmed subsequently in Message 0.82 (att'd as Appx "D") for an attack by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn supported by tks not before 1400 hrs. Subsequently ZERO was fixed for 1600 hrs but even then ZERO could not be adhered to owing to the late arrival of the tks. The tks, endeavouring to make up for lost time came in obliquely across the front end, in fact, failed ever to reach the left coy. The inf on this flank attacked without support of tks and were initially successful. It was found, however, that these successes could not be maintained and, though some ground was made, the inf were unable to maintain a footing in the coconuts. The line was consolidated for the night. During the night 29/30 Dec the Jap again endeavoured to counter attack on our right flank but without success.

93. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn arrived during the day and were moved to bivouac area at the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP where they remained in Bde Rec. Bn stores had arrived by the early morning 30 Dec.

94. It was decided by Bde Comd that 2/10 Aust Inf Bn should now hold the ground already gained and that his fresh bn - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - should make a further attack supported by tks. In this connection it should be remembered that 2/12 Aust Inf Bn though fresh, had arrived very considerably under strength. See para for table of unit strengths.



30 Dec.

95. Accordingly CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn went fwd on a recon. During the day 1/128 US Bn was relieved by 3/128 US Bn, 1/128 Bn moving to area CAPE ENDAIADERE.

96. At the request of the Bde Comd, Lt-Col IRWIN CBE 3 Aust Div had come fwd to carry out experiments with both flame throwers and blast charges to arrive at some practicable manner of dealing with Japanese pillboxes. Local experiments with flame throwers were without fruit but those with blast bombs containing 2 lbs of ammonal detonated by 35 grenades promised well. A supply of these blast bombs was manufactured locally for use by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn. Reports by Lt-Col IRWIN are att'd as Appx "E".

31 Dec.

97. The day was occupied in effecting relief by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn of left coys of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and recon by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn CO and offrs for attack on 1 Jan. 12 Aust Inf Bde Op Operation Order No. 2 (Copy att'd as Appx "F") was issued.

1 Jan.

98. Attack by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn supported by the anti arty through to the coast from incl GIROPA POINT East for a distance of approximately 400 yards was successful. Very strong enemy resistance was met particularly ~~near~~ from strong points near mouth of SIVAMI CK and it took eight hours hard fighting by six tanks and two coys 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to overcome this. This area was mopped up and consolidated that night.

99. On the right of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn 1/128 US Bn advanced towards the coconuts to maintain contact with 2/12 Aust Inf Bn but on their right they were unable to make ground nor was 2/10 Aust Inf Bn able to move fwd. Constant pressure was however maintained during the day by both 1/128 Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in support of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn. By nightfall the line of GIROPA CREEK had been made good except for one pillbox which was holding out at the very mouth of GIROPA CREEK. On the left of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn a left flank guard was maintained by 3/128 US Bn.

100. In the BUNA MISSION area advances had been made by the left flank of 52 US Div (URBANA FORCE) through the Govt Gardens and endeavours were being made to establish contact with them by patrol.

101. At this stage reference may be made to the fact that very considerable success attended the use of the ammonal blast bombs prepared under direction of Lt-Col IRWIN and referred to in Appx "E".

102. During the day the following casualties were suffered:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.	
	Off.	Orgs.	Off.	Orgs.	Off.	Orgs.	Off.	Orgs.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	5	-	-	-	23	-	-
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	5	15	-	-	7	103	-	35
2/6 Aust Armd Regt	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-

2 Jan.

103. The attack was continued at 0615 hrs supported by tks but owing to the proximity of our own tps to the enemy no preliminary bombardment was practicable. Shortly after midday the whole area of the coconut grove was in our hands.

/and that only a small pocket of enemy resistance remained between  
104. Simultaneously reports were received that URBANA FORCE had captured BUNA MISSION and GIROPA CREEK. Contact had been established with URBANA FORCE along the beach.

105. Arrangements were made for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to attack west over GIROPA CREEK to deal with this pocket on 3 Jan but this proved unnecessary.



3 Jan.

106. The day was spent in reorganising and clearing the battle field.
107. Following is summary of casualties of 18 Aust Inf Bde for period 14 Dec to 3 Jan:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Gr.	Off.	Gr.	Off.	Gr.	Off.	Gr.	Off.	Gr.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	8	70	1	16	14	233	-	38	25	351
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	7	91	1	11	12	170	-	6	20	278
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	5	49	-	8	7	121	-	1	12	179
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>606</b>

108. Estimate of Enemy Casualties: 800 - 1200 Killed.  
 Accurate figures cannot be given as enemy dead were largely found and buried in pill boxes and a detailed count was not possible.

109. Captured equipment included:-
- (a) Three 3" naval guns.
  - (b) One 25 mm Triple Pom Pom.
  - (c) One 25 mm Dual Pom Pom.
  - (d) Large number of MGs and LMGs and am.
  - (e) Two 37 mm guns and am.
  - (f) Number of .5 MGs.
  - (g) Two 75 mm Mountain guns on wheels.
  - (h) Large quantities of .256 mm and rifles.
  - (i) Large generating set and wireless eqpt.
  - (j) Number of bicycles and 1 Motor cycle combination.
  - (k) Nine trucks (all unserviceable).
  - (l) Two fighters (latest model ZERO) in good condition on OLD STRIP.
  - (m) Number of smashed aircraft on OLD STRIP.

Examples of the following eqpt were captured:-

- (a) Flamethrower.
- (b) Magnetic tank grenade.
- (c) Small Land Mine.
- (d) A/A Sight.
- (e) 77 mm Shell and fuse.

4 Jan.

110. Bde Comd attended conference at Hq Aiv NZF at DOBODURA at which it was arranged that Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde should move forthwith to SOPUTA area coming under comd 7 Aust Div.

5-8 Jan.

111. Bde Comd, B.M. and I.O. went forward to Hq 7 Aust Div at SOPUTA. Bde Comd conferred with Maj-Gen G.A. VASEY, Comd 7 Aust Div and made personal recon of fwd area.
112. On the arrival of 18 Aust Inf Bde in the area, fwd tps of 7 Aust Div consisting of 30 Aust Inf Bde (39 and 49 Aust Inf Bns and with under comd 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt) were in contact with the fwd Jap posn on the M.T. road at approx 170048 where it tapered to a "V" and with both its flanks.



113. In fact, as became obvious subsequently, the Jap defences in the SAKAHADA area were organised in three zones:-

(a) Fwd Zone - Astride M.T. road at 179348 thence running North to approx 178355 and NW for a further 300 yards, back East along Jap track to approx 182355 and East to 185355 thence to MT road at 179348.

This zone which was strongly organised with mutually supporting pillboxes sited in depth for approx 1400 yards and with a total width of nearly 1600 yards covered approaches to SAKAHADA by the M.T. road, the CAPE KILLERTON TRACK and the WEST KILLERTON TRACK.

(b) Intermediate Zone - Approx 185365 covering the junction of M.T. road and CAPE KILLERTON TRACK.

(c) Rear Zone - The inner perimeter defences which extended from CAPE KILLERTON, through CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE, track junc 193390, track end M.T. road junc 203392, thence to GIRUWA.

This position as was discovered subsequently was particularly strongly held in depth on M.T. road and along the coast, in particular between WYE POINT 203392 and SAKAHADA.

114. It should be remembered that tracks in this extremely close country afforded the only apparent possibility of movement and by securing the tracks the enemy apparently appreciated that he had secured his stronghold from attack.

115. Units of 18 Aust Inf Bde moved to a concentration area vicinity SOPUTA BRIDGE arriving -

2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	5 Jan 45.
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	6 Jan 45.
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	-	7 Jan 45.

116. It was arranged that 18 Aust Inf Bde should relieve 30 Aust Inf Bde who were in contact with Japanese positions astride the M.T. road at 179348 and that 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt who were in contact with Japanese right flank should come under command 18 Aust Inf Bde.

117. Prior to the deterioration of the track from BUNA to SOPUTA owing to heavy rain it had been possible for one tp of the of 2/5 Aust Armd Regt to be brought across. These were made available for the attack which was to ensue.

118. Arty support was available from the following tps of 25-pdrs:-

(a)	HANSON Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	-	vicinity SOPUTA.
(b)	HAWKING Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	-	vicinity ANGO.
(c)	HALL Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt	-	vicinity BUNA.

It should be noted, however that of these tps, HAWKING and HALL Tps fired obliquely across front with the result that tasks upon which they could be employed were limited owing to lack of safety margin between our own tps and the enemy positions to be engaged. These tps were, therefore, principally used in harassing tasks in the rear.

119. Simultaneously with relief of 30 Aust Inf Bde by 18 Aust Inf Bde, 163 U.S. Regt which had just recently arrived relieved US tps at the HUGGINS road block astride the MT road at 177267 between Jap fwd and intermediate zones with a view also to cutting the WEST KILLERTON TRACK at approximately 177267 thereby completely isolating the Japanese Fwd Zone.

120. In recess for relief were completed 8 Jan.



9 Jan.

-12-

181. The following reliefs were carried out:-

49 Aust Inf Bn by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.  
39 Aust Inf Bn and BOREM Det US Tps by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.

Bde Hq opened at 178944 while 2/10 Aust Inf Bn came into Bde reserve immediately South of Bde Hq.

182. It was also reported that US tps of 163 US Regt had cut the WEST KILLINGTON track at approx 177265.

10 Jan.

183. The day was spent in ascertaining all that could be found out of enemy dispositions to the immediate front and in making such local advances as were possible and which would bring units of the Bde right up against the enemy positions. Intelligence of enemy A/A and Fd guns was that none had fired since 23 Dec. It was appreciated however that one or more of such guns might still be available to enemy and being kept silent.

11 Jan.

184. Bde Comd discussed with CO's his outline plan for an attack on 12 Jan whereby it was intended to overcome Jap resistance right of HT rd with a view to the subsequent destruction of all enemy resistance in the Fwd Zone.

18 Aust Inf Bde Operation Order No. 3 was issued (Attd as Appx "G").

185. Dispositions of our own tps prior to attack were:-

Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde	-	approx 178947.
2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt	-	178948-178955.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	187252-187248-185248.
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	-	185248-182248-178947.
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	area 177244.

12 Jan.

186. Attacks by 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns, the latter with in support one tp 2/6 Aust Arml Regt went in at 0800 hrs at the conclusion of preliminary arty concentrations. The three tanks were to operate along the line of M.T. road in close mutual support. Employment of tanks was particularly required for the attack on enemy strong points West of the road and immediately North of our own position. This strong point was so close (approx 70 yards away only) that our arty could not bombard it with safety to our own tps. The initial advance required of the tks to attack above strong points was very short, only 40 to 50 yards.

187. Outline plans of bns were as follows:-

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - Two coys to move NE to circle enemy left flank thence to attack SW to objective which was timber line 183254-180253.
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - One coy supported by tks to attack Jap position astride M.T. road at approx 178948, two coys crossing road from 178948 to 182248 to attack in to road. As coy advancing up road reached then these coys would come into pos and would be available to allow coy on road to extend sufficiently to left to secure road from enemy interference.

188. In this instance the inf were early left without tk support, for three tks in succession were knocked out by a well-sited Japanese A.Tk gun on the M.T. road, combined with A.Tk mines. The tks were unable to manoeuvre to attack this gun owing to their movement being limited by the marshy nature of the ground off the road.



129. Unfortunately the wireless set of the leading tk, commanded by the tp comd, was put out of action by an enemy A.Tk shot and he lost control of consequence and could not advise other tks of A.Tk guns or order them to withdraw. The second tk on coming fwd was hit and the driver injured; it careered on down the road for approx 150 yards when it was knocked out. The third tk was pierced. The first tk withdrew and the third was subsequently recovered.

130. A long and bitter day's fighting ensued in which the 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on the right flank made a considerable advance while 2/12 Aust Inf Bn, though delivering hard blows at the enemy made only little ground and that was to the right of H.T. road.

131. During the day the following casualties were sustained:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	3	5	-	-	3	22	-	-	6	27
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2/12 Aust Inf Bn.	3	12	-	1	1	37	1	45	4	95
2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1-
X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	5	-	8
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>131</b>

13 Jan.

132. This day was spent consolidating gains made and active patrolling to ascertain possible weaknesses of Japanese positions and to make such local advances to keep pressure on enemy to straighten out our line and to make further ground as were possible.

14 Jan.

133. Pressure was maintained by both 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns by mortar fire and attacks on enemy strong points and these tactics proved successful. The Japanese resistance, hard hit as it had been in the attack of 12 Jan commenced to wilt under the pressure and, this pressure being maintained both 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns made good ground to their front and before darkness the whole area of the Japanese position was in our hands.

134. Orders were then received from 7 Aust Div to exploit this success by pushing 12 Aust Inf Bde down the WEST KILLERTON TRACK to the coast and to seize the area CAPE KILLERTON - CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE with a view to attacking BANANUDA and the HT rd from the West.

15 Jan.

135. Order (Message 0.120 att'd as Appx "K") was issued.

The Bde moved down WEST KILLERTON TRACK. Order of March:-

- 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- Hq 12 Aust Inf Bde.
- 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.

136. On arrival at plantation 1725 2/10 Aust Inf Bn pushed fwd along track to explore the going to the coast and CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE, while 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn were held in reserve in the vicinity of the plantation. Extreme difficulty resulted from tracks, marked on the map, actually not being in existence on the ground, having apparently been overgrown. The WEST KILLERTON TRACK as disclosed by aerial photos previously taken was inaccurately shown on map - its Northern portion should have been marked approx 1000 yards (one thousand yards) further West.



137. B. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn which was searching for CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE, on being unable to locate the village, was directed by Tac/R aircraft to a clearing with native huts that was assumed to be the village and took up posn there overnight. In fact this coy was not at the village and on the following morning was found to be bivouacked in the area 193890. Remainder of 8/10 Aust Inf Bn bivouacked at 178303. Bde HQ was established at 178303.

138. During the day no enemy resistance was encountered.

16 Jan.

139. Bde Comd's intention both to exploit North to the coast thence to advance eastwards through CAPE KILLERTON and WYE POINT to SAHANANDA and eastwards along the track from 193890 to the M.T. road thence NE to SAHANANDA.

140. Accordingly a second ("A") coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn was ordered to secure track junc 193890 while 8/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys was ordered to press North to coast then East.

141. As already mentioned B. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn was in fact already at 193890 and not at CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE.

142. When this was realised it was arranged that "A" Coy should hold the track junc and send fighting patrols East along the track to the M.T. road and that "B" Coy should occupy CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE.

143. While this was being done 8/10 Aust Inf Bn had reached the coast and had encountered opposition at BRIDGE 185514 over the creek West of CAPE KILLERTON.

144. Coy at CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE was then ordered to push up track running NE from KILLERTON VILLAGE to the coast, thence East along the coast. This was done, minor opposition being overcome at track junc ~~194306~~ 194306 and ground was made good before nightfall to WYE POINT (809307) where strong enemy resistance organised in depth of pillboxes along the beach, was encountered.

145. HQ 8/10 Aust Inf Bn moved first to CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE and then to the coast at 194306.

146. During this time 163 US Regt was still encountering opposition on the M.T. road North of the HUGONS road block at approximately 190868. During the day A. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn had pushed East through deep swamp along line of the track shown on the map from clearing at 193890 to the MT road approximately 807888 and had run up against enemy resistance.

147. Bde Comd decided to employ 8/12 Aust Inf Bn on this line of attack and accordingly ordered CO 8/12 Aust Inf Bn to go fwd with one coy on night 16/17 Jan, and for "A" Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn to come under comd 8/12 Aust Inf Bn.

~~148~~

17 Jan.

148. Remainder of 8/12 Aust Inf Bn moved at first light from plantation to clearing at 193890 thence to the M.T. road and commenced to press an attack NE along the line of the road towards SAHANANDA.

149. Contact with solid enemy resistance had now been gained on the two direct avenues of approach to SAHANANDA, i.e. along MT road and along the coast. While strong pressure by attacks was maintained on these approaches Bde Comd again decided to exploit the possibilities of penetration through country which the enemy might regard as a sufficient natural obstacle and which might be less heavily defended. Accordingly 8/9 Aust Inf Bn was moved from the vicinity of Bde HQ to the area of the small kunai patch 809288 and were later in the day moved to big kunai patch at 807290. Subsequently Bde Comd issued orders to 8/9 Aust Inf Bn to attack NE ~~193890~~ to capture SAHANANDA VILLAGE on morning 18 Jan.



18 Jan.

150. Again these tactics were successful for while 8/18 Aust Inf Bn and 8/10 Aust Inf Bn were unable to make headway on the H.T. road and coast respectively 8/9 Aust Inf Bn thrusting through swamp, jungle and kumai NS drove through to SAHANANDA which was in our hands at 1130 hrs.

151. Again the Japanese reliance on natural defences had proved his undoing and his defences was split in two. His Comd had ordered 8/9 Aust Inf Bn to immediately exploit the success by at once pushing on and capturing SAHANANDA POINT and eastwards along the coast to GIRUWA. This was successfully carried out and we now held the coast from CAVE HILLERTON to GIRUWA with the exception of 1500 yards enemy strong points on the beach between WYE POINT and SAHANANDA.

19, 20, 21 Jan.

152. Two pockets of strong enemy resistance still remained, one on the H.T. road between approximately 210233 and the road bend at 214233 and on the beach between WYE POINT and SAHANANDA. SAHANANDA itself and the coast to exclusive GIRUWA was however in our hands while reports were received that 32 US Div were to move west from TARAKENA to GIRUWA.

153. One coy of 8/9 Aust Inf Bn was ordered to assist the attack of 8/18 Aust Inf Bn by moving south down the H.T. road. By the pressure of this coy in the rear and the attack NS by 8/18 Aust Inf Bn the resistance on the HT road was overcome by the early morning, 21 Jan. This however had only been achieved after prolonged fighting under most miserable conditions, the tps never, in fact, being out of water and frequently remaining for hours in water up to their waists.

154. In the case of the coastal pocket soft spot tactics again proved successful for by dint of active patrolling 8/9 Aust Inf Bn discovered a way through to the centre of the Japanese poen from the top of the large kumai patch at approximately 208233. To exploit this G. coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn was placed under comd 8/9 Aust Inf Bn and a coordinated attack by 8/9 and 8/10 Aust Inf Bns from both ends of beach and by this coy in the centre on 21 Jan broke the back of the Japanese resistance in this area. One strong point still held out. This was reduced after it had been subjected to arty concentrations on the morning of 22 Jan.

155. 8/9 and 8/10 Aust Inf Bns met on the beach at approximately 1315 hrs 22 Jan and organised resistance in the area was at an end.

156. American tps from TARAKENA reached GIRUWA on 22 Jan while 163 US Regt overcame final resistance in the Jap intermediate zone on the H.T. road the same day.

23 Jan.

157. Bde Hq moved to SAHANANDA and the Bde assumed the role of beach defense from excl GIRUWA to incl GIRARA.

158. These poens were maintained until relieved by 3 Bn 163 US Regt on 29 Jan.

159. The casualties suffered during the SAHANANDA ops were as follows:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.
8/9 Aust Inf Bn	5	17	1	6	5	61	-	-	9	84
8/10 Aust Inf Bn	2	49	-	1	3	75	-	2	4	125
8/18 Aust Inf Bn	3	67	-	7	5	123	-	-	7	197.
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>406</b>



160. Estimate of enemy casualties was:-

- (a) Killed by 18 Aust Inf Bde - 6/700.
- (b) Found dead in area captured by 18 Aust Inf Bde - 3/400
- (c) P.W. - approx 140 (incl 40-50 Chinese coolies).

161. Captured eqpt included:-

- (a) Large number of HMGs (2 types) and LMGs (3 types).
- (b) Large number of rifles and .350 mm.
- (c) Magnetic Tank Grenades.
- (d) Two 20 mm Dual Purpose Guns.
- (e) Large Wireless Transmitter.
- (f) Large quantity of Medical Eqpt.
- (g) Drums of various eqpt, e.g. filters, wire, shovels, picks, tents at SANANANDA, all largely unserviceable.

162. Battle casualties suffered by units of 18 Aust Inf Bde and attd units 18 Dec 43 to 23 Jan 45 were:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.
B/9 Aust Inf Bn	11	67	2	22	12	304	-	53	22	435.
B/10 Aust Inf Bn	9	138	1	17	14	341	-	8	24	404.
B/12 Aust Inf Bn	7	116	-	15	12	344	-	1	19	376.
X Sqn B/6 Aust Apul Regt	-	2	-	4	2	9	-	5	2	20.
Det B/5 Aust Fd Regt	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	-	4	2.
J. Sec Sigs	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2.
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>798</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>1239</b>

**NOTE :** The above figures do NOT include any personnel evacuated due to illness.

163. See att Table I showing comparative units strengths on arrival at CAPE ENDALABERE, reinforcements received during ops, battle casualties and sick evacuations during period under review.



TABLE I.

Period Covered - 18 Dec 42 to 23 Jan 43 (both dates inclusive).

	2/9 Aust Inf Bn.				2/10 Aust Inf Bn.				2/12 Aust Inf Bn.			
	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>	<u>OFFER.</u>	<u>ORs.</u>
Unit Strengths on arrival												
CAPH HEADQUARTERS			86	638			34	648			53	588
	K.I.A.	11	87		KIA	9	138		KIA	7	116	
	DOW	8	82		DOW	1	17		DOW	-	15	
Battle Casualties	W	19	204		W	14	261		W	12	244	
	M	-	82		M	-	8		M	-	1	
			58	455			34	404			19	376.
Evacuated Sick			6	217			5	179			5	188
Reinfts Received			25	360			15	337			2	289.



LESSONS LEARNED IN GAPS HUNDALADERE - GIROPA POINT AND BANAHANDA AREA OPSOPG 42 - J/41 43 AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING THEREFROM.REINFORCEMENTS AND X LIST.

1. Jungle warfare through its inherent wastage from sickness quite apart from battle casualties necessarily entails the constant provision of reinforcements. Reinforcements were received during the ops under consideration but in 2 by far the majority of cases their trg left much to be desired. Whilst in most cases their weapon trg embraced all inf weapons except 2" Mortar their tactical trg was not high and in a few cases even the rudiments of weapon trg had not been taught.
2. Although the 2" Mortar is one of our most useful inf weapons, apparently owing to lack of these weapons for trg purposes in AUSTRALIA no reinforcements had any knowledge or trg in this most important weapon. Most reinforcements had had little real collective trg, and did not know or understand the usual field orders and signals as laid down in Inf Section Training. It could not be said that these reinforcements were fully competent to take their place as members of a section in battle. This applied too to specialist personnel. To remedy this present weakness it is felt that the necessity cannot be over emphasised for the retention of "X" List personnel to a unit as a matter of regular procedure and that every endeavour should be made to keep units in the field up to full W.E. personnel plus 1st reinforcements. It is again most strongly emphasised that in this type of warfare numbers of personnel available to actually fight is of supreme importance and unless units are kept up to strength the use of unit nomenclature is virtually fictitious and entirely misleading.

INF AND TANK COOPERATION IN JUNGLE WARFARE.

3. A separate paper on this subject is attached as Appx "A".
4. While no general opinion can be expressed as to future possibilities for the employment of tks in NEW GUINEA owing to lack of knowledge of the areas in which they might be called upon to operate, it would appear that the employment of tks will be largely limited to areas such as PORT MORSBY, MILNE BAY and BUNA-CAPE HUNDALADERE where extensive clearing of jungle and drainage has been carried out, thereby providing country over which tks may operate with comparative freedom. In hilly, swampy or thick jungle or timber country not so cleared and drained it would appear probable that tks, forced to operate in the defiles of the few prepared and semi-prepared tracks are from the outset at a disadvantage against an enemy as well versed in A.Tk warfare as the Jap has proved to be, provided, as is likely, that he has effective A.Tk weapons.
5. It may however be stated with confidence that the type of tk most suited to any conditions encountered will be a heavily armoured, slow moving tk possessing excellent cross country performance and ample range and arm carrying capacity. The tk should possess at least a 37 mm and preferably a 75 mm gun to deal with pillboxes and enemy A.Tk guns.
6. The possibilities of a flame throwing attachment being used with tks are put fwd after experiments by CRE G Aust Div in Appx "B".

METHODS OF DEALING WITH PILLBOXES

7. Considerable use was made by the enemy of strongly constructed pillboxes in the manufacture of which he used coconut logs, steel rail, earth-filled 44-gal drums and a variety of other material.
8. During the course of ops at GAPS HUNDALADERE Lieut-Col. IRWIN, CRE G Aust Div came forward at the request of Brig. G.F. SCOTTEN and carried out various experiments. These are summarised in his reports, attd as Appx "B".



9. Very considerable success attended the use of the "blast bombs" described therein and their use under similar circumstances is strongly advocated.

### ARTY

10. It was found at CAPE HEDALADERE-GIROPA POINT that arty were at a disadvantage in dealing with Jap pillboxes owing to lack of delayed action fuses.
11. This was overcome partially by firing fuse 119 with cap on which achieved a slight delayed action effect, while during ops in BAHANANDA area fuse 231 was made available with satisfactory results.
12. Even more successful was the use of a 25-pdr at OLD STRIP (BUHA) at a range of little over 1000 yds with both AP shot and HE. Here conditions were extremely favourable for the employment of a fwd gun, an emplacement being prepared at one end of the OLD STRIP with excellent observation of the Jap pillboxes at the far end. While such conditions may not often be met with it is suggested that the possibilities of employing one or more 25-pdrs in a fwd role against prepared defences be always borne in mind. A large number of AP shot with No. 3 charge were successfully used against pillboxes by this fwd gun.
13. Generally it may be stated with confidence that arty may be employed very successfully in jungle warfare. The problem is one more that of am supply than of making guns available; it was found nevertheless that the devotion of tpt space to arty am was amply repaid. The problem is to produce the number of shells of required types on desired targets, which is a combined one of both guns and am.
14. It will frequently be found that our own tps and the enemy are in such proximity that our tps must be withdrawn slightly to allow of arty being brought down. On this being done two matters are essential:-
- (a) That the enemy is prevented by fire from coming fwd and thus escaping from the arty shoot; and,
  - (b) Our own tps, withdrawn to a safe range, should during the shoot move as far fwd under cover of the shoot as is possible. The safety distance is laid down for ranging, once the first shells fall such ground can always safely be made.
15. Two points arise in connection with the dispersion of arty sub-units, as was the case in the ops under review:-
- (a) Dispersion over a wide front may result in limitation of arty tasks to possibly only one sub unit which is favourably sited for the task while it cannot be engaged by other sub-units from other posns. In the jungle it will almost invariably happen that our tps and the enemy will be engaged at very close quarters. To engage his front line therefore arty sub-units firing from an angle will be well placed, while those firing from behind can do so only after our own tps have been withdrawn a safe distance. This factor should constantly be borne in mind in siting arty sub-units.
  - (b) The supply routes for am may vary for the various gun sites e.g. during the ops under review one tp was supplied by sea and two by air. It is doubtful if guns should be sited in any posn unless it is considered that adequate am for their effective employment can be readily supplied to them. The availability of am at the site is the all important factor in working out the plan of attack. Guns not favourably placed for close tasks (see (a) above) should therefore be used primarily for any harassing tasks.



19

## SURPRISE & SOFT SPOT TACTICS.

16. The Jap has proved himself an enemy particularly susceptible to surprise. He plans with the greatest of detail but the very rigidity of his plans can prove his undoing. A full realisation of this, coupled with an endeavour at all times and in all manners to achieve surprise and to probe for the soft spots in his defence amply repaid the effort. He is an enemy quick to take advantage himself of natural features and to exploit unlikely going, but, nevertheless, he himself on two occasions at least underrated the possibilities of determined troops crossing unfavourable ground, and, having deemed ground "impassable" he left it virtually undefended.
17. The two occasions referred to are the SINGHI CREEK at the SE end of the OLD STRIP at BUNA and the approach from the SW to SANANANDA through kuni grass, swamp and jungle.
18. Obviously he had regarded this ground as "impassable" and he had not prepared adequate defences to cover approach in those directions. This led to his undoing for vigorous patrolling discovered ways through this "impassable" country and determined troops following up quickly had pierced his defences before he could recover or, in the case of SANANANDA, was even aware of his presence.
19. Surprise, too, can be achieved in the surprise use of weapons, for example, the Ika at CAPE ENDAIADERE and the Aerial Blast Bombs constructed locally after initial experience of his pillbox defences during those ops.
20. Success, too, has continually attended the use of soft spot tactics both on the larger scale of Big ops and equally importantly by units and sub-units.
21. By "soft spot" tactics is meant a policy of engaging the enemy and masking his strength and of pressing home and exploiting the attack where the enemy is weakest and by so doing piercing his defences and "mushrooming" behind those defences. His strong centres of resistance are masked by an adequate force while reserves are used to attack not those centres which are holding out, but to exploit success where success has been achieved or is likely and leaving centres of resistance that are holding out for subsequent destruction. These very centres thus weaken in strength as they become isolated and it was found not on one but on numerous occasions that by continually hammering away and exploiting the weak spots and by maintaining constant pressure that even the hardest nuts were found to crack under the pressure and a general weakening and ensuing collapse resulted.
22. Typical of this was the initial action on the MT road against Jap Fwd Zone at SANANANDA where, despite the fact that 2/12 Aust Inf Bn at the conclusion of the first Japs operations had made little headway, nevertheless the success achieved by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on the right by constant pressure all along the front and by the exploitation of local successes wherever possible by both has this exceedingly strong Japanese force been virtually folded up within 48 hrs.

## MINOR TACTICS.

### LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP.

23. The enemy has shown himself constantly on the watch to pick out and pick off the leader and it is therefore essential the leader train himself to carry out his task without such gesture or action as to focus attention upon himself. This postulates the employment of well trained soldiers and reinforcements. A large number of officers and NCOs were lost due to extra exposure required in leading sub-units consisting largely of reinforcements. It is not felt, however, that badges of rank should be discarded for, in the opinion of all units the leaders have suffered from their actions and not from these minor and inconspicuous parts of dress. On the other hand it is felt most definitely that the retention of cloth badges of rank by officers is an advantage both as regards leadership and morale and it is further suggested that some less conspicuous cloth insignia be provided for wearing by NCOs.



TREES.

24. In jungle and grass land, trees are definite tactical features. To control adjacent grass or semi-jungle ground the timber line must be held. By doing so we obtain observation and deny it to the enemy. The enemy has realized this and has exploited to full advantage the possibilities of sniper nests and arty C.Ps. controlling large areas outside the timber line by comparatively few well trained riflemen and arty F.O.s. This is a policy which we must follow. Our officers and ORs must be taught to use the trees for sniping and observation on all possible occasions and to deny these advantages to the enemy.

SNIPERS.

25. The extensive use made by the enemy of snipers makes it essential in any plan of action that, as an integral portion of that plan, a specific course of action should be laid down for dealing with snipers. This, according to circumstances, may comprise preliminary arty or mortar bombardment, MG fire on tree tops, specially selected anti-sniper parties of riflemen, smoke etc or any combination of such methods. The essential thing is that a manner of dealing with snipers form part of the plan of action.

CAMOUFLAGE.

26. The enemy has generally shown a standard of personal and unit camouflage which it should be our aim not only to emulate but to surpass. The extreme value of camouflage in jungle warfare against observation both from the air and from the ground should be stressed to the utmost to all ranks, while ample time should be spent in tagging individuals in the elements of successful camouflage.

CONSERVATION OF AMM.

27. This is an all important factor in jungle warfare. The necessity for rigid control of fire cannot be over emphasized. If an enemy is heard or gives his position away by movement of bushes, a short burst by LMG will often be justified and may be successful, but it has been the definite experience of all units that well aimed fire from the rifle and single round firing of LMG is more effective when observed small targets are offered. Against a closely bunched party of observed enemy a burst of automatic fire would probably be more effective.

NOISE AND TALKING.

28. Noise of any kind, particularly talking and coughing must be rigorously suppressed. Nothing is more calculated to give away our position to the enemy. In this connection it is essential that the present type of phone be improved so as to permit of low voiced conversation.

PATROLLING BY NIGHT.

29. It is felt that, when conditions other than dense jungle obtain, a policy of active patrolling and raiding by night be carried out as a matter of course. It is suggested while the locality defences taken up as night disposition should incorporate a mobile reserve prepared to deal with infiltrating enemy by means of the bayonet, a further reserve be maintained to carry out a co-ordinated policy of active patrolling by night.

30. Any rigid distinctions in task and composition between recon and fighting patrols should disappear. All patrols should be strong enough to deal with any but major enemy opposition encountered while even when the primary task may be recon the patrol should always be constituted in sufficient strength to take immediate advantage of any advantageous ground that it discovers. To send out a small recon patrol with the idea of later sending out a small force to seize ground it has discovered to be there for the taking is but to ask the enemy to seize it in the meantime. As stated the patrol should be initially capable of doing this, while it may itself always detach a small scouting party from its own strength to do local recon. Patrols or detachments for such operations should vary from strength of a pl to a Coy according to strength required and strength of sub-unit.



INTERCOMMUNICATION.

31. Previous experience to the effect that line communication was the only really reliable form of communication was amply borne out during ops. In one respect our task would be made far easier by the provision of lighter cable e.g. of the type of DS or of the US Army "assault cable" which would enable both far greater quantities of wire to be carried by units, and would further enable the highly desirable practice of patrols maintaining communication by L/T to be carried out more extensively.

32. The success, however, of line communication must not overshadow the possibilities of R/T and W/T. In fact the great lesson is that it is highly desirable to provide at all times as many alternative means of communication as possible.

33. The 100 Set did not prove reliable, but reasonable results were achieved with the US 336A "walkie Talkie" sets. To meet all conditions it is suggested that sets should be made available on the following scale:-

- |                  |  |                           |
|------------------|--|---------------------------|
| <u>Mc HQ</u>     |  | } includes En rear links. |
| 5 x No. 11 Sets  |  |                           |
| 5 x No. 300 Sets |  |                           |
| 1 x No. 100 Set  |  |                           |

En  
While reasonable but by no means constant results were achieved from US 336A "Walkie Talkie" sets, it is considered essential that a portable set with greater range and reliability be provided on a scale of 9 per bn.

34. The possibilities of V/T should also not be overlooked and it is recommended that eqpt on the following scale be carried:-

- |       |   |                  |
|-------|---|------------------|
| Mc HQ | - | 3 x Lucas Lamps. |
| En    | - | 6 x Lucas Lamps. |

35. One of the principal difficulties encountered at all times is the deterioration of signal eqpt and metallic circuits owing to moisture and condensation. It is recommended that experiments be carried out with a view to successfully waterproofing signal eqpt and ensuring audible telephone circuits in very rainy and waterlogged conditions.

Field Telephone.

36. The type of field telephone at present on issue is thought not to be satisfactory and the provision of a more robust and more reliable phone which will permit of low voiced conversation is highly desirable.

37. An increase in the establishment of a bn sig Pl of one HCO and 4 signalmen equipped with eight telephones and three to four miles of light cable is recommended. The purpose of this increase is to provide means of communication for Mortar OPS which in the jungle must almost invariably be sited at a distance from the Mortar.

WEAPONS AND AMM.

38. As a direct result of experience during ops it is recommended that the OWEN SMG be issued to units in preference to TSMG. To avoid further complexity of am supply it is not desired that two types of sub-machine gun be issued. If available the OWEN gun is preferred both for its performance and for its additional great advantage in that its am is lighter. Further advantage is found in the packing of its am in sealed cases of 1000 rds which is far preferable to the boxes of 2000 provided for TSMG. It is recommended however that the design of the OWEN gun be altered so that the magazine is underneath the weapon and does not impede sighting as it does at present.



A LIGHT-WEIGHT  
SHORT BARRELLED  
RIFLE WOULD  
BE BETTER  
(MIPS HAS  
10 RIFLES)

WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

39. The following alterations to present WM scale of arms are recommended:-

- (a) Stretcher Bearers. - That these personnel should be issued with Owen guns in place of rifles which proved a great handicap to their work under jungle conditions owing to the difficulty of carrying and handling in swamp and jungle.
- (b) Pioneer Pl should be issued with full weapons of an inf pl and its establishment increased to that of an inf pl. This would enable the pl not only to carry out its present tasks but in addition to provide Inf Coy with a ready reserve of fire and man power without a great increase in Inf numbers.
- (c) Full scale of issue of weapons recommended for Inf Rifle Coy and pls is as follows:-

- (i) One Bren gun per section;
- (ii) Two Owen guns per section;
- (iii) One 3-in Mortar per pl;
- (iv) One A/Tk gun per pl;
- (v) One M1 rifle per pl.

3" MORTAR

40. Experiment is recommended to devise:-

- (a) Some lighter but equally efficient form of base plate and bipod for 3" Mortar;
- (b) Waterproofing and ensuring of standardisation of ballistics of 3" Mortar Am. Charges recently used differed considerably and were greatly affected by weather.

A.TK RIFLES.

41. It is felt that the provision of explosive bullets for the A.Tk rifle would be advantageous.

NO. 56 GRENADE.

42. It is recommended that :-

- (a) both the 4 and 7 second grenades be packed in waterproof containers, that they should be painted different colours and that the base plate be permanently fixed to the 7 second grenade to allow it to be readily distinguished by night.
- (b) It is further recommended that an individual issue be made of a waterproof envelope capable of carrying two grenades so that they may be kept dry after issue to the man.

RIFLE OIL.

43. It is recommended that, in addition to the oil bottles carried in rifles, rifle oil be issued in expendable containers thereby facilitating distribution. Wet conditions of the type of warfare experienced demands a lavish expenditure of rifle oil to keep all ing weapons in good working order.



CLOTHING AND EQUIP.

44. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the most suitable clothing for jungle warfare is a tunic of safari type pattern as now being issued and slacks buttoning at the ankle after the fashion of British battle dress;
- (b) that these trousers be worn with present Australian type canvas gaiters;
- (c) that boots could be improved by waterproof tongues with an extra two inches of leather on the top of the boot; boots should be sprigged, preferably with brass;
- (d) that short puttees preferably of waterproof material remain on issue for use with shorts;
- (e) that in place of the present ground sheet or cloak, which is both not completely waterproof and is heavy to carry, a square 7' x 7' of light oiled waterproof silk be carried by each man;
- (f) that dixie and water bottle be made of lighter material; the dixie could be made smaller with advantage;
- (g) that a small waterproof container be provided for quinine tablets and a small waterproof packet for matches, pay book and other personal necessities.

TOOLS.

45. (a) It is recommended that an individual issue be made of a portable entrenching tool or of a small shovel of the type carried by US troops.
- (b) Machetes should be issued on the scale of two per man.

EMERGENCY RATIONS.

46. It has been found that considerable wastage in emergency rations has resulted from their being insecurely taped.
47. Regarding normal rations it is recommended that baking powder, flour and rice be included in the ration to enable cooks to vary the diet, while the provision of mustard is highly desirable.

COOKING EQUIP.

48. While hydra petrol burners are invaluable for preparing meals and hot drinks the provision of a light collapsible oven for frying and grilling would be an improvement.
49. It was found possible by day to ensure that during the entire operation a minimum of two hot meals per day was available even under the worst conditions. In the majority of cases the food was cooked under tin arrangements and sent forward by native carriers. In the cases where owing to the isolation of troops by swampy ground this was not possible the "Tommy Coker" of solidified alcohol proved invaluable in that it enabled the individual to make his own hot food.
50. Rations though plentiful were monotonous. It is felt that greater efforts should be made to vary diet for, faced with a monotonous diet, troops do not eat with relish with consequent prejudicial effects both to health, strength and morale. This is not to be construed as any criticism of the supply organisation but points to the necessity for the manufacture and provision of such types of food as will enable that supply organisation to provide a more varied and attractive diet to soldiers in battle under conditions such as existed in the campaign under review.



MEDICAL.

51. An increase in the medical section of the bn from 20 to 24 ORs is recommended. These personnel represent not only the nucleus of trained stretcher bearers in normal times but, in action, are the nursing orderlies with sub-units and are normally split up on a basis of four per coy (one per pl and one for coy HQ) with a reserve of four at the RAP. The reserve of four is felt to be insufficient and an increase to 24 would allow this reserve to be doubled.
52. A.B. It is strongly recommended that individuals who conscientiously object to the bearing of arms should not be allowed to function as stretcher bearers beyond the MDS as their usefulness is gravely affected by the additional responsibility they become.
53. Stretchers. It is urged that experiment be carried out in the provision of a lighter stretcher by, say, the substitution of tubular metal poles in place of the present wooden ones. It would be an advantage in jungle warfare if the poles could be made to fold and were made longer for shoulder carriage.
54. Trench Feet. It is recommended, too, that experiments be carried out by the medical authorities into some means of preventing waterlogging of feet. Instances are quoted of the successful use of Lanoline, Dubbin and Mosquito cream. It is felt that the provision of some medically safe substance to be rubbed into the feet would have considerable beneficial results. In the last war conditions of wet were met by the application of whale oil to the feet.

OFFICE EQPT.

55. The issue of light waterproof and light proof tents, say 8 ft x 10 ft on a scale of four per Bde HQ and two per unit as a minimum would be greatly to increase efficiency at night.

INTELLIGENCE.

56. Increased issue of compasses and binoculars is recommended.
57. The extensive use of air photography as the only reliable means of obtaining information in country which has for the most part been but inaccurately mapped was most effective. It is recommended that as many vacancies as possible be made available at Air Photo Interpretation courses and that personnel of Bn and Bde Intelligence sections be increased in each case by one NCO trained in air photograph interpretation.



NOTES ON TANK AND INF COOPERATION IN CAPE MIDALADERE-GIROPA POINT AND  
SANANANDA AREA OPS.

1. These notes treat the CAPE MIDALADERE-GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA Area ops separately owing to the widely divergent conditions encountered in the respective ops.
2. At CAPE MIDALADERE-GIROPA POINT, tks operated either on grass overgrown air strips or in coconuts. In the case of the air strips the ground was low lying and sodden, and for the most part covered by head high or higher grass which obscured vision; and though it was studded with hidden bomb craters, it was nevertheless ground that had at one time been cleared, was for the most part level and, apart from swampy patches, it was reasonably firm. The coconuts area was also firm and had been cleared, though a light jungle growth had grown up between the palms due to neglect for many months.
3. Despite these disadvantages the terrain was far more suitable to the use of tks than is normally the case in NEW GUINEA and was in direct contradiction to SANANANDA area where owing to the low lying swampy nature of the terrain, movement off the road or well defined tracks was virtually impossible, with the result that tks were obliged to operate in a defile.
4. The two ops are therefore dealt with separately.

CAPE MIDALADERE - GIROPA POINT.

GENERAL.

5. It must be remembered that while a considerable portion of the ground was suited to tk movement, tks were virtually confined to the area of once cleared and drained ground. Bogging resulted almost invariably and immediately that virgin ground was encountered.
6. In all 19 M3 Light ('General STUART') tks were made available to 18 Aust Inf Bde for ops. Owing to the rate at which tks arrived in the area of operations tk casualties from enemy action and irretrievable bogging the greatest number available at any one time was 11.
7. In all actions the tks were operating in direct conjunction with inf and their role was that for which the 'I' tk is specifically designed. This role is one for which the 'General STUART' is not intended and the necessity for operating at abnormally slow speeds told heavily on crews, engines, brakes and clutches.
8. The tk, too, is not heavily armoured with the result that, deprived of its normal mobility, it is an easy mark for enemy A.Tk weapons. While the 'I' tk is invulnerable to ~~any~~ A.Tk weapons other than possibly AA guns used in an A.Tk role the 'General STUART' can be made a casualty by even 20 mm AP and fired from a high velocity weapon at moderately close range. As mentioned in the report these were the only tks that could be made available under existing circumstances and transport limitations for the purpose. However they proved very effective notwithstanding.

Attd as Appx "AA" is an illuminating table of statistical data relative to the forces engaged..

TACTICS EMPLOYED.

9. Tk formations adopted were varied in the several attacks in accordance with availability of tks and local conditions. In all cases the tks preceded the main body of inf while one tk was closely followed by a specially detailed protective party of inf. The main body of inf attacked in open order at a distance behind the tks that was governed



by the nature of the ground - they were however never more than 50 yds behind the tks while in close country e.g. thick head high grass, they followed on the heels of the tks.

10. It was found most satisfactory to operate tks in pairs or threes to enable mutual support and protection. When a sufficiency of tks is available it is recommended that a tp of three tks be allotted to each fwd coy, the tp operating two up with one slightly back. This latter is then ready to move immediately in support of either of the leading tks or to replace a tk casualty.
11. In the event of an abundance of tks being available, the desirability of allotting tks to reserve coys to assist the latter in mopping up or alternatively to pass through the leading coys engaged in that operation without depriving them of their tk support is obviously desirable.
12. In all cases tks and inf operated on the same axis of advance. To do otherwise was not considered advisable or to offer any advantages in the type of country encountered.

#### ARTY COOP.

13. Owing to the relatively small number of guns and the wide dispersion of arty tp posns it was not possible to shoot more than one tp as a rule on a close target. For the attacks by 2/5th 2/10 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns on 18, 20, 22, 24 and 29 Dec and 1 Jan a preliminary arty shoot on selected targets or areas was laid down for the ten minutes prior to zero. This was not possible for the attack by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn on 3 Jan owing to the proximity of enemy and our tps.
14. One lesson learnt and practiced was the desirability of maintaining constant air arty/R during both the approach march of tks, when this is within possible range of enemy A.Tk weapons, and during the attack. By so doing our own arty is often able to engage immediately any enemy A.Tk guns which open fire, or alternatively blind them with smoke.

#### TANK APPROACH MARCH.

15. To achieve surprise the use of aircraft noise camouflage is recommended. In one captured document reference was made to noise of aircraft at a time when tks were moving without aircraft noise camouflage owing to its being unavailable.
16. The most detailed recon and marking of route of approach march from tk lying up area to FUP by tk offrs and crew coms is essential, also of FUP and line of advance up to inf front line. The ground over which the tks passed in CAPE MIDWAYERS - GIROPA POINT ops was both treacherous and, owing to tall grass, largely featureless and in addition was studded with craters. To follow it, each crew com must have an intimate knowledge of his route prior to attempting it in a tk.

#### E.U.P.

17. This was sited in each case behind and parallel to inf start line. The tks were therefore able to form up on their correct frontages facing in correct direction at FUP and move fwd from there so as to cross inf start line at ZERO.
18. This necessitates recon by tk offrs and coms of routes from FUP to start line and of start line itself for the reasons already given in para 16.
19. Tk coms must be prepared too to leave their tk and take part in any conference which the inf com may call prior to giving his orders for an attack on enemy posn. This applies not only to bn coms conferences but also to coy coms and even pl coms who are preparing to stage an attack.

#### RATE OF ADVANCE.

20. In the absence of an arty creeping barrage the rate of advance must be regulated by that of main body of inf. Tk coms must therefore be constantly on the qui vive to ensure both that they do not outstrip



The inf now, on the other hand, hold up its advance by continuing to engage targets with which inf are prepared to deal. If inf and tks become divorced during the action the tks are in much greater danger from Molotov cocktails, hand placed A.Tk mines and enemy personnel jumping on tk with A.Tk bombs. Inf casualties will be higher and their chance of success less.

#### THE PROTECTIVE PARTIES.

81. These must be assigned to each tk and must follow on the line of advance of that tk, ready to take instant action in the event of determined enemy endeavouring to make tk casualties by means of petrol, magnetic mines Molotov cocktails, firing through slits, etc.

82. The enemy encountered were well trained in A.Tk war and concentrated their fire on vision slits and weapon apertures and, given the opportunity, used magnetic mines, petrol and Molotov cocktails. Snipers concentrated on open turrets. Tks should therefore operate fully closed down, while they should not move right up to pill boxes or trenches. The pillboxes encountered were too strong to crush and the best method was to engage them at a range of 10 to 15 yds and to fire 37mm HE and .30 MAG through slits and entrances. It was found too that 37 mm will penetrate coconut logs in many cases.

83. Despite the additional discomfort it was found advantageous to employ a crew of five. This enables the crew commander to concentrate his attention on command while the addition of the fifth man enables one gunner to operate 37 mm and coaxially mounted MAG.

84. It is considered that in jungle warfare a periscope should always be available. Also the vision prisms which become damaged on account of firing at slits, should be readily replaceable at once by spares carried in the tk.

#### COMMAND AND INTERCOMM.

85. It was found to be of great advantage to use one tk as a command tk, which remained with the Command. Senior tk officer with the Command can then control his tks by R/T. In the event of its becoming necessary to put this tk into the fight command can be exercised through the 101 Set or "Walkie Talkie" set to a tk set tuned to "command" frequency.

86. Normally all tks were tuned to "TK" frequency on which the leaders directed ops, with "command" frequency (used by the Command, Senior TK Officer and by the leaders as a rear link) as their alternative frequency.

#### VISUAL INTERCOMMUNICATIONS AND SIGNS.

87. The following signals were employed:-

- (a) Tk requiring inf assistance fired GREEN very light.
- (b) Tk requiring tk assistance fired RED very light.
- (c) Line of flight of very pistol fired by inf indicated resistance in that direction.
- (d) Inf desiring tk to move to them raised steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.
- (e) Targets or centres of resistance were indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length.
- (f) Pans of all wounded were marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground. This is very necessary where fighting in grass, jungle or undergrowth.



SIG.  
SIG. CABLE.

28. Tks are a constant source of danger to sig cable. Tk coms, when receiving routes should make a special note of sig cable so that an overhead cable bridge can be made at the crossing places. Tks should take care to use only these crossing places. There should be close liaison between Sig and En Sig Offrs and tk coms to safeguard this. On one occasion at a crucial moment all fwd communication with Sig Hq was destroyed by tks, 15 wires being cut.

ADM.

29. Tk replenishment area should be established as far fwd as possible, if necessary being moved further fwd after ZERO. In CAPE ENDALADERE-GIROPA POINT ops bron carriers proved invaluable in maintaining tk replenishment areas.

30. The system found best to maintain tks in action was for one res tk to be held in readiness, fwd of replenishment area, and for this to be called into action immediately a tk in action became a casualty or required replenishment. On the res tk moving fwd into action another was immediately fed fwd from replenishment area. To minimise delay, direct intercom between En Hq and tk replenishment area is necessary.

31. While the frequent and rapid replenishment that was possible in CAPE ENDALADERE-GIROPA POINT ops justified a lavish expenditure of am, care should be taken to impress on all crew coms that such conditions do not always obtain, and that am expenditure must be governed in accordance with replenishment facilities. A tk without am is really of less use than a tk immobilised through lack of fuel.

RECOVERY.

32. The provision of block and tackle of sufficient strength and suitable type and of special recovery vehs is most desirable. In CAPE ENDALADERE-GIROPA POINT ops fighting tks were of necessity used to recover others that were bogged.

33. As already stated, the necessity for operating for abnormally long periods in low gear and the additional wear and tear on brake linings and clutches imposed by the nature of the ground resulted in correspondingly higher maintenance periods. To allow of these being carried out a tk harbour must be established beyond the actual battle area to which tks can retire at dusk. This place should be one where lights can be used for, if this is not possible, it will be found that tks cannot be used on successive days for any length of time.

34. It is considered essential that all tk sets should be complete as regards LAD personnel, tools and stores on the necessary scale.

35. One replacement frequently required is the periscopes. If these are immediately available, tks whose slits have been blinded by enemy small arms fire may readily be put back in action.

36. Owing to both casualties and exhaustion from long periods of action it is essential that ample reserves of personnel be immediately available. It is suggested that a complete spare crew should be available for each tk.

SANAYANDA AREA QIB.

GENERAL.

37. SANAYANDA area presented an entirely different picture to earlier action for, in this case, tk movement, by virtue of the sodden and swampy nature of almost the entire terrain, was virtually confined to roads and defined tracks. Tks when used were obliged to operate on the defile of prepared roads and tracks, while for the particular ops it had been found possible for four tks only to be brought from BUHA owing to deterioration of the track due to rain after the passage of the first tp.



38. Employment of tks was particularly required for the attack on enemy strong point west of the road and immediately North of our own position. This strong point was so close that our arty could not bombard it with safety to our own tps. Only one tk attack was made and the principal lesson learnt was confirmation of the fact that the enemy is well-versed in A.Tk warfare.
39. One tp of three tks with one tk in res, supported the attack of 8/18 Aust Inf Bn on 18 Jan.
40. It was known that the enemy might have A.Tk weapons, though no ft arty or high velocity weapons had fired for ten days.
41. The nature of the attack was such that the three tks in mutual support were obliged to advance in column along a road. The initial advance required was 40/50 yds. The leading tk was pierced by an A.Tk gun of approx 37 mm, but was driven clear, the second lost control when hit, ran on an anti-tk mine and subsequently burnt out, while the third also pierced by the 37 mm was later recovered.
42. By mischance the tp com's wireless set in the leading tk was put out of action with the result that control was momentarily lost. Had this not occurred at least one and probably two tk casualties would have been avoided.
43. The enemy showed himself both versatile in A.Tk warfare and astonishingly accurate in his A.Tk small arms fire. In this operation he had mines tied to bamboos ready to push out from jungle under tk tracks.
44. In such country against an enemy both well versed in A.Tk warfare and provided with A.Tk weapons, success can be achieved only by tks possessing a sufficiency of armour to enable them to close with the enemy A.Tk weapons to engage them. For this role the "General STUART" is NOT suitable.

TECHNICAL NOTES.

45. The sub-joined Technical notes were prepared by Capt. BALDOCK, S/C Aust Arml Regt.



APPENDIX "A"

to  
NOTES ON TANK AND INF COOPERATION UNIT IN CAPE BEDALADERE-GIROPA POINT  
AND UJANANDA AREA OPS.

TECHNICAL NOTES BY CAPT. BALDOCK - S/D AUST ARMD REGT.

1. Low track poundage per sq ft desirable.
2. Metal tracks. Heavy spuds.
3. Low overall height.
4. Armour and armament.
5. Ventilation.
6. Range - petrol and am (more petrol).
7. Easy replacement periscopes etc.
8. Periscopes essential.
9. Speed not a necessity.
10. Power sufficient to bash jungle.
11. Flaps to fasten and not fly open.
12. Moisture proof wireless.
13. B. frequency unnecessary.
14. Necessity of reserve frequency.
15. I.C. vital.
16. Netting should be checked late.
17. Trained operator should be able to check in a few seconds.
18. Range is limited by wet and jungle.
19. Very brief procedure necessary and use of tks as broadcasting stations.
20. Control tk useful as signals link but not essential.
21. Use of tracer for indication of targets for HE.
22. Loading of belts with AP ball and tracer.
23. Restricted use of TMS, grenade and pistol.
24. Use of independent gun control for hull gunner against snipers.
25. Fire only at indicated and observed targets.
26. Jettison tks hindrance.

B. EQUIPMENT.

1. Five Jeeps and five trailers and Slave Battery Charger.
  - (a) Two cooks and eqpt with two Hydra burners, four Dixie stands, spare burners and spare pump.
  - (b) Rations. Two days reserve in tins for sgn.
  - (c) Q Items. Dubbin, recuperator oil, 4 x 8, boots and clothes.
  - (d) Mechs and Armourer, tools and eqpt and carrying gear.
  - (e) POL.

Five Jeeps without Trailers.

- (a) Orderly Rm.
- (b) Q.
- (c) RAP.
- (d) Sgn Ldr.
- (e) Tp Sgt.

Jeeps and Trailers to be pooled to cart POL and am fwd to RA, also to cart men's gear.

RA to be repaired and maintained as far fwd as practicable. Two tk refills per tk engaged to be maintained at RA.



APPX "AA" to Notes on Tk and Inf Cooperation CAPS BENDALADERS-GIROPA JUMP and SAVANANDA Area Ops.

(a) Serial	(b) Location	(c) Date	(4) Tks in support of:-	(5) Number of tks employed	(6) Tks destroyed by gun fire.	(7) Tks temporarily u/s by gun fire.	(8) Tks destroyed by causes other than gun fire.	(9) Tks temporarily u/s by enemy action other than gunfire.	(10) Tks irretrievably bogged.	Remarks.
1.	BENDA-LADERS	18 Dec	3/9 En	7	-	-	2(1)	1(11)	-	(1) One tk destroyed by suspected Molotov cocktail, one caught fire when gun jump exploded. (11) Vision slits damaged by H&D fire.
2.	"	30 Dec	30	4	-	-	-	-	1	
3.	"	23 Dec	30	3	-	-	-	-	-	
4.	OLD STRIP (GIROPA)	26 Dec	2/10 En.	3	1	2(111)	-	-	-	(111) One tk pierced and engine put out of action - abandoned but subsequently recovered, one tk bogged, then hit by gunfire, subsequently recovered.
5.	"	29 Dec	30	4	-	-	-	-	-	
6.	"	1 Jan	2/12 En	7	-	-	-	-	-	
7.	"	3 Jan	30	7	-	-	-	-	-	
8.	Jap Mi Zone SAVANANDA Area.	18 Jan	30	4	1	3(1v)	-	-	-	(1v) One tk hit by gunfire withdrew, the second tk bogged after being hit by gunfire but subsequently recovered.
9.	TOTALS	-	-	39	3	4	2	1	1	

NOTE: 1. Tks held in pos but not actually employed in battle are NOT included in figures.  
 2. Tks were in action on eight days, arty and inf on 23 days during ops.  
 Rk

3. Total casualties sustained by all arms during ops were:

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Ops.	Off.	Ops.	Off.	Ops.
2/6 Aust Arty Regt	-	11	2	9	2	20.
Arty Units	-	-	4	2	4	2.
18 Aust Inf Bde*	30	442	45	775	75	1217.

\* These figures do NOT include casualties of U.S. inf and do NOT include personnel evacuated due to illness.



SECRET

Copy No. 114

Date: 17 Dec 42.

18 AUST INF BDE GP OPERATION ORDER NO. 1.

Ref Maps: BUNA LOCALITY REVISED approx 4 inches to 1 mile.  
BUNA TARGET PLAN NO. 24.

Note: Owing to these maps being gridded differently, any message must specify map used. In this order map used is BUNA LOCALITY REVISED.

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy.

- (a) As contained in topographical notes on BUNA AREA dated 11 Dec 42 already issued but NOT to all recipients of this order.
- (b) As given verbally at conferences by COMD 18 AUST INF BDE GP.
- (c) As contained in 18 AUST INF BDE GP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to be issued at 1600 hrs 17 DEC.

2. Own Troops.

The following troops are under command 18 AUST INF BDE GP.

- (a) X Sqn 2/6 AUST ARMED REGT.
- (b) MAHNING TP 2/1 AUST FD REGT.
- (c) HALL TP 2/5 AUST FD REGT.
- (d) OHARA TP 1 AUST MOUNTAIN BTY.
- (e) DET 2/4 AUST FD COY (ENGRS).
- (f) 128 U.S. REGT (1/128, 1/128, 3/128 U.S. BNS and att tps).
- (g) 2/9 AUST INF BN.
- (h) 2/10 AUST INF BN.
- (i) 17 AUST INF BDE CARRIER GP.
- (j) DET 2/5 AUST FD AMB.
- (k) DET 10 AUST FD AMB.
- (l) DET A.A.S.C.
- (m) DET A.A.C.C.

INTENTION

- 3. 18 AUST INF BDE GP will attack and capture area CAPE ENDAIADERE - NEW STRIP - OLD STRIP - BUNA MISSION.

METHOD

- 4. The attack will take place in phases. *the coast to*  
PHASE ONE to attack and capture area bounded on the right by AND the mouth of SIMEMI CK 278258 and on the left by a line through east end of NEW STRIP and west end of OLD STRIP thence NW along SIMEMI CK to its mouth.
- 5. This order covers the details of PHASE ONE only. Orders will be issued subsequently by HQ 18 AUST INF BDE GP for later PHASES.
- 6. Groupings.
  - (a) Fwd. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn with in support,
    - (1) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt less ONE tank.



- (ii) Manning Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt.
- (iii) Hall Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt.
- (iv) Ohara Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty.
- (v) Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy.

(b) Reserve

- (1) ONE tank X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt.
- (ii) 128 U.S. Regt.
- (iii) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn (on arrival HAROKI).
- (iv) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp.

7. Objectives.

- (a) Area bounded by coast on right and by SIMEMI CK on left to mouth of SIMEMI CK but excluding NEW STRIP.
- (b) Bridgehead on west side of SIMEMI CK in coconut grove at NW of OLD STRIP and commanding track OLD STRIP & BUNA MISSION.

8. Start Lines.

2/9 Aust Inf Bn will recon and mark start line by 1600 hrs 17 Dec. Start line will be approx 150 yards south of line now held by 3/128 Bn.

9. Forming Up Places.

- (a) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt less ONE tank will move from present position to forming up place already reconed between 1800 hrs and 1900 hrs D - 1. Sqn will be responsible for its own local security during night D - 1/D.
- (b) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn less B Ech will recon forming up place south of 128 G.P. and will move there by 1800 hrs D - 1.

10. ZERO.

0700 hrs which is time when tanks cross infantry start line.

11. D Day.

18 Dec.

12. Timing of Advance.

Pace of advance will be regulated by infantry. Tanks MUST conform to this rate of advance.

13. Compass Bearing of Advance.

535 deg true to CAPE ENDAIADERE then 285 deg true.

14. Supporting Arms.

(a) Arty.

- (1) Manning Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt, Hall Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and Ohara Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty will fire on targets already indicated on ground on enemy front and centre from Z - 10 minutes to Z. Targets already indicated in CAPE ENDAIADERE area will be engaged from Z - 10 to Z + 10 minutes.
- (ii) Rates of fire will be laid down by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp in accordance with availability of amm.
- (iii) Manning Tp, Hall Tp and Ohara Tp will each send F.O.O. and sig party to report to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn by 1600 hrs 17 Dec.



- (iv) On orders to be issued by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp Hall Tp will move one 25 pdr gun and available A.P. shot and normal H.E. to a position near eastern end of NEW STRIP with a view to engaging enemy pill boxes on NEW STRIP.

(b) Mortars of 128 U.S. Regt.

- (1) Heavy mortars of 128 U.S. Regt will give supporting fire on timed programme as arranged by C.O. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn with Comd 128 U.S. Regt on targets indicated on front of attack.
- (ii) 128 U.S. Regt will engage observed targets in area of NEW STRIP during PHASE ONE with heavy and light mortars using both H.E. and available smoke.

15. Role and Location of Reserves

(a) 128 U.S. Regt.

- (1) 1/128 Bn will remain present position.
- (ii) At 0600 hrs D day 1/128 and 3/128 U.S. Bn will withdraw to a line in rear of present positions to be indicated on ground by Maj Hall, 2/5 Aust Inf Regt on D - 1.
- (iii) 1/128 and 3/128 U.S. Bns will re-occupy their present positions as soon as 2/9 Aust Inf Bn has passed through those positions.
- (iv) 3/128 U.S. Bn will remain at immediate notice to take over ground from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on orders HQ 18 Aust Inf BdeGp.
- (v) Upon withdrawal of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn through 3/128 Bn, Hall Tp F.O.C. will remain with 3/128 U.S. Bn which will have a call on that tp.
- (vi) 1/128 U.S. Bn will remain at immediate notice to form a defensive flank facing west and linking up with defensive left flank of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn north of NEW STRIP.

- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. will on arrival move from HARIKO to bivouac area at present occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and will remain at immediate notice.

(c) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp.

- (1) Will move at 0700 hrs D day from present location to bivouac area 200 yds south of HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp at present occupied by X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt and will remain in Bde reserve at immediate notice.
- (ii) Det 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp will endeavour to recover two of carriers at present fwd of 3/128 U.S. Bn position if in fair running order when ground has been cleared by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn. These carriers will rejoin 17 Aust Inf Bde carrier Gp.

(d) Allied Air Forces.

- (1) Direct air support will be arranged by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.
- (ii) Aircraft noise camouflage will be provided from 1800 to 1915 hrs D - 1 and from 0615 to 0700 hrs D day to cover movements of tanks.



## ADMINISTRATION.

### 16. Rations.

Three days emergency rations will be carried on the men.

### 17. Amn.

First line amn will be carried. Amn will be replenished by S.C. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp on urgent request or normal expenditure return.

### 18. Tank Replenishment Area will be notified.

### 19. Arty Amn.

Separate orders will be issued.

### 20. Chlorination Tablets will be carried by each man.

### 21. Assault Boats.

S.C. will arrange to draw five assault boats from Major Lupient and will despatch these fwd as required by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

### 22. Medical.

(a) R.A.P. will evacuate stretcher cases and walking wounded by nearest direct route to coastal track running south from CAPE ENDAIADERE to HARIKO. Walking wounded will proceed down this track.

(b) Evacuation of Stretcher Cases on coastal track will be organised by SMO Maj Lavarack 2/5 Aust Fd Amb by Lt Sec 2/5 Aust Fd Amb.

(c) Det 2/5 Aust Fd Amb will establish ADS with 14 Portable US Hospital at 310236.

(d) S.C. will arrange further evacuation by Lt Sec 10 Aust Fd Amb. Jeep and Native Carrier to DOBODURA.

(e) Det 10 Aust Fd Amb will establish Lt Sec at DOBODURA.

### 23. Prisoners of War.

Will be sent under guard to 128 US Regt C.P. 308241.

### 24. B Echelons.

(a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn B Ech will move to present bivouac area of X Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt by 1800 hrs D - 1.

(b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn B Ech will remain at bivouac area on arrival until receipt of further orders.

## INTERCOMMUNICATION.

25. HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp remains present location 309238.

26. Main Artery of Comm will be coastal track.

### 27. Allocation of Wireless Sets.

(a) 1 x 101 Set will move with 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

(b) 1 x 101 Set and 1 x 11 Set will remain at HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

(c) Five portable US Wireless sets and two miles of US assault



cable will be issued by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn by 1600 hrs 17 Dec.

- (d) Capt Quilty Sig Offr HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will arrange for visual intercomm between 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and a terminal on coast at HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp as required.

28. Frequencies, Call Signs and Code Names.

Will be notified by Capt Quilty.

29. Wireless Restrictions.

- (a) Except for aircraft shoot HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp, ~~and~~ Arty HQ and Arty Tps X Sqn 2/6 Armd Regt 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will maintain wireless silence until contact is made on D day.
- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will maintain wireless silence until further orders.

30. Passwords.

A new schedule of passwords will be issued by 1800 hrs D - 1.

31. Visual Intercomm Tank and Inf.

~~ix~~ The following will be employed

- (a) Line of flight of Verey pistol will indicate resistance in that direction.
- (b) Inf desiring tank to move to <sup>them</sup> ~~rein~~ will raise steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.
- (c) Targets or centres of resistance may be indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length.
- (d) Positions of all wounded will be marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground.
32. ~~ix~~ In case it is necessary to postpone this operation the code words WYALONE till ----- hrs will be used to postpone ZERO.

SYNCHRONISATION.

33. Sigs 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will synchronise watches on 32 US Div time at 1600, 2000 and 2400 hrs D - 1 and at 0300 and 0600 hrs D day. Synchronisation must be exact to within five seconds.

ACK.

Issued at 1230 hrs 17 Dec.  
By hand and through sigs.

Major  
B.M. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

DISTRIBUTION.

X Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt  
Arty 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp  
Det 2/4 Aust Pd Coy  
128 US Regt  
2/9 Aust Inf Bn  
2/10 Aust Inf Bn  
17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp  
Det AAME (Maj Lavarack)  
32 US Div  
Comd  
BM  
SC  
IO  
Sigs.  
War Diary

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Appendix "C" to Report on Operations of 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.  
at CAPE ENDRIADERE - GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA. 14 DEC. 42 - 22 JAN. 43

TO: X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt 126 US Regt 2/9, 2/10 Aust Inf Bns  
33 US Div Arty Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp SG IO

FROM: 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

O 23

19

Ref 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp Operation Order No. 1 operation continues 20 Dec (.)  
Intention 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will complete PHASE ONE (.) Under cover from  
1900 hrs 19 Dec one coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in support from same time X Sqn  
2/6 Aust Arm Regt less one tank (.) Arty support will be arranged by  
this Hq to 0700 hrs (.) Supporting fire by HALL Tp can be arranged  
by this Hq as desired 20 Dec (.) FOO's MANNING HALL and OHARA tps remain  
with 2/9 Bn (.) ZERO 0700 (.) 126 US Regt will take over ground  
occupied by 2/9 Bn at ZERO as that Bn moves fwd (.) 1/126 and 1/128 US  
Bns will maintain active pressure on their fronts and will take immediate  
advantage of any opportunity to push fwd and consolidate (.) 2/10 Aust  
Inf Bn remains in Bde reserve at immediate notice probably moving area  
CAPE ENDRIADERE when ordered by this Hq (.) One tank 2/6 Aust Arm Regt  
remains Bde res at immediate notice (.) Administration and Intercommu-  
nication unchanged ASK

IMMEDIATE

1635

By hand to 33 Div



Appendix "D" to Report on operations of 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.  
at CAPE ENDAIADERE - GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA. 14 DEC. 42 - 22 JAN. 43.

TO: X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt 2/10 Aust Inf Bn 128 Inf Regt Rptd  
2/9 Aust Inf Bn 32 Div Adv HQ.

FROM: 18 Aust Inf Bde Cpt.

O 88

29

Confirming verbal instrs 2/10 Aust Inf Bn with under command COY 2/9  
Aust Inf Bn and with in support one tp of four tjs X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm  
Regt will attack coconut grove between GIROPA POINT and mouth of SIMMI  
CK (.). Attack will be in NE direction to coast with left on approx present  
C Coy posn and on a frontage that will allow forces on capture of objective  
to face N.W. and S.E. respectively with sufficient depth to allow  
consolidation and defence. (.). Start line for tks and inf and FUP for  
tanks and coordination of tank approach march will be laid down by bn  
comd (.). Arty will fire on beach S.E. of GIROPA POINT from 2-10 to 2 and  
along GIROPA CK on left flank from 2 (.). 2/10 Bn will arrange smoke  
diversion on S.E. end of coconuts on bank of SIMMI CK from 2-10 (.).  
ZERO HQ before 1400 repeat 1400 hrs (.). 128 US Regt will maintain  
left flank guard facing West S.W. and South (.). B Coy 1/128 US Bn  
will provide guard at tk Forward Up Place (.). Coys on right of C Coy  
2/10 Aust Inf Bn will take advantage of any opportunity to advance N.E.  
and maintain line (.). Synchronisation by this HQ (.). Administration  
and Intercommunication unchanged ACK

IMMEDIATE

1255



Ref 42/1/36.

SECRET  
HQ R.A.E.  
6 Aust Div.  
4 Jan 43.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS - EXPEDIENTS IN ASSISTING ATTACK.

1. At the request of Brig. G.F. WOOTTEN, Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde, a visit was made to the Bde area at BUNA on 29 Dec-2 Jan 43, and the question of employing expedients to assist in attack and mopping up of Jap strong points discussed with Bde and Bn Comds.
2. In this area the Jap has constructed shell proof MG posts, comd posts and shelters by means of which his casualties during our arty and mortar preparation and harassing are reduced and good protection is provided against aerial attack. It is generally considered that fire posns unprovided with overhead cover are manned by observers only until attacked, when the Japs move from their shelters to these positions. It is thought that the effectiveness of fd arty against the strong points has been limited to hits in the close vicinity of doorway openings and loopholes using H.E., and for this reason A.P. shell has been used successfully.
3. The shelters are constructed of an interior framework for walls of either coconut logs or 44-gallon oil drums on end, with two or more layers of coconut log bearers side butted overhead, and with either  $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plate or corr. iron on top of the bearers. Outside the walls and overhead framework to an overall thickness of at least 4 ft of earth is placed, with coconuts and strips of dry grass matting incorporated in the earth to assist in cushioning pressures set up by H.E., the structures vary in type and size and lengths from 12 ft to 40 ft, widths from 4 ft to 8 ft, heights - floor to underside bearers 3ft 6ins to 4ft 6ins. Access openings 2 ft wide, are at ends, sometimes on opposite sides and protected from splinters by low earth and coconut walls which serve as emergency fire positions. Loopholes, when provided, are approx 2 ft in length and 4 ins in height, sited at ends and/or sides. Floor levels are very little below the natural surface, in some cases within a few inches, in others, 2 ft below. This results in practically the whole of the strong point being above ground, with consequent difficulties in concealment, although this is assisted as far as possible by suitable siting. The underground water level in this area is generally within one to three feet of the surface, rendering it impossible to excavate to any depth below the surface.
4. Tests were carried out with ammonal charges on typical shelters as follows:-
  - (i) 5 lb charge placed inside shelter central to access opening to represent charge thrown through opening.  
  
Result:- Considerable blast effect, walls bulged outwards for almost full length of 30 ft, 8 ft of overhead cover above charge collapsed, access opening at opposite end disturbed.  
Conclusion:- Charge sufficient to knock out all occupants by blast irrespective of interior arrangements of slit trenches or splinter protective walls, if any.
  - (ii) 5 lb charge placed outside shelter between access opening and splinter protection wall.  
  
Result:- Similar to (i) but effect reduced.  
  
Conclusion:- As for (i).



- (iii) 10-lb charge placed halfway up side of shelter, central to length of shelter, not in vicinity of access openings or loopholes.

Result:- Small crater effect with earth, grass matting and coconuts disturbed to diameter 3 ft and maximum depth of 15 inches.

Conclusion:- Structure not damaged and occupants unlikely to be more than slightly shaken.

- (iv) 21 lb charge placed central on top of shelter.

Result:- Crater punched through earth, 4 sq ft of corrugated iron over bearers cut through, three bearers in each of the two layers of bearers disturbed by blast, structure otherwise undamaged.

Conclusion:- Occupants likely to be shaken but unlikely to be knocked out except within a few feet of the charge.

5. As a result of these tests it is concluded that the shelters are reasonably shellproof and that attack with explosives externally, will be ineffective unless heavy charges are employed. The design, however, provides little provision internally for blast, making it possible to ensure that occupants are knocked out by H.E. charges of 3 to 5 lbs thrown preferably through access openings or alternatively, exploded externally near these openings.. It is probable that 10 lb charges exploded within a few feet of either access openings or loopholes would knock out occupants by blast.

6. Comds of attacking troops consider that the two main problems are:-

- (i) To provide positive action in close support during attack, neutralising strong points and increasing Jap casualties.
- (ii) To provide means for rapid mopping up of strongpoints when surrounded. It was stated that this occupies considerable time and casualties, since remnants of Jap troops take refuge in shelters and cannot be readily dealt with by grenades.

7. Close support expedients during and in preparation for attack should preferably be either mobile or capable of operating at ranges approximating 1000 yards, in order to deal with defences in depth.

For this reason, expedients such as the fougasse with its range of 40 yards are of value only in limited cases. In discussion it was considered that flame and possibly explosive, non-poisonous gases would be of considerable value.

Some possibilities are:-

- (1) Flame Throwers:-

Haversack type, weight 40 lbs. Considered unsuitable in attack as operator becomes casualty or is pinned before reaching striking distance. Would be of some value in mopping up. Harvey type is unarmoured and cumbersome in movement. Has disadvantage that jet cannot be turned on and off at will but this could be eliminated by improvement of ignition arrangement. Jet operates continuously for 30 seconds. Both types appear suitable for employment from carriers fitted with overhead steel plate. Effective range is approximately 40 yards.

The ideal type appears to be the flame thrower mounted on a tank. This would provide mobility as well as protection for the operator. Flame thrower would be fitted to brackets at side or rear of tank, with a quick release arrangement in case of fire. If fire risks from fumes in case of petrol fuel tanks is considered too great, trailer flame thrower may be a possibility. In any case the flame thrower will require housing in armour plate.

It is generally considered that the mobile flame thrower would be most effective close support expedient.



(ii) Mortar Fired Oil Bombs:-

There appears to be no practical difficulty in devising a mortar bomb containing a mixture of oil, kerosene and petrol with a small bursting charge to allow diffusion, and with a flash device to either fire independently on impact, or by first firing a number of bombs without the flash devices to explode the gas after a sufficient concentration has been prepared at the target area. The 81 mm mortar appears suitable.

Advantages would be accuracy, ranges probably exceed 1500 yds and simplicity in requiring no special equipment other than the oil bombs.

(iii) Levens Projectors and Improvised Mortars:-

Suitable for firing oil bombs but appears to possess no advantages over (ii) and several disadvantages including less accuracy, special eqpt to be carried, and a slower rate of fire..

(iv) Incendiaries:-

Not considered to have any special advantages. Strong points will not readily burn and the flame throwers and mortar fired oil bombs would probably be much more effective.

8. Mopping up operations can be facilitated by the use of H.E. charges for blast effects referred to in para 5. Suitable charges have been made up using 2 to 5 lbs of ammonal in a ration tin container secured to a 36 grenade by a discharger cap, the assembled grenade and blast charge resembling the GERMAN Stick Grenade, with the 36 Grenade as a handle. Detonation of the ammonal charge is ensured by F.I.D. fastened to the grenade, which is primed and fired as when used independently.

It is considered that this expedient is the simplest and most effective for the purpose.

9. Scope may be found for the employment of booby traps and delay action charges in night raids, for which suitable eqpt is available in the form of Murray Switches and Time pencils.

10. As directed by C.E. NGF, experiments have been put in hand in conjunction with 2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy and the CW Offr NGF to investigate the possibilities referred to in 7 (i), (ii) and (iii).

Further reports will follow when experiments have advanced.

(- IRWIN) Lt-Col.  
CRE 6 Aust Div.

Ref S/43/17

HQ RAE, 6 Aust Div  
20 Jan 43.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS - EXPEDIENTS IN ASSISTING ATTACK.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

1. Further to my report 4 Jan 43, progress to date with experimental work is:-

FLAME THROWERS.

2. With the cooperation of the CO 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt a General Stewart tank is being fitted with a flame thrower and it is expected that tests can be concluded and necessary adjustments made within a few days. The flame thrower being used is a standard Harvey type with alterations to overcome its disadvantages. The method adopted involves no structural alterations to the tank, and it is considered will provide a simple means of converting tks for flame thrower use.



3. Alterations are being made to the Harvey eqpt to provide a valve between the fuel cylinder and the director, conveniently placed for the operator, and an ignition system by means of an acetylene gas jet playing on the fuel stream, itself ignited by an electric spark, switch controlled by the operator.. The method of operation will be for the operator to open the valve and switch on the electric current, which will be supplied from the tank batteries. Closing the valve will stop the flame thrower and the process will be capable of repetition until the fuel supply is exhausted. This system which will, if successful, remove the main disadvantages of the Harvey type flame thrower i.e. unsuitability for intermittent use, has been devised by Capt. L.G. MORTENSEN, 2/25 Aust Fd Par, Coy. Other alterations are of a minor nature, comprising extension of the pipe system and improvements in the director nozzle.

4. No structural alterations are required to the tank, the only alterations required being the mounting of the flame thrower cylinders on the floor and removal of the turret 3.7 mm gun. A steel tube, resembling the gun, takes its place and carries the thrower and acetylene piping and electric cable for the ignition device. The nearest point of combustion to this tk is, by means of the steel tube, kept clear of the tk tracks in case of splash. The turret mounting provides good traversing and elevation control as well as observation and protection for the operator.

5. It is anticipated that an effective range of 40 yds will be obtained and the capacity will be continuous operation for approx 3 mins, sufficient for a number of short bursts. An increase in cylinder capacities may be required to better its performances.

#### MORTAR FIRED OIL BOMBS.

6. Experiments have been carried out with bombs fired from a 3-in Mortar, containing 2 gallons of petrol oil mixture, and reasonable accuracy obtained at max range about 400 yds. The principal disadvantage is the size of the bomb, which, to get the 2-gallon capacity, consists of a pipe the full length of the mortar, with an extended pointed cylinder at the muzzle of the Mortar. A further disadvantage is the comparatively limited range.

7. Further possibilities being investigated are:-


- (a) Projectiles of smaller size and therefore less capacity for petrol oil filling, the object being to provide a similar type of projectile and increase the range.
- (b) Means of firing S.I.P. grenades from mortars or alternatively using a similar filling of yellow phosphorous, water, benzine and rubber, in mortar bombs.

#### BLAST BOMBS.

8. It is understood the BUNA type blast bomb has been used effectively, and that a 2lb ammonal charge has been found sufficient. Tests have disclosed failures in this type due to the primacord not detonating. This disadvantage is eliminated by removal of the explosive filler screw from the grenade, packing a small quantity of gelnite into the space and stopping the opening with putty. When the grenade is prepared for use the end of the primacord loop is inserted through the putty into the gelnite. Sketch is attached. Adoption of this method is recommended.

(-IRWIN) Lt-Col.  
CRE 6 Aust Div.





Note: Grenade is soldered to ration can as shown in sketch above

Primer - cord is inserted in container A & putty placed around hole to keep explosive dry. Primer cord is fixed to grenade with adhesive tape or light gauge wire.

Filling cap at (A) is removed & gelignite priming charge inserted - covered with putty to keep dry. When carried, Primer-cord is not inserted in charge, but is inserted approx 1" when it is to be fired.



SECRET

Copy No:.....

Date: 31 Dec 42.

18 AUST INF BDE GP OPERATION ORDER NO. 2.

Map Ref: BUHA LOCALITY REVISED approx 4 inches to 1 m.

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy. As contained in Sitrep to be issued to 1800 hrs 31 Dec.
2. Own Troops. (a) The following troops are under command 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp:-
  - (a) K Sqn 2/5 Aust Arm Regt.
  - (b) MANNING Tp 2/1 Aust FI Regt.
  - (c) HALL Tp 2/5 Aust FI Regt.
  - (d) One sec 4.5" hows.
  - (e) 128 US Regt (1/128, 1/128, 3/128 US Bns and att tps).
  - (f) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
  - (g) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
  - (h) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.
  - (i) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp.
  - (j) det AASC
  - (k) det AASC
  - (l) det AASC.
- (b) Present dispositions as contained in Sitrep to be issued to 1800 hrs 31 Dec.

INTENTION.

3. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will attack and capture coconut grove on coast between incl GIROPA POINT and incl mouth of SIMEMI CK.

METHOD.

4. The attack will take place in phases.
  - (a) PHASE ONE.
    - (1) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will attack from line 274257 - 272258 in NE direction to coast and will consolidate facing NW and SE.
    - (11) 3/128 US Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will press fwd to coconut grove on their fronts as opportunity offers in conformity with attack of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.
  - (b) PHASE TWO.
    - (1) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will exploit to SE end of coconuts.
    - (11) ZERO hour for exploitation phase will be notified.
5. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will attack on a frontage of approx 400 yds. This frontage will be maintained during attack and on consolidation.



6. Groupings.

(a) Fwd.

2/12 Aust Inf Bn with in support  
X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt of six tanks  
(Comd Capt R. G. MAY).

(b) Res.

- (i) Three tanks X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt.
- (ii) A Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- (iii) Reinft coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

7. Objective.

Coast between approx 277258 to 275261.

8. Start Line.

2/12 Aust Inf Bn will receive Start Line by 1200 hrs 31 Dec and will indicate Start Line to tank sqn comd.

9. Forming Up Places.

(a) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt will receive FUP by 1600 hrs 31 Dec and will move there on morning 1 Jan and will be formed up there by 0745 hrs in readiness for attack.

(b) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt will receive and mark routes from present posn to FUP and from FUP to Start Line by 1600 hrs. 31 Dec.

10. ZERO

ZERO HOUR 0800 hrs which is time when tanks cross inf start line.

11. D. Day - 1 Jan.

12. Timing of Advance.

Pace of advance will be controlled by inf. Tanks MUST conform to this rate of advance.

13. Compass Bearing of Advance. - 45° True.

14. Supporting Arms.

(a) ARTY

- (1) HALL Tp 2/5 Aust Ar'd Regt will fire on registered targets on beach between 277258 and 275263 from Z-10 to Z-2 Rate 3, and Z-2 to Z Rate 4.
- (ii) Fwd 25-pdr of HALL Tp will engage observed targets in coconut grove from first light to ZERO. F.O.O. will liaise with CO's 2/10 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns before firing.
- (iii) FOO's will report by 1200 hrs 31 Dec as follows:-
  - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - MANNING Tp
  - 2/10 Aust Inf Bn - HALL Tp, MANNING Tp  
and see 4.5 Hows.
  - 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - HALL Tp.



(b) Mortars of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

2/10 Aust Inf Bn will lay smoke screen as desired by CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn on SE end of coconut grove from Z-5 to Z+10.

(c) Inf.

2/9 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy) will be prepared to engage observed targets by MG and 37 mm fire on beach East of GIROPA POINT. No firing after Zero+10 without prior reference to this HQ.

15. Role and Location of Other Troops.

- (a) 1/128 US Bn will remain in present posn forming defensive flank facing West, SW and South.
- (b) Res tanks 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt will remain at Tank Replenishment Point to replace casualties or tanks requiring replenishment as called fwd by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.
- (c) A Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and Reinft Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will remain at 285245 and 294244 respectively in Bde reserve at immediate notice.
- (d) 1/126 US Bn with under comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy) will remain in present location.
- (e) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp will remain on Bde Res at immediate notice.

ADMINISTRATION.

16. Rations.

Three days Emergency Rations will be carried on the man.

17. AMB.

First line amn will be carried. Amn will be replenished by Staff Capt 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp on urgent request or normal expenditure return.

18. Tank Replenishment Area.

Will be notified.

19. Chlorination Tablets.

Will be carried by each man.

20. ASSISTANT. Medical.

- (a) Main route of evacuation will be DOBODURA track over BRIDGE 294244.
- (b) Light sec 2/5 Aust Rd Amb will be established fwd of BRIDGE in area to be notified and will evacuate from RAP.



- (c) Location of RAP will be notified to Light Sec by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.
- (d) ADS situated 292229 will be responsible for evacuation beyond Light Sec.
- (e) Walking wounded will proceed direct to ADS.

21. Prisoners of War.

Will be sent under guard to Bde fwd Report Centre at BRIDGE.

22. B Echelons.

Remain present areas.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

- 23. (a) Main artery DOBODURA track to BRIDGE thence along NEW STRIP to coastal road, thence South.
- (b) HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp remains present location 312232 with Fwd Report Centre at BRIDGE 294244.

24. Allocation of Wireless Sets.

- (a) 1 x 101 Set moves with each 2/9, 2/10, 2/12 Aust Inf Bns.
  - (b) 1 x 101 Set and 1 x 11 Set remain HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.
  - (c) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt will arrange W/P communication with 18 Aust Inf Bde HQ.
25. One tank from res tp will be available to Comd 2/12 Aust Inf Bn for tank intercommunication but will be employed in battle if he so requires.

26. Frequencies, Call Signs and Code Names.

Will be notified by Capt Gilty - Sig Offr HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde .

27. Wireless Restrictions.

2/12 Aust Inf Bn will maintain wireless silence until ZERO, otherwise normal traffic.

28. Passwords.

As already issued.

29. Visual Intercommunication Tks and Inf.

- (a) Tk requiring inf assistance will fire Green Verrey light.
  - (b) Tk requiring tk assistance will fire Red Verrey light.
  - (c) Line of flight of Verrey pistol fired by inf will indicate resistance in that direction.
  - (d) Inf desiring tank to move to them will raise steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.
  - (e) Targets or centres of resistance may be indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length.
  - (f) Positions of all wounded will be marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground.
30. In case it is necessary to postpone this operation, the code word "SYDNEY" till ..... hrs" will be issued to postpone ZERO.



30. Synchronisation.

Sigs 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will synchronise watches on 52 US Div time at 1600, 2000, and 2400 hrs D-1 and at 0300 and 0600 hrs D day. Synchronisation must be exact to within five seconds.

ACK.

Major  
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde

Signed 2230 hrs 30 Dec.

Issued through Sigs and by L.O.

DISTRIBUTION.

X Sqn 8/6 Aust Arm'd Regt	Copy No.	1.
Arty 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp	....	2.
128 US Regt	....	3.
1/126 US Bn	....	4.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	....	5.
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	....	6.
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	....	7.
52 US Div	....	8.
Comd, BM & War Diary	....	9.
SG, Sigs Offr, File	....	10.



Appendix 'G' to Report on operations of 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.  
at CAPE ENDAIADERE - GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA. 14 DEC. 42 - 22 JAN. 43.

SECRET

Copy No: .....

Date: 11 Jan 43.

18 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER NO. 3.

Confirming Verbal Orders

Ref Maps: BUNA LOCALITY REVISED approx 4" to 1 m.  
SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT No. 1 approx 1" to 96 yds.  
PHOTOMAP HQF/PH/001 Sheets 1 & 2 1/8000.

Note: Ref map will be quoted if PHOTOMAP used.

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy.

As given verbally at Bde Comd's conference 1100 hrs 11 Jan and to be brought up to date by unit I.O.'s with Bde I.O. at 1700 hrs 11 Jan.

2. Own Troops.

- (a) One tp B Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt comes under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde on arrival approx 1800 hrs 11 Jan.
- (b) P Tp 51 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt came in support 18 Aust Inf Bde 10 Jan.
- (c) 1 Bn <sup>163</sup> 155 US Regt is cooperating with 2/9 Aust Inf Bn by direct liaison.
- (d) 8 Bn <sup>163</sup> 155 US Regt at present astride KILLERTON TRACK at approx 177266 is to exert pressure South down Track on enemy right rear.

INTENTION.

3. 18 Aust Inf Bde will attack and capture area from present line held by 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns Westward to incl M.T. rd SOPUTA - SANANANDA South of 255 East West grid.

METHOD.

- 4. This attack will take place in phases. This order covers the details of PHASE ONE. Orders for later phases will be issued subsequently.
- 5. Forwards.
  - (a) Right - 2/9 Aust Inf Bn with under comd one coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn from 0730 hrs 12 Jan.
  - (b) Left - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn with in support one Tp B Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt less one tk and with under comd one coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn both from 0730 hrs 12 Jan.



Reg.

- (a) One tk B Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt.
- (b) 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt.
- (c) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys.
- (d) Bied Mortars of 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns.

7. Objectives

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - to incl line of timber  
~~183252~~ - 184255.  
183254 - 184253.
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - (i) to incl line of timber astride  
M<sup>1</sup> rd ~~189252~~ - 189253.  
182252 - 180253.  
(ii) Left flank will exploit  
sufficiently to West to deny enemy  
interference with M<sup>1</sup> rd.
- (c) On attaining objectives Bn Comds will exploit as  
practicable to maintain Bde intention.

8. Areas of Advance

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - circle enemy left flank to approx  
~~185255~~ thence SW to objectives.  
185255
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - M.T. rd.

9. Diversion.

2/9 Aust Inf Bn will maintain pressure on enemy to to their present front by fire and aggressive patrols from ZERO. Tactical ground gained by patrols will be consolidated.

10. Point of Junction.

Point of junction, at present 183252 will be maintained during advance.

11. Start Lines.

will be decided by C.O's.

12. ZERO.

0800 hrs 12 Jan which is time when the cross 2/12 Aust Inf Bn start line.

13. F.U.P.

- (a) Tp B Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt <sup>172235</sup> ~~175255~~.
- (b) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn } as laid down by C. O's
- (c) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn }

14. Timing of Advance.

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - as practicable.
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn -inf will regulate pace of adv. Tks MUST conform to this rate. CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will ensure maximum practicable rate of advance is maintained.



15. Apty.

- (a) F Tp 51 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt will fire following time programme:-
- (i) Z-15 to Z at rate 2 on registered targets along timber line area ~~180235~~ <sup>180253</sup> - 179249.
  - (ii) Z to Z+15 at rate 2 on registered targets in area ~~182252~~ <sup>183254 - 182252</sup>.
  - (iii) FOO's will move with each 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns.

16. Engns.

Engnr recee party will report to 2/12 Aust Inf Bn by 0730 hrs 12 Jan.

17. Role of Res.

- (a) One tk B Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt will move to HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde at ZERO.
- (b) 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt.
  - (i) will remain present locations at immediate notice from ZERO.
  - (ii) will maintain pressure on enemy to their front by fire and aggressive patrols from Z-15.
- (c) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn less two coys will remain present position at immediate notice.

ADMINISTRATION.

18. Ann and Sups.

- (a) A.P. and Sup P. at ~~172235~~ <sup>172235</sup>.
- (b) Bde Fwd Ann Dump at 176243.

19. Tk. Replenishment.

Tk replenishment areas will be established:-

- (a) Fwd - ~~183236~~ 183236.  
(contains ann and 20 gals petrol only).
- (b) Rear - 172235. <sup>172235</sup>.

20. Native Carriers.

will be allotted by S.C.

21. Medical.

- (a) ADS - ~~178243~~ 178243.
- (b) MDS - SOPUTA.
- (c) Evacuation beyond RAP will be by native carriers under orders of 14 Aust Fd Amb.

22. POW.

will be sent under guard to RHQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.



INTERCOMM.

23. Bde HQ remains 173245.

24. Line Comms.

Line comms will be maintained as at present. Two linesmen will be at 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns to extend line should Bn HQ advance.

25. W/T Comms.

(a) A Two-to-one gp will be established between HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns. Continuous watch from 0600 hrs 12 Jan 43. Frequency 2500 K/C.

(b) For comm to tks one gp will be established as follows:-

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	No. 11 Set	Freq 6330 K/C.
2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns	No. 108 Sets	
Sigs	No. 19 Sets.	

(c) As an alternative to 108 Sets 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns will also carry SCR536A sets and gp will use frequency 5387-5 K/C. Continuous watch from 0800 hrs 12 Jan 43.

26. A res cable dump is established at HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

27. Passwords.

as already issued.

28. Wireless Restrictions.

Wireless silence until ZERO.

29. Visual Intercomm Tks and Inf.

(a) Tk requiring inf assistance will fire Green verey light.

(b) Tk requiring tk assistance will fire Red verey light.

(c) Line of flight of verey pistol fired by inf will indicate resistance in that direction.

(d) Inf desiring tk to move to them will raise steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.

(e) Targets or centres of resistance may be indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length.

(f) Positions of all wounded will be marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet inground.

30. In case it is necessary to postpone this operation, the code word "MELBOURNE till ..... hrs" will be issued to postpone ZERO.

31. Synchronisation.

Sigs 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will synchronise watches on 7 Aust Div time at 2000 and 2400 hrs D-1 and at 0300 and 0600 hrs D. Day. Synchronisation must be exact to within five seconds.

ACK.

Signed at ..... hrs. Issued through Sigs and by L.O. Major BM 18 Aust Inf Bde

<u>DISTRIBUTION.</u>	7 Aust Div Cav Regt	Copy 1.	BM & WD	Copy 10.
	B Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt	2.	SC & WD	11.
	61 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	3.	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	Copy 6.
			163 US Regt	7.
File	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	4.	7 Aust Div	8.
Copy 12.	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	5.	Comd & File	9.




*As Index "H" to Report on operations of 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.  
at CAPE ENDAIDERE - GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA. 14 DEC. 42 - 22 JAN. 43.*

TO: 2/9 2/10 2/12 Aust Inf Bns Rptd 7 Aust Div 163 US Regt.  
FROM: 18 Aust Inf Bde. 0.120 14

Ref map GONA LOCALITY four inch (.) Ops 15 Jan (.) information (.) 163 US  
Regt is responsible for area East of and incl WESTERN KILLERTON TRACK (.)  
2/7 Aust Cav and B Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt revert to comd 7 Aust Div 0700 hrs  
15 Jan (.) Intention is Aust Inf Bde will advance along WESTERN KILLERTON  
TRACK and will seize and occupy area <sup>187303</sup> village ~~187568~~ - CAPE KILLERTON (.)  
Method (.) Advance gd 2/10 Bn (.) Order of march Bde HQ 2/9 2/12 Bns (.)  
2/10 Bn commences advance 0700 hrs (.) Bounds (.) one (.) line through  
track junc 183266 and Northern end PLANTATION 179286 (.) two (.) tracks area  
<sup>178306</sup> ~~178386~~ at 182304 181306 179307 177306 178306 (.) At bound one 2/10 Bn will  
send force NOT less than one coy to track junc <sup>183286</sup> ~~183866~~ which will be scoured  
until arrival US tps (.) 2/9 2/12 Bns move on orders this HQ NOT before  
0730 hrs (.) Adm details later (.) Intercomm (.) Bde Sigs will lay line  
behind 2/10 Bn (.) Bde HQ and all bns will tap line at clock hours and half  
hours when on move and will maintain constant watch when halted (.) 2/10  
Bn will report bounds immediately (.) 2/9 Bn sends LO or liaison NCO to 2/10  
Bn and 2/12 Bn to 2/9 Bn at first light 15 Jan (.) Sigs will synchronise  
watches night 14/15 Jan ACK

1910






NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID  
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

# GONA LOCALITY (Revised)

Scale: 4 Inches to 1 Mile



**LEGEND**

TIMBER	SWAMP	A.A. POSITION	HEAVY A.A.	LIGHT A.A.	DEFENCE POST	TRACK	BRIDGE	WATERCOURSE	COCONUT PLANTATION	GRASSLAND
--------	-------	---------------	------------	------------	--------------	-------	--------	-------------	--------------------	-----------

**WARNING**  
GRID DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH THAT SHOWN ON PREVIOUS EDITION

INFM From Native Sources  
INFM From AERIAL PHOTOS  
INFM From Tac R Reports  
INFM From Blk

Tac R From 11 JAN to 19 JAN.

COMPILED FROM ALL AVAILABLE  
INFORMATION TO 5 DEC. 1942  
H.O.N.G.F.

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST. ARMY TOPO. SURVEY COY., DEC. '42

*Propaganda leaflets dropped (1600hrs 16)*  
*Leaflets dropped Sanananda Pt 1/17*  
*Sanananda Pt quite dry 12/24/42*  
*Much water on Sanananda Sumba track 17/25/42*  
*300hrs 4/3*  
*Sanananda Sumba track under water 24 miles from coast Sanananda (along up from 16)*  
*1630 4/1*  
*Mud on SANANANDA Sumba track under water 12/24/42*  
*Camp fires observed in areas 19/27, 19/25, 19/21 N.M.S. 4/16/42*  
*19/23 fires north of this S.M. 1/00/42*  
*Large no of men 19/16/42*  
*4/16 found on 19/16/42*  
*Leaflets dropped 4/19*



GONA LOCALITY  
(REVISED)

TAC/R inform in - SANANANDA.



# General Blamey Tells Australia Of Papuan Victories

**TRIBUTES** to all ranks of all Services who contributed to the Allies' Papuan victory were paid by the commander, Allied Land Forces in the South-west Pacific area (General Sir Thomas Blamey) in a National broadcast on Sunday night. He warned the Australian people that the Japanese menace was still real and appealed to them to stand behind the troops to the end.

THERE was no kid glove in the Japanese methods of conducting a war, and he had definitely threatened to destroy Australia before Allied developments made it a base from which he could be destroyed, said General Blamey.

How far he would go in his effort to carry out that threat could not be foreseen, but he would do all he could. Australians in the forward area and in close-knit brotherhood with American troops, under conditions of unbelievable difficulty, had removed the menace from one quarter for a time at least.

"Australia owes much to her sons for having driven away this menace," Gen. Blamey added. "She owes much to General MacArthur for his magnificent understanding of us and his acceptance of us as part of his charge. She owes much to the American forces who have come to help us. She owes tribute to General Kenney, commanding Allied Air Forces, and to General Whitehead, ever vigilant in New Guinea.

"And I pay tribute, first to the magnificent troops who crossed the Kokoda track from Moresby to Buna, and to Brigadiers Eather and Lloyd, who led them; and second, to the stout-hearted Australian and U.S. men who drove the Japanese out of his lair in the coastal areas.

"I also pay tribute to those who built roads and bridges and aerodromes, to the men who unloaded ships, day and night, and to those whose ingenuity overcame all obstacles, even to improvising means of landing tanks in difficult places. To the men and their leaders, whom I have mentioned, to Lieutenant-General Herring, for his cheerful and happy co-operation as commander of the Corps from September onwards, to the sailors and airmen—to all these, Australia owes her happy relief from the immediate menace of invasion that she now enjoys. See to it this debt is paid by standing in line with us to the very end."

## Victory At Gorari

General Blamey traced the history of the Allied offensives across the Owen Stanley Range from Iorobaiwa and in the area between Wanigela and Buna. The Owen Stanley counter-attack, he said, was commanded first by General Allen, and a little later by General Vasey, who inflicted a complete defeat on the enemy at the Battle of Gorari.

"From this sharp conflict," said General Blamey, "only a remnant of the enemy escaped over the hills, and on November 16, General Vasey's force began to march down the road towards Gona. American forces, on the south, who had been waiting impatiently for the day, moved against the enemy's left at the same time.

"So complete was General Vasey's victory at Gorari that no single Japanese patrol was met with for 30 miles, but, when we reached the swampy, jungle-clad, low-lying coastal area, we found the enemy had constructed a series of extraordinary strong positions. He meant to hold his sea bases."

General Blamey gave a graphic picture of the difficulties of the Kokoda trail and described the investigations and careful planning which had been necessary to find an alternative way to hit at the Japanese in force between the range and the coast. He told of the final decision to fly an A.I.F. battalion to Wanigela, and how the presence of our troops (mainly South Australians) there was not discovered by

the Japanese for a considerable time. The experiment was completely successful, he said. As each body of troops was flown in, sufficient supplies had to be flown with it, and as the weather was extremely uncertain—rainfall going to 140 inches in places—there always had to be reserves in hand.

Japanese defence positions at Gona, Buna and Cape Endiader were had been troublesome to capture. The comparative slowness of the action for the capture of coastal fortresses was entirely due to the fact that in the absence of roads and a limited availability of transport, the battle was almost entirely carried out by the infantryman with his rifle and bayonet, with mortar and grenade.

Gradually, however, many difficulties were overcome and tanks and guns were brought forward. For these operations General Blamey paid special tribute to Brigadier Dougherty, Brigadier Wootton and General Eichelberger.

## Comparative Losses

The remaining Japanese were strongly entrenched in a small area around Sanananda, from which there was little hope of escape, he declared. The enemy had been defeated and his army in Papua destroyed by the superior quality of the Allied troops. They had outmarched and outfought him. Our battle losses were many thousands less than Japan's in land fighting alone, and every convoy the enemy had sent had been mauled by General Whitehead's air forces, and his losses at sea alone had exceeded Allied losses in the battle. A sharp blow had also been struck at his shipping.

"His army has not only been defeated—it has been practically exterminated," said General Blamey, "but because of this defeat do not imagine for one moment that we are out of the wood with the Japanese. His self belief is colossal. His valuation on human life is small. His resources are many. Do not imagine, because we have removed the immediate threat, that all the menace is past by any means."

## Assaulted By Soldier, Girl Alleges


FOUND wandering near the Exhibition Gardens, Melbourne, at 1.30 a.m. on Saturday, a 19-years-old Northcote girl said that an American soldier had seized her by the throat and attacked her. She is in St. Vincent's Hospital, and may have a fractured skull and nose.

She said that she and another girl met two Americans at Luna Park, and later had supper with them in the city. Subsequently they went to the gardens and separated, and the assault was then committed. Yesterday the girl, whose name is not disclosed, could not be interviewed.

## WORRY FOR BRIDES

BRIDES-TO-BE are worried about their trousseaux. Many of them are approaching the Rationing Commission for more coupons, but they will be disappointed, it having been decided by the Commission that no special allowance can be made. They state that a girl marrying in war time must expect to submit to wartime conditions.

## SCREEN MOTHER RETAINS GLAMOR



PROUD MAMA, Brenda Joyce, in private life Mrs. Owenword (he's in the U.S. Army) is the possessor of a brand-new daughter, Pamela. Brenda's latest 20th Century Fox film, "Little Tokio, U.S.A.," recently arrived in Australia.

## SPORT FLASHES

SATURDAY'S Peter Moore Cup, run for the first time at Canterbury Park, N.S.W., was one of the most sensational races seen on Sydney courses for some time.

The winner, Salivant, ran nine furlongs in time which equalled the track record of 1/52½. A section of the crowd made a hostile demonstration against Salivant, who, at his previous start in Newcastle, ran poorly.

On Saturday Salivant was 12 lengths clear three furlongs from home but Rimveil ran him to a close second.

## Jackson—82 In 90 Minutes

A DASHING 82 in 90 minutes by Vic. Jackson carried Waverley to a surprising cricket win on Saturday over the Sydney grade premiers leaders, St. George. As a result, Waverley and St. George again share the premiers lead.

ROY FOLEY (Army) won the inter-Service 100 yards at the Victorian Amateur Athletic Association meeting for the third week in succession from Sgt. George Shapiro (U.S. Army), who won his section of the 220 yards.

A CLEVER move by skipper George Robinson half a mile from the finish enabled Britannia to win the Sydney Flying Squadron's 18-footer race on Sunday. Britannia scored by seven seconds from Aberdare-Rampant won the River clubs' A class championship, and Pandora the Manly sixteens.

WARREN BOYD staged a brilliant finishing effort to win the 220 yards junior free-style swimming championship of N.S.W. at Manly Baths on Sunday. Rod Cahmen was two feet away second. It was the most thrilling race of the State Championships this season. Ken Sever, of the Singleton Club, took the quarter-mile title from Noel Ryan (Manly) by two yards.

LES SLOANE knocked out Mahomed Fahmy in the tenth round at Sydney Stadium on Saturday night.

OWING to unfavorable weather, Melbourne district cricket games were abandoned on Saturday after a brief period of play. Hobart cricket was also abandoned after brief play.

## MELBOURNE'S "COLOSSUS OF THE RING" LOSES £6,000

(From Gwyn Jones, "Orleigh" of the Melbourne Herald)

MICHAEL PITT, the "Colossus of Melbourne betting rings", was parted from some of his huge winnings at Mentone on Saturday, when outsider after outsider rolled home.

HE lost nearly £6000, including £3000 on the last race won by the 100/1 chance Matoura, about which five soldiers each had £100 to 5/.

PITT invested nearly £2000 on the favorite, Azores, and about £1000 on the second favorite, Inset, which finished second and third respectively to Matoura.

The five soldiers, who backed the outsider at 100/1, were practically penniless by the time the race came, and their choice of Matoura was a desperate challenge to Dame Fortune.

The totalisator paid at the rate of only 70/1 on Matoura. He started at 100/1 with the bookmakers. Mr. Wallace Mitchell, who had the

soldiers the bet at 400/1, also laid £100 to £1, but he won heavily on the race.

It was a shocking day for most backers, the prices of the last four winners being 10/1, 14/1, 20/1 and 100/1. W. Bullen, an apprentice, rode Matoura and also Liberal Knight, the 20/1 winner.

Bullen is apprenticed to Dave McNamara, who, in a "sentiment bet," linked Liberal Knight and Matoura in a double of £300 to 10/-.

BRISBANE jockey, H. Stubblett, died of wounds in New Guinea on January 2. Stubblett went to Brisbane from Melbourne some years ago to ride for A. E. Smart, and piloted many winners, including Cheverley in the Toowoomba and Rockhampton Cups.



# Millerovo, Important Rail Junction,

# Falls To Russians

## Service Brawl In Sydney

SHOTS were fired and bottles thrown in a brawl at a hostel in Albion Street, Darlinghurst, on Saturday night. It began when members of the Allied Provost Corps tried to arrest a colored serviceman, who had recently escaped from military custody. He ran from the club into Hutchinson Street, where he was shot in the thigh.

Members of the Corps tried to arrest the man at the club. He fought his way to the door, where he was joined by about 100 others of his service companions, who brandished bottles.

Captain Barrons, in charge of the Corps, drew a revolver and fired into the air to quieten the mob. Bottles were thrown against police cars, which brought 60 police to the club. After the man wanted by the Corps had been shot, he was placed in a military waggon.

## Rabaul Bombed And Lae Strafed; Ship Sunk In Eight Minutes

WIDESPREAD Allied air attacks yesterday included another raid on shipping in Rabaul Harbor. An 8000-ton enemy cargo vessel was sunk 100 miles north-west of Rabaul, and strong attacks were made on enemy installations and positions at Lae, Madang, and Finschafen. Australian-manned Bostons bombed and strafed enemy positions in the Mubo and Komiatum areas.

AN American-manned Liberator on reconnaissance was responsible for the sinking of the 8000-ton cargo vessel. Escorted by a destroyer or submarine-chaser, the vessel suffered two direct hits with 500lb. bombs, one on the stern and the other amidships. She burst into flames from bow to stern, and sank in eight minutes.

Members of the Liberator's crew say that after the vessel had disappeared, oil was still burning on the water. The same Liberator also bombed the runway at Madang.

The raid on Rabaul was made early yesterday morning by a strong formation of Liberators. Heavy bombs were dropped, and results so far known indicate that an enemy vessel was hit. Crews of the Liberators saw large explosions followed by an outbreak of fire. Enemy searchlights were active and A.A. fire heavy. Two searchlights were extinguished in a strafing run. Full results of the attack could not be observed.

### Dumps Fired

Beaefighters strafed Lae, attacking positions along the runway. One very large fire, apparently from a fuel dump, was visible for 25 miles, and it was still burning an hour after the attack.

The Beaefighters also strafed an enemy fighter on the ground, store dumps, and machine-gun positions; and near Malahang, a group of huts occupied by the enemy, and a truck on the road.

In their raid on Mubo and Komiatum, the Australian-manned Bostons shot up huts and trench systems. They made 12 runs over Mubo and five over Komiatum.

U.S. Army Air Corps Mitchell bombers also paid Lae a visit. A strong formation attacked a motor pool, and supply dumps. Two buildings were set on fire, and heavy explosions were observed. One large explosion rocked one of the aircraft as it flew at 2000 feet. Burnt-out supply dumps were observed on the beach.

A Liberator on reconnaissance attacked the waterfront and town area at Finschafen.

Read "Guinea Gold"—Then Pass it on

## NOT TIMOR-OUS

"THE natives of Timor have a funny game. They have two teams and rush at one another and kick one another in the stomach. That's all they do."

Corporal Robert Padley, of the A.A.S.C., who was a member of a guerilla band on Timor for 10 months, said this.

"In this game," he added, "the natives get very worked up and go for each other like mad. The last team to have anyone standing up wins."

## Errol Flynn Again!

SELMA WOODS is suing Errol Flynn for 15,415 dollars (£5138), claiming that she was seriously injured on Christmas Eve when her car collided with Flynn's car, which was driven by Buster Wales, described as the actor's bodyguard.

## RAF Active In Burma

BRITISH planes, supporting Allied troops in the Arakan district of Burma, were over Hayu peninsula and attacked enemy targets at Akyab island on Saturday.

They silenced A.A. positions and attacked river craft, ships, trains and occupied places. All planes returned.

The B.B.C. correspondent with the forces says that British officers are now leading patrols composed of Burmese troops and tribesmen along 800 miles of the border between Burma and Assam.

## Communique On Milne Bay Raid

GENERAL MacARTHUR'S communique, issued yesterday, stated that 24 medium bombers, escorted by 20 Zeros, took part in Sunday's attack on Milne Bay.

The communique added that there were no casualties and damage was not important.

## 700 Involved In Shipyard Strike

A COMPULSORY conference called by the Industrial Court in connection with a dispute at a Queensland shipyard ended in a deadlock, following which several hundred employees went on strike on Friday.

About 700 men, representing seven unions, are involved. A statement issued by Mr. R. Taylor, Ironworkers' Union secretary, after a compulsory conference called by the Industrial Court had proved abortive, stated that the union regretted the need for a strike because of the war situation, but it definitely claimed that its hand had been forced. All ironworkers at the shipyard and the fitting-out basin were on strike. Members of boiler-makers', shipwrights', painters', carpenters', engine-drivers and firemen's, and dockers' unions employed at the shipyard also joined in the strike.

FOLLOWING hard on the heels of Russian successes reported on Saturday, another special Moscow communique issued on Sunday night announced the fall of Millerovo, an important centre on the Voronej-Rostov railway line, which was by-passed by the Russians when the offensive opened. The communique states:—

"We took Millerovo after stubborn fighting on Sunday, and almost completely wiped out the garrison which was attempting to break out of our encirclement. Booty included planes, stores and rolling stock."

PRACTICALLY THE WHOLE OF THE RAILWAY LINE FROM VORONEJ TO KAMENSK ON THE DONETS IS NOW IN RUSSIAN HANDS. SEVERAL MORE TOWNS AND VILLAGES CLOSE TO THE DONETS RIVER HAVE ALSO FALLEN TO THE RUSSIANS, AND ONE REPORT SAYS THAT THE DONETS HAS BEEN CROSSED.

## W.M.H. HITS AT GOVT'S FINANCIAL POLICY

"THE Government's financial policy is becoming perilously dangerous, as it strains to find money to meet the war bill of about £510,000,000 this financial year," said Mr. W. M. Hughes at the week-end.

"There is, on the Government's figures, a gap of about £300,000,000 between the estimated expenditure and estimated revenue from taxation and business undertakings. When the Budget was introduced, the Government stated it proposed to bridge the gap by raising about £200,000,000 in loans during this financial year. Loans and war savings brought in only £88,000,000.



## Two Killed In Crash Of Service Plane

TWO employees of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, James Ogilvie Carter, of St. Kilda (Vic.), and Lionel Adrian Dungeon, of Elwood (Vic.), were killed, and an R.A.A.F. officer, Flight-Lieutenant James Herbert Harper, of Toorak, injured when a service aircraft crashed near Kilmore on Friday on a test flight.

Harper, who is an R.A.A.F. test pilot, baled out, but Carter left his parachute jump until too late. Dungeon was in the machine when it crashed.

## Guadalcanal Bombing

UNITED STATES positions on Guadalcanal were again bombed by Japanese planes on Friday night, but minor damage only was done. Reporting this, the latest Washington communique says that U.S. ground forces continued to advance slowly on Saturday in the face of determined enemy resistance. Medium bombers, escorted by fighters, again bombed the Japanese airfield at Munda on New Georgia Island.

THE communique also announced new successes south of Voronej. In this area Alexeyevsk and Korotyak have fallen, and the Russians are advancing towards Valuiki.

As well as making the Russian threat to Rostov more grave, the new gains constitute a threat to Kharkov, in the region of which the German offensive last summer was launched.

Alexeyevsk and Korotyak are on the railway line linking Voronej and Valuiki.

The Germans are resisting desperately along all the railways in the battle area, but their communications have been disorganised by mobile Russian columns.

The Russians are now on the offensive on a 600-mile front reaching from Voronej to Kursavka in the Caucasus.

## Leningrad Offensive?

There is still no confirmation from Russian sources of the German claim that the Red Army has also launched an offensive in the Leningrad area, but persistent and detailed reports about such an offensive continue to come from Stockholm. All speak of the employment by the Russians of a terrific artillery barrage from large calibre guns.

The position of the Germans trapped between the Volga and the Don before Stalingrad became more hopeless on Sunday night, when possession of the last aerodrome left to them in the area was wrested from them by the Russians.

An agency correspondent on the Stalingrad front says that the original German force of more than 200,000 men in this area has been reduced to "60,000 starving, killed and sickness-ridden men."

The German High Command admitted last night for the first time the loss of Veliki Luki. The Russians announced the capture of this important town, and the destruction of its German garrison, more than a week ago.

## New Jap. Fighters Better Than Zeros

MAJOR DAVID HILL, formerly squadron-leader of the old "Flying Tigers," told reporters on his return from the Far East that the Japanese are now using two new fighter planes in their China operations, which are superior to the Zero 97-2, with single engine, and considerably speedier than the Zero 1-45, a twin-engine, high-altitude plane. The latter, first used for reconnaissance, but recently as a fighter, even with armament gives very high performance at high altitude.

Major Hill added that with the new equipment in larger quantities the Japanese Air Force could be destroyed from China.



18 Bde  
and  
d 13/1

REPORT ON VISIT TO HQ 163 US REGT

1600-1830 hrs 12 Jan 43

HQ 7 Aust Div  
12 Jan 43

1. Instructed by Comd, 18 Aust Inf Bde to raise following points with Comd 163 US Regt; points of policy being confirmed by G7 7 Aust Div by phone 1430 hrs 12 Jan:-

(a) Lieut-Gen EICHELBERGER would be replacing Lieut-Gen HERRING as Comd in this area, latter moving back to MORESBY area to replace Gens MACARTHUR and BLAMEY who were moving back to Australia. It was probable that Lieut-Gen EICHELBERGER would be visiting this area shortly.

(b) Request 163 Regt to assist 18 Bde wherever possible to reduce southern pocket by movement directed at the north of this pocket.

(c) with "b" in view to make a strong movement towards south on the KILLERTON track with the object of relieving pressure on 18 Bde.

(d) Obtain a trace showing:-

i dispositions of units in HUGGINS block and fwd rd block area.

ii portions of SOPUTA-SANANANDA track controlled by 163 Regt.

(e) Discuss with Comd 163 Regt possibility of res bn 18 Bde with approval of GOC 7 Aust Div moving north by either east or west and complete encirclement of southern pocket at its north west corner.

(f) After discussing "e" myself to give opinion as to route of Bn if move to be carried out by east and best crossing point in HUGGINS area.

2. Following were results of discussion with Comd 163 Regt.

(a) Comd was most ~~interested~~, *interested*

(b) Comd was willing to assist 18 Bde if in his power.

(c) Impression gained that Comd was unwilling to make strong movement to south as desired for his following reasons:-

(d) i He did not consider it would achieve effect of drawing off pressure

ii He considered his forces would be better employed in cutting off enemy sup route which he thought ran from north along SOPUTA-SANANANDA rd skirting his defences at the fwd rd block and continuing south midway between HUGGINS and KILLERTON posns.

iii He would incur heavy casualties.

iv He was short of amm particularly 81 mm and mortar and MMG after his demonstrations today. Mentioned that his tps were very free in their use of amm.

Comd stated he would not be able to attack on 13 Jan and possibly not on 14 Jan due to his shortage of amm. He would like an offr from 18 Bde to discuss such an attack with him at 1600 hrs 13 Jan.

Comd mentioned that ~~KILLERTON~~ *KILLERTON* bn had located a strong enemy posn to their south and that others were further south.

(d) Trace was obtained but length of SOPUTA-SANANANDA rd actually controlled by 163 Regt was 300-400 yds less than thought by Comd. This was the portion to the south of the HUGGINS block.

(e) Comd did not know the exact nature of the country between the KILLERTON and SANANANDA rds but would send a patrol to investigate 13 Jan. Report would be available for representative of 18 Bde when he called to confer with Comd 163 Regt. The area in general however, was mostly swamp, knee high and difficult to move in

(f) Time for res bn to move from present posn to projected location by east route would probably be in excess of 6 to 7 hrs and would be most difficult.

Most suitable point at which to cross the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track would be a point approx 50 yds south of Comd Post, 163 Regt unless effective patrolling were carried out well south along rd in which case crossing could be effected further south and would thus shorten area to be traversed through swamp. It would appear essential that 163 Regt assist such a move by providing guides from rd block area and allocating possible bivouac areas.

3. Additional points which were mentioned by Comd 163 Regt were:-

(a) A track existed, running north and south between KILLERTON and HUGGINS posns, but its extent was unknown.



(b) A party of ten Japs was observed in the vicinity of this track  
at approx 1700 hrs today.

*P. H. W.*

Capt  
LO att 7 Aust Div



(253)

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO.1  
(Infm to 5-7 Jan)

HQ 7 AUST DIV  
GSI/978  
7 Jan 43

GENERAL

The following has been compiled from infm obtained from patrols, captured documents, PsW and captured natives. It is only intended as a guide as it is by no means complete or necessarily accurate in detail but provides the basis for future ops.

PART I

SANANANDA- CAPE KILLERTON AREA  
(Ref Map GCNA 4")

ENEMY INFM -

Dispositions - Dumps. Enemy main strength is believed to be located astride SANANANDA-SOPUTA rd NE 189268 as shown on sketch map Appx "A". Pockets exist both sides of rd between rd block posns at 186266. Pockets being contained by 30 Aust Inf Bde (shown on sketch map Appx "B") are at 183257 - 184254 - 183253 - 180251 - 178251 - 180253 - 177256 - 178255 - 182254. Their main line of defence in this area appears to extend from 176255 to 179250 to 186255. Jap coast-watching posts have been reported SURIRAI sand-spit 169312, CAPE KILLERTON 186316, SURIRAI PLANTATION 192312, SANANANDA PT and GIRUWA 225293. Isolated pockets are thought to be located on tracks west of SOPUTA-SANANANDA rd leading to KILLERTON area. There are indications that enemy is moving more tps into area SANANANDA-GIRUWA-TARAKENA.

Estimate of Enemy Strength. Ground tps and A/C Tac/R have found it impossible to give accurate estimates of enemy strengths due closeness of country making observation extremely limited and difficult. Captured documents unfortunately give no up to date infm. A captured map dated 20 Nov shows enemy tps disposed astride main rd between our fwd tps and 201257 totalled 1683, composed of inf, mtn arty, engrs and some base units acting as inf. (Base units around SANANANDA, strength unknown considered mostly KOREANS). Since that date, though 200-300 reinfts who landed on 22/23 Nov may be in fwd area, heavy casualties have been inflicted on enemy.

Estimated strengths (all very approx) -

Area 30 Bde to Rd Block	-	200-400
Area between Rear Rd Block and Fwd Rd Block	-	100
Area North Rd Block (incl Base Area units)	-	1000-1200
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>1300-1700</u>

Enemy Weapons.

(a) 30 Bde Area - Rd Block (185264). Enemy is using LMGs, MMGs, light mortars (1.87" grenade thrower type) and captured weapons mainly Brens. NO heavy weapons except MMGs have been reported firing in this area recently.

(b) Pockets astride road at 186266 between Rd Block posns. Enemy is reported to have at least one MMG (7.7 mm) and LMGs. NO heavy mortars reported.

(c) Fwd of Rd Block area. Enemy is using lt mortars, LMGs and MMGs. A maximum of 3 75 mm Mtn Arty Guns have been reported by natives. These guns fired intermittently until 23 Dec mostly searching for our 25 prs. The reason for cessation may be :-

PTO



- (i) NO further supplies amn
- (ii) Guns have been knocked out by our concentrated arty fire.
- (iii) Guns moved to SANANANDA - GIRUWA area
- (iv) Conserving amn for use against our tanks.

Supplies. Very little if any supplies are arriving in this area. Existing stocks of both amn and food appear to be getting very low; all available is being sent to fwd tps but even so PsW complain that there is NOT sufficient. Amn is being rigidly conserved to counter our attacks thereby forcing the enemy to remain on the defensive.

Condition of Tps. All fit tps appear to be in fwd areas and are normally well clothed and armed. Native reports and captured documents indicate, however, that those in rear areas and along the coast are poorly clad, weak and in very bad condition, existing mainly on native food. Fever and dysentery are reported as prevalent.

Lack of sups and reduced numbers will NOT cause the enemy to capitulate whilst his orders are to hold CAPE KILLERTON-SANANANDA area. He will fight tenaciously and resist "to the last man and the last round". After his last round has gone he may be expected to act like any other primitive man or wild beast.

Terrain. The area is covered with dense jungle interspersed with small kunai patches with large areas of swamp throughout. To the East of main SANANANDA-SOPUTA rd fwd of Rd Block area patrols report swamps cover most of area making movt extremely difficult, and in places impossible, even for small bodies of tps, and is an impracticable route to coast.

Swamps adjacent main SANANANDA-SOPUTA rd would render manoeuvre difficult. To the West tracks do exist approx as shown on GONA 4" and sketch maps, and though swamps would make movt off tracks slow and difficult, it is considered the most practicable route.

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## PART II

AMBOGA - GONA AREA  
(Ref Map BUNA 1 inch)  
( " " BUNA 1/4 " )

### ENEMY INFM

Dispositions - Strengths. Little accurate infm from ground tps is available regarding location of enemy concentrations. Reports indicate however that enemy tps from KUMUSI river and possibly some from MAMBARE area are now concentrating in the coastal areas from BAKUMBARI (083377) to AMBOGA R mouth (incl Eastern bank), with patrols moving inland to SENANI area (0333). It is estimated that approx 400-500 tps are in these areas with HQ (21 Indep Bde) in vicinity of BAKUMBARI, where a W/T station is operating. A strong enemy OP has been located at 133305. Approx 200 were reported on 20 Dec at AMBOGA River mouth, the main body being concentrated on northern bank.

Supplies and Amn. The situation must be considered bad as Jap patrols have been scouring native gardens for food and appear to be conserving amn as offensive action is NOT being taken by them. It is known from captured documents and native reports that the remnants of the NANKAI Det were very short of amn and arms of every description. If any supplies are arriving they must be coming either by launch at night, or possibly dropped by air. Owing to our air superiority and sea patrols they must necessarily be limited.

Enemy Weapons. MMGs, LMGs and lt mortars are the only weapons reported to have been used in this area. NO artillery landed.

Condition of Tps. The condition of remnants of tps who landed during Dec in MAMBARE and AMBOGA areas should still be quite good though the food shortage and fever should now be causing sickness. The remnants of the NANKAI Det, having retreated from the mountains, are poorly clothed, armed and generally in very bad condition.



Terrain. The coastal area is low swampy jungle with large patches of kunai. Movt, except along tracks, is slow and difficult. Inland it becomes drier and movt along the many existing native tracks presents few difficulties if native guides are used. The following are possible lines of adv open to the enemy :-

- (a) Beach track - good track but exposed to observation from GONA.
- (b) AMBOGA River mouth to AMBOGA CROSSING on main motor rd to POPONDETTA - possible but difficult.
- (c) A well used track runs inland from AMBOGA R mouth via SABARI to MAINBASUSU (7928 ref BUNA 1/4 inch) on main IOMA-WASIDA track. Many branch tracks lead south and with native guides the main WAIROPE-GONA track could be joined at almost any point desired.

*J. S. Chaffin*  
 for Col  
 GS 7 ABST DIV


DISTRIBUTION :-

Copy No.

13 Aust Inf Bde	1
30 " " "	2
163 US Regt	3
B-Sqn 6 Aust Armd Regt	4
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	5
Comd	6
CRE	7
Sigs	8
AA & QMG	9-11
Adv NGF	12
US BUNA Force	13
14 Aust Inf Bde	14
War Diary	15-16
File	17-18



APPX. A



**ESTIMATED STRENGTHS:**  
 North of Rd Black - 1000  
 South of Rd Black - 200-300  
 Note: These figures are very approx

**LEGEND:**  
 Kunal Patch  
 Defences, Trenches  
 MG  
 Gun  
 INFM TO 3 JAN 43

U.S. STANDING PATROLS  
 INFM FROM NATIVE REPORTS AND TAG R  
 REF MAP 'GONA LOCALITY - Revised'  
 4 INCHES TO 1 MILE



# Tanks

{ 18 Dec 2/9.  
20 " 2/9.  
22 " 2/9.  
24 " 2/10.  
~~25 " 2/10.~~  
29 " (1650 hrs) 2/10.  
1 JAN. 2/12  
2 JAN. 2/12

late  
AR  
about  
adv. VMA

3 TK/S up 2/12 but not operating on 3 JAN.

~~TK from~~  
8 runners  
2 portable runners  
2 truck sets  
4 hand truck sets  
1 fuel tank



12<sup>th</sup>

~~Following~~ ~~work~~ ~~arrangements~~ ~~under~~

following ~~work~~ ~~arrangements~~ will be completed

by 0600 hrs 10 Dec ① 1/9 work done

infat volume 49 done 2/12 done

contents 39 done and det US Ops area

11/30 date ① content 10's - 1/9

and 1/9 done with complete success of

respective areas by 1300 hrs 8 Jan

① also put in 1/9 1/12 work done

will be in operation by 1800 hrs

9 Jan ① 1/9 done with volume

49 done by 1200 hrs 9 Jan ①

2/12 done with volume 39 done

and det US Ops by ~~2000~~ 2000 hrs

9 Jan ① also put in 12 date

11/30 amount 30 date by 1300

hrs 9 Jan

1/9/11



HEADQUARTERS BUNA FORCE

5 Jan 43

SUBJECT: Correction of letter "Commendations" dated 4 Jan. '43.

TO : See Distribution below.

Congratulatory Message from C-in-C in letter "Commendations" dated 4 January '43 should read:

"The GOC, NGF, has pleasure in forwarding the appended signal from the C-in-C, Allied Land Forces."

*R. L. Eichelberger*  
R. L. EICHELBERGER, *RS*  
Lt Gen, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:

(65) - 18th Aust Brig)  
(20) - CO 126th Inf. ) For distribution to companies.  
(20) - CO 127th Inf. )  
(20) - CO 128th Inf. )



240  
9 Jan 43.

OPS  
9,571

240  
240  
240  
240

MEMO

1. Commencing forthwith all patrols projected for the following day commencing 0001 hrs will be notified to this HQ by 1000 hrs daily. Patrols for 10 Jan will be notified by 1000 hrs 9 Jan.
2. Patrols decided upon after this daily notification will be notified to this HQ by immediate signal NOT later than two hrs prior to time of patrol moving off. Patrols will NOT report NOT move until receipt of AM of message from this HQ.
3. All notifications will quote ref map and map scale and will contain the following information:
  - (a) Strength of patrol;
  - (b) Purpose (Recon, fighting, occupation of position);
  - (c) Starting point;
  - (d) Projected route;
  - (e) Time of departure;
  - (f) Estimated time of return;
  - (g) In case of projected occupation of a position, description of the position.
4. Suggested pro forma is subjoined.
5. Whenever a position is occupied in accordance with Bde Comd's verbal instrs, this HQ will immediately be notified of location and strength of the holding it.
6. AM.

8  
Maj.  
240 240

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL

Patrols by..... Regt ..... (Info)  
HQ

Serial	Strength	Purpose	Starting Point	Projected Route	Time of Departure	Estimated Time of Return	Remarks
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	incl Recon to be occupied.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.



RAC  
9 Jan 43.

14 7/1  
AGC 1700 h

RAC  
1000  
3/28  
RAC

MEMO

1. Commencing forthwith all patrols projected for the following day commencing 0001 hrs will be notified to this HQ by 1000 hrs daily. Patrols for 10 Jan will be notified by 1000 hrs 9 Jan.
2. Patrols decided upon after this daily notification will be notified to this HQ by immediate signal NOT later than two hrs prior to time of patrol moving off. Patrols will NOT repeat NOT move until receipt of ACK of message from this HQ.
3. All notifications will quote ref map and map refs and will contain the following information:
  - (a) Strength of patrol;
  - (b) Purpose (Recon, fighting, occupation of position);
  - (c) Starting point;
  - (d) Projected route;
  - (e) Time of departure;
  - (f) Estimated time of return;
  - (g) In case of projected occupation of a position, description of the position.
4. Suggested pro forma is subjoined.
5. Whenever a position is occupied in accordance with Bde Comd's verbal instrs, this HQ will immediately be notified of location and strength of troops holding it.
6. ACK.

*Page 2*  
Maj.  
RAC

STANDARD PRO FORMA

Patrols by..... Regt ..... (Date)  
In

Serial	Strength	Purpose	Starting Point	Projected Route	Time of Departure	Estimated Time of Return	Remarks incl rooms to be occupied.



18 Bde

OPS  
a 9/11

30 AUST INF BDE OO NO 14

SECRET

COPY NO 4

8 JAN. 43

Ref GON A 4" to mile maps

### INFORMATION

1. 30 Bde less 7 Aust Cav Regt is being relieved by 18 Bde NOT later than 0600 H/10 Jan 43
2. 7 Aust Cav Regt is remaining in present dispositions and will come under comd 18 Bde upon relief of 30 Bde HQ being signalled.
3. 3 Bns, det 1 Bn and att kps of 126 US Regt is being relieved and will concentrate in their present B level area with a view to their early return to 126 US Regt

### INTENTION

4. Upon relief, by respective units of 18 Bde: -
  - 39 Bn will march to area HANSEN TP and dispose of force for the protection of that area.
  - 49 Bn will march to area SOPUTA BRIDGE and dispose of force for protection of br as against ground and air attack.
  - Dets 126 US Regt will march to area to be indicated at SOPUTA and prepare for onward move.

### METHOD

5. The policy is that tps will be given maximum restitution as compatible with roles allotted. Units will march out in as soldierly a manner as possible and in keeping with the pride and quality of their past service.

6. Order of move will be in order of relief.

### 7. Preparatory moves

CO's and R tps 18 Bde from 9 Bn, 12 Bn and one Coy 10 Bn will complete recon of areas by 1300 hrs 8 Jan

8. 30 Bde units will detail one NCO and 4-8 specially chosen ORs per Coy (or part) area for the purpose of orientation of relieving tps. These will be relieved within 48 hrs of completion of relief. One offer per unit will remain with each relieving unit HQ for similar purposes.



- Adv parties of 18 Bde will join units as follows:-
- |    |           |                |    |      |       |
|----|-----------|----------------|----|------|-------|
| 52 | all ranks | 9 Bn to 49 Bn  | by | a.m. | 8 Jan |
| 16 | "         | 12 Bn - 39 Bn  | "  | p.m. | 8 Jan |
| 16 | "         | 12 Bn " US cps | "  | p.m. | 8 Jan |
| 8  | "         | 10 Bn " US cps | "  | a.m. | 8 Jan |

These parties will be administered by our respective units

10. Order of Relief + timings of completion
- |                     |    |          |          |            |     |
|---------------------|----|----------|----------|------------|-----|
| 49 Bn               | by | 9 Bn     | 1300 hrs | 9 Jan      | 2   |
| US perimeter guards | "  | by 10 Bn | "        | guard unit | 1/0 |
| US fwd cps          | }  | 12 Bn    | 1700 hrs | 9 Jan      | 8   |
| 39 Bn res cps       |    |          |          |            |     |
| 39 Bn fwd cps       |    | 12 Bn    | 2100 hrs | 9 Jan      |     |

11. Assembly Areas  
Present Unit HQ areas or Rear HQ areas under unit arrangements.

ADM

12. AMMUNITION Units will carry 200 rds per automatic, 50 rds per rifle and 2 x 4 sec grenades per man. Remainder to be handed to 18 Bde
13. WEAPONS Carry all LMGs, SMGs, MMGs, mortars, A/CK rifles Hand over EY rifles + discharger caps as required by 18 Bde
14. RATIONS Carry normal reserves as previously laid down. Hand over any accumulated stocks.
15. SIG WIRE Hand over all wire laid on ground
16. 14 FD AMB will maintain ADS for benefit 18 Bde, until further orders.

INTERCOMM

17. Adv 18 Bde HQ - opening at 30 Bde HQ 1600 hrs 9 Jan.
18. 30 Bde HQ will concentrate at present rear HQ
19. Signals to present location, until further ordered then to present Rear HQ.

ACK

TIME OF SIGNATURE 1330 hrs  
METHOD OF ISSUE - DR and LO  
DISTRIBUTION - See over

Al Salam Lt Col  
MAJ  
BM 30 AUST INF BDE







BM  
WP

pps  
am/1

SECRET

Copy No. 10

11 Jan 45.

10 AMT INF REG OF OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 3.

Confirming Verbal Orders.

Ref Maps: DINA LOCALITY DIVISION approx 4° to 1 N.  
SPECIAL REFERENCE No. 1 approx 1° to 95 yds.  
MOUNTAIN REF/NO/01 sheets 1 & 2 1/1000.

Note - Ref Map will be quoted if necessary used.

OPERATIONS.

1. INFO

As given verbally at the Coal's conference 1100 hrs 11 Jan and to be brought up to date by unit I.O's with the I.O. at 1700 hrs 11 Jan.

2. ORDER.

- (a) One tp B. Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt comes under coal 10 Aust Inf Bde on arrival approx 1800 hrs 11 Jan.
- (b) P Tp 5/8th Bn 2/1 Aust Inf Bde comes in support 10 Aust Inf Bde 10 Jan.
- (c) 1 Bn 103 US Regt is cooperating with 2/6 Aust Inf Bn by direct liaison.
- (d) 2 Bn 103 US Regt at present outside SECRET track at approx 17000 is to exert pressure South Sam Track on every night now.

OPERATIONS.

3. 10 Aust Inf Bde will attack and capture area from present line held by 2/6 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns westward to incl S.T. rd 8000-82000 South of 900 East East grid.

ORDER.

4. This attack will take place in phases. This order covers the details of PHASE ONE. Orders for later phases will be issued subsequently.

5. Right.

- (a) Right - 2/6 Aust Inf Bn with under coal one Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn from 0700 hrs 12 Jan.
- (b) Left - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn with in support one tp B. Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt less one th and with under coal one Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn both from 0700 hrs 12 Jan.

6. Res.

- (a) One th B. Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt.
- (b) 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt.
- (c) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys.
- (d) 23rd Porters of 2/6 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns.



7. Objectives.

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - to incl line of timber 163004 - 163005.
- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn - (i) to incl line of timber astride HZ rd 163000 - 163003.  
(ii) Left flank will exploit sufficiently to West to deny enemy interference with HZ rd.
- (c) On attaining objectives Bn Comd will exploit as practicable to maintain Dye intention.

8. Area of Advance.

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - circle enemy left flank to approx 165000 thence SW to objectives.
- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn - H.Z. rd.

9. Direction.

2/9 Aust Inf Bn will maintain pressure on enemy to their present front by fire and aggressive patrols from HZ. Tactical ground gained by patrols will be consolidated.

10. Point of Junction.

Point of junction, at present 163004 will be maintained during advance.

11. Start Line.

will be decided by C.O's.

12. Time

0800 hrs 28 Jan which is time when the cross 2/10 Aust Inf Bn start line.

13. Regts

- (a) Tp 2. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn Regt 170000
  - (b) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
  - (c) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- } as laid down by C.O's.

14. Rate of Advance.

- (a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - as practicable.
- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn - inf will regulate pace of div. The HZ confers to this rate. CO 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will ensure maximum practicable rate of advance is maintained.

15. Fire.

- (a) F. Tp 51 Coy 2/1 Aust Inf Bn Regt will fire following time programme:-
  - (i) 8-15 to 8 at rate 8 on registered targets along timber line area 163000 - 170000.
  - (ii) 8 to 8-15 at rate 8 on registered targets in area 163004 - 163009.
  - (iii) FOC's will move with each 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.



16. Engine.

Engine recon party will report to 2/18 Aust Inf Bn by 0730 hrs 18 Jan.

17. Role of Regt.

- (a) Coe Bn. on 2/6 Aust Armd Regt will move to HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde at 1800.
- (b) 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt.
  - (1) will remain present locations at immediate notice from 1800;
  - (11) will maintain pressure on enemy to their front by fire and aggressive patrols from 2-15.
- (c) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys will remain present position at immediate notice.

18.

18. AM and Sup.

- (a) A.P. and Sup P. at 170000.
- (b) 2nd Bn Am Sup at 170045.

19. Replenishment.

Replenishment areas will be established:-

- (a) Fuel - 180000  
(contains am and SO gals petrol only).
- (b) Rec - 170000.

20. Native Carriers.

will be allotted by S.O.

21. Medical.

- (a) AM - 170000.
- (b) MS - 180000.
- (c) Evacuation beyond 1800 will be by native carriers under orders of 24 Aust Inf Bn.

22. AM

will be sent under guard to HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

23.

23. HQ remains 170045.

24. Line Comm.

Line comm will be maintained as at present. The line comm will be at 2/9 and 2/18 Aust Inf Bn to extend line should Bn advance.

25. W/C Comm.

- (a) A two-to-one gp will be established between HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde 2/9 and 2/18 Aust Inf Bn. Continuous watch from 0600 hrs 18 Jan 45. Frequency 2600 S/C.



25. (b) For com to the one gp will be established as follows:-  
 Sig 18 Aust Inf Bde No. 21 Set Freq 6330 R/O  
 2/5 & 2/12 Aust Inf Bns No. 103 Sets  
 Sig No. 19 Sets.

(c) As an alternative to 103 Sets R/O and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns will also carry SPARKA sets and gp will use frequency 8337-5 R/O. Sentinences watch from 0600 hrs 18 Jan 43.

26. A rec cable loop is established at Sig 18 Aust Inf Bde.

27. Remarks.  
 as already issued.

28. Wireless Restrictions.  
 Wireless silence until 0800.

29. Signal Intercom. Sig and Inf.  
 (a) It requiring inf assistance will fire Green very light.  
 (b) It requiring it assistance will fire Red very light.  
 (c) Line of flight of very pistol fired by inf will indicate resistance in that direction.  
 (d) Inf desiring it to move to them will raise steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.  
 (e) Targets or centres of resistance may be indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at cross length.  
 (f) Positions of all wounded will be marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground.

30. In case it is necessary to postpone this operation, the code word "RESCUE" till.....hrs" will be issued to postpone 0800.

31. Synchronization.  
 Sig 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will synchronize watches on 7 Aust Div time at 0600 and 0800 hrs D-1 and at 0300 and 0600 hrs D. Day. Synchronization must be exact to within five seconds.

*[Handwritten signature]*

Major.

32. Signal at.....hrs. Issued through Sig and by L.O. Sig 18 Aust Inf Bde.

RECEIPTS:-	7 Aust Div Cav Regt	Copy	
	R. Coy 2/5 Aust Arml Regt	"	1.
	21 Coy 2/1 Aust Arml Regt	"	2.
	2/5 Aust Inf Bn	"	3.
	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	"	4.
	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	"	5.
	103 IB Regt	"	6.
	7 Aust Div	"	7.
	Comd & File	"	8.
	21 & 10	"	9.
	21 & 12	"	10.
	File	"	11.
		"	12.



ops

one tank bogged

on the left by estimated

37 mm (AWT) 20 mm

during slight loss out

this unit

but has advanced approx 80'

Present to join 0920

D

2



FOR GOD AND COUNTRY



7 Jan 43.

93  
shown to comd  
file 4 17/1

7 Aust Div O I No 21.

(In confirmation of verbal instns)

Ref maps: BUNA (PROVISIONAL) 1 in to 1 ml.  
GONA LOCALITY (Revised) 4 ins to 1 ml.

INFM

1. Enemy:

See 7 Aust Div Int Review No 1 of 7 Jan 43.

2. Own Tps:

- (a) 14 Aust Inf Bde based on GONA is containing the enemy in the AMBOGA RIVER area by offensive patrolling up to (incl) line of AMBOGA RIVER. It is also responsible for beach defence from (incl) WAUTUTU POINT (1531) - AMBOGA RIVER.
- (b) US BUNA FORCE is maintaining pressure on the enemy along track SIWORI (2527) - SANANANDA PT (foremost tps at present 500 yds East of TARAKENA 239283) and along other approaches from BUNA area towards SOIUTA - SANANANDA track.

3. Additional Tps:

Following additional tps under comd:-

18 Aust Inf Bde and att tps	- on arrival 7 Aust Div area
163 US Regt	- " " " " " "
B Sqn 6 Aust Armd Regt	- " " " " " "
2/1 Aust Pd Regt	- from 4 Jan 43
17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Pl (less two carriers)	- on arrival 7 Aust Div area

OBJECT

- 4. To destroy the Jap forces between the present fwd area of 30 Aust Inf Bde and the coast from excl GIRUWA (224292) - incl GARARA (161309).

METHOD

- 5. The operation will be carried out in 4 stages:-

STAGE I - to cut off enemy South of RD BLOCK area

- (a) 163 US Regt will occupy posns in the RD BLOCK area and astride the KILLERTON track by 1800 hrs 9 Jan 43.
- (b) Active patrolling along line running East-West through these posns will be carried out with the object of cutting the Jap L of C.
- (c) Offensive action will also be taken in a southerly direction from posn astride KILLERTON track with the object of attracting enemy's attention in that direction and thereby causing dispersion of enemy force in present 30 Aust Inf Bde area.

STAGE II - to destroy all enemy between 30 Aust Inf Bde and 163 US Regt



(2)

- (a) 18 Aust Inf Bde will relieve 30 Aust Inf Bde (less 2/7 Aust Cav) by 0600 hrs 10 Jan, at which time 2/7 Aust Cav will pass under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.
- (b) HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde, 39 and 49 Aust Inf Bns will come into div res in HANSEN Tp area upon relief and be responsible for protection of HANSEN Tp.
- (c) 3 Bn and det 1 Bn 126 US Regt will revert comd this HQ upon relief by 18 Aust Inf Bde and concentrate in their present B ech area with a view to early return to 126 US Regt.
- (d) Upon relief, HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde will ensure that ALL units (incl US tps under comd) leave selected personnel behind to assist incoming units. Personnel will be prepared to act as guides to patrols and be capable of assisting new units to appreciate the local situation. They will be returned to their units within 48 hrs of completion of relief.

STAGE III - to continue the attack by advancing northwards and prevent enemy retreating to the coast or in a westerly direction

- (a) Axis of adv 163 US Regt - MT rd to SANANANDA PT.
- (b) Axis of adv 18 Aust Inf Bde - KILLERTON track.

STAGE IV - mopping up of whole area.

6. Details of STAGES III and IV will be issued later.

7. AIR:

5 AF is being asked to carry out the following programme:-

(a) Bomb and strafe:

- (i) area GIRUWA - SANANANDA PT - TRACK JUNC 213295;
- (ii) village at 187303 - 1500 yds South of CAPE KILLERTON;
- (iii) SANANANDA MT rd from coast to 280 horizontal grid.

(b) Set on fire KUNAI GRASS and scrub in area North of 280 horizontal grid along tracks and KUNAI GRASS patches as follows:-

Tracks

- (i) 205280 to TRACK JUNC 213295.
- (ii) 186280 to coast at 183312.
- (iii) 206282 to TRACK JUNC 183285.
- (iv) TRACK JUNC 193290 to TRACK JUNC 188300.
- (v) 174280 to coast at 181311.

Kunai grass patches

- (vi) Patch extending South from 179301 to 280



(3)

horizontal grid.

(vii) Patch from 198288 to 203289.

(viii) Patch from 207296 to 203284.

ACK

Signed at 1530 hrs.

*R.G. Pollard, Col.*  
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution:

	<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Method of issue</u>
18 Aust Inf Bde	1 )	
30 Aust Inf Bde	2 )	
163 US Regt	3 )	LO
B Sqn 6 Aust Armd Regt	4 )	
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	5 )	
Comd	6 )	
CRE	7 )	Hand
Sigs 7 Aust Div	8 )	
AA & QMG	9-11 )	
Adv NGF	12 )	LO
US BUNA FORCE	13 )	
14 Aust Inf Bde	14 )	LO
War Diary	15-16	
File	17-18	



ORDER OF THE DAY

by  
Lt Gen E.F. HERRING C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D.

General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force  
3 rd January 1943

Now that the battle for BUNA is over and won, I desire to express to all ranks who have engaged in the battle, whether on the ground, or in the air; American and Australian alike, my heartfelt appreciation of your magnificent and prolonged effort. The enemy's defences were exceedingly strong and he fought the battle with a selfless devotion to duty that was worthy of a better cause. He had to defend an area that lent itself to defence: the going has been hard, you have performed great feats of endurance, you have overcome and borne hardships with cheerfulness and with a determination to prevail so steadfast, that your efforts have been crowned with victory.

You have done a job of which both our countries should indeed be proud.

The battle for BUNA is but a step on the way, we have now to clear the enemy out of SANANANDA Area. You know what the going will be like, it will not be any easier than BUNA, but I know that you will tackle it with the same determination, and, I believe, with the same result. Good luck to you all.

E.F. Herring LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
General Officer Commanding New GUINEA Force

ops  
ade and  
24/1



38 US Div  
7 Aust Div  
18 Aust Inf Bde  
4 AC Sqn  
COSC (Oro Bay)

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE FROM C-in-C.

The GOC, MCF, has pleasure in forwarding the appended signal from the C-in-C, Allied Land Forces:--

"Please accept yourself and convey to your staff and command hearty congratulations on the successful conclusion of operations on Buna front. They have been thoroughly planned and valorously executed".

*EPS*  
*Bde and*  
*9/4/41*

*C. F. G.* Col.  
i/c Adv, Adv MCF.

G  
A  
Q  
CORA  
CE  
CSO  
Hod  
Ord  
AASC





In conjunction with



The Animal Bomber.

Jan 3.

18 Aust Inf Bde

21.2 " " " " Bn.

I beg to report the new type of improvised animal bomb proved to be very effective in dealing with enemy Pill Boxes. The bomb thrown in one of the entrances caused a terrific blast blowing debris from any other entrance. It was found that since the bomb had exploded without the pill box that it was usually unnecessary to worry about any further about the occupants. Some misfires occurred owing to the sb grenade becoming detached from the main charge owing to impact with the ground. It is suggested that it would be an improvement if the ~~two~~ component parts of the bomb could be strengthened. The

5





In conjunction with



present size bomb is considered to be of convenient size & power for throwing & no increase is recommended as if necessary more than one bomb can be used on a particularly large emplacement. No appreciable difference was noted between the Golegnite filling & the Aminal filling, although the latter appeared to have a more shattering effect but this could have reasonably ~~been~~ been caused through the difference in actual construction of the pill boxes themselves.

W. C. Arnold  
 Lt Col  
 Commandant 1st Aust Inf Bn

deleted after commencing this  
 the col an effort & B.M. 4/1

8-2/1



18 PLUST INF BDE



KAPO

CPD  
10 1/1

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE NOTES TO 1200 HRS 6 JAN 43

(Extracts from NGF Int Summary No.103)

SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS and SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTH

SEA.

Until 3 Jan there was a conspicuous absence of movt from RABAUL of any considerable portion of the large shipping concentration which had remained there since 22 Dec, despite our repeated bombing attacks.

Shipping sightings in the SOLOMONS during this period indicated that the enemy had substantially discontinued the use of BUIN-FAISI as fwd base. He appeared reluctant to send surface vessels to the assistance of his forces on GUADALCANAL - to whom supplies had been dropped by parachute and probably run in by submarine. On 3 Jan, however, sightings indicated that a small naval force had moved from RABAUL to BUIN-FAISI area suggesting that another attempt was being made to assist the Japs on GUADALCANAL.

On 5 Jan between 50 and 60 vessels were in RABAUL Harbour during our heavy daylight bombing attack, and on 6 Jan a convoy of ten vessels evidently from RABAUL moved parallel to the south coast of NEW BRITAIN to GASMATA Area. Ultimate destination is at present uncertain.

AIR.

Scale of enemy air effort in NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS areas is still very low compared with his known capabilities. Medium bomber attacks have been notably few possibly because wastage during attacks had depleted reserves faster than production can replace. Only activity reported were seaward recces, attacks on our small craft between MILNE and ORO BAYS and Protection of his own shipping.

His A/C have paid close attention to D'ENTRE CASTEAUX Gp, but this may have been part of recce for attacks on our small craft. One of these A/C was reported to be an army type aircraft whereas previously these recces were presumed to be carried out by navy seaplanes. Should this identification be correct it may be the forerunner of the introduction of army type medium bombers to this area to make up for the present deficiency of navy types. Navy type medium bombers are the most suitable air weapon the enemy has to counter a naval offensive by us against his bases.

The enemy is increasing his air potential by his continued development of landing grounds.

It has now been established the enemy is using some tpt aircraft for the supply of LAE. Previously all twin engined aircraft landing at LAE were thought to be medium bombers staging there.

LAND.

The destruction of the enemy forces in the BUNA area has released further tps for ops against enemy posns at SANANANDA. However the enemy has attempted to offset this advantage by establishing himself on the North coast of NEW GUINEA and developing landing grounds there where he is unhindered by our land forces.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BY AREAS

- (a) LAND - (ref map BUNA LOCALITY 4 inches to 1 mile)
- ( " " GONA " " 4 " " 1 " )

OWN. The past week has seen the complete destruction of the enemy force in the BUNA MISSION - OLD STRIP area and the linking up of WARREN and URBANA Forces between GIROPA PT and the MISSION.

BUNA AREA : The 31 Dec was occupied in the strengthening of WARREN force by the addition of one Aust Inf Bn and the regrouping of both WARREN and URBANA for an attack by the former on GIROPA PT and exploitation of the Govt Gardens Corridor by the latter.

The fresh Aust Bn carrying out the attack on GIROPA PT crossed their starting line at 0800 hrs 1 Jan and supported by tanks, reached the beach on a 400 yd front just west of the SINEMI Ck mouth by 1200 hrs.

On the same day URBANA Force succeeded in occupying the BUNA MISSION spit but efforts to link up with the bridge head previously established across ENTRANCE Ck from the Island were held in check by strong enemy bunkers just north of the bridge.

Some slight progress was made by the tps holding the northern side of the corridor, along the sea-coast towards BUNA MISSION.

PTO



Next day (2 Jan) URBANA Force advancing on a front parallel with rd through the Govt Gardens occupied the remainder of the BUNA MISSION and Govt Plantation. A US Coy advancing SE between the coast and the BUNA - GIROPA PT rd succeeded in establishing contact with an Aust Bn at GIROPA Ck. With fighting patrols operating between the southern extremities of URBANA and WARREN Forces, this coastal movement completely encircled the remaining Jap tps in the GIROPA PT area.

A strong enemy pocket that had been holding out in the dispersal bay area to the NW end of the OLD STRIP was reduced by 1600 hrs and the only enemy resistance then remaining was a few isolated snipers and two or three bunkers.

The mopping up of these continued 3 Jan and by 1630 hrs all organised resistance was ended.

It is estimated that at least 300 enemy tps were killed in the DUROPA Pln - CAPE ENDAIADERE area, 450 around the OLD STRIP and GIROPA PT and 150 to 200 in the BUNA MISSION - Govt Gardens area. A report, later confirmed by a PW, stated that at 1700hrs 2 Jan, 40/50 Japs and coolies, many of which were unarmed, set out to escape in a SW direction. It is not yet known whether they escaped through our cordon into the jungle swamps south of the BUNA area or whether they ran into our patrols between URBANA and WARREN and were destroyed.

Other enemy tps and coolies endeavoured to escape by sea, swimming or improvising rafts etc from palm logs. Several swimmers landed on the spit west of SIWORI and escaped into the jungle but at least 60 on rafts and logs were intercepted between BUNA and TARAKENA by Allied A/C and accounted for.

URBANA Force reported some fresh Jap tracks in area 264251 leading in a NW direction on 3 Jan - a small patrol was sent to investigate. Throughout 4 Jan approx 50 stray enemy coolies were rounded up by general patrols. The same day enemy activity around TARAKENA was reported to be increasing. At 1630 hrs an enemy patrol from this area attacked our forces who withdrew to SIWORI Village.

SOPUTA - SANANANDA. Reorganization and re-grouping combined with patrolling has characterised ops in this area for the past week. An attack on enemy posns to the east of the rd block on 30/31 Dec was unsuccessful. The Japs in this area are using fire-bays with connecting trenches - moving their available weapons as required. Patrol activity continued for the next three days 15 Japs being killed.

There are indications that the Japs have withdrawn their fwd elements to their main position in this area which appears to be astride the rd in the vicinity of 182253. US patrols accounted for a further 13 Japs on 4 Jan. A suspected HQ was shelled at 214284 the same day.

A successful long range recce into the area west of the rd was completed on 5 Jan but the report has not yet been received.

KUMUSI - MAMBARE AREA. Patrols reported that the KUMUSI River mouth was clear of the enemy by 26 Dec. A barge at the KUMUSI mouth was sunk by a patrol on 27 Dec and three days later a patrol surprised 30/40 Japs at the mouth of the DUVIRA Ck killing one and damaging one motor launch.

SALAMAUA - MUBO AREA. A bombing sanctuary at BLACK CAT has been set aside for native evacuees from MUBO area. 200 natives from the villages of MUBO, WAIPALI, BUIBINNING and LALIBU have moved to this area and are settling down well.

On 3 Jan our OP at MUBO was sought out and destroyed by enemy. However personnel and eqpt were safely withdrawn to WAIPALI.

A patrol which reached within 3 miles of SALAMAUA reports that the BUSAMA-SALAMAUA track has been mined and is regularly patrolled by the enemy the natives being forbidden to move along the tracks to BUSAMA and MALOLO.

#### LAND - ENEMY

BUNA AREA. Enemy activity in this area continued to be almost entirely defensive. Some offensive patrolling was carried out and there is evidence that some parties endeavoured to escape by taking to the sea with lifebelts.

Recce A/C reported that the enemy was moving stores from inland locations to coast during 31 Dec.

During 1 and 2 Jan Japs were observed attempting to swim from GIROPA CK and the Govt Sta areas. Ten came ashore at GIROPA on night 1/2 Jan. A large party were strafed by our A/C while in the water.



**SANANANDA AREA.** The enemy is purely on the defensive in this area and some of his posns along the SANANANDA - SOPUTA track are reported to consist of fire bays connected by trenches in which he was moving his weapons as required. This suggests serious depletion of forces and is designed to obtain maximum fire power with forces available.

Interrogation of captured RABAUL natives who escaped from this area about 10 Dec indicates that the enemy is very short of food and that clothing is in rags. Some were without arms and were carrying bayonets tied to sticks.

All coconut palms on SANANANDA POINT were cut down by Japs during period 28 Dec to 1 Jan, probably to reinforce bunker type defence works. Burning of grassland between SANANANDA and GIRUWA suggests clearing of field of fire.

At TARA KENA at 1630 hrs 4 Jan enemy attacked our patrol facing them and forced our tps to withdraw to SIWORI Village i.e. to the east of SIWORI Ck.

**LAE-SALAMAUA.** Enemy patrols visiting GUADAGASEL village left notices calling on our tps to surrender and stating that WAU would be captured in near future.

In MUBO area the enemy apparently found that his method of handling the local natives has resulted in their "going bush". One native presented a note written in pidgin by CO of Jap forces calling on natives to assemble at MUBO for a conference.

Canoes containing Japs have been observed moving up the MARKHAM River from LAEU.

**FINSCHAFEN AREA.** Information from a reliable native source states that the drome has been cleared but no A/C were there. Enemy is stated to be "a large force" with some motor tpt.

Patrols are reported to be active inland near SATELBURG and DOREKO. Natives were informed that Jap patrols would operate to all places inland from FINSCHAFEN.

A late report from a reliable source states that every house shed or shelter is used to house Japs as well as tents. An estimate from this source places number of Japs at 2000. The estimate of 2000 is too high to be consistent with shipping sightings. Our estimates based on sightings is 5/700, but in view of the strategic importance of the position ~~of~~ a force of 2000 would not be unreasonable.

**WEWAK AREA.** It was reported on 1 Jan that the enemy was in the vicinity of ANGORAM (45 miles SE of WEWAK and on the SEPIK River 45 miles from the mouth). Doubt still exists as to the furthest extent of his penetration inland along the SEPIK.

**NEW BRITAIN.** On 31 Dec recce aircraft report that jungle was being cleared at a point approx 5 miles NW of JACQUINOT BAY. Fires were also seen around the shores of the bay and landing ground construction is suspected.

Recce A/C over SAG SAG (15 miles South by West of CAPE GLOUCESTER) reported a single tent in this vicinity. The posn appears to be a favourable one for commanding observation of DAMPIER STRAIT.

**AITAPE.** Infm from secret sources indicates this area occupied by enemy, but there is no ~~isn~~ indication of his strength or activities. There are two landing grounds - the one at TADJI to east of AITAPE can be extended into a bomber drome.

**DUTCH NEW GUINEA.** Enemy tps are known to be stationed at EFNA BAY, OELA, and KAUKENAU on SW coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Infm from a reliable source states that about 450 Japs were at KAUKENAU on 21 Dec. On 25 Dec our recce A/C observed new huts under construction at KAUKENAU and ATABO.

(b) SEA

**ENEMY.** The concentration of shipping in RABAUL altered very little between 22 Dec (65 vessels) and 5 Jan, when our daylight raiders reported between 50 and 60 vessels in harbour.

PTO



movement in and around BOUGAINVILLE (BUKA and BUIN-FAISI) continued to be below normal until 3-Jan when reports indicated a considerable increase in heavy naval vessels in the BUIN-FAISI area - six by cruisers or battleships and five by cruisers and nine other vessels being observed. On 2 Jan ten destroyers had been sighted 30 miles NW of RENDOVA IS (SOLOMONS) course South.

At 0500L/1 Jan two vessels considered to be 10,000 tons were sighted approx 62 miles SSE of RABAUL on course 230 degrees speed estimated ten knots. No further sightings of these two ships has been reported and their ultimate destination could not be determined, but it may well have been the BUIN-FAISI area, in view of the subsequently noticed increase there.

Enemy submarines have been sighted 260 and 110 miles respectively SE of EVANS HEAD (NSW) and there are indications that four are operating in the area CAPE WARD HUNT to LOUISADE ARCHIPELAGO and seven in NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND area. One sighted in WIDE BAY (NEW BRITAIN) 25 Dec is now suspected of being the plane carrying type.

On 3 Jan recce aircraft xx sighted a sub on course 150 degrees which crashdived 50 miles north of CAPE WARD HUNT.

At 1050L/6 Jan a convoy comprising 3 or 4 merchant vessels 4 destroyers and 2 cruisers was sighted approx 40 miles SE of GASMATA on a course of 250 degrees, estimated speed 12 knots. The convoy took evasive action from our strike forces operating during the day and at 2110L/6 was sighted 8 miles south GASMATA on course 290 degrees. Results of strikes not confirmed.

### (c) AIR

During the period air ops for the most part have been directed against large enemy shipping concentrations in RABAUL harbour, and against the LAE area. Armed recces have been carried out covering the sea approaches to NEW GUINEA, particular attention being paid to VITIAZ STRATTS, the north coast of NEW BRITAIN and the sea lanes between the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS WEWAK and MADANG.

RABAUL AREA. In the early morning of 3 Dec a successful strike was carried out against shipping. Direct hits were made on two large merchant vessels and two other vessels were skip-bombed, hits being made on both.

In the early hours of 1 Jan, 29 heavy bombers again attacked. One large tpt was hit and three others were left smoking.

On 5 Jan a heavy daylight raid had very successful results. Direct hits were registered on at least five vessels, and many near misses caused considerable damage.

LAE AREA. Co-ordinate bombing and strafing attacks were carried out on the aerodrome and dumps in this area. DIDDYMAN'S CK, JACOBSENS FARM and the TERRACE were hit. Numerous fires were started and several buildings destroyed. Strafing aircraft destroyed enemy aircraft on the ground and AA posns were also engaged.

BUNA AREA. Owing to the confined area in which the enemy is now operating air action in this area has been greatly reduced. The SANANANDA area has been strafed daily, and bombing attacks were made in this area on 4th and 5th. In these attacks fires were started and a possible ammunition dump was blown up.

ARMED RECCEs. Daily recces have been carried out along the coast between BUNA and LAE. The AMBOGA-BAKUMBARI area has been strafed daily and bombing and strafing of enemy boats in the MAMBARE mouth has been successful. Strafing attacks were made against MUBO and KOMIATUM on the 4th and 5th Jan.

FIGHTER OPS. Daily fighter cover has been provided for the movement of tpt in the BUNA area. Fighters have also provided top cover for strikes against LAE.

On the 31 Dec about 12 ZEKES attacked 12 P38s which were patrolling in the LAE area. The superiority of our fighters was proved and the enemy lost 8 ZEKES shot down two probably and 1 possible. Three of our aircraft were damaged, one as a result of an attempted ramming by a ZEKE. All were able to return to their base.



AIR

ENEMY. Enemy air activity during the past week appears to have been confined to reconnaissance and raids on Allied positions in the Eastern portion of NEW GUINEA and to two heavy raids on MERAUKE (on SW coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA).

Heavy losses in fighter A/C during the previous week and heavy attacks on LAE airdrome have apparently caused the enemy to conserve his fighters and to confine his activities to bomber sorties. Heavy and consistent raids by Allied A/C on RABAU, LAE and SALAMAU may compel him to keep fighter A/C available for cover against these attacks." (c)

KUMUSI-MAMBARE AREA. A/C on morning of 5 Jan reported a large ship's type boat, apparently serviceable, floating in bay immediately south of KUMUSI River, pm 6 Jan a reliable source reported that a launch was hidden on WEST ISLAND, MAMBARE River mouth. Patrols noted nightly barge movement past CAPE WARD HUNT. Tracks on island and corduroy track from DUVIRA Ck to DUVIRA Village and the continued presence of a small Jap party at MAMBARE supported theory that this is a staging point for coastal traffic.

LAE. Allied air attacks on LAE airdrome have caused considerable damage to grounded A/C and installations, and has resulted in reducing the effectiveness of the base to great extent and no doubt accounting for the absence of fighters over the BUNA area during the week. No serviceable A/C have been observed stationed on the drome but 6 ZEKES and 1 large u/i A/C were observed taking off on 5 Jan.

GOODENOUGH IS. One BETTY was shot down NE of island on 4 Jan one heavy bomber was seen circling over the island and then made off north. This follows the shooting down of an enemy recon A/C over the island on 28 Dec which has now been identified as a SALLY.

MILNE BAY. An u/i plane circled the bay for 2 hrs during the afternoon of 31 Dec.

TUFI. McLAREN Harbour was attacked by dive bombers and med bombers protected by 6 ZEKES on 2 Jan. This attack was directed at shipping only and dive bombers came down to 1500 ft to make these attacks.

MERAUKE. A raid by 22 enemy bombers thought to be SALLYs was made on MERAUKE a.m. 30 Dec, 22 x 1000 lb bombs being dropped with a result that half the town was demolished. A.m. 31 Dec 18 SALLYs dropped 40 x 500 and 1000 x 1 lb bombs on the barracks and hosp, (both had been previously evacuated) causing much damage. Fires were also started in the township, it is possible that these A/C were based at BABO (South coast BENTONI BAY) or BOEMI (South coast of GEELVINK BAY)

EQUIPMENTEnemy Shortage of Weapons.

(a) The following instruction issued by the YAZAWA Butai (41 Regt) in the SOPUTA-SANANANDA area 19 Nov indicates the shortage of weapons that faced the enemy at this period.

"It is not permissible to retreat even a step from each unit's original defensive position, I demand that each man fight until the last. As previously instructed, those without firearms or sabres must be prepared to fight with sharp weapons such as knives or bayonets tied to sticks, or with clubs."

(b) Further infm indicating a shortage still existed 28 Nov was revealed in a captured signal from GIRUWA requesting 500 rifles, 30 LMGs, 30 gren dischargers and replenishments of rifle amm.

(c) A shortage of adequate weapons in the BUNA area was revealed by the capture of a 20 mm OERLIKON a/c cannon lashed with wire to two lengths of 5" x 5" timber apparently for use as a ground weapon, although method of operation is not clear.

(d) Small arms amm has been dropped by A/C and some weapons may have been landed from small craft but of insufficient quantity to fulfil operational requirements, and it is considered that the enemy force in the SOPUTA-SANANANDA area now faces a grave shortage of essential weapons and arty amm.

PTO



TACTICS

(i) The following examples of ruses employed by the enemy in the BUNA area have been received from the fwd area :

(a) Dummy Snipers. A patrol advancing up the coast was fired on by a tree-top sniper. They halted, located him and apparently shot him down. They then advanced and were fired on again. This happened several times. Thorough investigation revealed that one sniper had been holding up the patrol and dummies had been placed in other trees; these being dropped by a pulley arrangement after the Americans had fired sufficient shots, making them imagine that they had cleared the opposition.

(b) "Drop Shorts". The morale and spirit of an American coy advancing under covering fire of own guns was seriously affected by this ruse.

Every time our guns opened up to provide covering fire for an advance or gun fire on any target, the one known Jap 7-mm gun in the Govt Gdns area also opened up and placed its rounds amongst the fwd Americans. The Japs timed the activity of their own gun to coincide exactly with that of our own supporting arty. This made the tps imagine that they were being blitzed by "Drop Shorts" of their own guns. No amount of demonstration by showing our tps dud 70-mm shells would convince them that the shelling wasn't from our own guns.

(ii) Camouflage of Enemy Shipping. In the past week many small enemy merchant craft have been sighted around the NEW GUINEA-NEW BRITAIN coasts. These vessels have been described by pilots as being carefully and skilfully camouflaged with leaves and branches from stem to stern, in such a way as to give the appearance of an island.

Another description received concerned a camouflaged 1500-ton cargo vessel attacked just West of ARAWE. The vessel was reported as being "rigged for wireless with two masts which were camouflaged as palm trees; the whole of the vessel was well camouflaged with brown material resembling palm leaves."

It has been suggested that, in view of the enemy's losses in other shipping categories, he may be using many small cargo vessels, close inshore and well camouflaged from high flying A/C.

GENERAL : JAPANESE WOMEN IN SOLOMONS OPERATIONS.

Reports that Japanese women have entered combat in the Pacific are mounting. The infm Bulletin No. 117 U.S. Marine Corps, carries an interview with enlisted men in the Solomons Battle, in which one marine stated:- "I personally saw about five or six Japanese radio women in the planes." This further verifies reports received previously that women are being used as radio operators and on other possible duties in Jap bombers, substantiation being that bodies of women have been recovered from the wreckage of these A/C in SPA. There have also been several reports of the use by the enemy of women as snipers at GUADALCANAL.

METEOROLOGICAL. Attached as appx 'A' is a table showing moonrise and moonset for specific localities in NEW GUINEA.

OTHER FRONTS - TIMOR. Generally there is increased Jap activity over entire Portuguese TIMOR, extensive patrolling, sporadic skirmishes and burning by the enemy assisted by natives, in all areas has been reported. Troops and supplies have been transported from BAUCAU and LAUTEM, on the north coast, to LORE BAGUIA (15 miles SE BAUCAU) and FULLORO ILLIOMAR, 27 miles SSW of LAUTEM. At OSSU, 24 miles SSW BAUCAU, daily training by their tps is carried out. Armed natives are very active in the NOVA CAMINHA (21 miles SE of DILLI) TURISCAI and MAOBISSE areas, while in the south Japs and natives are patrolling the beach east from BETANO to the KELAN River.

All infm indicates that the enemy is making an all out effort to clear the Island of Allied tps.

The enemy air force has been less active and apart from an abortive attack on an Allied vessel in the ARAFURA SEA on 26 Dec, little has been reported. Allied planes, on the other hand, have been making frequent bombings and strafing attacks over a wide area, including LAGA, LAIVAI, OSSU, FULLORO, VINA LALE and BETANO. DOBO in the AROE Islands has also been attacked.

Five vessels were reported in an anchorage on the north coast (possibly DILLI) on 30 Dec. These vessels are probably the convoy composed of four tpts and a destroyer, which was previously reported off LAIVAI disembarking tps and sups on 24 Dec. A further unidentified vessel was reported to be moving west along the coast from the direction of LAGA on same day.

*W. H. Schofield  
Capt.*




## MOON RISE AND MOON SET TABLES - JAN 43

Date &	R & S	MORESBY	BUNA	LAE- SALA- MAUA	Date	R & S	MORESBY	BUNA	LAE- SALA- MAUA
1	R S	0149 0419	0144 1413	0151 1419	16	R S	1529 0247	1524 0242	1528 0250
2	R S	0235 1513	0231 1507	0238 1512	17	R S	1618 0331	1612 0327	1616 0335
3	R S	0325 1609	0321 1604	0328 1608	18	R S	1706 0416	1700 0412	1704 0420
4	R S	0419 1710	0415 1704	0423 1708	19	R S	1754 0502	1748 0458	1751 0406
5	R S	0517 1813	0513 1807	0521 1810	20	R S	1841 0550	1835 0546	1839 0554
6	R S	0619 1916	0615 1910	0623 1913	21	R S	1928 0638	1922 0634	1926 0642
7	R S	0722 2018	0718 2012	0726 2016	22	R S	2013 0726	2007 0722	2011 0730
8	R S	0826 2117	0822 2111	0830 2115	23	R S	2057 0814	2052 0810	2056 0818
9	R S	0928 2212	0924 2207	0931 2211	24	R S	2140 0901	2134 0856	2139 0905
10	R S	1025 2304	1021 2258	1028 2303	25	R S	2222 0949	2216 0945	2222 0952
11	R S	1120 2351	1116 2346	1123 2351	26	R S	2304 1036	2259 1031	2305 1038
12	R S	1213 -	1208 -	1214 -	27	R S	2347 1125	2342 1120	2348 1126
13	R S	1304 0036	1259 0031	1304 0037	28	R S	- 1214	- 1208	- 1214
14	R S	1353 0119	1347 0115	1352 0122	29	R S	0031 1304	0027 1258	0033 1303
15	R S	1442 0202	1436 0158	1440 0205	30	R S	0117 1358	0113 1352	0120 1356
					31	R S	0207 1454	0203 1448	0211 1452



# BOMBARDMENT AND SHELLING JASO AREA



Scale 4 ins = 1 mile

### NO. OF MORTAR BOMBS USED

AS AT. 0700/17	650	757
" 18	1040	
" 19	1454	107
" 20	2772	+ 66 A/T SHELLS.
" 22	3480	
" 23	3632	
" 24	3730	

### NO. OF MORTAR BOMBS USED AS AT. 0700/185

24/12.	3738	1443-6767
25/12.	3817	2/1 6785
26/12.	3941	3/1 6849
27/12.	4576	4/1 6897
28/12.	4614	5/1 7218
29/12.	4999	6/1 7320
30/12.	6361	7/1 7509
31/12.	6439	8/1

NOTE Each Circle represents 10 rds. or Bombs in area

Each Square represents 10 rds. Shells in area



SECRET.

H.Q. R.A.E.  
6 AUST DIV.  
4 JAN 43.

ops  
10/11/36  
Seen  
if all but this is done by  
for man Perry  
4  
18 Aust Inf Bde.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS - EXPEDIENTS IN  
ASSISTING ATTACK.

- (1) At the request of Brig F.G. WOOTTEN, Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde, a visit was made to the Bde area at BUNA on 29-Dec-2 Jan 43, and the question of employing expedients to assist in attack and mopping up of Jap strong points discussed with Bde and Bn Comds.
- (2) In this area the Jap has constructed shell-proof MG posts, comd posts and shelters by means of which his casualties during our arty and mortar preparation and harassing are reduced and good protection is provided against aerial attack. It is generally considered that fire positions unprovided with overhead cover are manned by observers only until attacked, when the Japs move from their shelters to these positions. It is thought that the effectiveness of Fd Arty against the strong points has been limited to hits in the close vicinity of doorway openings and loopholes using H.E., and for this reason A.P. shell has been used successfully.
- (3) The shelters are constructed of an interior framework for walls of either coconut logs or 44 gallon oil drums on end, with two or more layers of coconut log bearers side butted overhead, and with either  $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plate or corr. iron on top of the bearers. Outside the walls and overhead framework to an overall thickness of at least 4 ft of earth is placed, with coconuts and strips of dry grass matting incorporated in the earth to assist in cushioning pressures set up by H.E., the structures vary in type and size and lengths from 12 ft to 40 ft, widths from 4ft to 8ft, heights - floor to underside bearers 3ft 6 ins to 4ft 6ins. Access openings 2ft wide, are at ends, sometimes on opposite sides and protected from splinters by low earth and coconut walls which serve as emergency fire positions. Loopholes, when provided, are approx 2ft in length and 4ins in height, sited at ends and/or sides. Floor levels are very little below the natural surface, in some cases within a few inches, in others, 2ft below. This results in practically the whole of the strong point being above ground, with consequent difficulties in concealment, although this is assisted as far as possible by suitable siting. The underground water level in this area is generally within one to three feet of the surface, rendering it impossible to excavate to any depth below the surface.
- (4) Tests were carried out with ammonal charges on typical shelters as follows:-
  - (i) 5 lb charge placed inside shelter central to access opening to represent charge thrown through opening.  
Result:- Considerable blast effect, walls bulged outwards for almost full length of 30 ft, 8 ft of overhead cover above charge collapsed, access opening at opposite end disturbed.  
Conclusion:- Charge sufficient to knock out all occupants by blast irrespective of interior arrangements of slit trenches or splinter protective walls, if any.

/over.



- (ii) 5 lb charge placed outside shelter, between access opening and splinter protection wall.

Result:- Similar to (i) but effect reduced.

Conclusion:- As for (i).

- (iii) 10 lb charge placed halfway up side of shelter, central to length of shelter, not in vicinity of access openings or loopholes.

Result:- Small crater effect with earth, grass matting and coconuts disturbed to diameter 3ft and maximum depth of 15 inches.

Conclusion:- Structure not damaged and occupants unlikely to be more than slightly shaken.

- (iv) 21 lb charge placed central on top of shelter.

Result:- Crater punched through earth, 4 sq ft of corrugated iron over bearers, cut through, three bearers in each of the two layers of bearers disturbed by blast, structure otherwise undamaged.

Conclusion:- Occupants likely to be shaken but unlikely to be knocked out except within a few feet of the charge.

- (5) As a result of these tests it is concluded that the shelters are reasonably shellproof and that attack with explosives externally, will be ineffective unless heavy charges are employed. The design, however, provides little provision internally for blast, making it possible to ensure that occupants are knocked out by H.E. charges of 3 to 5 lbs thrown preferably through access openings or alternatively, exploded externally near these openings. It is probable that 10 lb charges exploded within a few feet of either access openings or loopholes would knock out occupants by blast.

- (6) Comds of attacking troops consider that the two main problems are:-

(i) To provide positive action in close support during attack, neutralising strong points and increasing Jap casualties.

(ii) To provide means for rapid mopping up of strong points when surrounded. It was stated that this occupies considerable time and casualties, since remnants of Jap troops take refuge in shelters and cannot be readily dealt with by grenades.

- (7) Close support expedients during and in preparation for attack should preferably be either mobile or capable of operating at ranges approximating 1,000 yards, in order to deal with defences in depth.

For this reason, expedients such as the fougasse with its range of 40 yards are of value only in limited cases. In discussion it was considered that flame and possibly explosive, non-poisonous gases would be of considerable value. Some possibilities are:-

- (i) Flame Throwers:-

Haversack type, weight 40 lbs. Considered unsuitable in attack as operator becomes casualty or is pinned before reaching striking distance. Would be of some value in mopping up. Harvey type is unarmoured and cumbersome in movement. Has disadvantage that jet cannot be turned on and off at will but this could be eliminated by improvement of ignition arrangement. Jet operates continuously for 30 seconds. Both types appear suitable for employment from carriers fitted with overhead steel plate. Effective range is approximately 40 yards.

/over.



The ideal type appears to be the flame thrower mounted on a tank. This would provide mobility as well as protection for the operator. Flame thrower would be fitted to brackets at side or rear of tank, with a quick release arrangement in case of fire. If fire risk from fumes in case of petrol fuel tanks is considered too great, trailer flame thrower may be a possibility. In any case the flame thrower will require housing in armour plate.

It is generally considered that the mobile flame thrower would be most effective close support expedient.

(ii) Mortar Fired Oil Bombs:-

There appears to be no practical difficulty in devising a mortar bomb containing a mixture of oil, kerosene and petrol with a small bursting charge to allow diffusion, and with a flash device to either fire independently on impact, or by first firing a number of bombs without the flash devices to explode the gas after a sufficient concentration has been prepared at the target area. The 81 mm mortar appears suitable.

Advantages would be accuracy, ranges probably exceeding 1,500 yards, and simplicity in requiring no special equipment other than the oil bombs.

(iii) Levens Projector and Improvised Mortar

Suitable for firing oil bombs but appears to possess no advantages over (ii) and several disadvantages including less accuracy, special equipment to be carried, and a slower rate of fire.

(iv) Incendiaries:-

Not considered to have any special advantages. Strong points will not readily burn and the flame throwers and mortar fired oil bombs would probably be much more effective.

- (8) Mopping up operations can be facilitated by the use of H.E. charges for blast effects referred to in para 5. Suitable charges have been made up using 2 to 5 lbs of ammonal in a ration tin container secured to a 36 grenade by a discharger cap, the assembled grenade and blast charge resembling the GERMAN Stick Grenade, with the 36 grenade as a handle. Detonation of the ammonal charge is ensured by F.I.D. fastened to the grenade, which is primed and fired as when used independently.

It is considered that this expedient is the simplest and most effective for the purpose.

- (9) Scope may be found for the employment of Booby traps and delay action charges in night raids, for which suitable equipment is available in the form of Murray Switches and Time pencils.

- (10) As directed by C.E. NG.F., experiments have been put in hand in conjunction with 2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy and the C.W. Officer NGF to investigate the possibilities referred to in 7 (i), (ii) and (iii).

Further reports will follow when experiments have advanced.

.....*[Signature]*.....Lt Col.  
C. R. E. 6 Aust Div.

Copies to:- 6 Aust Div.  
C.E. N.G.Force.



~~SECRET~~

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde  
4 Jan 48.

58 US Div  
Adv H.C.F.

1. Faded herewith rough sketch of blast bomb improvised for use in BUNA ops.
2. These blast bombs were produced by Sgt B/18 Aust Inf Bde after consultation with Lt-Col IRWIN. Production was necessarily limited by supply of materials and by the small lot that could be made available for the task.
3. In view of the pronounced success attending the use of these bombs, copy of report of CG B/18 Aust Inf Bde is subjoined, it is recommended that the production of a similar type of bomb be undertaken on a large scale.

*J. MacCottin*  
Brig.  
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.


18 Aust Inf Bde.

5 Jan 48.

I beg to report the new type of improvised animal bomb proved to be very effective in dealing with enemy pillboxes. The bomb thrown in one of the entrances caused a terrific blast blowing debris from any other entrances. It was found that once the bomb had exploded within the pillbox that it was usually unnecessary to worry any further about its occupants. Some misfires occurred owing to the SG Grenade becoming detached from the main charge owing to impact with the ground. It is suggested that it would be an improvement if the junction of the two component parts of the bomb could be strengthened. The present size bomb is considered to be of convenient size and power for throwing and no increase is recommended as, if necessary more than one bomb can be used on a particularly large emplacement.

(A.S.W. ARNOLD) Lt-Col.  
Comd B/18 Aust Inf Bde.





Containers used were 4 1/2" by 4" deep

Scale: Approx 1/2 size.

Sketch of Grenade substituted chambered design

*[Handwritten signature]*



BLAST BOMBS

War Diary  
Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde  
4 Jan 43.

38 US Div  
Adv H.G.F.

1. Fwded herewith rough sketch of blast bomb improvised for use in Buna ops.
2. These blast bombs were produced by det 2/4 Aust Inf Coy after consultation with Lt-Col IRWIN. Production was necessarily limited by supply of materials and by the small det that could be made available for the task.
3. In view of the pronounced success attending the use of these bombs, copy of report of CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn is subjoined, it is recommended that the production of a similar type of bomb be undertaken on a large scale.

*J. H. Weston*  
Brig.  
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.


5 Jan 43.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

I beg to report the new type of improvised sminol bomb proved to be very effective in dealing with enemy pillboxes. The bomb thrown in one of the entrances caused a terrific blast blowing debris from any other entrances. It was found that once the bomb had exploded within the pillbox that it was usually unnecessary to worry any further about its occupants. Some misfires occurred owing to the 36 Grenade becoming detached from the main charge owing to impact with the gd. It is suggested that it would be an improvement if the junction of the two component parts of the bomb could be strengthened. The present size bomb is considered to be of convenient size and power for throwing and no increase is recommended as, if necessary more than one bomb can be used on a particularly large emplacement.

(A.S.W. ARNOLD) Lt-Col.  
Comd 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.





Containers used were  $4\frac{1}{2}$ "  
by 4" deep

Scale Approx  $\frac{1}{2}$  Size



BLAST BOMBS

War Diary

Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde  
6 Jan 43.

18th Div  
Div S.G.F.

1. Fwded herewith rough sketch of blast bomb improvised for use in BUNA ops.
2. These blast bombs were produced by Det 2/4 Aust PI Coy after consultation with Lt-Col IRWIN. Production was necessarily limited by supply of materials and by the small det that could be made available for the task.
3. In view of the pronounced success attending the use of these bombs, copy of report of CG 2/18 Aust Inf Bn is subjoined, it is recommended that the production of a similar type of bomb be undertaken on a large scale.

*L. McCarter*  
Brig.  
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.


5 Jan 43.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

I beg to report the new type of improvised mine bomb proved to be very effective in dealing with enemy pillboxes. The bomb thrown in one of the entrances caused a terrific blast blowing debris from any other entrances. It was found that once the bomb had exploded within the pillbox that it was usually unnecessary to worry any further about its occupants. Some misfires occurred owing to the S6 Grenade becoming detached from the main charge owing to impact with the ground. It is suggested that it would be an improvement if the junction of the two component parts of the bomb could be strengthened. The present size bomb is considered to be of convenient size and power for throwing and no increase is recommended as, if necessary more than one bomb can be used on a particularly large emplacement.

(A.S.W. ARNOLD) Lt-Col.  
Comd 2/18 Aust Inf Bn.





Containers used were  $4\frac{1}{2}$ "  
by 4" deep

Scale Approx  $\frac{1}{2}$  size



S E C R E T

Auth: CG 41 Inf Div

Initials: C.R.P.

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date 25 Jan 43

*Ops  
Cond  
10  
29/1*

Hq 41 US DIV  
Vic DOBODURA  
1200 hrs, 25 Jan 43

FO 1

MAPS: NEW GUINEA -- POPONDETTA and BUNA Sheets, 2nd Edition (Prov), Scale 1 inch to 1 mile; BUNA Sheet, Revised 2nd Edition, SALAMAUA Sheet 1st Edition, Scale 1 inch to 4 miles; GONA and BUNA Sheets (Revised), AMPOGA RIVER MOUTH LOCALITY Sheet, Scale 4 inches to 1 mile.

1.
  - a. Enemy Forces: See Intelligence Annex.
  - b. Friendly Forces: 41 US Inf Div assumes command of all forces in area ORO BAY -- MOROBE BAY previously under command of Adv NGF which relinquished control at 1200 hrs this date.
2. MISSION: Mission of 41 US Inf Div and attached troops will be defense of ORO BAY -- GONA, both inclusive, destruction of enemy forces in coastal area GONA, inclusive of MOROBE and MANGROVE ISLAND. Defense of ORO BAY -- BUNA -- GONA area will be in accordance with NGF Opns Instr No. 59.

TROOPS: 127 US Inf Regt, with attachments.  
128 US Inf Regt, with attachments.  
163 US Inf Regt, with attachments.  
186 US Inf Regt, with attachments.  
14 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments  
18 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments.  
2/6 Aust Armored Regt  
2/1 Aust Field Regt (Minus)  
2/5 Aust Field Regt (Minus)  
2/6 Aust Field Regt  
13 Aust Field Regt (Minus)  
CRE 1 Aust Corps Troops  
Sigs, 1st Aust Corps  
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit  
15 Aust Graves Registration Unit  
2 US Field Hosp  
COSC ORO BAY

3.
  - a. ORO BAY forces will continue present mission and will be responsible for maintenance of patrols to EMBOGO RIVER and will maintain contact with 186 Inf patrols there.
  - b. (1) 186 Inf, with attachments, (less Can Co and Band) will relieve 128 US Inf Regt, with attachments, and 127 US Inf Regt, with attachments, on or about 30 Jan and will be responsible for defense of area from EMBOGO to KONOMBI RIVER, entrance at TARAKENA, inclusive.  
(2) Band, 186 Inf, will remain in MAPLE as guard for 186 Inf equipment in that area.  
(3) 186 Inf will be responsible for maintenance of patrol from CAPE SUDEST to EMBOGO and will maintain contact with patrol from ORO BAY defense command there.
  - c. Can Co 186 Inf will remain in ORO BAY area for local inf defense and guard and unloading details under Div control.
  - d. 128 Inf Regt, with attachments, on relief by 186 Inf will move from present defensive area to vicinity of DOBODURA for air transport to MAPLE.
  - e. 127 Inf Regt, with attachments, on relief by 186 Inf will move to bivouac in vicinity of DOBODURA in Div Res.
  - f. (1) 163 Inf Regt, with attachments, will relieve 14 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments, in GONA area on or about 26 Jan and 18 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments, in SANANANDA area on or about 30 Jan and will be responsible for defense of area from GIRUWA VILLAGE to AMBOGA RIVER.  
(2) 163 Inf Regt will assume responsibility of defensive area from GIRUWA VILLAGE to KONOMBI RIV at TARAKENA, exclusive, on relief of 127 US Inf Regt by 186 Inf Regt.

- 1 -  
S E C R E T



- (3) 163 Inf will be responsible for protection of AMBOGA CROSSING and establishment of patrols from BANGABA MISSION to GONA. A force of not less than a reinforced platoon will be assigned this mission.
  - g. 14 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments, will assemble in vicinity SOPUTA for air transport to MAPLE, on relief by 163 Inf.
  - h. 18 Aust Inf Brig, with attachments, will assemble in vicinity SOPUTA in Div Res. on relief by 163 Inf.
  - i. (1) Personnel of 2/6 Aust Field Regt will relieve, in present position, personnel of 2/1 Aust Field Regt, 2/5 Aust Field Regt and 13 Field Regt (4.5 How) on or about 1 Feb.
  - (2) Personnel of 2/1 Aust Field Regt, with exception of Hanson Btry, 2/5 Aust Field Regt and 13 Field Regt on relief by 2/6 Field Regt will assemble in vicinity of DOBODURA for movement by air to MAPLE.
  - (3) Personnel of Hanson Btry, 2/1 Aust Field Regt, on relief by 2/6 Field Regt will assemble in vicinity of POPONETTA for movement by air to MAPLE.
  - j. 2/3 Aust Inf Co will assemble in vicinity of SOPUTA for special mission. Instruction for movement will be issued later.
  - k. (1) All elements of 116th Engr Bn will revert to Div control.
  - (2) CRE 1 Aust Corps Troops will be attached to 116th Engr Bn.
  - l. All elements of 41st QM Co will revert to Div control.
  - m. All elements of 41st Sig Co will revert to Div control.
  - n. All elements of 41 MP Plat will revert to Div control.
  - o. All elements of 741 Ord Co will revert to Div control.
4. Administrative details later.
5. a. See Annex No. 1, Signal Orders.
- b. Command Posts:
- 41 US Div - vic DOBODURA.
  - 186 Inf Regt - vic SIMEMI.
  - 163 Inf Regt - vic SOPUTA.
  - 127 Inf Regt - Initially vic BUNA, then vicinity of DOBODURA.
  - 128 Inf Regt - Initially vic CAPE ENDAIADERE, then vic DOBODURA.
  - 18 Aust Inf Brig - Initially SANANANDA PT, then vic SOPUTA.
  - 14 Aust Inf Brig - Initially GONA area, then vic SOPUTA.
  - 2/6 Aust Field Regt - Vic DOBODURA.
  - 116 Engr Bn - vic DOBODURA.
  - 2/6 Aust Armored Regt - vic CAPE ENDAIADERE.

By command of Major General FULLER:

HARRY W. MILLER,  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,  
Actg Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

*Charles R. Buxton*  
CHARLES R. BUXTON,  
Major, Infantry,  
Actg AG of S, G-3.

ANNEXES: 2

Signal  
Intelligence.

DISTRIBUTION: 1 Copy each.

- |       |                     |                          |                  |
|-------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| CG    | Adv NGF             | 2/6 Aust Fd Regt         | AA Comd Dobodura |
| G-2   | NGF                 | COSC ORO BAY             | Fighter Sector   |
| G-3   | 127 Inf             | CRE 1 Aust Corps Tps     | Dobodura.        |
| G-4   | 128 Inf             | Sigs 1 Aust Corps        | USN Tufi         |
| Sig O | 163 Inf             | 1 Aust Corps Salv Unit   |                  |
| Surg  | 186 Inf             | 15 Aust Graves Regn Unit |                  |
| Ord O | 14 Aust Brig        | 2 US Field Hosp          |                  |
| Eng O | 18 Aust Brig        | Air LO Dobodura          |                  |
| QM O  | 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt | Sta Comds Popondetta     |                  |
| PIB   | 2/1 Fd Regt         | Sta Comds Dobodura       |                  |



S E C R E T

41st INFANTRY DIVISION

Vicinity of DOBODURA, NEW GUINEA

1200 Hours

25 January 1943

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO

FIELD ORDER NO..... 1

MAPS: BUNA Provisional (Second Edition), 1 inch to 1 mile; POPONDETTA Provisional (Second Edition), 1 inch to 1 mile; NEW GUINEA Tactical, 4 mi. to 1 in.-- Sheets BUNA, SALAMAUA, LAE; Mercator Projection, Aeronautical Map.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. See G-2 Periodic Report No. 1

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Will the enemy occupy points along the east coast of NEW GUINEA from MAMBARE River to MOROBE River?
- b. Will the enemy launch a seaborne attack from LAE or SALAMAUA on our defensive area?
- c. Will the enemy launch a seaborne attack from RABAU?
- d. Will the remnants of the enemy now in the area between the AMBOGA River and the KUMUSI River be reinforced and launch attacks against our left flank?
- e. Will the enemy detachments in the AMBOGA-KUMUSI River area defend or delay from suitable positions?
- f. Will the enemy move a sufficient force from the vicinity of WAU south to threaten our left flank?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

- a. Army Cooperation Squadron, RAAF, will furnish command and reconnaissance missions as directed.
- b. The 116th Engineer Bn. will correct existing maps of the division area from its own and other unit route reconnaissance reports.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

- a. In addition to instructions contained in Intelligence Annex to Division SOP, prisoners will be sent to the PW enclosure or collecting point (when completed) by units concerned. Until such time as the division PW collecting point is established, the 163d Infantry will interrogate prisoners obtained by them and evacuate these prisoners from POPONDETTA.

The 127th, 128th and 186th Infantries will continue to interrogate prisoners and evacuate them through ORO BAY.

Intelligence Officers of above units will obtain blocks of numbers from the G-2 Office which will be assigned to prisoners under their control.

Reports of interrogation of prisoners will be made in quadruplicate. One copy will accompany the prisoner upon evacuation; three copies will be forwarded to the G-2 Office of this Headquarters.

- b. Documents and captured material will be handled as provided in Intelligence Annex to Division SOP.

-1-

S E C R E T



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S E C R E T

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

- a. The 116th Engineers will distribute maps and photographs in accordance with the supply available and under the supervision of the A. C. of S., G-2, 41st Infantry Division.
- b. Demands for photomaps and aerial reconnaissance will be forwarded to the G-2 Section.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

- a. See Intelligence Annex of Division SOP.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

- a. Situation reports will be submitted daily at 0700 and 1700 hours to this headquarters by priority signal and will include the following information for each regimental combat team or detached force in area:
  - (1) Enemy ground activity.
  - (2) Enemy air activity.
  - (3) Operations of own troops including projected operations.
  - (4) Movements and projected movements of own headquarters and units.
  - (5) Other information likely to be of use.
- b. If there is no information to report, a SITNOR or NIL report will be submitted.
- c. It is important that situation reports be despatched at the time stated, and should not be delayed to include anticipated information.
- d. Important information, if received between the above time, will be signalled immediately.
- e. Situation reports should be passed to all subordinate and flanking units.

By command of Major General FULLER:

OFFICIAL:

*Kenneth C. Downing*  
KENNETH C. DOWNING,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G - 2.

HARRY W. MILLER,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

-2-

S E C R E T



OPS  
Bde sig file  
+ return to files

41 US DIV  
VI: DOBODURA  
1200 hrs, 25 Jan 43

COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX NO. 1)  
TO FO 1

1. Command Posts: See attached FO.
2. Conforming to Signal Instructions No 16 NCF, the following is cited:  
"Communications in the GONA - BUNA - ORO BAY area which at the present the responsibility of Signals 1 Aust Corps, Sigs 7 Aust Div and 32 US Div Sig Co are to be taken over by 41st US Div Sig Co and Sigs NG L of C Area."

Responsibilities of Signals New Guinea Line of Comm Area:

- (a) Permanent line construction in this area.
- (b) Maintenance of line MORESBY - DOBODURA.
- (c) Wireless groups (1) MORESBY DOBODURA ORO BAY.  
(2) HMO station working with PT Boats.  
(3) Air Warning Coast Watching.

3. The 41 Sig Co and regimental communications sections will take over the existing signal communication agencies as rapidly as possible, thus, permitting reliefs of the signal personnel of 1 Aust Corps, Sigs 7 Aust Div, and 32 US Div Sig Co. Commanding officers will report when unit communications sections are prepared to relieve the above mentioned signal personnel.
4. The 41 Sig Co and unit communications sections will install, operate and maintain the signal agencies in conformance with the following plan:

Message Centers 41 US Div - Vic Strip 1 SOP.  
Div Arty - Vic Strip 1 SOP.  
163 Inf - Vic SOPUTA SOP.  
186 Inf - Vic SIMEMI SOP.  
18 Aust Brig - Vic SOPUTL SOP.  
ORO BAY BASE - Vic ORO BAY SOP.

Exact locations of message centers and command posts will be reported to Div Signal Officer by unit communications officers. Command Posts will be clearly marked with unit symbols.

Messengers:

Scheduled messengers: Div Hq to 186 Inf - 0900 hrs daily.  
Div Hq to 163 Inf - 1300 hrs daily.  
Div Hq to NCF and PORT MORESBY: Air courier  
0900 hrs daily.

Special messages: As required.

Radio and Visual:

Command, Flash Warning Nets: SOP.

Operation of radio nets will be held to the minimum and for emergency purposes only. NCS of regimental and separate unit radio nets, and the Div Command, Flash Warning Net will maintain 24 hour watch.

Flash Warning Procedure: SOP.

Wire:

(a) Construction.

- (1) Existing lines will be used to the maximum.
- (2) Division lines will be tagged per SOP.
- (3) Field lines will be laid off roads and placed overhead.
- (4) Alternate field lines and laterals will be installed and controlled by the common superior communications and Signal Officer.
- (5) Existing wire lines not necessary for operation of the Div Telephone system will be dismantled and serviced wherever practicable. Lines so cut will be carefully checked by the unit communications officer.
- (6) Line maintenance men will be armed and operate in groups of not less than two.

(b) Telephone Centrals.

- (1) Line checks will be maintained 24 hrs by switchboard operators.
- (2) Authenticators: SOP.
- (3) Basic Division Circuit diagram as indicated in Appendix A will be cut over to conform to that in Appendix B as rapidly as the arrival and relief of troops permit.



Supply

- (a) Units will maintain 30 day signal maintenance and expendable supplies.
- (b) Signal equipment taken over by regiments and separate units from the 32 Div and Aust Sigs in excess of TBA or current requirements will be turned in to the Division Signal Dump.
- (c) Signal equipment will be frequently serviced to prevent deterioration due to dampness.
- (d) Signal Dump will be located vicinity of the Signal Company.

Signal Officer will be located at Division Headquarters, Master 10.


By command of Major General FULLER:

HARRY W. MILLER,  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,  
Actg. Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

*Charles R. Buxton*  
CHARLES R. BUXTON,  
Major, Infantry,  
Actg. AC of S, G-3.






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 a white  
 1/22/42

APPENDIX "A"  
 PRESENT BASIC SYSTEM  
 28 Jan 42





APPENDIX "B"  
 DIVISION BASIC CIRCUIT DIAGRAM.  
 25 JAN 1943



Hq., Musket CT  
Soputa, N. G.  
28 January 43

18th Aust. Bde

ops  
4 28/1

FIELD ORDER:

NO.....6:

Map reference Buna Second Edition Provisional, one inch equals one mile.

1. a. Organized enemy resistance in the SANANANDA - BONA MISSION area has been broken. Small bands of stragglers and snipers are still enfiltrating through this area to the north and west.

b. The Third Battalion has established a beach defense from the mouth of the AMBOGA RIVER to the mouth of the GARARA RIVER all inclusive.

The First Battalion is in regimental reserve at SOPUTA.

2. The Second Battalion will relieve the 18th Australian Brigade by 1800 hours, 29 January, 1943, and establish a beach defense from the mouth of the GARARA RIVER exclusive to GIRUWA, inclusive.

3. a. The 18th Australian Brigade will withdraw to Soputa.

b. Boundary between battalions, a line between the points (19.4 - 29.0) - (15.5 - 16.8).

c. Not over one third of the battalion will be used on fixed beach defense. At least two thirds will be held mobile.

4. Supply for the present will be via the SOPUTA - SANANANDA road by truck and native carrier. At a later date supply will be via barge to SANANANDA POINT from ORO BAY.

5. a. Regiment will run a communication line from the new Second Battalion Headquarters to the Third Battalion Headquarters.

b. Line of communication SANANANDA - SOPUTA M.T. ROAD. The Second Battalion will report the exact location of their C P at Sanananda Point as soon as it is established.

c. Present Ship to Shore signals will be secured from the 18th Australian Brigade.

By order of Colonel DOE:

LEON W. WALTON,  
Capt., Infantry,  
S-3, Musket.

ble sig 1/2  
attached to  
arrange

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# MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

**CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS**

IN

OUT

*OPS  
cond ✓  
10 HZ*

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

KOTY KAPO MUSKET ADV NGF NGF

FROM

NANI

Originator's Number

I 28

Date

15

In Reply to Number

Fwded herewith report on interrogation of 5 PsW captured 14 Jan

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1650

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYST IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER



REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF 5 PsW CAPTURED 14 JAN 43

PW No. 53. YOSHIDA Shigeru, Superior Pte, 144 Regt  
Captured North of pocket on SANANANDA-SOPUTA Track by 163 US Regt morning  
14 Jan 43. Preliminary interrogation at 2/9 Bn RAP.

PW No. 54. TASAKA, Jokichi, Superior Pte, 144 Regt.

PW No. 55. NAGAI, Akira, " " " " HMGunner

PW No. 56. KUBO, Hideo, " " TAKAMORI Engrs

PW No. 57. YAMAMOTO, Kaoru, 1st Class Pte, 144 Regt.

Captured South of pocket on SANANANDA-SOPUTA Track by 18 Bde. Preliminary  
interrogation at 18 Bde HQ.

Preamble. PsW were interrogated separately as above, then went through  
further interrogation after reaching Div cage. All are in a very weak  
condition with the exception of No. 55. All are ill. No. 57 is wounded  
through the hand. It is considered that all were truthful and, having  
a grudge, were willing to tell all they knew.

None of the PsW had had any food for 3, 4 or 5 days.

Movements. All had fought in the mountains and had been evacuated to hosp  
with single exception of No. 56.

From the hospital in GIRUWA the PsW had been sent to the pocket by  
an Easterly route, skirting our fwd posns at the rd block, often having  
to wade through marshy ground up to their thighs.

Enemy Intentions. All confirmed the story that in the evening of the  
12 Jan 43 they had the orders to withdraw. The fit were to take all the  
arms and amm they could with them, the sick could either get back to hosp  
at GIRUWA, stay and fight it out or fend for themselves in any way  
possible.

These orders, according to one PW only, came from Regt HQ, the others  
all received their orders from neighbours.

Not one could give definite infm as to where the fit were to with-  
draw to, nor could one tell by which route.

The fit withdrew the same evening - 12 Jan 43.

Capture. No. 53 captured by 163 US Regt early morning 14 Jan 43 North of  
pocket, walking along rd towards GIRUWA.

Nos. 54 - 57 by 18 Bde in attack on South of pocket, morning 14 Jan.  
Nos. 54 and 55 were lying in trench ill; No. 56 went to look for rations,  
found supply personnel gone, came back to post and found personnel gone  
again, then was captured; No. 57 - wounded and captured.

Own units - Orgzn. No division into bns, coys, etc - all mixed and given  
posts.

Strength. Not one could give a reliable strength estimate, but one in  
consultation with another, suggested that the fit withdrawn numbered about  
200. The sick, wounded and those too weak to walk were thought to be in  
the neighbourhood of 50 (PsW all belong to this group).

Armament. Plenty of LMGs, several HMGs, had a few mortars and grenade  
throwers. 1 PW, No. 55, buried HMG and 2,400 rounds. Accounts vary as to  
guns, - two said they had no arty - the remaining three said they had two  
high-angle guns, one of which had been knocked out by our mortars or arty,  
the other they used as a flat-trajectory gun for attacking our tanks.

They guessed the calibre as 10 cm (4") but showed a circle by hand of  
about 3". One gun reported as taken back by retreating tps.

Amn. Fit men 120-150 rds per man. No. 55 buried 2,400 rds with 1 HMG.

Casualties. Heavy through mortar and arty fire.

Reinfts. Promised but not received. Only reinfts were returned men from  
hosp in GIRUWA. Most reinfts in Nov. None knew of any tps West of GONA.

Strengths in GIRUWA Area. Unknown, but 3 PsW suggested hosp accommodation  
1000 - 2000, and that no fit men in that area. No knowledge of defences  
in that area. 1 PW states AA gun near hosp in GIRUWA, but couldn't give  
further locati on.



Commander. Regtl Comd was Lt-Col TSUKAMOTO late Comd 1 Bn 144 Regt.

The Col's ancestry was not worth enquiring into according to Psw, it was known. He kept rice for himself, took cigarettes from soldiers, saying "Enlisted men should not smoke", and capped everything by moving out of the pocket with his HQ and leaving them to fend for themselves.

Communications. Had a runner connection with GIRUWA. Used to be a wireless (gasoline engine operated) which communicated with GIRUWA and RABAU, but gasoline ran out and in any case wireless was knocked out by mortar fire.

Defences in GIRUWA Area - Unknown.

Supplies. Psw had had nothing to eat for 3, 4 or 5 days. They state the same conditions exist in the GIRUWA area. The last supplies received in the GIRUWA area were by plane, when 6 tons of rice was twice dropped, once on 20 Dec, the other time being 24 Dec.

Dumps. A big dump is situated about 100 yds to the rear of the hospital (GONA REVISED 199276) towards the beach, but supplies exhausted.

Morale. Owing to lack of food and treatment of Co, to promise of reinforcements which never came, and heavy casualties and much sickness, Psw were completely demoralised. It is very rarely that one would hear such a tirade against a CO as was indulged in by PW 54, and to a lesser degree by 2 or 3 of the others.

Not one knew of the fall of BUNA, and only two knew of our attack on 12 Jan.



K A P O      4 161

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS CAPTURED 18 HDE 14 JAN 43

Translated by Sgt OGAWA H.  
15 Jan 43.

1. Calling cards
2. Malay language. TOMI No. 8125 Butai Medic. L/Cpl TANAKA.
3. Letter. Addressed to - KITAHARA, Shinichi, South China Exp Force. Nami No. 8125 Unit, Nakamura Tai HQ. Addressed from - Nakayama, Senji, City of Osaka.
4. Enlisted mens casualty book. Dates 29 Aug - 17 Oct.
5. Postal Savings. Owner - MATSUBURA, Kazuo, Aichi Ken.
6. Military postal savings. Owner - YAMAMOTO, Kaoru. Uye 3417 Butai, Okazaki Tai.
7. Paybook. YAMAMOTO, Kaoru. 1st Class Pte. Kusunose Butai, Chi Tai. Chi No. 119.
8. Plan for guards of HQ. OIF of the day Capt HAYASHI.
9. Military sketch of IORIBAIWA vicinity of No. 3 Bn - 18 Sep.

LOOSE SHEETS

1. KAYEHARA, Asaichi. Sup Pte. French-Indo Exp Force, Oka No. 9726 Butai, Takagi Tai.  
Philippine Koi Oki No. 5169 Butai (Kanda Tai) Ono Tai.  
Kodann Butai, Soratani Tai, No. 3 Han (group).
2. Letter - Kaneshige, Shuichi. Koi 5169 Butai, Tomono Butai.
3. Postcard. Kaneshige, Shuichi. Philippine Exp Force, Koi No. 5169 Butai, Kanda Tai.
4. Envelope. Kikuchi, Suyeo. 2nd Class Pte. Conscript reserve. 41st Inf Regt. No. 6 Coy.
5. Envelope. WO KANESHIGE, No. 7 Coy HQ.  
Coy organization -  
Comd      1st Lieut KANDA, Ketuizo  
1st Pl     2nd Lieut MITOGAWA, Noboru  
2nd pl    WO KANESHIGE, Shuichi  
3rd Pl    Sgt IIE, Masao.
6. Envelope. Offer certificate. Date 2 Aug 1942. No. 7 Coy, Mitogawa Noboru - 2nd Lieut, 41 Inf Regt.  
Address of Divisional District - Hiroshima Div (5th Div) (TN - personal history background).



Exacts :-

- 1 Jan - First time to welcome New Year in the trenches. Cooked 3 G5 (1.1/3 pints) rice and enemy's canned meat. Quite a few hit by the mortar and arty fire.
- 2 Jan - Quite a few hit last night. For breakfast cooked the bird shot last night as a soup and put sardine in it. Supper cooked banana.
- 3 Jan - Coming of mortar and arty shells from early in the morning. Can not resist them with our force. If I move, I get hungry. There is news that reinfts landed.
- 4 Jan - Reinfnts to land on the 10th. News brought by the runner MORI. At night hearing the arty fire every 30 minutes.
- 5 Jan - Enemy patrol in our bn. Went after them but useless.
- 6 Jan - The mortar and arty fire is getting close now. could hear the the explosions of hand grenades and firing of rifles in the surroundings.
- 1 G5 (1 pt) of rice for two days ration now.
- 7 Jan - Arty firing from the front. Hungry and no one tries to move. Im-possible to attack and advance. There is news that friendly tps landed.
- 8 Jan - Distributed a few rations from No.5 Coy.
- 9 Jan - No change. Rice once a day is impossible.
- 10 Jan - Enemy penetrated into the posn in the afternoon.



10 2 16/11

ENEMY INFORMATION REVIEW NO. 42  
For 24 hrs to 1800L/11

NEW GUINEA

KUMUSI. At approx 1030L/10 one mile north of KUMUSI Mouth recce A/C sighted a green flag flying from pole and many natives in vicinity. Although the flag is not known it does not necessarily indicate enemy activity as natives use pieces of coloured material picked up as decoration and may have put it on a pole.

SALAMAUA. Patrol which visited DUALI between 12-29 Dec reports safe to assume Japs at SALAMAUA and MUBO are short of food due to complete lack of shipping over the last 2 months, and they have ordered all native villages under control to supply as much native food as possible. Report also states no reinforcements have arrived for some time, the garrison at both SALAMAUA and MUBO consisting of original tps landed in Mar 42. There has been no enemy infiltration from BUNA area and the Japs do NOT occupy any coastal villages from LOBUI to WARIA River but pay infrequent visits by schooner to obtain co-operation of the coastal natives for obtaining food and to recover cloth stolen from the SALAMAUA stores. One such patrol was made 14 Dec.

LAE. Barge activity between LAE and LABU since the enemy convoy arrived has been considerable. It is probable that the Japs are using carriers to carry stores from LABU to SALAMAUA to relieve the shortage mentioned above as tpt by sea would be vulnerable to our air attack. Reliable infm states the LABU natives are pro Allies, who would not willingly assist the transportation of such stores.

The tpt which was beached at LAE was bombed and fired during 10 Jan but well used tracksto the vessel indicate the stores were off loaded. As the stores on the foreshore were bombed, strafed and also fired, and much debris was seen on the beach it is probable that a great quantity was damaged.

CAPE WARD-HUNT. One u/1 vessel was sighted by our A/C 50 miles ENE of CAPE bearing 266 degrees at 15 knots and was attacked with no results. The vessel was heading in the direction of MOROBE and may have some connection with the native report of visits to MAMBARE River/area. There is also the possibility of some connection between this report and the report of a sub crash diving at the mouth of MAMBARE River on 17 Dec.

MERAUKE. At 1409L/9 an enemy float plane attacked a ship in MERAUKE, but caused no damage or casualties. This is the 6th attack in recent weeks.

AMBOGA AREA. Statements made by two PSW captured near WADI give the following infm :-

(a) A portion of YAZAWA BUTAI remnants crossed KUMUSI near ARIGUTU, and eventually reached coast between GONA and AMBOGA. (One PW stated 600, most unarmed, in this party but this number considered greatly exaggerated). A smaller portion of YAZAWA went on towards KUMUSI mouth. Gen HORII and most of his staff drowned when raft capsized during this movement.

(b) Landing night 1/2 Dec brought only 300 tps of YAMAGATA BUTAI incl Maj-Gen YAMAGATA. These joined YAZAWA remnants in AMBOGA area.

(c) Night 13/14 Dec about 500 tps of YAMAGATA BUTAI (and a small det of rear details of YAZAWA) were landed in general MAMBARE area. Destroyers forced to leave before landing completed. Numerous casualties caused by strafing. Rice and amm were contained in sealed petrol drums dropped overboard by destroyers. (Drums joined together with straw ropes). Our strafing destroyed nearly all these drum "rafts" in water, and most of what was got ashore destroyed by strafing following day. After landing, about 100 (incl 50 sick and wounded) were left at MAMBARE, while remaining 400 went southward along coast towards BUNA by MLCs, which had been hidden near landing point. These forces joined those in AMBOGA River area. Total strength of force then in that area NOT clear, but possibly more than 700.

(d) On 30 Dec Maj-Gen YAMAGATA with a force (stated to be 500 strong) moved from AMBOGA area to GIRUA. He was still there on 6 Jan, according to.



2.

(e). Remaining in AMBOGA area on 6 Jan was a force possibly 300 strong (incl sick and wounded). They are short of amm and food, and have only 4 MGs and rifles. Have a large army W/T set in jungle near beach, NOT in a dugout. PW did not know of any land line to GIRUA. Tps in this area did NOT on 6 Jan, know that BUNA had fallen. They may also have been fed false propaganda of strengths in SANANANDA sector as one PW stated that there were 5/6000 fit tps there and about 3000 in hosp at GIRUWA.

GENERAL

W/T ACTIVITY. Messages from RABAUL and the new station thought to be connected with the LAE convoy are still being passed to the ex BUNA sta for onward transmission to the BAKUMBARI sta. As no traffic is observed between the two latter stas alternative suggestions to a submarine cable connecting them might be that the comd formerly using the BAKUMBARI set is now in the SANANANDA area and messages are being passed to the ex BUNA sta for him addressed as previously. Although PW states there was an army set at BAKUMBARI on 6 Jan there is no proof it was operating and may have become unserviceable due to our air attacks.



4871

INTERROGATION OF CHIBA, ATSUMARU, JAPANESE PRISONER CAPTURED BY WARREN FORCE  
2 JANUARY, 1943.

NAME OF P/W	CHIBA, Atsumaru.
SERIAL NO	P/W has no serial no. Reason: Reenforcement personnel do not have serial numbers, according to the P/W's statement.
AGE	24
RESIDENCE	KOCHI CITY, KOCHI PREFECTURE, JAPAN.
GRADE	Private First Class.
BRANCH OF SERVICE	Infantry.
UNIT	144th Regt. Attached to Regt'l Hqs.
WHERE CAPTURED	East of GIROPA PT. along the road running between BUNA MISSION and the old strip in a trench in the coconut grove along the shore.
HOW CAPTURED	The prisoner ran away from his CP and was asleep in a trench when captured. He did not resist capture.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FACTUAL SUMMARY OF THE P/W'S STATEMENTS

MILITARY HISTORY AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.

The P/W was conscripted into the army July, 1941, at ASAKURA VILLAGE, 144th Regt'l. Hqs., KOCHI CITY, JAPAN. He was a member of a reenforcement unit.

He came from RABAUL (where there were 1000 reinforcements of the 144th Regt.) with Col. YAMAMOTO, who brought with him 300 of these reinforcements for the KUSUNOSE UNIT (144th Regt.). Col. YAMAMOTO took over the command of the 144th because Col KUSUNOSE became ill and was sent out of the BUNA area. The remnants of the original KUSUNOSE UNIT, the TSUKAMOTO UNIT, the TOMITA UNIT, and the YOKOYAMA UNIT (Engineers) are located at the second junction of the road leading inland from SANANANDA. Although the remnants of the KUSUNOSE UNIT are theoretically under the command of Col YAMAMOTO, Col YOKOYAMA is actually in command of the area at the road junction. Col YAMAMOTO received orders to change his original plans (which were to replace Col KUSUNOSE in the area at the road junction), and reinforce the BUNA area with his 300 men.

The troops in the area at the road junction out of SANANANDA, according to the P/W's statement, is under the command of Col YOKOYAMA. There are Engineer and Transport Troops along the road leading out from SANANANDA.

The YASADA Unit (Navy) and the 3d Bn. of the 229th and the 144th Regt. are more or less under separate commands at BUNA. There is a regt'l. CP and a Bn. CP existing separately; Col YAMAMOTO is in command of the Regt'l. CP and Major KIMMOTSU in command at the Bn. CP. The entire BUNA defense area was more or less under the command of Col YAMAMOTO, because he was the senior officer there.

The 144th, the KUSUNOSE Regt., was originally detailed to go to GUAM. However, due to the lack of men in New Guinea, they had to come here. The 2nd Bn of the 144th landed at LAE in May or June, 1942, then returned to RABAUL, and came back to BUNA, landing at BASABUA.

P/W stated that the TSUKIOKA UNIT was from the SASEBO NAVAL BASE, and that the YASUDA UNIT was from the YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE.

As far as the P/W's knowledge of the term HEIDAN is concerned, he regards it as a unit somewhat similar to the Brigade in size.



P/W stated that the NANKAI SHITAI (South Seas Detachment) was the original unit ordered to the New Guinea area. This unit, under the command of a Lt. General, was of an independent nature. It was composed of one complete regiment, namely the KUSUNOSE, under the 11th Division. The KUSUNOSE Unit would roughly correspond to our Task Force, composed of the following branches of service: infantry, artillery, mountain artillery, cavalry (used in GUAM), engineers, antiaircraft artillery, and field hospital.

The P/W stated that the 144th Regt. was known, until quite recently, as the TATE 8417 Unit; now, it is simply called the 37 Unit. According to the P/W, the SEIBU 34 Unit, which is a regt., is now stationed in central China.

The P/W stated that the wounded personnel were evacuated by motor launches to the hospital at GIRUWA, but, since they do not have these motor launches now, they have not been evacuated recently.

#### STRENGTH OF JAPANESE FORCES.

According to the P/W's statement, there were 210 men between GIROPA PT. and STRIP PT. Area; 150 of which were army personnel and 60 of which were Navy personnel. In the BUNA MISSION Area are 190; 150 of which were army personnel and 40 of which were navy personnel.

#### ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUN STRENGTH.

The P/W stated that there were two mountain guns and two Bn guns; out of these four, there were three definitely out of commission. They used two rapid-firing guns against our tanks, but they were immediately put out of action. The P/W estimates that there are two to three mountain guns along the coast approximately half way between BUNA and SANANANDA.

P/W stated that an Infantry Regt. has three heavy machine guns, per MG company, and one light machine gun per squad. There are four squads per platoon, therefore, there are four light machine guns per platoon.

#### RATIONS AND SUPPLIES.

The P/W stated that they were receiving two rice balls per day, but recently, they had been receiving only one per day. They did have a certain amount of hardtacks, but evidently these were to be reserved for extreme emergencies, because they were reprimanded by their officers when they were discovered eating these.

According to the P/W, each individual in the units in the immediate vicinity of his unit had 200 rounds of rifle ammunition. There were two to three hundred rds of ammunition per light machine gun. There was a small supply of heavy machine gun ammunition, but these heavy machine guns had been put out of commission.

The P/W stated that a limited amount of supplies and ammunition had been dropped by aeroplanes. Supplies were also landed by submarines at night.

#### MORALE.

The P/W stated that there were some among them who were willing to give up. Four or five members of the Navy unit had already deserted before the P/W escaped. The P/W had planned to escape many days ago.

According to the P/W, the situation being what it was, the propaganda leaflets which were dropped upon the enemy lines had impressed them to a certain extent; however, had the progress of the battle been in their favor, they would have completely ignored them.

Two outstanding reasons for the deterioration of the morale, aside from the lack of provisions, was (1) the non-arrival of promised reinforcements, and (2) disunity of command which was the cause of confusion and delay. The



Regt'l. and Bn CP's existing separately under different commanders naturally caused friction between the two.

The P/W stated that among artillery fire, machine gun fire, mortar fire, and bombing, that the mortar fire was most damaging, especially around the trenches. However, these were no comparison to the terrific effect of the tank attack.

The P/W stated that they had no definite plans for evacuation, and that they had been ordered to hold Buna to the end.

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NOTE: This P/W stated that Major General HORII had drowned while crossing the KUMUSI River.



WARREN  
FOKSE

JPS  
8/1

INTERROGATION OF FUSE, IWATARO - CAPTURED JAPANESE PRISONER, JANUARY  
4, 1943

Name of P/W	FUSE, IWATARO
Age	40
Residence	GUMMA PREFECTURE
Grade	
Branch of Service	Laborer
Unit	15th Construction Unit (Navy)
Where Captured	East of Entrance Creek, north of Government Gardens.
How Captured	Ran away from unit. Did not resist capture.

The following information is a Factual Summary of P/W's Statements

Military History

On July 20, 1942, the P/W left YOKOSUKA with 1800 other Japanese laborers some of whom were workers taken in by the government and some who volunteered for this work. All of these workers were separated, some going to MILNE BAY, some to TRUK Island, some to KUAZERI Island, and some to OTORI Island. The P/W went to TRUK Island landing there July 29. After staying there for four days, 170 of them were attached to the 15th Construction Unit and 70 of them to the 10th Construction Unit. On August 2, they left TRUK Island landing at RABAUL on August 5. There they were issued various equipment such as clothes, shoes, raincoat, knapsack, mess kit and canteen etc. With 102 Japanese laborers (who were section leaders), 500 Formosan laborers and 1500 Korean laborers, they left Rabaul August 11, reaching BASABUA on August 13. The 500 Formosan laborers were attached to the Army Units at BASABUA and the remainder of the group went to BUNA on the 16th. The 14th Construction Unit had been detailed to construct the airfield at BUNA, and the 15th Construction Unit were to aid them for ten days in the work. On August 28, 230 men of the 15th Construction were ordered to remain in BUNA while the remainder of the Unit was to gradually return to GIRUWA, there to construct a road to MORESBY. Out of the 230 remaining in BUNA 42 were Japanese and the rest were Koreans. The 15th Construction Unit is under the command of Navy Technician ATSUSHI (corresponding to the rank of an officer), who moved his headquarters from BUNA to GIRUWA in the latter part of September. Technician SAKI was in command of the 15th Construction Unit at BUNA, however ATSUSHI is in complete command of the 15th Construction. The P/W was a runner for the HQ of Colonel YASUDA to the 15th Construction Unit HQ.

SAKAI

Disposition of Troops

On about the 18th of November, the YASUDA Unit came over from the area around the island to the area between the two strips because of the lack of troops there. The Intendance (Finance) took over the defense of the area around the island. The 3rd Battalion of the 229 Regiment took over the area north of the strip to the Cape Endaiadere area.



### Strength of Japanese Forces

The strength of the YASUDA BUTAI is about 350-360 plus about 100 men who were remnants of the TSUKIOKA Unit. There were about 45 men from the YASUDA Unit as guards for the 15th Construction Unit. On November 18, KIMMOTSU and YAMAMOTO brought with them 800 men from GIRUWA. In the Anti-aircraft Unit which was an independent unit, there were 120 men. The total number of men including both the army and navy personnel would be roughly about 1380 men. This figure would not include the number of workers in the construction units. There were about 230 men in the 15th Construction and about 150 in the 14th Construction which would add up to a total of about 380. The original strength of the NANKAI SHITAI (South Seas Detachment) was about 5000-6000, but of these over half are killed, wounded or sick. The remainder of the NANKAI SHITAI is at GIRUWA. Lieut. General UMEZU whose HQ is at RABAUL is the commander of the OKI SHUDAN (Group). The YAMAGATA HEIDAN is a part of the OKI SHUDAN and consists of about 1500 men. These men landed at GIRUWA on or about December 1. In the YAMAGATA HEIDAN has infantry units, tank destroyer units, and HMG units. The P/W estimates that there were only about 70 men left in the BUNA Area.

### Artillery and Machine Gun Strength.

There were 3 mountain guns, 2 battalion guns, one navy rapid-fire gun and 3 anti-aircraft guns. There were two 13mm automatic guns and two 25mm guns. These were all navy guns. They used magnetic bombs and molotov cocktails against tanks. The rapid-fire guns which they used against tanks were almost immediately put out of commission. The P/W states that most of these guns were destroyed by mortar fire.

### Rations and Supplies.

The P/W stated that they received 3 rice balls a day, and although there was a supply of food, they were placed on decreased rations to make the supply last over a long period of time. Provisions were dropped twice by planes, and submarines were utilized on few occasions to provide supplies which were landed at GIRUWA at night. The P/W stated that each individual soldier had about 200 rounds of ammunition, but he stated that there wasn't a sufficient amount of ammunition. They were told not to fire much until the 20th of December. Most of the machine guns were damaged, but ammunition for these was greatly limited.

### Morale.

There were several others beside the P/W who planned to escape. The P/W with definite intention of being captured remained in the area where he was captured. When our troops approached, he put up his hands and yelled "JAPAN" and submitted to capture. The P/W did not pay any attention to the propaganda leaflets at first, but later he did take notice of them and seriously considered their contents. The P/W stated that the soldiers regarded these leaflets with sarcasm. The P/W thought that a Chinese had written these leaflets. The P/W stated that he was giving all this information because he had no intentions of ever returning to Japan. The morale of the Japanese troops were high when they received word



Morale (Cont'd).

reinforcements were on the way and especially when the Emperor praised them for their brave stand. The commander of the combined Fleet also promised them naval aid and 30 planes a day from RABAUL to aid in the Buna Area. However, when none of these promises materialized the general morale of the troops deteriorated greatly.

Other Information.

The P/W stated that artillery fire and mortar fire were the most damaging. Aerial bombing was poor and ineffective. They received almost no casualties from bombings and from machine gun and rifle fire. The P/W stated that when American soldiers attack, they run without crouching, thereby presenting a large target, and in hand to hand combat, American troops were inferior. The rifle fire of the American troops tend to be too high. P/W stated that 700 troops were on their way to BUNA, and that if BUNA should have held out for another week, these troops would have come to reinforce them. The P/W stated that natives brought in four white prisoners one of whom was a woman. These four were beheaded. There were two American prisoners who were captured recently, and these were beheaded. The P/W stated that four nights ago, they evacuated prisoners by motor launches to SIRUWA. Only the severely wounded were evacuated, the more able-bodied men being left behind so that they could at least fire a rifle.

S/Sgt. S. Ishio

SGT. K. YAMADA

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REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF PW

WARREN  
FORCE

NAME           MOCKLING, JOHN  
BORN            CANTON, CHINA  
DATE            March, 1924

PW was impressed at Hongkong January, 1942, while attending accounting school (Queens Reign School). Was captured in Buna Mission January 2, 1943.

PW was in Hongkong in January, 1942, when the Japanese captured it. His family lived there and his father was a merchant. He did not attempt to escape and was taken in by the Japanese and with 12 others was impressed as a coolie. As to details and conditions of his employment he knew very little except that he was to be paid 8 yen for each 10 days service. During the latter part of January 1942, he and the other coolies impressed were taken by boat to Sumatra. His principle duties were to cook rice and make up rice balls for the Japanese troops. He remained in Sumatra for about 3 months and at Batavia about 3 months. After this time he was transported in a convoy of Japanese troops which he estimated at approximately 13,000 to Rabaul. The trip he stated consumed about 20 days before they reached Rabaul. He described Rabaul as a circular harbor containing many ships, some aeroplanes, and considerable troops. He stayed in Rabaul approximately 3 weeks when he together with approximately 44 other Chinese were loaded on 3 ships which he describes as probably destroyers, and sent to New Guinea. This force landed at New Guinea on or about 18th of November, 1942. This force, he estimated, contained 750 in all, among these the 45 Chinese coolies. He identifies the following Japanese officers as being a part of this force: Major Kimmotsu, Captains Matsuo, Kusakabe, and Iwabori. This force was transported from Basabua to the Buna area by launches and barges and the coolies were compelled to walk. He doesn't speak or understand Japanese very well -- a few general words -- several dozen words about the best he can do. During the time he was in the Buna area he was located in Buna Mission itself. He stated that all the Chinese were employed as cooks to cook rice and make rice balls, that they were kept under constant surveillance during the daytime and worked only during the night, that the rations for the Japanese troops was 4 rice balls a day flavored with soya sauce, but the coolies received only one rice ball with some sauce, that the Japanese did not trust them and abused and mistreated them. If they did not understand what to do they were promptly slapped about. He received no pay since the time he was in Sumatra. As to the strength of the Japanese forces, he stated that on December 30, 1942, he cooked up 2000 rice balls, which on the bases of 4 per Japanese soldier would account for 500 Japanese troops in the area at that time. On New Years eve he observed that a group of Japanese officers visited Major Kimmotsu and was told that the officers together with about 200 troops attempted to swim from Buna Mission to Giruwa and just as they went into the water, artillery fire came down on them and all the officers and about 100 soldiers returned to the Mission. He stated that the artillery and mortar fire placed upon the Mission was very effective and the Japanese suffered heavily, that about one-half of the coolies had been killed prior to the attack on Jan 2, that the Koreans had been utilized solely as laborers to do heavy work and so far as he knew they were not permitted to handle fire arms. About January 1st



when he realized the situation was critical he stated that he advised his Chinese friends that he would surrender and tell the Americans that he was a Chinese and he left that he would be able to save the living. In the final assault he shouted to the Americans that he was a Chinese but they did not hear him until a few grenades had landed in their midst from which he received a wound in the left hand. After that he called out to them and announced to them that he was a Chinese and the Americans took him and about 12 more of his countrymen prisoners. He stated that prior to their arrival here there was a Naval detachment in the area together with some Korean labor troops.

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INTERROGATION OF MATSUOKA, RYOJU, CAPTURED JAPANESE PRISONER, 3 JANUARY, 1943  
URBANA FORCES

Name of P/W	MATSUOKA, RYOJU
Serial No.	P/W had lost his dogtag sometime ago, he thought his serial No. was vaguely # 153.
Age	21. Born 3 June, 1921.
Residence	USHIGOME WARD, TOKYO CITY, JAPAN.
Grade	PFC
Branch of Service	Mountain Artillery.
Where Captured	On the beach between TARAKENA and SAWORI VILLAGE.
How Captured	The P/W swam from GIROPA PT. TO THE reef and returned to the beach, where he was chased. He attempted to escape capture by swimming away, but was creased on the left rear of the head and taken.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS A FACTUAL SUMMARY OF THE P/W'S STATEMENTS.

MILITARY HISTORY AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.

The P/W was born and raised in Tokyo City, Japan. He attended the Tokyo City Industrial School (Tykyo Furitsu Kogyo Gakko) to study radio. At the time of his conscription, winter 1941, he was working in MANCHURIA in the radio-telephone company, which system was connected between HARSIN and TOKYO. The P/W was conscripted into the regiment at NAGOYA CITY, because his paternal family records were kept in AICHI Prefecture (within which, said city and regiment are located). P/W stated that he remained at the NAGOYA Regt. for but a few days, and was sent out without any training. The ship on which he was, touched at RABAU for a day and landed at BASA at the end of November, 1942. The P/W remained at BASA a few days and was sent on to BUNA MISSION. Here he was a member of the SHIIKI Mountain Arty. battery as an ammunition carrier. This battery was attached to the YASUDA UNIT under the command of Colonel YASUDA. The P/W stated that a short time ago, when all of the mountain guns in his battery had been put out of commission, he was an ammunition carrier for an infantry heavy machine gun unit within the YASUDA UNIT. He remained in this capacity until the last heavy machine gun of the unit was knocked out a few days ago. Then he became a runner for a lesser headquarters, from whence he was ordered to swim to GIRUWA on the night of 1 Jan., 1943. He began his swim to GIRUWA at dawn 2 Jan., 1943, and was captured that afternoon about 1500.

The P/W stated that the YAMAGATA HEIDAN had landed at GIRUWA some time ago. And the troops in the BUNAMISSION Area expected reinforcements from this unit, which were not forthcoming. The P/W further stated that he did not know the strength of the Navy Special Landing Force at BUNA MISSION, but he did know that personnel of that unit existed there.

The P/W added that the sick and wounded were being cared for at a hospital in the BUNA MISSION area shortly before his departure from that area. Until that time, they had been evacuated somewhere by motor boats with RABAU as their final objective.



STRENGTH OF JAPANESE FORCES - ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUN.

The P/W was very vague about units and their strength. According to the P/W his mountain artillery unit consisted of but one battery of two mountain guns. The P/W stated that he thought the YAMAGATA HEIDAN which was in GIRUWA consisted of two brigades. The P/W knew of only the one heavy machine gun company to which he was attached for a few days.

RATIONS AND SUPPLIES.

The P/W stated that they had an ample supply of rice, however, they had not been able to cook it because of our artillery fire. Furthermore, the supply of soy bean powder which they sprinkled on their rice was depleted. The enemy troops had no fish, pickles, or hardtack. According to the P/W, machine gun ammunition was very scarce, although he had helped to bury a few boxes of it when the last heavy machine gun broke down. There was less than 100 rounds of rifle ammo per man; he had but 30 rounds with him just before he jumped into the sea to swim away from BUNA VILLAGE.

MORALE.

The P/W stated that his commanding officer had definitely ordered him to swim to GIRUWA on the night of 1 Jan., 1943, because there was no more hope of holding BUNA MISSION. The P/W was to contact other troops at GIRUWA to be taken elsewhere to a zone of safety. According to the P/W, our propaganda leaflets were not a laughing matter; the leaflets made them angry and had the opposite effect from what he thought they were originally intended. Among all of our weapons, the P/W stated that their effectiveness upon them were in the following order: (1) Air-plane bombings, (2) mortars, (3) tanks, (4) artillery. The P/W stated that he was determined to die because he did not wish to be a P/W and that he could no longer face his family or friends in Japan. He further stated that he would kill the enemy radio operator if he should transmit news of his capture by the Americans to his family. The P/W also stated that he intended to take his own life before he could be sent back further behind our lines.

The P/W stated that the commodity situation and abundance of articles of daily necessity in Japan proper has increased since the beginning of the present war. He credited this to the improvement of the rationing system in Japan, and the increase in commodities from the additional raw materials taken from conquered territories; namely, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. The P/W added that the commodity situation in Japan was serious just prior to the beginning of this war.

S/Sgt. A. K. Ushiro

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY 18 BDE 14 JAN 43

Includes a satchel marked - FRANCISCO S HORTILLAS, ABCCADO.  
Branded -

RIN	?
HERMANO	?
MANILA	

gps  
grad ✓  
10

4 16/1

- Diary. Owner - YUKITOMO, MASAJI, 1st Class Pte.  
Unit - KODAMA Tai, YANAGIGAWA Tai.  
Coy Comd - YANAGIGAWA, Sawao.

Extracts :-

- 4 Dec - Every day same. Sup Pte MORIKAWA killed in action several days ago. Sup Pte KIRAYAMA evacuated to the rear because of illness. I have a fever but no reliefs are coming and I must stand it.
- 5 Dec - Heard from Sup Pte NAKAJI that according to the report of the patrols saying Bde has assembled in GIRUWA so now it is a moment of resistance
- 7 Dec - From early in the morning the enemy shells are flying over. The enemy crossed the river 100 m wide to attack and their and our firing of rifles and machine guns (light) are terrific. "Oh God it is your protection over me that I am serving for the Country until now".
- 9 Dec - Enemy planes discovered our posn and fiercely bombed and strafed us. Because of God's protection over me none has fallen near me. It is to be regretted that dead bodies are to be found at Coy HQ.
- 10 Dec - Day has passed without bombing by the enemy planes.
- 11 Dec - Every day thinking of the homeland. Weather now is about the same as in Japan, become homesick. General attack has been planned on 15th according to the story and 1 bde has landed. Waiting now, is it today or is it tomorrow.
- 12 Dec - 1st year soldier wounded by mortar shell fragment. From today 200 (2/3 pint) of rice will be issued per day. Cannot sleep because of raging enemy arty fire.
- 13 Dec - Tonight the bde will land say rumours and I am happily waiting in the trench, but cannot depend upon it much.
- 14 Dec - The unit does not land and come. Must be a propoganda again. In trouble because of no rations and non arrival of the unit.
- 15 Dec - The 1 bde has landed according to the rumours. It is not a confirmed report. The reliefs do not come for us and enemy arty and mortar firing is fierce. In the Care of God I am active and lively.
- 16 Dec - Enemy arty firing from early in the morning. Raining and trench is filled with water. The sufferings can not be told.
- 17 Dec - I am grateful toward God that I am still living. 100 5 shaku (5/8 pint) of rice a day doesn't fill my stomach and hunger. This is for Country's cause that I am strongly resisting. Relieving unit does not come.
- 19 Dec - 1/3 pint of rice a week from now for a week, and the body grows too weak to do a days fighting. Impossible to walk and I am sure that I am getting thin.
- 20 Dec - 19th and 20th fierce enemy attack. HIROKAWA section in danger and retreated. The result of the battle 7 Chekko MG, 3 Tommy Guns, and 6 dead enemies. Several men killed in action for friendly tps (by hand grenades). No difference in our 7 YA Tai.
- 22 Dec - Quiet today. A story that tomorrow comd of TOSHI (JU) unit Maj-Gen will advance to (2 ri (4 mls) to the front) SOPUTA and appear in the rear of the enemy. Everyone is beginning to be lively.
- 23 Dec - Yesterdays story was propoganda. We did not know it was going to be as long a war as this.
- 1 Jan 43 - Welcomed the New Year in the trench with the comrades.
- 2-3 Jan - Quiet today. Finally have diarrhoea. I am in a way a lively one but cannot stand on my feet.
- 4 Jan - Comrade Sup Pte TEZIMA, Akira killed in action. Sup Pte Nakaji wounded in stomach, hand and leg.

- Diary - Owner unknown. Dates 29 Nov 1940 - 15 Nov 1942. Unit - OKI 5125. Landed in NEW GUINEA 15 Nov 1942.

- Diary - owner - MUKAI, Sudio. Unit - Western 36 Butai, Arai Tai. Dates 23 Nov - 2 Oct 42.

- Diary - Owner - KATO, Akira. Rank ?. Unit ?. Dates 2 Sep 42 to 10 Jan 43.



7. ~~Un~~listed men's promotion list. (TM - No date given or unit)

8. Discharge papers for patients, 41st Inf Regt No.7 Coy.

8 Oct 42	-	Hospital No 67,	L of C Hospital.		
20 Jul 42	"	No. 116,	" " "	"	"
22 "	"	" "	" " "	"	"
2 Aug 42	"	" "	" " "	"	"
26 May 42		Hospital KARARANPUHU No. 93	Loof C Hosp.		

9. Correction list for firing used out in the firing range. Date 0830 hrs 1 Mar 1941.

10. Diary - Probational officer OONO, Takeo. Dates 23 May to 22 Aug.